



THE PRICE OF RETREAT:

America Cedes Global Leadership to China



COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL	1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	7
SECTION ONE: The People’s Republic of China’s Global Ambitions	10
SECTION TWO: Reducing the U.S. Diplomatic Toolkit	12
SECTION THREE: Cutting U.S. Foreign Assistance and Development	17
Economic Assistance.....	20
Case Study: Sub-Saharan Africa – Lobito Corridor Critical Minerals	21
Case Study: South Africa – Critical Minerals	23
Case Study: Colombia – Counternarcotics and Law Enforcement	24
Case Study: Chile – Disaster Relief and Critical Minerals	25
Humanitarian Assistance	26
Case Study: Myanmar – Earthquake Response.....	26
Global Health Programming	27
Case Study: U.S. Retreat from the Global Vaccine Alliance (Gavi)	29
Case Study: South Africa – HIV/AIDS Programming	31
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).....	31
Case Study: Nepal – Hydropower.....	33
Case Study: Indonesia – Infrastructure Financing	34
Case Study: Kiribati and the Solomon Islands – Sustainable Livelihoods and Conservation.....	35
Case Study: Côte d’Ivoire – Energy Infrastructure	37
SECTION 4: Eroding U.S. Alliances and Partnerships	39
Pushing America’s Allies and Partners Toward China.....	41
Case Study: Tariffs and the Defense Industrial Base	43
Case Study: Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) Trilateral Partnership	44
SECTION 5: Abandoning Public Diplomacy and Surrendering to Chinese Propaganda	45
Eliminating U.S. Government Coordination to Counter Chinese Propaganda	48
Case Study: Radio Free Asia – Lost Radio Frequencies and Coverage	49
U.S. International Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs	50
Case Study: Fulbright University Vietnam.....	51
SECTION 6: Harming U.S. Research and Innovation	52
Damaging America’s Reputation as a Global Talent Hub	54
Case Study: CHIPS and Science Act	56
SECTION 7: Reducing America’s Diplomatic Footprint	57
SECTION 8: Ceding International Bodies to China	60
Actions That Have Diminished United States Leadership in International Bodies	62
Case Study: International Telecommunications Union – World Radio Conference 2027	64

ANNEX: Regional Examples of U.S. Foreign Assistance Pause and Termination Impacts..... 1

EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA1

AFRICA7

PACIFIC ISLANDS17

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN20

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL



COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN
RELATIONS

JULY 14, 2025

Dear Reader: The People’s Republic of China presents the United States with a strategic challenge distinct from any in our nation’s history. The Chinese Communist Party’s leadership is engaged in a long-term strategy to unseat the United States as the world’s leading superpower. To safeguard its core interests—regime survival and national rejuvenation—China has deployed disinformation, political interference, cyberattacks, maritime harassment and economic coercion without provoking open military conflict with the United States.

Over the past six months, the United States has abandoned many of the very tools it has long used to counter Beijing’s tactics. As a result, the United States is undercutting alliances and economic partnerships and weakening its ability to out-compete China.

Many Americans may see the countries and the arenas where the United States and China compete as distant and remote. But the critical minerals corridors of Africa and Southeast Asia, the foreign markets vital for U.S. supply chains and exporters and the information landscapes across Asia and Europe do matter—these are the frontlines of this battle. The outcomes of these contests are deeply connected to the future of life here at home, including the security and prosperity of the American people.

Elected officials across the United States—Democrats and Republicans alike—must work together to ensure the United States remains engaged internationally to protect its national security and economic interests. The United States is well-positioned to succeed in each arena of this competition. We are blessed by decades of investments in a system of alliances, strategic aid, domestic innovation and open trade that have made our country the dominant global superpower it is today. And while grave damage has been done in the opening months of the Trump Administration, it is not too late to act swiftly, on a bipartisan basis, to restore our competitive edge.


This report takes stock of the early damage done to U.S. competitiveness vis-à-vis China. It does not focus on the domestic or military investments necessary to compete, but rather the U.S. diplomatic and foreign aid components of this competition. You will find in the following pages that recent actions—the chaotic gutting of the U.S. Agency for International Development, a misguided tariff war and efforts to shutter Radio Free Asia, to name a few—have been a gift to Beijing. In private, our allies tell us that Chinese officials are gleeful, characterizing the United States as unreliable. In some cases, China is filling the void we have left behind, buying up now-vacant radio frequencies to broadcast its propaganda to millions. But in many cases, Beijing is doubling down on its own long-term investments—in overseas infrastructure, critical minerals exploitation and exchange programs that bring foreign talent to Chinese universities—all while America withdraws.

America's retreat from the world will have real and lasting consequences for the American people. Chipping away at our alliances makes the United States less secure and risks inviting devastating conflict. Ceding key export markets allows China to box out American workers, manufacturers, and other businesses and allows China to write unfair rules of the road for global trade. And a retreat from the system that we helped build following the Second World War—based on democracy, economic interdependence and American values—means China is increasingly able to set the global agenda at the expense of U.S. interests.

We hope this report serves as a call to action for Members of Congress who understand the magnitude of the challenge we face—and the opportunity we have to rebuild the tools we need to meet it.

Sincerely,

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations



Jeanne Shaheen
United States Senator
Ranking Member



Chris Coons
United States Senator



Chris Murphy
United States Senator



Tim Kaine
United States Senator



Jeff Merkley
United States Senator



Cory Booker
United States Senator



Brian Schatz
United States Senator



Chris Van Hollen
United States Senator



Tammy Duckworth
United States Senator



Jacky Rosen
United States Senator

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report documents the early damage done to America’s ability to compete with China in the first six months of the second Trump Administration. Conducted by the Minority Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it is based on open source research, official staff travel and meetings with the Administration, foreign government officials, U.S. companies and international non-governmental organizations.

The findings are clear: President Trump’s sweeping and non-strategic cuts to our diplomatic tools and international standing, his trade war against allies and partners, and the gutting of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM)—among many other actions—have deeply undermined U.S. competitiveness vis-a-vis China. The Administration’s pause and potential termination of Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts, the near blanket freeze on Countering the People’s Republic of China Influence Fund (CPIF) and Countering Strategic Competitors (CSC) projects and its arbitrary visa restrictions against top international talent weaken our standing, partnerships and economic edge against China. As America retreats from global leadership under the Trump Administration, China is well-positioned and eager to exploit this moment of American disengagement.

The following are key areas where U.S. global leadership has already been weakened. These broad themes are outlined in greater detail throughout the report. In addition, the Annex contains a detailed but non-exhaustive list of specific programs and activities with a nexus to U.S.-China competition that were either paused, terminated or are unlikely to continue.

- **Shrinking the U.S. International Affairs Budget:** The Trump Administration has proposed cutting America’s total international affairs budget by 84%, including 91% for U.S.-led international narcotics and law enforcement programs, by 90.5% for U.S. contributions to international organizations, by 61% for lifesaving humanitarian assistance and by 93% for U.S. people-to-people exchanges.¹ Meanwhile, China recently proposed an 8.4% increase in its own diplomatic budget for 2025, committed \$500 million to the World Health Organization over the next five years and continues to spend billions on international educational and cultural exchange programs.²

¹ Reductions in U.S. diplomatic resources have been proposed in the name of government savings and deficit reductions. Yet, these cuts are occurring simultaneously as President Trump signed into law a reconciliation package that, according to the Congressional Budget Office, will increase the U.S. federal deficit by \$3.3 trillion over the next decade and inject our military budget with an additional \$113 billion. Furthermore, recently reported State Department estimates indicate that the cost of shutting down the U.S. Agency for International Development will cost more than \$6 billion. In other words, the Administration’s near wholesale divestment in American diplomacy and global leadership, its elimination of international leverage and the damage it has caused to U.S. alliances and partnerships, have not saved Americans a dime. Congressional Budget Office, “Estimated Budgetary Effects of an Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute to H.R. 1, the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Relative to CBO’s January 2025 Baseline,” June 29, 2025, <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61534>; Background Briefing on Fiscal Year 2026 Defense Budget,” *Inside Defense*, May 21, 2025, <https://insidedefense.com/insider/house-appropriators-mark-defense-bill-june-13>; U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification, <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/FY-2026-State-CBJ-.pdf>.

² This 8.4% increase in the diplomatic budget was approved at the Third Session of the 14th National People’s Congress. “Report on China’s Central and Local Budgets,” *The State Council of the People’s Republic of China*, Mar. 13, 2025, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202503/13/content_WS67d2d817c6d0868f4e8f0c89.html. “China to Give \$500 Million to World Health Organization in Next 5 Years, Official Says,” *Reuters*, May 20, 2025. In 2018, China spent more than \$12 billion on “overseas education,” both for Chinese students studying abroad as well as foreign students studying in China; Final Statement of National General Public Budget Expenditure in 2018, *Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China*, July 18, 2019, https://www.mof.gov.cn/en/data/202011/t20201126_3630682.htm?utm.

- Eliminating U.S. Tools to Compete:** In the first quarter of 2025, the Trump Administration indiscriminately cut more than 7,400 U.S. foreign aid programs totaling approximately \$80 billion, which included economic assistance, humanitarian and disaster aid, global health programming and energy infrastructure projects to countries all over the world.³ The Trump Administration also ordered a near-complete pause to Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts and has requested to rescind \$1.2 billion worth of prior year MCC funds.⁴ As a result of these cuts, China will surpass the United States as the largest bilateral assistance partner for more than 40 countries.⁵ Meanwhile, organizations that carry out U.S. foreign assistance programs have raised the alarm that the Department of State will lack the necessary technical expertise, capacity and context for ongoing and future U.S. foreign assistance programs for the foreseeable future.
- Eroding U.S. Alliances and Partnerships:** The Trump Administration has announced new or revised tariff policies more than 50 times since taking office, including 50% steel tariffs against Mexico, Canada, Japan and the European Union.⁶ Blanket tariffs are not just wreaking economic havoc at home, they are also eroding longstanding U.S. alliances, including making it even more difficult to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP.⁷ In some cases, U.S. tariffs are forcing allies, including European partners, to consider closer economic ties with Beijing, as evidenced by Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent trip to Southeast Asia and the China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum.⁸ Tariffs also have direct consequences for our military readiness and the defense industrial base.⁹ Meanwhile, some allies have expressed a desire to seek greater independence from the United States, including NATO allies reconsidering purchasing U.S. F-35 Joint Fighters.¹⁰

³ These figures were drawn in part from Department of State documents submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Carmen Paun, "Documents Reveal Scope of Trump's Foreign Aid Cuts," *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025.

⁴ U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification.

⁵ Riley Duke, "U.S. Aid Cuts are a Soft Power Surrender to China," *Lowy Institute*, Mar. 18, 2025, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/us-aid-cuts-are-soft-power-surrender-china>.

⁶ "White House Eased China Tariffs after Warnings of Harm to 'Trump's People'," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 2025.

⁷ John Irish, "Aberration to Ask Europe to Spend More on Defence amid Trade War, Macron Says," *Reuters*, June 25, 2025.

⁸ Li Mingjiang, et al., "How Southeast Asia Sees Xi Jinping's Regional Push Amid U.S.-China Tensions," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, April 22, 2025; China-CELAC Forum, Accessed June 2025, <http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/>.

⁹ Paul McLeary, "Trump's Tariffs Threaten U.S. Weapons Production," *Politico*, April 3, 2025; Anna Miskelley, "Trump Tariffs Hammer U.S. Artillery Market Despite Export Dominance," *Defense and Security Monitor*, Apr. 16, 2025, <https://dsm.forecastinternational.com/2025/04/16/trump-tariffs-hammer-u-s-artillery-market-despite-export-dominance/>.

¹⁰ On Friday, March 14, 2025, Canadian Defence Minister Bill Blair said "The prime minister has asked me to go and examine those things and have discussions with other sources, particularly where there may be opportunities to assemble those fighter jets in Canada." Muarry Brewster, "Canada Reconsidering F-35 Purchase Amid Tensions with Washington, Says Minister," *Canadian Broadcasting Corporation News*, Mar. 14, 2025; In March 2025, Portuguese Defense Minister Nuno Melo said "The recent position of the United States, in the context of NATO ... must make us think about the best options, because the predictability of our allies is a greater asset to take into account." Lara Kayali, "Portugal Wobbles on Buying F-35s Because of Trump," *Politico*, Mar. 14, 2025.

