

TREATIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 29, 2015

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: <https://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

39-434 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2020

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, *Chairman*

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho	BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
MARCO RUBIO, Florida	BARBARA BOXER, California
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
CORY GARDNER, Colorado	CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
DAVID PERDUE, Georgia	TOM UDALL, New Mexico
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia	CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
RAND PAUL, Kentucky	TIM KAINE, Virginia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming	EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts

LESTER MUNSON, *Staff Director*

JODI B. HERMAN, *Democratic Staff Director*

JOHN DUTTON, *Chief Clerk*

CONTENTS

	Page
Hon. Johnny Isakson, U.S. Senator From Georgia	1
Hon. Bob Menendez, U.S. Senator From New Jersey	2
Robert B. Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC	3
Prepared Statement	5
Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, Wash- ington, DC	21
Prepared Statement	23
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD	
Response of Robert Stack and Thomas A. Barthold to a Question Submitted by Senator Cory Gardner	41
Letter From Companies in the U.S. in Favor of the Tax Treaties, Letter From the Business Roundtable and Other Executive Organizations, and a Letter From the Ambassadors and Embassy Organizations of Countries Affected by the Treaties	42

TREATIES

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:17 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Johnny Isakson presiding.

Present: Senators Isakson, Gardner, Menendez, and Murphy.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Senator ISAKSON. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

To begin with, I would like to ask unanimous consent that we introduce three letters into the record at this hearing. One is from a number of companies in the United States of America in favor of the tax treaties. One is from the Business Roundtable and other executive organizations. And one is from the Ambassadors and Embassy organizations of the countries affected by the treaties.

So without objection, that will be entered into the record.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The three letters submitted for the record can be found in the "Additional Material Submitted for the Record" section at the end of this hearing.]

Senator ISAKSON. I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and Senator Menendez for being here today. This is an important hearing for a lot of American businesses. It means more business for the United States, and it means predictable regulation in terms of many foreign businesses and opportunities overseas.

We are going to consider eight tax treaties, several of which this committee has considered in the past. The importance of tax treaties to American businesses and individuals is underappreciated and not widely understood, including, I will admit, by myself until I was asked to chair this hearing and got into the details of it.

For any business, one of the greatest disincentives to expand and take advantage of new opportunities is uncertainty. For governments, ensuring a favorable business climate environment by minimizing uncertainty is one of the most important things we can do to help U.S. businesses grow.

The United States uses a worldwide tax system that taxes the income of a U.S. citizen, resident, or corporation, whether the income is earned in the United States or in a foreign country. A

worldwide system of taxation would often result in double taxation if not for tax treaties.

Tax treaties ensure certainty by establishing rules on what foreign income may be taxed by the country in which it is earned, and how much tax may be withheld in foreign income. Tax treaties benefit the United States businesses and citizens in a number of ways by facilitating trade, foreign investment, and by preventing double taxation. They provide U.S. investors with greater certainty about the tax burden by ensuring the treaties are equally and fairly overseen, and by allowing them to invest and compete abroad with a thorough knowledge of how the regulations in that country will work.

Tax treaties strengthen the ability of United States business to explore many new opportunities abroad by establishing a predictable framework for new taxation to be structured.

Further, tax treaties provide tools to help resolve tax disputes between the United States and other countries. Without those tools, United States investors would have limited ability to resolve these problems on their own.

It is not just businesses that benefit from tax treaties, as they also impose reasonable limits on the amount of tax other countries may levy or can impose or withhold on a U.S. person who might live or work overseas.

Tax treaties also help ensure the United States maintains an appropriate tax base by preventing tax fraud.

In previous Congresses, this committee has responded with similar treaties and conventions and protocols with Chile, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and the OECD Mutual Assistance Protocol. Today, we will, for the first time, hear about an update to the new treaty with Japan.

It is time to move these treaties forward to the full Senate and for a full vote in the Senate as reasonably and early as possible.

With that statement read, I will turn it over to the ranking member for any comment he may have.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As someone who has sat and chaired some of these in the past, I can tell you that we are in for a scintillating hearing. [Laughter.]

Gentlemen, I know you are going to make it so.

Let me say, however, we are discussing eight important treaties pending before the committee, a new protocol to the existing tax treaty between the United States and Japan, which brings the treaty into line with our modern tax relationships, as well as seven other treaties and protocols the committee has considered over the past few years.

As I think most members are aware, this committee has expended significant effort in recent years to obtain Senate confirmation of pending income tax treaties and protocols. In February of last year, Senator Cardin chaired a hearing, together with Senator Barrasso, on five income tax treaties and protocols with Switzerland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Chile, and the OECD multilateral. And I chaired hearing a few months later on the Spain and Poland

treaties. The committee approved all seven previous treaties last Congress.

Today, we continue our consideration of tax treaties with the Japan protocol, which was transmitted to the Senate in April.

We have important and accelerating trade relationships with Japan. Being the largest and third-largest economies in the world, together our countries account for nearly one-third of global GDP. The United States has consistently been the largest source of foreign direct investment in Japan, and Japan is similarly one of the top investors in the U.S. economy.

American and Japanese businesses employ hundreds of thousands of people in both countries. As our trade and investment links continue to deepen, it behooves us to simplify the tax administration between our countries and ensure that an outdated tax treaty does not stand in the way of continued cross-border investment.

Traditionally, tax treaties have enjoyed strong bipartisan support, and I continue to urge my colleagues in the Senate to ratify these crucial components of U.S. trade and tax policy.

And I look forward to the hearing, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

We are very fortunate to have two very distinguished witnesses to testify today. First, Mr. Robert Stack, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the International Tax Affairs, Department of the United States Treasury; second, Mr. Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation and, I might add, a significant adviser to the Finance Committee, where I benefited from his advice on many occasions.

So we welcome your testimony today, and we will start with Mr. Stack first.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STACK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. STACK. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Isakson, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to recommend on behalf of the administration favorable action on eight tax treaties pending before this committee. The proposed agreements before the committee today with Chile, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland, as well as the proposed Protocol to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which I will refer to today as the multilateral convention, serve to further the goals of our tax treaty network, in particular, the goals of increased transparency, relief from double taxation, and protecting U.S. tax treaties from abuse.

It has now been over 5 years since the Senate provided its advice and consent to a tax treaty. This prolonged and unprecedented delay in approving tax treaties is inconsistent with the Senate's long history of bipartisan support for these agreements.

It denies U.S. businesses important protections against double taxation. It denies our law enforcement community the tools they need to fight tax evasion. It jeopardizes U.S. leadership on issues

of transparency in tax matters and causes other countries to question the United States' commitment to tax treaties.

I would like to take the opportunity at the outset to briefly address a concern that has been expressed by some in the Senate about these proposed tax treaties. As I understand it, the claim is that these agreements adopt a new and unacceptably low standard for exchanging information that departs from the prior U.S. policy of exchanging information only in cases of suspicion of tax fraud.

To the contrary, the standard in the pending treaties that permits exchange of information that may be relevant or is foreseeably relevant is not new. In fact, it has been the U.S. model standard since 1996 and has subsequently been endorsed as the international standard for information exchange under our tax treaties.

Of the 57 United States income tax treaties in force, all of which were approved by the Senate, only one, our existing treaty with Switzerland, refers to exchanging information only in cases of tax fraud or the like. This standard allowed Switzerland to become a haven for tax cheats. That is why that treaty must be updated.

Moreover, the foreseeably relevant standard has safeguards that prevent so-called fishing expeditions and ensures that information is kept confidential.

Because my written statement and the Treasury technical explanations describe in detail the provisions of the eight agreements pending before this committee, I would like to highlight only the most noteworthy aspects of each agreement. I would like to start with the proposed protocol to the multilateral convention.

If approved by the Senate, this agreement would establish several new information exchange relationships for the United States, which would enhance the IRS's ability to fight tax evasion. The proposed protocol amends the multilateral convention, which in its existing form is open to signature only by countries which are members of either the OECD or the Council of Europe, to allow any country to become a signatory, provided that all other signatories are satisfied that such a country has a sufficient legal framework to ensure that information exchanged pursuant to the agreement will be kept confidential.

The proposed protocols amending the United States tax treaties with Luxembourg and Switzerland replace the limited information exchange provisions of the existing tax treaties with updated rules that are consistent with the international standard.

The Treasury Department is hopeful that the proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland, if approved by the Senate, will greatly improve the collaboration between the IRS and the revenue authorities of Luxembourg and Switzerland in tax law enforcement matters.

The proposed income tax treaty with Chile, if approved by the Senate, would be only the second United States income tax treaty enforced in South America, a region into which the Treasury Department has long sought to expand the U.S. tax treaty network.

The most important feature of the proposed tax treaties with Hungary and Poland, which would both replace existing tax treaties with those countries, is that each agreement contains a comprehensive limitation on benefits article, which is designed to prevent third country investors from inappropriately taking advantage

of the treaty, a practice known as treaty shopping. Data from United States corporate tax returns show that the existing tax treaties with Hungary and Poland, which do not have limitations on benefit provisions, are facilitating treaty shopping. And for this reason, replacing them with new agreements has been a top treaty priority for the Treasury Department.

The proposed protocols amending the U.S. tax treaties with Japan and Spain significantly reduce source taxation of cross-border payments of income and gains. In addition, the proposed protocols adopt mandatory binding arbitration as a means of resolving certain disputes between the tax authorities.

The proposed protocol with Switzerland also contains a mandatory binding arbitration provision.

Another noteworthy feature of the proposed protocol with Japan is its adoption of rules that obligate the tax authorities to provide limited assistance to each other in the collection of taxes. While as a general matter, it is not the policy of the Treasury Department to include such assistance in collection provisions in U.S. treaties, we concluded after consultation with the IRS that entering into such an agreement with Japan would produce a net revenue benefit to the United States.

Let me repeat our appreciation for the committee's interest in these agreements. We are also grateful for the assistance and cooperation of the staffs of this committee and of the Joint Committee on Taxation, as well as the tireless work of the Treasury staff.

We urge the committee and Senate to take prompt and favorable action on all eight agreements, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Stack follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT B. STACK

Chairman Isakson, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear today to recommend, on behalf of the administration, favorable action on eight tax treaties pending before this committee.

This administration is committed to eliminating barriers to cross-border trade and investment, and tax treaties are one of the primary means for eliminating such tax barriers. Tax treaties provide greater certainty to taxpayers regarding their potential liability for tax in foreign jurisdictions, and they allocate taxing rights between jurisdictions to reduce the risk of double taxation. Tax treaties also ensure that taxpayers are not subject to discriminatory taxation in foreign jurisdictions.

Additionally, this administration is committed to preventing tax evasion, and our tax treaties play an important role in this area. A key element of U.S. tax treaties is exchange of information between tax authorities. Under tax treaties, one country may request from the other such information that is foreseeably relevant for the proper administration of the first country's tax laws. Because access to information from other countries is critically important to the full and fair enforcement of U.S. tax laws, information exchange is a top priority for the United States in its tax treaty program. I would like to emphasize to the committee that as we establish exchange of information relationships, the administration places a high priority on ensuring that our treaty partners not misuse the information exchanged. The United States will only exchange tax information with a country if we are satisfied that the country has adequate confidentiality laws that will protect the information we have provided.

A tax treaty reflects a balance of benefits that is agreed to when the treaty is negotiated. In some cases, changes in law or policy in one or both of the treaty partners make the partners more willing to increase the benefits beyond those provided in an existing treaty; in these cases, revisions to a treaty may be very beneficial. In other cases, developments in one or both countries, or international developments

more generally, may make it desirable to revisit an existing treaty to prevent improper exploitation of treaty provisions and eliminate unintended and inappropriate consequences in the application of the treaty. In yet other cases, the United States seeks to establish new income tax treaties with countries in which there is significant U.S. direct investment, and with respect to which U.S. companies are experiencing double taxation that is not otherwise relieved by domestic law remedies, such as the U.S. foreign tax credit. Both in setting our overall negotiation priorities and in negotiating individual treaties, our focus is on ensuring that our tax treaty network fulfills its goals of facilitating cross-border trade and investment and preventing tax evasion.

It has now been over 5 years since the full Senate last gave its advice and consent to a tax treaty. This prolonged delay is inconsistent with the Senate's long history of bipartisan support for timely consideration and approval of tax treaties, and it is damaging to important U.S. interests. It denies U.S. businesses important protections against double taxation. It denies our law enforcement community the tools they need to fight tax evasion. It jeopardizes U.S. leadership on issues of transparency. It causes other countries to question our reliability as a treaty partner and makes it harder to gain cooperation in other matters important to the United States.

The administration urges the Senate to act swiftly to approve the pending tax treaties and protocols with Switzerland, Luxembourg, Hungary, Chile, Spain, Poland, and Japan, as well as the protocol amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Each proposed treaty serves to further the goals of our tax treaty network, and in particular, the goals of providing meaningful tax benefits to cross-border investors as well as protecting U.S. tax treaties from abuse.

The proposed tax treaty with Chile would be the first tax treaty between the United States and Chile. The proposed tax treaties with Hungary and Poland would replace existing treaties the revisions of which have been a top tax treaty priority for the Treasury Department. The proposed protocols with Japan, Luxembourg, Spain, and Switzerland modify existing tax treaty relationships. The proposed protocol to the Multilateral Convention brings the Multilateral Convention, which the United States signed in 1989, into conformity with current international standards for full exchange of information between tax authorities to combat tax evasion.

Before talking about the proposed treaties in more detail, I would like to discuss some general tax treaty matters.

PURPOSES AND BENEFITS OF TAX TREATIES

Tax treaties set out clear ground rules that govern tax matters relating to trade and investment between two countries. One of the primary functions of tax treaties is to provide certainty to taxpayers regarding a threshold question with respect to international taxation: whether a taxpayer's cross-border activities will subject it to taxation by two or more countries. Tax treaties answer this question by establishing the minimum level of economic activity that must be conducted within a country by a resident of the other country before the first country may tax any resulting business profits. In general terms, tax treaties provide that if branch operations in a foreign country have sufficient substance and continuity, the country where those activities occur will have primary (but not exclusive) jurisdiction to tax. In other cases, where the operations in the foreign country are relatively minor, the home country retains the sole jurisdiction to tax.

Another primary function of tax treaties is relief from double taxation. Tax treaties protect taxpayers from potential double taxation primarily through the allocation of taxing rights between the two countries. This allocation takes several forms. First, because residence is relevant to jurisdiction to tax, a tax treaty includes a mechanism for resolving the issue of residence in the case of a taxpayer that otherwise would be considered to be a resident of both countries. Second, with respect to each category of income, a tax treaty assigns primary taxing rights to one country, usually (but not always) the country in which the income arises (the "source" country), and the residual right to tax to the other country, usually (but not always) the country of residence of the taxpayer (the "residence" country). Third, a tax treaty provides rules for determining the country of source for each category of income. Fourth, a tax treaty establishes the obligation of the residence country to eliminate double taxation that otherwise would arise from the exercise of concurrent taxing jurisdiction by the two countries. Finally, a tax treaty provides for resolution of disputes between jurisdictions in a manner that avoids double taxation.

As a complement to these substantive rules regarding the allocation of taxing rights, tax treaties provide a mechanism for dealing with disputes between countries

regarding the proper application of a treaty. To resolve such disputes, designated tax authorities of the two governments—known as the “competent authorities” in tax treaty parlance—are required to consult and endeavor to reach agreement. Under many such agreements, the competent authorities agree to allocate a taxpayer’s income between the two taxing jurisdictions on a consistent basis, thereby preventing the double taxation that might otherwise result. The U.S. competent authority is the Secretary of the Treasury, who has delegated this function to the Deputy Commissioner (International) of the Large Business and International Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).

Another key element of U.S. tax treaties is the exchange of information between tax authorities. Under tax treaties, one country may request from the other such information that is foreseeably relevant for the proper administration of the first country’s tax laws. Some have suggested that this standard is ambiguous and that it represents a lower threshold than the standard in earlier U.S. tax treaties. This is not the case. For at least 50 years, bilateral income tax treaties have permitted revenue authorities to exchange information for tax administration purposes. Moreover, this standard has been extensively defined in internationally agreed guidance to which no country has expressed a dissenting opinion to date.

Because access to information from other countries is critically important to the full and fair enforcement of U.S. tax laws, information exchange is a top priority for the United States in its tax treaty program. As we establish exchange of information relationships, the administration places a high priority on ensuring that the exchanged information will not be misused by our treaty partners. The United States will not exchange tax information with a country unless it has adequate confidentiality laws that will protect the information we have provided, and it has demonstrated the foreseeable relevance of the requested information to a tax matter.

Tax treaties also include provisions intended to ensure that cross-border investors do not suffer discrimination in the application of the tax laws of the other country. This is similar to a basic investor protection provided in other types of agreements, but the nondiscrimination provisions of tax treaties are specifically tailored to tax matters and, therefore, are the most effective means of addressing potential discrimination in the tax context. The relevant tax treaty provisions explicitly prohibit the types of discriminatory measures that once were common in some tax systems and clarify the manner in which possible discrimination is to be evaluated in the tax context.

In addition to these core provisions, tax treaties include provisions dealing with more specialized situations, such as rules addressing and coordinating the taxation of pensions, Social Security benefits, alimony, and child-support payments in the cross-border context. (The Social Security Administration separately negotiates and administers bilateral totalization agreements.) These provisions are becoming increasingly important as more individuals move between countries or otherwise engage in cross-border activities. While these matters may not involve substantial tax revenue from the perspective of the two governments, rules providing clear and appropriate treatment are very important to the affected taxpayers.

