

AMENDMENT NO.\_\_\_\_\_

Calendar No.\_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 2d Sess.****S. 3249**

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. RISCH (for himself, Mrs. SHA-  
HEEN, and Mr. BARRASSO)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-

2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Ca-

5 bles Act of 2026”.

6 **SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

7 The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title.

Sec. 2. Table of contents.

Sec. 3. Definitions.

**TITLE I— INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT  
ON CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE**

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.

See. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International Cable Protection Committee and other relevant international bodies to safeguard United States interests.

See. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure sabotage.

See. 105. Report on activities by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

See. 106. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure.

See. 107. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure.

## TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE

Sec. 201. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the Department of State.

## TITLE III—SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

### 1 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

2 In this Act:

3 (1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the  
4 meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44,  
5 United States Code.

6 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
7 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
8 mittees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations  
10 and the Committee on Appropriations of the  
11 Senate; and

12 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and  
13 the Committee on Appropriations of the House  
14 of Representatives.

4 (A) The Department of Commerce.

5 (B) The Department of Defense.

6 (C) The Department of Homeland Secu-  
7 rity.

8 (D) The Office of the Director of National  
9 Intelligence.

10 (E) The Department of State.

11 (F) The Federal Communications Commis-  
12 sion.

13 (G) The Department of the Treasury.

## 14 (H) The Department of the Judiciary.

15 (I) Any additional Federal agencies, as de-  
16 termined by the President.

17 (4) CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.—

18 The term “critical undersea infrastructure” refers to  
19 both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and  
20 subsea energy infrastructure.

21 (5) INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE.—The term  
22 “interagency committee” means the entity estab-  
23 lished under section 301(b) of this Act.

24 (6) NON-FEDERAL ENTITY.—The term “non-  
25 Federal entity” means any nongovernmental entity

1       that is an individual, organization, or business in-  
2       volved in the operation, maintenance, repair, or con-  
3       struction of critical subsea infrastructure, including  
4       critical undersea infrastructure owners.

5               (7) SABOTAGE.—The term “sabotage” means  
6       actions, or preparations for future actions, taken  
7       with the intent to cause defective production, oper-  
8       ation, or damage to critical underseas infrastructure,  
9       including the integrity of data transmitted via  
10      subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

11               (8) SUBSEA ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.—The  
12       term “subsea energy infrastructure” means a subsea  
13       cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, be-  
14       neath, or within the seabed, including—

15                       (A) to transmit electricity, including via  
16       subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity  
17       transformers, or equipment related to the sup-  
18       port of offshore energy production installations;

19                       (B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydro-  
20       gen between land-based or off-shore infrastruc-  
21       ture; and

22                       (C) associated landing stations and facil-  
23       ties.

24               (9) SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRA-  
25       STRUCTURE.—The term “subsea telecommunications

1       “infrastructure” means subsea fiber-optic cables and  
2       related equipment installed on, beneath, or within  
3       the seabed, and used to transmit communications,  
4       data, voice, video, or other electronic signals, as well  
5       as associated landing stations and facilities.

6       **TITLE I— INTERNATIONAL CO-**  
7       **ORDINATION AND ENGAGE-**  
8       **MENT ON CRITICAL UNDER-**  
9       **SEA INFRASTRUCTURE**

10      **SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

11      Congress makes the following findings:

12           (1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure  
13       poses a growing threat to United States and allied  
14       security and economic prosperity.

15           (2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea  
16       infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, in-  
17       cluding—

18               (A) in January 2022, the reported damage  
19       to subsea telecommunications cables connecting  
20       the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian  
21       archipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the  
22       largest commercial satellite ground station on  
23       Earth;

24               (B) in September 2022, the reported dam-  
25       age to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream

1        1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at  
2        sites northeast and southeast of the Danish is-  
3        land of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;

4                (C) in February 2023, the reported dam-  
5        age to subsea telecommunications infrastructure  
6        connecting the main island of Taiwan to the  
7        Matsu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

8                (D) in October 2023, the reported damage  
9        to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector nat-  
10        ural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland,  
11        in addition to the reported damage to subsea  
12        telecommunications cables connecting Estonia  
13        and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;