- Silencing America's Voice and Losing the Narrative:** While China spends over a billion dollars annually on propaganda and foreign media manipulation, the Trump Administration has eliminated the Department of State's counter-disinformation unit and has attempted to shutter the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM) and its affiliated networks, including Radio Free Asia and Voice of America.¹¹ The Administration sought to quickly dismantle these networks despite strong bipartisan support, including from then-Senator Marco Rubio, who sponsored legislation emphasizing the importance of Radio Free Asia's work.¹² As a result of the Trump Administration's actions, Radio Free Asia has lost 54 frequencies and millions of users.¹³ At the same time, Chinese state-run media outlets have added 80 new radio frequencies and multiple languages to its programming, including in regions where the America's voice has disappeared.¹⁴ To date, the Trump Administration has not offered a viable alternative for the United States to counter Chinese propaganda.
- Damaging America's Reputation as a Global Hub for Talent:** China aims to unseat the United States as the central hub for global talent. However, the Trump Administration's proposals to cut federal government grants for scientific research, its attacks against America's top universities and the crackdowns on international students have laid the groundwork for a brain drain from the United States.¹⁵ According to a March 2025 poll by *Nature*, 75% of U.S.-based scientists stated they were considering leaving as a consequence of the Trump Administration's assault on science.¹⁶ In addition to Europe and Canada, China has jumped at the opportunity to absorb top scientific talent leaving the United States due to the Trump Administration's actions.¹⁷

¹¹ U.S. Department of State, Global Engagement Center Special Report: How the People's Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment, Sept. 28, 2023, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/>.

¹² "Text - S.178 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): UIGHUR Act of 2019." Congress.gov, Library of Congress, Oct. 21, 2020, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/178/text>.

¹³ Sarah Ellison and Cate Cadell, "Chinese Propaganda Surges as the U.S. Defunds Radio Free Asia," *The Washington Post*, June 6, 2025.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Alexandra Witze, "75% of U.S. Scientists Who Answered Nature Poll Consider Leaving," *Nature*, Mar. 27, 2025, <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-025-00938-y>.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Andrea Mendes, "France's Safe Place for Science: The New Mobility Among International Researchers," *Jobbatical*, May 31, 2025, <https://www.jobbatical.com/blog/france-safe-place-for-science>; Simone Jacobs, "The Netherlands Launches New Fund to Draw in Top International Scientists," *I Am Expat*, Mar. 24, 2025, <https://www.iamexpat.nl/expat-info/dutch-news/netherlands-launches-new-fund-draw-top-international-scientists>; Alexander Freund, "Dear U.S. Researchers: Welcome to Germany!," *Deutsche Welle*, Mar. 27, 2025, <https://www.dw.com/en/dear-us-researchers-welcome-to-germany/a-72058292>; Juliette Portala and David Matthews, "Europe Scrambles to Help Researchers Escape Trump," *Science Business*, Mar. 20, 2025, <https://sciencebusiness.net/international-news/europe-scrambles-help-researchers-escape-trump>; Pierre Saint-Arnaud, "Quebec Hopes to Recruit Disenchanted American Scientists," *City News*, Mar. 13, 2025, <https://montreal.citynews.ca/2025/03/13/quebec-hopes-to-recruit-american-scientists/>; "HKUST Opens Doors to Harvard Students Amid Global Academic Shifts," *The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology*, May 23, 2025, <https://hkust.edu.hk/news/hkust-opens-doors-harvard-students-amid-global-academic-shifts>.

- **Reducing America’s Diplomatic Footprint:** In January 2025, the Department of State notified Congress of its intent to close at least ten U.S. diplomatic posts, and in April 2025, an internal Department of State memo indicated that the Administration was planning to close seven additional posts along with a reduction of embassy personnel, many in countries where U.S.-China competition is most intense, including the Maldives and Indonesia.¹⁸ Furthermore, the Administration’s hostility towards U.S. diplomats is harming Department of State morale disincentivizing top talent from joining the U.S. Foreign Service.¹⁹ Meanwhile, China is using its diplomatic levers across Global South nations to paint the United States as an unreliable partner.²⁰
- **Stepping Away from International Organizations:** The Trump Administration is proposing to halt nearly all U.S. funding to international bodies.²¹ Forums like the United Nations have been a leading means through which China has sought to increase its international influence and set standards for technologies of the future. In June 2025, after the Trump Administration signaled its withdrawal of support to international organizations, the International Telecommunications Union selected Shanghai, China to host the World Radio Conference in 2027.²² Meanwhile, China has pledged an additional \$500 million to the World Health Organization—from which the United States has announced its withdrawal—and is establishing new international organizations like the International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong.²³ If enacted, the cuts proposed in the Administration’s FY2026 budget request would make China a larger financial contributor than the United States to at least seven United Nations organizations.²⁴

¹⁸ Andrew Desiderio, “State Department to Propose Major Overhaul of U.S. Diplomatic Footprint,” *Puchbowl News*, Apr. 15, 2025; Karoun Demirjian, “State Department Expands Plans for Closing Embassies and Consulates,” *The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 2025.

¹⁹ Adam Taylor, et al., “Morale Craters at State Department as Mass Layoffs Loom,” *The Washington Post*, June 28, 2025.

²⁰ As just one recent example, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya tweeted a graphic on June 12, 2025 saying that while America levies tariffs and travel bans and eliminates foreign assistance programs in Africa, China is ready to implement zero-tariff treatment, launch visa facilitation measures, and increase Chinese infrastructure financing in Africa. Ambassador Guo Haiyan, “Who is #Africa’s true friend?” X Post, June 12, 2025. <https://x.com/AmbGuoHaiyan/status/1933878410390216863>.

²¹ U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification.

²² Muntazir Abbas, “China to Host WRC 2027; India; U.S. Fume,” *Economic Times*, June 27, 2025, <https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/policy/china-secures-hosting-rights-for-world-telecommunication-conference-2027-us-and-india-disappointed/122106443>.

²³ “Update: Chinese FM to Attend Convention on Establishment of Int’l Organization for Mediation Signing Ceremony,” *Xinhua*, May 20, 2025, <https://english.news.cn/20250520/2daaa7452d60492a88091f253dcc88aa/c.html>.

²⁴ These United Nations organizations include: the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); the World Health Organization (WHO); the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC); and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While serious damage has been inflicted on U.S. credibility, diplomatic tools and international leadership over the last six months, it is not too late for the executive and legislative branches to work together to swiftly reestablish and robustly fund the tools America needs to compete effectively with China.

There continues to be a bipartisan consensus that China poses the most significant challenge to U.S. global leadership this century. The following are lines of effort the U.S. government should pursue expeditiously to reverse course and place the United States back on its competitive footing.

- **The Administration must work urgently with Congress to rebuild the U.S. government’s capacity to provide robust and appropriate foreign assistance, including humanitarian, food and global health assistance.** The abrupt and chaotic gutting of USAID has handicapped America’s ability to provide critical assistance around the world. Institutional memory, including from implementers, experts and partners, is draining at a rapid pace. As threats and natural disasters inevitably occur in the coming months, the cuts to U.S. foreign aid present a unique window of opportunity for China to expand its international influence through increased programming. The United States must act swiftly to reconstitute these essential capabilities, which have long bolstered U.S. partnerships and nurtured support for the United States across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States cannot afford to remain on the sidelines while China is in a better position to respond.
- **Congress should reject the Administration’s proposal to significantly downsize and potentially eliminate the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC).** The MCC is consistently cited as a highly transparent U.S. development agency and is a provenly effective tool for countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative.²⁵ In many instances, MCC’s work has been foundational to the viability and success of Development Finance Corporation (DFC) projects. At a time when both the Administration and Congress are working on legislation to reauthorize and strengthen the DFC with an expanded remit, MCC’s continuation is all the more central to the DFC’s continued growth. Among other activities, MCC compacts have provided partner countries with critical alternatives to Chinese debt traps, such as the MCC’s work to support Indonesia’s ability to finance its own infrastructure investments.²⁶

²⁵ Charles Kenny, “The Impact of Shuttering the Millennium Challenge Corporation,” *Center for Global Development*, Apr. 24, 2025, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/impact-shuttering-millennium-challenge-corporation>.

²⁶ “Where We Work: Indonesia,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/country/indonesia/>.

- **The U.S. Intelligence Community should conduct a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that examines the impact that U.S. foreign assistance terminations have had on U.S. national security interests.** Such an assessment should include the potential health impacts on the American people of terminating or downsizing U.S. global health programs focused on monitoring and treating dangerous infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. It should also account for impacts these terminations have on our alliances and investigate warnings from U.S. military leaders that China is attempting to replicate U.S. foreign assistance programming across the Global South.²⁷ The NIE should include specific instances where China has taken advantage of the U.S. reduction in foreign assistance programming.
- **The Administration must swiftly reestablish critical counter-disinformation functions, including by supporting global independent media, in order to counter China’s propaganda overseas.** Each day that passes as the Administration’s attempts to dismantle USAGM and related entities are challenged in the courts, China is expanding the global reach of its propaganda. Some early consequences of seeking to quickly gut USAGM became clear when the Administration abruptly recalled nearly 75 employees of Voice of America’s Persian service in June 2025 to counter Iran’s disinformation against Israel and the United States.²⁸ Congress should also enact the INFORM Act (S.417), which would establish a Global News Service that makes available fact-based, uncensored China-related news to news organizations, independent journalists and online content creators around the world, while also providing financial support to USAGM entities.
- **Congress should appropriate robust funding for U.S.-led international educational and cultural exchange programming, including the Fulbright program, the Critical Language Scholarship and the Boren Fellowship.** While the Trump Administration proposes to shut down America’s most prestigious international exchange programs, China continues to fund academic scholarships and exchanges for students to study in China. In addition to robust support, the Administration should work with Congress to redesign existing or establish new U.S. international exchange programs tailored to U.S. strategic interests.

²⁷ General Michael Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command, The Posture of the United States European Command and United States Africa Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program, Hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Apr. 3, 2025, at 34, <https://www.africom.mil/document/35810/4325fulltranscriptpdf>.

²⁸ Ben Johansen, “U.S. Scrambles to Bring Back VOA’s Persian Service Amid Iran-Israel Conflict,” *Politico*, June 13, 2025.

- **Congress must reclaim its role in trade policy and reject the President’s trade war.** Tariffs are not only impacting our relationships with allies and their ability to increase their defense spending, they are also harming U.S. consumers and America’s own defense industrial base. Congress should make clear that the President’s attempts to use the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to levy tariffs against U.S. allies and partners is an overreach, such as by passing the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act (S.151).²⁹ In addition, the Department of Defense should share its analysis of the impact of tariffs on U.S. national security and the defense supply chain. Absent that analysis, the Rand Corporation should conduct a study on how U.S. tariffs impact the defense industrial base.
- **The Administration should maintain strong U.S. engagement at international organizations, including the United Nations, and it should also pay U.S. assessed contributions to the United Nations and UN Peacekeeping efforts.** Doing so will enable the United States to defend U.S. interests, drive meaningful reforms, support our allies and counter China’s expanding influence. The Administration should increase the number of Junior Professional Officer positions available to U.S. citizens to expand the presence of Americans at the United Nations. Congress should enact legislation to permanently establish and robustly fund an office at the Department of State dedicated to ensuring sustained U.S. engagement in international bodies, including by promoting qualified U.S. candidates for elected or appointed senior positions at multilateral institutions and international organizations.
- **Congress should exercise greater congressional oversight over the U.S. diplomatic footprint, with an eye towards China’s growth.** The opening and closing of U.S. diplomatic posts has long been based on internal Department of State decisionmaking. Congress must play a more active role in ensuring that the United States maintains a strategic presence to counter China’s continued diplomatic expansion. This should include requiring a report to Congress that, among other issues, outlines China’s diplomatic presence in the region prior to any proposed closure of a U.S. diplomatic post and whether the intended U.S. closure would put the United States at a disadvantage vis-à-vis China.
- **Congress should enact legislation that enhances U.S. international cooperation to secure critical mineral supply chains.** While the United States should reinstate USAID and MCC projects that are essential to supporting the DFC, along with U.S. Trade and Development Association and Export-Import Bank critical minerals related programming, the United States should equally prioritize international coordination with allies and partners on critical mineral supply chains.

²⁹ "All Info - S.151 - 119th Congress (2025-2026): Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act of 2025." Congress.gov, Library of Congress, 17 January 2025, <https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/151/all-info>.

