WASHINGTON – Today, U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal outlining her vision for a bipartisan American foreign policy, continued engagement with allies and partners on trade and the military and competing with China on the global stage.
Her piece, “America Needs a Bipartisan China Strategy,” argues that the United States cannot defeat China with short-term politics or erratic trade wars, but through a sustained, bipartisan strategy rooted in long-term thinking and partnership with our allies. She warns that President Trump’s volatile approach has left the America less prepared to compete in the Indo-Pacific. Ranking Member Shaheen calls for a strategy that strengthens alliances, holds China accountable for aiding Russia and rebuilds U.S. global leadership.
“If we want to win the competition with China, we need to think well beyond the next election and even the next decade,” wrote Ranking Member Shaheen. “We need to rebuild a durable bipartisan consensus over how to approach the world’s most consequential relationship. That will require a plan that avoids the big swings we’ve seen in our China strategy the past two decades.”
“America’s messy, imperfect democracy is among its greatest strengths,” she continued. “But as traditions of bipartisanship have eroded, especially in foreign policy, our global position has weakened. Adversaries have taken note. Huge foreign-policy swings in recent years have confused and weakened allies, damaged complex trading relationships, and created opportunities for enemies to seize advantage in the resulting chaos."
CLICK HERE to read Ranking Member Shaheen’s op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. The text of her op-ed has also been provided below.
America Needs a Bipartisan China Strategy
Trump’s trade war isn’t working, but neither did previous administrations’ policy of accommodation.
As President Trump meets Xi Jinping in South Korea, I believe America’s China strategy needs a course correction—but not a knee-jerk reversion to a pre-Trump status quo. If we want to win the competition with China, we need to think well beyond the next election and even the next decade. We need to rebuild a durable bipartisan consensus over how to approach the world’s most consequential relationship. That will require a plan that avoids the big swings we’ve seen in our China strategy the past two decades.
For nine months Mr. Trump has waged a damaging and unsustainable trade war with China that is raising costs for American families. The war hasn’t rebalanced trade, reduced the export of Chinese precursors for the fentanyl arriving in our cities, or held Beijing accountable for its aggressive gray-zone activities across the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, Mr. Trump has eroded many of the critical sources of strength we most need to compete with China—the collective economic leverage of our alliances, strategic foreign-aid programs, counter-disinformation tools, and the diplomatic infrastructure that advances American interests and influence globally.
Meanwhile, China has benefited from the consistency and patient strategy that its autocratic system and entrenched leadership allow. Mr. Xi and his lieutenants plan for outcomes in decades, not election cycles. He has set a goal of 2049 for China to become a “modern socialist country” and, more ominously, of 2027 for readiness to invade Taiwan.
America’s messy, imperfect democracy is among its greatest strengths. But as traditions of bipartisanship have eroded, especially in foreign policy, our global position has weakened. Adversaries have taken note. Huge foreign-policy swings in recent years have confused and weakened allies, damaged complex trading relationships, and created opportunities for enemies to seize advantage in the resulting chaos.
That’s why the U.S. needs a long view that begins with a rebuilt bipartisan consensus around our approach to China and recognizes that neither a go-it-alone strategy nor a policy of accommodation has proved effective.
First, we must acknowledge that our alliances are vital, but they’re not charity. We benefit enormously in the Indo-Pacific from the partnerships we’ve built over decades with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines. They are a potent military force multiplier in deterring conflict. Mr. Trump was right to reaffirm the Aukus initiative earlier this month and to press regional partners like Japan to spend more on defense. Our military alliances with Japan and South Korea are also undergoing an overdue modernization, including upgrading U.S. Forces Japan for the shared threats we face and rebalancing strategic responsibilities in South Korea.
But the nature of the threat China poses requires more than military alliances. Beijing seeks to dominate the world’s strategic sectors, including emerging technologies, critical minerals, infrastructure and information. We need a network of allies and partners—especially in Europe and the Pacific—that jointly coordinates critical minerals and investment strategies, technology controls, sanctions and industrial research. I applaud the administration’s initiative to sign a critical-minerals accord with Australia. We should expand that template to Group of Seven Plus partners in an approach mirroring bipartisan legislation I authored with Sen. John Curtis of Utah.
The U.S. must also hold China accountable for being the world’s largest supporter of Russia’s murderous war in Ukraine—a war that has contributed to global instability, economic headwinds and higher food prices. U.S. sanctions against Russian oil firms last week were a good start and should be followed with sanctions against Chinese companies that have given Russia the vast majority of the dual-use technology it’s needed to continue attacking Ukraine.
Next, we need to rebalance our economic strategy at home and abroad to bolster economic resilience, reduce costs, and make targeted, smart investments in our industrial and defense base—like the Chips and Science Act, another largely bipartisan bill. Instead of alienating close partners like Canada, we should deepen economic ties with like-minded countries and take advantage of the benefits of free trade while reducing our dependence on China.
We also need to retool the diplomatic infrastructure that advances American interests and power globally. Before the second Trump administration, there was longstanding bipartisan support on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for foreign-aid programs and counter-disinformation platforms such as Voice of America. These investments saved millions of lives, countered propaganda from countries like China and Russia, and stopped diseases from reaching our shores. I think we will soon feel the loss of influence caused by the administration’s reckless cuts—and that will create an important window we must seize to rebuild a reformed, reimagined and nonpartisan diplomatic infrastructure laser-focused on our national priorities.
I don’t pretend that finding common ground on anything in Washington these days is easy. But I do know that both sides of the aisle and the president acknowledge the generational threat China poses. Getting this relationship right matters, and it will define America’s place in the world for the rest of the century. We can’t let our policy swing wildly back and forth or succumb to partisan politics. If we do, the consequences will be felt far from the halls of power in Washington.
###