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Testimony by

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Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member, Members of the Committee, I am honored to be asked to speak about the future of our Atlantic Alliance before your committee today. I am also delighted to join some of my closest colleagues and friends on this panel.

The Atlantic Council of the United States promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the 21st century. But we cannot advance that mission without taking a critical view of NATO. It is only with such a critique that we ensure that we are working with our partners to strengthen our Alliance.

Since the end of the Cold War, the role of NATO has been repeatedly challenged by policy-makers and pundits, but also tyrants and terrorists. And despite the criticism and challenges, or perhaps because of them, the Alliance has overcome obstacles and grown more vibrant as it has gathered the political will to reinvent itself. Today, again, the Alliance faces a question of common vision and political will as it struggles with how to integrate Europe's east, how to succeed in Afghanistan, and how to develop the capabilities required to deter or win future conflicts.

My views of the Alliance are shaped by my experiences with NATO, whether as a State Department official helping to organize the 50th anniversary Washington summit in the midst of preparing for the air campaign in Kosovo, or as a NATO international staff member in Kabul to mark the first change of command to a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.

On September 11, 2001, I was at NATO Headquarters in the office of then-Secretary General Lord Robertson watching in horror as America was attacked. My first sentiments were one of helplessness. But then we went to work thinking through how NATO could help. On September 12, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and endorsed a package of measures to support the United States. After a history of hair-trigger alert, it was terrorists rather than Soviets that triggered NATO's collective defense guarantees.

This experience and its aftermath taught me three lessons which inform my views on the Alliance:

- the tremendous goodwill of America's allies in times of crisis;
- the limited capability of the Alliance to respond to a new type of threat; and
- the limited ability of the United States to integrate Allied assistance into U.S. military planning.

Each of these lessons is relevant today.

First, that reservoir of goodwill needs to be nurtured and turned into political will. Allied leaders must be prepared to advocate the Alliance and partnership with the United States to their publics, especially the fight in Afghanistan which is an Article 5 operation.

Second, since 9/11, the Alliance has accelerated an agenda to transform its capabilities to ensure NATO is prepared for 21st century threats, but the Alliance as a whole lags behind the evolution of the threats.

Third, the United Sates needs to remember that NATO remains its permanent coalition. Many critics argue that working with our allies militarily is too complicated and time-consuming with too little impact to merit the investment. I believe it is a political imperative that when American soldiers, sailors and airmen enter the fight, that they do so with allies. We should recognize that NATO is our permanent coalition, NATO allies will almost always form the core of any military coalition, and NATO can set the standards for interoperability with any international partner. Therefore, we should not waste time complaining about the complexities of coalition operations, but rather focus on how to improve them. After all, SHAPE exists to integrate many national contributions into a coherent military force. We need to use the Alliance structures we have invested in.

Last month's 60th anniversary summit launched the drafting of a new Strategic Concept which will serve as the roadmap for the Alliance in the coming years. As this

debate begins, in my view, we should focus the future role of the NATO Alliance on three key missions:

- to ensure the collective defense of its members from all forms of attack;
- to complete the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace; this means NATO should continue to be an engine of reform in fragile European democracies by maintaining a credible "open door" policy and by being an active partner in assisting those reforms; and
- to serve as a leading vehicle through which North America and Europe work together to promote security, prosperity and democracy around the world.

This first role is the unique core of the Alliance. The last two roles should be pursued by both NATO and the U.S.-EU partnership.

NATO is first and foremost a collective defense alliance. This solemn commitment is the bedrock of the Alliance, and should remain so.

Russia's invasion of Georgia raised questions about whether the Article 5 commitment remains credible. While the most likely attack on an ally will originate from a computer, virus or ballistic missile, all NATO allies deserve to know that military planning backs up the Article 5 commitment. NATO is right to begin quiet, prudent and routine contingency planning for responding to an attack on a member state, whether by conventional or unconventional means. This should be NATO's routine, private business.

