COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION:
UKRAINE AND BEYOND

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JANUARY 26, 2023

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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared Statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepared Statement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator James E. Risch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator James E. Risch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by Senator James E. Risch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator Mitt Romney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Erin McKee to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by Senator Todd Young</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator John Barrasso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by Senator John Barrasso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Ms. Victoria Nuland to Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Letter to Secretary Blinken, Dated August 4, 2020, About Plans To Nominate a Special Envoy to Belarus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
COUNTERING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION: UKRAINE AND BEYOND

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 2023

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:33 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez, Chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and Hagerty.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order.

Almost 1 year ago, as Vladimir Putin amassed his forces along the border with Ukraine, most of the world assumed the Russian military was one of the most powerful on Earth, but for nearly a year, brave Ukrainians, from army recruits to retired grandmothers, have exposed just how weak the Kremlin military really is because a leader who sends his soldiers into battle with almost no food is weak.

An army that gives its recruits instructions to use their weapons taken from Wikipedia is weak. Generals using maps from the 1960s to fight a war in 2022 are weak.

Nothing underscores Putin’s weakness more than his reliance on the Wagner Group of mercenaries, a group that Putin’s chef, a former convict, a man sanctioned by the United States, leads like a paramilitary death squad, a group recruiting violent criminals from Russian prisons and sending them into battle as cannon fodder.

Human Rights Watch documented one incident in the Central Africa Republic where Wagner mercenaries stopped a group of unarmed men at a roadblock. As the witness began to pray out loud, the Russians forced the men to kneel and one by one they shot them in the head.

These are not just criminals. They are war criminals and they are leading the fight in Ukraine today for Putin because Putin is failing spectacularly.

In fact, I am considering legislation to strengthen our tools to counter the Wagner Group, prohibiting transactions with those buying their natural resources as well as restricting security assistance to countries supporting this mercenary army.
Their reach is growing as Putin gets weaker, and weaker he gets the more dangerous he gets, the more suffering he causes. How many civilians will die from Russian missile attacks in Ukraine because Putin cannot achieve his battlefield goals?

What will Putin do as he gets more desperate? More letter bombing campaigns in NATO countries? Threats of nuclear war?

Now, I have been supportive of the Administration’s response to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, from supplying critical weapon systems and trainings to shoring up our allies in Europe to supporting the millions of refugees who have fled this war, including welcoming so many to the United States.

As I have said all along, this support should have come sooner. Ukraine’s embrace of good governance reforms in the years leading up to Russia’s invasion directly contributed to the success we are seeing today. While we are still learning more details, I want to commend President Zelensky and his cabinet for their serious oversight plans for U.S. and international assistance.

As I have said since Putin’s invasion, and I will say it again to the Ukrainian people, we will continue to support your heroic efforts to achieve victory. We will stand with you as you fight for your homeland against a dictator trying to erase your nation by force.

We will work with you so that a free and democratic Ukraine that respects the will and rights of its people survives and flourishes after this war comes to an end.

We will continue to work with those countries Putin threatens, from encouraging energy diversification to shoring up democratic institutions to stop Putin from spreading his poisonous autocratic savagery, and we must also support those Russians who are in prison because they are brave enough to stand up against Putin’s war machine.

I am disappointed that the Administration has not met its statutory deadline to make a determination with respect to Magnitsky sanctions in response to the arrest of Vladimir Kara-Murza.

Secretary Nuland, I hope you will tell us when we can get a response to our letter on this matter. I look forward to getting a full picture today from this entire panel on what the Departments of State, Pentagon, USAID, is doing to support Ukraine and counter future Russian aggression.

In the immediate term, I think there is a question that needs to be answered, which is what is our strategy for helping Ukraine achieve victory.

How are we taking lessons from the Ukrainian war to think about preparing ourselves and our partners for potential aggression from Russia in the future?

Because while Ukrainians are on the front lines of fighting for democracy and the rule of law now, we know that Putin’s ambitions do not end on his borders.

The United States and our democratic allies must show the authoritarian regimes of the world that the invasion and subjugation of free people is unacceptable in the modern world, is a violation of the international rule of law, and that is what is also at stake in Ukraine.
Yes, it is about the freedom of the Ukrainian people to decide their own future, but it is also to stand up for the universal proposition that you cannot by force take another country’s territory.

With that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking member for his remarks.

Senator Risch.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH, U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me say I concur in remarks that you have made and I am going to make some similar remarks along those lines. I look forward to having a concrete discussion on the Biden administration’s policy toward Russia.

I hope to hear from you how the United States is planning to do more and faster to help defeat Russia in Ukraine and counter Russian aggression and malign influence around the world.

Indeed, we are not the only ones that are hungry for this. I think if you look around this room and see the attendance today and see the gaggle of media people out in the hall shouting questions at us, everyone is hungry for this discussion and I hope we have a robust discussion on that today.

It has been almost a year ago now that Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine turned the status quo of international relations on its head. In response to this bold escalation, the United States and our allies around the world quickly came to a consensus that we need to support Ukraine’s defense of its people, territory, and way of life from Russian aggression.

Whenever we have a discussion like this it really ought to start with a short—very short and brief discussion of how we got here.

We all know that Ronald Reagan spent 8 years in his presidency as his top priority bringing down and breaking up the Soviet Union and pulling those satellite countries away from Russia.

He was successful. He got that done, and we, as America, adopted that as our policy. We promoted it. We helped it in every way we can. One of the things that happened, of course, was all the countries that were in the orbit of the USSR pulled away and went on their own way.

That breakup included four countries that had nuclear weapons at the time. One was Russia, of course, one was Kazakhstan, one was Belarus, and one was Ukraine.

Obviously, it is also the policy of United States to contain nuclear weapons and be against proliferation wherever possible.

On December 5, 1995, the United States sat down in Budapest, Hungary, with the Ukrainians, with the Brits at the table and with the Russians at the table, and entered into an agreement whereby they—that is, all of us—asked the Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons in return for which Ukraine would get security for their borders and against an invasion by any country.

All four of us signed that. The Ukrainians did what they agreed to do. They gave up their nuclear weapons, and where do they find themselves in 2022? Facing an invasion by one of the countries that actually signed that agreement.
We have not only a moral obligation, but a legal obligation to do what we said we would do on December 5, 1995 and we are doing that.

Over the past year, extensive discussions have taken place about how the U.S. and our allies can support Ukraine. That is the conversation of about every conversation you enter into here in DC.

However, these discussions get bogged down by fears of giving Ukraine too much equipment too quickly for fear of upsetting Moscow.

I am tired of hearing that. Everyone talks about the need to hand Russia a strategic defeat in Ukraine, but the Administration’s policy stopped short of fully supporting that goal.

What is missing is a more robust discussion about U.S. policy toward Russia now and, just as importantly, beyond the current conflict. Any notion that we can interact with Russia like we did a year ago was shattered by the invasion, but also by Russia’s non-compliance with the New START treaty and many other malign actions it has taken around the world.

It has not only soured its relationship with us, it has soured its relationship with virtually the rest of the planet with the exception of a half a dozen of what I call no-goodnik countries that are in league with them.

I expect our witnesses to help us better understand the Administration’s plans to confront all of Russia’s malign influence. It is critical that U.S. foreign policy be informed by a long-term vision for a future where Russia coexists with its neighbors and does not threaten to destabilize the international community.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration has so far not made clear a concrete policy for how the United States will directly confront Russia as a strategic adversary.

While Putin has irreversibly tied the fate of his regime to the outcome of the war in Ukraine, there is so much more to confronting Russia that the United States must consider.

It is essential that the Biden administration’s Russia policy be characterized by leadership and initiative. I hope your testimony and responses will be given with a focus on that overreaching Russia policy today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

With that, let me turn to our witnesses.

A long-time participant with this committee, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland has been a diplomat for more than 30 years. She started very young. Among her many accolades she previously led the Europe and Eurasia Bureau at this—and served as ambassador to NATO and was the State Department’s spokesperson.

We are also joined by USAID’s Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, Erin McKee, our former ambassador to Papua New Guinea, to the Solomon Islands, and to the Republic of Vanuatu, who began her career working on the post-Soviet space.

Finally, we welcome Assistant Secretary Wallander, who has worked on Russia at the National Security Council in the Pentagon
for many years and has published extensively on Russia and Europe while outside of government.

Welcome to you all. Your full statements will be included in the record, without objection.

I would ask that you try to summarize your statements in about 5 minutes or so that members of the committee can have a conversation with you.

With that, Madam Secretary, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE VICTORIA NULAND, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of this committee.

It is an honor for all of us to join you for this first hearing of the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are meeting on Ukraine as we approach the 1-year anniversary, as you both said.

First, let me thank this committee, the entire Congress, for your continued strong bipartisan support for Ukraine’s battle for its sovereignty, indeed, its very right to exist.

The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for security, economic, humanitarian support that you approved in December for FY23 confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic, teacher, and electricity technician that America stands with them and we stand with them in saying “no” to a vicious autocrat trying to redraw the maps of their country by force and “no” to any others around the world with similar ambitions, because Ukraine’s fight, as you have both said, is about so much more than Ukraine. It is about the world that our children and our grandchildren will inherit.

Since I last sat before this committee in September, Ukraine has regained control of large swaths of its territory in Kherson and in Kharkiv with strong U.S. and international support. It has held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very high costs, but taken losses in the surrounding towns in Soledar.

It has valiantly withstood Putin’s latest barbaric tactic, waves of drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity, and water infrastructure, and with your help has begun to build back and modernize its systems.

As you know, there was another vicious attack in four cities last night, taking out heat and electricity for millions of Ukrainians. Ukraine is already building that back.

Ukraine has also put forward a set of principles for a just and sustainable peace and challenged Russia to engage meaningfully around that framework. In just the last 2 weeks in addition to last night, it has grieved the losses of so many more innocents—Russian missiles destroyed an apartment in Dnipro and, as you know, Ukraine lost senior members of its government in a tragic helicopter crash.

Ukraine’s fight must and will continue because, as my boss, Secretary Blinken, has said so often, if Russia stops fighting this war ends today, but if Ukraine stops fighting Ukraine ends.

That is also the message that all of you heard from President Zelensky when he made his historic visit to the Oval Office on December 21 and also addressed the joint session of Congress.
As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is fighting back with our support. As Assistant Secretary McKee and Assistant Secretary Wallander will outline in more detail, we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them the training, the equipment, and the support they need to defend themselves and to make another concerted effort this spring to push back Russian forces.

This includes providing the PATRIOT air defenses, counter-drone systems, Abrams main battle tanks, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Stryker, artillery, and ammunition.

We and our partners are also speeding equipment and spare parts to Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical infrastructure, including a gas turbine provided by USAID just yesterday that is the size of a tennis court.

We are also providing budget support, economic and humanitarian assistance, and supporting those collecting evidence of Russia’s atrocities and crimes so there can be full accountability.

Throughout this, the Administration remains laser focused on ensuring that no aid or weapons are diverted. We have plumped up our embassy staff in Kyiv for technical oversight.

We are also working with the World Bank, with Deloitte, and with a team of U.S. Government auditors who are in Kyiv this week, in fact, and we continue to support essential reform and anti-corruption measures by the Ukrainian Government across the country.

Ukraine must not simply survive this war. It must emerge stronger, cleaner, more democratic, more European. That is what Ukraine’s patriots are fighting for. That is also central to the support that the United States and our international partners provide.

President Zelensky’s decision this week to fire and accept the resignations of officials suspected of corruption sends a strong signal of Ukraine’s own resolve in this regard.

In the meantime, our coalition of support for Ukraine remains amazingly strong. In total, more than 50 partner nations have committed tens of billions of dollars in military, economic, humanitarian support, and taken in millions of refugees.

We have also worked, as you know, on the Black Sea grain deal—17 million metric tons liberated from Port of Odessa—and we have helped Europe reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuel, more than doubling our own LNG exports to the continent, and we have imposed far-reaching sanctions and a global price cap on Russian oil to reduce revenues for Putin’s vicious war machine without destabilizing energy markets.

None of this—none of what we have seen in Ukraine over the past year, would have been possible, without daily acts of heroism by tens of millions of Ukrainians in all walks of life, but it is also true that much of it would have been impossible without the continued support of the Congress and the American people.

President Biden has pledged that the U.S. will support Ukraine for as long as it takes and we are grateful for the partnership that we have with you in meeting this commitment because it is in our own national interest.

We look forward to taking your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Victoria Nuland

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor to join you for the first hearing of the new Congress. It is also appropriate that we are meeting on Ukraine, as we approach the 1-year anniversary of Putin’s brutal invasion next month.

First, let me thank this Committee, and the entire Congress, for your continued, and strong bipartisan support for Ukraine’s battle for its sovereignty—indeed its very right to exist.

The more than $45 billion in supplemental funding for security, economic, and humanitarian support that you approved in December for FY23, confirms for every Ukrainian fighter, medic, teacher, and electricity technician that America stands with them. We stand with them in saying “no” to a vicious autocrat trying to redraw the map of their country by force. And “no” to any others around the world with similar ambitions. Because Ukraine’s fight is about so much more than Ukraine; it is about the world our own children and grandchildren will inherit.

Since I last met with this Committee in September, Ukraine has:

• Regained control of large swathes of its territory in Kherson and Kharkiv, with strong U.S. and international support;
• Held the line so far in Bakhmut, albeit at very high cost, but taken losses in Soledar;
• Valiantly withstood Putin’s latest barbaric tactic—waves of drone and missile attacks on its heating, electricity, and water infrastructure—and, with our help, begun to build back and modernize its systems;
• Put forward a set of principles for a just and sustainable peace, challenging Russia to engage meaningfully; and
• In the last 2 weeks, grieved the loss of so many innocents when Russian missiles destroyed an apartment complex in Dnipro, and the loss of senior government ministers in a tragic helicopter crash.

Ukraine’s fight must continue because, as Secretary Blinken has said so often: if Russia stops fighting, the war ends; if Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends. That was also the message that President Zelenskyy delivered when he made his historic visit to the Oval Office to thank President Biden and the American people, and when he addressed all of you in a joint session of Congress on December 21.

As Putin continues to pour pain on Ukraine, Ukraine is fighting back with our support. As A/S Wallander and A/A McKee will outline in more detail, we and our allies are working with Ukraine now to get them the training, equipment, and support they need to defend themselves, and make another concerted effort this spring to push Russian forces back. This includes providing PATRIOT air defense and counter-drone systems, Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Stryker armored personnel carriers, and artillery and ammunition.

We and our partners are speeding equipment and spare parts to Ukraine to rebuild and harden its critical infrastructure—including autotransformers as big as tennis courts. We are providing budget support, economic, and humanitarian assistance, and supporting those collecting evidence of Russia’s atrocities and crimes so there can be full accountability.

We also remain laser-focused on ensuring no aid or weapons are diverted—using our Embassy staff in Kyiv along with technical oversight from the World Bank, Deloitte, and U.S. Government auditors, some of whom are in Ukraine this week. And we continue to support essential reform and anti-corruption measures across the country.

Ukraine must not simply survive this war, it must emerge as a stronger, more democratic, and European state—that is what Ukraine’s patriots are fighting for, and that is also central to U.S. and international support. The dismissal this week of officials suspected of corruption sends a strong signal of Ukraine’s resolve in this regard, as well as the effective action of Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions, civil society, and independent media.

Meantime, our global coalition of support for Ukraine remains strong. In total, more than 50 partner nations have committed tens of billions of dollars in military, economic, and humanitarian support; and taken in millions of refugees.

We have also worked together as a coalition to rally the world to support the UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative, unlocking more than 17 million metric tons of food blocked by Russia. We helped Europe reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, more than doubling our own LNG exports to the continent. And together we’ve imposed far reaching sanctions and a global price cap on Russian oil to reduce revenue available to Russia’s war machine without destabilizing energy markets.
None of what we’ve seen in Ukraine over the past year would be possible without daily acts of heroism by tens of millions of Ukrainians in all walks of life. And much of it would be impossible without the continued support of this Congress and the American public. President Biden has pledged that the United States will support Ukraine for as long as it takes.

We are grateful for your partnership in meeting that commitment because it is in our own national interest. I look forward to answering your questions.

The Chairman. Administrator McKee.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIN MCKEE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR EUROPE AND EURASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. McKee. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of this committee.

I deeply appreciate the opportunity to testify about USAID’s work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider efforts to counter Russian aggression throughout Europe and Eurasia.

I also have to thank you for passing the four supplemental appropriations bills that allow the United States to present such a strong united front in assisting Ukraine.

Today, as we have noted, marks 335 days of the Kremlin’s senseless brutal war on Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainians are now refugees. Five point nine million Ukrainians are internally displaced. Some 430 children have been killed, and USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged war crimes and human rights abuses.

Putin’s unjustified war continues to cause catastrophic loss of life and has undermined the security of Europe and the global economy.

Yet, Putin drastically underestimated the Ukrainian people. The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The Ukrainian people demonstrate daily heroism and bravery. Communities emerging from occupation exemplify this resilience despite the horror that they have endured.

At USAID, we are proud to stand beside the Ukrainian people in their fight for freedom. Foreign assistance is a critical tool to realize the United States’ goals of helping Ukraine win its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory as a free, prosperous, independent country with a path towards EU accession.

Ukraine will need a well-functioning state, a vibrant inclusive economy, a free press, and strong institutions free from corruption to secure this future when the war ends.

The supplemental resources generously appropriated by Congress allow USAID to address urgent needs immediately created by the conflict while also remaining focused on what will be needed for recovery and reconstruction.

With these funds we are investing in Ukraine’s economy and helping resuscitate it after the Kremlin’s ruthless attacks on its civilian infrastructure. We are repairing the country’s energy and heating systems to counter Putin’s attempts to wield the harsh winter as a weapon against the people of Ukraine.

We are protecting public health from the deadly consequences of Russia’s war and supporting Ukraine’s health system to restore services while at the same time advancing progress on critical reforms.
We continue to fight corruption at every level, to build public trust, maintain that trust as well as donor support, attract critical private sector investment, safeguard the country’s institutions, and speed its integration with the rest of Europe.

We have also delivered on the United States’ commitment to provide reliable and sustained economic support to the Ukrainian Government, which is critical to ensuring that Ukraine can defend itself and uphold the democratic government and society that is at the core of Putin’s aggression against Ukraine.

The $13 billion in direct budget support that USAID has provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine through generous congressional appropriations has kept government services such as health care, education, and basic utilities running.

This support has made it possible for the Ukrainian people to sustain their resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with unrelenting attacks on that country’s energy grid.

USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility being entrusted with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet critical needs of Ukrainian citizens is USAID’s priority for all budget support provided to the Ukrainian Government, and the Ukrainian Government stands as our partner in this accountability and knows we will be exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.

Beyond the region, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is harming the global economy and worsening global food insecurity due to disruptions to food, fuel, fertilizer supplies, and subsequent price volatility.

As Russia becomes more aggressive in its energy policy, countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and consequently are accelerating their transition to other energy sources with U.S. Government assistance.

The countries in Central Asia are also facing serious disruptions to their economies and food security and are seeking alternatives to Moscow, which USAID is working to support through regional cooperation.

The consequences of Putin’s unprovoked unjustified war in Ukraine extend beyond the battlefield, beyond Ukraine, and beyond Europe. USAID will continue to stand with the Ukrainian people and we are grateful for the support from Congress.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McKee follows:]

Prepared Statement of Ms. Erin McKee

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about USAID’s work to support the people of Ukraine and our wider efforts to counter Russia’s aggression and malign influence throughout Europe and Eurasia. I also want to thank you for passing the four supplemental appropriations bills that allow the United States to present such a strong and united front in assisting Ukraine.

Today marks 335 days of the Kremlin’s senseless, brutal assault on Ukraine. Close to 8 million Ukrainian citizens are now refugees, 5.9 million are internally displaced, some 430 children have been killed, and USAID partners have documented over 20,000 instances of alleged war crimes and human rights abuses. Putin’s unjustified war continues to cause catastrophic loss of life and has undermined the security of Europe and the global economy.
However, Putin drastically underestimated the people of Ukraine. The Government of Ukraine still stands strong and capable. The people of Ukraine demonstrate daily their heroism and bravery. Communities emerging from occupation exemplify resilience, despite the horror they have endured.

At USAID, we are proud of our support to the people of Ukraine as they defend their country, their freedom, and their democracy.

**USAID'S PIVOTAL ROLE IN HELPING UKRAINE WIN THE WAR FOR ITS SURVIVAL**

Foreign assistance is a critical tool to realize U.S. goals of helping Ukraine win its war for survival and achieve a lasting victory as a free, prosperous, and independent country able to realize its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including through EU accession. To secure the future it has chosen, Ukraine must have a well-functioning state; a vibrant, inclusive economy; a free press; and strong institutions free of corruption to secure this future when the war ends. The supplemental resources generously appropriated by Congress allow USAID to anchor U.S. Government efforts to address the urgent humanitarian, economic, energy, and other needs created by the war, while also remaining focused on what will be required for recovery and reconstruction.

**BUDGET SUPPORT HELPS ALLEVIATE THE ACUTE FISCAL CRISIS CAUSED BY RUSSIA'S WAR**

The United States' commitment to provide reliable and sustained direct economic support to the Ukrainian Government is critical to ensuring Ukraine can continue to function as an independent democratic country, that its government can provide critical basic services to its people, and to ensure it is able to stay on a democratic trajectory toward full integration with Europe, which Putin's unprovoked war aims to derail. The $13 billion in direct budget support the U.S. Government has provided thus far to the Government of Ukraine, thanks to generous Congressional appropriations, has kept essential government services such as healthcare, education, and basic utilities running. This support has made it possible for the people of Ukraine to sustain their resolve even as Putin weaponizes winter with unrelenting attacks on the country's energy grid.

USAID delivers direct budget support through a World Bank mechanism, which provides the most effective way to expediently deliver urgently-needed funds with a high degree of accountability. Funds are released to the Government of Ukraine on a reimbursement basis. This mechanism provides a multi-tiered system for accountability—including monitoring, reporting, and audit requirements—with Bank fees waived since after the first tranche of budget support.

USAID appreciates the fundamental responsibility of being entrusted with these U.S. taxpayer funds. Ensuring oversight of and accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars used to meet the critical needs of Ukrainian citizens is a USAID priority. The Ukrainian Government stands as our partner in this accountability and knows we will be exercising extraordinary measures to track these funds.

As such, USAID has deployed an independent third-party monitor to review financial controls and procedures utilized by the Government of Ukraine to track and oversee U.S. funds being used for direct budget support. From day one of our assistance and continuing through the disbursement of the last dollar, USAID will remain laser-focused on making sure U.S. funds are reaching those they are intended to reach. We also plan to expand and strengthen our toolkit of oversight mechanisms, made possible with the most recent generous appropriation of Ukraine funding.

**USAID’S SUPPORT TO ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE KEEPING UKRAINE WARM THIS WINTER**

Last month, the United Nations reported that Russia had destroyed 50 percent of Ukraine's energy infrastructure, putting millions of Ukrainian civilians at risk this winter. Strengthening Ukraine's ability to maintain its systems despite Russia's attacks remains one of our top priorities.