14                (E) in November 2024, the reported dam-  
15        age to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea  
16        telecommunications cables and the Lithuania-  
17        to-Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications  
18        cable in the central Baltic Sea;

19                (F) in December 2024, the reported dam-  
20        age to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea  
21        electricity interconnection cable and nearby  
22        subsea telecommunications cables in the Gulf of  
23        Finland ;

24                (G) in January 2025, the reported damage  
25        to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea tele-

1           communications cable connecting Taiwan to the  
2           United States, the Republic of Korea, and  
3           Japan, among other global democracies;

4           (H) in February 2025, the reported dam-  
5           age to a subsea telecommunications cable con-  
6           necting the main island of Taiwan with the  
7           Penghu Islands in the Taiwan Strait;

8           (I) in January 2026, the reported damage  
9           to subsea telecommunications cables from Lat-  
10           via in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja  
11           and Šventoji; and

12           (J) in January 2026, the reported damage  
13           to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Esto-  
14           nia involving a vessel named the *Fitburg*.

15           (3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in  
16           the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlan-  
17           tic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the  
18           Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct  
19           information and threat intelligence sharing among  
20           private and public sector actors to protect subsea ca-  
21           bles.

22           (4) On February 21, 2025, the European  
23           Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Secu-  
24           rity to include the development and deployment of  
25           an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Sub-

1       marine cables work to establish a dedicated regional  
2       hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the  
3       integrated surveillance approach.

4                   (5) The Association of Southeast Asian States  
5       (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening  
6       Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and  
7       most recently announced plans to “build a secure,  
8       diverse and resilient submarine cable network” and  
9       “to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair,  
10      maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine  
11      cables, between ASEAN Member States”.

12                  (6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by  
13       the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met  
14       to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership  
15       on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meet-  
16       ing, the Quad underscored the need for digital infra-  
17       structure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables  
18       forum to be hosted by the United States and India  
19       and encouraging regulatory harmonization between  
20       Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad  
21       seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and  
22       transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-  
23       Pacific region.

24 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

25       It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) critical undersea infrastructure represents  
2 vital strategic and economic links between the  
3 United States and its partners and allies;

4 (2) according to NATO, “undersea cables carry  
5 an estimated \$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-  
6 thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted  
7 at sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent  
8 of global data flows are transmitted via undersea ca-  
9 bles”;

10 (3) since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine  
11 in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-  
12 profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in  
13 damage to critical undersea infrastructure, especially  
14 across Northern Europe and East Asia;

15 (4) the United States Government has an im-  
16 portant role to play in advancing United States in-  
17 terests in international bodies that oversee the pro-  
18 tection of critical undersea infrastructure, including  
19 promoting network resilience and redundancy, and  
20 advancing regulations in support of these goals;

21 (5) the United States Government should play  
22 a more active role in NATO initiatives such as the  
23 NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical  
24 Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea In-  
25 frastructure Coordination Call, the Critical Undersea

1       Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task  
2       Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, al-  
3       lied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Ex-  
4       peditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including  
5       the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and  
6       Resilience, and international organizations such as  
7       the International Cable Protection Committee  
8       (ICPC), in order to advance United States national  
9       security and economic interests;

10                   (6) the United States should lead efforts to pro-  
11       mote the deployment of resilient critical undersea in-  
12       frastructure networks, enhance situational aware-  
13       ness, strengthen preparedness, and formalize collec-  
14       tive responses among allies and partners through en-  
15       hanced information sharing and coordination; and

16                   (7) while critical undersea infrastructure own-  
17       ers and other associated private sector stakeholders  
18       carry significant responsibility in safeguarding this  
19       infrastructure, the United States Government and  
20       allied foreign governments need to play a greater  
21       role.

1   **SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EN-**  
2                   **GAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CABLE**  
3                   **PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER REL-**  
4                   **EVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFE-**  
5                   **GUARD UNITED STATES INTERESTS.**

6           (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in coordi-  
7   nation with the interagency committee, shall seek to in-  
8   crease United States Government engagement in inter-  
9   national bodies, including the International Cable Protec-  
10   tion Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national  
11   security and economic interests as it relates to critical un-  
12   dersea infrastructure.