- The Administration should maintain and strengthen the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) partnership, including by ensuring that it has sufficient authorities, resources and personnel. The AUKUS partnership will remain vital for U.S. and allied shared defense in the Indo-Pacific region. The Administration should maintain strong support for the AUKUS partnership, and Congress should maintain pressure to ensure the initiative's long-term success.
- Congress should enact legislation that requires the Administration to justify any large-scale terminations of personnel at U.S. diplomatic agencies. No Administration should have the ability to arbitrarily reduce America's diplomatic workforce without first taking into account the potential adverse impacts to U.S. national security. Congress should require the executive branch to certify in advance how such a reduction would impact our diplomatic presence and our ability to compete with China.

ANNEX: Regional Examples of U.S. Foreign Assistance Pause and Termination Impacts

The following is a non-exhaustive list of programs that have been paused or terminated by the Administration. Due to a general lack of transparency and engagement during the foreign assistance review, identifying which programs are suspended, which are cancelled and which may be reinstated remains challenging.³¹⁸

Regardless of whether programs contained in this list received approval to continue, the Administration's illegal and chaotic gutting of the U.S. Agency for International Development and its abrupt halt of other forms of U.S. foreign assistance will have lasting impacts on our ability to continue programming. Furthermore, this list does not include the programs that the Office of Management and Budget may decide to terminate upon conclusion of the Administration's foreign assistance review.

EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

As the Trump Administration upended U.S. foreign assistance and development programming, President Xi Jinping embarked on a Southeast Asia tour to meet with leaders in Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia.³¹⁹ In Vietnam, the two countries reached agreements to build new railroad connections, and China agreed to open its market to more Vietnamese agricultural products in the wake of U.S. tariffs.³²⁰ In Cambodia, China signed 37 cooperation agreements spanning key sectors including energy, education, infrastructure, trade, connectivity and tourism.³²¹ In Malaysia, both countries established government technical and subnational diplomacy and manufacturing exchanges.³²² They also announced the establishment of joint research and development platforms along with efforts to collaborate in vaccine development.³²³

Meanwhile, the following programs in East and Southeast Asia were either terminated or paused by the Trump Administration:

³¹⁸ Despite multiple requests from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff, the Administration would not provide detailed information about the status of U.S. foreign assistance programs, citing the ongoing foreign assistance review by the Trump Administration's Office of Management and Budget.

³¹⁹ Li Mingjiang et al., "How Southeast Asia Sees Xi Jinping's Regional Push Amid U.S.-China Tensions," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Apr. 22, 2025.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*

³²¹ *Ibid.*

³²² "Joint Statement Between the People's Republic of China and Malaysia on Building a High-level Strategic China-Malaysia Community with a Shared Future," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, Apr. 17, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202504/t20250417_11595814.html.

³²³ *Ibid.*

- **Bangladesh – Feed the Future:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$37 million USAID to support a “Feed the Future Bangladesh Rice and Diversified Crops” program, which was helping local farming households secure greater quantities of affordable rice.³²⁴ In June 2025, the Chinese International Development and Cooperation Agency contributed enough funding for the World Food Program’s livesaving food assistance program to supply 2,100 metric tons of rice, pulses, and cooking oil to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.³²⁵ In accepting the contribution, WFP’s Country Director Dom Scalpelli said, “We hope this contribution marks not only continued engagement, but a deepening of China’s role in responding to this ongoing crisis.”³²⁶
- **Cambodia – Demining Efforts:** The United States has historically funded roughly 30% of ongoing demining efforts in Cambodia from the Vietnam War era.³²⁷ In March 2025, after the Trump Administration suspended U.S. contributions, China pledged \$4.4 million in additional funding to the Cambodian Mine Action Centre, surpassing last year’s U.S. contributions.³²⁸
- **Cambodia – HIV/AIDS Prevention:** The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has an agreement with China to fund specific HIV-related activities and is applying for a grant to support Cambodia in the final phase of eliminating and validating the elimination of mother-to-child transmission (eMTCT) of HIV.³²⁹ USAID previously supported Cambodia’s National Center for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and Sexually Transmitted Infections (NCHADS) with data management and analysis related to eMTCT.³³⁰ Meanwhile, the Global Fund, previously supported by the United States, has cut \$6 million from NCHADS’s HIV budget for the remainder of the calendar year.³³¹ Cambodia is now seeking alternative funding to address the shortfall, and China will likely emerge as the replacement.³³²

³²⁴ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72038818CA00005; “Recipient: ABT Global LLC,” *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_72038818CA00005_7200; “Feed the Future Bangladesh Rice and Diversified Crops Activity,” *ACDI VOCA*, Accessed July 2025, <https://www.acdivoca.org/projects/bangladesh-rice-and-diversified-crops-activity/>.

³²⁵ *Ibid.*

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ Niem Chheng, “Demining Authorities: Cambodia Does Not Receive Direct Aid from USAID for Mine Clearance,” *Phnom Penh Post*, Feb. 7, 2025, <https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/demining-authorities-cambodia-does-not-receive-direct-aid-from-usaid-for-mine-clearance->

³²⁸ RFA Khmer, “Beijing Announces \$4.4 Million in Funding for Landmine Clearance in Cambodia,” *Radio Free Asia*, Feb. 10, 2025, <https://www.rfa.org/english/cambodia/2025/02/10/cambodia-china-mine-clearance-grant/>.

³²⁹ “Cambodian Parasitology, Entomology and Malaria \-control officials visit China CDC,” *Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention*, Dec. 25, 2023, https://en.chinacdc.cn/intl_cooperation/gallery/202312/t20231231_271744.html.

³³⁰ U.S. Agency for International Development, Office of the Inspector General, “Incomplete Evaluations and Cut in Funding From Another Donor Could Impede USAID/Cambodia’s HIV/AIDS Efforts,” Apr. 6, 2018, <https://oig.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2018-06/5-442-18-002-p.pdf>.

³³¹ Yatt Malai, “Cambodia Steps Up with \$100,000 for UNAIDS While Urging for More Global Support,” *KiriPost*, <https://kiripost.com/stories/cambodia-steps-up-with-100000-for-unais-while-urging-for-more-global-support>.

³³² *Ibid.*

- **Cambodia – Childhood Literacy and Nutrition Programs:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration eliminated two U.S.-supported aid projects aimed at promoting childhood literacy and improving nutrition for children under five in Cambodia.³³³ Subsequently, China’s foreign assistance agency announced funding through UNICEF for comparable child education and nutrition programs.³³⁴
- **Indonesia – Academic Exchanges with U.S. Universities:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$5 million USAID award that had previously helped the Indonesian International Education Foundation (IIEF) secure \$26 million in 2024 to send Indonesians to American universities.³³⁵ The first Trump Administration had supported this activity in 2020.³³⁶ Before its contract termination in March 2025, IIEF was confident it could substantially grow the pipeline of Indonesian students sent to the United States. As a result of the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance freeze, 42 Indonesian scholars had their scholarship plans abruptly disrupted, including a student planning to pursue a doctorate at the University of Rhode Island.³³⁷ Meanwhile, China aggressively recruits Indonesian students to its universities through its “Study in China” initiative, contributing to more than 10,000 Indonesians who study in China each year.³³⁸
- **Indonesia – Marine Conservation:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated USAID-supported marine conservation programs in Indonesia through the Coral Triangle Initiative.³³⁹ Soon after, Indonesia’s fisheries ministry began seeking alternative funding sources to sustain conservation efforts. In May 2025, China and Indonesia reached agreements on marine conservation initiatives, including the establishment of a vocational university focused on research-based marine and fisheries education, scientific exchanges, scholarship and internship opportunities, along with joint research.³⁴⁰

³³³ Ian Marlow and Philip Hejiman, “China Swoops in to Replace Asian USAID Efforts Axed by Trump,” *Bloomberg*, Mar. 25, 2025. Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049219CA00008.

³³⁴ “Cambodia, China and UNICEF Partner to Strengthen Education, Health and Hygiene for Cambodia’s Most Vulnerable Children,” *United Nations Children’s Fund*, Mar. 5, 2025, <https://www.unicef.org/cambodia/press-releases/cambodia-china-and-unicef-partner-strengthen-education-health-and-hygiene-cambodias>.

³³⁵ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049721C00002.

³³⁶ “Purchase Order: 72049720P00018,” Awarding Agency: U.S. Agency for International Development, USASpending.org, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_72049720P00018_7200_-NONE_-NONE-

³³⁷ Y Prayogo, “9 Dosen Demo di Kemendikri, Buntut Mandeknya Beasiswa Pendidikan Indonesia, Ada Apa Sih?” *Kaldera News*, May 26, 2025, <https://www.kalderanews.com/2025/05/26/9-dosen-demo-di-kemendikri-buntut-mandeknya-beasiswa-pendidikan-indonesia-ada-apa-sih/>.

³³⁸ Azis Anwar Fahrodin, “China’s Educational Soft Power is Seeing Results in Indonesia,” *The Diplomat*, Aug. 18, 2023.

³³⁹ Ibid; Basten Gokkon, “Bagaimana Nasib Program Konservasi Kelautan di Indonesia Setelah Dana USAID Dibekukan?” *Mongabay*, Mar. 19, 2025, <https://mongabay.co.id/2025/03/19/bagaimana-nasib-program-konservasi-kelautan-di-indonesia-setelah-dana-usaid-dibekukan/>.

³⁴⁰ “Indonesia, China Foster Collaboration in Marine HR Development,” *Antara*, May 31, 2025, <https://en.antaranews.com/news/357229/indonesia-china-foster-collaboration-in-marine-hr-development>.

- **Mongolia – Energy Governance and Disaster Risk Management:** In May 2025, the Trump Administration cancelled energy governance and disaster risk management programs in Mongolia.³⁴¹ Later that same month, China’s International Development Cooperation Agency launched its own climate change adaptation and clean energy development project in Mongolia in partnership with the International Federation of the Red Cross.³⁴²
- **Mongolia – Water Security:** Signed in July 2018 under the first Trump Administration, this \$350 million MCC compact with Mongolia sought to address water scarcity in Mongolia’s capital Ulaanbaatar.³⁴³ The project envisioned constructing new groundwater wells and a state-of-the-art plant for purifying drinking water. While the compact received an exemption to the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance freeze in March 2025, delays have already incurred unnecessary costs.³⁴⁴ Mongolian embassy officials reported that “if the project is not completed by the United States, the Mongolian government will not have enough funds to complete the project on their own and will need to seek out other partners,” implying they would need to rely on China.³⁴⁵
- **Nepal – Hydroelectric Power:** The Trump Administration is discontinuing a \$500 million MCC compact with Nepal to assist in building out Nepal’s energy infrastructure.³⁴⁶ Nepal faces significant pressure from China and terminating this key agreement pushes Nepal closer into Beijing’s arms. See further details under Case Study: Nepal – Hydropower.
- **Philippines – Countering Chinese Disinformation:** Due to the Administration’s decision to end Global Engagement Center functions at the Department of State, the Department likely is no longer pursuing Countering PRC Influence Fund support for counter Chinese disinformation work in the Philippines, which included capacity building for Philippines stakeholders to identify and react to Chinese propaganda and gray-zone activities in the South China Sea.³⁴⁷

³⁴¹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72043822F00001; Award ID: 720BHA22GR00144; U.S. Embassy in Mongolia, “USAID Continues Assistance to Protect Communities from Natural Disasters,” Nov. 21, 2022, <https://mn.usembassy.gov/pr-112122/>; U.S. Embassy in Mongolia, “USAID Launches New Energy Governance Program in Mongolia,” May 17, 2022. <https://mn.usembassy.gov/pr-051222/>.

³⁴² 全球发展和南南合作基金 - 蒙古气候变化适应性支持项目启动,” *China International Development Cooperation Agency*, May 28, 2025, <https://gdpc.org.cn/article/4Mt7F6bWPDT>.

³⁴³ Monica Weller, “How Dismantling the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation Will Undermine Mongolia,” *The Diplomat*, May 29, 2025.

³⁴⁴ The Millennium Challenge Corporation informed Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff during a June 2025 briefing that the foreign aid freeze and pause on MCC projects generated additional expenses due to delays in contracting.

³⁴⁵ Monica Weller, “How Dismantling the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation Will Undermine Mongolia,” *The Diplomat*, May 29, 2025.

