

**Statement of  
The Honorable Thomas M. Countryman  
Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation  
U. S. Department of State**

**Before the  
Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

*“Iran’s Missile Program and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)”*

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to talk to you today about our efforts to address Iran’s ballistic missile program. Iran’s efforts to develop increasingly capable ballistic missile systems remain one of our most significant nonproliferation challenges and a very real threat to regional and international security. As we have for many years, we continue to rely on a wide range of multilateral and unilateral tools to work to address Iran’s ballistic missile development efforts and our use of these tools remains unaffected by the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Currently, multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) that target Iran’s missile development, procurement, and proliferation activities remain in effect. In particular, resolution 1929 prohibits Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology. These resolutions require

all states to prevent transfers from their territory or by their nationals of missile-related items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology to and from Iran.

However, even with these strong provisions in place, Iran has continued to engage in activities that clearly violate these restrictions. This has been the case since the adoption of UNSCR 1737 in 2006, and we have continued to draw attention to Iranian violations of these provisions. For example, in October 2015, the United States, in conjunction with the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, reported an Iranian test of a medium range ballistic missile to the United Nations Security Council's Iran sanctions committee as an UNSCR violation. Other Security Council members joined the United States in condemning the launch as a violation, which the UN's own Iran Panel of Experts also agreed was contrary to UNSCR 1929. We will continue to call on the UN Security Council to address this serious matter, shine a spotlight on such destabilizing activities by Iran, and increase the cost to Iran of its behavior.

At the same time, we note that missile tests, such as the October launch reported to the UN, are not a violation of the JCPOA. The focus of the JCPOA is cutting off all of Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon. We have long said that the JCPOA was not predicated on any change in Iranian behavior -- including its missile development efforts -- other than specific changes that would have to be made to its nuclear program. Full implementation of the JCPOA by Iran will

ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains peaceful going forward and thus Iran will not be able to produce a nuclear warhead.

Under the JCPOA, after the IAEA verifies that Iran has implemented key nuclear-related measures, the provisions of previous relevant UNSCRs will terminate but the measures in UNSCR 2231, which was adopted last July after the JCPOA was finalized, still impose restrictions on Iran's missile-related activities for a period of eight years or the IAEA reaches the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. Specifically, UNSCR 2231 prohibits all States from transferring all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology set out in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Annex to Iran unless the Security Council decides in advance on a case-by-case basis to permit such activities. As a permanent member of the Security Council, we would not expect to approve such activities.

While these provisions will reinforce our overall missile nonproliferation efforts with respect to Iran, we also rely on a broad set of other multilateral and unilateral tools to impede and disrupt Iran's missile development efforts. Specifically, we continue to work with many of the over one hundred governments around the world that have endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related items, including Iran's prohibited missile-related imports or exports. We also use

our participation in the MTCR to prevent the spread of critical missile technologies and raise awareness among the 33 other MTCR Partners (members) of the proliferation concerns posed by Iran's missile development, procurement, and proliferation activities. We bolster these multilateral efforts through our bilateral cooperation with countries to prevent transfers to Iran's missile program, promote thorough UNSCR implementation, and target Iranian missile proliferation activities in third countries. In addition, we continue to use unilateral authorities to impose sanctions on entities connected to Iran's ballistic missile programs and procurement network.

We have no intention of reducing our focus and determination to prevent the development of Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, even as we take steps to implement the JCPOA. Thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this important security issue with you. I look forward to your questions.