13           (b) **REPORT.**—Not later than one year after the date  
14   of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
15   5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to  
16   the appropriate congressional committees that includes the  
17   following:

18                (1) A description of how increased United  
19   States Government engagement within the ICPC  
20   could support United States national security objec-  
21   tives as it relates to the protection of critical under-  
22   sea infrastructure.

23                (2) A description of key objectives for pro-  
24   moting and protecting United States national secu-  
25   rity interests within the ICPC.

4 (4) A description of how encouraging other  
5 countries and regional bodies to join the ICPC can  
6 better ensure coordinated, consistent global undersea  
7 subsea telecommunications infrastructure policies.

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in coordination  
16 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the  
17 Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in sub-  
18 section (c) with respect to any foreign person that the  
19 President determines, on or after the date of the enact-  
20 ment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage or  
21 facilitates acts of sabotage against critical undersea infra-  
22 structure, including—

23 (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or op-  
24 erator of which knowingly—

25 (A) commits acts of sabotage; or

6 (A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel  
7 or entity described in paragraph (1);

11 (C) facilitates deceptive or structured  
12 transactions to support a vessel or entity de-  
13 scribed in paragraph (1);

14 (D) provides port or logistics services or  
15 facilities for technology upgrades or installation  
16 of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of,  
17 a vessel described in paragraph (1) for the pur-  
18 pose of evading sanctions;

19 (E) provided documentation, registration,  
20 or flagging services for a vessel described in  
21 paragraph (1) for the purpose of evading sanc-  
22 tions; or

23 (F) serves as a captain, principal officer,  
24 or senior leadership of such a vessel or entity.

1       (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days  
2 after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person  
3 under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the ap-  
4 propriate congressional committees, the Committee on  
5 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and  
6 the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep-  
7 resentatives, a report that includes a detailed justification  
8 for the imposition of the sanctions.

9       (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-  
10 scribed in this subsection are the following:

11           (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President  
12 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-  
13 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50  
14 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block  
15 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-  
16 terests in property of a foreign person described in  
17 subsection (a), if such property and interests in  
18 property are in the United States, come within the  
19 United States, or are or come within the possession  
20 or control of a United States person.

21           (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR  
22 PAROLE.—

23           (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An  
24 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—  
25           (i) inadmissible to the United States;

1 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other  
2 documentation to enter the United States;  
3 and

4 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted  
5 or paroled into the United States or to re-  
6 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-  
7 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et  
8 seq.).

9 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

10 (i) IN GENERAL.—The visa or other  
11 entry documentation of an alien described  
12 in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regard-  
13 less of when such visa or other entry docu-  
14 mentation is or was issued.

15 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-  
16 tion under clause (i) shall—

17 (I) take effect immediately; and  
18 (II) automatically cancel any  
19 other valid visa or entry documenta-  
20 tion that is in the possession of the  
21 alien

## 22 (d) IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES—

1       Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out  
2       this section.

3                   (2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-  
4       tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a  
5       violation of this section or any regulation, license, or  
6       order issued to carry out this section shall be subject  
7       to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)  
8       of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-  
9       nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-  
10       tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-  
11       scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

12                   (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

13                   (1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-  
14       TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW EN-  
15       FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this sec-  
16       tion shall not apply with respect to the admission or  
17       parole of an alien to the United States if admitting  
18       or paroling the alien is necessary—

19                   (A) to permit the United States to comply  
20       with the Agreement regarding the Head-  
21       quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake  
22       Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force  
23       November 21, 1947, between the United Na-  
24       tions and the United States, or other applicable

1           international obligations of the United States;

2           or

3           (B) to carry out or assist authorized law  
4           enforcement activity in the United States.

5           (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTEL-  
6           LIGENCE ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section  
7           shall not apply to any activity subject to the report-  
8           ing requirements under title V of the National Secu-  
9           rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any au-  
10           thorized intelligence activities of the United States.

11           (3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF  
12           GOODS.—

13           (A) IN GENERAL.—A requirement to block  
14           and prohibit all transactions in all property and  
15           interests in property under this section shall not  
16           include the authority or requirement to impose  
17           sanctions on the importation of goods.

18           (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,  
19           the term “good” means any article, natural or  
20           manmade substance, material, supply or manu-  
21           factured product, including inspection and test  
22           equipment, and excluding technical data.