USAID has already delivered 1,700 generators to 22 oblasts across Ukraine, with many more on the way. These generators ensure electricity and heating for schools, hospitals, accommodation centers for internally-displaced persons, district heating companies, and water systems if and when power is knocked out by Russia's air strikes. For example, in the city of Chernihiv, USAID provided 31 diesel generators to the city's public schools, enough to ensure that 13,000 schoolchildren have electricity and heating despite Russia's ongoing attacks.

USAID has announced investments totaling more than $220 million in Ukraine's heating, energy, and utility infrastructure to help the Ukrainian people get through winter and beyond. For example, this assistance supports repairs and maintenance of pipes and other equipment necessary to deliver heating to homes, hospitals,
schools, and businesses across Ukraine. This includes delivering 60 excavators to re-
pair infrastructure in 48 cities, and providing more than 16 kilometers of heating
pipes, with roughly 70 more kilometers of pipes planned for delivery. This builds
on over two decades of support to Ukraine to strengthen the country’s energy se-
curity.

USAID PROVIDES $1.4B IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE WHICH IS NOW THE
WORLD’S LARGEST DISPLACEMENT CRISIS

With nearly 14 million internally displaced persons and refugees, Ukraine has
now surpassed Syria as the world’s largest displacement crisis. The United States
remains the largest donor to the humanitarian response for Ukraine. Since the start
of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. Government has
provided more than $1.9 billion in humanitarian assistance to support people in
Ukraine and those fleeing to neighboring countries, including more than $1.4 billion
in USAID humanitarian assistance.

USAID leads the U.S. humanitarian response for Ukraine through our Disaster
Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART has been working since day one to
provide food and market-based assistance, safe drinking water and hygiene support,
health care, support to women, children, and others affected by sexual violence or
other trauma, and other vital relief.

For example, USAID is supporting the World Food Programme (WFP) and three
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to scale up food assistance in
Ukraine. During December 2022, WFP reached nearly 2.2 million people in Ukraine
with in-kind food distributions, including children who received supplementary feed-
ing.

USAID will continue to coordinate with humanitarian partners in the country and
region to provide Ukrainian civilians with life-saving humanitarian assistance while
ramping up critical development assistance to respond to cyber-attacks and threats
to the energy sector, countering disinformation, supporting small businesses and the
agriculture sector, documenting abuses and atrocities, human rights violations,
meeting essential health needs, and bolstering the continued functioning of local, re-
gional, and national government entities.

USAID RESPONSE AS THE WAR WORSENS GLOBAL FOOD INSECURITY AND MALNUTRITION

Beyond the region, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is harming the global
 economy and worsening global food insecurity and malnutrition due to disruptions
to food, fuel, and fertilizer supplies and subsequent price volatility. Current esti-
mates point to drops in real income of around 1 percent of GDP across developing
countries.

To bolster Ukrainian agriculture exports and help alleviate the global food secu-
rity crisis, USAID established the Agriculture Resilience Initiative (AGRI). AGRI-
Ukraine supports access to inputs, finance, storage and drying services for farmers
and agribusinesses, and is addressing rail export logistics bottlenecks. In coordina-
tion with the EU, UN, Ukrainian Government, and the private sector, AGRI-
Ukraine targets Ukraine’s immediate agricultural production and export challenges,
while supporting the wider needs of Ukraine’s agriculture sector to ensure Ukraine’s
continued production and export of agricultural commodities. USAID has also pro-
vided over 13,600 Ukrainian farmers in Ukraine with seeds, fertilizers, crop protec-
tion, storage services, and other support, reaching approximately 29 percent of the
country’s registered agriculture enterprises, to help them deliver the 2022 harvest
and plant for 2023 despite the devastation caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion.
USAID also has helped farmers access nearly $42 million in loans and state grants
through USAID-supported digital finance apps. These are just some examples of
how USAID has scaled up its assistance in response to rising global food insecurity.

The impact of the war is also worsening the effects of the historic drought in the
Horn of Africa, where at least 23 million people are in need of emergency food as-
sistance. Many of these countries previously relied on imports of Ukrainian grain
and fertilizer to meet food needs and support domestic agricultural production. For
example, before the war, Somalia imported a majority of its wheat supply from
Ukraine. Additionally, high commodity and fuel prices due to disruptions in global
markets are decreasing the purchasing power of vulnerable households and increas-
ing the cost of providing humanitarian assistance. Since February 2022, the U.S.
Government has invested $7.66 billion to address the growing global food security
crisis, including $4.9 billion in humanitarian assistance. As part of that $4.9 billion
investment, Administrator Samantha Power announced nearly $1.2 billion in addi-
tional funding to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia in July 2022, covering a majority
of the $1.8 billion urgent funding requirements identified by the UN to support crit-
ical drought response activities between May to December 2022. To support these investments, we are using all of our tools creatively to communicate about U.S. food security assistance, including reaching 12.9 million unique users in Kenya, with 7.9 million engagements across Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube.

Under the Black Sea Grain Initiative, USAID is partnering with the WFP to help Ukraine export its wheat and continue to feed some of the more than 200 million people globally experiencing acute food security—meaning their lives and livelihoods are at serious risk. The United States has provided more than $68 million to WFP as part of this initiative. This supports WFP's ability to charter vessels for the export of grain when commercial options are limited. To share one example, in early November 2022, the Ikaria Angel, a USAID-supported ship, departed Ukraine en route to Ethiopia carrying 20,000 metric tons of WFP grain, enough to feed 3 million people for 3 months. To date, WFP chartered vessels transported over 426,000 metric tons of wheat through various Black Sea ports supporting Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Somalia.

LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS REMAIN IMPORTANT

In addition to strengthening Ukraine’s energy security during wartime, USAID assistance helps farmers in Ukraine to continue growing food for domestic and global markets, supports Ukrainian efforts to document and seek accountability for war crimes and other atrocities and human rights abuses, fills critical gaps in Ukraine’s health system, and helps local government bodies in 91 communities respond to challenges caused by Putin’s brutal invasion.

A robust civil society and independent media sector is essential as Ukrainian society resists Russia’s aggression and strives to strengthen its political and rule of law institutions and advance its Euro-Atlantic integration. USAID’s programs promote greater citizen participation by enhancing civic education, supporting civic initiatives, and building the organizational capacity of civil society organizations. These efforts advance Ukraine’s democratic development and cultivate grassroots approaches to addressing development challenges. USAID assistance strengthens the public service broadcaster, promotes accountability in the media sector, and helps media outlets create high-quality, fact-based content that educates audiences and contributes to public debate on critical issues. USAID also counters Kremlin disinformation narratives through fostering collaboration among government, commercial media, the creative sector, and civil society, helping these Ukrainian actors create and disseminate high-quality, fact-based content targeted to the audiences most vulnerable to disinformation.

Recently, USAID provided legal, financial, and technical assistance to develop Diia for Ukrainian citizens. Diia is a mobile application and online portal that provides digital access to 120 government services and enables Ukrainian citizens to engage with their government online in a one-stop-shop—from applying for benefits and government programs to paying taxes, accessing important documents, registering and running businesses, and providing identification and digital signatures. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Diia has also enabled Ukrainian citizens to electronically receive government services and social support in areas impacted by war, and has been used by displaced Ukrainian citizens to access aid and other critical services.

In the context of Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February 2022, USAID has continued to partner with the Government of Ukraine to improve essential health services and build the resilience of health systems and institutions to continue serving the Ukrainian people. USAID health activities have continued to operate inside Ukraine, pivoting assistance to ease strains on Ukraine’s health system and address the direct human costs of the war, interruptions to services, and the health needs of the large number of displaced persons inside the country. During the war, USAID’s network of implementing partners has continued working on the ground to meet immediate needs and support long-term strengthening of Ukraine’s health system.

REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

With its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has created new threats, economic turbulence, and uncertainty for countries across the region. As Russia has become more destructive in its energy policy, countries like Moldova are facing much higher prices and, consequently, are accelerating their transition to other energy sources with USAID assistance. These countries have had to re-orient trade, and find new and innovative ways to bolster their economies, even as some have seen substantial influxes of people fleeing Ukraine and Putin’s Russia.
In the earliest days of this crisis, the Lukashenka regime in Belarus allowed Russia’s forces to launch attacks from Belarusian territory. We however continue to support Belarusian independent journalists, media outlets, and bloggers as they provide fact-based content for citizens beyond state-sponsored or Russian propaganda and disinformation. We are also working to raise the civic literacy of Belarusian citizens so that they may remain resilient to malign influence.

At the same time, the Kremlin continues to employ its playbook of malign influence through disinformation, economic and energy coercion, and undermining neighboring democracies. USAID continues to address this as well. For instance, USAID is working in Georgia to debunk the Kremlin’s false narrative that the United States is attempting to drag Georgia into Russia’s war against Ukraine, with a very successful recent campaign that reached more than 400,000 viewers via one Facebook video alone. Malign influence from the Kremlin is only likely to increase in the near future, and USAID remains focused on ensuring our programming builds the long-term resilience of our partners and is able to respond to the Kremlin’s hostile attempts to control others through disinformation and digital authoritarianism.

Through the Countering Russia Influence Fund (CRIF), and in alignment with the broader Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), USAID is working to bolster partner resilience across key sectors, including to: (1) Counter the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine democratic institutions and the rule of law; (2) Resist the manipulation of information; 3) Reduce energy vulnerabilities; and (4) Reduce economic vulnerabilities, as well as counter the Kremlin’s use of corruption across all sectors.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has also brought serious disruptions to the economies of Central Asia, exacerbated food insecurities, and strained if not broken the region’s long-standing bonds with Moscow. Central Asian governments are seeking alternatives to their former reliance on Moscow, and USAID is working to enhance regional cooperation, as well as promote new trade and energy corridors across the Caspian, through the Caucasus and on to Europe.

CONCLUSION

USAID remains committed to supporting the people of Ukraine as they continue the fight to defend their country and their democracy. To date, most of the humanitarian, economic, and budgetary support that Congress previously provided for Ukraine in the supplemental packages has been disbursed or committed. We continue to call on Allies and partners to expeditiously meet their commitments to the people of Ukraine.

USAID will continue to stand with the people of Ukraine and we are grateful for the support from Congress. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to answering your questions.

The Chairman. Thank you.
Secretary Wallander.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Wallander. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today to express the unwavering support of the United States for Ukraine’s sovereignty and security in the face of Russia’s unprovoked and brutal invasion.

Thank you for holding this important hearing at this pivotal time for the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and of the world.

As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this past November, our support for Ukraine’s self-defense is an investment in our own security and prosperity.

What happens in the coming months may prove decisive and we are focused on providing Ukraine with the military capabilities it needs to defend its people and its territory. We are doing this in close cooperation with our allies and partners.
First, we have focused on a layered integrated approach to air defense to counter Russia’s devastating attacks on Ukraine’s population centers and civilian infrastructure.

The PATRIOT capability from the United States, Germany, and the Netherlands will give Ukraine advanced long-range capability. These are complemented by the medium and short-range air defense capabilities such as NASAMs and Avenger that we have provided.

Second, to enhance Ukraine’s ability to maneuver, the United States will provide Abrams main battle tanks, the best tanks in the world. The United Kingdom has also committed Challenger tanks and other European states will provide Leopard tanks.

These main battle tanks are complemented by other vital armor capabilities such as Bradleys and Strykers from the United States, Swedish CV–90s, French AMX–10s, and German Martyrs.

Third, we have expanded U.S.-led collective training to enable the Ukrainians to integrate fires and maneuver. Our training will complement the specialized training conducted by the United States, the European Union, and our allies.

Finally, we continue to work with allies and partners to deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition so Ukraine can sustain its fight.

Russia has discovered that the United States and our allies and partners are serious about supporting Ukraine for the long haul.

Our assistance to Ukraine is possible thanks to bipartisan support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates the most recent Additional Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided presidential drawdown authority, funding for the military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.

Presidential drawdown allows us to get Ukraine critical capabilities quickly. USAI allows us to contract with industry for new and innovative solutions while building Ukraine’s longer-term defense.

We are also ramping up defense industrial base production of critical munitions and equipment, doubling or, in some cases, tripling capacity. Even as we focus on getting Ukraine what it needs we have always prioritized accountability, and Ukraine has, too.

We have adapted our accountability practices for the combat environment to address the risk of illicit diversion, using mechanisms that go above and beyond our standard practices.

The U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any diversion of U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead, we see Ukraine’s front line units effectively employing security assistance every day on the battlefield.

Nearly a year ago, Russia launched its brutal invasion to destroy Ukraine as a free and sovereign nation, threatening European security and transatlantic unity. Today, NATO is stronger, Europe is investing in its own security at record rates, and the incredible people and armed forces of Ukraine remain unbowed and unbroken.

This war has demonstrated that aggression is not worth the price paid by the aggressor. That is a lesson that should reverberate around the world, including among autocratic leaders everywhere.
As Secretary Austin has said, free people always refuse to replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by force and fear. We are determined to support Ukraine’s fight against tyranny and oppression and, in doing so, to defend the American interests and values that are so clearly at stake.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander follows:]

Prepared Statement of Dr. Celeste Wallander

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is the worst crisis in European security since the end of the Second World War. It has upended peace and stability on the continent, poses a historic challenge to European Security, and without the U.S. and international response, would pose a dangerous example to autocratic regimes around the world.

Three decades ago, the collapse of the Soviet empire brought to Europe and Eurasia the possibility of a wider community of free, peaceful, and independent states. Instead, Russia has launched a war against Ukraine to change international borders and bend policies of vulnerable neighbors to its will.

Russia’s war against Ukraine is thus an assault on European and global security. The security of the United States has long rested on the transatlantic community. American forces have been stationed across the Atlantic for decades to ensure peace in cooperation with our NATO Allies. As Secretary Austin said at the Halifax Security Forum this past November, “our support for Ukraine’s self-defense is an investment in our own security and prosperity.”

At the same time, Russia’s war is also an assault on our bedrock values. In carrying out its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has wrought unconscionable death and destruction, killing thousands of civilians, committing horrific atrocities, and attacking critical infrastructure.

Yet nearly a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion last February, its attempt to eliminate Ukraine as an independent state has failed. Russia’s ground offensives, its air attacks, its assaults to freeze and starve and subjugate—all this has only strengthened the spirit and resolve of the indomitable people of Ukraine.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been failing since it started in February 2022. Ukraine defeated Russia’s strategic objective to seize Kyiv in the first months. Since then, we have seen Ukraine take the initiative, driving Russia’s forces from Kharkiv and Kherson. Failing on the ground in conventional battle, Russia turned to drone and cruise missile attacks on power and energy systems, but Ukraine’s air defenses and infrastructure have so far proven resilient during the cold winter, with thanks due in large measure to international support. Now we are seeing intense fighting in the east—including around Bakhmut, where Russia’s forces led by Wagner have been trying to take terrain for months at tremendous cost, and near Kreminna, where the Ukrainians are on the offensive.

POSITIONING UKRAINE FOR FURTHER SUCCESS

Russia is trying to gain momentum against increasingly capable Ukrainian Armed Forces along the front lines in Donetsk and Luhansk. Our near-term objective is to enable Ukraine’s forces to regain control of their sovereign territory.

We are working to achieve that objective through enhanced and carefully targeted security assistance, working with allies and partners to provide critical new capabilities and training.

First, we have focused on enabling a layered and integrated approach to air defense. The United States and Germany each have committed to send Patriot systems, and the Netherlands has committed to send launchers and missiles. These will give Ukraine a significantly advanced, long-range capability alongside medium- and short-range air defense capabilities, such as NASAMS and Avenger systems, that we have already provided. Ukraine will have a layered air defense to protect its citizens and fight for its territory.

Second, to enhance Ukraine’s ability to conduct complex maneuvers, in recent weeks the United States and several allies have committed to provide important armor capabilities. From the United States, this includes Abrams main battle tanks, Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, and multiple types of armored personnel carriers,
including Strykers. These armored vehicles will complement Challenger tanks committed by the UK, CV–90 infantry fighting vehicles from Sweden, AMX–10 light armored vehicles from France, and Marder infantry fighting vehicles from Germany.

Third, we have expanded U.S.-led training of Ukraine’s forces to focus on combined arms and joint maneuver operations. This collective training is designed to integrate fires and maneuver—using infantry, armor, artillery, and other capabilities concurrently to defeat an adversary’s ground forces. U.S.-led training will complement separate, specialized training conducted by the European Union and by individual Allies.

Fourth, we have made significant investments in the sustainment of complex weapon systems. This will support current operations as well as an enduring sustainment framework for meeting NATO standards that will persist long after this conflict is over. The U.S.-led framework enables robust and coordinated international capability to more effectively support maintenance, repair, and overhaul operations under continuous, intense combat operations. Sustainment becomes increasingly important as we introduce new and different systems to Ukraine.

Finally, we continue to deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition to ensure Ukraine can sustain its fight against Russia’s forces, which continue to rely on mass artillery fires to compensate for poorly trained forces.

SUSTAINING U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE LONG TERM

Russia has discovered that the United States and our Allies and partners are serious when we have said that we are committed to supporting Ukraine for the long haul.

Our assistance to Ukraine has been made possible by extraordinary support from Congress. The Department of Defense appreciates the most recent Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act that provided an increase in Presidential Drawdown Authority, replenishment funding for the military services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and additional funding for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI). Using Presidential Drawdowns, we are able to get Ukraine the critical capabilities it needs quickly from our own stocks. Through USAI, we have been able to contract with industry for new and innovative solutions, as well as building for Ukraine’s longer-term defense.

With congressional support, we are also ramping up defense industrial base production of critical munitions and equipment—doubling or tripling capacity in many cases. Allies have stepped up impressively on bolstering global production as well. Accountability for U.S. assistance also remains a top priority. The U.S. Government has not seen credible evidence of any diversion of U.S.-provided weapons outside of Ukraine. Instead, we see Ukraine’s frontline units effectively employing security assistance on a large scale every day on the battlefield. Nonetheless, we are keenly aware of the possible risk of illicit diversion, and we are proactively taking all possible steps to prevent this from happening. We have worked to adapt our accountability practices for the combat environment in Ukraine, through expanded reporting mechanisms and site inspections. These measures go above and beyond prior practices and programs.

LEADING A GLOBAL COALITION, FORTIFYING NATO

While the United States is committing significant resources to Ukraine’s defense, we are far from alone. Secretary Austin has marshaled a coalition of some 50 nations through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG), to provide security assistance now and to make investments in a sustainable industrial base.

On January 20, we held the eighth meeting of the UDCG, at Ramstein Air Base in Germany. This forum continues to generate significant commitments from allies and partners—including in the top capability priority areas of air defense, artillery, and armor. The most recent meeting highlighted contributions at levels in scale, variety, and likely battlefield impact even greater than the successful meetings in 2022.

And we have increased our own defense to deter future aggression by Russia. Our transatlantic defense alliance is stronger than ever, and NATO has bolstered its forward defenses and enhanced its forces. Since last February, we have deployed or extended more than 20,000 additional U.S. forces to Europe. In Poland, we have established the first permanent U.S. forces on NATO’s eastern flank. And we look forward to welcoming Finland and Sweden to NATO’s ranks. U.S. forces maintain a persistent combat credible presence across Europe in support of NATO, including forward on NATO’s eastern flank.
RUSSIA'S DIMINISHED STANDING

Even as Russia’s standing and strength are quickly eroding as a result of its ill-considered war against Ukraine, Moscow continues in its attempts to project influence around the globe. But one only needs to look to Russia’s neighbors to see how it is failing. As NATO’s cohesion and unity of purpose are reinforced, Russia’s standing is fraying among the countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate.

In Georgia, the United States is deepening our defense partnership and undertaking significant new defense capacity building and reform programs. Elsewhere, such as in Moldova, Armenia, and the states of Central Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable security partner. The Defense Department welcomes opportunities to deepen our own defense relations with these and other states as part of a whole-of-government approach that reinforces these states’ sovereignty, independence, shared values, and the rule of law.

* * * * *

Ultimately, when you take into account the fierce resistance of the people of Ukraine, the strengthening of the transatlantic alliance, and the massive costs to Russia, this war has already demonstrated that aggression is not worth the price paid by the aggressor. That is a lesson that should reverberate around the world—including among autocratic leaders everywhere. The United States and our allies and partners will not tolerate living in a world where borders can be changed, or spheres of influence imposed, by force.

As Secretary Austin has said, “free people always refuse to replace an open order of rules and rights with one dictated by force and fear.” We are determined to support Ukraine’s fight to defend its freedom, democracy, and independence against Russia’s aggression—and by doing so, to defend the American interests and values that are so clearly at stake.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you all for your testimony. We will start a round of 5-minute questions. Let me make some prefatory remarks before I go to my questions here.

I am all in and have been since 2014 when I waved my saber and said we should be far more responsive to the invasion of Crimea because it was the warning sign, and the world, including the United States, was relatively mute in its response to the invasion and annexation of Crimea.

Then Putin got the message that you can march on and that is part of what is at stake now, that he can march on.

There are those I know who have an insular view and others who have a legitimate question, and as someone who back at home in New Jersey when I am asked by my constituents why are we spending so much money on Ukraine, I make the point to them that, in fact, what is at stake is not only the Ukrainians’ freedom, which in and of itself is important, but also the proposition that you cannot by force take another country’s territory, because if that can become the rule of the day, there are many despots and authoritarians who will seek to do that—China in Taiwan, North Korea, possibly, against South Korea. The list is endless.

Having said that, I would commend to you, Madam Secretary, to speak to the Secretary and to the Administration that I think it is important that we articulate what is our definition of victory and what is the blueprint for victory in order to continue to have the bipartisan support of Congress for the resources that will be necessary to achieve that victory.

I think that is critically important. I am not saying that we do not have one, but it has not been well-articulated if there is one, and if there is not a full vision of what that blueprint is, we should be thinking about what it is and how we execute on it.
With that, and we also—I am a strong supporter. I have voted for everything for the Ukrainians in past legislation going back to 2014, but we also have to tell our friends in Ukraine you cannot sell white phosphorus to the Azerbaijanis that kill Armenians. There are responsibilities as well, not just the opportunity to receive resources.

My first question is about sanctions and it is particularly about China. As you well know, President Putin met with Chinese President Xi Jinping in February of 2022 where they touted their no-limits partnership just weeks before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Since that time, I understand there has been evidence that Chinese companies, including working through Hong Kong, have been exporting dual-use technologies, including semiconductor chips, which are critically important to fill in, particularly on missile guidance systems that Russia needs to continue its onslaught of Ukraine.

It seems to me that we should not forsake the potential of sanctions against China if it is providing critical assistance and it should not be able to hide behind some companies.

Have we raised these concerns at the highest levels of the Chinese Government? Is this support from China to Russia not a direct violation of U.S. sanctions?

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and for your strong personal support for Ukraine and your perfect articulation of what is at stake here, which the President agrees with, as he said yesterday.