³⁴⁶ “Millennium Challenge Corporation Official Visits Nepal to Continue Progress on Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, May 25, 2018, <https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release-052518-brooks-visit-nepal/>.

³⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State Congressional Notification to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

- Philippines – Disaster Relief:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated United States disaster relief aid (including through U.S. contributions to the International Organization for Migration), affecting the Philippines’ ability to respond to natural disasters and provide quality education for disaster response.³⁴⁸ As such, if United States support is requested, it is currently unclear which U.S. government agency has the capacity or authority to respond when the next typhoon strikes (the World Risk Index ranks the Philippines as the most vulnerable country globally to extreme natural events). An American failure to respond, particularly if China offers support, would be significant. During official travel to the Philippines in April 2025, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff met with local humanitarian aid implementers who noted they had been approached by Chinese emergency response agencies regarding funding shortfalls. Furthermore, USAID disaster relief capabilities in the Philippines were a key component for expanding U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in 2023 in order to justify the EDCA expansion to skeptical, local communities.
- Philippines – Maritime Domain Awareness:** The Philippines Coast Guard relies heavily on U.S. international narcotics and law enforcement (INCLE) funding to conduct maritime patrols in the South China Sea where it faces increasing gray-zone operations pressure from China. Over half of United States INCLE funding through Counter PRC Influence Funds (CPIF) for maritime security cooperation with the Philippines remain paused by the foreign assistance review.³⁴⁹ Some of these funds are set to expire in September 2025.³⁵⁰ During this time, the Chinese Coast Guard claimed sovereign control over a disputed landmass in the South China Sea claimed by the Philippines, highlighting the importance of maintaining robust U.S. maritime domain awareness support for the Philippines.³⁵¹
- Philippines – Semiconductor Supply Chains:** As part of a global effort by the Department of State to reroute semiconductor supply chains, U.S. funds provided by the bipartisan CHIPS and Science Act were strengthening Filipino workforce capacity for the assembly, packaging and testing phase of semiconductor development, a segment of the supply chain that China currently leads.³⁵² Trump Administration officials have not committed to continuing International Technology Security Initiative (ITSI) programs under the CHIPS and Science Act, and repealing the CHIPS Act would halt these efforts altogether.

³⁴⁸ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 720BHA24GR00242; Award ID: 72049225GR00001; Award ID: 72049223F00001; Award ID: 720BHA22GR00314; Award ID: 720BHA24I000213; Award ID: 72049225GR00002; Award ID: 72049225I000003.

³⁴⁹ U.S. Department of State briefings to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff.

³⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁵¹ “China Seizes Disputed Reef in the South China Sea,” *The Financial Times*, Apr. 26, 2025.

³⁵² “Recipient: University of Arizona,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_SQMIP24CA0028_1900.

- Philippines – Open Radio Access Networks:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$33 million USAID project that was helping develop Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) in the Philippines.³⁵³ These terminations have a direct impact on the O-RAN Academy, a public-private partnership effort in the Philippines to provide telecommunications training for the Southeast Asian workforce. The partnership worked to establish a safe, secure and reliable telecommunications network and to facilitate testing, research and development for private sector actors. China’s Huawei has been a significant player in the Philippines’ telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in 5G network development.³⁵⁴ Shutting down this U.S.-supported partnership is a step back in efforts to promote alternatives to Huawei in the Philippines and the rest of Southeast Asia.
- Southeast Asia – Cyber Scams:** The Trump Administration terminated two Department of State awards to improve the capability of law enforcement in member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to counter cyber-enabled scams and related money laundering practices.³⁵⁵ In 2024, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported \$13.7 billion in losses for Americans across the country due to cyber-enabled fraud—a 66 percent increase from 2023—much of which the FBI has traced back to countries in Southeast Asia.³⁵⁶ Furthermore, investigative reporting by *The Washington Post* has linked criminal syndicates behind cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia to China. These criminal actors also spread Chinese government propaganda, promote unification with Taiwan and have brokered projects for the Belt and Road Initiative.³⁵⁷
- Tibet – Support for Tibetan Society:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated approximately \$40 million in support for ethnic Tibetans in exile, including \$2 million to promote education among Tibetan children.³⁵⁸ USAID has also supported Tibet’s government in exile’s ability to push back against China’s propaganda. The Chinese government has led a decades long crackdown on independent voices inside and outside of Tibet. As recently as June 2025, IBM reported that Chinese affiliated actors were leading a hacking campaign to spy against Tibetan groups in the lead up to the Dalai Lama’s 90th birthday on July 6.³⁵⁹

³⁵³ John Garrity, “Updates on USAID’s Open RAN Initiatives in the Philippines,” *U.S. Agency for International Development*, Mar. 20, 2024, <https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/d8files/event-documents/Open%20RAN%20in%20the%20Philippines%20and%20Region%20-%20USAID%20BEACON%20-%20for%20distribution.pdf>; Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049221C00002.

³⁵⁴ Bea Cupin, “In Manila, How China Set up an Influence, Espionage Network,” *Rappler*, Aug. 10, 2024, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/how-china-set-up-influence-espionage-network-manila/>.

³⁵⁵ “Recipient: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_SINLEC24LA0211_1900; “Recipient: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_SINLEC22LA0360_1900.

³⁵⁶ “FBI Releases Annual Internet Crime Report,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, Apr. 23, 2025, <https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-releases-annual-internet-crime-report>; “The FBI’s Operation Level Up Takes a Proactive Approach Against Crypto Scams,” *Federal Bureau of Investigation*, Mar. 6, 2025, <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/miami/news/the-fbis-operation-level-up-takes-a-proactive-approach-against-crypto-scams>.

³⁵⁷ “Chinese Organized Crime Front Serves Beijing’s Interests, Investigation Shows,” *The Washington Post*, June 24, 2025.

³⁵⁸ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72038624P00019, Award ID: 72038624CA00006, Award ID: 7200AA21LA00004, Award ID: 72038621CA00006, Award ID: 72048624CA00001, Award ID: 72038623CA00006, Award ID: 72038623CA00005, Award ID: 72038624FA00003, Award ID: 72038624FA00004, Award ID: 72038624FA00006.

³⁵⁹ Golo Muehr, “Hive0154 aka Mustang Panda Shifts Focus on Tibetan Community to Deploy Pubload Backdoor,” *International Business Machines*, June 23, 2025, <https://www.ibm.com/think/x-force/hive0154-mustang-panda-shifts-focus-tibetan-community-deploy-pubload-backdoor>.

AFRICA

At the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China announced it would establish an alliance of Chinese and African hospitals that includes joint medical centers to elevate China-Africa health cooperation.³⁶⁰ Beijing announced that it would provide training for 100 African medical professionals and support the development and operation of Africa's Centres for Disease Control and Prevention headquarters and its sub-regional centers.³⁶¹ China will also provide Africa with approximately \$840 million in military grant support to strengthen African armed forces, train 6,000 African military personnel and invite 500 African military officers to undergo training in China.³⁶² Beijing will also train 1,000 police enforcement officers across the continent.³⁶³ Lastly, Beijing will provide "Chinese language plus vocational skills" education in Africa, roll out Chinese-language workshops and train African personnel with Chinese language proficiency and vocational skills.³⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the following programs in Africa were either terminated or paused by the Trump Administration:

- **Africa – Power Africa:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated at least \$80 million worth of programs under the "Power Africa" initiative.³⁶⁵ The Power Africa initiative leveraged development assistance and private sector investment, often from private U.S. companies, to accelerate more than 160 energy projects across the continent.³⁶⁶ The elimination of this initiative has reportedly jeopardized over \$26 billion in deals with U.S. companies, which provide support ranging from substation equipment to gas turbines and solar panels.³⁶⁷ Meanwhile, in September 2024, China pledged \$50 billion in financing for economic development and infrastructure projects in Africa over the next three years.

³⁶⁰ "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027)," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, Sept. 5, 2024, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485719.html.

³⁶¹ *Ibid.*

³⁶² *Ibid.*

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁵ Carmen Paun, "Documents Reveal Scope of Trump's Foreign Aid Cuts," *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72067422CA00003, Award ID: 72067423FA00007, Award ID: 72067424T00001, Award ID: AID-OAA-A-15-00054, Award ID: 72067425F00001, Award ID: AID-AFR-IO-16-00001, Award ID: 72067425C00001, Award ID: 72067424C00002, Award ID: 72067424CA00007, Award ID: 72067420T00001;

³⁶⁶ Chico Harlan, "The U.S. says Africa needs energy. But DOGE halted a program to help," *The Washington Post*, Apr. 14, 2025; Nancy Lee, "What We're Losing: Energy, Growth, and Power Africa," *Center for Global Development*, Feb. 25, 2025, <https://www.cgdev.org/blog/what-were-losing-energy-growth-and-power-africa>; "China's Xi Promises \$50 Billion for Africa Over Next Three Years," *Voice of America*, Sept. 5, 2024, <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-s-xi-promises-50-billion-for-africa-over-next-three-years/7772161.html>.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

- **Angola – Cyber Defense Training:** Prior to the Trump Administration’s stop work order, the Department of State was providing just over \$1 million to support cyber defense training for leaders within the Angolan Armed Forces.³⁶⁸ The Department of State briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff in June 2025 that the Administration’s foreign assistance freeze has halted this work, it is unclear whether the project will continue. Meanwhile, Angola is deepening its security cooperation with China, with Angolan President João Lourenço recently approving a \$36 million deal to acquire military equipment from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC).³⁶⁹
- **Angola – Telecommunications and Financial Technology:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$5 million USAID project supporting Africell, the only mainstream U.S.-owned mobile network operator in Africa, to develop a secure mobile money and digital finance ecosystem in Angola as part of the broader Lobito Corridor initiative (see Case Study: Sub-Saharan Africa – Lobito Corridor Critical Minerals).³⁷⁰ Meanwhile, China continues to promote its own expertise in financial technology across Africa.³⁷¹
- **Benin – Regional Transportation:** Signed in December 2022, a \$202 million MCC regional compact would widen and rehabilitate approximately 74 kilometers of roads in Benin and improve road maintenance.³⁷² It would also improve operations in the transport sector by strengthening the Beninese government’s oversight of trucks and freight vehicles and by professionalizing truck driver training.³⁷³ Benin committed \$204 million to the initiative, making it the first time that a partner provided more funding than MCC for a project.³⁷⁴ In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this compact remains paused by the Administration’s foreign assistance review. Meanwhile, Beijing remains committed to large scale infrastructure projects in Benin, including the \$4 billion Benin-Niger railway project announced in 2018.³⁷⁵

³⁶⁸ Emmanuel Chilamphuma, “U.S. and Angola Have Expanded Defense Ties,” *Further Africa*, Dec. 5, 2024, <https://furtherafrica.com/2024/12/05/u-s-and-angola-have-expanded-their-defence-ties/>.

³⁶⁹ Emmanuel Chilamphuma, “Angola Secures \$36 Million USD Deal with China for Military Equipment,” *Further Africa*, Mar. 5, 2025, <https://furtherafrica.com/2025/03/05/angola-secures-us36m-deal-with-china-for-military-equipment/>.

³⁷⁰ About Us, Africell, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.africell.com/about-mobile-network/>; “Recipient: International Development Group Advisory Services, LLC,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025,

https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_7200AA22N00006_7200_47QRAD20D1072_4732; Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 7200AA22N00006.

³⁷¹ Aaron MC Nicholas, “China’s Fintech Footprint in Africa,” *The Wire China*, May 12, 2024, <https://www.thewirechina.com/2024/05/12/chinas-fintech-footprint-in-africa-african-fintech-investments-opay/>.

³⁷² “Benin Regional Transportation Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/benin-regional-transport-compact/>.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁵ Caleb Mills & Birgen Brimine, “The Benin Model: China’s Africa Strategy in Action,” *Geopolitical Monitor*, Oct. 25, 2024, <https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-benin-model-chinas-africa-strategy-in-action/>.

