PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES FOR U.S. INTERESTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

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The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in Room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Gardner, Perdue, Cardin, Menendez, Shaheen, Murphy, and Markey.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The Chairman. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

We thank our witnesses for being here, and I want to thank our ranking member for continual cooperation and making sure that these hearings go off as appropriate.

I gave some longwinded opening comments yesterday. So I am not going to do that today. I will just generally outline the fact that our relationship with Pakistan has been very complicated. I think we have gone through a period of time where we both viewed our relationship as very transactional. We went through a period of time where we tried to change that and deal with Pakistan in a different manner and to create a more whole relationship with them. And from my standpoint, that has not been very successful.

We have expended about $33 billion of U.S. taxpayer dollars toward Pakistan since the early 2000s. I think we have probably all been to the FATA areas and see the expense, actually tremendous progress that was made there with U.S. dollars with electricity and roads coming in to really cause those areas not to be as fertile, if you will, for terrorists. And I am being a little bit cutting in saying this, but whereas at one time we were using our drones to ferret out terrorists in that region, what ultimately happened was they moved to the suburbs of Pakistan and they are now getting medical care. The Haqqani Network leadership has been living there. The Government of Pakistan knows where they live. And what, in essence, has happened is where we used to be able to take them out, to be somewhat crude, in the FATA areas, now that they are living in the suburban areas, we cannot do that. As a matter of fact, they have safe haven there.

They are the number one killers of U.S.—or attempted killers of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan. It has been of tremendous concern to our leadership there that we have this policy where, in effect, we
are working with Pakistan and yet the extreme duplicity that exists with the relationship is that on one hand they say they want to see a stable Afghanistan. On the other hand, they are harboring people and through their own proxies are destabilizing Afghanistan.

So I thank our witnesses for being here. It is a very frustrating relationship, and working with others on the committee, I think you all know we have put a hold on resources relative to the acquisition of F–16’s, which I think is appropriate. I think all of us are becoming more and more frustrated with our relationship, and I am sure we are going to hear some pros and cons today. But we thank you for being here to help us more fully understand how we need to go forward in our relationship there.

So with that, I will turn it over to our distinguished ranking member, Senator Ben Cardin.

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator CARDIN. Well, Chairman Corker, when you indicate that our relationship with Pakistan is complicated, that might be the understatement of the day. This is very challenging, the relationship with Pakistan. It is one of our strategic partners in our counterterrorism in a very dangerous part of the world. We look at Pakistan’s borders with China, Afghanistan, Iran, India. And they have been effective in working with the United States in dealing with Al Qaeda in Pakistan. So it is a strategic partner in our war against terror.

But as you point out, we have major concerns about that relationship. They seem to be very selective in the terrorist organizations that they go against. And the Haqqani Network, as you point out, has had too much freedom in that country. The LeT and its impact on India and our relationships in that region is also a matter of major concern. So we have problems in our relationship with Pakistan.

This is a very timely hearing and I thank you very much for calling it.

We went through a discussion in regards to a potential arms sale, F–16’s, to Pakistan. And as you and I both know and members of this committee, that was very complicated, and there were many factors engaged in our discussions. And quite frankly, we did not think we had all the information we needed, and I think this hearing will help us to fill in some of those blanks as to how we are going to move forward in the relationship with Pakistan.

We also know that it is a country in which its military leadership plays a very important role, and there is a scheduled change in their military leadership this month. So it will be interesting to see how that impacts on this relationship.

In 2018, they have their parliamentary elections. So a lot is going on.

In addition, at least reports that I have seen, it has if not the fastest, one of the fastest growing nuclear arsenals in the world. So it is a country of major interest, a strategic partner in our war against terror, counterterrorism, to help degrade Al Qaeda. Certainly they have done that in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas. But they have selectivity in how they help in this campaign. In some cases, they have been counterproductive to our efforts.

So the question is how can we use our tools more effectively to change the behavior in Pakistan. We do provide, as you point out, Mr. Chairman, a significant amount of assistance to this country. Is there a better way of doing this? We have tried conditionality of aid, but is there a better way that we can deal with our relationship and all the tools that we use so we can get a more comprehensive partner in dealing with the threat of terrorism?

There are some related issues that I hope we will have a chance to talk about that deal with good governance in Pakistan, which to me is fundamental to their long-term security, maybe even short-term security, promotion of democratic institutions, support for international NGOs and what they are doing in regards to registration and whether that will have an impact on their future development of democratic institutions. Their tolerance for religious freedom is a major concern, and we welcome thoughts as to how we can be more effective in instilling upon the authorities in Pakistan the importance for religious tolerance.

And then we talk about the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and we know there has been a cleansing of much of the terrorist organizations there. But what comes next? I have heard no real game plan on how that area can be governed. So how can we rebuild an area and provide the type of longer-term stability that prevents the return of terrorist organizations that we may have been effective in the short term in degrading.

So, Mr. Chairman, this is an extremely important hearing, and I thank you very much. And you have brought together a distinguished panel, and I look forward to hearing from them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, and I appreciate your comments and scene-setting. I will just add to the fact that they continue to not do the things in their own country to generate revenues to support their own nation. I mean, you sit down with the business community there, and it is just a fascinating discussion.

So, look, I do not think I have had a conversation yet with leadership on the military side and the ISI side that has not been full of duplicity. And I cannot say that enough. Again, I just want to reiterate the fact that they know exactly where these Haqqani Network leadership members live, they know where their families are, when they pass through roadblocks, they give them get out of jail free cards. They provide medical care. The fact that they are a threat to our Nation and that what has, in essence, happened through our policies, they have moved it one more time into the suburban areas where we cannot get at them, and they are not willing to get at them to me is a tremendous problem.

Our first witness is Dr. Toby Dalton, the Co-Director of Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. We thank you so much for being here.

Our second witness is Dr. Daniel Markey, Senior Research Professor of International Relations and Academic Director of the Global Policy Program at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington. We thank you for being here.
And our third witness is Dr. Robert Grenier, a former Director of CIA Counterterrorism Center and current Chairman of ERG Partners in Washington.