With regard to China, yes. From well before this latest invasion began in November and December even of 2021 we began an intense conversation with China at every level, which the President himself has led and all of our senior leaders have been involved in with regard to their relationship with Russia and about their own interests, in our view, and upholding the U.N. Charter and not allowing Putin style rules of the road to dominate, and we have made clear that we will bring to their attention when we see sanctions violations by their companies and we have been very clear with regard to the impact on our relationship and their standing in the world were they——

The CHAIRMAN. I just do not think that we have followed up those conversations with robust sanctions against companies that are providing dual-use technology that is allowing the Russians to continue to have access to missile capabilities that we should not let them have.

Ms. NULAND. Chairman, I would——

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me that—we need to in—addition to all the money that we are providing, all the defense equipment we are providing, we need to cut the head of the snake off in every way we can and that means sanctioning it directly and its inner core, which I give the Administration credit for.

It also means sanctioning those vigorously who are assisting Russia in this unjust and unholy war, and so I hope we will be far more robust in that regard. I do not care that it is China. I do not care who it is. At the end of the day, they cannot act with impunity and face no consequence.
Ms. NULAND. We agree with that, Chairman, and we have a new set of sanctions out today, which I think you will see some of the things that you have been calling for—

The CHAIRMAN. I look forward to that.

Ms. NULAND. —particularly with regard to—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know if you are familiar directly with what I mentioned in my opening statement about the Magnitsky letter and Vladimir Kara-Murza. It has past the time statutorily to get an answer.

I see no reason why, in fact, we cannot, in essence, have sanctions against someone who is one of Russia’s biggest critics—Putin’s biggest critic, not Russia’s biggest critic, Putin’s biggest critic—and is jailed as a result of it.

We should make it clear through Magnitsky sanctions. Senator Cardin has been the author of that law. This is an example of what it was meant to use. Can you get us an answer, please?

Ms. NULAND. We are not only going to get you an answer, we are going to get you Magnitsky sanctions in very short order.

The CHAIRMAN. Bravo. All right. Now, lastly, what are we doing as it relates to the need for—some of us went to The Hague earlier last year to press the case on sanctions and prosecutions against those who are committing war crimes. There must be. There must be accountability and accountability without prosecutions is not accountability. Are we focused on that as well?

Ms. NULAND. We are, Chairman. We have a G–7 working group of lawyers as well as the group of G–7 political directors that I am involved in looking at various models of accountability. There are three or four under consideration.

I think we will have more to say about that as we approach the anniversary in terms of the actual setting up of judicial proceedings.

In the meantime—and Erin can speak to this in more detail—we are involved in supporting all kinds of accountability mechanisms on the ground in Ukraine, everything from collecting evidence to supporting the cataloguing of atrocities, et cetera, and we are working with the Ukrainians on some interim measures of registries of attack, et cetera, that could be used for future accountability.

I do not know if Erin has anything she wants to add there.

Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.

We are working very closely on the ground through our Human Rights and Access to Justice Centers that have a network throughout Ukraine, over 22 locations, to gather and document the evidence for such time to be able to, as you said, prosecute and hold accountable those actions inside Ukraine.

We are not waiting for the determination for that process to be set up, but preparing all we can so that when it is in place, swift and appropriate due process can be made and the evidence is available.

The CHAIRMAN. The earlier that possible prosecutions are prosecuted and successfully done will send a chilling effect to those who think they can act with impunity.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Nuland, you said there are going to be new sanctions out today. Who are those going to be against? Who are the targets of those sanctions?

Ms. Nuland, Ranking Member Risch, there are more than 40 sanctions coming out. They may actually have been published at about 10:30. The vast majority of them are against Prigozhin and the Wagner Group in Africa.

There are also sanctions against Putin’s cronies, against those who provide material support to Russia’s military industrial complex, and then there is one in particular that addresses the Chairman’s question with regard to China.

Senator Risch. The Chairman and I have both been anxious to see what is happening with China because China seems to be acting with impunity, and that we really need to ratchet up our sanctions in that regard.

Nobody—they may be big, but they are not too big to fail in that regard and we really need to ratchet the sanctions up there.

Also, Secretary Nuland, first of all, I think most of us here were glad to see that finally the Administration yesterday agreed to provide Abrams tanks and we have been calling for this for some time, but we have been repeatedly told over the months that sending tanks to Ukraine was not possible or desirable, or would somehow be escalatory, and all of a sudden it changed yesterday.

How did that—this is embarrassing. How did that change? What happened?

Ms. Nuland. I am going to let Assistant Secretary Wallander talk about the internal discussion inside the Pentagon.

What I will say to you, Ranking Member, is that Abrams, as you know, are very sophisticated tanks and they require significant training. So even as we approved them yesterday it is going to take some time to get them to the battlefields. This is not something that is going to appear in time for the spring offensive. What is most needed—

Senator Risch. Which brings it—which underscores what I said. We have been asking for this for 6 months. Had you started 6 months ago they would be all ready for the spring offensive.

So what happened here? Who is to blame for this?

Ms. Nuland. I think at every stage of this we have looked at what the Ukrainians have needed, what they have been requesting. There was a period in the fall where they were capturing a huge number of Russian tanks on the battlefield, which they were able to use successfully in the Kherson and Kharkiv offensive, but now they need more and so we are responding.

Senator Risch. It did not answer the question, but I guess we are not going to get an answer to that question. I got to tell you, it is—all through this thing we have been pressing the Administration to do things and usually they do the right thing, but it takes forever to get there and, as a result of that, there is a great loss on the battlefield and lives lost in the meantime. I want to underscore that the Administration, truly, needs to act more rapidly.

That brings us, Secretary Wallander, to the Stryker combat vehicles. As we all know, there are different versions of the Stryker vehicles and one of the things that Ukraine has been asking for is the Strykers that are equipped with the cannons that are com-
parable to those found on tanks, but the Administration is declining to give them those. They are giving them something with only machine guns and no heavy weapons, and they are really not much more than an armored taxi cab.

What is going on there? Can we expect the reversal of that, hopefully, in the near future?

Dr. Wallander. Senator, I do not have information on the specific variant of Stryker vehicles’ APCs, as you refer to. What I will say is that——

Senator Risch. You do know that they are not going to—they have decided they are—at least they are telling us they are not going to give them the ones with the cannons that are found on the tanks?

Dr. Wallander. I would need to validate that, Senator, but I will speak to the value of the Stryker capability and the volume of the Stryker capability.

Senator Risch. We know the value of the Stryker capability and we know how much it is enhanced if it has got a cannon on it instead of machine guns.

I am not really interested in that part of the answer, but again, I would urge you, and I suppose the way things go eventually they will do it, but they need to do it and they really need to do it rapidly.

My time is almost up. At some point in time we need to have a really good discussion on what is going to happen when this is over. It will be over at some point in time. Either the Russians will quit fighting or the Ukrainians will quit fighting. Neither one of them are near that point at this point.

What is going to happen in the future? Look, we are not going to go back to doing business with Russia as we have before and so as a result of that we need to talk about how we are going to interact with Russia.

The Europeans are already doing that. When they come to see me they have already got blueprints as far as where—they are going to change directions, so I would like to hear how we are going to change directions.

With that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank our three witnesses, not just for their testimony today, but for your service to our country.

I want to follow up on Chairman Menendez’s last point first and that is accountability. Tomorrow is Holocaust Remembrance Day, the 77th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz.

I appreciate and believe we are making substantial progress in maintaining the evidence to pursue war crimes or crimes against humanity for those that are responsible at the highest levels.

Early action is going to be important. Is there any hope that we could move forward with some recognized international mechanism that could start the process so that it is known internationally that accountability is going to be part of the resolution of this conflict?

Ms. Nuland. Senator Cardin, as I said, we are working hard on this with our G–7 partners and with Ukraine. We want to just——
Senator CARDIN. I understand you are working on gathering the evidence.

Ms. NULAND. No. Also on which of the various models for pursuing justice.

Senator CARDIN. What is the timing on that?

Ms. NULAND. I would like to see us come to conclusion before the anniversary around February, but it may take another few months. Certainly before the summer, I would hope.

Senator CARDIN. That——

Ms. NULAND. I would also note that when I was out with the Secretary in Kyiv in September we went to Irpin to see one of the towns that had been decimated by Russian missiles and we met with some of the nongovernmental organizations that USAID is supporting, who were minutely gathering evidence and plotting it. So——

Senator CARDIN. No, I appreciate the fact.

Ms. NULAND. Yes.

Senator CARDIN. I have been actually briefed on some of the evidence that has actually been obtained.

Ms. NULAND. Yes.

Senator CARDIN. My concern is will we have a mechanism that will allow the international community to observe that accountability is actually being pursued, such as like the Nuremberg trials after World War II.

Are we going to have some mechanism like that? If I understand your answer, we should know that in the next couple of months.

Ms. NULAND. That is our aspiration, and in another setting I can brief you on the various options we are considering.

Senator CARDIN. I appreciate that. I will pursue that.

You have all mentioned the Wagner Group several times, and as I understand there will be some additional sanctions in regards to those involved in the Wagner Group.

You have taken certain steps to designate them as an international criminal group. You have not designated them as a foreign terrorist organization. Why not and what else can we do? Because this is not only a threat to what is going on in Ukraine, this is a global threat.

What else can we do to show that we are doing everything we can to protect against the growth of this type of an organization?

Ms. NULAND. We went, Senator, with a transnational criminal organization designation because it better suits the way Wagner operates, particularly what it is doing in Africa, that they are in this for their own material gain and for power and for ripping off the wealth of states, particularly in Africa.

In addition to sanctioning the main entities we are now working on—the sanctions today go to some of those supporting entities of Wagner, those they do business with.

We are also looking at gold and other main sources of revenue for the Wagner team. As you know, they have access to gold mines in Mali and in Central African Republic. They are seeking more of that and that directly funds the combat that they are engaged in in Ukraine.

We are working on some of those measures, and we are working with African governments and encouraging those who have gotten
in bed with Wagner to rethink and trying to strengthen those who are under threat of Wagner now.

Senator CARDIN. Do you need any further guidance or support from—by congressional action?

Ms. NULAND. Not at this moment, but as we pursue the drying up of the financial network of Wagner we may come back to you if we may, and then, as you know, in another setting we can talk about some of the other activities that we are involved with.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

I want to just mention one point in regards to USAID. I understand you are now using some of the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund dollars have been successfully rededicated to help Ukraine. Can you just give us a quick status on the use of those funds?

Ms. MCKEE. Thank you, Senator.

Yes, it was, I think, with your help and bipartisan support we were able to unlock those funds that have been frozen, frankly, for 15 years and we are providing the vast majority of those reflows that have been frozen to WNISEF, which is the Western Newly Independent States Enterprise Fund, to stimulate and support small and medium enterprise growth and activity and access to finance and credit in Ukraine and Moldova, which is part of their mandate.

The conclusion of the modifications to the various instruments was done right before the holidays and we are rolling ahead now with identifying those opportunities.

I need to note that WNISEF did not stop working inside Ukraine at the start of the war or the second invasion, and immediately mobilized their team, their network, and their clients to relocate and stay in business, which was vital to continue to help provide both livelihoods and income as well as revenue to the Government of Ukraine.

Senator CARDIN. Just please keep us informed as to how those funds are being utilized. We appreciate it.

Ms. McKee. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Paul.

Senator PAUL. It has been argued that all we need is more sanctions and there is an argument that sanctions have value, but it is the unwinding and the leverage of removing sanctions that actually accomplishes something, not adding more sanctions.

In fact, Ms. Nuland, when you went to Moscow in October of 2021 you were only allowed to go because there was a negotiation in advance of that where we agreed to take sanctions off of a Russian individual and Russia agreed in tandem to take sanctions off of you.

I have had this discussion for quite a while. We have sanctions on 25 members of the Duma, mostly for political reasons because they have politically spoken out against U.S. interests, but they are, of course, Russians.

They also, in turn, sanction us as well. So 25, 30 members of Congress are sanctioned as well.

Do you favor or oppose some sort of arrangement similar to your arrangement where sanction removal was traded to enhance diplomacy? Do you favor that for legislative sanctions on individuals?
Ms. NULAND. Senator Paul, in the context of a Russian decision to negotiate seriously and withdraw its forces from Ukraine and return territory, I would certainly favor and I believe Secretary Blinken would also favor sanctions relief in that context.

Senator PAUL. I do not think hardly taking off sanctions on a member of the Duma is going to be traded for the end of the war. I mean, I wish it were that easy.

What I am talking about is allowing members of their Duma, many of whom may be favorable to our country, to travel to our country, and vice versa. I am talking about diplomatic legislative exchange. I am not talking about trading it for peace.

I am sure that would be great, but I do not think that is really on the table, trading—removing sanctions on Senator Risch for peace. I wish that were important enough, but I do not know that that is going to happen.

That is what I am talking about. I am talking about very small, incremental removal of sanctions on legislative members in exchange for them doing the same.

Ms. NULAND. Senator, all of the members of the Duma on whom we have sanctions are people who have supported Russia’s war, the annexation of Crimea, et cetera.

Senator PAUL. That would be about 90 percent of the people of Russia.

Ms. NULAND. Absolutely.

Senator PAUL. I mean, it probably would be 90 percent of the Duma. We only have sanctions on 25 or 30, but I would venture to say every member of the Duma probably supports Crimea.

I am not saying it is right. I am just saying this is their perspective, and if we are going to sanction people for their belief and their sort of nationalist version of the world, then we will not have any discussion between people or any legislative exchange.

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I would say that if it is in U.S. interest for there to be conversations with Russians, we should look hard at what can be done to facilitate those and I——

Senator PAUL. I would argue that it is. There has been a great deal of discussion about prosecutions. Let us drag people to The Hague. Let us have some prosecutions. Would Putin be one of those targets?

Ms. NULAND. Senator, he is certainly guilty of prosecuting war crimes. He is certainly the leader of this illegal aggression. As I said to Senator Cardin——

Senator PAUL. It sounds like the Administration would favor taking him to The Hague?

Ms. NULAND. As I said to Senator Cardin, we are now looking with our allies and partners and the Ukrainians at the appropriate judicial mechanism and that would indicate the scope of what would be covered.

Senator PAUL. If you are really thinking ultimately that there might be a peaceful settlement that does not involve unconditional surrender by the Russians, or vice versa by the Ukrainians, you might at least put some thought into the fact that saying that he is guilty of war crimes and that it is a possibility he is going to The Hague, that it may make any kind of settlement—peaceful settlement or someone who is fighting a war less likely to prosecute
a peace or to engage in peace talks if he thinks, hmm, if there is peace we are going to The Hague—that there is going to be prosecutions.

I am not saying one way or another on the facts of whether there are war crimes. I am just saying that if you say the leader of somebody in a war that you would like to ultimately resolve is guilty of these things, I think it makes it very much less likely.

I think it is a careless remark and it is a remark that does not really think fully through the ramifications of what you say. Because when you say that, I think you are basically saying this war is going to go on forever and with—if you want to picture devastation—you see Ukraine now, in 5 years it will be worse.

I mean, I do not imagine this getting better over the next 5 years, but if you preclude peace I think you inevitably will make it worse.

Ms. NULAND. Senator, if I may.

I have spent my life at the State Department. We never preclude peace. That is what we are about. I would cite the precedent of Kosovo, of Bosnia, of Rwanda, where we have successfully supported wars winding down through diplomatic means while also pursuing justice.

Senator PAUL. We kind of—just about unconditionally, one, too—and we captured those people or somebody captured them and gave them to us—I mean, that is what you would have to imagine, and I do think that you need to think through this because I do not think you or the Administration have or anybody that is calling for prosecution of Putin for war crimes and saying this is genocide and all of these things and saying it is the Holocaust because once you say that I think you make peace less likely.

Nothing of what I am saying is to say anything Putin has done is justified. I am just saying that if you are going to say these things you are very less likely to have any kind of peaceful settlement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Booker.

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our three witnesses today, really, for the work that you are doing. Your commitment and your leadership at a time of global crisis is extraordinary, and I am just humbled and grateful for your professionalism and your focus and, obviously, for you being here today.

I want to mention how grateful I was in a bipartisan way that in the NDAA we were able to get some more reporting language requirements on the activities of the Wagner Group, and I am very concerned—and it has already been addressed in some other questioning—about the Wagner’s activities in Africa and cannot lose sight of how this is all interrelated.

We are in a moment in human history where this idea that might makes right, where you can invade your neighbor—this is not just a Ukrainian issue. This is very much, as I think my senior senator and chairman said, an issue that all Americans should be concerned with, and if we do not face this Russian aggression here, we will see the crisis expand in ways that threaten the world order
and stability that we have fought and invested in generations to establish not just in Europe, but globally.

I would like to drill down, if I can, about my ongoing concerns about food insecurity and how this is affecting global issues.

Ukraine is obviously approaching its planting season. It is likely that their agricultural capacity will be further reduced by the effects of this invasion and this could, in turn, have just impacts on what we are seeing now, which is not just disruptions in the global food chain, but a level of food insecurity globally that is some of the highest it has ever been.

I am wondering what the Administration is doing to plan ahead on this and what further resources might be needed from Congress to address the growing crisis of food insecurity globally.

Ms. Nuland. Why do I not start and then Assistant Administrator McKee can jump in?

Senator, thank you for all of your support as well and your frequent travel.

As I said in my opening, through the Black Sea Grain Initiative brokered by the U.N., which we supported and helped midwife, we have liberated about 17 million tons of Ukraine’s grain, but, as you said, their exports are still down about 30 percent and there are risks for planting.

From that perspective, the money that the Congress has provided both last year and in FY23, we are working at every level with the World Food Programme, as you know, to speed both food and fertilizer to countries that would normally be consumers of Ukraine and, frankly, Russia’s output to ensure that they can plant this year.

Secretary Blinken is particularly focused on ensuring that we are working on this problem not just for today, but for tomorrow, and particularly in Africa, but in other parts of the world we have, over years of climate change, civil war, other issues, drought, seen soil degraded, seen crops become vulnerable, et cetera.

As we look at the appropriation that you have just given us, we are focused in particular on soil health, on new kinds of seeds and varietals, particularly on the continent of Africa that can withstand climate change, on small farmer support, but also more systemic answers to these questions, and we look forward to working with you.

Erin, I do not know if you have anything to add to that.

Ms. McKee. I do, thank you, and I would like to build on what Under Secretary Nuland mentioned with respect to what we are doing inside Ukraine, who is a key supplier of agricultural commodities and resources, but not the only one, both getting the grain out, but ensuring that the next planting season takes place.

Both through the Black Sea Grain Initiative as well as the solidarity lanes to ensure that all of the above—our ability to trust and rely on Putin to adhere to the agreement—is something that—a factor that we must take into account.

As of at least yesterday there were 121 ships waiting to leave the port in Odessa and there are about four to five ships a day that—through inspections—that are sort of being slow rolled. It is not the—it provided relief, but it is not the only solution.
The greatest solution to helping Ukraine both continue its agricultural contributions to global food security is, obviously, to end the conflict.

I want to thank you, though, for your highlighting this important topic because, as you know, in 2022, just last year, over 205 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian food assistance, which was an 8 percent increase over 2021 and an 89 percent increase compared to 2016.

The global food security crisis that we are seeing today created by climate change, the impacts of supply chain issues, and everything—and compounded and exacerbated by Putin’s unjust war are resulting in a crisis that we have not seen in—at least in my lifetime.

Senator Booker. I just want to add as I conclude, Russia is in this doing a lot on disinformation to try to hide its responsibility for this crisis and deflect responsibility and I think it is just really important, especially as I just met with many African leaders, that we make it clear that this is a crisis being caused by Putin’s war of choice, war of aggression.

Thank you.

Ms. Nuland. Just to say, Senator, I feel that that message is getting through. As you saw at the African Leaders Summit, what they want is solutions and that is why the support you have given us to work creatively with them is most important.

The Chairman. Senator Rounds.

Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Under Secretary Nuland, I am curious about how much information we have really been able to share with the public with regard to the reasoning behind our funding for the Ukrainians in this war with Russia.

Many of us have the opportunity to get the classified discussions where we can be pretty frank about what is going on. I think there is a lot of folks out there that have not had the opportunity that we have had and they will challenge whether or not we have been appropriate or reasonable in our support—continued support for Ukraine in this particular instance.

Would it be fair to say in this unclassified discussion that the Administration’s policy is or the position is that Ukraine can win this war against Russian aggression?

Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think a year ago none of us would have believed that we would be sitting here and Ukraine would still be standing as she is. That said, a third of her territory, as you know, is now held by Russia illegally.

If we did not think that this investment could push back Putin and turn back this tactic that is lawless and creates a world that none of us wants our children to live in, that you can just take a piece of your neighbor’s property by force and that is okay, we would not be asking you, we would not be asking the American people, for this support.

We have seen the gains that the Ukrainians were able to make through September. We are now—they want to push again very hard as the spring comes and that is why you see these new forms of equipment that will help them, we believe, to push Russia back further this spring.
Senator Rounds. In terms of the Administration’s position, our goal is one of, on the ground, seeing Ukraine regain lost land that Russia has taken in previous offensive moves. Is that a fair statement?

Ms. Nuland. That is a fair statement.

Senator Rounds. Longer term, would it be the position that we continue to fund Ukraine as long as Russia has those ill-gotten gains in their possession?

Ms. Nuland. Senator, I think we are going to have to ensure that Ukraine has the defenses not only to continue to try to push Russia back, but to ensure that Putin cannot reconstitute and come back.

One scenario one could see and one that some think that the Russians favor is a pause in this war now on these lines because that would give Putin time to rest and refit and rebuild his own military, and as we saw between 2014 and 2022 he will just be back and he will push further and he will come not just for Ukraine, but for other countries around him. That is why it has to end here.

Senator Rounds. It may be semantics, but what we are really talking about is whether or not Ukraine can win this episode, this war, and part of what you are telling me is within the Administration it is a matter of taking back land from Russia and putting them in a position to where they will not be able to come back and attack again, and that suggests to me that we really do believe that Ukraine can win this war.

Is that a fair statement or—I am trying to get you to either say, yes, we believe Ukraine can win the war, or we are not really making that statement. Do we believe that Ukraine can win the war?

Ms. Nuland. We believe that Ukraine can regain the sovereignty to survive and thrive and it can push Russia back further, yes.

Senator Rounds. Does that mean they win the war?

Ms. Nuland. Ukraine will define what winning is, right, but yes, I believe so.

Senator Rounds. The Administration has a belief that if we continue to fund their needs, and those needs have yet to be defined, it is based upon what the current requests are. Do we know what the next requests are that would give them the ability to retake this land?

Ms. Nuland. Senator, you and the American people have been very generous for FY23. We are assuming that what you have given us for 2023 will—is what we will have through September.

As we saw, a year is an eternity in Ukraine. We do not know where we will be this summer.

Senator Rounds. What I am getting at is—and I do not mean to be argumentative, but it is one thing to say that we are going to put resources in. It is another thing to say that Ukraine has made requests that we have either responded to and said no to, or Ukraine is making requests that we are not going to respond to.

We just did the Abrams tanks after a lot of foot dragging. Are there other items out there that are in the near future that we intend to expand on that we have simply not talked about yet?
Ms. NULAND. In this setting I would simply say that we are working in particular now on speeding more air defenses, speeding more artillery, speeding more ammunition, to the Ukrainians.

