

**Statement of
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**Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

“Reviewing the Administration’s Nuclear Agenda”

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Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee: thank you for inviting me to testify today about the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit and the Administration’s efforts to advance nonproliferation.

In a landmark speech in Prague in April 2009, President Obama sounded a warning call on nuclear terrorism as one of the greatest threats to our collective security, citing the potentially catastrophic consequences of nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands. The President called on world leaders to convene a Summit to adopt concrete measures to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and reduce the amount of nuclear material at risk of exploitation by bad actors.

Seven years later, President Obama is preparing to host the fourth Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), bringing together leaders from more than 50 countries and four international and regional organizations to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by reducing the amount of nuclear material at risk of falling into the wrong hands.

These Summits have contributed measurably to our national security, spurring concrete actions to decrease highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium stocks around the world, improve security measures for protecting nuclear facilities and transporting nuclear materials, and strengthen capacity to counter nuclear smuggling.

The Summit Process has raised the profile of the vital importance of ensuring the security of nuclear material. States have responded by accelerating their nuclear security activities, publicly highlighting their efforts, and taking additional measures.

An important focus of this process has been minimizing the civilian use of HEU, which can be used to make nuclear weapons, and getting existing stocks of vulnerable nuclear material properly and effectively secured. As a direct result of the Summit process, more than a dozen countries are now free of HEU. Together, countries have completely disposed of or removed more than 3.3 metric tons of HEU and plutonium. Nearly two dozen research reactors have been converted to using low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel or verified as shut down. To put this amount into perspective, 3.3 metric tons of HEU could be used to make more than 130 bombs.

The international community has also focused on simple, but critical steps, like bolstering security at facilities with nuclear and radioactive material to guard against the most serious threats. With an emphasis on transparency and cooperation, we have expanded our ability to prevent, detect and respond to trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. These efforts have included the installation of radiation detection equipment at over 300 international border crossings, airports, and seaports.

In January of this year, we signed a Joint Action Plan with Jordan to combat nuclear terrorism and improve efforts against nuclear and radiological smuggling—the most recent of 14 Joint Action Plans we have in place with key partner countries including Iraq, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine. Joint Action Plans have encouraged our partners to take concrete steps, including increasing radiological source security, strengthening border detection, and passing essential legislation that criminalizes nuclear and radiological smuggling. They have been instrumental in securing commitments to strengthen law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, establishing nuclear smuggling incident protocols, and improving nuclear forensics capabilities.

In 2014, Japan agreed to send to the United States more than 500 kgs of HEU and separated plutonium used for research purposes that was stored at Japan's Fast Critical Assembly in Tokai. The disposition of such material is a major victory for nuclear security and reduces the amount of weapons-grade nuclear material that might be targeted by non-state actors.

Chile has been active over the years in supporting the Nuclear Information Security, Training and Support Centers, and NSS Outreach Gift Baskets. Just prior to the 2010 NSS, Chile eliminated all of its HEU by sending it to the United States for disposition.

We continue to work closely with Ukraine to help that country bolster the security of its nuclear and radiological materials. Ukraine has fulfilled its pledge to remove all HEU from its territory, a pledge initially made at the first NSS, demonstrating Ukraine's commitment to upholding the highest nuclear security and nonproliferation standards. Our continued cooperation with Ukraine is particularly important as Russia's actions in Ukraine have undermined the foundation of global security architecture and created new challenges for the security of nuclear and radioactive materials on Ukrainian territory.

And tomorrow, Energy Secretary Moniz will lead a U.S. delegation to the opening of China's Nuclear Security Center of Excellence (COE), which is being established based on an agreement between our Department of Energy and the China Atomic Energy Authority. This center will serve as an important domestic nuclear security training resource for China's growing nuclear complex. Beyond China, in concert with other COEs in the region, it will provide a forum to train relevant personnel across Asia in nuclear security best practices. China is also working with Ghana and Nigeria to convert Chinese-origin miniature neutron source reactors from HEU to LEU. To promote ongoing cooperation on nuclear security, the United States and China have initiated an annual bilateral Nuclear Security Dialogue, the first of which we just conducted in February.

At the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, Pakistan detailed its nuclear security related training centers, including at its core, the Pakistan Center of Excellence for Nuclear Security, which conducts courses across the spectrum of nuclear security disciplines, including physical protection and personnel reliability. This week, Pakistan is hosting a meeting of the IAEA-coordinated International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centers at its Center of Excellence, where countries will share best practices related to nuclear security. Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, the Department of State Coordinator for Threat Reduction Programs and the State Department lead on the Nuclear Security Summits, is attending this event. Twenty-six countries have pledged to create nuclear security Centers of Excellence, the vast majority of which have been established in conjunction with previous Nuclear Security Summits.

We regret that Russia has chosen not attend the Summit this month, and we remain disappointed that Russia has chosen to reduce our bilateral cooperation on nuclear security in recent years. As the countries with the largest stockpiles of weapon-usable nuclear materials, the United States and Russia have a special obligation to ensure we meet the highest standards of nuclear security. I note that we do

continue to cooperate productively with Russia in co-chairing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Thanks to the Summit process, we have seen increased membership of Summit participants in related international initiatives, such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the GICNT; additional contributions to the IAEA nuclear security fund; enhanced compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and the establishment of Centers of Excellence in nuclear security in 24 countries, and of counter nuclear smuggling teams around the world.

We are also closer than ever to entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM/A). We are very grateful for your support in passing the necessary implementing legislation that enabled the United States to join this Amendment as well as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) in 2015. This was very important because our ability to lead on nonproliferation is tied to the example we set.

With the President's direct engagement on nuclear security with leaders from countries on every continent, we have significantly strengthened bilateral, regional, and international cooperation on nuclear security.

This Summit will be a "transition Summit," that will lay the foundation for ensuring the important achievements of the past seven years are sustained. To do this, we will look to international organizations and multilateral partnerships to adopt individual institutional Action Plans on April 1 and ensure they are implemented. We will continue to rely on our Summit partners, as well as engaging countries and organizations that have not been a part of the Summit process, to work with us to carry this important work forward.

I also would like to take this opportunity to thank this Committee and Congress for its strong bipartisan support for the State Department's nonproliferation programs, which reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction around the world. These programs – Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), Export Control and Related Border Security Activities (EXBS), the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), and Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism (WMDT) carry out a range of vital work across the CBRN spectrum including work that directly advances the goals of the Nuclear Security Summit. They are among the most cost effective and

valuable investments the nation can make to protect our citizens, our forces deployed abroad, and the international community.

I look forward to your questions.