TAX TREATY NEGOTIATING PRIORITIES AND PROCESS

The United States has a network of 57 comprehensive income tax treaties covering 66 countries. This network covers the vast majority of foreign trade and investment of U.S. businesses and investors. In establishing our negotiating priorities, our primary objective is the conclusion of tax treaties that will provide the greatest benefit to the United States and to U.S. taxpayers. We regularly seek input from the U.S. business community and the IRS regarding the areas on which we should develop our treaty network, and any practical problems encountered under particular treaties or particular tax regimes.

Numerous features of a country’s tax legislation and its interaction with U.S. domestic tax rules are considered in negotiating a tax treaty. Examples include whether the country eliminates double taxation through an exemption system or credit system, the country’s treatment of partnerships and other transparent entities, and how the country taxes contributions to, earnings of, and distributions from pension funds.

Moreover, a country’s fundamental tax policy choices are reflected not only in its tax laws, but also in its tax treaty policy positions. These choices differ significantly from country to country with substantial variation even across countries that seem to have quite similar economic profiles. A tax treaty negotiation must take into account all of these aspects of the treaty partner’s tax system and treaty policies to arrive at an agreement that accomplishes the United States tax treaty objectives.

Obtaining the agreement of our tax treaty partners on provisions of importance to the United States sometimes requires concessions on our part. Similarly, the other country sometimes must make concessions to obtain our agreement on matters that are critical to it. Each tax treaty that is presented to the Senate represents not only the best deal that we believe can be achieved with the particular country, but also constitutes an agreement that we believe is in the best interests of the United States.

It is not uncommon for the Treasury Department to conclude that the right result may be no tax treaty at all. With certain countries there simply may not be the type of cross-border tax issues that are best resolved by a treaty. For example, if a country does not impose significant income taxes, or imposes tax on a strictly territorial basis (that is, it exempts not only dividend income but all foreign source income from taxation by reason of its foreign source), there is little possibility of unresolved double taxation of cross-border income, given the fact that the United States provides foreign tax credits to its citizens and residents regardless of the existence of an income tax treaty. Under such a circumstance, it would not be appropriate to enter into a comprehensive tax treaty with that particular country because doing so would result in a unilateral concession of taxing rights by the United States. Absent instances of unrelieved double taxation, a bilateral agreement that focuses exclusively on the exchange of tax information (often referred to as a “tax information exchange agreement” or “TIEA”) may be appropriate.

In other cases, a tax treaty may be inappropriate because the potential treaty partner is not willing to agree to rules that address tax issues U.S. businesses operating there have identified. If the potential treaty partner is unwilling to provide meaningful benefits in a tax treaty, such a treaty would provide little or no relief from double taxation to U.S. investors, and accordingly there would be no merit to entering into such an agreement. The Treasury Department will not conclude a tax treaty that does not provide meaningful benefits to U.S. investors or which may be construed by potential treaty partners as an indication that we would settle for a tax treaty with inferior terms.

COMBATING TAX EVASION AND IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY THROUGH FULL EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

As noted above, effective information exchange to combat tax evasion and ensure full and fair enforcement of the tax laws is a top priority for the United States. A key provision found in all modern U.S. tax treaties is a rule that obligates the competent authorities of the two countries to obtain and exchange information that is foreseeably relevant to tax administration in the requesting country. In recent years there has been a global recognition of the need to strive for greater transparency and for full exchange of information between revenue authorities to combat tax evasion. The United States has taken a leading role in this movement.

The proposed protocols amending the bilateral tax treaties with Switzerland and Luxembourg and the Multilateral Convention that are before the committee today are intended to ensure full exchange of information to prevent tax evasion and enhance transparency. These proposed protocols incorporate the modern international standards for exchange of information, which require countries to obtain and exchange information for both civil and criminal matters, and which require the tax authorities to obtain and exchange information held by banks or other financial institutions.

The international standards on transparency and exchange of information for tax purposes are now virtually universally accepted in the global community. Indeed, all jurisdictions surveyed by the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (the Global Forum) are now committed to implementing these standards. The Global Forum, now the largest international tax group in the world with 126 member jurisdictions (and 15 observing members), endorses exchange of information. The Global Forum uses a robust and comprehensive monitoring and peer review process by evaluating the compliance of jurisdictions with the international standards of transparency.

Initiated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Global Forum has been a driving force behind the acceptance and implementation of international standards. The United States actively participates in the Global Forum. Treasury’s Offices of Tax Policy and General Counsel, and IRS’s Office of Chief Counsel and its Large Business and International Division have devoted substantial resources over the past 2 years both to the peer review of U.S. rules and procedures and to our role as members of the Steering Group and Peer Review Group of the Forum.

In addition, the G20 has, for the past several years, stressed the importance of quickly implementing the international standards for transparency and exchange of information. It has also requested proposals to make it easier for developing countries to secure the benefits of the new cooperative tax environment, including a multilateral approach for the exchange of information.

Against the backdrop of the Global Forum and the G20 process, the proposed Protocol to the Multilateral Convention was opened for signature on May 27, 2010. The Multilateral Convention is an instrument that permits its signatories to exchange information for tax purposes. However, because it was signed in 1989, its provisions are out of date in many respects and do not conform to current international standards for transparency and exchange of information. In addition, prior to its amendment by the proposed protocol, the Multilateral Convention was open for accession only to member countries of either the Council of Europe or the OECD. The proposed protocol to the Multilateral Convention conforms the existing agreement to the current international standards for exchange of information, and opens the agreement for signature by any country, provided that the Parties have provided unanimous consent. This important agreement is therefore a centerpiece to the global effort to improve transparency and foster full exchange of information between tax authorities.

ENSURING THE PROTECTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION EXCHANGED WITH OUR TREATY PARTNERS

As we modernize existing exchange of information relationships and establish new relationships, the administration is also strongly committed to ensuring that information that we provide our treaty partners will not be misused and will be strictly protected and treated as confidential. One of the critical principles under today's existing international standards for information exchange upon request is that the country receiving information must ensure that exchanged information is kept confidential and only used for legitimate tax administration purposes. Consistent with this standard, the United States will not enter into an information exchange agreement unless the Treasury Department and the IRS are satisfied that the foreign government has strict confidentiality protections. Specifically, prior to entering into an information exchange agreement with another jurisdiction, the Treasury Department and the IRS closely review the foreign jurisdiction's legal framework for maintaining the confidentiality of taxpayer information. Before entering into an agreement, the Treasury Department and the IRS must be satisfied that the foreign jurisdiction has the necessary legal safeguards in place to protect exchanged information.

Even if an information exchange agreement is in effect, the IRS will not exchange information with a country if the IRS determines that the country is not complying with its obligations under the agreement to protect the confidentiality of information and to use the information solely for collecting and enforcing taxes covered by the agreement.

With respect to the Multilateral Convention, a Coordinating Body, on which the United States sits, was established under the terms of the Multilateral Convention for the express purpose of evaluating the domestic laws of countries that request to sign the agreement to ensure that new signatories will provide confidential treatment to information received under the agreement. In many cases, potential signatory countries have statutory confidentiality laws that cover information exchanged pursuant to an international agreement. In other cases, the potential signatory country has agreed to adopt as law the confidentiality provisions that are found in the Multilateral Convention itself. Countries that do not have sufficient domestic laws or the legal framework to guarantee the confidentiality of taxpayer information are not permitted to sign the proposed protocol to the Multilateral Convention.

ENSURING SAFEGUARDS AGAINST ABUSE OF TAX TREATIES

A high priority for improving our overall treaty network is a continued focus on prevention of "treaty shopping." The U.S. commitment to including comprehensive Limitation on Benefits articles is a key element to limiting treaty benefits to residents of the United States and residents of the particular treaty partner on a reciprocal basis. Tax treaty benefits are not intended for residents of a third country. If third country residents are able to exploit one of our tax treaties to secure reductions in U.S. tax, such as through the use of an entity resident in a treaty country that merely holds passive U.S. assets, the benefits would flow only in one direction. That is, third country residents would enjoy U.S. tax reductions for their U.S. investments, but U.S. residents would not enjoy reciprocal tax reductions for their investments in that third country. Moreover, such third country residents may be

securing benefits that are not appropriate in the context of the interaction between their home countries' tax systems and policies and those of the United States. This use of tax treaties is not consistent with the balance of the agreement negotiated in the underlying tax treaty. Preventing this exploitation of our tax treaties is critical to ensuring that the third country will sit down at the table with us to negotiate on a reciprocal basis so we can secure for U.S. persons the benefits of reductions in source-country tax on their investments in that country. Effective antitreaty shopping rules also ensure that the benefits of a U.S. tax treaty do not accrue to residents of countries with which the United States does not have a bilateral tax treaty because that country imposes little or no tax, and thus the potential of unrelieved double taxation is low.

In this regard, the proposed tax treaties with Poland and Hungary before the committee today include comprehensive limitation on benefits provisions and represent a major step forward in protecting the U.S. tax treaty network from abuse. These achievements demonstrate the Treasury Department has been effective in addressing concerns about treaty shopping through bilateral negotiations and amendments of our existing tax treaties. We hope the Senate will provide its advice and consent to the new tax treaties with Poland and Hungary, as well as the other tax treaties currently pending before the Senate, as soon as possible.

CONSIDERATION OF ARBITRATION

A tax treaty cannot provide a stable investment environment unless the tax administrations of the two countries implement the treaty effectively. Under the mutual agreement procedure article, a U.S. taxpayer concerned with a treaty partner's application of a treaty can bring the matter to the U.S. competent authority to resolve the matter with the competent authority of the treaty partner. The competent authorities are expected to work cooperatively to resolve the dispute.

The U.S. competent authority has a good track record in resolving disputes. Even in the most cooperative bilateral relationships, however, there may be instances in which the competent authorities will not be able to reach timely and satisfactory resolutions. Moreover, as the number and complexity of cross-border transactions increase, so do the number and complexity of cross-border tax disputes. Accordingly, we have considered ways to equip the U.S. competent authority with additional tools to assist in resolving disputes promptly, including through arbitration.

As it developed the arbitration provisions for the tax treaties with Canada, Germany and Belgium, the Treasury Department carefully considered and studied various types of arbitration procedures that could be included in our treaties and used as part of the competent authority mutual agreement process. Based on our review of the merits of arbitration in other areas of the law, the success of other countries with arbitration in the tax area, and the overwhelming support of the business community, we concluded that mandatory binding arbitration as the final step in the competent authority process can be an effective and appropriate tool to facilitate mutual agreement under U.S. tax treaties.

Three of the treaties before the committee (the proposed protocols with Switzerland, Spain, and Japan) include mandatory arbitration provisions. In general, these provisions are substantially similar to arbitration provisions in several of our recent treaties (Canada, Germany, Belgium, and France) that the Senate has approved over the last several years.

In the typical competent authority mutual agreement process, a U.S. taxpayer presents its case to the U.S. competent authority and participates in formulating the position the U.S. competent authority will take in discussions with the treaty partner. Under the arbitration provision in the proposed protocols with Switzerland, Spain, and Japan, as in the similar provisions that are now part of our treaties with Canada, Germany, Belgium, and France, if the competent authorities cannot resolve the issue within 2 years, the competent authorities must present the issue to an arbitration board for resolution, unless both competent authorities agree the case is not suitable for arbitration. The arbitration board must resolve the issue by choosing the position of one of the competent authorities. That position is adopted as the agreement of the competent authorities and is treated like any other mutual agreement under the treaty (i.e., one that has been negotiated by the competent authorities).

The arbitration process in each of these proposed protocols is mandatory and binding with respect to the competent authorities. However, consistent with the negotiation process under the mutual agreement procedure generally, the taxpayer can terminate the arbitration at any time by withdrawing its request for competent authority assistance. Moreover, the taxpayer retains the right to litigate the matter (in the United States or the treaty partner) in lieu of accepting the result of the

arbitration, just as it would be entitled to litigate in lieu of accepting the result of a negotiation under the mutual agreement procedure.

In negotiating the arbitration provisions in the proposed protocols with Switzerland, Spain, and Japan, we took into account, as we did when we negotiated the arbitration provision in the 2009 protocol to the France tax treaty, concerns this committee expressed in its report on the 2007 protocol to the U.S.-Canada treaty over certain aspects of the arbitration rules in our treaties with Canada, Germany, and Belgium. Accordingly, the proposed arbitration rule in each of these treaties differs from the provision in the treaties with Canada, Germany, and Belgium in three key respects. First, the proposed rule allows the taxpayer who presented the original case that is subjected to arbitration to submit its views on the case for consideration by the arbitration panel. Second, the proposed rule prohibits a competent authority from appointing an employee from its own tax administration to the arbitration board. Finally, the proposed rule does not prescribe a hierarchy of legal authorities that the arbitration panel must use in making its decision, thus ensuring that customary international law rules on treaty interpretation will apply.

Because the arbitration board can only choose between the positions of each competent authority, the expectation is that the differences between the positions of the competent authorities will tend to narrow as the case moves closer to arbitration. In fact, if the arbitration provision is successful, difficult issues will be resolved without resorting to arbitration. Thus, it is our objective that these arbitration provisions will rarely be utilized, but their presence will motivate the competent authorities to approach negotiations in ways that result in mutually agreeable conclusions without invoking the arbitration process.

We are hopeful that our desired objectives for arbitration are being realized, even though we are still in the early stages in our experience with arbitration and at this time cannot report definitively on the effects of arbitration on our tax treaty relationships. Our observation is that, where mandatory arbitration has been included in a treaty, the competent authorities are negotiating with greater intent to reach principled and timely resolution of disputes. Therefore, under the mandatory arbitration provision, double taxation is being effectively eliminated in a timely and more expeditious manner.

ASSISTANCE IN COLLECTION OF TAXES

Among the important modifications to the existing tax treaty with Japan that are made in the proposed protocol amending the tax treaty with that country is the introduction of provisions obligating the tax authorities of the United States and Japan to provide to each other limited assistance in the collection of taxes. While the inclusion of assistance in collection provisions has been part of the international norm of tax treaty policy (both the OECD and United Nations Model Tax Conventions contain such provisions), this has not been a policy that the Treasury Department has followed as a general matter, largely because of our concerns that such treaty obligations could lead to a disproportionate amount of additional burden on the IRS without the commensurate benefit to the U.S. fisc. For this reason, only five U.S. tax treaties in force contain assistance in collection provisions, including our treaties with Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and Sweden.

The Treasury Department's general policy with respect to collection assistance remains unchanged, and we will continue to decline the many requests from other countries to include these provisions in tax treaties when we do not have reason to believe that doing so would yield net benefits to the fisc. We will continue to examine requests for collection assistance on a case-by-case basis, and will commit to such treaty provisions if, based on a thorough consultation with the IRS, we conclude that establishing collection assistance obligations with a particular country would on balance enhance the collection of U.S. taxes. The proposed protocol with Japan is an example of one such case.

It is noteworthy that, in line with our continued concern that any obligations to assist a treaty partner in the collection of taxes must not lead to a disproportionate burden on the IRS, the proposed protocol with Japan contains a number of protections to ensure that the U.S. and Japanese tax authorities will provide such assistance in a limited and balanced manner. First, the protocol mandates the U.S. and Japanese tax authorities to arrive at a mutual understanding on a limit to the number of applications for assistance that either country may make in any given year. In addition, the two revenue authorities must mutually establish a minimum monetary threshold for applications, in order to prevent either country from seeking assistance in the collection of revenue claims that represent negligible amounts of taxes owed.

As is explained in the following paragraphs, the scope of the collection assistance provisions in the proposed protocol with Japan differs in significant ways from the five collection assistance provisions we have in force with our other treaty partners. The Treasury Department firmly believes that these adjustments to the scope permitted in the prior treaties are both justified and appropriate.

First, the proposed protocol permits a country to request assistance in the collection of a revenue claim that that country has against an individual citizen of the other country. Thus, Japan would be able to request, in certain cases, assistance from the IRS in the collection of a Japanese revenue claim against a U.S. citizen. However, the scope of such requests is limited only to situations in which the citizen has either, filed a fraudulent tax return (or a fraudulent claim for refund), willfully failed to file a tax return in an attempt to evade taxes, or has transferred assets to the other country to avoid collection of the revenue claim.

Second, the proposed protocol permits a country to request assistance in the collection of a revenue claim that it has against a company resident in the other country. Just as is the case for collection against citizens, we have agreed to limitations with Japan on the scope of permissible collection assistance of companies resident in the other country. As a general matter, we do not want to allow the collection assistance provisions to be used as an end run against the dispute resolution provisions in the tax treaty. Therefore, under the proposed protocol, the tax authority of Japan may only request assistance from the IRS on the collection of a Japanese revenue claim against a company incorporated in the United States if the authority has exhausted all applicable dispute resolution mechanisms with respect to the particular revenue claim.

EXPANDING THE U.S. TAX TREATY NETWORK

While much of the Treasury Department's tax treaty negotiations involve modernizing existing agreements with key trading partners to close loopholes or improve the level of benefits to U.S. investors, we also engage countries such as Chile to negotiate new tax treaties. The Treasury Department actively pursues opportunities to establish new tax treaty relationships with countries in which U.S. businesses encounter unrelieved double taxation with respect to their investments. The Treasury Department is aware of the keen interest of both the business community and the Senate to conclude income tax treaties that provide meaningful benefits to cross-border investors with South American countries. If approved by the Senate and the Chilean Congress, the tax treaty with Chile would be the second U.S. tax treaty in force in South America. Thus, the proposed tax treaty with Chile represents a significant inroad into the South American region.