I think you all understand you can understand your comments in about 5 minutes, we hope. Your written testimony, without objection, will be entered into the record. And again, we cannot thank you enough for being here and helping us with this issue today. And if you will just begin and go through in the order that I introduced you, I would appreciate it. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DALTON, CO–DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR POLICY PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. DALTON. Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin, both for your leadership on these important issues but also for the invitation to appear before the committee today.

In my remarks, I will try to provide a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges to U.S. policy posed specifically by developments in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and what they mean for U.S. policy and interests in South Asia.

I would note that in the testimony I submitted for the record, there is a more expansive discussion on these issues, including on India’s nuclear program, but I'll focus specifically on Pakistan today.

Let me start by outlining two priorities that I believe should guide U.S. policy in this regard and then turn to some analysis of the challenges.

The first priority is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons which is most likely to occur during a military confrontation. Successive U.S. administrations have intervened during serious South Asian crises to contain conflict before nuclear weapons could be deployed. This is a role that the U.S. should be expected to continue.

The second priority is to maintain the security of nuclear weapons and material. The probability of a nuclear terrorist incident remains low, but the consequences would be severe both locally and globally, with the added concern that in South Asia, terrorists might attempt to use nuclear weapons to precipitate another war between India and Pakistan.

These priorities face growing challenges in the region. Publicly available information suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may number 120 or more weapons and that over the past decade, it expanded significantly the production of fissile material such that it could add perhaps 20 nuclear weapons per year to its arsenal at full production. Estimates such as this yield the common perception that Pakistan has the fastest growing nuclear program.

It is also actively developing a number of short- and long-range missiles to carry these weapons. One of the newer ones that has caused considerable global concern is a battlefield missile, the Nasr, which Pakistani Government officials assert will carry a low-yield tactical nuclear weapon designed to deter India from carrying out conventional military operations against Pakistan.

It is important that we try to understand why Pakistan has expanded the size and scope of its nuclear forces. I think there are two forces at work here.
The first is a perceived need to meet an expanding set of threats from India. These threats include growth in Indian defense spending, development of offensive conventional military strategies, a burgeoning Indo-U.S. partnership, an expansion of the Indian nuclear weapons program after the nuclear deal with the United States. For Pakistan, these threats, whether they are real or perceived, provide ample justification for its nuclear buildup.

The second force behind this expansion is I think, for want of a better term, the black hole of deterrence logic. And by this, I mean that as Pakistan places increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons to counter Indian military threats rather than conventional arms, nuclear deterrence has become a self-reinforcing phenomenon. Whenever the Indian threat is perceived to grow, it justifies more or new nuclear capabilities. At some point, nuclear weapons become a solution in search of a problem. Today that means short-range battlefield nuclear weapons but who knows where this logic might lead tomorrow.

South Asia is a region with multiple potential sources of conflict, unclear nuclear redlines, and considerable room for miscalculation. Political pressure seems to be growing in India for a punitive response to the next terror attack attributed to Pakistan. Should there be another crisis, the potential speed of escalation may not afford the United States much time to intervene and attempt to contain the conflict. This necessitates that American officials and military officers maintain strong working relationships with our counterparts in both countries.

The same is true of efforts to secure nuclear weapons and material. And to be fair, I think Pakistan is not given sufficient credit for the nuclear security practices it has put in place. I think they are probably quite good, although not foolproof. The prominence given to nuclear weapons in Pakistan's national security strategy means that the government has a very strong interest to protect them.

That said, the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks on Pakistani military facilities, including on some thought to store nuclear weapons, speaks to a high threat environment. In addition to implementing the best possible nuclear security, it is also necessary to degrade the capabilities and reach of non-state groups that might seek to steal or explode a nuclear weapon. Thus, U.S. policy cannot focus only on improving security. There is necessarily a counterterrorism component as well.

Ideally the United States and others should seek ways to convince Pakistan to flatten the growth curve of its nuclear program. The honest assessment is, however, that since Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapons program, very little the U.S. has tried, whether sanctions or inducements, has had an appreciable impact. Recognizing that U.S. options and leverage are limited, I think one possible opportunity is to incentivize restraints through something like membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. A process to negotiate benchmarks for membership for both India and Pakistan might encourage restraint in their nuclear programs.

In closing, in my analysis, there continues to be a profound need for the United States to sustain options to mitigate perceived nuclear threats in South Asia. Notwithstanding the challenges posed
by Pakistan to U.S. interests, this means preserving, to the extent possible, patterns of cooperation and institutional relationships that facilitate U.S. influence.

Thank you.

[Dr. Dalton’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. TOBY DALTON

Thank you, Chairman Corker and Ranking Member Cardin, for the invitation to appear before the committee today. The issue you have selected—the policy challenge posed by Pakistan for U.S. interests—is both timely and important. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has experienced significant highs and lows in recent years. Lamentably, the signs now point to more challenging times ahead. I’m pleased to have the opportunity to provide some personal views on this issue, noting that my employer, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, does not take institutional positions on policy matters.

In my remarks today I will try to provide a clear-eyed assessment of the challenges to U.S. policy posed specifically by developments in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and what they mean for U.S. interests in South Asia. Though obvious, it is worth underscoring the point that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program does not exist in a vacuum. Nuclear weapons are central to Pakistan’s security-seeking behavior in a region it considers to be enduringly hostile. From Pakistan’s perspective, the trend lines are quite negative. India’s economic growth, blooming strategic relationship with the United States, and development of nuclear and advanced conventional military capabilities and doctrines have been and will remain drivers of Pakistan’s nuclear build-up. Experts are therefore understandably concerned that the 70-year security competition between India and Pakistan is becoming a nuclear arms race, albeit one in which the antagonists—unlike the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War—have fought four hot wars, still regularly exchange fire over contested territory, and quite possibly sponsor the activities of non-state actors who project violence across their shared border. Considering what we now know of the close calls experienced by U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces during the Cold War, the nuclear situation in South Asia is cause for concern.

Any nuclear explosion would have catastrophic consequences, which is why it will continue to be in the U.S. interest to sustain an ability to mitigate nuclear threats in South Asia even as its role and presence in the region evolves. The challenge with Pakistan is how to preserve patterns of cooperation and institutional relationships that facilitate U.S. influence at a time when Pakistani behavior in other spheres may be injurious to U.S. interests.