23           (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

24           (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms  
25           “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the

1       meanings given those terms in section 101 of the  
2       Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

3               (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-  
4       son” means an individual or entity that is not a  
5       United States person.

6               (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term  
7       “United States person” means—

8                       (A) any United States citizen or an alien  
9       lawfully admitted for permanent residence to  
10      the United States;

11                       (B) an entity organized under the laws of  
12      the United States or of any jurisdiction within  
13      the United States, including any foreign branch  
14      of such an entity; or

15                       (C) any person in the United States.

16               (g) NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER.—The  
17      President may waive the application of sanctions under  
18      this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President  
19      submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

20                       (1) a certification in writing that the issuance  
21      of the waiver is in the national security interests of  
22      the United States; and

23                       (2) a report explaining the basis for the certifi-  
24      cation.

1   **SEC. 105. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S RE-**  
2                   **PUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FED-**  
3                   **ERATION.**

4       (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
5   of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
6   5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the  
7   heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a  
8   report to the appropriate congressional committees that  
9   includes the following:

10               (1) A description, with respect to the applicable  
11   reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing,  
12   installation, and maintenance capabilities of the Peo-  
13   ple's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Fed-  
14   eration.

15               (2) An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and  
16   activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Re-  
17   search (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian  
18   Federation, including—

19               (A) a description of GUGI operations and  
20   capabilities in deep water and littoral infra-  
21   structure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sab-  
22   otage, including recent activity trends and de-  
23   velopment of new weapons systems;

24               (B) a description of GUGI's use of ostensi-  
25   bly civilian research vessels to conduct critical

1           undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed  
2           warfare, and potential sabotage;

3           (C) an assessment of the impact of sanc-  
4           tions on the ability of GUGI to procure ad-  
5           vanced technologies and equipment, as well as  
6           its efforts to circumvent those sanctions; and

7           (D) a list of suspected GUGI research or  
8           scientific vessels, including vessel names and  
9           International Maritime Organization and Mari-  
10           time Mobile Service Identity numbers, and re-  
11           lated equipment that are suspected of engaging  
12           in dual-use operations and probing of critical  
13           undersea infrastructure.

14           (3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities,  
15           and activities of the Main Directorate of the General  
16           Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-  
17           tion (GRU), including—

18           (A) a description of GRU operations and  
19           capabilities related to physical, electronic, and  
20           cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of  
21           critical undersea infrastructure and maritime  
22           logistics;

23           (B) a description of the use of Russian ci-  
24           vilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU,  
25           including a list of fishing and merchant vessel

1           names and International Maritime Organization  
2           and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers  
3           believed to be involved in surveillance or sabo-  
4           tage activities; and

5           (C) an assessment of the impact of sanc-  
6           tions on the ability of GUGI to procure ad-  
7           vanced technologies and equipment, as well as  
8           its efforts to circumvent those sanctions.

9           (4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities,  
10          and activities of the People's Liberation Army, the  
11          PRC Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Re-  
12          search Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-  
13          based entities, including unmarked or dual-use mari-  
14          time militia or commercial vessels related to surveil-  
15          lance, monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea  
16          infrastructure, including—

17           (A) a description of recent capability devel-  
18          opments related to surveilling or sabotaging  
19          critical undersea infrastructure, including for  
20          both deep-sea and littoral purposes; and

21           (B) a description of the PRC's use of os-  
22          tensibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research  
23          vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical  
24          undersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-

1           Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the  
2           Western Hemisphere.

3           (5) An assessment of cooperation between the  
4           Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or  
5           sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, includ-  
6           ing—

7                   (A) any current or planned operational co-  
8                   ordination against United States or allied and  
9                   partner nation targets;

10                   (B) any joint research, development, test-  
11                   ing, or evaluation of critical undersea infra-  
12                   structure surveillance, sabotage, or seabed war-  
13                   fare capabilities;

14                   (C) any technology transfers or joint train-  
15                   ing related to critical undersea infrastructure  
16                   surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and

17                   (D) any coordination in procurement of  
18                   advanced technologies related to critical under-  
19                   sea infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or  
20                   seabed warfare, or circumvention of sanctions  
21                   against the Russian Federation.

