WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing, “Arms Race 2.0.” In her remarks, Ranking Member Shaheen underscored the need for a strong commitment to arms control as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran continue to up the nuclear ante. She also noted the need for America to bolster and honor its commitments to increase their legitimacy and maintain deterrence. Witnesses included Marshall Billingslea, a Senior Fellow the Hudson Institute and Former Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control at the Department of State, and Rose Gottemoeller, a Fellow at Stanford University and Former Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the Department of State.
You can watch her opening remarks here.
“This hearing comes at a moment when nuclear risks are rising on several fronts,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “Russia is modernizing its arsenal with unconventional delivery vehicles. China is seeking to triple its warheads over the next ten years. North Korea and Iran continue to present a dangerous threat.”
Ranking Member Shaheen highlighted the bipartisan sentiments behind strong U.S. arms control, noting the successes that arms control initiatives have had in safeguarding American interests.
“And, these challenges are converging as the New START treaty—the last legal restriction on Russian nuclear weapons—is about to expire. Across both parties, there are leaders who recognize the gravity of this moment. That includes President Trump, who has a long track record of concern about nuclear war. Despite his recent comments, he called nuclear war the “ultimate catastrophe” as far back as 1990,” Ranking Member Shaheen said. “The only option with a track record of success in reducing these risks has been arms control. We faced more than 40,000 Russian nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War and today that number has fallen to less than 2,000 deployed strategic warheads. Those reductions were not charity. They were hard-nosed strategic wins for the United States—limiting adversaries’ capabilities and increasing our visibility into their programs.”
Finally, the Ranking Member used the example of Ukraine agreeing to give up its nuclear weapons to push the need for strong bilateral nuclear limits in upholding nuclear deterrence.
“And none of this matters if America’s commitments are not believed. I think Ukraine is the clearest example of that. Some of us remember the Budapest Memorandum, I’m sure both of you do, when Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees. If we allow Russia to swallow sovereign Ukrainian territory, other nations are going to draw the obvious conclusion: they need nuclear weapons to be safe. That is a deterrence failure that we can’t afford,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “That is why we must continue pressing for bilateral nuclear limits, where doing so strengthens U.S. security, even in this period of heightened tension. This requires consistent attention and disciplined leadership.”
The Ranking Member’s remarks, as delivered, are below.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to both of our witnesses today, thank you both for being here.
This hearing comes at a moment when nuclear risks are rising on several fronts. Russia is modernizing its arsenal with unconventional delivery vehicles. China is seeking to triple its warheads over the next ten years. North Korea and Iran continue to present a dangerous threat.
And, these challenges are converging as the New START treaty—the last legal restriction on Russian nuclear weapons—is about to expire. Across both parties, there are leaders who recognize the gravity of this moment. That includes President Trump, who has a long track record of concern about nuclear war. Despite his recent comments, he called nuclear war the “ultimate catastrophe” as far back as 1990.
This year, as President Trump said, and I quote, “There’s no reason for us to be building brand new nuclear weapons, we already have so many.”
I think the real question is: how do we reduce the nuclear threat without handing strategic advantage to Russia or China? Restarting nuclear testing is not the answer, I believe. Simply building more weapons will only trigger another arms race and even the most expensive missile defense would fail to stop every warhead and destabilize the nuclear balance.
The only option with a track record of success in reducing this risk has been arms control. We faced more than 40,000 Russian nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War. Today that number has fallen to less than 2,000 deployed strategic warheads. Those reductions were not charity. They were hard-nosed strategic wins for the United States—limiting adversaries’ capabilities and increasing our visibility into their programs.
And they were achieved with leaders who, like Vladimir Putin today, could not be trusted. That’s why verification matters. Arms control, as you both know so well, is not based on trust, but on inspection that protects American interests. We would all sleep better if we were conducting the most advanced, intrusive inspections modern technology allows right now on Russian, Chinese and Iranian weapons programs.
So, I hope we will hear you both discuss how we can modernize those inspections, and how we can update our own nuclear forces for the challenges ahead. Because today’s nuclear environment includes AI-enabled systems, hypersonics and cyber threats—technologies that shrink decision time and magnify the risk of miscalculation.
And none of this matters if America’s commitments are not believed. I think Ukraine is the clearest example of that. Some of us remember the Budapest Memorandum—I’m sure both of you do—when Ukraine agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees. If we allow Russia to swallow sovereign Ukrainian territory, other nations are going to draw the obvious conclusion: they need nuclear weapons to be safe. That is a deterrence failure that we can’t afford.
That’s why we must continue pressing for bilateral nuclear limits, where doing so strengthens U.S. security, even in this period of heightened tension. This requires consistent attention and disciplined leadership.
I look forward to hearing from both of you your views on how we meet this challenge and what steps Congress should be thinking about.
Thank you.
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