U.S. PRIORITIES

U.S. priorities related to nuclear weapons in South Asia have shifted over time. While the United States first sought to prevent the development of nuclear weapons in the region, the focus shifted to cap and rollback of the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs after the countries’ nuclear tests in 1998 and then to ensuring the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and technologies. Today, there are two priorities above others that should guide U.S. policy.

The first priority is the prevention of intentional or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, which is most likely to occur during a military confrontation. Successive U.S. administrations intervened with India and Pakistan—during the Kashmir crisis in 1990, the Kargil war in 1999, the crisis in 2001-02, and following the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2008—in order to contain conflict before nuclear weapons could be deployed. Although the two states have implemented several nuclear and military confidence building measures, these are insufficient to temper their security competition. And substantial differences in their deterrence practices invite the potential for miscalculation.

Second is to maintain the security of nuclear weapons and materials in order to prevent their theft or diversion. This priority has been front and center in U.S. global counterproliferation policy since the 9/11 attacks, resulting in efforts such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summits. The probability of a nuclear terrorist incident is low, but the consequences would be severe, both locally and globally, with the added concern that in South Asia, terrorists might attempt to use nuclear weapons to precipitate another Indo-Pak war.

The challenges inherent in these priorities continue to grow in complexity. Increases in fissile material stocks compound the difficulty of implementing effective and strong nuclear security practices. Changes in nuclear posture toward greater
readiness and possible deployment especially of tactical nuclear weapons raise concerns about security and command and control. Evolving nuclear and conventional military strategies and postures pose greater risks of rapid conflict escalation. And violent nonstate actors have targeted government and military facilities; some of the same groups have expressed interest in nuclear weapons. To be clear: these are challenges that derive not just from conditions in Pakistan, but also in India, China, and even the United States. My focus will be more on Pakistan, given the subject of this hearing, but it is worth reiterating that nuclear dynamics there have regional and global aspects.

**PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT**

What is known publicly about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is mostly what Pakistan wants India (and the world) to know for deterrence purposes. When it flight tests a nuclear-capable missile, the military issues a press release. When the nuclear command authority meets to discuss threats and policies, they issue a press release. But the other essential facts of the Pakistani nuclear program are fairly elusive. Public assessments rely largely on analysis of satellite imagery by non-government organizations, occasional media articles featuring leaks of governmental information, and the writings and statements of Pakistani officials and experts. This information suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal may number 120 or more weapons, but over the past decade it expanded significantly the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In addition to existing facilities to produce highly-enriched uranium, Pakistan constructed and now operates four reactors to produce plutonium. It is not clear whether Pakistan is concurrently processing all of this material, or that it is going straight into nuclear weapons, but if it did so, Pakistan could add perhaps 20 nuclear weapons per year to its arsenal. Estimates such as this produce the common perception that Pakistan has the “fastest growing nuclear program.”

There is somewhat clearer data about the nuclear-capable missiles Pakistan has tested, based on statements by the government as well as videos and photos of the launches, but that data does not extend to missile production rates or deployment status. In recent years, Pakistan has supplemented its fleet of medium-range ballistic missiles with a short-range battlefield missile, the Nasr. Pakistani government officials assert that it will carry a low-yield, tactical nuclear weapon in order to deter India from carrying out conventional military operations on Pakistani territory. Pakistan also has tested a longer-range missile, the Shaheen-III, which could target Indian military facilities as far away as the Andaman and Nicobar islands. And it has tested two nuclear-capable cruise missiles, linking these to concerns about an eventual Indian ballistic missile defense system. The conventional wisdom is that Pakistan does not deploy nuclear weapons in peacetime, that it keeps warheads and delivery vehicles separate. Whether and how long this non-deployed status will remain the case is an open question.

Why has Pakistan undertaken this expansion of the size and scope of its nuclear forces? There are two forces at work here. The first is reactive, based on a perceived need to meet an expanding set of threats from India. Following the nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan announced that it would seek credible minimum deterrence. But then the Indian economy began to grow, as did its defense spending and along with it discussion of offensive conventional military doctrines. Concurrently, the United States and India announced a strategic partnership, under which the United States would essentially remove the shackles on India’s nuclear energy program. In Pakistan, these developments led many to believe that minimum deterrence of existential threats was insufficient for Pakistan’s security. Thus, in 2011, Pakistan began to talk about instead about so-called “full-spectrum deterrence,” under which nuclear weapons will be used to deter not just a nuclear war, but also other threats such as an Indian conventional military attack. It is in this context that Pakistani officials have dubbed the Nasr—a tactical, battlefield nuclear weapon—a “weapon of peace,” because it is supposed to prevent India from seeking space for limited conventional military operations short of Pakistan’s nuclear red-lines.

The second force behind Pakistan’s nuclear expansion is, for want of a better term, the black hole of deterrence logic. By this, I mean that as Pakistan places increasing emphasis on nuclear weapons to counter Indian military threats—rather than conventional arms—nuclear deterrence has become a self-reinforcing phenomenon. From Pakistan’s few official pronouncements on nuclear doctrine and statements by government officials, it is clear that deterrence is understood to be elastic; whenever the Indian threat grows, more or new nuclear capabilities are needed. The expansion of the target set to cover the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional military threats necessitates more missiles of various ranges and capa-
The growth in Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and the broadening of its deterrence objectives raise thorny challenges for U.S. interests to prevent a nuclear explosion and to maintain effective security on nuclear weapons and materials.

The stated Pakistani concerns about India’s offensive conventional military planning are not without merit. Pronouncements from the Indian military and strategic community make clear that India has been contemplating ways to punish Pakistan for continuing to harbor and even support militant groups that have carried out attacks in India. Many Indians view this search in terms of restoring deterrence. In their view, Pakistan is unlikely to rein in groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba unless and until India credibly threatens damage to Pakistan’s interests in ways that don’t invoke Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. Accordingly, the Indian Army has sought to formulate and exercise a proactive strategy, often called “Cold Start,” the point of which is to be able to rapidly mobilize sufficient firepower to overwhelm Pakistani defenses and inflict defeat on the Pakistan Army. Even if the Indian military could carry out such an operation, many experts doubt that the Indian government would ever sanction it, given the inherent potential for conflict escalation. But for Pakistan, this threat—real or perceived—has provided ample justification for its nuclear build-up.