But this also means developing the right capabilities to defend the homeland. Expeditionary capabilities and sustainment are just as important for Portuguese, Dutch or Canadian reinforcements to an imaginary crisis in Europe's east as they are for Allied contributions in Afghanistan. The Alliance must also do better developing doctrine and defenses against new threats, like cyberwarfare, biowarfare and missile strikes. NATO has made significant progress on cyber and biodefense in recent years, but the Alliance should be on the cutting edge rather than playing catch up. Similarly, NATO's theater missile defense efforts have dragged on for years, and European and U.S. ambivalence has kept NATO from being a full partner in broader ballistic missile defense efforts important to Allied security over the long-run.

NATO nuclear policy has traditionally underpinned the collective defense guarantee. The twin pressures of an aging, impractical arsenal stationed in Europe and the vision outlined in President Obama's speech in Prague mean the future of NATO nuclear policy is in doubt. Creative work is required to ensure a continued Alliance deterrent without depending on the current force structure.

NATO's open door policy has meant that the Alliance has remained open to all European democracies which share the values of the Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose inclusion can contribute to common security and stability. Alliance leaders at Strasbourg-Kehl

endorsed this policy, but despite this rhetorical support, the challenge is keeping this commitment credible as the Alliance grapples with how to integrate a restless Balkans, as well as the controversial cases of Georgia and Ukraine.

Some continue to challenge the enlargement process as a weakening of the Alliance. I would argue that many of the newest members have demonstrated greater political will to commit their scarce resources to Alliance operations and to take tough decisions in the North Atlantic Council. Furthermore, the fears of increased costs or difficulty with consensus did not materialize as more nations joined. Achieving consensus within the North Atlantic Council depends more on our diplomacy with Paris, Berlin, Ankara or Athens than it ever will Tirana, Bucharest, Zagreb or Prague.

There is a common vision among allies that as the nations of the Balkans implement reforms, they will earn a place within Euro-Atlantic institutions. Yet there is no clear path to deliver on this vision. The European Union has a leading role to play, but may fail to play its part without prodding from American diplomacy. We need to help the Greeks and Macedonians settle their differences, foster serious reform efforts in Bosnia and Montenegro, and lay the groundwork for closer ties with and ultimately between Serbia and Kosovo. The success of Albania and Croatia within the Alliance is also important to reinforce the demonstration effect – that is, the prospect of membership serving as a magnet and a driver of change in their Balkan neighbors. Just as NATO and the EU helped heal the great divisions between neighbors elsewhere in Europe, they should do so decisively in the Balkans in the next decade.

After the tensions at last year's Bucharest Summit and the Russian-Georgian war, some believe it is time to put the issues of Georgia and Ukraine on the back burner. I believe that is a recipe for disaster, risking backsliding in Tbilisi and Kyiv and catering to Russia's temptation to pursue a sphere of influence. Given the caution in Europe today, American leadership is required to ensure the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions do not languish. Fragile European democracies merit strong Western support as they struggle to determine their own futures. This engagement need not be delayed by a false debate about NATO membership, which is many, many years away in the best of circumstances; rather, our efforts should focus on using the Commissions, bilateral efforts and the EU's Eastern Partnership to bolster the democratic institutions and free markets in these nations. But without the vision of where tough reforms will lead, the political support for such reforms may thin.

The key challenge to a Europe whole, free and at peace is how Russia fits into the equation. I was at the founding summit of the NATO-Russia Council at Pratica di Mare Air Force Base outside Rome. Aspirations were high for what this partnership could accomplish. President Bush even referred to the Council as a pathway to an alliance with the Alliance. However, democratic backsliding in Russia undermined the confidence in that partnership, limiting the possibilities of the Council.