- **Botswana – Public Diplomacy:** According to an affidavit submitted by the President of the American Foreign Service Association, which was informed by cables from U.S. diplomatic posts, the U.S. mission in Botswana has lost “its most potent interagency partner in the fight against Chinese media influence in Botswana” with the gutting of the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).³⁷⁶ Without USAGM programming, Russia’s Sputnik and China’s Xinhua News Agency “will be the primary sources of re-distributed international news wire content in Botswana, including those that broadly shape narratives about the United States.”³⁷⁷
- **Democratic Republic of the Congo – Peacekeeping Operations:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$1 million award to provide a U.S.-supported advisor to the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Peacekeeping Operations funds.³⁷⁸ As of June 2025, it is unclear whether this award will proceed. Meanwhile, China continues to export military equipment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Chinese manufactured arms have reportedly fallen into the hands of regional extremist groups such as M23, sometimes due to Chinese criminal syndicates involvement.³⁷⁹
- **Djibouti – Countering Strategic Competitors Project:** Prior to the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance freeze, the Department of State was funding a \$27 million project through Countering Strategic Competitors funds in Djibouti to establish a Maryama Training Center to support the training of forces participating in counterterrorism operations in Djibouti.³⁸⁰ The Maryama Training Center has educated and improved information sharing and coordination with Djiboutian counterparts on rule of law and the protection of civilians and human rights. In June 2025, Department of State officials informed Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority Staff that the Trump Administration’s stop work order incurred \$600,000 in unnecessary expenses due to delays in programming, and that it is unclear whether this program will continue. Furthermore, in March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$500,000 award to support a maritime maintenance and logistics advisor in Djibouti.³⁸¹ Meanwhile, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017 and continues to expand its military cooperation across the continent.³⁸²

³⁷⁶ Thomas Yazdgerdi, Affidavit, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, dated April 16, 2025, in *Widakuswara, et al. v. Lake*, at 4. <https://afsa.org/sites/default/files/declaration-case-1-25-cv-01015-rcl-2025-04-16.pdf>.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁷⁸ “Contract to Culmen International, LLC,” *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_19AQMM21F4225_1900_19AQMM19D0151_1900.

³⁷⁹ Adam Rousselle, “PRC-Manufactured Weapons Abound Among African Militant Groups,” *The Jamestown Foundation*, Nov. 1, 2024, <https://jamestown.org/program/prc-manufactured-weapons-abound-among-african-militant-groups/>.

³⁸⁰ U.S. Embassy Djibouti, “Strengthening Security Together: Insights from the Annual BCAP Conference,” Nov. 16, 2023, <https://dj.usembassy.gov/strengthening-security-together-insights-from-the-annual-bcap-conference/>.

³⁸¹ “Contract Recipient: Sincerus Global Solutions Inc.” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_19AQMM23F2651_1900_19AQMM19D0152_1900.

³⁸² Paul Nantulya, “The Growing Militarization of China’s Africa Policy,” *Africa Center*, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militarization-china-africa-policy/>.

- **Gabon – Port Security and Maritime Domain Awareness:** In June 2025, the Department of State informed Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that the Trump Administration had frozen over half of the Department of State’s Counter PRC Influence Fund activities in Gabon, including \$1 million to improve Gabon port security and \$4 million to enhance maritime domain awareness. A portion of this funding countered illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, in which China is complicit in the region.³⁸³
- **Ghana – Maritime Security:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$6.6 million award in Peacekeeping Operations funds to strengthen the Ghanaian Navy’s ability to enforce its maritime sovereignty.³⁸⁴ Ghana has historically struggled with Chinese illegal fishing within Ghana’s territorial waters, and U.S. support has assisted Ghana in combatting these activities.³⁸⁵
- **Kenya – Manda Bay Runway Project:** In July 2024, the Department of State awarded \$10 million in Peacekeeping Operations funding to upgrade the 10,000 foot Manda Bay runway near Camp Siba, capable of supporting Northrop F-5 and Boeing C-17 operations.³⁸⁶ In June 2015, Department of State briefed Senate Foreign Relations Committee Minority staff that the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance freeze resulted in approximately \$42,000 in unnecessary incurred costs in delays. As of June 2025, it is unclear whether this project will move forward; the Trump Administration’s FY2026 budget request reduces the Department of State’s Peacekeeping Operations funding by 93%.³⁸⁷ Meanwhile, Kenya and China have deepened their security cooperation over the decades, with the share of Kenya’s military equipment imported from China increasing from practically zero to 50% in 2018.³⁸⁸

³⁸³ Ryan Loomis & Heidi Holz, *PRC Vessels Engaging in Illegal Fishing in Gabon*, Center For Naval Analysis, Dec. 2021. <https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/12/prc-vessels-engaging-in-illegal-fishing-in-gabon>.

³⁸⁴ “Contract to Sincerus Global Solutions Inc.” *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_19AQMM23F3309_1900_SAQMMA17D0079_1900; Sincerus’ Post, LinkedIn, 2024, https://www.linkedin.com/posts/sincerus-global-solutions_newaward-activity-7124796535619362816-pcuq.

³⁸⁵ “Ghana Suspends Licenses of Chinese Trawlers over Illegal Fishing,” *Africa Defense Forum*, May 13, 2025, <https://adf-magazine.com/2025/05/ghana-suspends-licenses-of-chinese-trawlers-over-illegal-fishing/>; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Efforts to Combat Illegal Fishing and Associated Labor Abuses, Dec. 13, 2024, <https://2021-2025.state.gov/u-s-efforts-to-combat-illegal-fishing-and-associated-labor-abuses/>.

³⁸⁶ Master Sgt. Kayla White, “U.S.-Kenya Partnership Fortified through Joint Engineering Efforts at Camp Simba,” *U.S. Air Force*, Mar. 27, 2025, <https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/4137524/us-kenya-partnership-fortified-through-joint-engineering-efforts-at-camp-simba/>. U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification.

³⁸⁸ Paul Nantulya, “The Growing Militarization of China’s Africa Policy,” *Africa Center*, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/militarization-china-africa-policy/>.

- **Kenya – Urban Mobility:** Signed in September 2023 and in force since May 2024, this \$60 million MCC threshold program would address limited connectivity in urban areas in Kenya by spurring private sector financing required for Nairobi’s BRT system.³⁸⁹ The project will build internal capacity for project planning and plan, design and construct access to rail stations.³⁹⁰ In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this threshold program remains paused by the Administration’s foreign assistance review. In April 2025, China and Kenya upgraded ties amid the “turbulent international situation” and announced plans to deepen cooperation in infrastructure connectivity.³⁹¹
- **Kenya – Peacekeeping Operations:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$2.5 million award in Peacekeeping Operations funding to a Texas-based firm providing aviation advisory support to Kenya.³⁹² As of June 2025, it is unclear whether this activity will continue, and the Trump Administration’s FY2026 budget request reduces the Department of State’s Peacekeeping Operations funding by 93%.³⁹³ Meanwhile, China is providing training to 400 Kenyan security officials on an annual basis.³⁹⁴
- **Lesotho – Emergency Food Aid:** In March 2025, the UN World Food Program was forced to close its southern Africa bureau amid the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance terminations.³⁹⁵ USAID had been providing food assistance cash distributions to vulnerable populations in Lesotho impacted by the El Niño drought.³⁹⁶ The same month, China delivered a consignment of 810 tons of rice and wheat, valued at \$1.4 million, to the government of Lesotho.³⁹⁷

³⁸⁹ “MCC, Kenya Launch \$60 Million Threshold Program During U.S. State Visit,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, May 23, 2024, <https://www.mcc.gov/news-and-events/release/release-052324-kenya-threshold-program-launch/>.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁹¹ Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Joint Statement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Kenya on Creating an Inspiring Example in the All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era, Apr. 24, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202504/t20250424_11603292.html.

³⁹² “Contract to Crisis Response Co. LLC,” *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_19AQMM21F3757_1900_SAQMMMA17D0054_1900.

³⁹³ U.S. Department of State, Fiscal Year 2026 Congressional Budget Justification.

³⁹⁴ Paul Nantulya, “China’s ‘Military Political Work’ and Professional Military Education in Africa,” *Africa Center for Strategic Studies*, Oct. 30, 2023, <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-pla-military-political-work-pme-africa/>.

³⁹⁵ Nellie Peyton, “United Nations Food Agency Shuts Southern Africa Bureau During Drought, Citing Low Funding,” *Reuters*, Mar. 3, 2025.

³⁹⁶ Tlali Tleketle, “World Vision Lesotho Distributes Cash Assistance to 343 Food-Insecure Households through the USAID Funded Emergency Food Assistance Project – Lesotho,” *World Vision Lesotho*, Dec. 23, 2024, <https://www.wvi.org/stories/lesotho/world-vision-lesotho-distributes-cash-assistance-343-food-insecure-households>.

³⁹⁷ Seithati Motsoeneng, “China Donates Grains Worth M26 Million to Help Alleviate Food Crisis in Lesotho,” *Sunday Express*, Mar. 10, 2025, <https://sundayexpress.co.ls/china-donates-grains-worth-m26-million-to-help-alleviate-food-crisis-in-lesotho>.

- **Lesotho – Health and Horticulture:** Signed in May 2022 and in force since March 2024, a \$300 million MCC compact helped provide greater access to healthcare, create business development opportunities and invest in high-value crop production in Lesotho.³⁹⁸ In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this compact remains paused by the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance review. Meanwhile, in May 2025, China sent its 19th medical team to Lesotho through its China-Lesotho Pairing-up Medical Aid Project, through which it will build the first intensive care unit in a public hospital in Lesotho.³⁹⁹
- **Malawi – Transportation and Land:** Signed in September 2022 and in force since May 2024, this \$350 million MCC compact would improve road conditions and encourage transparent business environments in Malawi.⁴⁰⁰ The American Catalyst Facility for Development Project seeks to facilitate DFC investment in Malawi to catalyze private investment.⁴⁰¹ The compact also seeks to develop a well-functioning property tax system.⁴⁰² In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this compact has been paused by the Administration’s foreign assistance review. In 2015, China provided \$45 million to construct Malawi’s main highway and recently announced a \$80 million investment to construct a new judicial complex in the capital Lilongwe.⁴⁰³
- **Mauritania – Energy Development:** Signed in January 2025, a \$27 million MCC threshold program would improve electricity services and address vulnerabilities to environmental hazards in Mauritania.⁴⁰⁴ This includes improving power sector planning, grid operations and electricity regulation.⁴⁰⁵ In June, 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this threshold remains paused by the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance review. Meanwhile, in March 2025, Chinese companies won contracts issued by Mauritanian energy companies to construct power plants, which Mauritanian authorities have described as key to their national energy strategy.⁴⁰⁶

³⁹⁸ “Lesotho Health and Horticulture Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/lesotho-health-and-horticulture-compact/>.

³⁹⁹ “Full Script of Chinese Ambassador to Lesotho Yang Xiaokun’s Interview with LTV,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, Apr. 3, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zwbdt/202504/t20250418_11596535.html.

⁴⁰⁰ “Malawi Transport and Land Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/malawi-transport-land-compact/>.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*

⁴⁰³ “Project ID: 57499,” *AidData*, Accessed June 2025, <https://china.aiddata.org/projects/57499/>; Otiato Opali, “Malawi and China Sign \$80m Agreement to Construct Judicial Complex,” *China Daily*, Apr. 23, 2025, <https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202504/23/WS6808a7f8a3104d9fd3821195.html>.

⁴⁰⁴ “Mauritania Threshold Program,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/mauritania-threshold-program/>.

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰⁶ Sinomach, News, “CNEEC Wins Bid for Mauritania’s 60MW Dual-Fuel Power Plant Project,” Mar. 13, 2025, https://www.sinomach.com.cn/en/MediaCenter/News/202503/t20250313_539220.html.