Pakistani analysts also point out that India is augmenting its own nuclear weapons, not just its conventional military arms. Publicly-available evidence indicates that India continues to pursue a triad of land-, sea-, and air-delivered nuclear weapons in order to provide a secure second strike capability, while maintaining minimum credible deterrence in accordance with its announced doctrine. It is possible India’s nuclear posture will change or its arsenal will grow beyond an estimated 100 or so weapons as it seeks to balance deterrence challenges posed both by China and Pakistan. Some reports suggest that, like Pakistan, India is also expanding its fissile material production; given the opacity of India’s nuclear research program and mixing of civilian and weapons facilities, though, it is not clear whether additional fissile material would go into an expanded nuclear arsenal or into some other activity.

The sum of these developments is a region with multiple potential sources of conflict, unclear nuclear redlines, and considerable room for miscalculation. It is alarming that, privately, Indian and Pakistani officials and experts indicate they do not find the other’s nuclear policy credible. Many Indians (and some Pakistanis) argue that there is no such thing as “tactical” nuclear use that can be confined to the battlefield, that any use of nuclear weapons against India will result in nuclear retaliation. For their part, many Pakistanis (and some Indians) believe that India would not actually respond to limited nuclear use on the battlefield with “massive retaliation,” as the Indian nuclear doctrine calls for. There is no shared sense of where nuclear redlines might be drawn. Political pressure seems to be growing in India for a punitive response to the next terror attack attributed to Pakistan. But given the importance of nuclear deterrence for Pakistan, its officials will face severe pressure to respond to any Indian military action, lest the credibility of their deterrent threat be eroded. Should there be another crisis, the potential speed of escalation may not afford the United States much time to intervene and attempt to contain the conflict. This necessitates that American officials and military officers maintain strong working relationships with their counterparts in both countries.

The same is true of efforts to secure nuclear weapons and material. Here it is useful to distinguish between activities to strengthen security and those to mitigate threats. Both are important. To be fair, Pakistan is not given sufficient credit for the nuclear security practices it has put in place. By most indicators, its security is probably quite good, but not foolproof. It has learned lessons from the A.Q. Khan affair and it has responded to international fears about terrorists acquiring weapons by putting in place a comprehensive security strategy run by a professional branch within the military. The prominence given to nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s national security strategy means that the government has a very strong interest to
To date, there is no public information that indicates any close calls of material going missing, and no hints of further technology leakage after the Khan proliferation network was dismantled.

But the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks on military facilities, including on some thought to store nuclear weapons, speaks to the high threat environment. In addition to implementing the best possible nuclear security, it is also necessary to degrade the capabilities and reach of non-state groups that might seek to steal or explode a nuclear weapon or material. Thus, U.S. policy can’t focus only on improving security—there is necessarily a counterterrorism component as well. It is a long-standing American (and Indian) complaint that Pakistan harbors—and in some cases actively supports—groups that harm U.S. interests in the region. Yet it is still in the U.S. interest to support Pakistan’s fight against groups such as the Pakistani Taliban to the extent that these groups pose potential threats to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. This tension is unavoidable.

U.S. INFLUENCE

What means of influence can the United States employ to address the priorities described here? Although successive U.S. administrations have sought to pursue non-zero-sum relations in South Asia, it is clear that U.S. actions or policies toward one state have effects on the other. This has important implications for the ability of the U.S. government to shape the primary challenges to its interests.

If nuclear weapons are most likely to be used during military conflict, then it makes sense to promote policies to prevent conflict. Here, the U.S. role in the region has evolved in recent years—U.S.-India relations have blossomed while U.S.-Pakistan relations have become more troubled. In the past, Pakistan sought to catalyze U.S. intervention as a way to internationalize the dispute over Kashmir, while India actively opposed any U.S. policy interest in a resolution to the Kashmir issue. India has not been overly welcoming of U.S. intervention unless it came with promises to coerce Pakistan to crack down on groups that attack India. Meanwhile, most Pakistanis probably do not trust the United States to be an honest broker in regional disputes. Thus, in the abstract, it is difficult to frame the role the United States might play in addressing likely sources of conflict.

Instead, it may be more feasible for the U.S. government to seed and facilitate crisis mitigation measures—essentially firebreaks that could slow escalation. This objective is particularly worth pursuing if Pakistan demonstrates the commitment not to only investigate groups and individuals that carry out attacks in India—as it did initially following the attack in January this year on the Indian air base at Pathankot—but also to prosecute them.

Turning to the security of nuclear weapons, in addition to degrading terrorist threats, another approach is to provide direct assistance when and where possible, utilizing cooperative programs undertaken by the U.S. Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, as well as those offered by organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. Trust is a necessary condition for this kind of engagement, given the sensitivities involved. Before and after the U.S. operation that resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden, there was a prevalent narrative in Pakistan that the United States was trying to denuclearize it. That kind of story is very corrosive to the trust necessary to sustain cooperation on sensitive issues such as nuclear security. Security is not an absolute, nor is security cooperation an end to itself. And at some point the marginal cost may not produce marginal gain, but with the continuing threat posed by groups such as the Pakistani Taliban and possibly the self-proclaimed Islamic State, it does not seem prudent to risk such cooperation now.

At the same time, as noted previously, the security challenge is growing because of actions taken by Pakistan, specifically the buildup and diversification of its nuclear arsenal. Arsenal growth and effective security run at cross purposes. Ideally, the United States and others should seek ways to convince Pakistan to flatten the growth curve of its nuclear program. The honest assessment, however, is that since Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapons program in earnest after it suffered defeat in the 1971 war with India, little the United States has tried—both in terms of sanctions and inducements—has had an appreciable impact on the scope and scale of Pakistan’s nuclear development.

