

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—115th Cong., 2d Sess.

H. R. 3776

To support United States international cyber diplomacy, and
for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mr. CORKER

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. United States International Cyberspace Policy.
- Sec. 5. Department of State responsibilities.
- Sec. 6. International cyberspace executive arrangements.
- Sec. 7. International strategy for cyberspace.
- Sec. 8. Annual country reports on human rights practices.
- Sec. 9. GAO report on cyber threats and data misuse.
- Sec. 10. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity sanctions against North Korea and
cybersecurity legislation in Vietnam.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The stated goal of the United States Inter-
4 national Strategy for Cyberspace, launched on May
5 16, 2011, is to “work internationally to promote an
6 open, interoperable, secure, and reliable information
7 and communications infrastructure that supports
8 international trade and commerce, strengthens inter-
9 national security, and fosters free expression and in-
10 novation . . . in which norms of responsible behav-
11 ior guide states’ actions, sustain partnerships, and
12 support the rule of law in cyberspace”.

13 (2) In its June 24, 2013 report, the Group of
14 Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field
15 of Information and Telecommunications in the Con-
16 text of International Security (referred to in this
17 section as “GGE”), established by the United Na-
18 tions General Assembly, concluded that “State sov-
19 ereignty and the international norms and principles
20 that flow from it apply to States’ conduct of [infor-
21 mation and communications technology] ICT-related
22 activities and to their jurisdiction over ICT infra-
23 structure with their territory”.

24 (3) In January 2015, China, Kazakhstan,
25 Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan pro-
26 posed a troubling international code of conduct for

1 information security, which could be used as a pre-
2 text for restricting political dissent, and includes
3 “curbing the dissemination of information that in-
4 cites terrorism, separatism or extremism or that in-
5 flames hatred on ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.

6 (4) In its July 22, 2015 consensus report, GGE
7 found that “norms of responsible State behavior can
8 reduce risks to international peace, security and sta-
9 bility”.

10 (5) On September 25, 2015, the United States
11 and China announced a commitment that neither
12 country’s government “will conduct or knowingly
13 support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property,
14 including trade secrets or other confidential business
15 information, with the intent of providing competitive
16 advantages to companies or commercial sectors”.

17 (6) At the Antalya Summit on November 15
18 and 16, 2015, the Group of 20 Leaders’
19 communiqué—

20 (A) affirmed the applicability of inter-
21 national law to state behavior in cyberspace;

22 (B) called on states to refrain from cyber-
23 enabled theft of intellectual property for com-
24 mercial gain; and

1 (C) endorsed the view that all states
2 should abide by norms of responsible behavior.

3 (7) The March 2016 Department of State
4 International Cyberspace Policy Strategy noted that
5 “the Department of State anticipates a continued in-
6 crease and expansion of our cyber-focused diplomatic
7 efforts for the foreseeable future”.

8 (8) On December 1, 2016, the Commission on
9 Enhancing National Cybersecurity, which was estab-
10 lished within the Department of Commerce by Exec-
11 utive Order 13718 (81 Fed. Reg. 7441), rec-
12 ommended that “the President should appoint an
13 Ambassador for Cybersecurity to lead U.S. engage-
14 ment with the international community on cyberse-
15 curity strategies, standards, and practices”.

16 (9) On April 11, 2017, the 2017 Group of 7
17 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in
18 Cyberspace—

19 (A) recognized “the urgent necessity of in-
20 creased international cooperation to promote se-
21 curity and stability in cyberspace”;

22 (B) expressed commitment to “promoting
23 a strategic framework for conflict prevention,
24 cooperation and stability in cyberspace, con-
25 sisting of the recognition of the applicability of

1 existing international law to State behavior in
2 cyberspace, the promotion of voluntary, non-
3 binding norms of responsible State behavior
4 during peacetime, and the development and the
5 implementation of practical cyber confidence
6 building measures (CBMs) between States”;
7 and

8 (C) reaffirmed that “the same rights that
9 people have offline must also be protected on-
10 line”.

