

Manager's Amendment

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—117th Cong., 1st Sess.**S. 1061**

To encourage the normalization of relations with Israel, and
for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mr. PORTMAN (for himself and Mr.
BOOKER)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-

2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Israel Relations Nor-

5 malization Act of 2021”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Support for peace between Israel and its

9 neighbors has longstanding bipartisan support in

10 Congress.

1 (2) For decades, Congress has promoted
2 Israel's acceptance among Arab and other relevant
3 countries and regions by passing numerous laws op-
4 posing efforts to boycott, isolate, and stigmatize
5 America's ally, Israel.

6 (3) The recent peace and normalization agree-
7 ments between Israel and several Arab states—the
8 United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Mo-
9 rocco—have the potential to fundamentally trans-
10 form the security, diplomatic, and economic environ-
11 ment in the Middle East and North Africa and ad-
12 vance vital United States national security interests.

13 (4) These historic agreements could help ad-
14 vance peace between and among Israel, the Arab
15 states, and other relevant countries and regions, fur-
16 ther diplomatic openings, and enhance efforts to-
17 wards a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
18 conflict resulting in two states—a democratic Jewish
19 state of Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian
20 state—living side by side in peace, security, and mu-
21 tual recognition.

22 (5) These agreements build upon the decades-
23 long leadership of the United States Government in
24 helping Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and

1 Jordan and promoting peace talks between Israel
2 and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.

3 (6) These agreements also build on decades of
4 private diplomatic and security engagement between
5 Israel and countries in the region.

6 (7) These normalization and peace agreements
7 could begin to transform the region by spurring eco-
8 nomic growth, investment, and tourism, enhancing
9 technological innovation, promoting security coopera-
10 tion, bolstering water security and sustainable devel-
11 opment, advancing understanding, and forging closer
12 people-to-people relations.

13 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
14 **FINED.**

15 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
16 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of
17 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
18 House of Representatives.

19 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

20 It is the policy of the United States—

21 (1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Ac-
22 cords to encourage other nations to normalize rela-
23 tions with Israel and ensure that existing agree-
24 ments reap tangible security and economic benefits
25 for the citizens of those countries;

1 (2) to develop and implement a regional strat-
2 egy to encourage economic cooperation between and
3 among Israel, Arab states, and the Palestinians to
4 enhance the prospects for peace, respect for human
5 rights, transparent governance, and for cooperation
6 to address water scarcity, climate solutions, health
7 care, sustainable development, and other areas that
8 result in benefits for residents of those countries and
9 regions;

10 (3) to develop and implement a regional secu-
11 rity strategy that recognizes the shared threat posed
12 by Iran and violent extremist organizations, ensures
13 sufficient United States deterrence in the region,
14 builds partner capacity to address shared threats,
15 and explores multilateral security arrangements built
16 around like-minded partners;

17 (4) to support and encourage government-to-
18 government and grassroots initiatives aimed at nor-
19 malizing ties with the state of Israel and promoting
20 people-to-people contact between Israelis, Arabs, and
21 residents of other relevant countries and regions, in-
22 cluding by expanding and enhancing the Abraham
23 Accords;

24 (5) to support a negotiated solution to the
25 Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two states liv-

1 ing side by side in peace, security, and mutual rec-
2 ognition;

3 (6) to implement the Nita M. Lowey Middle
4 East Partnership for Peace Act (title VIII of divi-
5 sion K of Public Law 116–260), which will support
6 economic development and peacebuilding efforts
7 among Israelis and Palestinians, in a manner which
8 encourages regional allies to become international
9 donors to these efforts;

10 (7) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of
11 Israel and legal barriers to normalization with
12 Israel; and

13 (8) to work to combat anti-Semitism and sup-
14 port normalization with Israel, including by coun-
15 tering anti-Semitic narratives on social media and
16 state media and pressing for curricula reform in
17 education.

18 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND**
19 **EXPAND THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND**
20 **OTHER RELATED NORMALIZATION AGREE-**
21 **MENTS WITH ISRAEL.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
24 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
25 trator of the United States Agency for International De-

1 velopment and the heads of other appropriate Federal de-
2 partments and agencies, shall develop and submit to the
3 appropriate congressional committees a strategy on ex-
4 panding and strengthening the Abraham Accords.

5 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
6 section (a) shall include the following elements:

7 (1) An assessment of future staffing and
8 resourcing requirements of entities within the De-
9 partment of State, the United States Agency for
10 International Development, and other appropriate
11 Federal departments and agencies with responsi-
12 bility to coordinate United States efforts to expand
13 and strengthen the Abraham Accords.

14 (2) An assessment of opportunities to further
15 promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation be-
16 tween Israel, Arab states, and other relevant coun-
17 tries and in the economic, social, cultural, scientific,
18 technical, educational, and health fields and an as-
19 sessment of roadblocks to increased cooperation.

20 (3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral
21 security cooperation between Israel, the United
22 States, Arab states, and other relevant countries and
23 regions that have normalized relations with Israel,
24 including an assessment of potential roadblocks to

1 increased security cooperation, interoperability, and
2 information sharing.

3 (4) An assessment of the likelihood of addi-
4 tional Arab and other relevant countries and regions
5 to normalize relations with Israel.