As in the past, it is very unlikely today that employing punitive measures, or even the conditioning of support in other areas such as financing of military equipment, would have a significant impact on Pakistan’s nuclear program. Moreover, such sanctions would likely jeopardize the trust necessary to continue security cooperation and possibly also the relationships integral to intervention in a possible future militarized crisis. By the same token, and speaking hypothetically, there is probably no amount of aid or financial support that the United States could provide that
could change the direction of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, largely because of the political effect in Pakistan: no leader could be seen as selling out Pakistan's nuclear weapons to the Americans.

Recognizing that U.S. options and leverage are quite limited, an alternative approach would be to support the development of an Indian and Pakistani logic of managing their security competition through negotiated limitations on nuclear and military capabilities and postures. Or, to put it in blunter terms: to support arms control. It is hard to imagine either India or Pakistan signing onto an arms control agenda today, but leaders in both countries may find the logic appealing in the future as a way to extricate themselves from their security dilemma. For mutual restraint to work, it must have an internal logic and internal constituencies—it can't be imposed by or be seen as the agenda of external actors. But there may be ways to incentivize some of the early steps on this path. One possible opportunity is through membership in international regimes that both seek to join, and specifically the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). If there were a process to negotiate benchmarks for membership for both states, it could encourage them to temper impulses in their security competition that exacerbate the challenges described above.

In this regard, the policy of the current U.S. administration to support an unconditional and exceptional NSG membership path for India is problematic. This policy requires no commitments from India to bring its nuclear weapons practices in line with those of other nuclear states in return for membership. It also opens no pathway to membership for Pakistan that would incentivize it to consider nuclear restraints. It is not surprising that the U.S. policy has encountered significant opposition from a number of other NSG members, not least China, who argue that the group should utilize objective criteria when considering the membership of states like India and Pakistan that have not signed the international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps the next U.S. administration will rethink this policy approach and the opportunities it presents to address the two nuclear priorities described here.

In closing, against the backdrop of an evolving U.S. role and presence in the region and the challenges to U.S.-Pakistan relations, but considering the potential consequences of a nuclear incident, there continues to be a profound need for the United States to sustain options to mitigate perceived nuclear threats. Notwithstanding the challenges posed by Pakistan to U.S. interests, this means preserving to the extent possible patterns of cooperation and institutional relationships that facilitate U.S. influence.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Go ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL MARKEY, SENIOR RESEARCH PROFESSOR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; ACADEMIC DIRECTOR, GLOBAL POLICY PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dr. Markey. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify about Pakistan and the challenges for U.S. interests.

This morning I will focus on three sets of issues, all of which I have covered at greater length in my written testimony.

Let me begin with the question of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan. Americans have been, I think rightly, frustrated by our tortured relationship with Pakistan not least because we have courted Islamabad with tens of billions of dollars in assistance since 9/11. And the question that is often raised is whether we should continue to provide aid at all. I believe we should but also that our next President should take another long, hard look at our Pakistan strategy across the board.

Part of my answer to this question is tactical. Pakistan is a high stakes game for the United States. Washington would be wise to steer clear of risky policy moves at the tail end of this administra-
tion unless they hold realistic promise of big gains. This is not an unqualified argument against cutting Pakistan’s aid. It is only an argument for thinking carefully and acting with purpose. Top U.S. policymakers should appreciate that the inadequate cooperation we have from Pakistan today is probably better than none at all. We face some common enemies, including Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and ISIS, even while we do not see eye to eye on other fronts.

In order to justify major policy shifts like eliminating aid, labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, or enacting sanctions, U.S. policymakers should be able to explain how such actions would make America’s strategic predicament better. They would need to consider the possibility that coercion could backfire, raising tensions, and making Islamabad less willing or able to advance any constructive agenda. So our next President could take a far more coercive approach with Pakistan, but I think given the likely costs and benefits, I expect we are more likely to reduce and restructure assistance to Pakistan than to end it altogether.

Now, in the process, we should find ways to more clearly link our ends with our means and also to impose appropriate conditions in ways that more Pakistanis and Americans will actually understand. And I have tried to sketch out some of these in my written testimony.

Second, with respect to Pakistan’s leadership, I would suggest that it is difficult to predict who will be running Pakistan even by the end of this year. Over the past 6 months, there has been media speculation that Pakistan’s prime minister might step down because of his failing health or because his family was implicated in the Panama Papers scandal. Political opposition parties are again campaigning for his ouster. Other rumors swirl about whether the current army chief, General Raheel Sharif, might be granted an extension rather than handing over his baton in November as scheduled.

That said, policy continuity is more likely than change in Pakistan. This is because despite two rounds of democratic elections and 8 years of civilian government, the military remains Pakistan’s most dominant national political institution, the primary decision-maker on core matters of defense and foreign policy, and the chief steward of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal. The military’s policies on issues of top importance to the United States are slow to change, even as new faces come and go in Islamabad or Rawalpindi.

Finally, top Pakistani officials claim they are countering all terrorists and militants on their soil, including groups that have historically enjoyed the support of the state like Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the Haqqani Network. And Americans are justifiably skeptical of these claims. But even if Pakistan were to seriously tackle these groups, it is possible we would not recognize it, at least not right away. If Pakistani leaders were aiming to demolish homegrown terrorist groups, they would have good reasons to hide their intentions and play a more subtle game of divide and conquer. And shortly after 9/11, U.S. policymakers were often willing to give President Musharraf the benefit of the doubt when he said that he would eliminate all terrorists on its soil but not all at
the same time. At this stage in our relationship with Pakistan, however, the burden of proof has shifted to Islamabad.

For the moment, that means that we should limit our expectations, focus our bilateral relationship on where our security interests overlap such as the fight against the Pakistani Taliban. And in that common fight, our assistance, including some relevant military equipment, would be justified.

But looking to the future, U.S. and Pakistani officials must understand that we are far from a sustainable equilibrium in our relationship. Fundamental differences persist, and another bilateral crisis is too easy to imagine. Our next President will need to undertake a comprehensive review of our Pakistan strategy to include questions of assistance, the promotion of democracy and good governance and counterterrorism, among others.

Thank you.