The Treasury Department is also developing new tax treaty relationships in other regions of the world. For example, on July 7 of this year, the administration signed a new tax treaty with Vietnam, a country that U.S. businesses have listed as a priority because they have experienced significant unrelieved double taxation. We hope to transmit the new tax treaty with Vietnam soon for its advice and consent. This treaty, if approved by the Senate, would be the first agreement of its kind between the United States and Vietnam.

DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED TREATIES

I would now like to discuss the eight tax treaties that have been transmitted for the Senate's consideration. The treaties are generally consistent with modern U.S. tax treaty policy as reflected in the Treasury Department's 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention. As with all bilateral tax treaties, the treaties contain minor variations that reflect particular aspects of the treaty policies and domestic tax laws of the foreign countries, and their economic relations with the United States. We have submitted a Technical Explanation for each treaty that contains detailed discussions of the provisions of each treaty. These Technical Explanations serve as the Treasury Department's official explanation of each tax treaty.

Chile

The proposed Chile tax treaty is generally consistent with U.S. tax treaty policy as reflected in the 2006 U.S. Model. There are, as with all bilateral tax treaties, some variations from these norms. In the proposed treaty, these variations from the U.S. Model reflect particular aspects of the Chilean tax system and treaty policy, the interaction of U.S. and Chilean law, and U.S.-Chile economic relations.

The proposed treaty provides for reduced source-country taxation of dividends distributed by a company resident of one country to a resident of the other country. The proposed treaty generally allows for taxation by the source country of 5 percent on direct dividends (i.e., where a 10-percent ownership threshold is met) and 15 per-

cent on all other dividends. Additionally, the proposed treaty provides for an exemption from withholding tax on certain cross-border dividend payments to pension funds. In recognition of unique aspects of Chile's domestic tax system, the withholding rate reductions on dividend payments from Chile will generally not apply to Chile unless Chile makes certain modifications to its corporate tax system in the future.

Consistent with the U.S. Model, the proposed treaty contains special rules for dividends paid by U.S. regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts to prevent their usage to inappropriately avoid U.S. tax.

The proposed treaty provides a limit of 4 percent on source-country withholding taxes on cross-border interest payments to banks, insurance companies, and certain other financial enterprises. For the first 5 years following entry into force, the proposed treaty provides a limit of 15 percent on all other cross-border interest payments. After the initial 5-year period, the 15-percent limit is reduced to 10 percent for all other cross-border interest payments. In addition, consistent with the U.S. Model, source-country tax may be imposed on certain contingent interest and payments from a U.S. real estate mortgage investment conduit. The proposed treaty also permits the United States to impose its branch-level interest tax according to the applicable withholding rate reductions for cross-border interest payments.

The proposed treaty provides a limit of 2 percent on source-country withholding taxes on cross-border royalty payments that constitute a rental payment for the use of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, and a limit of 10 percent on all other cross-border royalty payments.

The taxation of capital gains under the proposed treaty generally follows the format of the U.S. Model, with some departures in recognition of unique aspects of Chile's domestic tax system. Similar to the U.S. Model, gains derived from the sale of real property and real property interests may be taxed by the country in which the property is located. Likewise, gains from the sale of personal property forming part of a permanent establishment situated in a country may be taxed in that country. Gains from the alienation of shares or other rights or interests in a company may either be taxed at a maximum rate of 16 percent by the country in which the company is a resident, or in certain circumstances in accordance with that country's domestic law. However, the proposed treaty recognizes a unique aspect of Chile's domestic law and provides that these gains shall be taxable only in the country of residence of the seller if Chile makes certain modifications to its corporate tax system in the future. Certain other gains from the alienation of shares of a company are taxable only in the country of residence of the seller, such as gains derived by a pension fund. Furthermore, gains from the alienation of ships, boats, aircraft, and containers used in international traffic, as well as gains from the alienation of any property not specifically addressed by the proposed treaty's article on capital gains, are taxable only in the country of residence of the seller.

The proposed treaty permits source-country taxation of business profits only if the business profits are attributable to a permanent establishment located in that country. The proposed treaty generally defines a "permanent establishment" in a way consistent with the U.S. Model. One departure from the U.S. Model, but found in a number of other U.S. tax treaties with developing countries, is a provision that deems an enterprise to have a permanent establishment in a country if the enterprise has performed services in that country exceeding 183 days in a 12-month period.

The proposed treaty preserves the U.S. right to impose its branch profits tax on U.S. branches of Chilean corporations. The proposed treaty also accommodates a provision of U.S. domestic law providing that income earned during the life of the permanent establishment, but deferred and not received until after the permanent establishment no longer exists, is still attributed to the permanent establishment.

The proposed treaty provides that an individual resident in one country and performing services in the other country will become taxable in the other country only if the individual has a fixed place of business (a so-called "fixed base"). The proposed treaty generally defines "fixed base" in a way consistent with the U.S. Model, with a departure found in a number of U.S. tax treaties with developing countries which deems an individual to have a fixed base if he or she has performed services in that country for at least 183 days in the taxable year concerned.

The rules for the taxation of income from employment under the proposed treaty are similar to those under the U.S. Model. The general rule is that employment income may be taxed in the country where the employment is exercised unless three conditions constituting a safe harbor are satisfied.

The proposed treaty permits both the residence country and source country to tax pension payments, although the source country's taxation right is limited to 15 percent of the gross amount of the pension. Consistent with current U.S. tax treaty

policy, the proposed treaty permits the deductibility of certain cross-border contributions to pension plans. Also consistent with current U.S. tax treaty policy, the proposed treaty provides for exclusive source-country taxation of Social Security payments.

The proposed treaty contains a comprehensive “limitation-on-benefits” article designed to address “treaty shopping,” which is the inappropriate use of a tax treaty by residents of a third country. The limitation-on-benefits article is consistent with current U.S. tax treaty policy, although it contains a special rule for so-called “headquarters companies” that is also found in a number of other U.S. tax treaties.

The proposed treaty incorporates rules providing that a former citizen or long-term resident of the United States may, for the period of 10 years following the loss of such status, be taxed in accordance with the laws of the United States. The proposed treaty also coordinates the U.S. and Chilean tax rules to address the “mark-to-market” provisions enacted by the United States in 2007, which apply to individuals who relinquish U.S. citizenship or terminate long-term residency.

Consistent with the OECD and U.S. Models, the proposed treaty provides for the exchange between the competent authorities of each country of information that is foreseeably relevant to carrying out the provisions of the proposed treaty or enforcing the domestic tax laws of either country. The proposed treaty allows the United States to obtain information from Chile, including from Chilean financial institutions, regardless of whether Chile needs the information for its own tax purposes.

The proposed treaty will enter into force when the United States and Chile have notified each other that they have completed all of the necessary procedures required for entry into force. With respect to taxes withheld at source, the treaty will have effect for amounts paid or credited on or after the first day of the second month following the date of entry into force. With respect to other taxes, the treaty will have effect for taxable years beginning on or after the first day of January next following the date of entry into force.

Hungary

The proposed tax treaty and related agreement, which will be effected by exchange of notes with Hungary, were negotiated to bring the existing tax treaty into closer conformity with modern U.S. tax treaty policy. Entering into a new agreement has been a top tax treaty priority for the Treasury Department because the existing tax treaty with Hungary, signed in 1979, does not contain the necessary treaty shopping protections and, as a result, is currently being used inappropriately by third country investors to gain access to U.S. treaty benefits.

The proposed treaty contains a comprehensive Limitation on Benefits article designed to address this problem. Similar to the provision included in all recent U.S. tax treaties with member countries of the European Union, the new Limitation on Benefits article includes a provision granting so-called “derivative benefits.” The article also contains a special rule for so-called “headquarters companies” found in a number of other U.S. tax treaties.

The proposed treaty incorporates updated rules providing that a former citizen or long-term resident of the United States may, for the period of 10 years following the loss of such status, be taxed in accordance with the laws of the United States. The proposed treaty also coordinates the U.S. and Hungarian tax rules with the “mark-to-market” U.S. domestic tax laws enacted in 2007, which apply to individuals who relinquish U.S. citizenship or terminate long-term residency.

The withholding rates on investment income in the proposed treaty are the same as, or lower than, those in the current treaty. The proposed treaty provides for reduced source-country taxation of dividends distributed by a company resident of one country to a resident of the other country. The proposed treaty generally allows for taxation by the source country of 5 percent on direct dividends (i.e., where a 10-percent ownership threshold is met) and 15 percent on all other dividends. Additionally, the proposed treaty provides for an exemption from withholding tax on certain cross-border dividend payments to pension funds.

The proposed treaty updates the treatment of dividends paid by U.S. regulated investment companies and real estate investment trusts to prevent their usage to inappropriately avoid U.S. tax.

Consistent with the existing treaty, the proposed treaty generally eliminates source-country withholding taxes on cross-border interest and royalty payments. However, consistent with current U.S. tax treaty policy, source-country tax may be imposed on certain contingent interest and payments from a U.S. real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The taxation of capital gains under the proposed treaty generally follows the format of the U.S. Model. Gains derived from the sale of real property and real property interests may be taxed by the State in which the property is located. Likewise,

gains from the sale of personal property forming part of a permanent establishment situated in a country may be taxed in that country. All other gains, including gains from the alienation of ships, boats, aircraft, and containers used in international traffic, as well as gains from the sale of stock in a corporation, are taxable only in the country of residence of the seller.

The proposed treaty, like several recent U.S. tax treaties, provides that the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines apply by analogy in determining the amount of business profits of a resident of the other country. The source country's right to tax such profits is generally limited to cases in which the profits are attributable to a permanent establishment located in that country. The proposed treaty preserves the U.S. right to impose its branch profits tax on U.S. branches of Hungarian corporations. The proposed treaty will also accommodate a provision of U.S. domestic law providing that income earned during the life of the permanent establishment, but deferred and not received until after the permanent establishment no longer exists, is still attributed to the permanent establishment.

The proposed treaty would change the rules currently applied under the existing treaty regarding the taxation of independent personal services. Furthermore, an enterprise performing services in the other country will be taxable in the other country only if the enterprise has a fixed place of business in that country.

The rules for the taxation of income from employment under the proposed treaty are similar to those under the U.S. Model. The general rule is that employment income may be taxed in the country where the employment is exercised unless three conditions constituting a safe harbor are satisfied.

The proposed treaty preserves the current treaty's rules that allow for exclusive residence-country taxation of pensions, and, consistent with current U.S. tax treaty policy, provides for exclusive source-country taxation of Social Security payments.

Consistent with the OECD and U.S. Models, the proposed treaty with Hungary provides for the exchange between the tax authorities of each country of information relevant to carrying out the provisions of the proposed treaty or the domestic tax laws of either country. The proposed treaty allows the United States to obtain information (including from financial institutions) from Hungary whether or not Hungary needs the information for its own tax purposes.

The proposed treaty would enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. With respect to taxes withheld at source, the treaty will have effect for amounts paid or credited on, or after, the first day of the second month following the date of entry into force. With respect to other taxes, the treaty will have effect for taxable years beginning on or after the first day of January next following the date of entry into force. The existing treaty will, with respect to any tax, cease to have effect as of the date on which the proposed treaty has effect with respect to such tax.

Japan

The proposed protocol to amend the existing tax treaty with Japan and an agreement effected by exchange of notes were negotiated to make a number of key amendments to the existing tax treaty with Japan concluded in 2003. Many of the provisions in the proposed protocol are intended to bring the existing tax treaty into closer conformity with current U.S. tax treaty policy as reflected in the U.S. Model. The provisions also reflect particular aspects of Japanese law and tax treaty policy, the interaction of U.S. law with Japanese law, and U.S.-Japan economic relations.

The proposed protocol brings the existing treaty's taxation of cross-border interest payments largely into conformity with the U.S. Model by broadening the existing treaty's limited exemptions from source-country withholding to cover all payments of interest. However, contingent interest may be subject to source-country withholding tax at a rate of 10 percent, and full source-country tax may be imposed on payments from a U.S. real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The proposed protocol with Japan expands the category of cross-border dividends that are eligible for an exemption from source-country withholding. Under the existing treaty, such dividends are exempt from source-country withholding if the company that beneficially owns the dividends has owned, for a period of at least 12 months ending on the date on which the entitlement to the dividends is determined, greater than 50 percent of the voting stock of the company paying the dividends (and only if additional requirements are satisfied). The proposed protocol slightly lowers the ownership requirement for the exemption from source-country withholding to 50 percent or more of the voting stock of the company paying the dividends, and reduces the holding period requirement to 6 months.

The proposed protocol amends the provisions of the existing Convention governing the taxation of capital gains to allow for taxation of gains from the sale of real property and from real property interests by the State in which the property is located.

Accordingly, under the proposed protocol, the United States may fully apply the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act.

The proposed protocol updates the provisions of the existing Convention with respect to the mutual agreement procedure by incorporating mandatory arbitration of certain cases that the competent authorities of the United States and Japan are unable to resolve after a reasonable period of time. These provisions are similar to the mandatory arbitration provisions recently introduced into a number of other U.S. bilateral tax treaties.

As previously discussed, above, the proposed protocol incorporates into the existing Convention provisions that enable the revenue authority of a country to request assistance from the revenue authority of the other country in the collection of taxes and related costs, interest and penalties.

Consistent with the U.S. Model and the international standard for tax information exchange, the proposed protocol provides for the exchange between the revenue authorities of both countries of information foreseeably relevant to carrying out the provisions of the existing Convention (as modified by the proposed protocol) or the domestic tax laws of either country. The proposed protocol allows the United States to obtain information (including from financial institutions) from Japan whether or not Japan needs the information for its own tax purposes.

The proposed protocol will enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The proposed protocol will have effect, with respect to taxes withheld at source, for amounts paid or credited on or after the first day of the third month next following the date of entry into force, and with respect to other taxes, for taxable years beginning on or after the first day of January next following the date of entry into force. Special rules apply for the entry into force of the mandatory binding arbitration provisions.

Luxembourg

The proposed protocol to amend the existing tax treaty with Luxembourg and the related agreement effected by exchange of notes were negotiated to bring the existing treaty, signed in 1996, into closer conformity with current U.S. tax treaty policy regarding exchange of information.

The proposed protocol replaces the existing treaty's information exchange provisions with updated rules that are consistent with current U.S. tax treaty practice and the current international standards for exchange of information. The proposed protocol allows the tax authorities of each country to exchange information foreseeably relevant to carrying out the provisions of the agreement or the domestic tax laws of either country. Among other things, the proposed protocol would allow the United States to obtain information from Luxembourg authorities whether or not Luxembourg needs the information for its own tax purposes. In addition, the proposed protocol provides that requests for information cannot be declined solely because the information is held by a bank or other financial institution.

The proposed related agreement effected by exchange of notes sets forth agreed understandings between the countries regarding the updated provisions on tax information exchange. The agreed understandings include obligations on the United States and Luxembourg to ensure that their respective competent authorities have the authority to obtain and provide, upon request, information held by banks and other financial institutions and information regarding ownership of certain entities. The understandings also provide that information shall be exchanged without regard to whether the conduct being investigated would be a crime under the laws of the country from which the information has been requested.

The proposed protocol would enter into force once both the United States and Luxembourg have notified each other that their respective applicable procedures for ratification have been satisfied. It would have effect with respect to requests made on or after the date of entry into force with regard to tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2009. The related agreement effected by exchange of notes would enter into force on the date of entry into force of the proposed protocol and would become an integral part of the proposed protocol on that date.

POLAND

The proposed tax treaty with Poland was negotiated to bring the current treaty, concluded in 1974, into closer conformity with current U.S. tax treaty policy as reflected in the U.S. Model. There are, as with all bilateral tax treaties, some variations from these norms. In the proposed treaty, these differences reflect particular aspects of Polish law and treaty policy, the interaction of U.S. and Polish law, and U.S.-Poland economic relations.

The proposed treaty contains a comprehensive Limitation on Benefits article designed to address "treaty shopping." The existing tax treaty with Poland does not

contain treaty shopping protections and, for this reason, revising the existing treaty has been a top priority for the Treasury Department's tax treaty program. Beyond the standard provisions, the new article includes a provision granting "derivative benefits" similar to the provision included in all recent U.S. tax treaties with member countries of the European Union. The article also contains a special rule for "headquarters companies" identical to with the rule in a number of other U.S. tax treaties.

The proposed treaty incorporates updated rules that provide that a former citizen or former long-term resident of the United States may, for the period of 10 years following the loss of such status, be taxed in accordance with the laws of the United States. The proposed treaty also coordinates the U.S. and Polish tax rules to address the "mark-to-market" provisions enacted by the United States in 2007 that apply to individuals who relinquish U.S. citizenship or terminate long-term residency.

The withholding rates on investment income in the proposed treaty are in most cases the same as or lower than those in the current treaty. The proposed treaty provides for reduced source-country taxation of dividends distributed by a company resident in one country to a resident of the other country. The treaty will generally allow for taxation by the source country of 5 percent on direct dividends (i.e., where a 10-percent ownership threshold is met) and 15 percent on all other dividends. Additionally, the treaty will provide for an exemption from withholding tax on certain cross-border dividend payments to pension funds.

The proposed treaty updates the treatment of dividends paid by U.S. regulated investment companies and U.S. real estate investment trusts to prevent their usage to inappropriately avoid U.S. tax.