11 (10) In testimony before the Select Committee
12 on Intelligence of the Senate on May 11, 2017, Di-
13 rector of National Intelligence Daniel R. Coats iden-
14 tified 6 cyber threat actors, including—

15 (A) Russia for “efforts to influence the
16 2016 US election”;

17 (B) China, for “actively targeting the US
18 Government, its allies, and US companies for
19 cyber espionage”;

20 (C) Iran for “leverag[ing] cyber espionage,
21 propaganda, and attacks to support its security
22 priorities, influence events and foreign percep-
23 tions, and counter threats”;

24 (D) North Korea for “previously
25 conduct[ing] cyber-attacks against US commer-

1 cial entities—specifically, Sony Pictures Enter-
2 tainment in 2014”;

3 (E) terrorists, who “use the Internet to or-
4 ganize, recruit, spread propaganda, raise funds,
5 collect intelligence, inspire action by followers,
6 and coordinate operations”; and

7 (F) criminals who “are also developing and
8 using sophisticated cyber tools for a variety of
9 purposes including theft, extortion, and facilita-
10 tion of other criminal activities”.

11 (11) On May 11, 2017, President Donald J.
12 Trump issued Executive Order 13800 (82 Fed. Reg.
13 22391), entitled “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of
14 Federal Networks and Infrastructure”, which—

15 (A) designates the Secretary of State to
16 lead an interagency effort to develop an engage-
17 ment strategy for international cooperation in
18 cybersecurity; and

19 (B) notes that “the United States is espe-
20 cially dependent on a globally secure and resil-
21 ient internet and must work with allies and
22 other partners toward maintaining ... the policy
23 of the executive branch to promote an open,
24 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet that
25 fosters efficiency, innovation, communication,

1 (1) promotes human rights, democracy, and
2 rule of law, including freedom of expression, innova-
3 tion, communication, and economic prosperity; and

4 (2) respects privacy and guards against decep-
5 tion, fraud, and theft.

6 (b) IMPLEMENTATION.—In implementing the policy
7 described in subsection (a), the President, in consultation
8 with outside actors, including private sector companies,
9 nongovernmental organizations, security researchers, and
10 other relevant stakeholders, in the conduct of bilateral and
11 multilateral relations, shall pursue the following objectives:

12 (1) Clarifying the applicability of international
13 laws and norms to the use of ICT.

14 (2) Reducing and limiting the risk of escalation
15 and retaliation in cyberspace, damage to critical in-
16 frastructure, and other malicious cyber activity that
17 impairs the use and operation of critical infrastruc-
18 ture that provides services to the public.

19 (3) Cooperating with like-minded democratic
20 countries that share common values and cyberspace
21 policies with the United States, including respect for
22 human rights, democracy, and rule of law, to ad-
23 vance such values and policies internationally.

24 (4) Encouraging the responsible development of
25 new, innovative technologies and ICT products that

1 strengthen a secure Internet architecture that is ac-
2 cessible to all.

3 (5) Securing and implementing commitments
4 on responsible country behavior in cyberspace based
5 upon accepted norms, including the following:

6 (A) Countries should not conduct, or
7 knowingly support, cyber-enabled theft of intel-
8 lectual property, including trade secrets or
9 other confidential business information, with
10 the intent of providing competitive advantages
11 to companies or commercial sectors.

12 (B) Countries should take all appropriate
13 and reasonable efforts to keep their territories
14 clear of intentionally wrongful acts using ICTs
15 in violation of international commitments.

16 (C) Countries should not conduct or know-
17 ingly support ICT activity that, contrary to
18 international law, intentionally damages or oth-
19 erwise impairs the use and operation of critical
20 infrastructure providing services to the public,
21 and should take appropriate measures to pro-
22 tect their critical infrastructure from ICT
23 threats.

24 (D) Countries should not conduct or know-
25 ingly support malicious international activity

1 that, contrary to international law, harms the
2 information systems of authorized emergency
3 response teams (also known as “computer
4 emergency response teams” or “cybersecurity
5 incident response teams”) of another country or
6 authorize emergency response teams to engage
7 in malicious international activity.

8 (E) Countries should respond to appro-
9 priate requests for assistance to mitigate mali-
10 cious ICT activity emanating from their terri-
11 tory and aimed at the critical infrastructure of
12 another country.

13 (F) Countries should not restrict cross-bor-
14 der data flows or require local storage or proc-
15 essing of data.

16 (G) Countries should protect the exercise
17 of human rights and fundamental freedoms on
18 the Internet and commit to the principle that
19 the human rights that people have offline
20 should also be protected online.

21 (6) Advancing, encouraging, and supporting the
22 development and adoption of internationally recog-
23 nized technical standards and best practices.