You have given us the ability and the financing that we already have to do more between now and September, and we are working with the Ukrainians as they proceed with their battle plans to ensure that what we are giving meets the needs on the ground.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for going over. I just simply think it is really important that the American people understand that this has not been a one step at a time without knowing the direction that we are trying to go and that there really is a plan in place. If not, there should be a plan in place with strategies in place to be ahead of the game rather than simply waiting for the next request in line.

Ms. NULAND. No, absolutely, and just understanding better what you were getting at, as you saw from August to the Kherson offensive in October we worked intensively with the Ukrainians on the kinds of equipment and other kinds of support and training that they needed to mount that offensive.

They did that and now they have plans for a spring offensive and that is what we are focused on both in terms of training and equipment.

I do not know if Assistant Secretary Wallander wants to add.

Senator ROUNDS. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I know members understand that we recognize we cross back and forth and we recognize members who were present at the time of the beginning of the hearing. I know some members have waited, have come back. I just want to remind everybody of the rules.

Senator Van Hollen.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you for your testimony and for your service.

Under Secretary Nuland, thank you and the team for all you have been doing to support the people of Ukraine both on the military front, the political front, and the economic front.

My question relates to sanctions because I think we put in place early on important sanctions on the Russian economy. Those include both financial sanctions, but also export controls and I think, especially on the export control side as time goes on, we have seen that they have had teeth.

The Russians are trying to cast about the world trying to get parts for infrastructure and military. We also, of course, as you mentioned in your testimony put in place an oil price cap, and I do want to focus on that for a moment because despite our sanctions the reality is because of Russian oil exports they continue to reap an awful lot of revenue to support their war machine.

I think the price cap on oil was an important innovation, but I guess my question is what impact have we seen? Because as I see it, I see some reduction in the price people are paying for Russian oil, but I want to know if Russians are making up for it on volume.

India, as you know, has been importing an awful lot of Russian oil. I just saw the other day Pakistan decided to enter into a long-
term oil purchase agreement with Russia. Other countries around the world are looking for cheaper oil.

Are they making—in terms of Russian revenue from oil what is your projection as to both the impact of our sanctions and where—what we can expect it to be over the next—the remainder of the year?

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.

I think one of the success stories of this campaign with our allies is that Europe, which was heavily dependent on Russian oil, has now gone to zero and that the U.S. has successfully been able to support them in that as well as increasing our own LNG exports to Europe some 68 percent.

The oil price cap, which was a new tool of financial diplomacy which some folks were skeptical of has been extremely successful. As you probably know, the price of Russian crude was over $100 a barrel before the price cap and it is now trading at around $40 per barrel as of January 9.

Even if Russia is pumping more to India and other countries, the profit margin that they are making on it is less. I, frankly, do not have in front of me the total numbers, but if we had not instituted the price cap along with our allies and partners the revenues would have been off the charts.

Countries like India that need the oil, but do not want to fund the fuel machine—the war machine have a better option.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Sure. I am going to go from this hearing to a meeting with the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, who has been very involved, as you know, in this and try to get a full read-out, but there is no doubt there is progress on the price of Russian oil and I applaud the Administration. That was an innovative approach.

In terms of overall revenue coming into the Russian coffers, I think we need to be very watchful of that because if the overall objective is to reduce the money coming in for the war machine, of less profit the Russians make, good, but so long as they are making some profit and make up for lost profit in volume on revenues we have not achieved our overall objective, at least in my view.

I know there have been some questions about the Wagner Group, including in the Central African Republic. Reporting suggests Wagner is also very much in the mining business these days in Africa and some of those proceeds can also help fund the war against Ukraine.

Could you talk specifically about the situation in Burkina Faso? Because I think we are familiar on this committee with what happened in Mali. A lot of us are very concerned about the Wagner Group's penetration into Burkina Faso.

Ms. NULAND. Senator, before you joined I made reference to a new tranche of sanctions being announced today—they may already have been announced—which include a large number of Prigozhin and Wagner targets and particularly Wagner targets in Africa, those who help facilitate his network there.

We are very focused on Burkina Faso. I think, as I mentioned to you when I saw you in another setting, I was there in October with an interagency delegation along with Assistant Secretary Wallander, and at that time and continuing in a phone call that
I had with the acting president or with President Traoré around Christmas, he continued to say that he would not invite Wagner, that he was accepting Russian equipment, but that Burkinabe would fight for Burkina.

We have strongly encouraged them not to go in that direction and cited the example of the Central African Republic in Mali where they no longer control their own sovereignty, their own territory, their own mines, that that is the property of Wagner and directly funds the war in Ukraine.

We are continuing to work on that issue within the constraints that we have in a country that has had a coup, Section 7008. We are encouraging those allies who can provide equipment to do so and continuing our own security support as we are allowed.

Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Hagerty.

Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to state that I certainly want to see Ukraine win this conflict. The people of Tennessee, the people of America, want to see that result, too, and I would like to associate myself with the comments of our Chairman about having a blueprint in place to understand the path to get there.

I think that is responsible, and to the extent you are able to share that with us in this sort of setting or another I would look forward to participating in that goal.

My real concern and what I would like to talk with you first about is the magnitude of U.S. funding of this and the accountability associated with it.

Right now, the United States is bearing the lion’s share of the funding for the assistance—the military assistance to Ukraine and we are doing that despite real concerns about accountability, about corruption.

President Zelensky recently, very recently, dismissed senior officials over corruption concerns and many Americans, certainly, many Tennesseans that talk to me are very concerned about a type of open-ended commitment to Ukraine.

Again, this gets back to what the Chairman was raising. Having a clear picture of where we are headed, I think, would be most useful.

The other concern I hear about, though, greatly is where the United States is relative to other European nations. Now, the countries that are most proximate to the border countries have really stepped up and punched above their weight when you look at the share of their defense spending versus their GDP.

You have other major economies in Europe that are not pulling their weight, and when you look at it relative to the United States you have got countries like Germany where the United States is paying double our GDP versus what the Germans are doing. We are doing five times what France is spending as a percentage of GDP in terms of supporting this war.

My first question is what are you—what are we doing as a nation—what are you doing specifically to try to encourage these large European allies who are far more proximate to the problem to step up and do more?

Ms. Nuland. Thanks, Senator Hagerty.
We should compare our statistics because, actually, we have throughout this war worked very hard with our coalition of some 50 partners both on the security side and on the economic side to ensure burden sharing, and our numbers indicate that our allies and partners around the world are carrying at least half of the burden, if not more, in some categories, including some of the things that are hard to calculate like the millions—10 million or more—Ukrainian refugees in some of their cities, and the recent announcement by the Germans of Leopard tanks will make a significant increase to their particular contribution, but what I am—

Senator HAGERTY. I know it was very painful getting the Germans to that point, but I appreciate the effort that went into getting that to happen.

Ms. NULAND. With regard to the longer term as we spoke about what is ahead for the Ukrainians, which is this strong push in the spring, and I think we will see the results of that and that will give us a sense, but what they have made clear is they cannot pause now. That will only favor Russia, and we want to put them in the best possible position so that whether this war ends on the battlefield, whether it ends with diplomacy or some combination that they are sitting on a map that is far more advantageous for their long-term future—

Senator HAGERTY. Understood.

Ms. NULAND. —and that Putin feels the strategic failure.

Senator HAGERTY. I would just encourage continued efforts working with our European allies to get them to step up and find their way to the point that you just described where German got to the tank support. Please do more of that.

Can I go to presidential drawdown authority right now and what has happened there? I have watched this Administration transfer billions of dollars worth of military equipment to Ukraine under the PDA, but I watch what is happening in Taiwan and this is a source of frustration, I think, you and I may have discussed before. Right now my understanding is that we have a $19 billion backlog—a years-long backlog of military equipment that is destined for Taiwan, but is not yet there.

I have spent a tremendous amount of time on our foreign military sales program here in America with our allies. The system does not work as well as it should, and I would very much appreciate the opportunity to hear from you if you have an immediate perspective and then later, perhaps, a briefing on where we are going with that.

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I would like to come back to you on the specifics of Taiwan backlog and, perhaps, not in this setting, but we agree with you that even as we support Ukraine and push back Russia, we have to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses and we are engaged in that intensively with the Pentagon.

Senator HAGERTY. Secretary Wallander, any further comments on that?

Dr. WALLANDER. No, simply to agree that the Pentagon is focused on the acute fight and importance of supporting Ukraine, but at the same time is learning lessons for support of Taiwan and shares concern about supply chain issues and fulfilling of contracts
and has a focused working group led by the acquisition and sustainment portion of OSD to focus exactly on that.

Senator HAGERTY. I will have my team reach out and arrange an update in the appropriate setting to follow up on this.

Thank you both. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Schatz.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being here. I will start with Secretary Wallander.

The Biden administration has so far been very successful in keeping allies unified in response to Russian aggression. I think the last few days, maybe the last week, has been anomalous.

Can you tell me why—and why we should be reassured that this was a blip on the screen and that we are going to move forward in a more unified fashion, especially as I assume wrangling has to happen all the time.

The fact that it happened in public was not insurmountable, just a little bit of a stubbing of our toe, and we got through it, but I want to make sure that this is not the new normal and that we are going to go back to what I thought was pretty extraordinary coordination and unity.

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Senator.

The history of NATO, as Under Secretary Nuland can attest, is one of bringing the alliance together because there is always a common purpose, but there are different ideas about how to get to that common purpose, and we are really grateful and admiring of the work of European allies over the last year in bringing different capabilities, different niches of military capabilities, financing support, to Ukraine. It is a work in progress always.

The specifics of the issue of how to move forward on armor, there was a lot of success built up over the previous weeks on APCs, on infantry fighting vehicles, on all kinds of armored vehicles.

There was intensive discussions about the right mix to get to Ukraine for the fight right away as well as the long term, and the urgency of the fight right now, combined with at the same time thinking about what we needed to provide Ukraine for a longer-term capability, did kind of emerge in public, but underneath we have been working with allies and partners all along and we knew that we would get to a resolution and a solution that provides Ukraine with the capability that it needs.

Senator SCHATZ. Thank you.

Secretary Nuland, I want to talk to you about applying Russia lessons to China, especially as it relates to the economic sanctions regime.

Couple of thoughts. First, if you could just elucidate briefly the differences, right. I think we had extraordinary success, and quickly, in unifying not just allies, but almost the entire planet around a sanctions regime and economic isolation.

That is a heck of a lot harder to do if we are talking about China and an invasion of Taiwan. That is number one, so please talk about the differences.

Number two is can you reassure me that there is an interagency process now on developing a sanctions regime? I get the balance that you have to strike between signaling to China that there will
be consequences, but also, tactically speaking, not telling them exactly what they might be facing so that they can spend 5 years figuring out a plan to evade those sanctions.

Can you talk to me about where we are in that process?

Ms. NULAND. Thanks, Senator.

In this setting I am going to say the following, and I look forward to following up in another setting if you would like. Just as China is intensely learning the lessons of Putin’s failure and the way the world responded so are we thinking about applying the lessons to any future contingencies in Taiwan and, frankly, we are speaking very clearly to the Chinese about it.

We are also speaking to the whole world about it. Were there to be a conflict, as you know, in the Taiwan Straits, 50 percent of global commerce would be disrupted.

If we have had food insecurity as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we would have massive economic global dislocation and China would be directly responsible. That is a talking point that we are using not just with China, but with other allies.

We are also talking about the need to have with every partner, whether or it is an ally or whether it is a hedging state or whether it is a state with deep relations with China, about the concern about having over-reliance, whether it is in their supply chains, whether it is in their strategic relationships, whether in debt on China and creating resiliency.

Senator SCHATZ. So derisking?

Ms. NULAND. Right.

Senator SCHATZ. I do want to—and you do not—maybe this is not appropriate for an open session—but we are having a discussion about how to configure a sanctions bill or send the right signals and I would like for us to get it right and not polarize this issue about are you tough on China or not and make sure that we do not telegraph things that we do not want to telegraph.

I think that they should be clear that there will be severe consequences. I am not sure that they should know exactly what they are because they may be capable of evading those consequences if we tell them 5 years in advance.

Thank you.

Ms. NULAND. I think we would welcome the chance in another setting for those conversations.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to each of you for being here and for the work that you are doing every day.

Ambassador Nuland, I would like to begin with Belarus. Last year, along with three other colleagues, we sent a bipartisan letter to Secretary Blinken about plans to nominate a special envoy to Belarus to succeed Julie Fisher. I did finally get a letter last night in response to that.

Actually, Mr. Chairman, can I ask that we enter this letter into the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[EDITOR’S NOTE.—The information referred to above can be found in the “Additional Material Submitted for the Record” section at the end of this hearing.]
Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

There was nothing in the letter that I was surprised or that I thought we would not have known 6 months ago. I guess my question is while I know that the Belarus affairs unit continues to be very important in supporting pro-democracy movement in Belarus, can you tell me are there plans to appoint a special envoy and who currently leads the Administration’s policy on Belarus?

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.

I am going to apologize on behalf of our Department for taking 6 months to answer a letter from you. That is unacceptable, frankly.

We are looking for an appropriate candidate—a career candidate for this job. It is a complex job, as you know, because you have to work in Vilnius at this moment, given the status.

We have a very excellent chargé who is doing most of the on the ground contact work, but our Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, Karen Donfried, has been meeting with fellow Russians as has her deputy, Robin Dunnigan, at regular intervals to test whether there might be any openings there.

I would not say that we have had manifest success, but also working intensively with the Belarusian opposition and Madam Tikhanovskaya, and the Secretary is seeing her regularly.

We are continuing to work on this and I hope we will have somebody to talk to you about in the not too distant future.

Senator SHAHEEN. Great. I would point out that the congressional delegation in Halifax met with Ms. Tikhanovskaya and she was also very concerned about the lack of a special envoy to address Belarus.

This next question is probably both for you and for Secretary Wallander and it is really about Turkey’s continued failure to ratify Sweden and Finland’s accession agreement into NATO and their interest in getting F–16s and how we are addressing that issue with them.

I would tell you that I, for one, am opposed to supporting—providing F–16s to Turkey until they have ratified that agreement and I think a number of my colleagues share that concern. I know there are other issues around those F–16s, but I just want to put that on the table as one of the concerns that I have.

I think Sweden has moved very deliberately to address the concerns that were discussed with Turkey in terms of their accession into NATO and that their—President Erdogan, unfortunately, is using this, it appears, for his domestic political interests as opposed to really addressing what is in the interest of NATO and the security agreement that we need as we support Ukraine in their fight against Russia.

I do not know which of you would like to address that.

Ms. NULAND. Why do I not start?

We agree with you, Senator Shaheen, that Finland and Sweden are ready to join NATO now and we were grateful for the speedy ratification here and, as you know, almost all allies have now ratified with the exception of Hungary and Turkey.

This comes up in every single conversation we have with Turkey and we have tried to—the Swedes, as you know, have put forward a roadmap that they worked through with Turkey. They have met
many of those benchmarks and they are continuing to try to do more there.

We have made the same point to our Turkish allies that you just made, that we need this Congress’ support, moving forward, for the security enhancements that we think that they need as allies—F–16s, some of them are old—but that this Congress is likely to look far more favorably on that after ratification.

Keep making your points and we will, too.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you.

Would you like to add to that?

Dr. Wallander. I would just add that the Defense Department makes precisely the same points to our Turkish allies at every opportunity and reinforces that in the process—in the democratic processes that support American foreign policy the Congress plays an important role and they need to take that seriously.

Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have lots of questions about Russian influence in the Balkans, but I will save that for another time.

Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Merkley.

Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to all of you.

I wanted to start by having you all and, particularly, Secretary Nuland to address both with India, with South Africa, with the ASEAN nations, the difficulty in getting them to take a strong stand against Russia.

I think it particularly bothers me with democracy in South Africa as democracies, and we have strong partnerships with countries like the Philippines that—and a new government there and, yet, we are not really seeing them as robustly supportive of defending a republic against a dictatorial aggression.

Ms. Nuland. Senator, let me start with the Philippines and the new government where actually they have been quite strong supporters of Ukraine including voting with us in the United Nations against the annexation of Ukrainian territories, including some other work we are doing together on security support, et cetera.

With regard to South Africa and India, as you know, these countries have long-standing historic intertwinnings with Russia. We have been making the case regularly with them that these dependencies that they have created make them more vulnerable and we will continue to do that.

In the case of the oil price cap, as you know, which India was quite skeptical of, they are now major beneficiaries because the oil that they are buying from Russia is so much cheaper, and we are now working with them on ways to diversify away from Russian weapons. I will be in India next week talking about that, among other things.

The South African situation is complex and is also tied to some of the politics inside South Africa, but I would look forward to talking with you offline about some of those things.

Senator Merkley. Great. I am glad to hear that you are going to India and I would think that after the performance of Russian weapons on the battlefield has been demonstrated they might be
somewhat less interested in. Also, that is a big issue with the ASEAN countries, many of which depend on Russian weapons.

Are you proceeding on to Jakarta or to the ASEAN after India?

Ms. NULAND. This trip is South Asia. It is India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and then on to Qatar to work on some of the Afghan SIV issues.

We have—Deputy Secretary Sherman and Secretary—Counselor Chollet have all made these same points in ASEAN and on my last trip to India that was one of the first things we said—look at how these weapons perform on the battlefield.

I think they find themselves after 60 years of entanglement having to find alternatives and that is part of the job we have to do is help them with alternatives.

Senator MERKLEY. Yes. I want to turn to the stories that have been raised about corruption concerns. Zelensky has fired several people. There are stories about the military paying a lot more than market price, which always implies corruption, in buying food.

It is important for us to really work diligently to support Zelensky’s government in taking on corruption because it will be a kind of a cancer eating away at that support that they need from everyone in the world, and I would just get your insights and commentary on that.

Ms. NULAND. Assistant Secretary McKee may have more to add, but as I said in my opening, what Ukrainian patriots are fighting for and what we in the international community are supporting is a more democratic, cleaner, more European Ukraine.

I think Zelensky is very conscious of that and we have been very clear that we need to see, even as they prosecute this war, the anti-corruption steps, including good corporate governance and judicial measures, move forward.

We agree with you that the fact that a number of folks have been dismissed or forced to resign as their cases are being pursued that sends a very strong signal to others who would try to rip off this war effort and is important for the future of Ukraine.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

Last question. My colleague was mentioning concern that the Europeans are not putting as much into support of Ukraine as we are and—but I wonder what that analysis looks like if one considers the much higher prices that they are paying for energy or to host refugees and if you have any sense of how all that balances out in terms of our thinking about the sacrifices that the European partners are making.

Ms. NULAND. Thank you for raising that, Senator Merkley.

I did mention the refugee burden—some 10 million refugees hosted all over Europe—which impacts towns and communities all over the continent and you see that everywhere.

Your point about the fact that most of my European friends report a 300 percent increase in their energy bills over the winter, and if you just think about the sticker shock that that would create if it were happening here, you are absolutely right.

That speaks to the fact that they have now woken up to the fact that the dependence that they had on Russian oil was bad for their national interest, and so there will be—as hard as this has been there will be good structural changes that come out the other end.
Senator MERKLEY. If there is any analysis that weighs those different financial factors together to paint a more complete picture I would just be interested in seeing it.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to each of the witnesses.

Ms. Nuland, as you know, in January of last year, the Senate voted on my legislation to impose sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and it did so before Russia had invaded Ukraine.

When the Senate voted on those sanctions, President Zelensky publicly urged, even begged, the United States Senate to pass those sanctions and President Zelensky said passing those sanctions then were the last chance to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine, the last chance to prevent Russian tanks rolling into Ukraine.

Was President Zelensky wrong?

Ms. NULAND. Senator Cruz, like you, I am and, I think, the Administration is very gratified to know that Nord Stream 2 is now, as you like to say, a hunk of metal at the bottom of the sea.

I, personally having been involved along with my boss, Secretary Blinken, in all of those negotiations with Russia to try to prevent this war in December, do not believe that had that Nord Stream 2 been cut off in January, that would have been decisive for Putin.

It was important that the day the war began the Germans cut the pipeline, as did the rest of the Europeans, but he was bound and determined to go into Ukraine, as you know.

Senator CRUZ. You believe Zelensky was wrong when he said stopping Nord Stream 2 was the last and best way to stop this war?

Ms. NULAND. I do not think it would have stopped Putin and I—

Senator CRUZ. When the Government of Poland similarly said—begged the United States Senate to pass those sanctions and said this is the last and best opportunity to stop Russia from invading Ukraine, you believe Poland was wrong, too?

Ms. NULAND. I do not believe we would have prevented this war had the Europeans acted faster on Nord Stream 2. I wish it were the case, but I do not think it would have stopped him.

Senator CRUZ. Okay. Let us talk about how the war is going, and I know that you and I both agree that it is important for Russia to suffer a crushing defeat.

Putin is a KGB thug and he is committed to undermining our interests, and our enemies across the globe, including in particular China, are watching carefully what happens in Ukraine.

The Iranian regime is watching as well and Iran is committed to doing everything they can to ensure Putin’s victory. They are supplying Putin with resources, especially drones, which are devastating Ukrainian civilians and military assets.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration, which waived the sanctions on Nord Stream 2, the last and best hope of preventing the war, right now today continues to be obsessed with a new nuclear deal with Iran.
Iranian officials say talks remain ongoing while Administration officials say they remain committed to diplomacy, but not right now.

I am deeply concerned that this Administration even in the middle of a war is subordinating the need to counter the Russian-Iranian alliance to its own partisan political preferences.

For example, this Administration has dropped the general U.N. arms embargo against Iran. This Administration has made Russia our intermediary in nuclear talks with Iran.

This Administration has issued sanctions waivers, allowing the Ayatollah to become Putin’s nuclear client. This Administration has withheld weapons for Ukraine to target Iranian operatives in Crimea, helping Russia launch drones, and this Administration has avoided using relevant sanctions authority against Iranian banks, facilitating the transfer of drones to Iran.

As a result, Iran has been able to dramatically boost Putin’s war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, America and the American taxpayer areshouldering the burden of assisting Ukraine while the Biden administration is greasing both sides of this war.

Let us talk about Iran’s supply of drones to Russia. The Biden administration made an immediate decision to go to the United Nations and drop the general U.N. arms embargo on Iran because they say it was required by the original JCPOA nuclear deal.

Biden officials say part of the embargo dealing with drones is still in place, but even that measure will expire this fall pursuant to the JCPOA.

I believe the Biden administration should immediately go to the U.N., invoke our snapback authority, and keep the embargo in place.

Do you agree or do you believe we should allow the U.N. arms embargo on Iran to expire and allow Iranian drones to continue to go to Russia and be used against the people of Ukraine?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the senator has expired, but please answer his question.

Ms. NULAND. Thank you.

Senator Cruz, you are absolutely right that Iranian drones are fueling this war and that is why we have taken many, many increased sanctions measures against Iran over the last couple of months, including against the IRGC Guard Corps Aerospace Force, the Quds Force aviation industry, the Shahed aviation industry, Russian Aerospace Forces, the——

Senator CRUZ. Have you stopped the drones?