[Dr. Markey’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL S. MARKEY

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify about Pakistan and the challenges for U.S. interests. In my testimony, I will address three broad issues. First, I will discuss U.S. assistance to Pakistan, weighing its limitations and its value as a policy tool for inducing Pakistan to undertake policies that serve U.S. interests. Second, I will assess the current status of civilian-military relations in Pakistan, stressing the primacy of the military, the prospects for civilian democracy, and the implications of political change in the near term. Third, I will consider the likelihood that Pakistan will take significant measures against militant organizations that threaten Pakistan’s neighbors, including the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammad.

LESSONS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE AND THE WAY FORWARD

One lesson Washington should have learned from its long experience with Pakistan is never to overestimate the leverage generated by U.S. assistance. Despite tens of billions of dollars in aid since 9/11, Islamabad does not see the world through the United States’ preferred strategic prism, whether in Afghanistan, India, or with respect to nuclear proliferation. As I will discuss at greater length below, Pakistan’s inadequate effort in the fight against terrorism represents a fundamental sticking point in its relationship with the United States.

Then again, history also shows that U.S. sanctions on Pakistan throughout the 1990s failed to curtail Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, the political dominance of its military, or the state’s support to terrorist groups like the Taliban and LeT that have engulfed the region in violence. In short, aid is no panacea. But neither are sanctions.

To appreciate the limitations of U.S. aid to Pakistan, we should begin by noting that assistance has never been the only—and is rarely the most significant—policy tool used by Washington at any given time. Therefore, the consequences of aid must not be judged as if they were delivered in a vacuum. For instance, U.S. lawmakers should not be surprised that billions of dollars in development assistance over the past decade failed to win Pakistani “hearts and minds” when the arrival of that money coincided with a massive surge in violence at least partly caused by the U.S. war in neighboring Afghanistan.

Worse than being ineffective, U.S. aid to Pakistan can even be counterproductive. Too often throughout the history of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, American money...
has propped up some of the most repressive, anti-reformist leaders and institutions in Pakistani society, including the military and feudal civilian elites. Unfortunately, many of America’s natural allies in Pakistan have been alienated as a consequence.

In principle, whether provided for military or civilian purposes, aid can serve one of several basic aims: building capacity, improving leverage, and buying access. But too often the arguments for U.S. aid to Pakistan have been unconvincing because the purposes were muddled. The recent debate over whether to pay for F-16s is a case in point. It has never been clear precisely what U.S. financing of eight new F-16s would do to advance U.S. interests. Were they intended to improve Pakistan’s countterinsurgency capacity along the Afghan border? Buy U.S. officials more time in Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif’s office? Convince Pakistan’s army to attack the Haqqanis? The lack of clarity on this point—in a climate of pervasive skepticism about Pakistan—helped to kill that deal.

This leaves us with two questions: First, why bother to continue aid to Pakistan at all? And second, if there are good reasons to keep the aid flowing, can we do it more effectively?

At present, the simplest reason to avoid a dramatic cut in aid is that it would represent a significant shift from the status quo. Pakistan is a high-stakes game for the United States. Washington would be wise to steer clear of risky policy moves, including threats to curtail assistance and reimbursements, unless they hold the realistic promise of significant gains. This is not an unqualified argument against cutting Pakistan’s aid, but only for thinking carefully and acting with purpose.

Pakistan is a frustrating partner, but that does not reduce the value of its partnership to zero. Pakistan permits—and at times has enabled—the United States to wage a counterterror drone campaign over parts of its territory and, even at times of deep bilateral discord, to continue flying personnel and arms across Pakistani airspace into Afghanistan. Neither side has been eager to publicize these areas of cooperation, but even American skeptics must admit their utility. Air corridors are readily closed and drones are easy to shoot down, so if Pakistan had really wanted to end what in 2009 then-CIA Director Leon Panetta called the “only game in town in terms of confronting and trying to disrupt the al-Qaeda leadership,” or to further complicate the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, it could have done so without breaking much of a sweat. It still could.

Top U.S. policymakers appreciate that the inadequate cooperation we have from Pakistan today is probably better than none at all. They also know that Pakistan and the United States do face some common enemies, including al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and ISIS, even if we don’t see eye-to-eye on other fronts. In order to justify major policy shifts like eliminating aid, labeling Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, or enacting sanctions, U.S. policymakers should be able to explain how such actions would make America’s strategic predicament easier. In the process, they would need to consider the possibility that U.S. attempts at coercion could backfire, raising tensions and weakening Pakistan in ways that only make Islamabad less willing or able to advance any constructive agendas.

With U.S. presidential elections around the corner, now would be an especially poor time for Washington to undertake a tougher coercive approach with Pakistan. The Obama administration cannot credibly threaten Pakistan because it will not be in office long enough to make its threats real. Islamabad would exercise the option of waiting out any new policy from the Obama administration, hoping that the next president takes a friendlier approach. Some might argue that the Obama administration should take a parting shot at Pakistan, demonstrating its displeasure with Islamabad and then enabling the next administration to reestablish ties at whatever level it deems warranted. But such a move would force the incoming president to grapple with Pakistan immediately, a tall and unwelcome order given the many other global challenges that await.

It is difficult to imagine that any new White House team would willingly choose to make Pakistan a top issue for the president’s first few months in office. That said, President Obama’s successor is almost certain to order a thorough review of Pakistan policy upon taking office. Then, working on its own timeline, the new administration could decide to implement a restructuring and/or reduction of aid, threats of sanctions, and other coercive steps.

It is at least conceivable that a potent new combination of U.S. policies could compel or induce Pakistan’s military and civilian establishment into enacting policies that better serve U.S. interests. Indeed, the United States has successfully coerced Pakistan in the past, at least temporarily. The George W. Bush administration’s post-9/11 “with us or against us” threat to then-President Pervez Musharraf forced Pakistan into an early, if fleeting and inadequate, alliance against al-Qaeda, one that netted several high-profile terrorists living in Pakistan like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. Of course, the new administration would also need to recognize that the
United States is rarely as capable of delivering a credible threat as it was in the
days after 9/11. Unless the United States is willing to pick a fight with Pakistan,
it should avoid moves that irritate or weaken Islamabad when they hold little hope
of advancing a serious strategic purpose.

I anticipate that after weighing all the costs and benefits, the next administration
is likely to reduce and restructure assistance to Pakistan but not to end it alto-
gether. With this in mind, the Obama administration would do its successor a favor
by completing a final review of all existing and planned aid to Pakistan.