6 (5) An assessment of opportunities created by
7 normalization agreements with Israel to advance
8 prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians

9 (6) A detailed description of how the United
10 States Government will leverage diplomatic lines of
11 effort and resources from other stakeholders (includ-
12 ing from foreign governments, international donors,
13 and multilateral institutions) to encourage normal-
14 ization, economic development, and people-to-people
15 programming.

16 (7) Identification of existing investment funds
17 that support Israel-Arab state cooperation and rec-
18 ommendations for how such funds could be used to
19 support normalization and increase prosperity for all
20 relevant stakeholders.

21 (8) A proposal for how the United States Gov-
22 ernment and others can utilize the scholars and Ara-
23 bic language resources of the United States Holo-
24 caust Museum to counter Holocaust denial and anti-
25 Semitism.

1 (9) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic
2 Center for Pluralism to prepare educational mate-
3 rials, convene international seminars, promote toler-
4 ance and pluralism, and bring together scholars as
5 a means of advancing religious tolerance and coun-
6 tering political and religious extremism.

7 (10) Recommendations to improve Department
8 of State cooperation and coordination, particularly
9 between the Special Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism
10 and the Ambassador at Large for International Reli-
11 gious Freedom, and the Office of International Reli-
12 gious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia,
13 Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder im-
14 provement of relations between Israel, Arab states,
15 and other relevant countries and regions.

16 (11) An assessment on the value and feasibility
17 of Federal support for inter-parliamentary exchange
18 programs for Members of Congress, Knesset, and
19 parliamentarians from Arab and other relevant
20 countries and regions, including through existing
21 Federal programs that support such exchanges.

22 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)
23 shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified
24 annex.

1 **SEC. 6. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION**
2 **WITH ISRAEL.**

3 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the
4 “Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the
5 Normalization of Relations with Israel Act of 2021”.

6 (b) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
7 ings:

8 (1) The Arab League, an organization com-
9 prising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries
10 and entities, has maintained an official boycott of
11 Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the
12 founding of Israel in 1948.

13 (2) Longstanding United States policy has en-
14 couraged Arab League states to normalize their rela-
15 tions with Israel and has long prioritized funding co-
16 operative programs that promote normalization be-
17 tween Arab League States and Israel, including the
18 Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which
19 promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.

20 (3) While some Arab League governments are
21 signaling enhanced cooperation with the state of
22 Israel on the government-to-government level, most
23 continue to persecute their own citizens who estab-
24 lish people-to-people relations with Israelis in non-
25 governmental fora, through a combination of judicial
26 and extrajudicial retribution.

1 (4) Some Arab League states maintain draco-
2 nian anti-normalization laws that punish their citi-
3 zens for people-to-people relations with Israelis, with
4 punishments, including imprisonment, revocation of
5 citizenship, and execution. Extrajudicial punish-
6 ments by these and other Arab states include sum-
7 mary imprisonment, accusations of “treason” in gov-
8 ernment-controlled media, and professional black-
9 listing.

10 (5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the
11 other forms of retribution, effectively condemn these
12 societies to mutual estrangement and, by extension,
13 reduce the possibility of conciliation and com-
14 promise.

15 (6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said
16 in 2008 at the United Nations that Israel agrees
17 with the Arab Peace Initiative that a military solu-
18 tion to the conflict “will not achieve peace or provide
19 security for the parties”.

20 (7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a ris-
21 ing tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct engage-
22 ment with Israeli citizens and residents. These in-
23 clude the Arab Council for Regional Integration, a
24 group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab countries
25 who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds that

1 the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partner-
2 ship with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to
3 bridge the Israeli-Palestinian divide, and inspired di-
4 visive intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and
5 ethnic groups.

6 (8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the
7 Arab Council to the French National Assembly in
8 Paris testified to the harmful effects of “anti-nor-
9 malization laws”, called on the Assembly to enact a
10 law instructing the relevant French authorities to
11 issue an annual report on instances of Arab govern-
12 ment retribution for any of their citizens or resi-
13 dents who call for peace with Israel or engage in di-
14 rect civil relations with Israeli citizens, and re-
15 quested democratic legislatures to help defend the
16 region’s civil peacemakers.

17 (9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France
18 published an endorsement of the Arab Council’s pro-
19 posal, calling on France and other democratic gov-
20 ernments to “protect Arabs who engage in dialogue
21 with Israeli citizens” and proposing “the creation of
22 a study group in the National Assembly as well as
23 in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a
24 legal and technical monitoring of the obstacles which
25 Arab proponents of dialogue with Israelis face”.

1 (10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides signifi-
2 cant symbiotic benefit to the security and economic
3 prosperity of the region.

4 (c) ADDITIONAL REPORTING.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
7 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall
8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees
9 a report on the status of efforts to promote normal-
10 ization of relations with Israel and other countries .

11 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
12 paragraph (1) shall include the following informa-
13 tion:

14 (A) The status of “anti-normalization
15 laws” in countries comprising the Arab League,
16 including efforts within each country to sharpen
17 existing laws, enact new or additional “anti-nor-
18 malization legislation”, or repeal such laws.

19 (B) Instances of the use of state-owned or
20 state-operated media outlets to promote anti-
21 Semitic propaganda, the prosecution of citizens
22 or residents of Arab countries for calling for
23 peace with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or
24 engaging Israeli citizens in any way.

1 (C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution
2 by Arab governments or government-controlled
3 institutions against citizens or residents of Arab
4 countries for any of the same actions referred
5 to in subparagraph (B).

6 **SEC. 7. SUNSET.**

7 This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that
8 is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.