STATEMENT OF

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Introduction

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear here today with Acting Under Secretary of State Gottemoeller and Administrator D’Agostino to discuss implementation of the New START Treaty.

I would like to touch on three topics: the status of our implementation of the New START Treaty; its implications for our nuclear forces and policy; and work underway to ensure a future nuclear force structure in line with the President’s vision. I would also like to take this opportunity to address some misperceptions associated with the New START Treaty and related matters.

The New START Treaty

As Acting Under Secretary Gottemoeller has discussed in her statement, implementation of the New START Treaty is proceeding successfully. I am pleased to report that DoD is also fully engaged in meeting its obligations under the New START Treaty.

The continuing successful implementation of the New START Treaty is the result of the significant amount of work by many departments and agencies. It is a true interagency partnership and an example of how well our organizations can work together for a common goal -- in this case, taking concrete steps toward the President’s goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

During the first year of the Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation each completed its annual quota of 18 on-site inspections and both sides appear likely to do so again during Treaty Year Two. The Parties are exchanging updates to their databases on strategic offensive arms twice a year and delegations have met under the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission to discuss implementation issues.

The Department of Defense is responsible for implementing the majority of U.S. obligations under the Treaty. Personnel from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) staff, train, equip and lead the U.S. teams that conduct on-site inspections in Russia and escort Russian teams inspecting our facilities. To date, DoD has hosted 29 inspections and exhibitions at U.S. strategic facilities throughout the United States and has participated in 26 inspection activities at Russian strategic facilities. Such on-site inspections are the linchpin of the New START Treaty’s verification framework. DTRA inspectors and escorts are responsible for observing, documenting, and reporting the factual findings of their inspection activities to the interagency community responsible for making verification and compliance judgments.

DTRA also works closely with the DoD Office of Treaty Compliance and the military services to maintain the readiness of U.S. facilities for New START inspection activity. This involves working through the inspection procedures for each site, conducting site-assistance visits as needed, and conducting mock inspections. These events provide opportunities for DTRA to simulate actual inspections and refine training for inspection and base personnel. As a result of
the DTRA actions, DoD facilities and personnel have been fully prepared to receive the Russian inspectors during the 29 inspections and exhibitions that have taken place in the United States since New START entered into force.

Representatives from DoD serve as essential members of the U.S. delegation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) – the bilateral body chartered by the Treaty to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the New START Treaty. Since the Treaty entered into force in February 2011, the BCC has met three times to discuss and resolve a variety of early implementation issues ranging from the format of inspection activity reports to the amount of telemetric information from strategic ballistic missile launches that the Parties agree to exchange. The Bilateral Consultative Commission builds directly on the experiences and lessons learned from the now-expired START Treaty’s Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and continues the long-standing professional relationship between Treaty experts of both Parties. We anticipate the next session of the BCC will be held this fall.

Force Structure

The United States is on track to complete the reductions needed to comply with the New START central limits of 1,550 warheads on deployed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and counted for deployed heavy bombers; 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers; and 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers by the February 2018 deadline set in the Treaty.

The Department of Defense has established a baseline force structure to guide the implementation planning, one that will not require changes to current basing arrangements. The Department plans to retain 240 deployed Trident II D5 SLBMs distributed among Ohio-class submarines. This is the most survivable leg of the triad. Recognizing the flexibility of the bomber leg of the triad, we plan to retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all operational B-2s. Finally, the United States also plans to retain up to 420 deployed single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs.

To achieve this baseline force structure, the United States currently plans to make most of the reductions in deployed systems towards the end of the seven-year reduction period. To meet the Treaty’s central limits, the Administration plans to convert or eliminate a yet-to-be determined combination of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, or nuclear-capable heavy bombers.

The initial reductions of the strategic offensive arms will come from the conversion or elimination of systems that were accountable under the START Treaty, but are no longer maintained in a deployable status. These previously retired systems were often referred to as “phantoms” in that they were no longer deployed but still counted under the START Treaty.