The proposed treaty provides for an exemption from source-country taxation for the following classes of interest: interest that is either paid by or paid to governments (including central banks); interest paid in respect of a loan made to or provided, guaranteed or insured by a government, statutory body or export financing agency; certain interest paid to a pension fund, interest paid to a bank or an insurance company; and interest paid to certain other financial enterprises that are unrelated to the payer of the interest. The proposed treaty provides for a limit of 5 percent on source-country withholding taxes on all other cross-border interest payments. In addition, consistent with the U.S. Model, source-country tax may be imposed on certain contingent interest and payments from a U.S. real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The proposed treaty provides a limit of 5 percent on source-country withholding taxes on cross-border payments of royalties. The definition of the term "royalty" in the proposed treaty includes payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use any industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.

The taxation of capital gains under the proposed treaty generally follows the U.S. Model. Gains derived from the sale of real property and from real property interests may be taxed by the country in which the property is located. Likewise, gains from the sale of personal property forming part of a permanent establishment situated in either the United States or Poland may be taxed in that country. All other gains, including gains from the alienation of ships, aircraft, and containers used in international traffic and gains from the sale of stock in a corporation, are taxable only in the country of residence of the seller.

Consistent with U.S. tax treaty policy, the proposed treaty employs the so-called "Approved OECD Approach" for attributing profits to a permanent establishment. The source country's right to tax such profits is generally limited to cases in which the profits are attributable to a permanent establishment located in that country. The proposed treaty defines a "permanent establishment" in a way that grants rights to tax business profits that are consistent with those found in the U.S. Model.

The proposed treaty preserves the U.S. right to impose its branch profits tax on U.S. branches of Polish corporations. The proposed treaty also accommodates a provision of U.S. domestic law that attributes to a permanent establishment income that is earned during the life of the permanent establishment, but is deferred and not received until after the permanent establishment no longer exists.

Under the proposed treaty an enterprise performing services in the other country will become taxable in the other country only if the enterprise has a fixed place of business.

The rules for the taxation of income from employment under the proposed treaty are consistent with the U.S. Model. The general rule is that employment income may be taxed in the country where the employment is exercised unless the conditions constituting a safe harbor are satisfied.

The proposed treaty contains rules regarding the taxation of pensions, Social Security payments, annuities, alimony, and child support that are generally consistent with the U.S. Model. Further, pensions and annuities are taxable only in the

country of residence of the beneficiary. In addition, the treaty provides for exclusive source-country taxation of Social Security payments. Payments of alimony and child support are exempt from tax in both countries. Consistent with the U.S. Model and the international standard for tax information exchange, the proposed treaty provides for the exchange between the tax authorities of each country of information that is foreseeably relevant to carrying out the provisions of the proposed treaty or the domestic tax laws of either country. The proposed treaty allows the United States to obtain such foreseeably relevant information (including from financial institutions) from Poland whether or not Poland needs the information for its own tax purposes.

The proposed treaty will enter into force when both the United States and Poland have notified each other that they have completed all of the necessary procedures required for entry into force. The proposed treaty will have effect, with respect to taxes withheld at source, for amounts paid or credited on or after the first day of the second month next following the date of entry into force, and with respect to other taxes, for taxable years beginning on or after the first day of January next following the date of entry into force. The current treaty will, with respect to any tax, cease to have effect as of the date on which this proposed treaty has effect with respect to such tax.

The proposed treaty provides that an individual who was entitled to the benefits under the provisions for teachers, students and trainees, or government functions of the existing treaty at the time of entry into force of the proposed treaty shall continue to be entitled to such benefits until such time as the individual would cease to be entitled to such benefits if the existing treaty remained in force.

Spain

The proposed protocol with Spain and an accompanying memorandum of understanding and exchange of notes make a number of key amendments to the existing tax treaty with Spain, concluded in 1990. Many of the provisions in the proposed protocol are intended to bring the existing treaty into closer conformity with the U.S. Model. The provisions in the proposed protocol also reflect particular aspects of Spanish law and tax treaty policy and U.S.-Spain economic relations. Modernizing the existing treaty has been a high tax treaty priority for the business communities in both the United States and Spain.

The proposed protocol brings the existing tax treaty's rules for taxing payments of cross-border dividends into conformity with a number of recent U.S. tax treaties with major trading partners. The proposed protocol provides for an exemption from source-country withholding on certain direct dividends (i.e., dividends beneficially owned by a company that has owned, for a period of at least 12 months prior to the date on which the entitlement to the dividends is determined, at least 80 percent of the voting stock of the company paying the dividends), as well as dividends beneficially owned by certain pension funds. With respect to other dividends, consistent with the U.S. Model, the proposed protocol limits to 5 percent the rate of source-country withholding permitted on cross-border dividends beneficially owned by a company that owns at least 10 percent of the voting stock of the company paying the dividends, and limits to 15 percent the rate of source-country withholding permitted on all other dividends. The proposed protocol permits the imposition of source-country withholding on branch profits in a manner consistent with the U.S. Model.

The proposed protocol brings the existing tax treaty's rules for taxation of cross-border interest payments largely into conformity with the U.S. Model by exempting such interest from source-country taxation. However, interest that is contingent interest may be subject to source-country withholding tax at a rate of 10 percent (in contrast to 15 percent under the U.S. Model). Consistent with the U.S. Model, full source-country tax may be imposed on payments from a U.S. real estate mortgage investment conduit.

The proposed protocol exempts from source-country withholding cross-border payments of royalties and capital gains in a manner consistent with the U.S. Model.

The proposed protocol updates the provisions of the existing treaty with respect to the mutual agreement procedure by requiring mandatory binding arbitration of certain cases that the competent authorities of the United States and Spain are unable to resolve after a reasonable period of time. The arbitration provisions in the proposed protocol are similar to other mandatory arbitration provisions that were recently incorporated into a number of other U.S. bilateral tax treaties.

The proposed protocol replaces the limitation-on-benefits provisions in the existing tax treaty with updated rules similar to those found in recent U.S. tax treaties with countries in the European Union.

Consistent with the U.S. Model and the international standard for tax information exchange, the proposed protocol provides for the exchange between the tax authorities of each country of information that is foreseeably relevant to carrying out the provisions of the tax treaty or the domestic tax laws of either country. The proposed protocol allows the United States to obtain such foreseeably relevant information (including from financial institutions) from Spain regardless of whether Spain needs the information for its own tax purposes.

The proposed protocol will enter into force 3 months after both countries have notified each other that they have completed all required internal procedures for entry into force. The proposed protocol will have effect, with respect to taxes withheld at source, for amounts paid or credited on or after the date on which the proposed protocol enters into force, and with respect to other taxes, for taxable years beginning on or after the date on which the proposed protocol enters into force. Special rules apply for the entry into force of the mandatory binding arbitration provisions.

Switzerland

The proposed protocol to amend the existing tax treaty with Switzerland and related agreement effected by exchange of notes were negotiated to bring the existing treaty, signed in 1996, into closer conformity with current U.S. tax treaty policy regarding exchange of information. There are, as with all bilateral tax conventions, some variations from these norms. In the proposed protocol, these minor differences reflect particular aspects of Swiss law and treaty policy, and they generally follow the OECD standard for exchange of information.

The proposed protocol replaces the existing treaty's information exchange provisions with updated rules that are consistent with current U.S. tax treaty practice and the current international standards for exchange of information. The proposed protocol will also allow the tax authorities of each country to exchange information that may be relevant to carrying out the provisions of the agreement or the domestic tax laws of either country, including information that would otherwise be protected by the bank secrecy laws of either country. In addition, it will allow the United States to obtain information from Switzerland whether or not Switzerland needs the information for its own tax purposes, and provides that requests for information cannot be declined solely because the information is held by a bank or other financial institution.

The proposed protocol amends a paragraph of the existing protocol to the existing treaty by incorporating procedural rules to govern requests for information and an agreement between the United States and Switzerland that such procedural rules are to be interpreted in order not to frustrate effective exchange of information.

The proposed protocol and related agreement effected by exchange of notes update the provisions of the existing treaty with respect to the mutual agreement procedure by incorporating mandatory arbitration of certain cases that the competent authorities of the United States and Switzerland are unable to resolve after a reasonable period of time.

Finally, the proposed protocol updates the provisions of the existing treaty to provide that individual retirement accounts are eligible for the benefits afforded to pensions under the existing treaty.

The proposed protocol would enter into force when the United States and Switzerland exchange instruments of ratification. The proposed protocol would have effect, with respect to taxes withheld at source, for amounts paid or credited on or after the first day of January of the year following entry into force. With respect to information exchange, the proposed protocol would have effect with respect to requests for bank information that relate to any date beginning on or after the date the proposed protocol is signed. With respect to all other cases, the proposed protocol would have effect with respect to requests for information that relates to taxable periods beginning on or after the first day of January next following the date of signature. The mandatory arbitration provision would have effect with respect both to cases that are under consideration by the competent authorities as of the date on which the proposed protocol enters into force and to cases that come under consideration after that date.

Protocol to the Multilateral Convention

On January 25, 1988, the OECD and the Council of Europe jointly opened for signature the Multilateral Convention, which the United States signed in 1989. The proposed protocol to the Multilateral Convention was negotiated to bring the Multilateral Convention into conformity with current international standards regarding exchange of information for tax purposes.

Although the Multilateral Convention contains broad provisions for the exchange of information, it predates the current internationally agreed standards on exchange

of information. Thus, the obligations contained in the Multilateral Convention are subject to certain domestic law limitations that could impede full exchange of information. In particular, the Multilateral Convention does not require the exchange of bank information on request, nor does it override domestic tax interest requirements. In contrast, the current internationally agreed standards on transparency and exchange of information provide for full exchange of information upon request in all tax matters without regard to a domestic tax interest requirement or bank secrecy laws. The protocol amends the Multilateral Convention in order to bring it into conformity with these international standards, which are also reflected in the U.S. Model and OECD Model tax treaties.

The Multilateral Convention specifies information the applicant country is to provide the requested country when making a request. In some situations, the name of the person under examination is not known to the applicant country, but there is other information sufficient to identify the person. The proposed protocol amends the Multilateral Convention by providing that a request for assistance is adequate even if the name of the person(s) under examination is not known, provided that the request contains sufficient information to identify the person or ascertainable group or category of persons.

Prior to amendment, the Multilateral Convention was open for signature only by countries that were members of the Council of Europe, the OECD, or both. The proposed protocol amends the Multilateral Convention by allowing any country to become a party thereto. However, countries that are not members of the OECD or of the Council of Europe are only invited to become a party to the amended Convention subject to unanimous consent of the parties to the amended Convention.

The Multilateral Convention as amended by the proposed protocol entered into force on June 1, 2011, for countries that signed and ratified it prior to that date. For countries that sign subsequent to that date, the Multilateral Convention as amended by the proposed protocol will enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of a period of 3 months after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification with one of the Depositaries.

Any Member State of the Council of Europe or of the OECD that is not yet a party to the Multilateral Convention will become a party to the Multilateral Convention as amended by the proposed protocol upon ratification of the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol by that Member State, unless it explicitly expresses the will to adhere exclusively to the unamended Convention. Any country that is not a member of the OECD or the Council of Europe that subsequently becomes a signatory to the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol shall be a party to the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol.

The amendments shall have effect for administrative assistance related to taxable periods beginning on or after January 1 of the year following the year in which the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol, entered into force in respect of a party. Where there is no taxable period, the amendments shall have effect for administrative assistance related to charges to tax arising on or after January 1 of the year following the year in which the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol entered into force in respect of a party. Any two or more parties may mutually agree that the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol may have effect for administrative assistance related to earlier taxable periods or charges to tax. However, for criminal tax matters, the proposed protocol provides that the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol shall have effect for any earlier taxable period or charge to tax from the date of entry into force in respect of a party. A signatory country may nevertheless lodge a reservation according to which the provisions of the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol would have effect for administrative assistance related to criminal tax matters, only as related to taxable periods beginning from the third year prior to the year in which the Convention as amended by the proposed protocol entered into force in respect of that party.

CONCLUSION

Chairman Isakson and Ranking Member Menendez, let me conclude by thanking you for the opportunity to appear before the committee to discuss the administration's efforts with respect to the eight treaties under consideration. We appreciate the committee's continuing interest in the tax treaty program, and we thank the members and staff for devoting time and attention to the review of these new treaties. We are also grateful for the assistance and cooperation of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation.

On behalf of the administration, we urge the committee to take prompt and favorable action on the agreements before you today. That concludes my testimony, and I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Stack.
Mr. Barthold.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. BARTHOLD, CHIEF OF STAFF,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. BARTHOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Joint Committee staff, led by my colleague, Kristine Roth, has prepared pamphlets covering each of the proposed treaties and protocols. These pamphlets provide detailed descriptions of the treaties and protocols, and include comparisons with U.S. model and other recent U.S. treaties, as well as providing discussion of issues raised by the proposed agreements.

There are many proposed agreements before your committee today. I will highlight only a few issues presented by these agreements, with some emphasis on the most recent protocol with Japan.

Let me note first, though, that treaties and protocols are negotiated in the context of the tax laws of the two countries involved in the negotiation. We understand that there have been potentially noteworthy changes in the income tax laws of Chile, Poland, and Spain since the Foreign Relations Committee last considered the proposed agreements with those countries in 2014.

In particular, in Chile, the corporate shareholder income tax, which is fully integrated, has been the subject of reform legislation scheduled to take effect in 2017. And under this reform, a shareholder of a Chilean corporation who is a resident of a country with which Chile does not have an income tax treaty, would be credited with 65 percent rather than 100 percent of the corporate tax paid.

We also understand that the Government of Spain has enacted legislation that, among other things, reduces its corporate tax rate and modifies its depreciation rules, and that the Government of Poland has enacted changes to the individual income tax and corporate income tax.

The committee may wish to inquire of my colleagues from the Treasury Department if they believe that these current proposed agreements appropriately accommodate these internal law developments in these other countries.

The principal purposes of income tax treaties are to reduce or eliminate double taxation of income, and to prevent avoidance or evasion of taxes between the two countries. These objectives are primarily achieved through countries agreeing to limit, in certain situations, its right to tax income derived from its territory by residents of the other country and providing procedures to resolve disputes.

The proposed protocol with Japan broadens the scope of companies eligible for a zero withholding tax rate on parent subsidiary dividends provided under the existing treaty. The proposed protocol with Spain would bring to 13 the number of U.S. income tax treaties that provide such a zero rate on direct dividends. The U.S. model treaty does not provide a zero rate on direct dividends. In previous testimony before the committee, the Treasury Department has stated that the dividend withholding tax should only be eliminated on the basis of an overall balance of benefits, and only in sit-

uations where treaties have restrictive limitations on benefit rules and provide comprehensive information exchange.

I observe that every recent U.S. income tax treaty or protocol has included restrictive limitation-on-benefits provisions and comprehensive income information exchange provisions. Therefore, the committee may wish to inquire whether there are particular considerations the Treasury Department will now take into account in deciding whether to negotiate for zero-rate direct-dividend provisions in future income tax treaties or protocols, and whether the new U.S. model treaty that is being developed by the Treasury Department will eliminate withholding tax on direct dividends.

The proposed protocol with Japan also provides for, as noted by Mr. Stack, mandatory and binding arbitration in mutual agreement procedure cases pending before the competent authorities that have been without resolution for 2 years or more. The protocols amending the Swiss and Spanish treaties also include similar provisions.

While similar to arbitration procedures adopted in some recent income tax treaties, the Japanese protocol presents some significant differences. First, it does not require the presenter of the case to have filed a return with each of the two jurisdictions. It also may expedite the schedule on which the taxpayer who seeks a bilateral advanced pricing agreement may have it resolved by binding arbitration related to that advanced pricing agreement. And the proposed protocol also departs from the U.S. model treaty general rules limiting participation of a taxpayer in any mutual agreement proceedings by allowing that taxpayer who presents a case to submit a position paper directly to the arbitration panel.

The committee may wish to consider the extent to which the inclusion of mandatory arbitration rules and the particular features of the Japanese protocol now represent United States policy regarding mandatory binding arbitration. In particular, you may wish to inquire about the criteria on which the Treasury Department determines whether to include such provisions, the appropriate scope of issues eligible for determination by binding arbitration, the absence of precedential value, and the role of the taxpayer in an arbitration proceeding.

Lastly, the pending protocol with Japan also expands the mutual collection assistance available under the Japan treaty to include taxes not otherwise covered by the treaty and to permit collection assistance against one's own nationals on behalf of the other jurisdiction in cases of fraudulent conduct by the citizen.

This provision aggregates what is known as the revenue rule, a common law doctrine against providing collection assistance to which the United States has generally adhered. The changes to the scope of collection assistance are similar to those of only five other countries, but there is no comparable provision in the U.S. model treaty, and the United States has expressly reserved with respect to a similar provision that is included in the OECD multilateral treaty, which is also pending before this committee.

The protocol's article requires the competent authorities to negotiate limitations to the extent of which assistance will be sought or provided in order to ensure that the administrative burden is not unfairly imposed on the jurisdiction.

The committee may want to, again, explore the basis for agreeing to this departure from general policy and the criteria applied in so doing. And in addition to any concerns that there might be about preserving the sovereignty of the United States and the rights of its taxpayers, the risk of increased administrative burden should also be considered.

This concludes my testimony. I would be pleased to answer any questions that the members might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barthold follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS A. BARTHOLD¹

My name is Thomas A. Barthold. I am Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. It is my pleasure to present the testimony of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation today concerning the proposed income tax treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland, the proposed tax protocols with Japan, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland, and the proposed protocol amending the multilateral mutual administrative assistance treaty.