1 **SEC. 5. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBILITIES.**

2 (a) OFFICE OF CYBERSPACE AND THE DIGITAL
3 ECONOMY.—Section 1 of the State Department Basic Au-
4 thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a) is amended—

5 (1) by redesignating subsection (g) as sub-
6 section (h); and

7 (2) by inserting after subsection (f) the fol-
8 lowing:

9 “(g) OFFICE OF CYBERSPACE AND THE DIGITAL
10 ECONOMY.—

11 “(1) IN GENERAL.—There is established, within
12 the Department of State, an Office of Cyberspace
13 and the Digital Economy (referred to in this sub-
14 section as the ‘Office’). The head of the Office shall
15 have the rank and status of ambassador and shall
16 be appointed by the President, by and with the ad-
17 vice and consent of the Senate.

18 “(2) DUTIES.—

19 “(A) IN GENERAL.—The head of the Of-
20 fice shall perform such duties and exercise such
21 powers as the Secretary of State shall prescribe,
22 including implementing the policy of the United
23 States described in section 4 of the Cyber Di-
24 plomacy Act of 2018.

1 “(B) DUTIES DESCRIBED.—The principal
2 duties and responsibilities of the head of the
3 Office shall be—

4 “(i) to serve as the principal cyber
5 policy official within the senior manage-
6 ment of the Department of State and as
7 the advisor to the Secretary of State for
8 cyber issues;

9 “(ii) to lead the Department of
10 State’s diplomatic cyberspace efforts, in-
11 cluding efforts relating to international cy-
12 bersecurity, Internet access, Internet free-
13 dom, digital economy, cybercrime, deter-
14 rence and international responses to cyber
15 threats, and other issues that the Sec-
16 retary assigns to the Office;

17 “(iii) to promote an open, interoper-
18 able, reliable, unfettered, and secure infor-
19 mation and communications technology in-
20 frastructure globally;

21 “(iv) to represent the Secretary of
22 State in interagency efforts to develop and
23 advance the policy described in section 4 of
24 the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018;

1 “(v) to coordinate cyberspace efforts
2 and other relevant functions, including
3 countering terrorists’ use of cyberspace,
4 within the Department of State and with
5 other components of the United States
6 Government;

7 “(vi) to act as a liaison to public and
8 private sector entities on relevant cyber-
9 space issues;

10 “(vii) to lead United States Govern-
11 ment efforts to establish a global deter-
12 rence framework;

13 “(viii) to develop and execute adver-
14 sary-specific strategies to influence adver-
15 sary decisionmaking through the imposi-
16 tion of costs and deterrence strategies;

17 “(ix) to advise the Secretary and co-
18 ordinate with foreign governments on ex-
19 ternal responses to national-security-level
20 cyber incidents, including coordination on
21 diplomatic response efforts to support al-
22 lies threatened by malicious cyber activity,
23 in conjunction with members of the North
24 Atlantic Treaty Organization and other
25 like-minded countries;

1 “(x) to promote the adoption of na-
2 tional processes and programs that enable
3 threat detection, prevention, and response
4 to malicious cyber activity emanating from
5 the territory of a foreign country, including
6 as such activity relates to the United
7 States’ European allies, as appropriate;

8 “(xi) to promote the building of for-
9 eign capacity to protect the global network
10 with the goal of enabling like-minded par-
11 ticipation in deterrence frameworks;

12 “(xii) to promote the maintenance of
13 an open and interoperable Internet gov-
14 erned by the multi-stakeholder model, in-
15 stead of by centralized government control;

16 “(xiii) to promote an international
17 regulatory environment for technology in-
18 vestments and the Internet that benefits
19 United States economic and national secu-
20 rity interests;

21 “(xiv) to promote cross-border flow of
22 data and combat international initiatives
23 seeking to impose unreasonable require-
24 ments on United States businesses;

1 “(xv) to promote international policies
2 to protect the integrity of United States
3 and international telecommunications in-
4 frastructure from foreign-based, cyber-en-
5 abled threats;

6 “(xvi) to serve as the interagency co-
7 ordinator for the United States Govern-
8 ment on engagement with foreign govern-
9 ments on cyberspace and digital economy
10 issues as described in the Cyber Diplomacy
11 Act of 2018;

12 “(xvii) to promote international poli-
13 cies to secure radio frequency spectrum for
14 United States businesses and national se-
15 curity needs;

16 “(xviii) to promote and protect the ex-
17 ercise of human rights, including freedom
18 of speech and religion, through the Inter-
19 net;

20 “(xix) to build capacity of United
21 States diplomatic officials to engage on
22 cyber issues;

23 “(xx) to encourage the development
24 and adoption by foreign countries of inter-

1 nationally recognized standards, policies,
2 and best practices; and

3 “(xxi) to promote and advance inter-
4 national policies that protect individuals’
5 private data.