These phantoms include 103 empty ICBM launchers and 47 heavy bombers--a total of 150 systems removed from accountability under the New START Treaty. These planned reductions include: 50 empty Peacekeeper ICBM silos at F.E. Warren U.S. Air Force Base (AFB); 50 empty Minuteman III ICBM silos at Malmstrom AFB; three excess ICBM test silos at Vandenberg
AFB; and 34 B-52Gs and 13 B52Hs currently stored at Davis-Monthan AFB. The estimated cost to eliminate or convert these systems is $47 million.

The Department is working to complete a comprehensive plan for the draw-down, which must be completed no later than February 2018. A substantial portion of this planning effort will be completed to support the FY 2014 budget request. We will continue to maintain the flexibility to make the necessary additional decisions needed to implement these reductions during the latter part of the seven-year draw down period.

We are committed to providing Congress with updates on our plans concerning these force reductions as they become available.

**Force Modernization**

As the President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2013 (FY2013) makes clear, DoD has important work underway to modernize the delivery systems covered by the New START Treaty and that underpin nuclear deterrence. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) concluded that the United States will retain a nuclear triad under the New START Treaty composed of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2013 reflects this commitment.

Sustaining the sea-based leg of our nuclear deterrent is particularly vital as we move to lower numbers under New START. The service life of our current Trident D5 missiles is being extended to 2042. Due to budget constraints, construction of the first *Ohio*-class replacement submarine is scheduled to begin in 2021. While this represents a two-year slip compared with last year’s plan, the Navy believes it can manage the resulting challenges and maintain our commitment to the United Kingdom regarding cooperation in the design of key elements of their new ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). The Navy is planning to build 12 new SSBNs with the first one scheduled to begin patrol in 2031. All DoD sustainment and modernization efforts for the submarine-based strategic nuclear deterrent are fully funded in the President’s FY2013-2017 request.

The Administration plans to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM system through 2030, as directed by Congress. Ongoing intensive flight test and surveillance efforts will, by 2017, help determine the investment necessary to achieve that date by providing better estimates for component age-out and system end-of-life. Additionally, the Air Force is nearing completion of a two-year study examining options and required capabilities for a follow-on ICBM system. The study will make recommendations on whether we should begin a new ICBM development program or initiate a follow-on Minuteman III ICBM life extension program. A small-scale program to maintain a “warm” production line for Minuteman III solid rocket motors was completed this year (FY 2012). A key modernization issue is sustainment of the large-diameter solid rocket motor industrial base. The President’s budget request includes $8 million for the Air Force in FY 2013 to study and evaluate a path forward to sustain this key industrial capability.

The United States will maintain two nuclear capable B-52H strategic bomber wings and one B-2A wing. Both bombers, however, are aging and sustainment and modernization funding will
have to be provided to ensure they remain operationally effective through the remainder of their service lives. Funding has been allocated to upgrade these platforms; for example, to provide the B-2A with survivable communications, a more modern flight control system, and a new radar. The B-52 will also need various upgrades including for its bomb bay and survivable communications. These modernization and sustainment programs are needed to maintain the effectiveness of the current bomber force until the introduction of a new long-range bomber.

This year, the Department started a program for a new, long-range, nuclear-capable, penetrating bomber that is fully integrated with a family of supporting aircraft and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets. Because the growth of modern air defenses is putting even the bomber stand-off missions increasingly at risk, DoD is carrying out an analysis of alternatives (AOA), for a follow-on Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The final report for the AOA for the new system, the Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) missile, is due in late 2012. The existing ALCM weapon system will be sustained until the LRSO can be fielded during the 2020s.

DoD is also continuing to conduct research and testing to support the development of concepts and technologies associated with boost-glide systems that could provide the basis for a conventional prompt global strike capability. These boost-glide systems are not associated with ICBMs or SLBMs and would not be subject to the provisions of the New START Treaty.

Dispelling Critiques and Misperceptions

A number of misperceptions have emerged since President Obama and then-Russian President Medvedev signed the New START Treaty in April 2010.