OVERVIEW

The Joint Committee staff has prepared pamphlets covering each of the proposed treaties and protocols.² The pamphlets provide detailed descriptions of the proposed treaties and protocols, including, in the case of the income tax treaties and protocols, comparisons with the United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006 ("U.S. Model treaty"), which reflects preferred U.S. tax treaty policy, and with other recent U.S. tax treaties. The pamphlets also provide detailed discussions of issues raised by the proposed treaties and protocols. We consulted with the Treasury Department and with the staff of your committee in analyzing the proposed treaties and protocols and in preparing the pamphlets.

The principal purposes of the proposed income tax treaties and protocols are to reduce or eliminate double taxation of income earned by residents of either country from sources within the other country and to prevent avoidance or evasion of the taxes of the two countries. The proposed income tax treaties and protocols also are intended to promote close economic cooperation between the treaty countries and to eliminate possible barriers to trade and investment caused by overlapping taxing jurisdictions of the treaty countries. As in other U.S. income tax treaties, these objectives principally are achieved through each country's agreement to limit, in certain specified situations, its right to tax income derived from its territory by residents of the other country.

The principal purpose of the multilateral mutual assistance treaty is to promote increased cooperation in tax administration and enforcement among the parties to the treaty.

The proposed protocol with Japan amends an existing treaty, last amended by a protocol signed November 6, 2003. The proposed protocol with Spain would amend an existing tax treaty signed on February 22, 1990, and its protocol. The proposed treaty with Poland would replace an existing income tax treaty signed on October 8, 1974. The proposed treaty with Hungary would replace an existing income tax treaty signed in 1979. The proposed protocol with Luxembourg would amend an existing tax treaty that was signed in 1996. The proposed protocol with Switzerland would amend an existing tax treaty and previous protocol that were both signed in 1996. The proposed treaty with Chile is the first income tax treaty with that nation. The last proposed protocol under consideration by your committee amends the multilateral mutual administrative assistance in tax matters agreement that the United States ratified in 1991.

My testimony today will first provide an article-by-article summary of the principal features of the proposed protocol with Japan. My testimony will also address the extent to which the U.S. Model treaty continues to represent U.S. tax policy, as reflected in the issues related to benefits conferred under the various agreements pending with your committee and issues related to mutual administrative assistance. With respect to the former, these issues include the limitation-on-benefits provisions in the treaties with Spain, Chile, and Hungary; zero-withholding for parent-subsidiary dividends in Spain, Japan; and the commitment included in the proposed protocol with Spain to negotiate toward an agreement between Puerto Rico and Spain. With respect to the latter, the issues are the exchange of information modernization included in all of the agreements, including the expansion of the multilateral mutual administrative assistance agreement; the mandatory arbitration

provisions of the protocols with Switzerland, Spain, and Japan; and the expanded collection assistance agreed upon with Japan.

ARTICLE-BY-ARTICLE SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL WITH JAPAN

The proposed protocol with Japan includes the following significant changes to the existing treaty.

Article II provides that companies that are resident in both Japan and the United States (dual resident companies) will not be considered resident of either jurisdiction for purposes of the treaty. As a result, the treaty benefits available to such companies are limited to those that are available to nonresidents.

Article III reduces the thresholds for exemption from source-country taxation of dividends from subsidiaries resident in one country to a parent corporation resident in the other treaty country. Under the proposed protocol, ownership of 50 percent or more, rather than ownership of more than 50 percent, qualifies. Article III also reduces the required holding period for elimination of source-country taxation on such dividends to the 6-month period ending on the date on which entitlement to the dividends is determined. Both the ownership standard and the holding period thresholds depart from recent U.S. tax treaties that provided zero-rate withholding contingent upon a 12-month holding period and 80-percent ownership.

Article IV replaces Article 11 of the existing treaty, regarding taxation of cross-border dividend payments (interest payments arising in one treaty country to residents of the other treaty country). First, the proposed protocol brings the tax treatment of cross-border interest payments into closer alignment with the rules described in the U.S. Model treaty and exempts such interest from source-country taxation. The interest remains subject to tax in the residence country. Antiabuse provisions are also provided that permit source-country taxation, notwithstanding the above rule, for contingent interest payments and payments with respect to ownership in entities used for securitization of real estate mortgages.

Article V revises the definition of real property in Article 13 of the existing treaty to conform more closely to the U.S. Model treaty.

Article VII repeals Article 20 of the existing treaty, which provides certain benefits to researchers and teachers from one jurisdiction when they are temporarily present in the other jurisdiction, consistent with modern treaty policy of both the United States and Japan. A conforming change is made by Article I to paragraph 5 of Article 1 of the existing treaty.

Article IX revises the rules regarding foreign tax credits to conform to changes in Japanese statutory rules for relief from double taxation. The changes reflect the recent adoption of a participation exemption system in Japan.

Article X revises the nondiscrimination rules of Article 24 of the existing treaty to reflect the changes to Article 11, as summarized above.

Article XI provides mandatory and binding arbitration in mutual agreement procedure cases pending before the competent authorities without resolution for 2 years or more. The provision is similar in scope and process to that found in recent treaties and in the proposed protocol with Spain that is also pending before the committee. The new article includes procedures to ensure confidentiality of taxpayer information and the mutual agreement process are included, as well as rules for the selection of members of the arbitration panel to avoid conflicts of interest. The taxpayer is permitted an opportunity to participate in the proceeding in the form of a presentation of views and reasoning. Each competent authority is permitted to provide views, reasoning and its proposed solution to each issue. The panel must reach a determination that selects the proposed solution of one of the competent authorities. That determination is not accorded precedential value and does not include a rationale or other reasoning.

The article prescribes standards similar but not identical to those found in recent treaties with Belgium, France, Germany, and Canada, and is a departure from the U.S. Model treaty. First, it does not require the presenter of the case to have filed a return with each of the two jurisdictions. It also may expedite the schedule on which a taxpayer who seeks a bilateral advanced pricing agreement may contest a proposed adjustment that is related to the subject of the pending request for a pricing agreement, thus compelling arbitration if the competent authorities do not reach agreement on the bilateral advanced pricing agreement. The proposed article also departs from the U.S. Model treaty general rules limiting participation of the taxpayer in any mutual agreement proceedings by allowing the taxpayer who presents a case to submit a position paper directly to the arbitration panel.

Article XII of the proposed protocol modernizes the exchange of information provisions of Article 26. The revised exchange of information provisions conform to modern standards similar to those in the U.S. Model treaty and the OECD Model treaty.

Unlike the U.S. Model treaty, the proposed protocol includes a specific provision that the obligation to exchange information does not override domestic law privilege that attaches to confidential communications.

Article XIII expands the mutual collection assistance available under Article 27 to include taxes not otherwise covered by the treaty, and to permit collection assistance against one's own nationals on behalf of the other jurisdiction in cases of fraudulent conduct by the citizen. The provision abrogates the Revenue Rule, a common law doctrine against providing collection assistance to which the United States has generally adhered. The changes to the scope of collection assistance are similar to those in treaties with only five other countries: France, Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Denmark. There is no comparable provision in the U.S. Model treaty, and the United States expressly reserved with respect to a similar provision that is included in the OECD Multilateral treaty that is also pending before this committee. The article requires the competent authorities to negotiate limitations on the extent to which such assistance will be sought or provided, in order to assure that administrative burden is not unfairly imposed on either jurisdiction.

Article XIV amends the 2003 Protocol to provide rules for the implementation of both arbitration and collection provisions, as well as conforming changes.

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE U.S. MODEL TREATY CONTINUES
TO REFLECT U.S. TAX POLICY

The most recent U.S. Model treaty was published in 2006. A number of U.S. income tax treaties and protocols to earlier treaties have entered into force since then. Significant deviations from the U.S. Model treaty have, understandably, proliferated. This proliferation can be expected to continue as the U.S. State Department and Treasury Department negotiate new income tax treaties and protocols. Earlier this year, the Treasury Department proposed several revisions and additions to the U.S. Model and announced its goal of completing its revision of the U.S. Model treaty this year.³ The following discussion identifies areas in which the pending protocols differ from the current U.S. Model treaty. First, I address those issues related to benefits conferred under the various agreements pending with your committee, and second, the issues related to mutual administrative assistance, specifically exchange of information and mutual collection assistance.

A. Issues Related to the Benefits Provided to Relieve Double Taxation

Attribution of profits in treaty with Poland

In the proposed treaty with Poland, Article 7 (Business Profits) is the first United States treaty to adopt rules for the taxation by a treaty country of the business profits of an enterprise located in the other treaty country that is based on the language of Article 7 (Business Profits) of the OECD Model treaty. Although the language used in the OECD Model treaty differs from the U.S. Model treaty, the policy toward, and implementation of, the business profits article under the two models are substantively similar. The committee may wish to ask the Treasury Department whether the use of the OECD Model treaty Article 7 in the Polish treaty represents a change in U.S. income tax treaty policy. One area in which the U.S. Model treaty and that of the OECD differ is the inclusion of an antiabuse measure. The U.S. Model treaty, paragraph 7, and the proposed treaty, paragraph 5, include an antiabuse provision treating income or gain attributable to a permanent establishment as taxable in the treaty country where the permanent establishment is located, even if the payment is deferred until after such permanent establishment has ceased to exist. The OECD Model treaty does not include a similar provision and the United States reserved the right to amend Article 7 to provide for taxation of income or gain even if payments are deferred until after the permanent establishment has ceased to exist.⁴ The committee may wish to ask the Treasury Department if they believe this provision is adequate to prevent the avoidance of tax on income attributable to a permanent establishment when that permanent establishment is no longer in existence.

Limitation-on-benefits provisions in treaties with Hungary, Chile, Poland, and Spain

Like the U.S. Model treaty, the proposed revisions to the treaties with Chile, Hungary, Poland, and Spain include extensive limitation-on-benefits rules (Chile, Article 24; Hungary, Article 22; Poland, Article 22; Spain, Article IX of the proposed protocol, amending Article 17 of the existing treaty) that are intended to prevent third-country residents from benefiting inappropriately from a treaty that generally grants benefits only to residents of the two treaty countries. This practice is commonly referred to as "treaty shopping." With the inclusion of modern limitation-on-

benefits rules, the proposed treaties with Hungary and Poland represent a significant opportunity to mitigate treaty shopping. The present treaties with Hungary and Poland are two of only seven U.S. income tax treaties that do not include any limitation-on-benefits rules.⁵ The lack of any limitation-on-benefits rules in combination with provisions for complete exemption from withholding on interest payments from one treaty country to the other treaty country present attractive opportunities for treaty shopping.⁶ For example, a November 2007 report prepared by the Treasury Department at the request of Congress suggests that the income tax treaty with Hungary has increasingly been used for treaty-shopping purposes as the United States adopted modern limitation-on-benefits provisions in its other treaties. In 2004, U.S. corporations that were at least 25-percent foreign owned made \$1.2 billion in interest payments to related parties in Hungary, the seventh-largest amount of interest paid to related parties in any single country.⁷

Earlier this year, a possible revision of Article 22 (Limitation on Benefits) of the U.S. Model treaty was published for public comment. Although the limitation-on-benefits rules in the proposed treaties with Chile, Hungary, Poland, and Spain are similar to the rules in other recent and proposed U.S. income tax treaties and protocols and in the U.S. Model treaty, they are not uniform. Your committee may wish to inquire about certain differences among these agreements, the underlying rationale for the differences and the extent to which they align with the policies in the U.S. Model treaty or its proposed revision. The principal differences from the U.S. Model treaty are the inclusion of the headquarters company category of qualified person, the derivative benefits rule, and the antiabuse rule for triangular arrangements, and with respect to Spain, the standard for exercise of competent authority discretion to grant treaty benefits to persons or with respect to income not otherwise eligible.

As in the U.S. Model treaty, in the pending protocols, a recognized stock exchange includes certain exchanges specified in the treaty as well as any other stock exchange agreed upon by the competent authorities of the treaty countries. Your committee may wish to explore the rationale underlying the identification of recognized stock exchanges for purposes of limitations of benefits, and the criteria the Treasury Department considers when negotiating over the definition of a recognized stock exchange.

The derivative benefits rules may grant treaty benefits to a treaty-country resident company in circumstances in which the company itself would not qualify for treaty benefits under any of the other limitation-on-benefits provisions. Like other recent treaties, including those with Canada and Iceland as well as several European treaty countries, the proposed treaties with Poland, Spain, and Hungary include a derivative benefits rule. Under the derivative benefits rule, a treaty-country company receives treaty benefits for an item of income if the company's owners (referred to in the proposed treaty as equivalent beneficiaries) reside in a country that is in the same trading bloc as the treaty country and would have been entitled to the same benefits for the income had those owners derived the income directly. The definition of equivalent beneficiary differs in the proposed agreements. With respect to Spain, a party whose ownership interest is held indirectly is not an equivalent beneficiary unless the intermediate owner also qualifies as an equivalent beneficiary, similar to the rule in the proposed revision to the U.S. Model treaty. The Chile treaty, like the existing U.S. Model treaty, does not include derivative benefits rules.

The proposed treaties with Chile and Hungary include special antiabuse rules intended to deny treaty benefits in certain circumstances in which a Chilean or Hungarian resident company earns U.S.-source income attributable to a third-country permanent establishment and is subject to little or no tax in the third jurisdiction and (as applicable) Chile or Hungary. A rule on triangular arrangements is not included in the U.S. Model treaty, but similar antiabuse rules are included in other recent treaties and protocols.

With respect to the headquarters company rule, the committee may wish to explore the rationale for granting benefits to an entity that is not otherwise eligible for benefits. The proposed treaties with Chile and Hungary and the proposed protocols with Spain and Poland allow full treaty benefits for an entity that functions as a headquarters company, but does not satisfy the other categories of persons entitled to full treaty benefits. In doing so, they conform to U.S. income tax treaties in force with Austria, Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland but not the U.S. Model treaty. The conditions for qualifying as a headquarters company include requirements intended to ensure that the headquarters company performs substantial supervisory and administrative functions for a group of companies, including its multinational nature, that the headquarters company is subject to the same income tax rules in its country of residence as would apply to a company en-

gaged in the active conduct of a trade or business in that country; and that the headquarters company has independent authority in carrying out its supervisory and administrative functions.

Finally, the committee may wish to inquire whether it is appropriate to grant discretion to competent authorities to extend treaty benefits to persons not otherwise entitled to such benefits, and, if so, the standard for exercise of any such authority. As in the U.S. Model and other recently negotiated treaties with modern limitations on benefits articles, the proposed treaty with Poland includes a grant of discretion to the competent authority to extend otherwise unavailable treaty benefits to a party that is not otherwise entitled to treaty benefits if the competent authority determines that the organization or operation of the person claiming benefits did not have as a principal purpose the obtaining of treaty benefits. By contrast, the proposed protocol with Spain requires that the competent authority evaluate the extent to which the resident of the other country met any of the criteria under other provisions in the article, without regard to motivation.

The committee may wish to inquire of the Treasury Department about the alternative formulations of the standard for discretion to extend tax treaty benefits that have been proposed as part of Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, undertaken by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") at the request of the G20.⁸

Mandatory arbitration in treaties with Japan, Spain, and Switzerland

In addition to the proposed protocol with Japan, the protocols amending the Swiss and Spanish treaties also include revisions to the mutual agreement procedures to require competent authorities to resort to binding arbitration if unable to reach a resolution within a specified period of time. Although tax treaties traditionally have not included a mechanism to ensure resolution of disputes, the addition of mandatory procedures for binding arbitration as part of the mutual agreement procedures has become increasingly frequent in recent years. The U.S. tax treaties currently in effect with Belgium, Germany, France, and Canada include such provisions. Mandatory binding arbitration is provided upon request of the taxpayer in paragraph 5 of Article 25 (Mutual Agreement Procedure) of the OECD Model treaty. Following its 2-year study on base erosion and profit shifting, the OECD concluded that the inclusion of mandatory binding arbitration is necessary to achieve the goal of the mutual agreement procedures, which generally encourage, but do not require, dispute resolution by the competent authorities.⁹

In considering the proposed protocols, the committee may wish to consider the extent to which the inclusion of mandatory arbitration rules and the particular features of the arbitration provisions in the proposed protocols now represent the United States policy regarding mandatory binding arbitration. In particular, the committee may wish to inquire about the criteria on which the Treasury Department determines whether to include such provisions in a particular treaty, the appropriate scope of issues eligible for determination by binding arbitration, the absence of precedential value of arbitration determinations, the role of the taxpayer in an arbitration proceeding and how to ensure adequate oversight of the use of mandatory arbitration.

Regardless of whether the Treasury Department expects mandatory arbitration to become a standard feature in all future U.S. tax treaties, the committee may wish to inquire about the experience to date in the four treaties with such provisions currently in effect, and whether the Treasury Department intends to develop and publish a standardized set of arbitration principles and procedures for inclusion in a revision to the U.S. Model treaty.

Zero-withholding on parent-subsidiary dividends in treaties with Spain and Japan

When certain conditions are satisfied, the proposed protocol with Spain eliminates withholding tax on dividends paid by a company that is resident in one treaty country to a company that is a resident of the other treaty country and that owns at least 80 percent of the stock of the dividend-paying company (often referred to as "direct dividends"). The elimination of withholding tax on direct dividends is intended to reduce the tax barriers to direct investment between the two treaty countries. The proposed protocol with Japan broadens the scope of companies eligible for zero-withholding under the existing treaty by reducing the ownership and holding period thresholds for eliminating of withholding on dividends.

