STATEMENT OF

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ON
THE STATE OF ARMS CONTROL WITH RUSSIA

BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

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Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control with Russia.

**Russian Compliance with Arms Control Treaties and Agreements**

I will not repeat much of what Under Secretary Thompson has already discussed: the bottom-line is that arms control with Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility of all international agreements with Russia is at risk.

The United States is committed to its long-held arms control, non-proliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation and avoids destabilizing arms competition. To advance our national security objectives, the United States supports effective arms control that is verifiable, enforceable, and consistent with U.S., allied, and partner security objectives. We are committed to complying with our arms control obligations, and we remain open to considering future arms control opportunities that advance U.S. security interests.

However, the Nuclear Posture Review also acknowledges that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself. The current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader security environment and must include the participation of willing partners. It is difficult to envision progress in a security environment that is currently threatened...
by Russia’s continuing non-compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments. In this regard, Russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms control agenda.

The Russian Federation remains in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It is also either rejecting or avoiding its obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki Accords, and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. In addition, Russia remains in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and is selectively implementing the Vienna Document.

It would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold Russia responsible for its violations. As a reliable ally and partner, the United States must advocate for arms control agreements that make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.

**Russian Compliance with the New START Treaty**

The United States assesses that Russia is in compliance with the New START Treaty because it values the predictability and transparency it provides, and also because Russia finds the agreement to be in its interest. Both sides met the New START Treaty’s Central Limits in February 2018, and I can assure you the United States will faithfully implement and verify Russian compliance with the treaty.

Moving forward, the United States will consider whether to extend the New START Treaty beyond its February 2021 expiration. Many factors will affect this decision, and there are two I want to talk about today.
The first is Russia’s broader approach to arms control. This Administration is concerned about Russia’s violations of other agreements and Moscow’s lack of will to address these concerns. As the Nuclear Posture Review made clear, the United States take seriously its role in preserving the value of meaningful arms control, and will only enter into and remain in arms control agreements when they further our national security interests in an increasingly complex security environment. Any decision on extending the Treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START Treaty remains in our national security interest, in light of overall Russian arms control behavior.

A second factor is Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are not captured under any treaty. Russia is modernizing its active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons – this is many times the number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommends countering this threat by advocating pursuit of two supplemental capabilities: the low-yield ballistic missile warhead and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. We have opened the door to future arms control discussions with Russia by stating that we would consider forgoing development of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile if Russia is willing to engage in meaningful discussion on non-strategic nuclear arms control.

**Russian Compliance with the INF Treaty**

The Russian Federation remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. This is a conclusion reached by the previous administration more than four years ago and remains the case today. We
have been more than patient and have provided Russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance, to no avail.

We have worked in diplomatic channels to urge Russia to preserve the INF Treaty. We have sought answers to our questions at all levels, but have received no meaningful response. Russia denies any wrongdoing but offers no explanation in response to the evidence we have presented to Russian officials. Instead, it levies false counter-accusations against the United States in an effort to deflect the world’s attention from its violation.

This Administration’s determination of Russia’s violation is no different than the one first announced in July 2014. We reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. The evidence is conclusive. Russia possesses a missile system, the SSC-8, in direct violation of the INF Treaty. Russia has tested this ground-based system well into the ranges covered by the INF Treaty, produced it, and fielded it. The violation is real, and it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of the INF Treaty.

In responding to this gross breach of the Treaty, this Administration has sought to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by applying pressure on Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. We believed it was in the national security interest of the United States and in our allies and partners’ interest to preserve the INF Treaty, but we recognized that Russia ultimately would determine whether the INF Treaty remains viable. Our response has also focused on preparing the United States for a world without the INF Treaty. We would prefer that Russia cease its noncompliant activity, and eliminate all INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner. By doing so, it can preserve the INF Treaty. One thing is certain. We cannot allow our Treaty partner to continue to violate a core tenet of the INF Treaty.
indefinitely, and we will not let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners.

**Department of Defense Response to Russia’s INF Treaty Violation**

For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed and evaluated systems it could develop if it were not constrained by the INF Treaty. This is the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) portion of the U.S. Integrated Strategy implemented in the last half of 2017 to respond directly to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. DoD has identified a number of conventional ground-launched capabilities that it could develop if no longer bound by the INF Treaty – as a means to pressure Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. The identification of these capabilities seeks to remind Russia of why it entered into the INF Treaty in the first place. Such systems could also fill potential gaps in our military capabilities caused, in part, by Russia’s violation. The INF Treaty prevents us from possessing and testing these types of missile systems, and we have no intention of doing so while the United States is still bound by the INF Treaty, but it does not prevent us from conducting general research and development. We cannot sit idle while Russia makes a mockery of international agreements at the expense of our security and that of our allies and partners.

We appreciate the efforts of Congress to help the Department of Defense implement these research and development efforts. Together, we are sending a strong message to Russia and any other country violating its obligations: Your actions will result in consequences that will make you less secure, not more. Not complying with agreements unilaterally may provide you some short-term gain, but it will result in long-term costs.
Regardless of whether Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty, there are broader implications for the future of arms control due to the lack of trust that has been created by Russia. It is difficult to envision a way forward for the United States and Russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level of transparency that could lead to a brighter future for arms control. The onus to create the conditions for this trust falls on both the United States and Russia, but Russia will bear the burden should these efforts fail, as Russia’s actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in. We support the State Department’s “Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament” approach, which aims to develop “effective measures” to increase confidence and trust, thus beginning to create the conditions for future arms control.

**Russian Non-Compliance with Conventional Arms Control**

Russia also continues to violate or avoid its obligations with regard to conventional arms control agreements and confidence and security building measures. Most fundamentally concerning is Russia’s continued occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as its arming, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces in eastern Ukraine. These actions undermine the most basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which are reaffirmed in the Vienna Document.

Russia selectively implements the Vienna Document, and has both failed to report required data about its military forces located in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine, and has improperly reported and failed to report major land and air equipment. Since 2015, Russia has also blocked reasonable updates to the Vienna Document that would provide basic transparency on its exercises.
Russia also continues to be in violation of its obligations under the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe. There remains no CFE Treaty basis for Russia’s
2007 suspension of CFE Treaty implementation.

Finally, Russia remains in violation of its Open Skies Treaty obligations. The United
States and other treaty parties have engaged in years of diplomatic efforts with Russia to resolve
concerns about its non-compliance, but to no avail. In June 2017, the United States declared
Russia in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and in September 2017 imposed a number of
Treaty-compliant, reversible response measures to encourage Russia’s return to full compliance
with its Treaty obligations. Those efforts continue today, with the support of our allies and
partners.

Conclusion

We appreciate the attention of this Committee and the rest of the Congress to these
issues, and we will keep you informed of developments. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I look forward to your questions.