On the civilian side, this should be done with a critical eye to how each project
can realistically contribute to Pakistan’s economic and political development and/or
reform. That review will enable the next administration to cut or reallocate re-
sources in ways that better advance Pakistan’s long term political stability, econ-
omic growth, and security, bearing in mind that U.S. aid alone cannot solve most
of Pakistan’s challenges and that the goal is to find areas where targeted invest-
ments of U.S. money or technical know-how can pay outsized or unique dividends.
The review should also assess whether the overall scale of U.S. aid is appropriate
to the task at hand in Pakistan, or whether a fundamentally different approach—
such as the Chinese are pursuing with concessional loans aimed at promoting infra-
structure or other investments—would be smarter.

With respect to security assistance, the next administration should think in terms
of three basic categories of aid. Each would come with different purposes and condi-
tions.

Aid in the first category would support Pakistan’s activities in which there is a
nearly complete convergence of American and Pakistani goals, but where the United
States can offer financial, technical, or other support to lighten the burden on a rel-
atively weaker, less-developed, and poorer nation. Military assistance in Pakistan’s
fight against domestic insurgent groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan would
fall into this category, because Washington also views these groups as dangerous
terrorists. In overseeing this aid, Congress would mainly seek confidence that U.S.
resources are being put to effective use and would not need to impose significant
conditions because Pakistani and U.S. ends and means are aligned.

Aid in the second category would be used to alter Pakistan’s security tactics in
areas where Washington and Islamabad agree broadly about ends, but not means.
For instance, funds for counterinsurgency could be linked to specialized training in-
tended to reduce civilian casualties. This category of aid should be conditioned by
Congress to make it more likely that it will be put to use in the ways defined by
U.S. officials, but with enough flexibility to show that Washington’s main goal is co-
operation, not coercive leverage.

In the third category would be funds offered as inducements for strategic shifts
by Pakistan. Aid in this category would be intended as leverage, for instance to en-
courage Pakistan to take action against terrorists like the Haqqani Network and
LeT. These funds would need to be offered with strictly legislated conditions, struc-
tured in ways that ensure aid delivery takes place only after Pakistan satisfies
Washington’s requirements. Here, the goal is to demonstrate the value that the
United States would place on policy shifts by Islamabad while simultaneously being
honest with ourselves and the Pakistanis about the deep differences that threaten
to derail the bilateral relationship.

Across the board, the clearer and more realistic our aims, the easier it will be to
to judge whether U.S. assistance is likely to deliver our desired outcome at a reason-
able cost, the more likely it will garner sustained political support among Americans
and their elected representatives, and the simpler it will be to explain to Pakistanis.

MILITARY DOMINANCE, CIVILIAN TURBULENCE

Despite two rounds of democratic elections and eight years of civilian government,
the military remains Pakistan’s most dominant national political institution, the
primary decision-maker on core matters of defense and foreign policy, and the chief
steward of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal. Decisions about how to manage the
state’s relationships with violent extremist organizations depend on Pakistan’s mili-
tary, and within it, the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI). In ad-
dition, the military has jealously guarded its perks and resources that insulate uni-
formed personnel from many of the economic hardships suffered by their country-
men. If Pakistan is ever to enjoy a more effective, consolidated democratic rule, the
generals will need to loosen their hold and submit to civilian authority.

In 2008, the end of the Musharraf regime marked the return of elected civilian
government, and a euphoric surge of hope that Pakistan would set itself on a path
of sustainable democracy. By the time the PPP-led government under president Asif
Ali Zardari left office in 2013, however, it was widely perceived to have surrendered
core governing authorities under pressure from the army. That year’s resounding election victory by the PML-N and the return to power of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif again raised expectations that a strong civilian team would use its popular legitimacy to check political encroachment by the military.

Yet during the past several years, Pakistan’s army has on multiple occasions reasserted its dominance over civilian politicians. At least some of Pakistan’s top brass are reportedly unsatisfied with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, blaming his government for ineffective rule or labeling him unfit for a variety of other reasons. Over the past six months, there has been media speculation that the prime minister might step down because of his failing health or because his family was implicated in the Panama Papers scandal, or that the current army chief, General Raheel Sharif, might be granted an extension rather than handing over his baton in November as scheduled. Simultaneously, political opposition parties are once again campaigning for Nawaz Sharif’s ouster. In short, it is difficult to predict precisely who will be running Pakistan when America’s next president takes office.

Under similar conditions in decades past, Pakistan might be ripe for a coup. Now the military is playing a savvier game, pulling the nation’s strings from behind a curtain so as to avoid the taint of dictatorship and, perhaps more importantly, to shirk its responsibility for improving the quality of governance. But this puppet show will not be so easily sustained. Political turnoil has consumed the army’s energy, eroding any potential in the short run. More worrisome, a sham democracy will have dangerous vulnerabilities over the long run, depriving the state of popular legitimacy in the midst of an existential confrontation with Islamist insurgency.

That said, barring a serious crisis, we should anticipate more policy continuity than change from Pakistan over the next six months. In particular, a new army chief is unlikely to alter Pakistan’s strategic trajectory in significant ways—either positive or negative. This is partly a consequence of the fact that General Sharif (who nominates a short list of his successors) and Prime Minister Sharif (who selects his new chief from that list) both have strong reasons to avoid wild card candidates.

At other periods in U.S.-Pakistan history, U.S. officials have implicated themselves in Islamabad’s political dramas. This was most notable in the final years of the Musharraf era. Today the cooling of the bilateral relationship in general and specific U.S. frustrations with all of Pakistan’s leading political figures make that less likely. U.S. interests are now less personal and more institutional. American confidence in the benefits associated with civilian democratic rule will lead U.S. policymakers to support democratic reform and consolidation in Pakistan, while pressing security requirements will lead them to pursue certain types of cooperation with Pakistan’s most powerful leaders, no matter who they happen to be.