- Nigeria – Public Diplomacy:** According to an affidavit submitted by the President of the American Foreign Service Association, which was informed by cables from U.S. diplomatic posts, the U.S. Agency for Global Media had built “a network of 40 affiliate radio and TV stations across Nigeria” with content reaching 19 million Nigerians.⁴⁰⁷ Meanwhile, Voice of America (VOA) Hausa had been used to reach 16.9 million weekly listeners out of approximately 60 million Hausa speakers in West Africa.⁴⁰⁸ VOA coverage countered narratives of U.S. competitors, while providing access to credible Islamic voices of opposition to terrorism. Ten Northern Nigerian civil society organizations wrote to U.S. Ambassador Mills saying, “VOA Hausa is a beacon of hope and a source of credible information” for millions of Nigerians and Africans across the continent.”⁴⁰⁹ Meanwhile, Beijing’s China Global Television Network and Russia’s RT maintain strong Hausa-language coverage, which they use to influence public opinion in West Africa.⁴¹⁰
- Nigeria – Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) Services:** In February 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$2 million USAID award to UNICEF to support nutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) programs in Nigeria.⁴¹¹ The same month, the Export and Import Bank of China and UNICEF signed an Memorandum of Understanding committing support for the same services in Nigeria.⁴¹² Apart from the UNICEF program, the Trump Administration terminated an additional \$25 million worth of U.S. supported WASH services in Nigeria.⁴¹³
- Rwanda – Clean Energy Infrastructure:** The Trump Administration terminated a three year, \$1.5 million USAID program to transition Rwanda’s transportation system to electric buses.⁴¹⁴ The termination coincides with Kigali’s clear requests for clean energy investments from foreign partners.⁴¹⁵ Meanwhile, China, through its companies Sinohydro and Tailing Electric Vehicle, opened an electric vehicle plant in 2022 near Kigali and is currently constructing a hydroelectric power station to power tens of thousands of Rwandan homes.⁴¹⁶

⁴⁰⁷ Thomas Yazdgerdi, Affidavit, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, dated Apr. 16, 2025, in *Widakuswara, et al. v. Lake*, at 4. <https://afsa.org/sites/default/files/declaration-case-1-25-cv-01015-rcf-2025-04-16.pdf>.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*; Hausa is a widely spoken language in West and Central Africa.

⁴⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴¹⁰ Digital Forensic Research Lab, “In Sub-Saharan Africa, China Embraces Russian Messaging against Ukraine,” *Atlantic Council*, June 12, 2024, <https://dfriab.org/2024/06/12/china-russia-sub-saharan-africa/>.

⁴¹¹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 720BHA24I000200; “Recipient: UNICEF,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_720BHA24I000200_7200.

⁴¹² “China EXIM and UNICEF Agree to Support Vulnerable Children in Nigeria with Life-Saving Services,” *United Nations Children’s Fund*, Feb. 11, 2025, <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/press-releases/china-exim-and-unicef-agree-support-vulnerable-children-nigeria-life-saving-services>.

⁴¹³ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 720BHA23I000226, Award ID: 72062020CA00010, Award ID: 72062023N00001.

⁴¹⁴ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 7200AA23FA00017; “BasiGo Flags Off First Electric Buses in Kigali,” *BasiGo*, Dec. 11, 2024; <https://www.basi-go.com/in-the-news/basigo-flags-off-first-electric-buses-in-kigali>.

⁴¹⁵ Ma Jingjing and Zhang Yiyi, “Rwanda Seeks Closer Cooperation with China in Infrastructure, Emerging Industries: Ambassador,” *Global Times*, June 20, 2024, <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1314519.shtml>.

⁴¹⁶ Denys Bedarride, “Rwanda Has Installed a New Electric Vehicle Assembly Plant, Built by the Chinese Company ‘Tailing Electric Vehicle,’” *EcomNews Afrique*, Jan. 31, 2022, <https://ecomnewsafrique.com/en/2022/01/31/rwanda-has-installed-a-new-electric-vehicle-assembly-plant-built-by-the-chinese-company-tailing-electric-vehicle/>; Hudson Kuteesa, “Rwanda’s China-Financed Nyabarongo II Dam Halfway Done,” *All Africa*, June 26, 2025, <https://allafrica.com/stories/202506260203.html>.

- **Senegal – Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH):** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a 5-year, \$28 million USAID program to increase access to WASH services in Senegal and reach universal access to water and sanitation by 2030.⁴¹⁷ In April 2025, China announced a partnership between Chinese company Sinohydro and the Senegalese Sovereign Fund for Strategic Investment (FONSIS) to build Senegal’s first “water highway.”⁴¹⁸ China continues to support other, smaller-scale WASH programs in Senegal.⁴¹⁹
- **Senegal – Young African Leadership Initiative Regional Leadership Center:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$17 million USAID award for a Young African Leaders Initiative Center in Senegal that seeks to develop the future leaders of Africa from 25 African countries.⁴²⁰
- **Sierra Leone – Energy Infrastructure:** Signed in September 2024, a \$480 million MCC compact would address the lack of affordable and reliable electricity in Sierra Leone, including upgrades to the distribution network and the creation of new connections.⁴²¹ The project includes the development of a new transmission corridor. In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this compact remains paused by the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance review. China has contributed to Sierra Leone’s energy infrastructure in the past, including the construction of at least three hydropower plants.⁴²² In March 2025, the Chinese Ambassador to Sierra Leone met with Sierra Leone’s Ministry of Energy to offer its further assistance in developing the country’s energy infrastructure.⁴²³
- **Tanzania – Agricultural Development:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated at least \$8 million in USAID-supported agricultural sustainment programming, impacting over 60 non-governmental organizations across Tanzania’s agricultural value chain.⁴²⁴ In May 2025, China announced a joint project with the United Nations International Fund for Agricultural Development that seeks to provide climate-resilient agricultural assistance in Tanzania.⁴²⁵

⁴¹⁷ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72068524C00001; Kagaye, “Cooperation/Access to Water for All in Senegal: USAID Launches Gire and Wash-Services Projects,” *Senegalese News*, Jan. 19, 2025; <https://www.seneneews.com/en/senegal/cooperation-access-to-water-for-all-in-senegal-usaid-launches-gire-and-wash-service222s-projects-6077.html#>.

⁴¹⁸ Aly Diouf, “Meeting a Vital Need: Chinese Company Sinohydro Selected to Build Senegal’s First ‘Water Highway,’” *Chinafrica*, Apr. 17, 2025,

⁴¹⁹ Huaxia, “Senegal’s PM Launches Phase II of Rural Water Supply Project,” *Xinhua*, Feb. 4, 2025, <https://english.news.cn/africa/20250204/3a9adeead3a8411e828238cc13805409/c.html#:~:text=DAKAR%2C%20Feb.,partnership%22%20betwee%20Senegal%20and%20China>.

⁴²⁰ “Le Centre Régional de Leadership (CRL) YALI DAKAR,” Accessed June 2025, <https://yaliфриquedelouest.org/#892da538-0125-4787-a294-fea331486758>; “Recipient: Centre Africain D’Etude Supérieures En Gestion,” *USA Spending*, Accessed June 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_AID685A1600001_072.

⁴²¹ “Sierra Leone Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/sierra-leone-compact/>

⁴²² “Project ID: 22211,” *AidData*, Accessed June 2025, <https://china.aiddata.org/projects/22211/>.

⁴²³ “China Reaffirms Commitment to Advancing Sierra Leone’s Energy Sector,” *Sierraloading*, Mar. 28, 2025 <https://sierraloading.sl/local/china-reaffirms-support-for-sierra-leone-energy-sector/>

⁴²⁴ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72062122F00002, Award ID: 72062122F00002, Award ID: 72062123LA00001, Award ID: 72062119LA00001; Press Release, U.S. Embassy Dar Es Salaam, U.S. Launches Five-Year Project to Cut Post-Harvest Food Loss in Tanzania, Sept. 26, 2024, <https://tz.usembassy.gov/u-s-launches-five-year-project-to-cut-post-harvest-food-loss-in-tanzania/>; Gadiosa Lamtey, “USAID Funding Halt Puts Tanzania NGOs, Agriculture at Risk,” Jan. 8, 2025, <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/usaid-funding-halt-puts-tanzania-ngos-agriculture-at-risk-4904180#>.

⁴²⁵ “国家国际发展合作署与联合国国际农业发展基金首次合作实施全球发展和南南合作基金项目,” *China International Development Cooperation Agency*, May 22, 2025, <https://gdpc.org.cn/article/4Mt7BKsH7B6>

- **The Gambia – Global Health:** In April 2025, the Trump Administration eliminated the \$13 million USAID-supported Gambia President's Malaria Initiative that delivered high-impact malaria control and prevention services in line with The Gambia's National Malaria Control Strategy.⁴²⁶ The same month, China, The Gambia Red Cross Society and the International Federation of Red Cross launched a project aimed at reducing malaria in The Gambia.⁴²⁷
- **The Gambia – Transportation:** In December 2024, MCC selected The Gambia as eligible to develop a compact based in part on its performance under its \$25 million threshold program.⁴²⁸ The compact would address economic underutilization of the Gambia River for transport and tourism and low enrollment and poor quality of education.⁴²⁹ In a June 2025 briefing, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff that development plans for this compact have been placed on hold due to the Trump Administration's foreign assistance review. Meanwhile, China continues to build infrastructure around The Gambia River, including announcements in August 2024 that they would construct two bridges to boost transportation.⁴³⁰
- **Togo – Peacekeeping Operations:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$1.6 million award in Peacekeeping Operations funding to support the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI) in Togo.⁴³¹ Meanwhile, Togo is seeking to enhance its military cooperation with China as evidenced by recent engagements at the September 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation.⁴³²
- **Uganda – Food Aid:** The Trump Administration's foreign assistance terminations disrupted the World Food Program's provision of food aid in Uganda.⁴³³ In March 2025, in coordination with the World Food Program, China donated \$2 million in rice to Uganda to help feed vulnerable communities in Karamoja and school-going children.⁴³⁴

⁴²⁶ Carmen Paun, "Documents Reveal Scope of Trump's Foreign Aid Cuts," *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72068525CA00001.

⁴²⁷ Fatou Sillah, "Gambia Red Cross and China Launch \$2 Million Malaria Elimination Initiative," *Kerrfatou*, Apr. 26, 2025, <https://www.kerrfatou.com/gambia-red-cross-and-china-launch-2-million-malaria-elimination-initiative/>.

⁴²⁸ "The Gambia Proposed Compact," *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/the-gambia-proposed-compact/>; "The Gambia Threshold Program," *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/gambia-threshold-program/>.

⁴²⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁰ Abdur Rahman Alfa Shaban, "Gambia Plans to Construct 2 Key Bridges with Chinese Expertise," *africanews*, Aug. 2013, <https://www.africanews.com/2018/07/21/gambia-plans-to-construct-2-key-bridges-with-chinese-expertise/>.

⁴³¹ "Contract to Sincerus Global Solutions Inc." *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_19AQMM24C0109_1900_-NONE_-NONE-.

⁴³² "Togo Seeks to Military Ties with China During FOCAC," *Togo First: Invest in Togo*, Sept. 9, 2024, <https://www.togofirst.com/en/security/0909-14742-togo-seeks-to-military-ties-with-china-during-focac>.

⁴³³ Samuel Okiror, "Trump's Aid Cuts Blamed as Food Rations Stopped for a Million Refugees in Uganda," *The Guardian*, May 8, 2025.

⁴³⁴ "China Donates Rice to Northeastern Uganda to Alleviate Food Shortage," *Xinhua*, June 16, 2025, <https://english.news.cn/africa/20250327/990f039d3b07406f9b451499fde98ccb/c.html>.

- **Zambia – HIV/AIDS:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a three and five year \$37 million USAID grant in HIV/AIDS programming in Zambia.⁴³⁵ In May 2025, the Chinese Embassy in Zambia’s Deputy Chief of Mission Wang Sheng said that China was ready to help Zambia fight HIV/AIDS in the wake of America’s withdrawal, including by donating 500,000 rapid HIV testing kits to Lusaka Province.⁴³⁶ Wang confirmed that several meetings will follow to discuss China’s continued partnership with Zambia on this issue.⁴³⁷
- **Zimbabwe – Malaria and Tuberculosis Prevention:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$2.5 million USAID program supporting malaria and tuberculosis prevention research at Africa University in Zimbabwe along with a \$2.5 million program supporting the Union Zimbabwe Trust’s tuberculosis prevention activities.⁴³⁸ As a result of the sudden termination, Africa University experienced an immediate \$1.2 million impact, and 30 employees suddenly could no longer be paid.⁴³⁹ Meanwhile, China remains committed to malaria-related programming in Zimbabwe and across sub-Saharan Africa.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁵ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72061122FA00001, Award ID: 72061120CA00009, Award ID: 72061120CA00008.

⁴³⁶ Elizabeth Mabenga, “China Says It’s Ready to Help Zambia Fight HIV after U.S. Aid Cut,” *Diggers: Ear to the Ground*, May 16, 2025, <https://diggers.news/local/2025/05/16/china-says-its-ready-to-help-zambia-fight-hiv-after-us-aid-cut/>.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴³⁸ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72061321FA00002, Award ID: 72061324CA00001, Award ID: 72061324CA00002.