Ms. NULAND. We have not stopped the drones and this is part of the problem, but we know what Iran looks like and we also know who Russia’s friends are—Iran, North Korea, and Hamas.

As you know, we are not currently in active discussions with Iran. It is not prepared to take these negotiations seriously right now and we have many of the same concerns that you have, but I look forward to speaking with you in a separate setting about our larger strategy vis-à-vis Iran. I think this is probably not the appropriate setting for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Coons.
Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank you, all three of you, for your service and for your work to continue to help lead the efforts of our Administration in combating Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

I thought the recent decision taken jointly by the United States, Germany, and a number of other NATO allies and European partners—soon to be NATO allies—to send main battle tanks as well as to send Bradleys and Strykers from our Department of Defense was the right one.

I am assuming, if I might, that this was not factored in to your supplemental request last year, and on behalf of the DoD, and if anyone else wants to speak, fine, but what impact does it have on available resources for this new commitment to have made and are there any additional resources or assistance required to meet the additional requirements both security and nonsecurity of deploying Abrams?

Dr. WALLANDER. Thank you, Senator.

DoD has a very focused process in preparing PDA packages and USAI packages in light of what the Ukrainians prioritize, what our assessment is that they require as well, what the readiness impacts are, and what the costs are and deliverability of the capabilities are.

While you are correct that the specific capabilities of the last couple of weeks were not previewed necessarily in the original supplemental, the scope of the supplemental for which we are grateful does accommodate this planning and ongoing planning.

That does not preclude that we may need to come back to request additional funding, but for now, we are in a very good place for that deliberate planning and constant provision of capability to Ukraine.

Senator COONS. I think it is a positive step forward that complements the Bradleys and Strykers that were already announced.

I do think it is important for us to ensure that the assistance made possible by the $45 billion supplemental appropriations at the end of last year is used as intended, that any misuse is identified and addressed.

I have raised these issues directly with President Zelensky last week with the Deputy Prime Minister, the mayor of Kyiv, with a number of legislators from Ukraine, also with our team in Kyiv when I visited in November.

We provided significant additional resources through the State and Foreign Operations appropriations provisions for both USAID and State OIGs. I think enhanced oversight is a good idea.

I would be interested whether, Ms. Nuland, you might describe whether you think the accountability and oversight mechanisms currently in place have been effective and what if anything we need to do to strengthen them. If I might also, Ms. Wallander?

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator Coons, for your attention and support for all of this.

As I mentioned earlier, we have a layered approach on the civilian side. As you know, we have extra staff thanks to you and the embassy who are focused on accountability. We have the budget support—that is the bulk of the economic support funds goes through the World Bank so they actually pay the salaries, et
cetera, that we are intending to support and is double monitored by Deloitte.

We also have—as you said, all of our OIGs are very, very active. In fact, all three of them—State, USAID, and the Department of Defense—as we sit here they are on the ground in Kyiv now doing their first look at all of this.

I will not speak for my colleagues, but when I was in Kyiv in December I got a very intensive brief from the military about how they are accounting for every single artillery shell. It is quite impressive.

Senator Coons, So did I in November and I found it constructive. I just think it is important for our colleagues to get as much of this as we possibly can.

I have just a minute left, if either you would like to speak briefly to it.

Ms. McKee. Thank you, Senator.

I wanted to add in addition to what Under Secretary Nuland mentioned vis-à-vis the reimbursement process for direct budget support through the World Bank and verifying through third party monitoring that those arrears that we are covering are valid.

We also entered into just last month an interagency agreement with the GAO that is going to work with the financial systems and the ministry of finance, of course, in Ukraine to strengthen their own audit capability and with their supreme audit authority to make more robust their internal controls as well. We are moving out and expanding both our internal capacity building as well as third party monitoring and oversight.

Senator Coons. Thank you. I am near the end of my time. I have another colleague waiting.

I will just comment that I am glad to see the Administration has decided to sanction the Wagner Group. I am very concerned about the scope and reach of their impact.

During the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit we pulled together a meeting of five coastal West African national leaders who expressed grave concern about their stability and security, and I think Russia’s malign actions are not limited to Ukraine by any extent and I am concerned about a number of countries in Africa, which I would be happy to work with you further on.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine.

Senator Kaine. Let me go to another part of the world. I have questions for Secretaries Nuland and Wallander about Russian activity in the Americas.

In June—past June, President Ortega in Nicaragua authorized Russian troops, planes, and ships to deploy to Nicaragua for purposes of training law enforcement or emergency response. Russia called this a routine development.

In September, Ortega reached an agreement with Putin to air Russian-produced media content through Russia’s Sputnik Radio network available to more than 20 Nicaraguan state channels broadcasting to the country’s nearly 7 million people.

In Venezuela, Russia has supported the oil industry, helped Venezuela skirt U.S. sanctions, and sent military personnel and equipment to the country. Some observers think that following Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine, Maduro’s fortunes have improved because, in large part, due to our campaign to limit people using Russian oil revenues and the U.S.’ consequent need for other oil partners. The Venezuelan economy and energy situation has gotten better.

I want to ask a couple of questions about this, first to Secretary Nuland. Russia’s state media conducts active disinformation campaigns in Latin America through outlets like RT in Español. Sputnik Mundo and RT play in Español.

How is the Department working with others to counter Russian disinformation efforts in the region?

Ms. NULAND. Senator Kaine, thanks for this and for your support of our efforts to beat back both Russian malign influence and Chinese malign influence in the Americas.

We have robust programs both through our media hub for Latin America, through all of our travel, and through our embassy platforms to speak back ourselves, but also strengthen investigative journalism and government journalists’ understanding of how the Russian disinformation networks work and to be able to expose it as they see it.

Of course, in countries like Nicaragua and Venezuela, who have set their lot with Russia, they are not so interested in hearing it, but we do what we can in the Americas, more broadly, with regard to that.

Senator KAINE. To Secretary Wallander, what is the DoD assessment of the level of Russian military activity in Nicaragua or more generally in the region?

Dr. WALLANDER. Senator, the first and most important duty of the Department of Defense is to protect the American homeland so the Department is always devoting resources in tracking, monitoring, and planning to deter and defend against any threat to the homeland.

The Department does not currently assess that there is a heightened threat to the American homeland because of Russian presence, but it is something that is tracked and monitored every day. Russian presence facilitated by countries like Nicaragua is, of course, a major focus of tracking and watching. I can reassure you that this is not lost upon us, but also reassure that we do not see a heightened threat in the current circumstance.

Senator KAINE. In recent visits to the region and discussion with heads of state there, the Chinese presence is very dominant economically and more and more military activity, and the Russian presence is not at the same level and I think a number of folks there see it as more kind of opportunistic or to kind of annoy us, but we would be foolish to take it for granted. We have to just keep monitoring it and I appreciate the witnesses for your answers.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Let me just join and I really appreciate Senator Kaine’s focus on the Americas. It is great to have someone else who cares about it.

I want to echo his concerns about Russia’s footprint in the hemisphere, same as with China. We say that China is our biggest geostrategic challenge. That means challenging in every dimension in every part of the globe.
Here, with Russia, we see a footprint in Venezuela: the president of Russian Security Services in the country, cooperation with the Maduro regime on intelligence and cyber capabilities, its ability to influence democratic institutions in neighboring countries, the fact that Maduro invited Russia to attend negotiations in Mexico City, media reports last year about the presence of Russian radar deployed along Venezuela's border utilized to surveillance the Colombian Government's institutions. I know this is something you spoke about publicly during your travel to Bogota last year.

We need to be focused multi-dimensionally as it relates to Russia, and for that matter China, in our own hemisphere, and if you are going to beat someone who you consider your single biggest geostrategic challenge, i.e., China, and if we are going to continue to weaken Russia in every dimension we can as it relates to the war in Ukraine, that means playing three-dimensional chess and that means also focusing on the hemisphere.

I hope that the questions that Senator Kaine raised and this comment helps us create some focus. I would love to hear from our Assistant Secretary of the Western Hemisphere about that focus in this regard.

Ms. NULAND. Just quickly, Senator, to say that you mentioned it—you alluded to it, but one of the greatest risks is democratic backsliding across the hemisphere and as these countries—too many countries follow Putin and Xi Jinping's model of governance and control of judiciaries and control of the free press, et cetera. That is part of the larger message.

If I may just go back. Senator Hagerty asked me if Ukraine can win. I believe and I believe the—all of us believe that if we define winning as Ukraine surviving and thriving as a cleaner, democratic state, it can and it must and it will with our help.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I disagree with my colleague from Texas' characterization of this Administration. I think no one has been more insightful, decisive, and helpful to the Ukrainians than the Biden administration and to suggest something else is just a parallel alternate universe, but some of us seem to live there.

In any event, there is one thing, though, that I do want to echo on and that is Iranian drones. Iranian drones have been present on the Ukrainian battlefield now for months.

It is inflicting massive damage to military and civilian infrastructure across the country. We are reading troubling reports that Russia now intends to acquire Iranian ballistic missiles that can strike deep even into Europe, which would be a game changer.

How is the Administration responding to the growing military alliance between Iran and Russia and what measures, in this case particularly in concert with our allies who should understand that it is in their interest, particularly European interests, to be more robust as it relates to Iran.

If Iran produces the missiles that it already has the capacity and breadth of scope of reach and greater sophistication in terms of targeting to Russia that can hit different targets in Europe, it is a dramatically different world.
They need to be engaged with us. They have been reticent because they are looking for the JCPOA. Even the Iranians are not interested in the JCPOA.

They need to now understand that the risk for them is greater and the risk for all of us collectively as it relates to success in Ukraine is greater if the Iranians can do all of this with impunity and not face further consequences.

Ms. NULAND. Could not agree more, Senator, including about the risk of Russian tech—missile technology helping the Iranians get better at that themselves.

We are engaged in intensive conversations with our key allies and partners about strengthening the sanctions regime in response to this. As you know, we have done, and as I mentioned earlier, a number of sanctions ourselves.

We are also engaged in a number of other things, which I think we should talk about in another setting and we look forward to it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am happy to do that.

I would just simply suggest that the Europeans have been reticent about multilateralizing what is our sanctions as it relates to Ukraine. The door is closed, from my perspective, on the JCPOA because Iran itself has not sought to accept what I thought was a bad deal, but, nonetheless, even that bad deal they are not willing to accept it.

At the end of the day, now they are helping Russia. We are pouring enormous amounts of resources, as are the Europeans, to help Ukraine win this battle for itself and for the greater existential threat.

It seems to me now the Europeans should think differently about joining us in sanctions on Iran so that they understand that—the Iranians understand there are consequences to their actions because right now they do not.

This record of this hearing will remain open until the close of business tomorrow. We thank all of you for your appearance and for your insights.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:31 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MS. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Reconstruction: While it’s a bit difficult to talk about reconstruction while Russia continues to destroy anything it can in Ukraine, I have begun thinking about what kind of legislative support reconstruction will require—including ongoing governance reforms in Ukraine and private sector engagement. Most importantly, Ukraine must know that we will continue to stand with them. Other countries have even appointed specific individuals to lead their efforts. How does the Administration view medium- and long-term reconstruction, including modernization efforts in Ukraine?

Answer. The Government of Ukraine must lead Ukraine’s recovery, but Ukraine alone cannot coordinate the extensive international effort needed to implement recovery efforts. We continue to emphasize the need for Ukraine to implement an inclusive, reform-minded program, with focused attention on rule of law, good governance, and anticorruption measures, which will be essential to building confidence in Ukraine and stimulating private sector financing and investment. We are also encouraging Ukraine to build in transparent and accessible opportunities for private sector engagement in the reconstruction process so that U.S. companies’ experience
and expertise can support the massive rebuilding and modernization effort in Ukraine.

**Question. War Crimes:** Russia and the Wagner Group’s war crimes continue to mount. I am particularly concerned about kidnappings of thousands of children, deportations via so-called filtration camps, widespread sexual violence, murder, and targeting of civilian infrastructure across Ukraine. Crimes will be prosecuted in different ways, including by Ukrainian courts and the International Criminal Court (ICC). What are the appropriate venues for prosecuting the different types of atrocities perpetrated by Russian forces? Are there gaps in Ukraine’s ability to prosecute these crimes caused by jurisdictional issues, and how do we fill those gaps?

**Answer.** The Administration supports a range of existing mechanisms and international inquiries to examine and investigate atrocities in Ukraine, such as those of the International Criminal Court, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, and other efforts. We are devoting significant resources to strengthening the capacity of Ukraine’s justice system to ensure accountability, including support to the Atrocities Crimes Advisory Group, a multilateral initiative providing strategic advice and operational assistance to Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General.

The fulsome investigation and prosecution of atrocity crimes will require legal reform in Ukraine, and a number of legal and practical challenges have been identified. We are committed to working with Ukraine to address those challenges as we have done with other countries where large-scale atrocities have occurred.

**Question. Sanctions:** I am pleased by the sanctions the Administration has imposed, but I believe there is more to be done to go after Putin’s inner circle. What more is the Administration considering and has it coordinated these efforts with other allies?

**Answer.** The Administration has imposed sanctions on both Vladimir Putin personally and a significant number of his associates. These include Sergei Naryskin, Nikoai Patrushev, Sergei Lavrov, Boris and Arkady Rotenberg, as well as numerous others. We are continuously evaluating additional sanctions targets in this program, including among Vladimir Putin’s close associates. The Administration continues to coordinate particularly closely with the United Kingdom, European Union, and NATO Allies as well as with Japan and Five Eyes Partners.

**Question. Wagner in Africa:** In September, I asked our Sanctions Coordinator, Amb. Jim O’Brien, why the Administration hadn’t sanctioned anyone in Africa in response to coups in the Sahel and West Africa, and those known to be working with Wagner to export Sudanese gold to Russia. He stated at that time that the Administration was well aware of Wagner operations and Prigozhin (Pree-gozh-in) advertising himself across the region, and indicated that Sudan and the gold trade are “very important to us.” Has the Administration taken further action to look at particular individuals or entities relative to the export of Sudanese gold to Russia since my exchange with Ambassador O’Brien in September?

**Answer.** On January 26, we designated Wagner as a Transnational Criminal Organization and levied new sanctions. This designation will assist our efforts to disrupt their ability to profit from the gold sector. We continue diplomatic outreach to gold producing and trading countries to identify specific actors of concern and promote more transparency in this sector. On January 31, Ambassador O’Brien and the interagency convened an industry group to express concerns about the role of Wagner in the gold supply chain and urge cooperation to limit Wagner’s ability to profit from operations in Africa. We will evaluate further options.

**Question. What about sanctions on leadership of governments and juntas in Central Africa Republic and Mali who are working with Wagner mercenaries alleged to have committed numerous human rights abuses?**

**Answer.** We continually review and deploy all appropriate tools to determine the best instruments to advance U.S. foreign policy goals in both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Mali. In Mali, we are reviewing allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Malian Armed Forces and others, and expect to issue new sanctions soon. In CAR, as of January 26, we have sanctioned additional actors supporting the Wagner Group’s network. These actions provide greater authority and ability for us to continue the use of sanctions and other tools over time against actors working with Wagner to commit atrocities.

**Question. Russian Disinformation in Latin America:** The Putin regime seeks to actively undermine democratic values by engaging in sophisticated disinformation and propaganda operations. They do so not just in Europe, but throughout the develop-
oping world, including in Latin America and the Caribbean. Russian state media companies like Sputnik and RT collude with authoritarian regimes in Cuba and Venezuela to engage in Spanish-language information operations that have manipulated regional information environments, spread lies about the war in Ukraine, and exacerbated polarization. What steps is the United States specifically taking to track and counter Russian information operations in Latin America and the Caribbean, and how can we more effectively protect vulnerable information ecosystems in our own hemisphere against Russian malign influence?

Answer. The State Department is keenly aware of Russia’s disinformation campaign in the Western Hemisphere. In monitoring disinformation, we have seen a sharp rise in viewership of Russian state media in Latin America since 2020, reflecting the Kremlin’s increased priority of the region. Discussions with our foreign partners indicate they are also aware of Russia’s efforts to spread disinformation, both before and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine began. A key effort to combat Russia’s disinformation efforts is the implementation of programs that allow our partners to recognize and counter disinformation and propaganda in civil society, academia, and government. The State Department also supports fact-checkers and independent media to increase journalistic standards and amplify positive, fact-based content.

Question. Syria: Russia’s barbarism against Ukrainian civilians is not new. It developed and refined its playbook of war crimes in Syria, where it continues to slaughter innocent civilians, emboldens Iranian proxies like Hezbollah and is trying to facilitate closer ties between Bashar al-Assad and President Erdogan of Turkey. What steps is the Administration taking to counter Russian attempts to rehabilitate or normalize the Assad regime?

Answer. This Administration does not support efforts to normalize or rehabilitate Bashar al-Assad, which we have regularly and vocally emphasized to our partners. We also do not support reconstruction of Syria absent authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution that meets the terms of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2254. We urge states considering engagement with Syria to carefully consider the regime’s atrocities against the Syrian people over the last decade, as well as the regime’s ongoing efforts to deny much of the country access to humanitarian aid and security. We continue stressing to our partners that stability in Syria, and the greater region, can only be achieved through a UN-facilitated, Syrian-led political process consistent with UNSCR 2254.

Question. Have we seen any notable effect of Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine on its posture in Syria? What effect will continued Russian setbacks in Ukraine, or sudden successes for that matter, have on Russia’s posture in Syria?

Answer. We have not seen Russia significantly reduce its force posture or its military activities in Syria as a direct consequence of its invasion of Ukraine. On the contrary, over the last several months, Russia has reportedly reinforced its presence in areas of northern Syria and convened the defense ministers of Syria and Turkey, demonstrating that it remains committed to supporting the Assad regime militarily.

Question. Arms Control: As you know Russia continues to block on-site inspections of its nuclear facilities as required by the New START Treaty. Is Russia’s unwillingness to implement the New START treaty explicitly tied to U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine?

Answer. In recent public statements, Russian officials have tied U.S. economic and military support for Ukraine to New START implementation. In fact, however, Russia has not complied since 2020, initially citing COVID–19 as its reason. The overall deterioration of the U.S.-Russian relationship is not an excuse for Russia to stop complying with its treaty obligations. Maintaining and strengthening nuclear guardrails only grows more important in times of heightened tensions. The U.S. message to Russia is that the full, effective implementation of New START is in our mutual security interests, that Russia cannot selectively implement its legal obligations, and that the United States will not trade concessions in Ukraine to get Russia to fulfill its treaty obligations to us and to global security.
State Department’s decision-making about sending tanks to Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense, continuously work to assess the military requirements of Ukraine. The decision to provide Strykers, Bradleys, and Abrams is tied to Ukraine’s specific operational needs for its planned Spring counter-offensive, including limitations of its existing battle-worn systems, and better positions Ukraine for future offensive operations. We will continue to be responsive to the evolving needs of the Ukrainian military, cognizant of the level of support that is required to ensure Ukraine’s ultimate success on the battlefield.

Question. What changed in the State Department’s decision-making about sending Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?

Answer. As the conflict in Ukraine evolves, we have been responsive to Ukraine’s evolving military requirements. Our assistance is meant to counter Russia’s actions. Stinger MANPADS blunted the original Russian assault on Kyiv; Javelin anti-tank system savaged Russian columns in the northern woods; HIMARS rocket systems have torn apart Russian logistics hubs in the Donbas; and air defense systems have prevented strikes against Ukrainian homes. Bradley and Stryker vehicles are needed for Ukraine’s planned Spring offensive, especially as Ukraine has worn through so many of its Soviet era vehicles.

Question. When will the Administration agree to provide Ukraine fighter planes such as the F–16?

Answer. We continue to look at Ukraine’s evolving needs on the battlefield, and to sustain an effective air defense. At each decision stage, we weigh this against available resources, equipment, and training timelines.

Question. If the Administration is opposed to providing F–16 capability, why?

Answer. We continue to be responsive to Ukraine’s evolving military requirements. I welcome continuing this discussion in a classified setting.

Question. What is the Department’s view on the provision of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?

Answer. The Department of State recognizes the tragic cost to civilians that can result from the use of cluster munitions and emphasizes that their indiscriminate or disproportionate use violates international humanitarian law. Current DoD policy restricts the transfer to another government of cluster munitions with an unexploded ordnance rate greater than 1 percent, consistent with longstanding U.S. law.

Question. Direct Budgetary Support for Ukraine: Since February 2022, the United States has provided the overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine—$13 billion, or 72 percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date—which is being disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public Expenditures for Administrative Space Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and Contributions to Health Enhancement and Life-saving (HEAL) Project. Does the Department of State Office of the Inspector General maintain direct audit authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the justification?

Answer. The United States has provided direct budget support (DBS) to the Government of Ukraine (GOU) through the PEACE mechanism, the World Bank’s flagship financing instrument for Ukraine, and prior to its creation, through the FREE Ukraine Multi-donor Trust Fund, the World Bank’s budget support package. As of April 12, 2023, $15.5 billion of the $22.9 billion in DBS funds has been disbursed to the GOU, and $2.5 billion of the $22.9 billion has been transferred to the World Bank to disburse in April and May. Neither the URTF nor HEAL have been utilized for these payments.

The United States has employed a multi-tiered accountability system to ensure oversight of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, which includes third-party monitoring. We intend to further strengthen oversight with additional measures using Ukraine supplemental funds. As required by Ukraine supplemental legislation, the Department has submitted reports on the implementation of this assistance. Additionally, in accordance with the Ukraine legislation, State’s OIG recently released its first report on the Department’s coordination with USAID on budget assistance provided via the World Bank mechanisms. The Department is not aware of any authority of any U.S. inspector general to audit the internal operations of an international organization or international financial institution.

OIG is separately responding to your question directly.
Question. Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports or audits conducted on Ukraine assistance?

Answer. The Department of State and USAID, the Departments of Defense and Treasury, and the Government of Ukraine are working closely together to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability over U.S. assistance to Ukraine. We are committed to accommodating the legitimate needs of Congress for information necessary to perform its legislative and oversight functions. When presented with specific requests for information, including relating to assistance for Ukraine, we will work with Congress, including the Committee, to accommodate such requests, consistent with appropriate needs for protection of executive branch confidentiality interests.

Question. Please describe the State Department’s efforts to press bilateral donors on the need for greater burden sharing to meet Ukraine’s assistance needs.

Answer. The United States is working closely with Allies and partners around the world to provide Ukraine the assistance it needs to defend itself against Russian aggression and initiate recovery and reconstruction efforts. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, since February 2022, Ukraine has received $13.8 billion in budget support from EU institutions and member states. EU institutions and member states and other donors have provided $4.7 billion in humanitarian aid, more than double the United States’ $1.9 billion contribution. Our European allies and partners are also bearing the financial burden of hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees. Since February 2022, our Allies and partners worldwide have also provided more than $24 billion in security assistance.

Question. Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there have been no treaty inspections during that time. What actions are your Departments taking to mitigate against the risks associated with Russia’s non-compliance with the New START treaty?