6 “(3) QUALIFICATIONS.—The head of the Office
7 should be an individual of demonstrated competency
8 in the fields of—

9 “(A) cybersecurity and other relevant cyber
10 issues; and

11 “(B) international diplomacy.

12 “(4) ORGANIZATIONAL PLACEMENT.—During
13 the 4-year period beginning on the date of the enact-
14 ment of the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018, the head
15 of the Office shall report to the Under Secretary for
16 Political Affairs or to an official holding a higher po-
17 sition than the Under Secretary for Political Affairs
18 in the Department of State. After the conclusion of
19 such period, the head of the Office shall report to
20 an appropriate Under Secretary or to an official
21 holding a higher position than Under Secretary.

22 “(5) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in
23 this subsection may be construed to preclude—

24 “(A) the Office from being elevated to a
25 Bureau within the Department of State; or

1 “(B) the head of the Office from being ele-
2 vated to an Assistant Secretary, if such an As-
3 sistant Secretary position does not increase the
4 number of Assistant Secretary positions at the
5 Department above the number authorized under
6 subsection (c)(1).”.

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
8 gress that the Office of Cyberspace and the Digital Econ-
9 omy established under section 1(g) of the State Depart-
10 ment Basic Authorities Act of 1956, as added by sub-
11 section (a), should be a Bureau of the Department of
12 State headed by an Assistant Secretary, subject to the rule
13 of construction specified in paragraph (5)(B) of such sec-
14 tion 1(g).

15 (c) UNITED NATIONS.—The Permanent Representa-
16 tive of the United States to the United Nations should
17 use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to
18 oppose any measure that is inconsistent with the policy
19 described in section 4.

20 **SEC. 6. INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE EXECUTIVE AR-**
21 **RANGEMENTS.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President is encouraged to
23 enter into executive arrangements with foreign govern-
24 ments that support the policy described in section 4.

1 (b) TRANSMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Section 112b of
2 title 1, United States Code, is amended—

3 (1) in subsection (a) by striking “International
4 Relations” and inserting “Foreign Affairs”;

5 (2) in subsection (e)(2)(B), by adding at the
6 end the following:

7 “(iii) A bilateral or multilateral cyberspace
8 agreement.”;

9 (3) by redesignating subsection (f) as sub-
10 section (g); and

11 (4) by inserting after subsection (e) the fol-
12 lowing:

13 “(f) With respect to any bilateral or multilateral
14 cyberspace agreement under subsection (e)(2)(B)(iii) and
15 the information required to be transmitted to Congress
16 under subsection (a), or with respect to any arrangement
17 that seeks to secure commitments on responsible country
18 behavior in cyberspace consistent with section 4(b)(5) of
19 the Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018, the Secretary of State
20 shall provide an explanation of such arrangement, includ-
21 ing—

22 “(1) the purpose of such arrangement;

23 “(2) how such arrangement is consistent with
24 the policy described in section 4 of such Act; and

1 “(3) how such arrangement will be imple-
2 mented.”.

3 (c) STATUS REPORT.—During the 5-year period im-
4 mediately following the transmittal to Congress of an
5 agreement described in section 112b(e)(2)(B)(iii) of title
6 1, United States Code, as added by subsection (b)(2), or
7 until such agreement has been discontinued, if discon-
8 tinued within 5 years, the President shall—

9 (1) notify the appropriate congressional com-
10 mittees if another country fails to meet the commit-
11 ments contained in such agreement; and

12 (2) describe the steps that the United States
13 has taken or plans to take to ensure that all such
14 commitments are fulfilled.