⁴³⁹ Jim Patterson, “USAID Freeze Strikes Africa University,” *United Methodist News*, Feb. 10, 2025, <https://www.umnews.org/en/news/usaid-freeze-strikes-africa-university>.

⁴⁴⁰ Odhiambo, Julius Nyerere et al. “China’s Hidden Role in Malaria Control and Elimination in Africa.” *BMJ Global Health* vol. 8,12 e013349. Dec. 18, 2023.

PACIFIC ISLANDS

In May 2025, amid the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance terminations, China hosted 11 Pacific Island nations at the third China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Xiamen, Fujian Province.⁴⁴¹ Key deliverables from Beijing to the Pacific Island country participants included \$2 million for climate cooperation, 200 local development projects and mechanisms for disaster management and maritime cooperation, scholarships for educational and medical exchanges, agricultural and fisheries cooperation and other training opportunities.⁴⁴² Beijing also announced a regional tourism promotion campaign, support for cultural events and think tank and media collaborations.⁴⁴³

Meanwhile, the following programs in the Pacific Islands were either terminated or paused by the Trump Administration:

- **Pacific Islands – “Climate Finance Activity”:** Pacific Island leaders consistently cite climate change as their most pressing national security threat.⁴⁴⁴ Despite this, the Trump Administration terminated a \$45 million initiative dubbed the “Climate Finance Activity,” which aimed to strengthen Pacific Island countries’ capacity to access and manage climate financing and mobilize private sector funds.⁴⁴⁵ On May 25, China announced that it will allocate \$2 million for the further expansion of cooperation with the Pacific Islands in such areas as clean energy, agriculture, fisheries, low-carbon infrastructure, low-carbon tourism and disaster prevention and mitigation, to help Pacific Islands countries respond to climate change.⁴⁴⁶
- **Pacific Islands – Digital Connectivity Projects:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated projects aimed at improving digital connectivity in Pacific Island countries, including programs to enhance internet access and cybersecurity.⁴⁴⁷ The Trump Administration’s aid freeze also stalled USAID contributions to the Palau Submarine Cable Branch System project, which includes U.S. company involvement.⁴⁴⁸ China has long sought to promote its own telecommunications solutions, such as China’s Huawei, in the Pacific Islands. In 2022, China provided a loan to the Solomon Islands of \$66 million for a Huawei Mobile Towers project and a \$20 million loan to Samoa for its National Broadband Highway fiber-optic network.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴¹ “List of Measures for China to Implement the Consensus of the Third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, May 28, 2025, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjzbhd/202505/t20250528_11635736.html

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁴ “Release: Climate Change Remains the Single Greatest Threat for Pacific—New Pacific Security Report,” *Pacific Islands Forum*, Feb. 7, 2023, <https://forumsec.org/publications/release-climate-change-remains-single-greatest-threat-pacific-new-pacific-security>.

⁴⁴⁵ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049224T00001, Award ID: 72049224C00002.

⁴⁴⁶ Kathryn Paik and John Augé, “China Courts the Pacific: Key Takeaways from the 2025 China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 3, 2025, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-courts-pacific-key-takeaways-2025-china-pacific-island-countries-foreign-ministers>.

⁴⁴⁷ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049223C00001.

⁴⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: The United States Partners with Australia and Japan to Expand Reliable and Secure Digital Connectivity in Palau,” Oct. 2020, Accessed June 2025, <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-united-states-partners-with-australia-and-japan-to-expand-reliable-and-secure-digital-connectivity-in-palau/>

⁴⁴⁹ Georgina Kekea, “Solomon Islands Secures \$100 Million China Loan to Build Huawei Mobile Towers in Historic Step,” *The Guardian*, Aug. 18, 2022; “Project ID: 37695,” *AidData*, Accessed June 2025, <https://china.aiddata.org/projects/37695/>.

- **Pacific Islands – Disaster Preparedness:** USAID provided over \$13 million for disaster preparedness in countries like Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Tonga.⁴⁵⁰ The cessation of these programs undermines the region's ability to respond to natural disasters. Moreover, without a change in authorities, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command likely will not be able to respond to any disasters, effectively taking the United States out of the disaster response ecosystem. Meanwhile, China recently established the China-Pacific Island Countries Center for Disaster Risk Reduction and Cooperation and pledged and additional \$2 million on climate cooperation projects.⁴⁵¹
- **Pacific Islands – Pacific American Fund (PAF):** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a five-year, \$35 million initiative launched in 2020 to support local development projects across Pacific Island nations in cooperation with Taiwan's development arm, TaiwanICDF.⁴⁵² The Fund supports projects focused on disaster resilience, market-based enterprise development, biodiversity and sustainable natural resource management and health care.⁴⁵³ On May 25, China announced it would implement 200 "small and beautiful" livelihood programs in the Pacific Islands region within the year.⁴⁵⁴ This is the same model as the small local development grants provided by USAID through the Pacific American Fund.
- **Pacific Islands – Pacific Humanitarian Warehouse:** The Trump Administration's gutting of USAID has likely upended U.S. support to a program that pre-positioned warehouses in 14 Pacific Island countries and Timor-Leste.⁴⁵⁵ This Pacific-led initiative included donations from Australia, New Zealand, Germany and France.⁴⁵⁶ America's absence will be noted by fellow donor partners as well as Pacific Island countries as the Pacific Community (SPC) is the lead for this initiative. This could leave a leadership gap in humanitarian matters in the Pacific Islands that could potentially be filled by China, which is eager to expand its engagement.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁰ Terence Wood, "What Will U.S. Aid Cuts Mean for the Pacific?" *Devpolicy.org*, Feb. 7, 2025, <https://devpolicy.org/what-will-us-aid-cuts-mean-for-the-pacific/>.

⁴⁵¹ "List of Measures for China to Implement the Consensus of the Third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, May 28, 2025; "Special Envoy for Pacific Island Countries Affairs of the Chinese Government Qian Bo Attends the Launching Ceremony of the China-Pacific Island Countries Center for Disaster Risk Reduction and Cooperation," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, Feb. 23, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjwb/zzjg_663340/bmdyzt_664814/xwlb_664816/202302/t20230227_11032109.html.

⁴⁵² Carmen Paun, "Documents Reveal Scope of Trump's Foreign Aid Cuts," *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049220C000004; "U.S.-Taiwan Cooperation on International Development and Humanitarian Assistance," *American Institute in Taiwan*, Nov. 4, 2022, <https://www.ait.org.tw/us-taiwan-cooperation-on-international-development-and-humanitarian-assistance/>

⁴⁵³ "USAID Pacific American Fund," Accessed June 2025, https://assets.ctfassets.net/431cqw7mefvo/1jCwLxvt3q8wOJ8wLlgMyR/8e72f2fb8a0f6262b3169a0f87d71e7e/USAID_Pacific_American_Fund_Fact_Sheet_2020-11_A4_.pdf

⁴⁵⁴ "List of Measures for China to Implement the Consensus of the Third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, May 28, 2025.

⁴⁵⁵ "Pacific Humanitarian Warehousing Program," *Geosciences, Energy and Maritime Division*, Accessed July, 2025, <https://gem.spc.int/projects/pacific-humanitarian-warehousing-program>

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁷ "List of Measures for China to Implement the Consensus of the Third China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China*, May 28, 2025.

- Papua New Guinea – Biodiversity Conservation:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated USAID biodiversity programming in Papua New Guinea.⁴⁵⁸ USAID was investing more than \$42 million in biodiversity projects in Papua New Guinea to protect the world’s third largest rainforest, including by working directly with traditional clan landowners in five provinces covering more than 360,000 hectares of land.⁴⁵⁹ This work was critical to pushing back on China’s illegal logging and exploitation of Papua New Guinea’s forests.⁴⁶⁰ By abruptly terminating these conservation efforts, the Trump Administration has likely damaged America’s reputation as a reliable bilateral partner to the Papua New Guinea government.⁴⁶¹
- Papua New Guinea – HIV/AIDS:** USAID-funded initiatives providing HIV treatment and prevention services in Papua New Guinea have been halted.⁴⁶² The Pacific Islands were the center of strong competition between the U.S. and China regarding COVID vaccines and supplies.⁴⁶³ China provided the Sinopharm vaccine, medical supplies such as ventilators and masks and medical support funding to most countries in the Pacific. Chances are likely that China will seek to replace previously U.S.-led HIV/AIDS programming.⁴⁶⁴
- Papua New Guinea – Papua New Guinea Electrification Partnership (PEP):** The U.S. contribution to this strategically vital multilateral effort, also involving Australia, Japan and New Zealand, to expand energy access in Papua New Guinea has been terminated, affecting energy infrastructure development and our credibility with partners and the Papua New Guinea government.⁴⁶⁵ Meanwhile, China has invested substantially in Papua New Guinea, including a \$414 million Port Moresby Infrastructure Development, a \$1.3 billion loan supporting the liquefied natural gas sector and the acquisition of the Frieda River Mining Project.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁵⁸ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049222CA00003. “USAID Promotes Sustainable Landscapes Opportunities for PNG through Launch of New US\$16 Million (K56 Million),” *U.S. Embassy to Papua New Guinea*, Accessed June 2025, <https://pg.usembassy.gov/usa-id-promotes-sustainable-landscapes-opportunities-for-png-through-launch-of-new-us16-million-k56-million-project/>.

⁴⁵⁹ Press Release, U.S. Embassy to Papua New Guinea, USAID Promotes Sustainable Landscapes Opportunities for PNG through Launch of New US\$16 Million (K56 Million), Accessed June 2025, <https://pg.usembassy.gov/usa-id-promotes-sustainable-landscapes-opportunities-for-png-through-launch-of-new-us16-million-k56-million-project/>.

⁴⁶⁰ Shimali Chauhan, “Papua New Guinea’s Rainforests in Danger; Illegal Logging Crises Fuel Human Rights Abuses and Threaten Biodiversity,” *DowntoEarth*, Nov. 3, 2024, <https://www.downtoearth.org.in/wildlife-biodiversity/papua-new-guineas-rainforests-in-danger-illegal-logging-crises-fuel-human-rights-abuses-and-threaten-biodiversity>.

⁴⁶¹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049222CA00003.

⁴⁶² Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049218CA00008.

⁴⁶³ Ville Sinkkonen and Anu Ruokamo, “Vaccines as Contentious Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific,” *Finnish Institute of International Affairs*, October 2022, https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/wp129_vaccines-as-contentious-connectivity-in-the-indo-pacific.pdf.

⁴⁶⁴ Huiheng Tan, “Experts Warned USAID’s Gutting Would Give China Room to Replace the U.S. Now, it’s Happening,” *Business Insider*, Mar. 27, 2025, <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-replace-usaid-shutdown-humanitarian-aid-funding-development-assistance-2025-3>.

⁴⁶⁵ Press Release, U.S. Embassy to Papua New Guinea, U.S. Government Delivers on PNG Electrification Partnership Promise, Jan. 20, 2021. <https://pg.usembassy.gov/u-s-government-delivers-on-png-electrification-partnership-promise/>; “Recipient: Research Triangle Institute,” *USA Spending*, Accessed July 2, 2025, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/CONT_AWD_72049221C00001_7200_-NONE_-NONE-.

⁴⁶⁶ “Envy in Papua New Guinea as Chinese Money Pours In,” *France24*, May 21, 2023, <https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230521-envy-in-papua-new-guinea-as-chinese-money-pours-in>; “Project ID: 39326,” *AidData*, Accessed June 2025, <https://china.aiddata.org/projects/39326/>; John Cannon, “Proposed Copper and Gold Mine Threatens the World’s ‘Second Amazon’ in PNG,” *Mongabay*, June 13, 2022, <https://news.mongabay.com/2022/06/proposed-copper-and-gold-mine-threatens-the-worlds-second-amazon-in-png/>.