22           (6) A list of instances during the previous cal-  
23                   endar year in which the United States, or allies and  
24                   partners of the United States, documented anom-  
25                   alous behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or

1       operated by the PRC or Russia, around critical un-  
2       dersea infrastructure, including—

3                   (A) any official United States Government  
4                   response to counter the anomalous behavior;  
5                   and

6                   (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with  
7                   allies and partners.

8                   (7) An assessment of the extent to which PRC-  
9                   based entities are involved in laying, maintaining,  
10                   and repairing United States-invested cables.

11                   (b) INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—The ini-  
12                   tial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the  
13                   period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the  
14                   enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by  
15                   subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for  
16                   the reporting period.

17                   (c) CLASSIFICATION.—The report required under  
18                   subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but  
19                   may include a classified annex.

20 **SEC. 106. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL**  
21                   **UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.**

22                   Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-  
23                   ment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in  
24                   coordination with the Secretary of State and the heads  
25                   of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Se-

1 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Perma-  
2 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of  
3 Representatives, and the appropriate congressional com-  
4 mittees a report that includes the assessment of the intel-  
5 ligence community, including dissents from individual  
6 agencies, of the likely cause and, if applicable, the attribu-  
7 tion of the following instances of reported sabotage of crit-  
8 ical undersea infrastructure:

9 (1) In January 2022, the reported damage to  
10 the subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-  
11 necting the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian  
12 archipelago of Svalbard.

13 (2) The September 2022 sabotage of three of  
14 the four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord  
15 Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast  
16 and southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in  
17 the Western Baltic Sea, including—

18 (A) an assessment of the activities of Rus-  
19 sian military vessels, including those with un-  
20 dersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord  
21 Stream blast sites in the months leading up to  
22 the incident;

23 (B) a description of any Russian civilian or  
24 military vessels intercepted or diverted from the  
25 blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or

1           vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that  
2           gained access to the blast sites;

3           (C) an assessment of the technical feasibility  
4           of a small group of divers conducting the  
5           Nord Stream sabotage using the rental boat  
6           “Andromeda” in the weather and sea conditions  
7           present at the time;

8           (D) an assessment of whether the Russian  
9           Federation’s documented practice of recruiting  
10          or coercing Ukrainians or other third country  
11          nationals to conduct sabotage operations on  
12          land targets is applicable to a maritime context;

13          (E) an assessment of the fees and penalties  
14          for failure to honor gas delivery contracts  
15          that Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially  
16          faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via  
17          the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;

18          (F) an assessment of the insurance implications  
19          for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its  
20          insurers and Western financiers, depending on  
21          the identity of the perpetrator;

22          (G) a description of the law enforcement  
23          investigations by regional governments, the  
24          scope of their investigations, and their outcomes;

1 (H) an assessment of whether any Russian  
2 vessels documented in close proximity to the  
3 Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading  
4 up to or immediately after the incident, includ-  
5 ing those with undersea surveillance or warfare  
6 capabilities, were present at other suspected  
7 sabotage sites either before or after the incident  
8 in question; and

9 (I) any information on potential attribution  
10 received from allied or partner nation com-  
11 munications through diplomatic or intelligence  
12 channels.

22 (5) In November 2024, the reported damage to  
23 the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea tele-  
24 communications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden

1        BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the central  
2        Baltic Sea.

3            (6) In December 2024, the reported damage to  
4        the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity  
5        interconnection cable and nearby subsea tele-  
6        communications cables in the Gulf of Finland.

7            (7) In January 2025, the reported damage to  
8        the Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications  
9        infrastructure connecting Taiwan to the  
10       United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan,  
11       among other global democracies.

12           (8) In February 2025, the reported damage to  
13       a subsea telecommunications cable connecting the  
14       main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in  
15       the Taiwan Strait.

16           (9) In January 2026, the reported damage to  
17       subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the  
18       Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.

19           (10) In January 2026, the reported damage to  
20       the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia in-  
21       volving a vessel called the *Fitburg*.