Until 2003, no U.S. income tax treaty provided for a complete exemption from dividend withholding tax, and the U.S. Model treaty does not provide an exemption. By contrast, many bilateral income tax treaties of other countries eliminate withholding taxes on direct dividends between treaty countries, and the European Union

(“EU”) Parent-Subsidiary Directive repeals withholding taxes on intra-EU direct dividends. Recent U.S. income tax treaties and protocols with Australia, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, France, and New Zealand include zero-rate provisions. The Senate ratified those treaties and protocols in 2003 (Australia, Mexico, United Kingdom), 2004 (Japan, Netherlands), 2006 (Sweden), 2007 (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Germany), 2009 (France), and 2010 (New Zealand). The proposed protocol with Spain therefore would bring to 13 the number of U.S. income tax treaties that provide a zero rate for direct dividends.

Because zero-rate provisions are a relatively recent but now prominent development in U.S. income tax treaty practice, the committee may wish to consider possible costs and benefits of zero-rate provisions such as revenue considerations and diminishing of barriers to cross-border investment; the Treasury Department’s criteria for determining when a zero-rate provision is appropriate; and certain specific features of zero-rate provisions such as ownership thresholds, holding-period requirements, the treatment of indirect ownership, and heightened limitation-on-benefits requirements. These issues have been described in detail in connection with the committee’s previous consideration of proposed income tax treaties and protocols that have included zero-rate provisions.¹⁰

Although zero-rate provisions for direct dividends have become a common feature of U.S. income tax treaties signed in the last decade, the U.S. Model treaty does not provide a zero rate for direct dividends. In previous testimony before the committee, the Treasury Department has indicated that zero-rate provisions should be allowed only under treaties that have restrictive limitation-on-benefits rules and that provide comprehensive information exchange. Even in those treaties, according to previous Treasury Department statements, dividend withholding tax should be eliminated only on the basis of an evaluation of the overall balance of benefits under the treaty. Every recent U.S. income tax treaty or protocol has included restrictive limitation-on-benefits provisions and comprehensive information exchange provisions. The committee therefore may wish to inquire into whether there are other particular considerations that the Treasury Department will now take into account in deciding whether to negotiate for zero-rate direct dividend provisions in future income tax treaties and protocols. The committee also may wish to ask whether any new U.S. model income tax treaty might eliminate withholding tax on direct dividends and, if it would not so provide, why it would not.

Developments in substantive foreign tax laws of Chile, Poland, and Spain

Based on our own research and on assistance from foreign law specialists of the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress’ Law Library, we understand that there have been potentially noteworthy changes in the income tax laws of Chile, Poland, and Spain since the Foreign Relations Committee last considered the proposed agreements with those countries in 2014.

In Chile, the corporate-shareholder income tax, which is fully integrated by means of a shareholder-level credit for corporate tax paid on distributed profits, has been the subject of reform legislation scheduled to take effect in 2017. Under this reform, a shareholder of a Chilean corporation who is a resident of a country with which Chile does not have an income tax treaty will be credited with 65 percent, rather than 100 percent, of corporate tax paid on distributed profits. We understand that the Government of Spain has also enacted legislation that, among other things, reduces the corporate tax rate and modifies depreciation rules. Finally, we understand that the Government of Poland has enacted changes to the individual income tax and corporate income tax.

The committee may wish to inquire whether the Treasury Department believes that the proposed agreements appropriately accommodate these internal law developments.

B. Administrative Assistance Issues

Mutual collection assistance with Japan

The proposed protocol with Japan departs from the U.S. Model Article 26 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) in providing for assistance in the collection of revenue claims of the other contracting state beyond those amounts required to ensure that treaty benefits are respected and limited to those entitled to them under the terms of the treaty. The committee may wish to explore the basis for agreeing to this departure from general U.S. policy and the criteria applied in determining to do so. For example, the committee may seek assurances as to the nature of safeguards protecting the rights of persons whose U.S. tax debts may be subject to collection in Japan and the extent to which persons with Japanese

tax debts can be assumed to have had adequate opportunities for review of the merits of the underlying claim may also warrant inquiry.

The infrequency of such provisions is consistent with the revenue rule doctrine, which can be traced to the centuries-long tradition based on Lord Mansfield's statement, "For no country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of another."¹¹ Although its vitality and scope have been questioned, most recently in *Pasquantino v. United States*,¹² the doctrine remains a cornerstone of all common law jurisdictions, as well as many others. In determining whether to honor a judgment of a foreign court, U.S. courts generally do not accord comity to tax or penal judgments of a foreign court.¹³

In addition to the concerns about preserving the sovereignty of the United States and the rights of its taxpayers, the risk of increased administrative burden may also be considered. The agreement includes requirements that the authorities reach agreement to limit the volume of such requests and share costs of the program.

Exchange of information issues in all pending protocols

Tax treaties establish the scope of information that can be exchanged between treaty countries. Exchange of information provisions first appeared in the late 1930s,¹⁴ and are now included in all double tax conventions to which the United States is a party. A broad international consensus has coalesced around the issue of bank transparency for tax purposes and strengthened in recent years, in part due to events involving one of Switzerland's largest banks, UBS AG, the global financial crisis, and the general increase in globalization. Greater attention to all means of restoring integrity and stability to financial institutions has led to greater efforts to reconcile the conflicts between jurisdictions, particularly between jurisdictions with strict bank secrecy and those seeking information to enforce their own tax laws.¹⁵ As a result, the committee may wish to inquire as to whether the U.S. Model treaty published in 2006 remains the appropriate standard by which to measure an effective exchange of information program.

Although the United States has long had bilateral income tax treaties in force with Hungary, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, the United States has engaged in relatively limited exchange of information under these tax treaties. With Luxembourg and Switzerland, the limitations stem from strict bank secrecy rules in those jurisdictions. The proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland are a response to that history as well as part of the international trend in exchange of information.

The pamphlets prepared by the Joint Committee staff provide detailed overviews of the information exchange articles in each of the pending protocols. They also describe the extent to which those articles differ from the U.S. Model treaty's rules on information exchange. The pamphlets published on May 20, 2011, describing the agreements with Hungary, Luxembourg, and Switzerland included detail about several practical issues relating to information exchange under income tax treaties. We addressed those issues in testimony with respect to those agreements and others in 2014. Since then, additional developments relevant to exchange of information with Luxembourg and Switzerland have occurred.

Here I wish to highlight first those issues related to the effectiveness of information exchange under income tax treaties that are common to all of the pending protocols under consideration today, and second, issues specific to the proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland and recent developments.

Effectiveness of U.S. information exchange agreements in general

Today, I will briefly note three issues: automatic exchange of information, the ability of the United States to provide information about beneficial ownership of foreign-owned entities, and the limitations on specific requests for information.

The committee may wish to explore issues related to "routine exchange of information." In this type of exchange, also referred to as "automatic exchange of information," the treaty countries identify categories of information that are consistently relevant to the tax administration of the receiving treaty country and agree to share such information on an ongoing basis, without the need for a specific request. The type of information, when it will be provided, and how frequently it will be provided are determined by the respective Competent Authorities after consultation. In particular, the committee may wish to inquire about (1) the extent to which the United States presently engages in automatic exchange of taxpayer-specific information, (2) practical hurdles to greater use of automatic exchange, and (3) whether it anticipates significant changes in that practice with the ratification of the documents presently before the committee.

The inability of the United States to provide information about beneficial ownership of entities formed in the United States has been criticized in the past and led to pressure to eliminate policies that provide foreign persons with the ability to shel-

ter income.¹⁶ Because the information obtained through information exchange relationships with other jurisdictions has been central to recent successful IRS enforcement efforts against offshore tax evasion, the Treasury Department has included in its budgets for fiscal years 2015 and 2016 a proposal to address the perceived shortcoming by requiring certain financial institutions to report the account balance (including, in the case of a cash value insurance contract or annuity contract, the cash value or surrender value) for all financial accounts maintained at a U.S. office and held by foreign persons.¹⁷ The committee may wish to explore the extent to which either the existing U.S. know-your-customer rules or the corporate formation and ownership standards prevent the United States from providing information about beneficial ownership on a reciprocal basis with its treaty countries. The committee may also consider whether there are steps to take that would help refute the perception that the United States permits States to operate as tax havens and that would help the United States better respond to information requests from treaty countries who suspect that their own citizens and residents may be engaging in illegal activities through U.S. corporations and limited liability companies.¹⁸

The committee may wish to inquire as to the extent to which a request that a treaty country provide information in response to a John Doe summons¹⁹ is a specific request within the meaning of the Article 26, and whether protracted litigation similar to that which occurred in the UBS litigation²⁰ can be avoided or shortened. A “specific” request refers to an exchange which occurs when one treaty country provides information to the other treaty country in response to a specific request by the latter country for information that is relevant to an ongoing investigation of a particular tax matter. One problem with specific exchange has been that some treaty countries have declined to exchange information in response to specific requests intended to identify limited classes of persons.²¹ Your committee may wish to seek assurances that, under the proposed treaties and protocols, treaty countries are required to exchange information in response to specific requests that are comparable to John Doe summonses under domestic law.²²

Information exchange with Luxembourg and Switzerland

The existing treaties with Luxembourg and Switzerland include exchange of information articles that do not comply with the U.S. Model treaty, the terms of U.S. tax treaties currently in force, or the international norms on transparency. To date, neither jurisdiction has achieved a satisfactory rating under the peer review process of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information, the international body organized within the OECD to conduct its work on exchange of information standards (“Global Forum”). The peer review is conducted in two phases: Phase I evaluates the legal and regulatory aspects of exchange, that is, whether or not the domestic law and administrative structures exist in a jurisdiction to enable it to exchange information. In Phase II, the peer review evaluates the actual practice of exchange of information.²³ Both jurisdictions have made progress in addressing the deficiencies, according to the Global Forum, but neither has yet been rated to be compliant or largely compliant.

Switzerland

The exchange of information article in the 1951 U.S.-Swiss treaty was limited to “prevention of fraud or the like.” Under the treaty, Switzerland applied a principle of dual criminality, requiring that the purpose for which the information was sought also be a valid purpose under local law. Because “fraud or the like” was limited to nontax crimes in Switzerland, information on civil or criminal tax cases was not available. The provision was substantially revised for the present treaty, signed in 1996, and accompanied by a contemporaneous protocol that elaborated on the terms used in the exchange of information article. That 1996 Protocol was intended to broaden the circumstances under which tax authorities could exchange information to include tax fraud or fraudulent conduct, both civil and criminal. It provided a definition at paragraph 10 of “tax fraud” to mean “fraudulent conduct that causes or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of tax paid to a contracting state.” In practice, exchange apparently remained limited, leading the competent authorities to negotiate a subsequent memorandum of understanding that included numerous examples of the facts upon which a treaty country may base its suspicions of fraud to support a request to exchange information.²⁴

The proposed protocol, by replacing Article 26 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) of the present treaty and amending paragraph 10 of the 1996 Protocol, closely adheres to the principles announced by Switzerland. It also conforms to the standards, if not the language, of the exchange of information provisions in the U.S. Model treaty in many respects. As a result, the proposed protocol may facilitate greater exchange of information than has occurred in the past, chiefly

by eliminating the present treaty requirement that the requesting treaty country establish tax fraud or fraudulent conduct or the like as a basis for exchange of information and providing that domestic bank secrecy laws and lack of a domestic interest in the requested information are not possible grounds for refusing to provide requested information. Lack of proof of fraud, lack of a domestic interest in the information requested, and Swiss bank secrecy laws were cited by Swiss authorities in declining to exchange information. The proposed protocol attempts to ensure that subsequent changes in domestic law cannot be relied upon to prevent access to the information by including in the proposed protocol a self-executing statement that the competent authorities are empowered to obtain access to the information notwithstanding any domestic legislation to the contrary.

Nevertheless, there are several areas in which questions about the extent to which the exchange of information article in the proposed protocol may prove effective are warranted. The proposed revisions to paragraph 10 of the 1996 Protocol reflect complete adoption of the first element listed above in the Swiss negotiating position, "limitation of administrative assistance to individual cases and thus no fishing expeditions." The limitation poses issues regarding (1) the extent to which the Swiss will continue to reject requests that do not name the taxpayer as a result of the requirement that a taxpayer be "typically" identified by name, and (2) the standard of relevance to be applied to requests for information, in light of the caveat against "fishing expeditions." In addition, the appropriate interpretation of the scope of purposes for which exchanged information may be used may be unnecessarily limited by comments in the Technical Explanation. In particular, although paragraph 2 of Article 26 (Exchange of Information), as modified by the proposed protocol, generally prohibits persons who receive information exchanged under the article from using the information for purposes other than those related to the administration, assessment, or collection of taxes covered by the treaty, the paragraph also allows the information to be used for other purposes so long as the laws of both the United States and Switzerland permit that use and the competent authority of the requested country consents to that use. The Technical Explanation, however, states that one treaty country (for example, the United States) will seek the other treaty country's (for example, Switzerland's) consent under this expanded use provision only to the extent that use is allowed under the provisions of the U.S.-Switzerland Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that entered into force in 1977.

The extent to which Swiss commitment to transparency in practice is consistent with international norms remains the subject of inquiry by the Global Forum, despite the apparent adoption of the OECD standards on administrative assistance in tax matters in 2009,²⁵ when it simultaneously announced key elements that it would require as conditions to be met in any new agreements. The Swiss conditions established by the Federal Council limited administrative assistance to individual cases and only in response to a specific and justified request. Although Switzerland is considered by the OECD to be a jurisdiction that has fully committed to the transparency standards of the OECD, the OECD report on Phase I of its peer review of Switzerland states that the Swiss authorities' initial insistence on imposing identification requirements as a predicate for exchange of information was inconsistent with the international standards and that additional actions would be needed to permit the review process to proceed to Phase II. Those actions include bringing a significant number of its agreements into line with the standards and taking action to confirm that all new agreements are interpreted in line with the standard. On October 1, 2015, the Global Forum launched the Phase II peer review of Switzerland, signaling that the actions taken by Switzerland to improve its transparency with respect to tax matters since the Phase I report have satisfied the Global Forum.

According to advice we received from foreign law specialists at the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress' Law Library, the actions taken by the Swiss since the initial unfavorable Phase I peer review include its agreement to the international standards on automatic exchange, expansion of its information exchange network, amendment of existing agreements to conform to the international transparency norms, and revision of domestic law to ensure the ability of tax authorities to comply with the exchange of information obligations and safeguards required in its bilateral and multilateral agreements. A report of the recently launched Phase II peer review is expected in 2016.

Luxembourg

The proposed protocol with Luxembourg, by replacing Article 28 (Exchange of Information and Administrative Assistance) of the 1996 treaty, is consistent with both the OECD and U.S. Model treaties. There are several areas in which questions are warranted about the extent to which the new article as revised in the proposed

protocol may prove effective. These questions arise not from the language in the proposed protocol itself but from the mutual understandings reflected in diplomatic notes exchanged at the time the protocol was signed. Potential areas of concern are found in statements in the diplomatic notes concerning (1) the obligation to ensure tax authority access to information about beneficial ownership of juridical entities and financial institutions, other than publicly traded entities, to the extent that such information is of a type that is within the possession or control of someone within the territorial jurisdiction, (2) the requirement that all requests must provide the identity of the person under investigation, (3) the standard of relevance to be applied in stating a purpose for which the information is sought, and (4) the requirement that requests include a representation that all other means of obtaining the information have been attempted, except to the extent that to do so would cause disproportionate difficulties.

The Global Forum's Phase II peer review of Luxembourg's implementation of transparency and information exchange standards reported in 2013 that Luxembourg was noncompliant with OECD standards. Based on the research assistance from foreign law specialists of the Global Legal Research Center of the Library of Congress' Law Library, we understand that Luxembourg has undertaken significant action to address the deficiencies identified in the earlier peer review report. These measures include ratification of the OECD Multilateral agreement that is pending before this committee, implementation of various directives of the European Union, and enactment of legislation in 2014 explicitly intended to remedy a number of criticisms of the Global Forum report.²⁶ It has also ratified a number of bilateral agreements that include exchange of information provisions that comply with the international norms. Based on these measures, the Global Forum agreed to conduct a supplementary peer review, which was launched on January 16, 2015. The results of that review are not yet known.

Expansion of the OECD Multilateral mutual administrative assistance agreement

One of the most significant changes to the multilateral convention made by the proposed protocol is the opening of membership in the convention to states that are neither OECD nor Council of Europe members. The signatories include a number of countries who are not members of G20,²⁷ the OECD or the Council of Europe: Colombia, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guatemala, and Tunisia. All members of G20 are among the signatories. Those members of G20 who are not also members of either the OECD or Council of Europe include Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Thus, on the one hand, the inclusive standard for permitting nations to participate has opened the multilateral convention to a number of significant trade partners of the United States. On the other hand, it requires the United States to initiate an exchange of information program with jurisdictions with which it has not previously entered into a bilateral relationship. Among the signatories that have neither a tax treaty nor a TIEA with the United States are Albania, Andorra, Croatia, Ghana, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore.

The extent to which any of those states are jurisdictions with which the United States has previously participated in an exchange of information program and whether the program has operated satisfactorily are areas in which the committee may wish to inquire. To the extent that they are jurisdictions with whom the United States has no exchange of information program under a bilateral agreement, the committee may wish to inquire about the extent to which the United States has been able to satisfy itself that each jurisdiction is an appropriate partner for exchange of information. The committee may also wish to inquire whether the expanded exchange of information requirements will be manageable.