- Pacific Islands – Promoting Just, Engaged, Civic-Minded and Transparent (PROJECT) Governance:** The Trump Administration’s suspension of USAID funding has disrupted a \$35 million U.S.-led initiative in the Pacific Islands focused on strengthening sound, just and responsive governance by promoting electoral integrity, independent media, human rights and rule of law.⁴⁶⁷ Meanwhile, China continues to make inroads into governance support in the Pacific Islands, including legislative exchanges between China and Fiji.⁴⁶⁸ The Trump Administration terminated USAID programming that was building these types of partnerships with the Fiji government, including supporting Fiji’s Elections Office to conduct Fiji’s first municipal elections in over 20 years.⁴⁶⁹
- Timor-Leste – Water Infrastructure:** Signed in July 2022, this \$420 million MCC compact sought to improve water, sanitation and education in Timor-Leste by reducing disease-causing pathogens in groundwater through infrastructure investment and the creation of the country’s first centralized wastewater treatment system.⁴⁷⁰ The compact also intended to establish a Center of Excellence as a training and professional certification center for current and future secondary school teachers and school leaders in Timor-Leste. In June 2025, MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this compact remains paused by the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance review. Meanwhile, China and Timor-Leste signed a memorandum of partnership for water purification cooperation where the Prime Minister expressed an interest in learning how to replicate China’s water conservation system.⁴⁷¹

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

In May 2025, amid the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance freeze, Beijing hosted the China-Latin America and the Caribbean Forum (China-CELAC).⁴⁷² In addition to Colombia joining its Belt and Road Initiative, China announced it would provide a RMB 66 billion (\$9 billion USD) credit line and additional infrastructure investments to the region. China also committed to coordinate with Latin American countries on combatting transnational crime and counter drug trafficking.⁴⁷³ Over the next three years, China will provide 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 international Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese bridge program.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁶⁷ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025. Award ID: 72049221CA00002.

⁴⁶⁸ Kathryn Paik and John Augé, “China Courts the Pacific: Key Takeaways from the 2025 China–Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, June 3, 2025, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-courts-pacific-key-takeaways-2025-china-pacific-island-countries-foreign-ministers>; “Zhao Leji Holds Talks with Speaker of the Parliament of Fiji Filimone Jitoko,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China*, Mar. 21, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjfb/zjzg_663340/bmdyzs_664814/xwlb_664816/202503/t20250324_11580850.html.

⁴⁶⁹ Peceli Naviticoko, “USAID Aims to Increase Women’s Participation in Election,” *FBC News*, Aug. 16, 2023, <https://www.fbcnews.com.fj/news/usaid-aims-to-increase-womens-participation-in-election/>.

⁴⁷⁰ “Timor-Leste Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/timor-leste-compact/>.

⁴⁷¹ Forum for Economic and Trade Co-operation Between China and Portuguese-speaking Countries (Macao), “China Health Care Foundation Signs Partnership Documents with East Timor,” July 23, 2024, https://www.forumchinapl.org.mo/en/economic_trade/view/8170; Jose Belarmino de Sa, “Timor-Lest Wants to Learn Chinese Water Conservation System,” *Agência Noticiosa de Timor-Leste*, May 23, 2024, <https://en.tatoli.tl/2024/05/23/timor-leste-wants-to-learn-chinese-water-conservation-system/20/>.

⁴⁷² China-CELAC Forum, Accessed June 2025, <http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/>.

⁴⁷³ Writing a New Chapter in Building a China-LAC Community with a Shared Future, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China*, May 13, 2025, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyxw/202505/t20250513_11622043.html.

⁴⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, the following programs in Latin America and the Caribbean were either terminated or paused by the Trump Administration:

- **Belize – Energy Development:** Signed in September 2024, this \$125 million MCC compact addresses high electricity costs by providing technical support for solar power projects, modernizing the electric grid and facilitating new power purchase agreements with independent producers.⁴⁷⁵ In June 2025 MCC informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Compact’s entry into force remains paused by the Trump Administration’s foreign assistance review. Belize is one of Taiwan’s last remaining diplomatic allies in the Western Hemisphere.⁴⁷⁶ By jeopardizing this MCC compact, the Administration is potentially opening the aperture for increased Chinese pressure against Belize to recognize Beijing over Taipei.
- **Chile – Foreign Investment Screening:** In February 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$200,000 Department of State grant to the Center for International Private Enterprise to enhance Chile’s investment screening regulations.⁴⁷⁷ Meanwhile, Chinese companies are actively seeking to buy up lithium reserve sites in Chile.⁴⁷⁸
- **Colombia – Critical Minerals:** The Trump Administration terminated a \$25 million program that leveraged local and international expertise to strengthen mining supply chains, alternative livelihood supply chains, environmental processes and regulatory and enforcement efforts in Colombia.⁴⁷⁹ The program worked with gold, silver, platinum and critical mineral mines regularly exploited by Chinese-backed mining interests.⁴⁸⁰
- **Colombia – Energy Development:** The Trump Administration terminated a USAID project called “Energy for Peace” in Colombia that supported the planning, building, operation and transfer of sustainable solar energy projects in conflict-affected communities.⁴⁸¹ USAID was also working with the Colombian government to diversify energy generation and develop transparent power procurement policies. Meanwhile, China is investing heavily in Colombia’s energy sector, including the Hidroituango project.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁵ “Belize Compact,” *Millennium Challenge Corporation*, Accessed June 2025, <https://www.mcc.gov/where-we-work/program/belize-compact/>

⁴⁷⁶ Evan Ellis, “PRC Influence and the Status of Taiwan’s Diplomatic Allies in the Western Hemisphere,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Mar. 26, 2025.

⁴⁷⁷ “Recipient: Center for Private Enterprise,” *USA Spending*, https://www.usaspending.gov/award/ASST_NON_SINLEC24GR5244_1900.

⁴⁷⁸ Maria Zuppello, “China’s Lithium Expansionist Interests Extend Beyond the Argentina-Bolivia-Chile Triangle,” *Diálogo Américas*, Aug. 12, 2024, <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinas-lithium-expansionist-interests-extend-beyond-the-argentina-bolivia-chile-triangle/>.

⁴⁷⁹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72051423C00001.

⁴⁸⁰ Jennifer Scotland, “Gold Rush: Organised Crime in Transition Mineral Supply Chains,” *Rusi*, May 12, 2025, <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/gold-rush-organised-crime-transition-mineral-supply-chains>.

⁴⁸¹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72051424FA00002; Natalie Alm, “Energy for Peace: Blended Finance for Clean Energy and Economic Development in Colombia,” *Medium*, Aug. 27, 2024, <https://medium.com/usaid-invest/energy-for-peace-blended-finance-for-clean-energy-and-economic-development-in-colombia-285f99866bb9>.

⁴⁸² Josep Freixes, “Chinese-Colombian Consortium Wins Bid to Complete the Hidroituango Mega Dam,” *Colombia One*, Oct. 12, 2013, <https://colombiaone.com/2023/10/12/chinese-colombian-consortium-hidroituango/>.

- **Dominican Republic – Energy Sector:** The Trump Administration terminated USAID support for energy sector reform in the Dominican Republic. The program promoted self-reliance in 13 Caribbean countries by bolstering the performance of energy systems, focusing on increasing renewable power generation and enhancing the ability of electricity systems to withstand shocks.⁴⁸³ Meanwhile, China already has a history of deepening energy sector investments in the Dominican Republic.⁴⁸⁴
- **Ecuador – Cybersecurity:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated USAID support for cybersecurity capacity building training in Ecuador under ProICT. The program trained Ecuador’s cyber response team and provided recommendations to launch Ecuador’s Ministry of Telecom’s (MINTEL) digital transformation strategy. Chinese companies, notably Huawei and ZTE, support the vast majority of Ecuador’s digital and telecommunications infrastructure.⁴⁸⁵ Ecuador has been the target of Chinese cyber attacks, including in August 2023, when Ecuador’s national election agency claimed that cyberattacks from China disrupted online voting in their elections.⁴⁸⁶ Terminating this programming only serves to disincentivize Ecuador to partner with the United States on telecommunications and cyber infrastructure in the future.
- **Guyana and Suriname – Government Transparency:** The Trump Administration terminated a USAID project called “INVEST Transaction Advisory Services” to develop transparent and accountable government practices for public infrastructure and mining and service procurement, which includes legal and financial analysis.
- **Latin America – Economic and Trade Ties:** The Trump Administration terminated USAID’s \$250 million “Catalyze Blended Capital Investment Platform,” which facilitated Latin American entrepreneurs’ access to blended capital, skills, networks and investments to grow businesses and create jobs.⁴⁸⁷ This 8-year program was initiated in 2019 under the first Trump Administration.⁴⁸⁸
- **Latin America – Independent Media:** The Trump Administration terminated a \$6.5 million cooperative agreement with various Latin American countries for a project called “Communities Resilient to Disinformation, Building Local Engagement” (CREDIBLE), which built youth digital literacy so that individuals could discern between facts and propaganda perpetuated by actors like China.⁴⁸⁹

⁴⁸³ Evan Ellis, “The Evolution of Chinese Engagement with the Dominican Republic,” *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, Oct. 31, 2023, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-chinese-engagement-dominican-republic#>.

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁵ “Ecuador Country Commercial Guide,” *International Trade Administration*, Accessed July 3, 2025, <https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/ecuador-telecommunications>.

⁴⁸⁶ “Ecuador Hit by Earthquake and Cyberattacks amid Presidential Election,” *CBS News*, Aug. 21, 2023.

⁴⁸⁷ “USAID CATALYZE: Twelve 2024 Highlights Across Twelve Activities,” *Medium*, Dec. 17, 2024, <https://catalyze-comms.medium.com/usaid-catalyze-twelve-2024-highlights-across-twelve-activities-e17be8682d16>; Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 7200AA19C00080.

⁴⁸⁸ Palladium Group, “Mobilizing \$2 Billion in Private Capital: USAID Awards CATALYZE Contract to Palladium,” Nov. 4, 2019, <https://thepalladiumgroupusa.com/news/Mobilizing-2-Billion-in-Private-Capital-USAID-Awards-CATALYZE-Contract-to-Palladium>.

⁴⁸⁹ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025.

- **Latin America – Investigative Journalism:** The Trump Administration terminated a \$6 million USAID project in Latin America that empowered independent journalists and media outlets to identify and uncover corruption, propaganda narratives and financial crimes that obscure corruption, with specific training on Chinese tactics.⁴⁹⁰ Opaque, predatory Chinese investments often crowd out U.S. companies and generate unsustainable debt for Latin American countries.
- **Panama – Pharmaceutical Supply Chains:** The Trump Administration terminated a \$160 million USAID program called “Promoting the Quality of Medicines Plus (PQM+),” which supported regulatory reform aimed at enabling Panama’s development as a pharmaceutical and medical supply manufacturing and distribution hub. The effort also inculcated international norms that enable U.S. private sector partnership.⁴⁹¹ Meanwhile, China has continued to expand its vaccine diplomacy in Latin America through its Health Silk Road.⁴⁹²
- **Peru and Ecuador – Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing:** In March 2025, the Trump Administration terminated a \$5.7 million award to build Peru and Ecuador’s capacity to push back against Chinese IUU fishing.⁴⁹³ The project also sought to enable anti-IUU investigative journalism to target wider illegal operations. China operates the world’s largest deep-water fishing fleet whose ships exploit fish stocks, destroying marine ecosystems and undercutting local economies. The west coast of South America has seen hundreds of Chinese ships fishing near protected marine reserves.
- **Peru – Government Procurement:** Despite widespread evidence of Chinese-fueled corruption in Peru’s public procurement system, the Trump Administration terminated a \$3.5 million program to strengthen Peru’s public procurement policies.⁴⁹⁴ USAID had been maintaining a partnership with the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law Development Program to strengthen Peru’s Ministry of Economic and Finance’s procurement practices.⁴⁹⁵ These programs push back against opaque and potentially corrupt infrastructure deals from China.⁴⁹⁶

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Seth O’Varrell, “Sinovac Expands in LatAm Despite China Viasco,” *fDi Intelligence*, June 22, 2022, updated June 27, 2023, <https://www.fdiintelligence.com/content/341cf7e8-6da0-5c71-8966-05ebacac0271>.

⁴⁹³ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72052722CA00003.

⁴⁹⁴ Carmen Paun, “Documents Reveal Scope of Trump’s Foreign Aid Cuts,” *Politico*, Mar. 26, 2025, Award ID: 72052720T00002.

⁴⁹⁵ U.S. Mission Lima, “Fact Sheet: Advancing the United States – Peru Partnership,” Nov. 15, 2024, <https://pe.usembassy.gov/fact-sheet-advancing-the-united-states-peru-partnership/#>.

⁴⁹⁶ Sabina Nicholls, “China’s Dangerous Play in Peru – PART III,” *Diálogo Américas*, Mar. 3, 2025. <https://dialogo-americas.com/articles/chinas-dangerous-play-in-peru-part-iii/>.