15 (d) EXISTING EXECUTIVE ARRANGEMENTS.—Not
16 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
17 this Act, the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate
18 congressional committees regarding any executive bilateral
19 or multilateral cyberspace arrangement in effect before the
20 date of enactment of this Act, including—

21 (1) the arrangement announced between the
22 United States and Japan on April 25, 2014;

23 (2) the arrangement announced between the
24 United States and the United Kingdom on January
25 16, 2015;

1 (3) the arrangement announced between the
2 United States and China on September 25, 2015;

3 (4) the arrangement announced between the
4 United States and Korea on October 16, 2015;

5 (5) the arrangement announced between the
6 United States and Australia on January 19, 2016;

7 (6) the arrangement announced between the
8 United States and India on June 7, 2016;

9 (7) the arrangement announced between the
10 United States and Argentina on April 27, 2017;

11 (8) the arrangement announced between the
12 United States and Kenya on June 22, 2017;

13 (9) the arrangement announced between the
14 United States and Israel on June 26, 2017;

15 (10) the arrangement announced between the
16 United States and France on February 9, 2018;

17 (11) the arrangement announced between the
18 United States and Brazil on May 14, 2018; and

19 (12) any other similar bilateral or multilateral
20 arrangement announced before such date of enact-
21 ment.

22 **SEC. 7. INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE.**

23 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—Not later than 1 year
24 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President,
25 acting through the Secretary of State, and in coordination

1 with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and
2 agencies, shall develop a strategy relating to United States
3 engagement with foreign governments on international
4 norms with respect to responsible state behavior in cyber-
5 space.

6 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
7 section (a) shall include the following:

8 (1) A review of actions and activities under-
9 taken to support the policy described in section 4.

10 (2) A plan of action to guide the diplomacy of
11 the Department of State with regard to foreign
12 countries, including—

13 (A) conducting bilateral and multilateral
14 activities to develop norms of responsible coun-
15 try behavior in cyberspace consistent with the
16 objectives under section 4(b)(5); and

17 (B) reviewing the status of existing efforts
18 in relevant multilateral fora, as appropriate, to
19 obtain commitments on international norms in
20 cyberspace.

21 (3) A review of alternative concepts with regard
22 to international norms in cyberspace offered by for-
23 eign countries.

24 (4) A detailed description of—

1 (A) new and evolving cyberspace threats to
2 United States national security from foreign ad-
3 versaries, state-sponsored actors, and private
4 actors;

5 (B) Federal and private sector cyberspace
6 infrastructure of the United States;

7 (C) intellectual property in the United
8 States; and

9 (D) the privacy of citizens of the United
10 States.

11 (5) A review of policy tools available to the
12 President to deter and de-escalate tensions with for-
13 eign countries, state-sponsored actors, and private
14 actors regarding threats in cyberspace, the degree to
15 which such tools have been used, and whether such
16 tools have been effective deterrents.

17 (6) A review of resources required to conduct
18 activities to build responsible norms of international
19 cyber behavior.

20 (7) A plan of action, developed in consultation
21 with relevant Federal departments and agencies as
22 the President may direct, to guide the diplomacy of
23 the Department of State with regard to inclusion of
24 cyber issues in mutual defense agreements.

25 (c) FORM OF STRATEGY.—

1 (1) PUBLIC AVAILABILITY.—The strategy re-
2 quired under subsection (a) shall be available to the
3 public in unclassified form, including through publi-
4 cation in the Federal Register.

5 (2) CLASSIFIED ANNEX.—The strategy required
6 under subsection (a) may include a classified annex,
7 consistent with United States national security inter-
8 ests, if the Secretary of State determines that such
9 annex is appropriate.

10 (d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the
11 completion of the strategy required under subsection (a),
12 the Secretary of State shall brief the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees on the strategy, including any material
14 contained in a classified annex.

15 (e) UPDATES.—The strategy required under sub-
16 section (a) shall be updated—

17 (1) not later than 90 days after any material
18 change to United States policy described in such
19 strategy; and

20 (2) not later than 1 year after the inauguration
21 of each new President.

22 (f) PREEXISTING REQUIREMENT.—The Rec-
23 ommendations to the President on Protecting American
24 Cyber Interests through International Engagement, pre-
25 pared by the Office of the Coordinator for Cyber Issues

1 on May 31, 2018, pursuant to section 3(c) of Executive
2 Order 13800 (82 Fed. Reg. 22391), shall be deemed to
3 satisfy the requirement under subsection (a).