The first misperception is that the New START Treaty imposes unilateral constraints on the United States. This is not the case. The New START Treaty includes a package of negotiated limits that will apply equally to U.S. and Russian strategic forces. Like the United States, Russia will have to limit the number of strategic warheads it deploys to comply with the 1,550 limit of the Treaty. This limit will constrain Russia as it modernizes its strategic nuclear delivery systems with the deployments of several substantially MIRVed new strategic missiles, including the MIRVed Yars ICBM, new Borey-class missile submarines carrying 16 MIRVed Bulava SLBMs, and, in the event it is deployed during the life of the Treaty, a planned new “heavy” ICBM to replace the SS-18 that will almost certainly carry several MIRVs. Under the New START Treaty, the Russian modernization will be limited to 800 total and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems and 1,550 warheads, the same limits applicable to U.S. systems. And this modernization, given the New START Treaty, does not endanger the ability of U.S. forces to fulfill U.S. deterrence requirements.

The second misperception is that the New START Treaty included a “secret deal” that places meaningful limits on U.S. missile defenses and conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capabilities. This too is incorrect. The President made clear in his communication to the Congress in December 2010 that the Administration will move forward with implementation of all four phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense, and will not accept limits on U.S. missile defenses. We have now deployed an AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey; secured agreements with Romania and Poland so as to base land-based SM-3 interceptors in each
country in the 2015 and 2018 timeframes; and secured an agreement with Spain to host four Aegis BMD-equipped destroyers. Last month at the NATO Summit in Chicago, the President announced that as NATO reached an interim ballistic missile defense capability, the United States is now providing support to NATO missile defense by placing the AN/TPY-2 radar under NATO command and control.

We have proceeded down this path despite Russian objections and protests because we agree with our allies that missile defenses are necessary to ensure Alliance security in the 21st century. We have also made clear publicly and privately to Russian officials that our missile defenses are being deployed to defend against North Korean and Iranian threats, not to undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But to reiterate, we have not limited and will not limit our planned missile defense deployments; indeed, we have made substantial progress since signing the New START Treaty.

As mentioned above, the fiscal year 2013 budget request included funding for the continued development and testing of potential CPGS capabilities. This technology program remains focused on developing and demonstrating boost-glide technologies. When fielded, a CPGS capability could provide the President with a wider range of options to engage targets at strategic ranges in less than an hour, a capability that has previously only been available with nuclear-armed strategic missiles.

While DoD has no plans to replace nuclear warheads with conventional warheads on Minuteman ICBMs or Trident SLBMs, the New START Treaty would not prohibit such a decision. Such systems would, however, remain accountable under the Treaty.

In short, there was no “secret deal” constraining U.S. missile defenses or CPGS capabilities.

A third critique about the New START Treaty is that it fails to capture nonstrategic or “tactical” nuclear weapons within the Treaty’s limits. The United States wants to reduce further the total number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons including nonstrategic weapons. The Administration made the decision early on not to seek to include nonstrategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons in New START, but to focus on putting in place a successor treaty to the START Treaty set to expire in December 2009, and thus ensure the continuation of verifiable limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. New START strengthens American security by putting new lower limits and a sound verification regime in place. That said, the Administration has made clear its readiness to negotiate on strategic, nonstrategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons with Russia in the next round of arms control talks. This commitment dates back to the President’s statement at the signing of the New START Treaty in April 2010 and his communications with the Congress during the debate on advice and consent to ratification of the New START Treaty in 2010. More recently the NATO Alliance has signaled its support for this effort in the recently completed Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.

The final misperception associated with New START is that the Administration acted in “bad faith” by committing to a modernization program in the Section 1251 Report prior to ratification in 2010 and then abandoning the program once the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty. This is also not the case. The Administration remains committed to a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and the nuclear enterprise that supports it and has requested the necessary funding to make that possible. No one in the Obama Administration has walked away from our commitment to modernization, even as the Budget Control Act drives difficult decisions. The threat of sequestration, however, does raise significant concerns. While the Department has done much to mitigate the effects of the Budget Control Act to ensure a viable plan to sustain and modernize the nuclear forces, sequestration would be devastating.

**Conclusion**

One of President Obama’s first acts as President was to direct a comprehensive approach to address nuclear dangers. The Nuclear Posture Review and the New START Treaty reinforce strategic stability with Russia at lower force levels while ensuring that we have the capabilities necessary for effective deterrence and assurance. DoD continues to strongly support the New START Treaty. Maintaining strategic stability, assuring allies, and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective deterrent require a partnership between the Executive Branch and the Congress. President Obama has demonstrated his commitment to these priorities; we hope Congress will demonstrate the same commitment.