Answer. The New START Treaty remains in U.S. national security interests, and our objective is to return Russia to full compliance. The State Department has and will continue to work with allies, partners, and others in the international community to push Russia to comply with its New START Treaty obligations. The United States will also continue to monitor and assess what impact Russian noncompliance has on U.S. national security. Russian actions will inform consideration of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States will ensure in any event that the United States is postured to defend the United States and our allies.

Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia’s efforts to establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?

Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to this question regarding the potential of a Russian naval base in Sudan, and to give you our unvarnished assessment of the Wagner network and our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S. personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are in place for responding to such incidents in the future?

Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to this question regarding Wagner threats against our personnel, and to give you our unvarnished assessment of the network and our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner Group’s outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?
Answer. I have discussed our concerns regarding the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group directly with Transition President Traore both in-person and over the phone, and he has repeatedly asserted that only Burkinabe will defend their security and that they have no intention of inviting in Wagner. I would need to provide further information on this question in a classified setting.

Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats in Africa?

Answer. Combatting cybercrime and improving cybersecurity practices is critical for the economies and national security of all countries, including those in Africa. Russia continues to improve its ability to target critical infrastructure and allows cybercriminals to operate from its territory with impunity. For example, Russia-based cybercriminals are suspected by industry experts to have conducted ransomware attacks against a South African transportation company in July 2021, disrupting maritime shipping for nearly a week. In Africa and elsewhere, Russia-led and affiliated disinformation campaigns seek to spread falsehoods and destabilize societies.

Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner governments?

Answer. The Department’s implementation of CAATSA Section 231 has had a substantial impact on Russian arms sales to African countries. As detailed in the classified annexes to our quarterly reports to Congress pursuant to Section 1294 of the 2018 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, we have urged African countries to abandon arms deals with Russia and to sunset their use of legacy Russian military equipment. Many African countries now realize the negative aspects of engaging in significant transactions with Russia’s defense sector and are taking steps to reduce or end their dependency on Russian arms.

Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?

Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. Recent events in Burkina Faso show how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it did in Mali. To fully respond to the question concerning Wagner’s role in recent coups and irregular changes in government, along with giving you our unvarnished assessment of the network and presenting our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

Question. How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in African countries, and for what purposes?

Answer. We are working closely with U.S. and allied diplomatic, defense, intelligence, and law enforcement partners to counter the Kremlin and the Wagner Group efforts to co-opt African governments, exploit African resources, and abuse human rights. To fully respond to the question concerning Russia’s war against Ukraine to Wagner’s activities in Africa, along with giving you our unvarnished assessment of the network and presenting our plan for thwarting them, we would like to offer a classified briefing at your convenience. Members of multiple State Department bureaus briefed SFRC and HFAC staffers February 7 in a classified setting. We welcome continued engagements with Committee members and staff.

Question. Mozambique Detainee: An American citizen, Ryan Koher, has been detained without trial in Mozambique for 3 months. I spoke with President Nyusi about this case on the sidelines of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022, and he personally promised to examine the situation and report back to me. I also understand that Ambassador Vrooman and others at the U.S. Embassy in Maputo have engaged with Mozambican officials on Mr. Koher’s case. Yet, there appears to be no movement toward either charging or releasing him. How and when does the State Department plan to engage with the Mozambican Government on Mr. Koher’s case if there is no forward movement on either charging or releasing him?

Answer. The U.S. Embassy and the Department have actively engaged the Mozambican Government since learning of the U.S. citizen’s initial detention on November 4. This case has been raised multiple times at the highest level of the
The Consular Section continues to receive regular updates from the U.S. citizen on the case. The Embassy has communicated Ranking Member Risch’s request for follow-up to senior Mozambican officials.

Question. Sahel: The Administration adopted an interagency strategy for the Sahel in March 2022, and you led an interagency delegation to the Sahel in October 2022. According to the State Department’s public readout, your trip focused, in part, on the Wagner Group’s role in the region and underscored that “good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, education, and a vibrant civil society are key to breaking the cycle of violent extremism.” Since then, the security situation in Mali and Burkina Faso has continued to deteriorate, Mali’s political transition has not advanced, and Burkina Faso’s military junta has decided to expel French military forces amid what appears to be growing outreach from the Wagner Group. What were the central conclusions of your meetings in Sahel countries in October 2022, including with regard to Russia’s malign influence in the region? How have recent events in Mali and Burkina Faso reshaped these conclusions and U.S. engagement moving forward?

Answer. Many countries of the Sahel face a crisis of governance that has contributed to the spread of violent extremism. In the long-term, we can only address this security challenge by addressing its underlying causes, like access to education, healthcare, economic opportunity, and good governance. Recent events in Burkina Faso show how Wagner is trying to run the same playbook as it did in Mali. We must not allow the Wagner Group to similarly exploit Burkina Faso’s resources, undermine its democracy, commit rampant human rights abuses, and spread disinformation and lies, all while helping fund and prosecute Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Question. What is the Administration’s plan for deterring and responding to Russia’s malign influence, including the Wagner Group’s presence, in the Sahel?

Answer. We seek to increase the cost and difficulty of doing business for Yevgeniy Prigozhin through sanctions and blocking supply routes. The Administration has designated the Wagner Group as a significant transnational criminal organization, which will aid us in preventing economic benefits from flowing to Russia via Wagner’s nefarious activities. We are sharing information on the deleterious effects of the Wagner Group with our partners, reminding them that countries that partner with Wagner become weaker, poorer, more volatile and less secure. We are also working on campaigns to counter disinformation so publics across the Sahel know what Wagner truly represents.

Question. What has been the concrete impact of the 2022 Sahel strategy, to date?

Answer. The Sahel strategy provides a framework for our medium- and long-term policy and resource investments in the region. It’s underlying conclusion—that the region’s security problems can only be addressed with better governance solutions—remains valid. In the period since the strategy was written, conditions on the ground have worsened, requiring us to revise our near-term tactics. Nevertheless, in accordance with the Sahel strategy we are collaborating more effectively across the interagency and are engaging our multilateral partners in new ways that complement existing activities. In a resource-constrained environment, we are prioritizing activities to support Sahelian democracies, to slow the spread of violent extremist organizations southward, and to push the Wagner Group from the region.

Question. During the 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, the Administration announced a new initiative to “engage with complex political transitions in Africa and demonstrate U.S. Government support to governments and civil society at critical moments.” What will this initiative mean, concretely, for U.S. engagement with political transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Mali?

Answer. The Department continues to identify available resources to support sustainable democratic transitions across the continent while closely working with the interagency to operationalize the new initiative. We intend to leverage available expertise and ensure a coordinated response to the multiple dynamic transition processes taking place. At the end of FY 2022, the Bureau of African Affairs began developing a project with the United States Institute of Peace to evaluate the ongoing transitions in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Guinea, which we anticipate will support both existing democratic transitions work and the new initiative.

Question. What role do you expect to play in implementing deliverables announced by the White House during the December 2022 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS)?
Answer. I have made three trips to Africa in the past 18 months and expect that pace to continue. These trips, plus my regular interagency engagement with African leaders when they visit Washington, afford lots of opportunities to push implementation of the ALS deliverables. In addition, the AF Bureau, including Ambassador Johnnie Carson, Special Representative for ALS Implementation, is working intensively with USAID and the rest of the USG interagency community to support policies, programs and initiatives to advance these commitments. Since the ALS, the Department has focused its efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa on priorities areas identified at the Summit and continuing to align our resources with those, the State-USAID Joint Regional Strategy, and the U.S. Strategy for Africa.

Question. The Administration pledged during the ALS, among other things, to expand U.S. support for leadership training, economic and trade integration, digital access and literacy, health system capacity, food security, climate adaptation, and security sector reform in Africa. How, and according to what benchmarks, does the State Department intend to measure success in achieving these objectives?

Answer. As part of this pledge, the Administration announced new programs, such as Digital Transformation for Africa, African Women’s Entrepreneurship Program—Reimagined, and a new security sector consortium. It also announced new investments in existing programs such as Prosper and Power Africa, Feed the Future, the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the Adaptation Fund. Programs will be designed and regularly evaluated to determine if they are achieving results or if adjustments are needed to ensure their success. Another measure of success will be State’s ability to elevate our African partners to lead in addressing shared priorities and for countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa to emerge as prosperous and peaceful.

Question. U.S.-Europe Coordination on China in Africa: In November 2020, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report calling for greater U.S.-Europe cooperation on China. Among the recommendations were for the United States and Europe to work toward a comprehensive strategy that “affirms the close linkage between democracy, good governance, and sound economic management.” What is the State Department doing to coordinate U.S. and European messaging for African political leaders and publics regarding China’s engagement in the region?

Answer. State Department officials meet routinely with our European partners, bilaterally and multilaterally, to discuss and coordinate messaging on People’s Republic of China (PRC) engagement, including in Africa. We meet with European counterparts in multilateral formats such as the G7 Africa Directors Meeting. The State Department provides guidance, talking points, and other materials to U.S. embassies in sub-Saharan Africa to engage public audiences on the PRC’s harmful practices in the region. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs regularly speaks with European counterparts to coordinate European and U.S. cooperation and messaging in sub-Saharan Africa, including related to the PRC and Russia.

Question. To what extent is the Administration working with European partners to deter Chinese-funded dual-use infrastructure construction at African ports?

Answer. As mentioned in response to Q24, State Department officials meet routinely with our European partners to discuss PRC-related issues. We share concerns with our European partners about PRC’s dual-use ports in Africa and align our efforts to deter them.

RESPONSES OF MS. ERIN MCKEE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. USAID’s operations inside of Russia have been severely curtailed in recent years. What is the status of USAID’s operations inside the Russian Federation?

Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-person at your convenience.

Question. USAID’s operations inside of Russia have been severely curtailed in recent years. Does USAID still operate any programs inside of Russia? If so, please list them.

Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in person at your convenience.

Question. USAID’s operations inside of Russia have been severely curtailed in recent years.
What is the status of USAID’s activities involving Russian citizens living abroad, including, but not limited to, Russian civil society and independent media?

Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in person at your convenience.

Question. USAID’s operations inside of Russia have been severely curtailed in recent years. Does USAID maintain a plan in case there is an opportunity to reengage in Russia or with the Russian population in the future?

Answer. USAID would be pleased to brief you and your staff in-person at your convenience.

Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.

Please describe how Russia has exploited the Black Sea Grain Initiative’s grain inspections to stall vessels and limit Ukraine’s agricultural exports and revenue.

Answer. Under the terms of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) agreement, inbound and outbound vessels are inspected by teams consisting of members of the United Nations and the three signatory countries: Ukraine, Türkiye, and Russia. Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure asserts that, as soon as the BSGI began to grow in October, Russia reduced the number of inspection teams from five to three without explanation and has artificially increased the time required to conduct inspections by checking vessels’ performance indicators—which are not regulated by the BSGI Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) or the grain agreement—and has been stalling over issues like fumigation. Thus, it takes at least 4 hours to inspect one vessel, and the JCC completes about five to seven inbound/outbound inspections daily rather than the 16 to 18 that USAID-supported advisors to Ukraine’s Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food estimate are needed to reach the ports’ 6 million metric tons (MMT) per month capacity. Ukraine is prioritizing the departure of larger vessels once loaded. Although this can help increase export volumes, it leaves smaller vessels waiting longer and incurring costs that make them less competitive.

The BSGI JCC reports that, as of January 26, 676 vessels have departed Ukrainian ports with 18,422,020 metric tons of grains, oilseeds, and derivatives (e.g., edible oil, meal, and bran). This represents an average of 3.16 MMT/month since BSGI began, about half of the 6 MMT capacity of these ports (per Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure). BSGI throughput remains limited and has experienced some of its lowest throughput since the initiative began in August 2022. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports per day was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels leaving per day for every month except August 2022, when the initiative began. January exports totaled 3.02 MMT, a figure lower than every month except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and well below prior year volumes of 5–7 MMT per month. This figure is also below the 5 MMT that Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN Security Council to press Russia to support.

The slowdown in inspections has led to lower revenues for Ukraine, and lower prices for goods produced by Ukrainian farmers, as buyers pass on the increased shipping costs caused by the slowdowns. The State Department reported that the price of grain for importers has increased by as much as 20 percent per ship, as shippers must cover the cost of crews, fuel, and insurance for that idle time. The costs of these delays exacerbate other cost increases for Black Sea shippers, such as insurance, which has become costlier due to the high risks associated with operating in a conflict area and a reduction in reinsurers willing to cover ships. For each ship, each day waiting costs an additional $20,000. The average waiting time of 21 days translated to over $400,000 of additional costs for each shipload of grain, which results in lower revenues for Ukraine and its farmers, and higher prices for consumers.

Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.

How have the inspections impacted global supply chains?
Answer. Disruptions in Black Sea Grain initiative (BSGI) inspections have affected supply volumes in the short term and stand to have long term effects in these areas if it is not resolved.

Volumes: As of January 2023, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is experiencing some of its lowest throughput levels to date due to slow inspections. In January, the average number of vessels departing ports per day was 2.5, which is lower than the average number of vessels leaving per day for every month, except August 2022 when the initiative began. January exports totaled 3.02 million metric tons (MT). This is below every month except August (1.57 MMT) and November (2.61 MMT), and well below prior year volumes of 5–7 MMT/month. This is also well below the ports’ 6 MMT capacity per Ukraine’s Ministry of Infrastructure, and below the 5 MMT that Linda Thomas-Greenfield recently urged the UN Security Council to press Russia to support.

These short-term supply decreases stand to affect longer-term supply by reducing Ukrainian farmers’ incomes, leaving them with fewer resources to invest in planting and maintaining winter 2022 and spring 2023 crops. Additionally, farmers may be less motivated to plant if they are not certain of a guaranteed market with sufficient profits. Finally, some Ukrainian farmers are switching to more profitable oilseeds, and away from less profitable grains like corn (which has a higher cost of production and lower prices due to a backlog of corn as a result of war-related port closures).

Per the Ukrainian Club of Agrarian Business, farmers expect to increase spring oilseed planting area by 15 percent (due to higher profitability), decrease barley areas by 15 percent, and decrease corn areas up to 30 percent (due to lower profitability).

Prices: Per the State Department, the backlog has raised the price of grain for importers by as much as 20 percent per ship because shippers must cover the cost of crews, fuel, and insurance for that idle time. The costs of these delays exacerbate other cost increases for Black Sea shippers, such as insurance, which has become costlier due to the high risks associated with operating in a conflict area, and a more recent reduction in reinsurance options due to a decision by a large group of specialty maritime vessel insurers to stop covering Black Sea vessels (non-specialty reinsurers still offer cover). For each ship, each day waiting costs an additional $20,000. The average waiting time of 21 days translated to over $400,000 of additional costs for each shipload of grain. Exporters have reduced the prices they pay to Ukraine’s farmers in order to cover their increased shipping costs, further harming farmers’ abilities and motivations to continue planting.

Question. Inspections of vessels carrying Ukrainian grain and other exports under the Black Sea Grain Initiative have decreased by half since September 2022, creating backlogs in delivering vital supplies to other nations. The UN estimates that over 100 vessels are waiting for inspection or for applications to clear, with the waiting time between application and inspection averaging over 21 days in the last 2 weeks.

Given the conditional nature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative, what is USAID doing to help Ukraine’s agricultural economy recover and regain its place in the global economy as a major grain exporter?

Answer. USAID is helping Ukraine’s agricultural economy recover through support for both production and exports, with a focus on increasing the capacity of Ukraine’s railway system to strengthen resilience against shocks such as the war-induced port closures.

The UN-brokered Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) has been a critical component of increasing Ukrainian capacity to export and supporting farmers needs—allowing over 20 million metric tons of food to get to global markets, with nearly 20 percent going directly to lower-income countries. However, Russia’s unwillingness to fully implement and facilitate the deal and its previous delays on renewal are stark reminders that the deal is unstable, making support for Ukraine’s agriculture sector essential to both Ukraine’s economic survival and to helping vulnerable communities across the world.

In response to Russia’s blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports and the resulting impact on Ukrainian farmers and the agriculture sector, USAID launched the Agriculture Resilience Initiative-Ukraine (AGRI-Ukraine) in July to support Ukraine’s agriculture sector. This initiative was taken in direct response to the export crisis and with an understanding that Russia would be an unreliable party to the BSGI, then under negotiation and not yet launched, even if a deal were to be reached.

USAID directly contributed $100 million in support to AGRI-Ukraine, with a goal to raise $150 million in additional external funding. To date, USAID has established a flagship partnership with Bayer, which has invested approximately $35 million in Ukraine’s agricultural sector. AGRI-Ukraine is seeking to address Ukraine’s immediate and near-term agriculture production and export challenges, while also sup-
porting longer-term resilience. AGRI-Ukraine focuses on four areas that are crucial to sustain Ukraine's agricultural production and exports: providing critical inputs for farmers; improving export logistics and infrastructure; increasing farmers' access to financing; and supporting crop drying, storage, and processing needs.

On the production side, AGRI-Ukraine has reached over 13,000 farmers (about 29 percent of Ukraine's 47,000 registered farmers before the war) with critical inputs, agricultural and financial services, and storage through our AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, Agriculture Growing Rural Opportunities (AGRO). The AGRI-Ukraine storage program has helped farmers pack and store 501,500 metric tons of grain to allow them to wait until export channels allow for and market prices justify a sale. Since the war began, 604 farmers have accessed $48.2 million in credit via three AGRO-supported finance apps.

On the export side, under AGRI-Ukraine's focus on export logistics and infrastructure, USAID has coordinated closely with our European allies on their Solidarity Lanes effort, the EU's primary initiative to promote Ukrainian exports in the absence of a safe and reliable Black Sea route. Another AGRI-Ukraine implementing activity, the Economic Resilience Activity (ERA), is supporting co-investments to improve rail export capacity and border-crossing efficiency. As Ukraine has historically exported about 95 percent of its grain and oilseeds via the Black Sea, its rail and road export routes were not equipped to handle agricultural export demands when the war shuttered ports. The war underscored the need to bolster other export modalities, such as rail transit. ERA is increasing rail carrying capacity by helping exporters pilot Mega Big bags, which are large, flexible, reusable, food-safe bags that enable Ukraine Railways to carry grain in open-top gondola cars, which are widely available and low-cost. This effort has helped address Ukraine Railways' limited grain car stock, and the high cost and long time involved in getting new grain cars. ERA is also co-investing in transshipment improvements, which will increase export speed and volumes by making the process of transferring grain across transport modalities faster and more efficient (e.g., rail to sea vessel), and increasing storage capacity at transshipment points (e.g., ports and land borders). These procurements support equipment and facility improvements such as loading machines and conveyors for a privately-owned terminal at Ukraine's Izmail port (Danube).

**Question.** Since February 2022, the United States has provided the overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine—$13 billion, or 72 percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date—which is being disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project. Does the USAID Office of the Inspector General maintain direct audit authority over these mechanisms? If not, what is the justification?

**Answer.** USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has independent authority to conduct oversight of all USAID programs, including budget support to Ukraine. In a recently released Congressionally-mandated report, OIG determined that the design of the monitoring mechanisms and safeguards for the World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism (through which USAID provides budget support) are aligned with federal internal control standards.

USAID's OIG is working closely with the Department of State and Department of Defense OIGs to take a whole-of-government approach to accountability and oversight. Recently, the three IGs issued a hotline poster in both English and Ukrainian, which is being widely distributed in Ukraine. The three IGs also recently returned from a joint trip to Kyiv, Poland, and Germany. The objectives of their trip were: (1) continue to build a shared understanding of the circumstances on the ground; (2) collaborate with oversight counterparts, demonstrating a "whole-of-government" approach to Ukraine response oversight; (3) communicate expectations for transparency and accountability to the U.S. and Ukrainian officials charged with overseeing the substantial assistance provided by the U.S.; and (4) deepen their understanding of response management and operations in Kyiv and Rzeszow to inform oversight plans.

The USAID OIG has informed us that they will continue to collaborate with oversight partners at the Department of State and World Bank to monitor and strengthen USAID's management of direct budget support to Ukraine. Accordingly, they are currently conducting research to inform potential oversight efforts related to direct budget support. We have flagged your interest in their potential audits to the USAID OIG.
**Question.** Since February 2022, the United States has provided the overwhelming majority of budget support for Ukraine—$13 billion, or 72 percent, of a total $18 billion mobilized to date—which is being disbursed through the following World Bank mechanisms: Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine), Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE), Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF), and Contributions to Health Enhancement and Lifesaving (HEAL) Project.

**Should Congress have access to any/all oversight reports or audits conducted on Ukraine assistance?**

**Answer.** USAID has provided budget support to Ukraine via the World Bank's Financing of Recovery from Economic Emergency in Ukraine (FREE Ukraine) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE) mechanism, and a Special Transfer to the Ukraine Single-Donor Trust Fund. USAID will provide the Committee with prompt and timely access to the results of audits conducted on USAID-funded budget support for Ukraine.

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**RESPONSES OF DR. CELESTE WALLANDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH**

**Question.** Since the outset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Administration has repeatedly refused to provide military capabilities requested by Ukrainian officials, such as tanks, HIMARS, and air defense, only to subsequently change course and provide them at a later date.

**What changed in DoD’s decision-making about sending tanks to Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?**

**Answer.** Secretary Austin is focused on ensuring that we deliver full capabilities to the Ukrainians. When this involves highly sophisticated systems with complex maintenance, sustainment, and other considerations, all factors need to be assessed before moving forward with introducing a new capability. Together with the collective training we’ve been providing, armored capabilities will improve Ukraine’s ability to maneuver, which is critical for Ukraine as they continue to defend and reclaim their territory. This includes Armored Personnel Carriers, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and Main Battle Tanks.

**Question.** What changed in the DoD’s decision-making about sending Bradley and Stryker vehicles to Ukraine that resulted in the decision to do so now?

**Answer.** Secretary Austin is adamant about providing Ukraine with the capability it needs, when it needs it. With collective training efforts underway, the Department, in consultation with Ukrainian counterparts, assessed a need to provide Ukraine additional armored maneuver systems like Bradleys and Strykers.

**Question.** When did the Department first receive a request from the Ukrainian Government asking for Western Main Battle Tanks and Infantry Fighting Vehicles?

**Answer.** For operational security reasons, the Department does not comment in public settings on the status of official requests for capabilities from partners. However, we have been and continue to be in close and constant consultation with Ukrainian counterparts regarding their most urgent capability requirements. Throughout, we considered a broad range of capabilities that Ukraine needs for the current fight and will need in the future. These considerations evolve given dynamics on the battlefield, which ultimately informs the contours of any security assistance package provided to Ukraine.

**Question.** How long has the Department been aware of reported shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine’s existing tank fleet? If the Administration was aware of looming 125mm tank ammunition shortfalls, why did the Administration continue to provide exclusively Soviet tanks as assistance until this week’s sudden decision to provide Abrams, which uses the more plentiful NATO-standard 120mm round?