4 **SEC. 8. ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS**
5 **PRACTICES.**

6 Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
7 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the
8 following:

9 “(h)(1) The report required under subsection (d)
10 shall include an assessment of freedom of expression with
11 respect to electronic information in each foreign country
12 that includes the following:

13 “(A) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
14 ernment authorities in the country inappropriately
15 attempt to filter, censor, or otherwise block or re-
16 move nonviolent expression of political or religious
17 opinion or belief through the Internet, including
18 electronic mail, and a description of the means by
19 which such authorities attempt to inappropriately
20 block or remove such expression.

21 “(B) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
22 ernment authorities in the country have persecuted
23 or otherwise punished, arbitrarily and without due
24 process, an individual or group for the nonviolent ex-
25 pression of political, religious, or ideological opinion

1 or belief through the Internet, including electronic
2 mail.

3 “(C) An assessment of the extent to which gov-
4 ernment authorities in the country have sought, in-
5 appropriately and with malicious intent, to collect,
6 request, obtain, or disclose without due process per-
7 sonally identifiable information of a person in con-
8 nection with that person’s nonviolent expression of
9 political, religious, or ideological opinion or belief, in-
10 cluding expression that would be protected by the
11 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
12 adopted at New York December 16, 1966, and en-
13 tered into force March 23, 1976, as interpreted by
14 the United States.

15 “(D) An assessment of the extent to which wire
16 communications and electronic communications are
17 monitored without due process and in contravention
18 to United States policy with respect to the principles
19 of privacy, human rights, democracy, and rule of
20 law.

21 “(2) In compiling data and making assessments
22 under paragraph (1), United States diplomatic personnel
23 should consult with relevant entities, including human
24 rights organizations, the private sector, the governments
25 of like-minded countries, technology and Internet compa-

1 nies, and other appropriate nongovernmental organiza-
2 tions or entities.

3 “(3) In this subsection—

4 “(A) the term ‘electronic communication’ has
5 the meaning given the term in section 2510 of title
6 18, United States Code;

7 “(B) the term ‘Internet’ has the meaning given
8 the term in section 231(e)(3) of the Communications
9 Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 231(e)(3));

10 “(C) the term ‘personally identifiable informa-
11 tion’ means data in a form that identifies a par-
12 ticular person; and

13 “(D) the term ‘wire communication’ has the
14 meaning given the term in section 2510 of title 18,
15 United States Code.”.

16 **SEC. 9. GAO REPORT ON CYBER THREATS AND DATA MIS-**
17 **USE.**

18 Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment
19 of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United States
20 shall submit a report and provide a briefing to the appro-
21 priate congressional committees that includes—

22 (1) a description of the primary threats to the
23 personal information of United States citizens from
24 international actors within the cyberspace domain;

1 (2) an assessment of the extent to which United
2 States diplomatic processes and other efforts with
3 foreign countries, including through multilateral
4 fora, bilateral engagements, and negotiated cyber-
5 space agreements, strengthen the protections of
6 United States citizens' personal information;

7 (3) an assessment of the Department of State's
8 report in response to Executive Order 13800 (82
9 Fed. Reg. 22391), which documents an engagement
10 strategy for international cooperation in cybersecu-
11 rity and the extent to which this strategy addresses
12 protections of United States citizens' personal infor-
13 mation;

14 (4) recommendations for United States policy-
15 makers on methods to properly address and
16 strengthen the protections of United States citizens'
17 personal information from misuse by international
18 actors; and

19 (5) any other matters deemed relevant by the
20 Comptroller General.

21 **SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY SANC-**
22 **TIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND CYBER-**
23 **SECURITY LEGISLATION IN VIETNAM.**

24 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the President should designate all entities
2 that knowingly engage in significant activities under-
3 mining cybersecurity through the use of computer
4 networks or systems against foreign persons, govern-
5 ments, or other entities on behalf of the Government
6 of North Korea, consistent with section 209(b) of
7 the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement
8 Act of 2016 (22 U.S.C. 9229(b));

9 (2) the cybersecurity legislation approved by the
10 National Assembly of Vietnam on June 12, 2018—

11 (A) may not be consistent with inter-
12 national trade standards; and

13 (B) may endanger the privacy of citizens
14 of Vietnam; and

15 (3) the Government of Vietnam should—

16 (A) delay the implementation of the legis-
17 lation referred to in paragraph (2); and

18 (B) work with the United States and other
19 countries to ensure that such law meets all rel-
20 evant international standards.