The committee may also wish to inquire about the circumstances under which the United States would object to accession by a nonmember state, as contemplated under the procedures for securing the unanimous consent of the governing body of the treaty before the agreement may enter into effect with respect to that nonmember state. For example, in explaining its general standards for considering entry into a bilateral agreement with a jurisdiction, Treasury has stated, "... prior to entering into an information exchange agreement with another jurisdiction, the Treasury Department and the IRS closely review the foreign jurisdiction's legal framework for maintaining the confidentiality of taxpayer information. In order to conclude an information exchange agreement with another country, the Treasury Department and the IRS must be satisfied that the foreign jurisdiction has the necessary legal safeguards in place to protect exchanged information and that adequate penalties apply to any breach of that confidentiality."²⁸

CONCLUSION

The matters that I have described in this testimony are addressed in more detail in the Joint Committee staff pamphlets on the proposed treaties and protocols. I am happy to answer any questions that your committee may have at this time or in the future.

End Notes

¹This document may be cited as follows: Joint Committee on Taxation, "Testimony of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Chile, Hungary, and Poland the Proposed Tax Protocols with Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain, and Japan, and the Proposed Protocol Amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters" (JCX-137-15), October 29, 2015. This document is available on the Internet at <http://www.jct.gov>.

²Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol Amending the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Japan" (JCX-XX-15), October XX, 2015; Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Hungary" (JCX-32-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Luxembourg" (JCX-30-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Switzerland" (JCX-31-11), May 20, 2011; Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol Amending the Multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters" (JCX-9-14), February 21, 2014; Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Chile" (JCX-10-14), February 24, 2014. Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Poland" (JCX-68-14), June 17, 2014; and Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Spain" (JCX-67-14), June 17, 2014. The pamphlets describing the proposed treaty with Hungary and the proposed protocols with Luxembourg and Switzerland were prepared in connection with a Committee on Foreign Relations hearing held on June 7, 2011. The pamphlet describing the proposed treaty with Chile was prepared in connection with the hearing of the Committee on February 26, 2014. The pamphlets describing the proposed treaty with Poland and the proposed protocol with Spain were prepared in connection with the hearing on June 19, 2014.

³Full text of the proposed rules published on May 20, 2015, at the Resource Center, Department of Treasury, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/international.aspx>.

⁴See Commentaries to the OECD Model treaty, paragraph 79.

⁵The other income tax treaties without limitation-on-benefits rules are the ones with Greece (1953), Pakistan (1959), the Philippines (1982), Romania (1976), and the U.S.S.R. (1976). Following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the income tax treaty with the U.S.S.R. applies to the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

⁶The income tax treaty with Greece also provides for complete exemption from withholding on interest, although it contains restrictions that limit the availability of the exemption, such that a Greek company receiving interest from a U.S. company does not qualify for the exemption if it controls, directly or indirectly, more than 50 percent of the U.S. company.

⁷Department of the Treasury, "Report to the Congress on Earnings Stripping, Transfer Pricing and U.S. Income Tax Treaties" (Nov. 28, 2007). The report states that, as of 2004, it does not appear that the U.S.-Poland income tax treaty has been extensively exploited by third-country residents. Although the report also focused on Iceland to the same extent as Hungary, a 2007 Income Tax Convention with Iceland that includes a modern limitation-on-benefits provision has since taken effect.

⁸OECD, "Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances Action 6-2015 Final Report," (October 5, 2015), available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-2015-final-report_9789264241695-en.

⁹OECD, "Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, Action 14-2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting Project," OECD Publishing, Paris.

¹⁰See, for example, Joint Committee on Taxation, "Explanation of Proposed Protocol to the Income Tax Treaty Between the United States and Germany" (JCX-47-07), July 13, 2007, pp. 82-84.

¹¹*Holman v. Johnson*, 98 The English Reporter 1120 (King's Bench 1775), cited in *AG of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc.*, 268 F.3d 103, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1000 (2002).
¹²544 U.S. 349; 125 S. Ct. 1766; 161 L. Ed. 2d 619 (2005).

¹³"Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States," secs. 483 (1987), stating "Courts in the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states." The principle is permissive, not a requirement.

¹⁴Article XV of the U.S.-Sweden Double Tax Convention, signed on March 23, 1939.

¹⁵See, Joint Committee on Taxation, "Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Proposal; Part Three: Provisions Related to the Taxation of Cross-Border Income and Investment" (JCS-4-09), September 2009. Section VI of that pamphlet provides an overview of the international efforts to address these issues.

¹⁶Financial Action Task Force, IMF, "Summary of the Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism United States of America,"

pp. 10–11 (June 23, 2006); Government Accountability Office, “Company Formations: Minimal Ownership Information Is Collected and Available,” a report to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate GAO–06–376 (April 2006); Government Accountability Office, “Suspicious Banking Activities: Possible Money Laundering by US Corporations Formed for Russian Entities,” GAO–01–120 (October 31, 2006).

¹⁷ A description and analysis of the complete proposal can be found in Joint Committee on Taxation, “Description of Certain Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Proposal” (JCS–2–14), December 2014, at pages 184–190. See also Joint Committee on Taxation, “Description of Certain Revenue Provisions Contained in the President’s Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Proposal” (JCS–2–15), September 2015, at page 248.

¹⁸ E.g., the “Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act,” S. 569, 111th Congress (2009), would require States to obtain and periodically update beneficial ownership information from persons who seek to form a corporation or limited liability company.

¹⁹ When the existence of a possibly noncompliant taxpayer is known but not his identity, as in the case of holders of offshore bank accounts or investors in particular abusive transactions, the IRS is able to issue a summons to learn the identity of the taxpayer, but must first meet greater statutory requirements, to guard against fishing expeditions. Prior to issuance of the summons intended to learn the identity of unnamed “John Does,” the United States must seek judicial review in an ex parte proceeding. In its application and supporting documents, the United States must establish that the information sought pertains to an ascertainable group of persons, that there is a reasonable basis to believe that taxes have been avoided, and that the information is not otherwise available.

²⁰ See, *United States v. UBS AG*, Civil No. 09–20423 (S.D. Fla.), enforcing a “John Doe summons” which requested the identities of U.S. persons believed to have accounts at UBS in Switzerland. On August 19, 2009, the United States and UBS announced an agreement (approved by the Swiss Parliament on June 17, 2010) under which UBS provided the requested information.

²¹ For example, a petition to enforce a John Doe summons served by the United States on UBS, AG was filed on February 21, 2009, accompanied by an affidavit of Barry B. Shott, the U.S. competent authority for the United States–Switzerland income tax treaty. Paragraph 16 of that affidavit notes that Switzerland had traditionally taken the position that a specific request must identify the taxpayer. See *United States v. UBS AG*, Civil No. 09–20423 (S.D. Fla.). On August 19, 2009, after extensive negotiations between the Swiss and U.S. governments, the United States and UBS announced that UBS had agreed to provide information on over 4,000 U.S. persons with accounts at UBS.

²² Under a John Doe summons, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) asks for information to identify unnamed “John Doe” taxpayers. The IRS may issue a John Doe summons only with judicial approval, and judicial approval is given only if there is a reasonable basis to believe that taxes have been avoided and that the information sought pertains to an ascertainable group of taxpayers and is not otherwise available.

²³ Certain OECD conclusions about information exchange with Luxembourg and Switzerland are noted below. The OECD peer reviews of Chile and Hungary found that although those jurisdictions generally are compliant with OECD standards, each country had certain deficiencies preventing fully effective information exchange.

²⁴ “Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the Swiss–U.S. Tax Convention of October 2, 1996,” reprinted at paragraph 9106, “Tax Treaties,” (CCH 2005).

²⁵ See “Switzerland to adopt OECD standard on administrative assistance in fiscal matters,” Federal Department of Finance, FDF (March 13, 2009), available at <http://www.efd.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00467/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=25863> (last accessed March 1, 2011).

²⁶ Law of November 25, 2014: New applicable procedure with respect to exchange of information on request, amending the Law of March 31, 2010.

²⁷ G20, or the Group of Twenty, is a forum for international economic cooperation among the member countries and the European Union. The leaders of the members meet annually, while finance and banking regulators meet more frequently throughout the year. They work closely with a number of international organizations, including the OECD.

²⁸ Preamble to Treas. Reg. 1.6049–4(b)(5). T.D. 9584, April 12, 2012.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, and thanks to both of you for your testimony today.

Mr. Stack, are there any provisions in the treaties being considered today that would override current U.S. domestic tax laws requiring protection of taxpayer information? Or are these treaties consistent with U.S. domestic law?

Mr. STACK. Senator, these treaties are consistent with U.S. domestic law and do not override U.S. domestic law in connection with the treatment of confidential information.

Senator ISAKSON. I think I heard you in your testimony refer to the perception of Swiss bank accounts being a safe haven in the past. Was that a perception or was that true? And does, in fact, the

treaty limit that being a safe haven so there is more transparency on deposits in Switzerland?

Mr. STACK. Well, let me answer this way, Senator. In a report from this committee, when the Swiss treaty was reported out, the committee took note of the difficulties faced in 2008 and 2009 by the IRS and the Department of Justice in obtaining information needed to enforce U.S. tax laws against U.S. persons who utilized the services of UBS AG back then, a multinational bank based in Switzerland.

What we expect, and this, again, was reported by the Senate committee, expect that the proposed protocol, including in particular the express provision making clear that a country's bank secrecy laws cannot prevent the exchange of tax information requested pursuant to a treaty, should put the Government of Switzerland in a position to prevent recurrence of such an incident in the future.

So without directly saying whether it was a haven or not, we had a difficulty. The difficulty was the old treaty required a showing of fraud, or the like, before the Swiss would give us information. The new treaty to which they have agreed says the United States just needs to demonstrate that the information sought is foreseeably relevant to a tax investigation. The Swiss treaty says "may be relevant." And that is going to make it easier for us to hunt down tax cheats that might be hiding assets in Switzerland.

Senator ISAKSON. That would be a consistent standard with domestic U.S. law, if it was a domestic case. Is that not right?

Mr. STACK. Yes, Senator. The treaty standard is actually taken from our statutory standard in section 7602, which authorizes the IRS to inspect books and records that "may be relevant to a tax inquiry." So the standard that is in the treaty and the standard that is in our statutes are coterminous.

Senator ISAKSON. I would assume, when you refer to limited cooperation in the Japan treaty and others in terms of the collection of taxes, that that is a step forward in collecting taxes that might be owed to the United States.

Mr. STACK. It is, Senator. It is. I would add that we are very careful before we agree to enter into mutual assistance and collection in our treaties, simply because we do not want to put a disproportionate burden on the IRS to be spending more effort collecting taxes for the other jurisdiction than the other jurisdiction might be helping us collect. So we do a very careful balancing.

So while we are happy to have this in our Japan treaty, I would not say that this will necessarily become the standard, since we weigh it on a case-by-case basis.

But, yes, you are correct. It will assist us in this case in collecting taxes from people in Japan who owe the U.S. taxes.

Senator ISAKSON. As I understand it, the tax rate on tax treaty participants in Chile is 27 percent, and the tax rate in Chile on nonparticipants in a tax treaty is 35 percent. Is that correct? I have been told that is correct.

Mr. STACK. I would just say, I mean, there are different flows that might have different rates. I would just say that, under the treaty, we are reducing all of the withholding rates on payments out of Chile that otherwise might have applied in the absence of

the treaty, although because they have a unique corporate tax system, we have given them some more time to be able to collect a withholding tax on shareholders on dividends out of Chile.

But generally speaking, the treaty participants get a reduced rate, a better rate than nontreaty participants investing in a country.

Senator ISAKSON. Assuming my numbers are correct at 35 percent and 27 percent, an American company competing in Chile and earning money from a country that does not have a treaty with Chile would be at an 8 percent disadvantage competing in the country. Would that not be correct?

Mr. STACK. Yes. If the point is that if we do not have our Chilean treaty, our companies can be at a disadvantage with companies that do have a treaty with Chile, that would be correct, yes.

Senator ISAKSON. That is what I am trying to get into the record.

Mr. STACK. Thank you.

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Barthold, one of the stated goals of entering into a tax treaty is to prevent tax avoidance and tax evasion. A primary tool used to prevent tax avoidance is the exchange of information between countries and revenue authorities.

The United States has used exchange of information for decades in its tax treaties. Is that correct?

Mr. BARTHOLD. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ISAKSON. That has resulted in better collection. Is that correct?

Mr. BARTHOLD. The Internal Revenue Service believes that it has aided in their collection of liabilities that are owed, sir, yes.

Senator ISAKSON. Can you tell us, for the record, the assurances that the information of domestic U.S. taxpayers, how they are protected in these treaties, in terms of the privacy information they would otherwise have protected in the United States?

Mr. BARTHOLD. The treaties do not grant access to taxpayer records that are beyond what is provided in U.S. law. Under code section 6103, there is strict protection on the ability of anyone to access taxpayer information, except for tax administration purposes. That is mainly within the Internal Revenue Service.

As part of their treaty process, and Mr. Stack can address this further, before there is any exchange of information, the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service assure themselves that there are comparable rights or that disclosures are not permitted that are beyond what is permitted under U.S. domestic law.

Senator ISAKSON. Are there any penalties for unauthorized release of private information by any of these treaties? I mean, a country that accidentally or intentionally released private information, is there a penalty within the treaty provided for that? Or is there an enforcement mechanism to give them a motivation to be sure they do not do that?

Mr. BARTHOLD. I am not sure. There are not penalties on countries, per se. There is potentially penalty on our side, on the United States person, if we are party to an unauthorized disclosure. So Mr. Stack might be at risk.

Senator ISAKSON. Okay. So I understand breaking the treaty is probably the penalty you have. If you break the treaty, you can always dissolve the treaty. Is that correct?

Mr. BARTHOLD. You could abrogate the treaty. That would be the basis for the administration to abrogate.

Senator ISAKSON. That is the ultimate enforcement mechanism, because these treaties are mutually beneficial to the countries.

Mr. BARTHOLD. That is the idea behind the treaty.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you both for your testimony.

Senator MENENDEZ.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When you said Mr. Stack is at risk, you meant that the Treasury Department would be at risk?

Mr. BARTHOLD. It can actually be specific individuals, Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay.

Mr. Stack, you have to watch out here.

First of all, I want to thank you, Mr. Stack, and your colleagues at Treasury for the immense work that has gone into negotiating these treaties and preparing them for consideration. For most of this, this is the second round that we have been at this. I know that when I was chairman, I wanted to push these through. Chairman Corker has also expressed a great deal of interest in trying to break the logjam here. I hope we can work with him to achieve that.

Mr. Barthold, to you and your colleagues, thanks for your analysis and the questions that you posed in the pamphlets that you provided to the staff, which were incredibly helpful. I saw them, and I think they are incredibly helpful in addressing the treaties.

So just a few questions. I really want to develop a record here for when we have a debate on the floor to be able to refer to it, because, from my knowledge, this is largely being impeded by one or two colleagues who have somewhat of a different view.

To both of you, since Japan is really the only new treaty that we will be considering before the committee, could you highlight any notable departures, if there are any, from the United States model or any unique aspects of the Japan treaty that we should be aware of?

Mr. BARTHOLD. I noted a couple directly in my oral testimony, Senator Menendez, and Mr. Stack partially addressed both of those.

One was the mutual assistance. I mean, it is not provided for. It is somewhat unusual. And as I noted, its position in the Japan treaty is somewhat at odds with the reservation that the United States has taken with respect to the OECD multilateral mutual assistance treaty.

The other, I think, most notable departure from what we have been doing recently, and, of course, from the model, is the mandatory and binding arbitration. So it is not part of our model. It might be part of a new model treaty that the Treasury is developing.

But I also noted that within this protocol there are slightly different provisions of how it will operate than in the four operative mandatory and binding arbitration provisions that we have.

One item of note is the ability of the taxpayer involved to participate in the arbitration by submitting a position paper directly to the panel.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Stack, your observations? And could you address yourself to the utility of the mandatory arbitration procedures that we have in this?

Mr. STACK. Yes, Senator.

Mandatory arbitration has garnered the support, mandatory binding arbitration, of many countries around the world as part of the work we just finished at the OECD in connection with base erosion and profit-shifting. Many, many countries are hoping to move forward in including provisions on mandatory binding arbitration in treaties going forward.

Why? Well, I think the reigning view is that it is a tremendous help to resolving cases if both of the competent authorities know that, at the end of the day, their distinct positions will be presented to a neutral arbitrator.

You may, or may not, be aware that we use a particular type of arbitration in our tax treaties, which is sometimes called baseball arbitration or last best offer. What that means is that the arbitrator must choose only between the positions given by the two countries with respect to the tax issue before it. The feeling is that this helps the tax administration move toward a more reasonable position because they know that, at the end of the day, the arbitrator is bound to choose only one of the two government positions.

It is also the hope with arbitration that when the entire tax administration of a country is aware that, at the end of the day, some neutral party is going to decide which country has the better claim to the income, that this could improve administration throughout the governments that we deal with.

So the goal of an arbitration provision is often said not to have an arbitration but to simply help the system more easily resolve cases as we go through the process.

Senator MENENDEZ. I can see that. When I was mayor and negotiating with police and fire unions, we had a very similar process. It brought people to a much more reasonable offer, because they wanted to be closer to the offer that the arbitrator would choose at the end of the day.

Mr. Barthold, let me ask you, with reference to my understanding that these treaties, in essence, the reason that we pursue them is in large part to lower the tax burden of U.S. companies or firms operating abroad. Could you give us a sense of how this does that?

Mr. BARTHOLD. There are a number of different ways. Countries impose withholding taxes on cross-border distributions, such as the point I noted on the zero rate on a distribution of a dividend from a subsidiary to a parent, which is provided anew at a zero rate under the Spanish treaty, and the eligible companies have been expanded for the zero rate under the Japanese treaty.