1   **SEC. 107. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN**  
2                   **THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA IN-**  
3                   **FRASSTRUCTURE.**

4       (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
5 gress that—

6                   (1) as international critical undersea infrastruc-  
7 ture expands, there are increasing challenges to the  
8 proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protec-  
9 tion of international subsea cables that have the po-  
10 tential to undermine United States and foreign part-  
11 ner national security interests;

12                  (2) the United States is uniquely positioned to  
13 provide technical, material, and other forms of sup-  
14 port to international partners to enhance the resil-  
15 ience of international critical undersea infrastruc-  
16 ture;

17                  (3) the United States Government should en-  
18 hance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trust-  
19 ed allies to help foreign governments improve efforts  
20 to quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair,  
21 and protect international critical undersea infra-  
22 structure; and

23                  (4) given the importance of critical undersea in-  
24 frastructure to United States and allied energy secu-  
25 rity and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly

1 prioritizing capabilities designed to target United  
2 States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.

3 (b) COMMITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND RE-  
4 SOURCES.—The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient  
5 personnel and resources towards—

6 (1) engaging with foreign countries to improve  
7 security and reduce barriers to the installation, mon-  
8 itoring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea  
9 infrastructure; and

10 (2) working with allies and partners to support  
11 the development of a multinational fleet of cable re-  
12 pair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabo-  
13 tage.

14 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
15 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
16 the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to  
17 the appropriate congressional committees a report that  
18 outlines efforts by the United States Government in the  
19 prior calendar year to work with international allies and  
20 partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers  
21 to the monitoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of  
22 international critical undersea infrastructure networks, in-  
23 cluding—

24 (1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that  
25 create barriers to United States-led efforts to install,

1 maintain, repair, and protect international critical  
2 undersea infrastructure networks; and

3 (2) progress made in the previous calendar year  
4 as a result of United States engagement with allies  
5 and partners.

6 **TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF  
7 STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA  
8 INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERT-  
9 TISE**

10 **SEC. 201. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUC-  
11 TURE-RELATED EXPERTISE AT THE DEPART-  
12 MENT OF STATE.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall as-  
14 sign not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals, of  
15 which not fewer than 5 individuals shall be assigned to  
16 the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover  
17 subsea telecommunications infrastructure, in order to sup-  
18 port the Department of State’s interagency engagement  
19 on matters related to critical undersea infrastructure pro-  
20 tection, including—

21 (1) protection and resilience;  
22 (2) coordination with United States allies and  
23 partners; and  
24 (3) United States engagement in international  
25 bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure.

1        (b) ASSIGNMENT.—The Bureau for Cyberspace and  
2 Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed per-  
3 sonnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement out-  
4 lined in subsection (a).

5        (c) NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15 days after ful-  
6 filling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Sec-  
7 retary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Re-  
8 lations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-  
9 fairs of the House of Representatives.

10       (d) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CRITICAL UN-  
11 DERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.—Not later than  
12 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the  
13 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
14 sional committees a report on how the United States Gov-  
15 ernment plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within  
16 relevant international bodies to spur increased information  
17 sharing between allied and partner governments and rel-  
18 evant private sector companies on critical undersea infra-  
19 structure sabotage.

1   **TITLE           III—SUBSEA           TELE-**  
2   **COMMUNICATIONS           INFRA-**  
3   **STRUCTURE   COORDINATION,**  
4   **CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR**

5   **SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CO-**  
6                   **ORDINATION   OF   SUBSEA   TELECOMMUNI-**  
7                   **CATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

8               (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-  
9        ings:

10               (1) According to a December 2024 Department  
11        of Homeland Security white paper, “There currently  
12        exists no forum in which the full scope of the  
13        [subsea] cable industry can effectively collaborate  
14        with the U.S. government to identify and address  
15        shared challenges.”.

16               (2) United States Federal Government respon-  
17        sibilities for the protection of subsea telecommuni-  
18        cations infrastructure, damage reporting, informa-  
19        tion and intelligence sharing, and emergency re-  
20        sponse are overseen by various government actors  
21        through a multitude of mechanisms spanning several  
22        Federal departments and agencies.

23               (3) In order for the subsea cable industry to  
24        align with United States economic and security in-  
25        terests and help industry prepare security risk miti-

1 gation measures, the United States Government  
2 must provide the industry a clearer concept of oper-  
3 ations, assessed risks to cable supply chain and in-  
4 frastructure, enhanced and standardized security  
5 measures, defined lines of effort in cases of emer-  
6 gency, and definitive cost analysis.