As the NATO-Russia relationship mimics the U.S.-Russia relationship in hitting the reset button, we need to do so with our eyes wide open. This effort will not succeed

if Russia decides not to cooperate. Russia is seeking to use the Council to enhance its stature and to gain leverage of the Alliance. Hence, Moscow shuts off alternative routes to support NATO operations in Afghanistan, while making available routes that cross Russia. Like the Administration, I want this to be a relationship of cooperation rather than competition, but we do not hold all the cards to make it so.

Furthermore, I caution that we not allow ourselves or our allies to be lured away from the hard work of renewing our Atlantic Alliance by Russian proposals for a new European security architecture. There is no harm from discussing such ideas as long as we keep our governments focused on the task of strengthening NATO over the coming year and not downgrade the role of NATO in any broader architecture.

Increasingly, the focus of the U.S. relationship with Europe is not European issues, but rather global challenges. Indeed, when the United States and Europe act together, we are more effective in dealing with any problem regardless of geography. NATO, accordingly, should be a leading vehicle through which Europe and North America act globally. This means ensuring we have an Alliance prepared to help lead new missions as merited, for example, supporting an African Union humanitarian operation or even an eventual peace deal in the Middle East.

Almost any conceivable military mission today would involve our NATO allies, but also entail valuable contributions from other partners. NATO can and often should remain the organizing core around which such broader coalitions are built, as the Alliance offers an increasingly international standard of interoperability and command capable of incorporating partners. NATO's track record with the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative is a good basis upon which to continue to strengthen ties to other global partners, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the African Union. As we work to strengthen the Alliance's global partnerships, we should entertain the possibility of alliances with the Alliance with our closest partners who share our values and interests.

Before I conclude, I would like to comment on European defense efforts and France's return to the integrated military command.

President Sarkozy's election in France represented the victory of a vision of a strong France in partnership with the United States, rather than the Gaullist tradition of a strong France defined in opposition to the United States. The challenge Paris and Washington face is to ensure that this French strategic perspective endures beyond the presidency of Sarkozy. The United States laid the groundwork over the past several years for France to normalize its relations with the Alliance as we worked to end the perception of ambivalence or even hostility in the United States toward European defense, by calling for a strong Europe as a strong partner of the United States. Our experience shows us that we do not need to fear a strong Europe, but rather the weakness of our partners. In parallel, the French began to demonstrate that Sarkozy was serious about committing the resources required to return France to NATO's military command. Both sides were committed to avoid the pitfalls of the previous failed attempts. President

Bush's strong statement on European defense at the Bucharest summit and France's emphasis on defense issues during its EU Presidency last year allowed Sarkozy to get his politics right, framing France's return to the integrated command as a "normalization" of French ties to a new NATO. It worked.

Now we need to reap the benefits of France's return by helping France succeed within NATO and ensure European defense reinforces NATO. This means:

- reaching an understanding with France that it will no longer work to limit NATO for ideological reasons, such as preventing the Alliance from developing its own civil-military capacities for fear of treading on EU turf;
- harnessing a serious French military in support of creating serious Alliance capabilities;
- ensuring French leadership within the Alliance, including the position of Strategic Commander for Transformation, invests France in NATO's success, particularly that of Allied Command Transformation; and
- restoring as the default for cooperation between NATO and the EU the "Berlin Plus" arrangements which allow for the Deputy SACEUR to serve as the EU's commander.

Currently, this mechanism is only used to support the EU operation in Bosnia. While the EU's current military staff capacity is minimal, as the EU undertakes more complicated missions, it will require a stronger, more permanent planning and command and control capability. This capability should take place at SHAPE rather than any new permanent EU operational headquarters to avoid unnecessary costs and duplication.

France's return to the integrated military command may open possibilities for lessening traditional European resistance to develop common Alliance capabilities. Much of this resistance is the result of a commitment in certain European capitals to building a more integrated European-only defense industry. While the current economic climate is an obstacle, concrete projects premised on transatlantic defense industrial cooperation, in which industry on both sides of the Atlantic plays a significant role, offer the prospect for gaining Allied backing for new NATO capability initiatives.

Thank you Madame Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Committee. I look forward to answering your questions.