**Answer.** The Department of Defense has been aware of reported shortfalls in 125mm tank ammunition affecting Ukraine’s existing tank fleet for some weeks now. That is why DoD decided to procure an additional 100,000 rounds of 125mm tank ammunition for Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) package we announced on December 21, 2022. This procurement was designed to complement our procurement of 45 upgraded T–72 tanks for Ukraine, also under USAI. Tanks such as the T–72 are easier for Ukraine to integrate into its existing forces, and we have seen their success on the battlefield. Yesterday’s an-
nouncement of Abrams, alongside Allied and partner announcement of Leopards, will be the next step—a complex one—to integrate Western main battle tanks to support its battlefield objectives.

**Question.** When will the Administration agree to provide Ukraine fighter planes such as the F-16?

**Answer.** The Administration does not currently plan to provide Ukraine with U.S. fighter aircraft.

**Question.** If the Administration is opposed to providing F-16 capability, why?

**Answer.** The Administration has no plan to provide Ukraine with U.S. fighter aircraft at this time.

Fighter aircraft considerations must be weighed against a number of Ukraine’s other priority capability requirements. This includes urgent priorities to provide Ukraine additional air defense, artillery, long-range fires, and armored vehicles.

**Question.** What is the United States doing to expedite the transfer of military assistance that has already been announced?

**Answer.** The Department of Defense has continually expedited the transfer of military assistance to Ukraine, including accelerating requirements development, contracting timelines for new procurements, and deliveries for immediately available equipment. U.S. Transportation Command has moved large volumes of assistance at historic speed.

In November 2022, the Department also stood up the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine or SAG-U to help execute the full-range of U.S. security assistance activities for Ukraine. This includes supporting the historic levels of security assistance and leading our expanded training efforts in a more efficient and sustainable manner.

DoD is also working with industry to find ways to further speed up procurement and delivery, such as expanding production capacity and identifying and addressing issues around long lead-time components.

**Question.** What is the United States doing to expedite the production of military vehicles, equipment, etc. that could be sent to Ukraine or be used to backfill allies who have donated their own stocks to Ukraine?

**Answer.** The Department appreciates Congress’ support as it continues to work to help expand the capacity of the Defense Industrial Base to replenish the U.S. and allies and partners’ inventories in response to Ukraine Presidential Drawdowns. Through the use of Ukraine replenishment and supplemental funding, actions such as investments in the 155mm artillery industrial base or for Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle capacity expansion could enable the U.S. to more rapidly replenish capabilities donated to Ukraine. As the situation continues to develop, the Department will continue to utilize all its authorities and available appropriations as it identifies opportunities to support critical DIB capabilities.

**Question.** What is the Department’s position on the provision of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to Ukraine?

**Answer.** Although the United States and Ukraine are not parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, under current law the United States Government may only transfer cluster munitions that are below the 1 percent unexploded ordnance standard.

**Question.** How would a decision to provide DPICMs alleviate or exacerbate pressure placed on other munitions stockpiles by our assistance to Ukraine?

**Answer.** As noted above, the United States is currently prohibited by statutory restriction to transfer DPICMs to Ukraine. The United States maintains stockpiles of DPICMs. In theory, provision of these DPICMs to Ukraine, which are nearing the end of their shelf life, might lessen Ukraine’s requirements for unitary rounds from other sources.

**Question.** What has been the battlefield impact of DPICMS provided by other partners to Ukraine?

**Answer.** The Department of Defense assesses that DPICMs provided by other partners to Ukraine have been effective against Russian armored vehicles and dug-in troop formations in eastern Ukraine.

**Question.** Arms Control: Russia is not in compliance with the New START treaty. The BCC has not convened in more than 2 years and there have been no treaty inspections during that time.
What actions is your Department taking to mitigate against the risks associated with Russia’s non-compliance with the New START treaty?

Answer. Mutual compliance with New START strengthens the security of the United States, our allies and partners, Russia, and the world. We have conveyed that Russia’s noncompliance with the New START is unfortunate and irresponsible. We have reiterated that the United States remains ready to work constructively with Russia to fully implement the New START Treaty. We are watching carefully to see what Russia does moving forward. How Russia chooses to proceed will help inform considerations of appropriate U.S. responses. The United States will ensure in any event that we are postured to defend the United States and our allies.

We have not determined that Russia’s current noncompliance threatens the national security interests of the United States. The United States assesses that Russia did not engage in significant activity above the Treaty limits and that Russia was likely under the New START Treaty warhead limit at the end of 2022. We continue to closely monitor Russian compliance with the New START Treaty limits. Inspections play a critical role in verifying Russian compliance, but are not the only source of U.S. information regarding Russian nuclear forces. We also use U.S. means for monitoring Russian compliance, and Russia has continued providing notifications and data updates as required by the New START Treaty.

Question. Russia-Africa: What is the status of Russia’s efforts to establish military basing infrastructure in Africa, including reported agreements concerning a naval facility in Port Sudan?

Answer. Russia continues to pursue military basing infrastructure in Africa, including in Sudan. Russia seeks to pursue implementation of a 2017 agreement with the Bashir Government for a naval facility at Port Sudan, though Sudanese authorities have thus far taken no steps to implement it.

Moving forward with such a naval agreement or any other form of security cooperation with Russia would further isolate Sudan’s military regime and undermine stability in the Horn of Africa and broader Red Sea region.

Question. Have there been instances when Wagner Group or other Russian private military contractor (PMC) personnel threatened U.S. personnel in Africa? If so, how has the U.S. responded? What plans are in place for responding to such incidents in the future?

Answer. The Department of Defense takes all threats to U.S. personnel and U.S. citizens seriously and takes appropriate steps to address them. We would be happy to discuss specific threats and the steps we are taking to address them in a classified setting.

Question. What is your assessment of where things stand with Wagner Group’s outreach to the military junta in Burkina Faso and what the Kremlin or Wagner might offer to the government?

Answer. We are monitoring the situation closely, and working with the Department of State and the U.S. Embassy in Ouagadougou to ensure that our messaging to the Burkina Faso Government is synchronized and clear about the negative effects of Wagner’s presence in their country. We continue to explore ways to help the Burkina Faso Government address its security concerns without turning to options that do not align with their broader interests. We would be happy to discuss our current assessment in a classified setting.

Question. How would you characterize Russian cyber security threats in Africa?

Answer. Russia has resisted the institutionalization of global governance non-binding norms around cyber security of responsible state behavior in cyberspace and has courted African countries to support its positions in multilateral fora.

Question. What impact has CAATSA had on Russian arms sales to African countries? How is CAATSA perceived among African partner governments?

Answer. The Department of Defense defers to the Departments of State and Treasury regarding the effectiveness of sanctions on Russian arms sales to African countries and how African partner governments perceive CAATSA. However, given that many African partners have legacy Russian equipment, CAATSA has created an additional challenge for African partners to purchase spare parts and/or replace equipment that their forces have trained on in the past.

Question. What role did Russia and Russian PMCs play in recent military coups and seizures of power in African countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan)?
Answer. The Wagner Group has deployed across Africa and has increased insecurity and instability, engaged in human rights abuses, and eroded African leaders’ control over their own security forces. Wagner benefits from continued instability because Wagner relies on instability to justify its presence in these countries. The result is a vicious cycle of dependence and vulnerability to exploitation. We can provide more details in a classified setting.

**Question.** How has the war in Ukraine affected the Wagner Group’s activities in Africa? To what extent is Wagner recruiting locally in African countries, and for what purposes?

Answer. The Department of Defense assesses that Wagner activity in Africa decreased during the early stages of the war in Ukraine, but that this trend has since reversed. We defer to the Intelligence Community to assess specifics, such as how the war in Ukraine has affected Wagner’s efforts to recruit locally in African countries.

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**RESPONSES OF MS. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITT ROMNEY**

**Question.** The U.S. Senate remains committed to supporting Ukraine and pushing back on Putin’s evil expansionist war. I remain concerned, however, that we are only supporting Ukraine from collapsing, as compared to winning. One cannot win a war purely using defensive measures. Does this Administration support building up Ukraine’s offensive capabilities such that the Ukrainians can expel Russia from Ukrainian territory?

Answer. We have tailored our assistance to meet Ukraine’s evolving military requirements, for both offensive and defensive operations. Along with support from our Allies and partners, our assistance has included Stinger and Javelin systems that blunted the original Russian assault on Kyiv, as well as artillery systems, air defense systems, and armored fighting vehicles that enabled the successful recapture of large swaths of Ukrainian territory. Our ongoing assistance efforts are meant to strengthen both Ukraine’s short-term security needs, and long-term defense, to ensure Russia cannot simply re-prosecute this war in a few months or a few years.

**Question.** Some have suggested that the United States’ support for Ukraine is diminishing our resources and reserves such that we can’t effectively address the China threat. China is the greatest geostrategic threat of the coming decades—but our support for Ukraine can both limit Russia’s ability to bolster China’s power and show that the United States unequivocally supports free nations attacked by expansionist powers. What, if any, empirical evidence does the Administration have on how U.S. support for Ukraine impacts our preparedness regarding the threats in the Indo-Pacific?

Answer. DoD has confirmed that no equipment purchased by Taiwan via the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process has been diverted to Ukraine, and, to date, equipment transferred to Ukraine through PDA had no negative impact on Taiwan’s delivery timelines for defense articles already on contract through FMS. U.S. and allies’ coordinated, large-scale support for Ukraine should be a warning to adversaries with expansionist desires about what to expect in response to a range of contingencies in the Indo-Pacific. China is also watching Russia’s war in Ukraine closely, and allied resolve to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes.

**Question.** Does this Administration believe that U.S. support for Ukraine undermines our ability to address the China threat?

Answer. No.

**Question.** One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that people become desensitized to the tragedy being inflicted on the Ukrainian people. How many civilians have been causalities of Putin’s murderous invasion?

Answer. According to an estimate from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, as of January 30, more than 7,100 Ukrainian civilians have been killed and more than 11,500 injured due to Russia’s war. The actual number is likely higher. The International Organization for Migration estimates there are close to 6 million Ukrainian internally displaced persons, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates there are nearly 8 million refugees recorded across Europe since February 2022. As Putin failed to achieve his aims on the battlefield, Russia’s forces began deliberately targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, including residences, hospitals, train stations, cultural and religious institutions, schools, and
the energy grid in the middle of winter. To give one recent example, on January 14, a Russian ballistic missile that hit a residential building in Dnipro killed at least 45 civilians, including six children, injured 79, and rendered more than 1,000 homeless.

**Question.** How many refugees have resulted from Putin’s war, both internal to Ukraine and external to Ukraine?

**Answer.** The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports via its Ukraine Refugee Situation Operational Data Portal that approximately 8 million refugees from Ukraine were recorded across Europe as of January 26, 2023. They calculate this number based on data provided to them by authorities in European countries hosting refugees from Ukraine.

The International Organization for Migration reports that as of January 26, 2023, there were approximately 6 million internally displaced persons across Ukraine.

**Question.** How many people have suffered from hunger in the world because Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from Ukraine?

**Answer.** In the 2022 Global Report on Food Crises updated in September 2022, it was estimated the global population in need of emergency food assistance would increase from 193 million in 2021 to between 205 and 211 million in 2022 due to high global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as well as drought, conflict, and other shocks. The Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by the UN and Turkiye, has helped stabilize global food supplies and brought prices down.

**Question.** How many people have been without power due to Russian attempts to freeze Ukrainians this winter?

**Answer.** As a direct result of Russia’s attacks, about 40 percent of Ukraine’s grid is degraded or destroyed and must be replaced or repaired. Ukraine is managing this degraded grid through planned daily power outages of varying length and severity. The exact number of people impacted varies. These nationwide outages are best categorized as follows: (1) scheduled blackouts lasting from a few to many hours each day due to insufficient supply or to allow for repairs of damaged infrastructure; (2) unscheduled blackouts that may last hours, days, or weeks as a result of damaged infrastructure, with repairs underway; and (3) continual blackouts in areas of massive damage that cannot be repaired or are too dangerous for repair crews.

**Question.** How many children does the State Department estimate have been taken from Ukraine and illegally transferred to Russia?

**Answer.** The United States remains deeply concerned with the horrible impacts that Putin’s war has had on children. While the State Department does not maintain a comprehensive numerical estimate of the number of children who have been taken from Ukraine and transferred to Russia, the State Department-supported Conflict Observatory, which independently compiles and documents evidence to support investigations of abuses during Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, has identified thousands of Ukraine’s children who have been transferred to facilities under Russia’s control. According to this independent analysis, the network of these facilities spans from Russia-occupied Crimea across Russia itself, from the Black Sea region to its Far East.

**RESPONSES OF MS. ERIN MCKEE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITT ROMNEY**

**Question.** One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian people.

**Answer.** How many civilians have been casualties of Putin’s murderous invasion?

**Answer.** As of January 22, 2023, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported 7,068 civilians in Ukraine have been killed since February 24, 2022, including 438 children, and 11,415 civilians have been injured, including 836 children. OHCHR believes that the actual figures are considerably higher, as the receipt of information from some locations where intense hostilities have occurred has been delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration. For example, these areas include Mariupol, Lysychansk, Popasna, and Sievierodonetsk cities, where there are allegations of numerous civilian casualties. Most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with wide area effects, including air strikes, missiles, and shelling from artillery and
rocket artillery. More than 9,900 civilian casualties—or more than half of the recorded total—were in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian people.

How many refugees have resulted from Putin’s war?

Answer. According to reporting by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of January 24, 2023, there are 8 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe. This figure reflects individual refugees who have fled since February 24, 2022, and are present in European countries, of whom 4.9 million are registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection status. Additionally, there are currently 5.4 million Ukrainians who are internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Ukraine as a result of the war, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian people.

How many people have suffered from hunger in the world because Putin has prevented or slowed down grain deliveries from Ukraine?

Answer. A series of political, security, and economic shocks have occurred since 2019, each with complex and intertwined impacts on global hunger. To date, no credible analysis has fully calculated the specific, direct impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on global hunger. However, an assessment of existing poverty and acute hunger data can suggest the order of magnitude of the invasion’s impacts.

First, the World Bank estimates that global shocks since 2019 resulted in an additional 89 million extremely poor people in 2022. The World Bank analysis does not break down this figure by specific driver (e.g., COVID–19, global prices, etc). However, a multi-country analysis conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute suggests that one third of this total, equivalent to roughly 30 million people, can be attributed to global price increases that occurred between 2019 and 2022. These increases in global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices were driven by a combination of factors in addition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including the People’s Republic of China’s restriction on fertilizer exports, reduced crop production in some key exporting countries, and increased global demand related to economic recovery from the COVID–19 pandemic.

Second, in terms of acute hunger, the Global Report on Food Crises suggests that the global population in need of emergency food assistance rose from 193 million in 2021 to 205–211 million in 2022. One driver of this increase (12–18 million people) was high global food, fuel, and fertilizer prices resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, though drought, conflict, and other shocks also played a significant role.

Question. One of the problems with a protracted conflict is that everyone becomes desensitized to the tragedy inflicted on the Ukrainian people.

How many people have been without power due to Russian attempts to freeze Ukrainians this winter?

Answer. Since October, Russian attacks targeting critical electricity infrastructure, particularly electric substations, have led to power system outages throughout the country. Ukraine’s utilities have been able to repair some of the damaged equipment and/or reroute power along alternative routes. Still, Ukraine’s transmission system operator, Ukrenergo, has been forced to institute rolling blackouts given the significant damage to critical substation equipment, such as transformers, which are necessary to transit electricity from power plants to consumption centers across the country. As such, the number and duration of outages across the country can vary considerably. As of late January, Ukraine’s power system is estimated to be able to meet about 75 percent of normal customer demand, but it has at times fallen below 50 percent due to rolling outages and/or restoration timelines following attacks.

Question. I’m continually struck by the generosity of the American people in sending over goods and funds to Ukraine. Whether it’s food, clothing, or generators, I know that Utahans remain firmly committed to supporting the Ukrainian people.

For those who are still willing to help through donations, beyond money transfers, what supplies are most needed on the ground in Ukraine?

Answer. In order to maximize the effectiveness and speed of international assistance during any international disaster, the proven best practice to help the most people the fastest remains cash donations to reputable relief organizations, rather than the cumbersome and uneven process of in-kind donations. Unlike material donations, cash involves no transportation costs, shipping delays, or customs fees. It also enables relief organizations to spend more time providing aid by spending less time managing goods. This is particularly the case given the complex operating en-
environment inside Ukraine. Financial donations remain the best way that generous Utahns can help humanitarian partners to procure any supplies that are needed for the ongoing humanitarian response—and such assistance can be used immediately. To support those generously looking to assist, USAID manages our Center for International Disaster Information (CIDI) website (CIDI.org), which provides a list of organizations that can be supported through cash donations and information on how to donate. For businesses and private sector actors looking to assist, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the UN Global Compact, and the UN Connecting Business Initiative (CBI) have also released a business guide, “OCHA Business Guide: Ukraine Humanitarian Crisis” to support the engagement of the private sector in the Ukraine response.

RESPONSES OF MS. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

*Question.* Media reports on a letter bomb campaign targeting our Embassy in Spain claimed unnamed U.S. officials claiming the perpetrators acted under the direction of Russian intelligence. Regardless of the credibility of this assessment, how likely is the general threat of Russian asymmetrical tactics against U.S. interests?

*Answer.* Russian malign influence remains a significant threat to U.S. interests and the interests of our Allies and partners. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine clearly demonstrates Moscow’s willingness to undermine the norms of the international system. Russia is engaged in overt and covert campaigns to undermine core institutions, including NATO and the EU, and to weaken faith in democratic governments and in the free-market system. These campaigns are aggressive and coordinated. The Department will continue to work with interagency and likeminded Allies and partners to counter Russian malign influence through a variety of tools.

*Question.* How is the Administration working to ensure the safety of our civilian personnel and facilities in the face of this kind of hybrid threat?

*Answer.* Department personnel serving overseas face and overcome challenges daily in their effort to provide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Between November 21 and December 7, 2022, there were approximately 20 suspicious packages received at various embassies and diplomatic facilities throughout Europe. In response, the Department sent out notices to every U.S. Mission instructing security personnel to review their security posture and mail screening procedures and further discuss with host nation law enforcement. Department policy requires all external mail to be screened for explosive and other materials at established offsite facilities. This is what occurred at the Embassy in Madrid when explosives were detected.

*Question.* Noting your mention of a deepening partnership with Tbilisi, can you explain why Georgia continues to maintain a nonreciprocal visa-free regime for Russian citizens?

*Answer.* With 20 percent of its sovereign territory still under Russian occupation, Georgians know all too well the effects of Russia’s aggression. Questions on Georgia’s visa regime are best directed to the Government of Georgia. At the same time, it is crucial for the Georgian Government to provide safe-haven to those fleeing repression, including from Russia.

*Question.* To what degree does Georgia’s Russia policy undermine U.S. and allied efforts to maintain maximum pressure on the Russian economy?

*Answer.* Georgia has complied with international financial sanctions against Russia and continues to work to comply with export controls. The United States is working with Georgian authorities, border police, customs, and government agencies to bolster these compliance efforts. Russia continues to occupy 20 percent of Georgia, and Georgia works through the Geneva International Discussions and other venues to counter Russia’s aggression. The United States is working to ensure Georgia has the capacity to comply with international sanctions against Russia.

*Question.* Provided Georgia addresses the EU’s governance priorities, what is your assessment of its candidate status?

*Answer.* The European Council’s unanimous decision to grant European perspective status to Georgia is an important step that recognizes the European aspirations of the Georgian people. This step keeps Georgia on the path to EU membership and the security, prosperity, and western integration that comes with it. We continue to press Georgia’s government to undertake the meaningful reforms called for by the European Commission for EU candidacy status.
Georgia’s road to EU candidate status is clear and achievable. We have strongly urged the government to seize this opportunity and work with stakeholders across Georgian society to enact and implement the necessary steps as laid out by the European Commission. We expect the EU will review Georgia’s candidate status application again by the end of 2023.

RESPONSES OF MS. ERIN MCKEE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. An asymmetric escalation of Russian tactics reminds us of the sobering reality that our implementing partners present a very attractive target for adversaries. How is USAID working to preserve their security without overly constraining their ability to work where U.S. assistance is most needed?

Answer. USAID has prioritized the safety and security of its implementing partners working inside Ukraine. At Ukraine Mission implementing partner (IP) meetings, USAID’s Office for Security (SEC) provides security briefings along with practical guidance for both organizational and personal safety and security. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, IPs have augmented their security staff and refined their security plans. USAID SEC has met directly and virtually with our IPs to provide their expertise as they refine their security plans. USAID maintains a very close relationship with the Embassy Regional Security Officer (RSO) team. In December, the Ukraine Regional Contracting Office organized a security-specific briefing, led by Embassy RSO, for our IPs. As appropriate, USAID also masks international and national non-governmental organization (NGO) partner names in public communications to further protect their safety. USAID also removed reports and evaluations from the Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC)—a public database housing USAID reports and evaluations—as they may contain personal identifiable information. Our implementers continue to submit reports and evaluations to the DEC, however information is only visible internally within USAID. No public reports are visible—for safety reasons—as they may mention names of partners, civil society organizations, and individual names.

As part of the USAID Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) application process, we ask applicants to submit safety and security plans that reflect robust analysis and planning around facts in the operating environment that impact safety and security. During the application process, applicants also articulate the resources needed for their safety and security for USAID/BHA consideration. USAID/BHA also funds two organizations, including the United Nations Department for Safety and Security (UNDSS), specifically to provide common safety and security services to the humanitarian community in Ukraine. These services include real-time reporting about security threats and incidents.

RESPONSES OF DR. CELESTE WALLANDER TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TODD YOUNG

Question. Noting Russia’s ongoing difficulties procuring key components for its defense industry, can you speak to the effect on its military readiness in the region?

Answer. Despite degradations in its ability to procure key components for its defense industry—thanks to sanctions and export controls imposed by the international community—Russia remains a formidable near-peer adversary, and its ability to rapidly reconstitute its military inventory should not be taken for granted. Ensuring a long-term strategic failure for Russian aggression will rely on a whole-of-government effort combined with commitments from Allies and partners.

Question. Seeing its very public losses on the battlefield, what is the long-term reputational impact on Russia given its status as a regional guarantor of security for its allies?

Answer. Russia’s international standing has eroded as a result of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but Russia continues in its attempts to project influence around the globe. However, one only needs to look to Russia’s neighbors to see how it is failing. Among the countries on its borders, which it seeks to dominate, Russia’s reputation is fraying. In Moldova, Armenia, and the states of Central Asia, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable or even desirable security partner.

Question. Noting Russia’s formal defense pacts—and Iran’s sales of military hardware to Moscow—does Russia use the territory in these countries as a waystation for Iranian arms shipments? And if so, how is the Administration working to block the trafficking of these arms?
Answer. The Administration is using all the tools at our disposal, including working with our Allies and partners, to stop and prevent all support for Russia and its war effort. We are monitoring trade data to identify jurisdictions where problematic transfers may be occurring to prevent the movement of defense materiel or transactions in support of this activity.

**Question.** What actions should the Administration pursue in Mali to undermine the influence of the Wagner Group?

Answer. The United States Government employs a “3D” (development, diplomacy, and defense) approach in Mali, subject to U.S. legal and policy restrictions on cooperation with post-transition leaders in Mali, and those leaders’ willingness to work with the United States and our allies and partners. We also continue to highlight to the Malian transition government Wagner’s human rights abuses against host populations and other destabilizing activities, such as depleting national resources for Wagner’s own gain and undermining host nations’ control over their own territory. The Wagner Group has not improved security anywhere it has deployed, including in Mali. To the contrary, it has complicated and deepened conflicts.