7 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than one year after  
8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
9 establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act  
10 as the “interagency committee”) comprised of the heads  
11 of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States  
12 Government efforts to—

13 (1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea  
14 telecommunications infrastructure;

15 (2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable  
16 licensing and permitting; and

17 (3) address other matters related to subsea tele-  
18 communications infrastructure deemed appropriate  
19 and necessary by the President.

20 (c) COORDINATION.—The President shall direct the  
21 interagency committee to conduct an overview of the  
22 United States Federal Government’s operational authori-  
23 ties for subsea telecommunications infrastructure security  
24 and resilience. The overview shall include—

14 (d) ANALYSIS OF SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
15 INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.—

24 (A) identify trends;

1 (B) refine attributions, particularly in  
2 cases where subsea telecommunications infra-  
3 structure has been intentionally damaged by  
4 malicious actors;

5 (C) identify high-risk geographic areas for  
6 subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-  
7 struction;

8 (D) identify Federal Government functions  
9 and private sector engagement methods to sup-  
10 port the security of subsea telecommunications  
11 infrastructure; and

12 (E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to  
13 reduce damage to subsea telecommunications  
14 infrastructure systems.

15 (2) STRATEGY ELEMENTS.—The strategies re-  
16 quired under paragraph (1) shall include—  
17 (A) resourcing requirements;  
18 (B) coordination with United States allies  
19 and partners and relevant subsea telecommuni-  
20 cations infrastructure industry stakeholders;  
21 and  
22 (C) the necessary technical expertise to  
23 make attributions for subsea telecommuni-  
24 cations infrastructure sabotage.

1       (e) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after estab-  
2 lishing the required interagency committee under sub-  
3 section (b), the President shall submit to Congress a re-  
4 port that includes the following elements:

5           (1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff  
6 the interagency committee and United States Fed-  
7 eral agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in  
8 subsection (b).

9           (2) A detailed plan for how the interagency  
10 committee will advance the objectives outlined in  
11 subsection (b).

12 **SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BE-**  
13           **TWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND**  
14           **PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA TELE-**  
15           **COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

16       (a) PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHAR-  
17 ING.—Consistent with the necessary protections of classi-  
18 fied information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence ma-  
19 terial, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agen-  
20 cies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee  
21 and in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence shar-  
22 ing partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the  
23 maintenance, repair, and protection of subsea tele-  
24 communications infrastructure, issue procedures to estab-  
25 lish and promote—

22 (4) the timely sharing between the interagency  
23 committee and non-Federal entities, when and if ap-  
24 propriate, of information relating to indications of  
25 potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure

1       sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by  
2       the interagency committee or non-Federal entities  
3       about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sab-  
4       otage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential  
5       adverse effects from such sabotage; and

6               (5) the timely release of funds to meet cost,  
7       schedule, and performance metrics.

8       (b) DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES.—The proce-  
9       dures developed under subsection (b) shall—

10               (1) ensure the interagency committee has and  
11       maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea  
12       telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and in-  
13       dications of potential subsea telecommunications in-  
14       frastructure sabotage in real time to the appropriate  
15       Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent  
16       with the protection of classified information;

17               (2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing  
18       processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of  
19       the interagency committee and non-Federal entities  
20       for information sharing, including subsea tele-  
21       communications infrastructure-specific information  
22       sharing and analysis entities; and

23               (3) require members of the interagency com-  
24       mittee and other appropriate Federal agencies which  
25       are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastruc-

1       ture sabotage indicators or defensive measures to  
2       employ any applicable security controls to defend  
3       against unauthorized access to or acquisition of such  
4       information.

5       (c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The Director of Na-  
6       tional Intelligence, in consultation with the members of  
7       the interagency committee, shall—

8               (1) not later than 60 days after the date of the  
9       enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the proce-  
10       dures required under subsection (b); and

11               (2) not later than one year after submitting  
12       such procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years,  
13       submit to Congress a report on the implementation  
14       and execution of information sharing with private  
15       sector actors in the previous year pursuant to sub-  
16       section (a).