The default in American law is a 30 percent withholding rate on a payment out of the United States. Other countries have comparable rates on payments out of their countries into the United States. So in the treaties, we mutually agreed to lower those rates.

While such taxes might be creditable under the different tax systems of those countries, sometimes tax credits are not always currently available because of foreign tax credit limitations. So you have a direct effect of lowering the tax rate on earnings by U.S. en-

terprises that are earned abroad when they are paid back in that situation.

Some other situations that arise are that it is possible that the income tax base of a foreign country is somewhat different than the income tax base in the United States. And so it might be the perception of both countries' tax administrators that there is some part of income that is earned that they get to tax. That is the clear case of double taxation, and a primary purpose of the treaties is to try to lay out a number of specific instances where, no, this is yours, and this is mine, so that you eliminate clear cases of double taxation.

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, I have a question or two left, but I am happy to wait for the next round.

Senator ISAKSON. Go ahead.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay.

Mr. Stack, my understanding is that Treasury typically prioritizes the negotiation of new tax treaties partially based on where U.S. individuals and businesses stand to see the most benefit from reducing, for example, double taxation. What kind of support is there in the business community for ratification of these treaties?

Mr. STACK. There is extraordinary support. I think in the opening you mentioned some letters coming in from business groups. And in our prior hearings, Senator, as you may recall, the National Foreign Trade Council and the Organization for International Investment came here and testified.

So we have felt nothing but very strong support from the business community, because they would very much like the benefits that Mr. Barthold mentioned in terms of cross-border investment.

Senator MENENDEZ. And then two final sets of questions. One is, I understand the Spain protocol includes a provision that requires the United States and Spain to begin negotiations within 6 months from the protocol entering into force to conclude an agreement to avoid double taxation on investments between Puerto Rico and Spain. Given that Puerto Rico administers its own tax system but cannot enter into treaties, how is Treasury planning to work with its Spanish counterparts to extend the benefits of the protocol to Puerto Rico?

Mr. STACK. Thank you, Senator. Just for the record, paragraph 3 of the protocol commits the contracting states to initiate discussions as soon as possible but no later than 6 months after the entry into force of the 2013 protocol regarding the conclusion of an appropriate agreement to avoid double taxation on investments between Puerto Rico and Spain. I believe, as we discussed in prior hearings, the United States actually has reached out and worked with both Puerto Rico and Spain in advance of that deadline, since obviously the treaty has not yet entered into force.

The concept of how to handle the double tax issues between Puerto Rico and Spain raises complex legal and political questions. In our involvement to date, we are seeking to see if the agreement referenced in the protocol could be somehow handled by both Spain and Puerto Rico via a statutory approach where, for example, Puerto Rico could lessen withholding taxes on investments in Spain,

and vice versa. This is an analogy to the process undertaken by Guam.

We will return to this issue in full once the agreement is in force and with respect to the discussions we started and continue them as well.

Senator MENENDEZ. Finally, one of, if not the biggest hurdle that I understand some of my colleagues have in supporting this, is something that the chairman started off with you, and that is the question of information exchange and privacy, and other issues which in part you touched upon.

I just want you, for the record, to talk about how standards on information exchange in these treaties have changed from previous treaties. Does the “may be relevant” standard in the treaties before us today represent a new standard not used in previous tax treaties? And in your view, is there any reason why people who have a foreign bank account should be treated any differently from a U.S. citizen who has a bank account in the United States?

Mr. STACK. Thank you, Senator.

As I mentioned in my opening statement, this is not a new standard. What has happened over time is sometimes it has been labeled “such information as is relevant,” “as may be relevant.” Over time, the OECD has adopted a phrase “foreseeably relevant,” which is what we tend to see in our current treaties.

Each of these standards really are about a simple idea, which is that when another country is asking us for tax information, they must demonstrate that there is a link between the information sought and some actual tax investigation of a taxpayer, so that we can avoid what is called a fishing expedition where people can just come in and say give me all the information possible about this or that.

The confusion in this space I think has been caused by the fact that Switzerland alone, out of 57 treaties, has a standard that said one country can only get information from the other if there is a demonstration of fraud or the like, a much higher standard before a tax authority could investigate assets of others abroad.

But as I mentioned in the opening, the “may be relevant,” “foreseeably relevant” has been in our model since 1996. The Senate has already ratified 14 treaties, I am told, since 1999 with a version of this standard in the treaty.

In terms of the bank accounts, I would just say that there is no reason to treat someone with a foreign bank account, different from someone with a U.S. bank account when it comes to the ability of a tax authority to find out whether the person has been evading taxes. These information exchange provisions put people with foreign bank accounts on an equal footing with U.S. citizens who have bank accounts here in the United States.

As I just mentioned earlier, under the code, the IRS has authority to seek information that “may be relevant or material.” The treaties before the committee today permit the IRS to request information that is foreseeably relevant, even if there is a variation in the phrasing.

So in the tax treaty context, this standard and these provisions are critical to ensure that taxpayers cannot avoid their obligations

by the simple device of shifting accounts overseas and getting better treatment than their U.S. resident counterparts.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you very much.

Senator ISAKSON. In light of the question originally asked by Senator Menendez, I will add to my unanimous consent record that the unanimous consent for the three letters that I introduced, one of those letters was from 77 United States companies, from Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola to Baxter and Caterpillar and everybody else in between, in favor of these treaties.

Senator MENENDEZ. Is Coca-Cola from Georgia?

Senator ISAKSON. Yes, they are a small bottling company in Georgia. Pepsi-Cola, their competitor, is on here, too, so we have competitors on there just alike.

Secondly, I want to echo the compliments Senator Menendez made to you all on the information you supplied to the committee and the staff, and tell you that when we go into binding arbitration as a country, I am glad we have two people like you all on our side of the table and not on the other side. So thank you for your service to the country, and we will do everything we can to expedite the consideration of the treaties.

If there are no further comments or questions, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF ROBERT STACK AND THOMAS A. BARTHOLD TO A QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CORY GARDNER

In 2014 testimony before this committee describing the purposes and benefits of tax treaties, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Tax Affairs Robert Stack said that one purpose of tax treaties is to “reduce potential ‘excessive’ taxation by reducing withholding taxes that are imposed at the source,” which ensures that a taxpayer is not “subject to an effective rate of tax that is significantly higher than the tax rate that would apply to net income in either the source or residence country.” In fact, the 2006 U.S. Model Income Tax Convention specifies a zero rate of withholding tax on interest payments as the standard goal.

The current U.S.-Poland tax treaty, signed in 1974, has a zero rate of withholding tax on interest payments. In his 2014 testimony, Deputy Assistant Secretary Stack stated this treaty was one of three U.S. tax treaties, along with the Hungary treaty, that “provided an exemption from source-country withholding on interest payments but contained no protections against treaty shopping.” Treasury testified this year that the updated Poland and Hungary income tax treaties would now include comprehensive limitation-on-benefits provisions to avoid treaty shopping, “represent[ing] a major step forward in protecting the U.S. tax treaty network from abuse.”

Our existing tax treaties with Poland and Hungary both have zero-rate withholding on interest payments, and the proposed new tax treaty with Hungary maintains that zero rate. The updated U.S.-Poland tax treaty, however, would actually increase the rate of withholding tax on interest to 5 percent.

- ♦ Why, given that both treaties now have comprehensive limitation-of-benefits provisions that “represent a major step forward” in abuse protection, did the United States maintain a zero rate in the treaty with Hungary but not in the treaty with Poland?

Answer. The tax treaty policy of the United States is generally to assign the exclusive taxation right on cross-border payments of interest to the country of residence of the payee of the interest. Poland has expressed that its current policy is to maintain a level of taxation at source on cross-border payments of interest. The proposed income tax treaty, as is the case with every bilateral tax treaty, therefore represents a negotiated overall package that both countries concluded was mutually acceptable.

It should be noted that in the process of the negotiations the Treasury Department was able to secure a fairly low rate of withholding on interest (5 percent). In addition, the proposed treaty provides that interest paid: (1) by or to a governmental body; (2) in respect of a loan that is guaranteed or insured by a governmental body; (3) to a pension fund; or (4) to a bank, insurance company or other financial institution that is unrelated to the payor of the interest; shall nevertheless be exempt from withholding at source. The proposed income tax treaty with Hungary does not contain a positive rate of withholding on cross-border payments of interest because doing so is not the current tax treaty policy of either the United States or Hungary.

JULY 1, 2015.

Chairman Bob Corker,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR CORKER The bilateral income tax treaties and protocols pending before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are important to U.S. economic growth and U.S. trade and tax policy. For over eighty years, income tax treaties have played a critical role in fostering U.S. bilateral trade and investment and protecting U.S. businesses, large and small, from double taxation of the income they earn from selling goods and services in foreign markets.

We ask for your support for these treaties and protocols and also ask for expeditious action on them by both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate.

Sincerely,

ABB Incorporated
AbbVie Pharmaceuticals
Adobe
Akzo Nobel Incorporated
Amazon.com
Applied Materials
Baxter International Inc.
Bayer Corporation
BASF Corporation
Bechtel Corporation
BHP Billiton
Braskem America, Inc.
British American Tobacco
BP plc
Caterpillar Incorporated
Chevron Corporation
Chrysler Corporation
CIGNA International
Cisco Systems
Coca-Cola Company
ConocoPhillips, Inc.
Daiichi Sankyo Inc.
Dassault Systemes
DHL North America
DSM North America
eBay, Inc.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
ExxonMobil Corporation
Fluor Corporation
Ford Motor Company
General Electric Company
Google, Inc.
Halliburton Company
Hanesbrands Inc.
Hercules Group
Hewlett-Packard Company
Honda
Iberdrola USA

International Business Machines Corporation
Johnson & Johnson
Magna International, Inc.
Mars Incorporated
McCormick & Company, Inc.
Microsoft Corporation
Michelin North America
Nestle
North American Stainless
Novartis Corporation
Occidental Petroleum
Oracle Corporation
Panasonic Corporation North America
Pepsi-Cola Corporation
Pernod Ricard USA
Pfizer International Inc.
Procter & Gamble
Prudential Financial Inc. RELXGroup
Ridgewood Group International, Ltd.
Siemens Corporation
SSAB Americas
Sony Corporation of America
Solvay America, Inc.
Swiss Re Americas
Syngenta
Thomson Reuters
Toyota
Tupperware
Tyco International
UCB Inc.
Umicore USA Inc.
United Parcel Service, Inc.
United Technologies
Visa, Inc.
Vodafone Group plc
Walmart Stores, Inc.
Zurich North America

Embassy of Chile
Embassy of Hungary
Embassy of Japan
Embassy of Luxembourg
Embassy of Poland
Embassy of Spain
Embassy of Switzerland

October 29, 2015

The Honorable Mitch McConnell
Majority Leader
United States Senate
S-230 Capitol Building
Washington, DC 20510

The Honorable Harry Reid
Minority Leader
United States Senate
S-221 Capitol Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Majority Leader McConnell and Minority Leader Reid,

We, the Ambassadors of Chile, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, and Switzerland, are writing to ask your further support for the tax treaties pending before the United States Senate.

We welcome the hearing being held today by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and request that once these treaties have been favorably reported to the full Senate, they be given prompt consideration on the Senate floor.

The pending bilateral treaties were signed between the United States and each government several years ago, and our home countries have taken all necessary steps to ratify the treaties.

Ratification will benefit all of our countries including the United States. Once all of the pending treaties go into effect, they would further invigorate foreign direct investments in both directions by mitigating double taxation and withholding tax on companies from each country in the United States and vice versa. They would also foster greater legal certainty for investors. Our countries are already deeply integrated with foreign direct investment of \$900 billion in the United States and 1.3 million American jobs created by that FDI. Ratification will help deepen the ties between our countries, as well as strengthen cooperation between our tax authorities.

We respectfully request expeditious consideration and consent for the tax treaties by the United States Senate. For your information, the attached document describes each bilateral treaty, and we would be happy to provide any additional information that you require.

Sincerely,




Juan Gabriel Valdés
Ambassador of Chile



Réka Szemerényi
Ambassador of Hungary



Kenichiro Sasae
Ambassador of Japan



Jean-Louis Wolzfeld
Ambassador of Luxembourg



Ryszard Schnepf
Ambassador of Poland



Ramon Gil-Casares
Ambassador of Spain



Martin Dahinden
Ambassador of Switzerland

cc Members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
 Members of the Senate Committee on Finance

**Business Roundtable
Financial Executives International
National Association of Manufacturers
National Foreign Trade Council
Organization for International Investment
Semiconductor Industry Association
Software Finance & Tax Executives Council
Trans-Atlantic Business Council
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
United States Council for International Business**

February 20, 2015

The Honorable Tim Scott
United States Senate
520 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510-0609

Dear Senator Scott,

The bilateral income tax treaties and protocols pending before the Senate are important to U.S. economic growth and U.S. trade and tax policy. We ask for your support for these treaties and protocols and also ask for expeditious action on them by the United States Senate.

Many of these agreements were signed by the U.S. Department of Treasury several years ago. The protracted period of ratification could send a signal, inadvertently, to all U.S. tax treaty partners that the U.S. does not value the benefits of tax treaties and that the expansion, improvement and modernization of the U.S. bilateral tax treaty network is not a priority. Given the unilateral actions that many foreign governments are considering as a consequence of issues raised in the OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting process, this sends the wrong signal at the wrong time.

For over 80 years, income tax treaties have played a critical role in fostering U.S. bilateral trade and investment and protecting U.S. businesses, large and small, from double taxation of the income they earn from selling goods and services in foreign markets. Tax treaties do so primarily by reducing foreign withholding taxes and otherwise restricting the ability of the foreign treaty partner to tax the income of U.S. taxpayers. On a reciprocal basis, tax treaties reduce U.S. withholding taxes to encourage foreign companies to invest in the United States. Where both

countries have the right to tax an item of income under the treaty, the treaty seeks to avoid double taxation by requiring one of the countries to allow a credit for the other country's tax (or to exempt the income from its own tax). Tax treaties help the U.S. economy by allowing U.S. companies to more efficiently conduct their businesses abroad and by making the U.S. more hospitable to foreign investment, which creates and sustains millions of American jobs.

In addition, tax treaties contain administrative procedures for U.S. taxpayers, treaty-partner taxpayers, and the U.S. and foreign taxing authorities themselves to resolve disagreements and to assist in the enforcement of the two countries' tax laws. In these and other ways, the U.S. network of over 60 bilateral income tax treaties plays a significant role in advancing the economic interests of the United States in the global economy.

- The pending bilateral treaties and protocols contain pro-investment, pro-trade, and pro-job creation measures and help to coordinate tax administration with our treaty partners: The proposed tax treaty with Chile, signed in 2010, would be our first with that country, and its ratification would represent an important milestone in lowering tax barriers to U.S. companies operating in Latin America, where we have few such agreements. The proposed treaty would lower withholding taxes on a bilateral basis and protect the interests of U.S. taxpayers in that country. Chile has adopted a tax reform package that contains two different levels of corporate taxes—one for companies incorporated in countries with which they have bilateral tax treaties, and a separate higher rate for companies in countries without a tax treaty. Unfortunately, until the Senate acts on the tax treaty with Chile, U.S. companies are in the latter category and pay a higher corporate tax than their competitors in Chile.
- The proposed tax treaty with Hungary, also signed in 2010, would modernize the existing treaty, which was signed when Hungary was part of the Soviet bloc. The new treaty also would close a “treaty shopping” loophole in the existing treaty that currently allows non-Hungarian companies to obtain U.S. tax benefits even if their home country does not grant benefits to U.S. companies.
- The Swiss and Luxembourg treaty protocols, both signed in 2009, would among other measures update our information exchange provisions with those countries to override their bank secrecy laws. The Swiss Protocol in particular would enable the U.S. Government to collect U.S. tax revenues from hidden offshore accounts of U.S. tax evaders, while specifically protecting against “fishing expeditions” by either country. The Swiss Protocol has been ratified by Switzerland, and its approval is essential to resolving hundreds of long-running U.S. tax investigations.
- The proposed treaty with Spain updates the tax treaty signed in 1990. The Spanish Protocol lowers the withholding rates for dividends, interest, and royalties. The Spanish

Protocol provides for mandatory arbitration of certain cases that cannot be resolved by the competent authorities within a specified period of time.

- The Polish Tax Treaty replaces the treaty signed by the U.S. and Poland in 1974. The Protocol and Tax Treaty improve conventions that have stimulated increased investment, greater transparency, and a stronger economic relationship between our countries. The Polish Tax Treaty also includes a limitation on benefits (LOB) provision that will help stop treaty shopping through Poland. The proposed treaty would lower withholding taxes on a bilateral basis and protect the interests of U.S. taxpayers in that country.

Treaties and protocols such as these have routinely been approved by unanimous consent. These treaties promote good business and financial decisions based on free-market principles rather than government influence. They incorporate reforms that foster robust economic growth and build on long-term investment partnerships between the U.S. and our tax treaty partners. Their contents are the product of years of dialogue among Senate Foreign Relations Committee Members, the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Executive Branch, and interested stakeholders in the U.S. and abroad.

The bilateral tax treaties and protocols before the Senate include provisions repeatedly approved by the Senate. The tax treaties and protocols have been reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee without amendment in 2014, and are likely to be reported out in 2015.

We encourage prompt consideration and approval of these pending tax treaties in protocols by the United States Senate.

Sincerely,

Business Roundtable
Financial Executives International
National Association of Manufacturers
National Foreign Trade Council
Organization for International Investment
Semiconductor Industry Association
Software Finance & Tax Executives Council
Trans-Atlantic Business Council
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
United States Council for International Business