**Question.** The Biden administration has consistently extended a waiver that allows the United States to provide security and other assistance to the Government of Azerbaijan. To what extent has the waiver extension translated into substantive U.S. military assistance for Azerbaijan since its 2020 hostilities with Armenia?

Answer. U.S. military assistance for Azerbaijan has declined considerably since the fall 2020 hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This assistance has been focused on International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs that work to strengthen ties between the U.S. and Azerbaijani militaries, increase interoperability, and provide English language programs to increase the exposure of Azerbaijani military personnel to U.S. and western military values. All assistance to Azerbaijan is carefully evaluated to ensure compliance so that it is provided consistent with Section 907 of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 (P.L. 102–511) and the related waiver of that restriction. It is provided on terms that clarify both the intended purposes and limitations of the use of such assistance, is carefully calibrated to ensure it does not undermine or hamper efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Armenia, and is not to be used for offensive purposes.

RESPONSES OF MS. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN BARRASSO

**Question.** Do you agree that the U.S. needs to ban Russian uranium?

Answer. Russia uses energy exports, including in the nuclear sector, to exert political and economic pressure on its customers globally. G7 nations have resolved to reduce their reliance on Russian nuclear energy supplies and services and to help other countries seeking to do the same. Several countries have taken important steps in this direction, most recently Bulgaria. Consistent with our G7 pledge, State is working with other departments and agencies to identify alternatives, and we welcome Congressional support for that effort.

**Question.** What is the threat posed by the United States continuing to be dependent upon Russia for energy?

Answer. Russia leverages national and regional dependencies on Russian energy to expand its political, economic, and military influence and to undermine transatlantic security and foreign policy interests. In March 2022, the Administration banned imports of Russian oil and petroleum products, liquefied natural gas, and coal. We are working with allies and partners to identify ways to further reduce dependence on Russian energy, both in the United States and globally. Consistent with our G7 pledge, the Administration is working to identify alternatives to Russian enriched uranium supply, and we welcome Congressional support for that effort.

**Question.** Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Congress has passed four supplemental appropriations packages that included funding for Ukraine. In total we have approved roughly $113 billion. This includes $49 billion military aid, $41 billion in economic aid and $23 billion for U.S. military operations in Europe and other U.S. agencies: What steps is the Administration taking to ensure this funding is not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into the wrong hands?

Answer. We have focused on oversight and accountability from the beginning. All budgetary support is disbursed through the World Bank mechanism only after
verification. Deloitte is there permanently to audit the auditors. We have increased embassy staff, led by Ambassador Brink, to focus on technical oversight, and increased OIG oversight from State, USAID, and DoD with regular reporting to Congress. Finally, we have an effective and comprehensive plan to prevent any diversion of weapons systems.

**Question.** Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or weapon systems falling into Russia's control?

**Answer.** The Pentagon reports it has seen no credible evidence of diversion. We take every allegation of the capture of our military equipment or weapon systems seriously, anywhere in the world. There is an inherent risk of weapons capture and diversion on the battlefield in any armed conflict, and it is reasonable to believe that Russian forces have captured some Ukrainian weapons, which may include U.S.-origin equipment or weapon systems. We cannot speak to what Russia does with equipment it may capture on the battlefield. However, we can confidently say Russia is constantly spreading disinformation regarding weapons diversion in its bid to both discredit Kyiv and distract the international community from its invasion of Ukraine.

**Question.** Do you estimate we will need further supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?

**Answer.** The Administration appreciates the supplemental appropriations Congress provided to support the U.S. response to Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale assault on Ukraine. Despite this historic support, Ukraine faces monumental challenges in funding the defense of its nation and our values, meeting the needs of its people, and ultimately, recovering. We will be forward-leaning in utilizing our available funding to address the highest needs and in working with other donors to leverage additional support to help meet Ukraine's budget gaps and assistance needs. Given the fluidity of the situation on the ground, we will continue to assess requirements and available resources to meet those needs.

**Question.** How can programs be properly evaluated and monitored with the current restrictions on civilian personnel and in a deteriorating security environment?

**Answer.** Embassy Kyiv's team remains engaged with interagency partners and the Government of Ukraine on accountability issues related to all foreign assistance, including budget support. This engagement includes regular assistance oversight meetings. In addition, State, USAID, and DoD Inspectors General have increased the frequency and scope of their oversight reporting on U.S. assistance. On budget support funds, State works closely with USAID and the Department of the Treasury to ensure rigorous oversight and accountability of these funds. The mechanisms to ensure budget support accountability include World Bank verification of expenditures, third-party monitoring through Deloitte, and Embassy Kyiv reviews of updates provided by Deloitte.

**Question.** What are biggest challenges in safely and quickly delivering humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine?

**Answer.** Our humanitarian partners bravely deliver assistance to Ukraine in highly challenging circumstances while encountering major obstacles, including: the difficult security environment in portions of the country that are active war zones; populations living in areas under the temporary military control of the Russian Federation, which are hard to access and have severe needs; Russia’s ongoing infrastructure attacks and its impact on humanitarians’ ability to operate; and harsh winter conditions that hamper humanitarian activity.

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**Responses of Dr. Celeste Wallander to Questions Submitted by Senator John Barrasso**

**Question.** On November 4, 2022, Sabrina Singh, Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary said: “In terms of why aren’t we providing new tanks or American tanks, introducing a new main battle tank is extremely costly, it’s time-sensitive, and it would be a huge undertaking for the Ukrainian forces.” Press Secretary Singh said it was time sensitive that we provide the Ukrainians with old refurbished Russian T–72 tanks. This was almost 3 months ago. We lost almost 3 months of training the Ukrainians on the Abrams tank. The M1 Abrams tank is right next door in Poland. I have seen the tanks at the training area myself.

What steps is the Administration taking to ensure this funding is not wasted and military weapon systems do not fall into the wrong hands?
Answer. Last October, the Administration released the “U.S. Plan to Counter Illicit Diversion of Certain Advanced Conventional Weapons in Eastern Europe,” which outlines how the United States is proactively working to prevent the diversion of weapons from Ukraine. The plan highlights three priorities: ensuring accountability, enhancing border security, and building partner capacity.

Consistent with these objectives, DoD has adapted its accountability practices for the combat environment; for example by expanding self-reporting mechanisms for Ukraine, including by using improved technologies, and conducting site inspections to verify inventories of U.S.-provided equipment (when security conditions permit).

DoD is also supporting broader U.S. Government outreach to Allies and partners to promote multilateral cooperation to prevent arms trafficking.

Question. Are we aware of any cases of our military equipment or weapon systems falling into Russia’s control?

Answer. We are aware that Russia has captured relatively small numbers of U.S.-provided weapons when it has overrun Ukrainian positions. This is inevitable in war zones, and is a risk that DoD factors into its calculus prior to providing security assistance.

However, the fact remains that DoD has not seen credible evidence of the diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons by Ukraine. Unfortunately, Russia continues to aggressively push disinformation and false reports of arms trafficking in an attempt to erode Kyiv’s credibility and international support for Ukraine.

Question. Do you estimate we will need further supplemental appropriations for Fiscal Year 2023? How much?

Answer. The supplemental funding provided by Congress alongside the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 has been critical in supporting Ukraine on the battlefield to ensure it has the strongest hand at the negotiating table when that time comes. Each individual account line has contributed to battlefield gains. Our requests are always conditions based, and we expect to evaluate the need for additional funding as the situation evolves.

Question. What are the key components to Ukraine’s strategy to drive Russians from occupied territory?

Answer. Ultimately, Ukraine determines its own strategy, but Ukrainian resolve has proven critical to Ukraine’s success in pushing back Russia’s brutality. The tremendous sacrifice and bravery of the men and women of Ukraine as they defend their homeland with grit and ingenuity has been the catalyst for repelling Russia’s attacks and regaining control over sovereign Ukrainian territory.

Broad international support for Ukraine has also been essential. The eighth meeting of Secretary Austin’s Ukraine Defense Contact Group on January 20, 2023 again demonstrated the wide-sweeping support for Ukraine, both in political terms as well as in security assistance with the largest amount of donations committed by Ukraine’s partners to date.

Question. What is the Administration’s strategy to help Ukraine defend its people, and push Russia out?

Answer. As the Secretary of Defense has said, we are “moving heaven and earth” to get Ukraine the capabilities they urgently need to defend themselves and retake territory. To date, with the support of Congress, the Administration’s efforts have amounted to more than $27.1 billion in security assistance since Russia’s unprovoked, full-scale invasion. This assistance has included hundreds of armored vehicles, more than 1 million rounds of artillery, thousands of arms, and key air defense capabilities.

Question. What is your assessment of Russia’s military actions so far?

Answer. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Russian military has failed to achieve its strategic or operational objectives. Russian forces have suffered enormous casualties on the battlefield, have lost hundreds of pieces of military equipment, and have expended significant numbers of precision and other munitions. Russia’s frequent changes in operational commanders, its reliance on Wagner fighters, and its turn to external support from Iran and North Korea are all indicators of its military failures.

Question. What weapons and equipment have been the most beneficial to the Ukrainian military?

Answer. Ukraine’s battlefield requirements have evolved over time. At the outset of Russia’s full-scale invasion, surging Stinger air defense and Javelin anti-tank
missiles proved critical. As the war shifted to the south and east, the decision to provide HIMARS helped Ukraine seize the momentum from Russia. Air defense became more important as Russia’s indiscriminate widespread air attacks increased and we’ve committed key air defense systems, including NASAMS and Patriot. In recent weeks, we have been laser-focused on getting Ukraine more armored maneuver capability, which will enable them to continue to push Russia further back and retake more territory.

**Question.** What are the greatest challenges to the Russian security forces?  
**Answer.** Throughout the last year of conflict, Russian forces in Ukraine have faced significant challenges with command and control, logistics, and morale, among other issues. To increase the number of military personnel available for the war, Russian leadership had to institute a mobilization drive in fall 2022. Russian stocks of equipment and munitions have also been diminished as a result of the conflict, as indicated by Russia’s efforts to obtain supplies from Iran and North Korea.

**RESPONSES OF MS. VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL HAGERTY**

**Question.** In response to my question on how the Biden administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to improve burden-sharing and increase their relative contribution of total assistance to Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S. allies and partners roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January 27, 2023, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to provide assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these appropriations laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S. assistance. As tracked by Germany’s Kiel Institute—a reliable open-source database—aid from non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of November 20, 2022 while assistance from the United States to Ukraine totaled $66 billion during the same period. In other words, the United States provided the bulk of total aid to Ukraine—62 percent—during this time period. Moreover, Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent of the weaponry—in dollar value—received by Ukraine in this period has come from the United States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country’s total bilateral assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian defense contact group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80 percent), Poland (0.49 percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32 percent), and the United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United States (0.22 percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08 percent of GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance to Ukraine during this period. Please note that none of the statistics from Kiel Institute’s dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law ($47.3 billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative contributions. Under Secretary Nuland, do you disagree with any of this open-source data that I’ve summarized?

**Answer.** The United States continues to work closely with allies and partners around the world to provide Ukraine the vital assistance it needs to defend itself against Russian aggression. From February 2022 through early April 2023, the United States has provided $56.9 billion in economic, military, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. While we are not in a position to validate the data gathered by nongovernmental organizations, we currently estimate that our allies and partners have provided approximately $60.7 billion in aid to Ukraine across all sectors during that same timeframe. We will continue to prioritize discussions with other nations to share in the responsibility we all bear to ensure Russia’s strategic failure in Ukraine.

**Question.** Would you like to clarify, expand, or amend your claim that allied and partner contributions to aid Ukraine and affected countries are roughly equal to U.S. contributions in the aggregate? I would appreciate it if you could provide the data used to substantiate your claim and its source. I request the data also be broken down by military, economic, and humanitarian/other assistance categories.

**Answer.** U.S. allies and partners are assisting Ukraine in numerous ways. According to Ukraine’s Ministry of Finance, since February 2022, Ukraine has received $29.7 billion in budget support from non-U.S. donors, of which $15.8 billion is from EU institutions and member states, compared to $18 billion from the United States. EU institutions and member states and other donors have provided $37 billion in humanitarian aid, nearly double the United States’ $19 billion contribution. EU countries are also bearing the financial burden of hosting over 5 million Ukrainian refugees (out of a total of 8 million refugees). Since February 2022, the United
States has provided approximately $35 billion in security assistance to Ukraine. Allies and partners worldwide have provided or committed over $24 billion in security assistance, and these contributions continue to accrue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assistance to Ukraine since February 2022:</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>All Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>$27 billion</td>
<td>$13 billion</td>
<td>$3.68 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Support</td>
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<td>$11.2 billion (with $15.7 billion additional planned before the end of 2023)</td>
<td>$12.2 billion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
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<td>$1.5 billion</td>
<td>$2.23 billion</td>
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<td>Refugee support related to TPD</td>
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**Question.** On the use of Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA): In response to my question on whether the Biden intends to use emergency PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign military sales backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the time and requested an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan's arms backlog remains roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon officials' assessment that China will be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1 billion per year in PDA to transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the event of an emergency—the same authorization that President Joe Biden used to send billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against Russia's invasion. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has directed 30 drawdowns under PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in weaponry from the Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers, and Javelins. Under Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the current backlog in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19 billion? If not, please provide the updated statistic.

**Answer.** Claims of a $19 billion FMS backlog to Taiwan are misleading. An FMS contract is often signed and funded months or years after the Congressional Notification to the Hill, and U.S. defense companies only start production after the contract is signed and funded. While many of Taiwan's FMS cases are delivered by the mutually agreed upon date in the contract paperwork, the actual, final delivery date is driven by the manufacturer and other factors external to State or Congressional control. That date is often only publicized if late. Our experts would be happy to provide you and your staff a briefing on the specifics of the current FMS pipeline for Taiwan.

**Question.** Under Secretary Nuland, why is the Administration not invoking PDA to proactively provide arms necessary for Taiwan to deter a possible Chinese invasion of the island?

**Answer.** The Administration is grateful for Congress' enactment of this authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resiliency Act, and we are actively discussing how best to exercise the $1 billion drawdown. We recognize that military assistance drawdowns are one of the U.S. Government’s most valuable tools to provide defense articles to foreign partners quickly. There are numerous policy and national security implications the United States must consider before the President decides to authorize a drawdown that would pull from DoD inventory. The Administration looks forward to discussing the results of this review with Congress in the coming months.

**Question.** Under Secretary Nuland and Assistant Secretary Wallander, to what extent has the United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA that could also be used for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?

**Answer.** Many of our partners have similar defense needs, and there are similarities and differences between the capabilities Taiwan and Ukraine need to effectively maintain their self-defense. We are supporting both partners simultaneously and in a manner that does not detract from either. There are technical considerations involved, including whether DoD stock can be released to Ukraine and Taiwan.
Question. What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S. weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific?

In response to my question on how the Biden administration plans to persuade U.S. allies to improve burden-sharing and increase their relative contribution of total assistance to Ukraine, you claimed that the contributions of U.S. allies and partners roughly equaled total U.S. support. As of January 27, 2023, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations laws to provide assistance to Ukraine and other countries affected by the war since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. As of today, these appropriations laws provide an additional $113 billion in U.S. assistance. As tracked by Germany’s Kiel Institute—a reliable open-source database—aid from non-U.S. sources totaled $41 billion as of November 20, 2022 while assistance from the United States to Ukraine totaled $66 billion during the same period. In other words, the United States provided the bulk of total aid to Ukraine—62 percent—during this time period. Moreover, Kiel Institute estimates about 80 percent of the weaponry—in dollar value—received by Ukraine in this period has come from the United States. Kiel Institute also tracks a country’s total bilateral assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). Out of the more than 50 countries in the Ukrainian defense contact group, only Estonia (0.83 percent), Latvia (0.80 percent), Poland (0.49 percent), Norway (0.36 percent), Lithuania (0.32 percent), and the United Kingdom (0.24 percent) exceeded the United States (0.22 percent). By way of contrast, Germany had spent only 0.08 percent of GDP and France, 0.05 percent of GDP on bilateral assistance to Ukraine during this period. Please note that none of the statistics from Kiel Institute’s dataset include the December 2022 omnibus law ($47.3 billion), which would even further increase the gap in relative contributions.

Answer. DoD and State are working closely with the defense industrial base to assess current needs, project future requirements in the Indo-Pacific and globally, and lessen supply chain bottlenecks negatively impacting production timelines. Through this process, the Administration has been able to improve production timelines for several weapons, including Javelins, Stingers, and HIMARS. The Executive Branch is reviewing our processes to ensure defense acquisitions proceed as quickly as possible, and we look forward to collaborating with Congress on potential mechanisms to incentivize defense partners to expand production capacity.

Question. In response to my question on whether the Biden intends to use emergency PDA authority to cut down the $19 billion foreign military sales backlog for Taiwan, you were unable to answer at the time and requested an opportunity to look into the matter. Taiwan’s arms backlog remains roughly $19 billion despite senior Pentagon officials’ assessment that China will be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act authorizes $1 billion per year in PDA to transfer defense articles to Taiwan in the event of an emergency—the same authorization that President Joe Biden used to send billions of dollars in aid to Ukraine for defense against Russia’s invasion. Since February 2022, the Biden administration has directed 30 drawdowns under PDA totaling approximately $18.3 billion in weaponry from the Department of Defense, including HIMARS, Stingers, and Javelins.

Assistant Secretary Wallander, do you concur the current backlog in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan totals roughly $19 billion? If not, please provide the updated statistic.

Answer. DoD assesses the claim of a $19 billion FMS backlog to Taiwan to be misleading. Actual contracts for arms and services announced in Congressional Notifications are often signed and funded months or years after an announced Congressional Notification. U.S. defense companies only start production after the contract is signed, and many of Taiwan’s FMS cases are scheduled to be delivered by the mutually agreed-upon date in the contract paperwork.

Question. Assistant Secretary Wallander, to what extent has the United States sent weapons to Ukraine via PDA that could also be used for an asymmetric defense of Taiwan?

Answer. Support to Ukraine and support to Taiwan are not mutually exclusive. We continue to work diligently to provide asymmetric capabilities to Taiwan, including anti-ship missiles, command control networks and secure communication systems, data links, early warning radar, and integrated air and missile defense, as...
fast as possible while also making sure Ukraine can defend itself against Russian aggression. Although some of the systems we have transferred to Ukraine under presidential drawdown align with some of Taiwan’s priorities for acquisition, it is important to reiterate that this is not a zero-sum game.

*Question.* What steps is the Administration taking to ensure the U.S. defense industrial base is prepared to replenish depleted U.S. weapons stockpiles and ramp up production to prepare for a possible major regional conflict in the Indo-Pacific?

*Answer.* Thanks to Congressional support, the Department is replenishing stocks of munitions transferred to Ukraine. The Department is working with industry to increase production of certain capabilities to continue meeting the needs of Ukrainian forces, while ensuring the United States is ready to defend itself, our partners, and Allies.

The Department, through the Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive (MIDD), has identified over 2 billion dollars of industrial base investments to increase and/or accelerate production of Javelin, Singer, HIMARS, GMLRS, 155mm artillery shells, and Patriot missiles. In addition, the Department is leveraging lessons learned from supporting the Ukraine conflict, as well as from its supply chain resiliency analyses, to utilize various authorities to make the munitions supply chain more resilient, increase its capacity, and maintain its readiness.

More broadly, the Department has found that the traditional munitions procurement practices resulted in “feast or famine” cycles that created instability in the industrial base and incentivized production sized only to current demand, with little slack for any surges in demand. In addition, some munitions that are in high demand by foreign partners—such as Stinger missiles—are not currently in use by the U.S. military and therefore did not have active production lines.

The authorities passed in the FY23 NDAA will provide the Department the ability to lock in critical munitions investments, send a stable demand signal to the munitions industrial base, and respond more quickly to future contingencies. This includes Multi-year procurements as well as the ability to purchase long-lead items for some key systems. Long-term industrial base resilience will depend on increased use of these authorities as well as consistent buying behavior, to send the appropriate demand signals to industry, authorizing suppliers to acquire long-lead-time items in advance, to reduce future production times, and establishing additional U.S. and allied sources for critical components.
LETTER TO SECRETARY BLINKEN, DATED AUGUST 4, 2020, ABOUT PLANS TO NOMINATE A SPECIAL ENVOY TO BELARUS

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510
August 4, 2022

The Honorable Antony Blinken
Secretary
United States Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Blinken,

We write to express our continued support for the position of U.S. Special Envoy to Belarus, which is vital to promoting democracy and freedom in Belarus. On December 15, 2020, Ambassador Julie Fisher was confirmed by the Senate as U.S. Ambassador to Belarus. This was the first time the position had been filled since 2008 and demonstrated the United States’ continued commitment to a free and democratic Belarus. Unfortunately, Ambassador Fisher was denied a visa and accreditation by the Belarusian authorities and instead had to serve as Special Envoy to Belarus from Vilnius, Lithuania. Ambassador Fisher served in this role with distinction. However, given her recent appointment as Ambassador to Cyprus, we urge you to appoint a successor for this important role.

Over the past two years, the Lukashenka regime has continued to crack down on peaceful protesters and punish dissenting voices — a trend that began with the detention of more than 10,000 people who protested the 2020 fraudulent elections. These ongoing human rights violations include attacks on independent media, which are critical to a free and open society. In addition, Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s continued support for Putin’s unprovoked war in Ukraine shows his complete disregard for the democratic principles that have kept the peace in Europe since the end of World War II.

As Mr. Lukashenka tightens his authoritarian grip, the United States must remain a committed partner for all those pursuing a democratic future for Belarus. Ambassador Fisher provided critical support to the pro-democracy movement in Belarus and was a strong advocate for its democratic aspirations. She kept the spotlight on Lukashenka’s horrendous human rights abuses and worked with Senators to establish the Free Belarus Caucus, which continues to marshal bipartisan support for the Belarusian people.

On June 9, 2022, Ambassador Fisher announced her departure from the role of U.S. Special Envoy to Belarus. We wish to thank the Government of Lithuania and the U.S. Embassy in Vilnius for their partnership in America’s efforts to support the Belarusian people, and we congratulate Ambassador Fisher on her tour of duty. Her role of Special Envoy cannot be left vacant. As Ambassador Fisher demonstrated, this role played a critical role in keeping much-needed focus on Belarus, and the Administration needs to ensure this continues.

We therefore urge the State Department to work quickly with President Biden to ensure this position is preserved and filled without delay. If it is not filled, we respectfully request that the
State Department outline its strategy on diplomatic engagement with Belarus going forward, including plans to fill the position of U.S. Special Envoy.

Sincerely,

Jeanne Shaheen  
United States Senator

Roger F. Wicker  
United States Senator

Richard J. Durbin  
United States Senator

Thom Tillis  
United States Senator

Lindsey Graham  
United States Senator