PROSPECTS FOR A STRATEGIC SHIFT

Pakistani officials claim they are committed to countering all terrorists and militants on their soil, including groups that have historically enjoyed the support of the state like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and the Haqqani Network. Americans are justifiably skeptical of such promises, having heard them repeatedly over the past fifteen years without adequate follow-through. One glaring example of the chasm between rhetoric and reality: President Musharraf banned LeT in 2002 but the group’s leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed still addresses large rallies in Pakistan’s cities, including the capital. Many critics of Pakistan—whether Indian, Afghan, or American—see in all of this a nefarious double game. At best, Pakistan’s leaders have failed to demonstrate to the world that they possess the will and capacity to implement a truly non-discriminatory approach toward terrorists.

This raises at least two questions. First, how would we know if Pakistan were actually in the process of a positive strategic shift on countering terrorism? And second, until Pakistan’s position is clear, how should Washington deal with Islamabad?

The first question is a serious one because, as some Pakistani security officials argue in private, if Pakistan did pick a fight with all of the terrorists and militants on its soil at once, victory could not be assured. Beyond that, a frontal assault might not be the smartest approach to rooting out terrorists and unraveling decades of state support to militants. It could even make a bad situation worse. By this logic, if Pakistani leaders were aiming to demolish homegrown terrorist groups, they would have good reasons to hide their intentions and to play a more subtle game of divide and conquer. As a consequence, outside observers would find it difficult to discern the difference between a continuation of Pakistan’s old double game and a carefully calibrated counterterror strategy.

Washington’s patience with Pakistan on this score has waxed and waned. Shortly after 9/11, U.S. policymakers were often willing to accept such arguments at face
value, or at least to give President Musharraf the benefit of the doubt when he pro-
 pledged his intention to eliminate all terrorists on his soil, but not all at the same
time. By 2011, however, when Admiral Michael Mullen testified before Congress
that the Haqqani network was a “veritable arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelli-
gence agency,” it was clear that the burden of proof had shifted to Pakistan.

Today administration officials maintain greater equanimity. They have neither
 swooned over Pakistani army operations against the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in
North Waziristan (by, for instance, reprising some version of the Bush administra-
tion’s rhetoric about Pakistan being a “frontline ally in the war on terror”), nor have
they regularly gone out of their way to belittle Pakistani efforts because they do too
little to tackle America’s terrorist enemies. More often than not, they have praised
Pakistani steps in the right direction without attempting to judge their broader con-
sequences. With some exceptions, including recent statements by Secretary Kerry in
New Delhi, U.S. criticism tends to be delivered behind closed doors rather than
through public reprimands.

This is the best near-term answer to how the United States should work with
Pakistan, at least until the next administration is ready to formulate a different ap-
proach. In effect, it means accepting a gradual downward drift in relations with
Pakistan while working within the confines of reduced expectations. Where U.S. and
Pakistani security interests overlap, such as the fight against the TTP, there should
be opportunities for cooperation and even significant U.S. assistance. For example,
the FMF denied for use in purchasing F-16s could be well spent on weapons more
clearly intended for use against the TTP. On other fronts, such as certifying that
Pakistan is making progress against the Haqqani Network, U.S. officials should
hold back until Pakistan delivers.

Yet U.S. and Pakistani officials must understand that they have found only a
temporary salve for the relationship, not a sustainable equilibrium. Fundamental
differences simmer on the back burner, unresolved. A relationship built on reduced
expectations, diminished attention, and little trust will likely fizzle over time,
even if it is not again confronted by any spectacular crisis. And at least as long as
sophisticated international terrorists call Pakistan home, another crisis is reason-
ably easy to envision.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Go ahead, sir.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GRENIER, CHAIRMAN, ERG
PARTNERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. GRENIER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, I want to
thank you very much, along with the other members of the com-
mittee, for inviting me here today to talk about what is arguably
one of the most difficult, complicated, trying, and I would also
argue most important foreign relationships.

My personal knowledge of U.S.-Pakistani relations is primarily
informed by practical experience as I have engaged with others in
trying to manage those relations dating back to the mid-1990s. As
I began in the early days of the Clinton administration, I was a
special assistant to the then-Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs on loan from the CIA and was involved in the annual ter-
rorism review involving Pakistan. I can tell you that in 1993 and
1994, Pakistan came within a hair’s breadth of ending up as a for-
mal member of the list of state sponsors of terrorism dating back
even then.

Later in 1999, I was assigned as the CIA Station Chief in Paki-
stan with the responsibility for both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
And I can say that during the 3 years of that tenure, I saw perhaps
the worst U.S. relations with Pakistan in recent times, as well as
perhaps the best ones in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.

I then returned to that sphere in 2004–2006 when I was then the
Director of Counterterrorism at CIA.
As I look back on the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations over the last 50 years or so, it is very clear that we have a repetitive cycle at work here. The reasons for U.S. dissatisfaction with Pakistan may have evolved over time from past reluctance to deal with antidemocratic military regimes to abhorrence of Pakistani atrocities in east Pakistan in the early 1970s, to concerns over nuclear proliferation in support of Kashmiri militants in the 1980s and the 1990s, to the preoccupation that we have just been discussing now with Pakistani tolerance for the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network.

Throughout it all, however, the U.S. has been willing at least episodically to overlook its concerns with aspects of Pakistani behavior and to subordinate those concerns to what we perceived at the time to be overriding national security priorities, only to revert then to more contentious relations when those interests no longer apply. I will not repeat the history of the 1980s where we were willing to overlook growing evidence of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program at the time in deference to our joint efforts against the anti-Soviet Mujahiddin when in the 1990s, with the Soviets having essentially withdrawn from Afghanistan, we instead replaced former rewards with congressionally mandated sanctions.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the cycle began again. Needing a platform for operations in Afghanistan and a partner to intercept Al Qaeda members who were fleeing from that country, the U.S. was willing to subordinate its broader concerns with Pakistani support for militancy in Kashmir and elsewhere, as well as Pakistan’s highly ambivalent relationship with the Afghan Taliban. And arguably, that is the bargain that we have maintained ever since.

As U.S.-Pakistan relations have gone through these cycles of boom and bust and as the U.S. policy toward Pakistan has alternated between extremes, some things have remained constant. Pakistan, for its part, has stubbornly clung to its own perceptions of national interest and has generally refused to compromise those perceived interests even when their pursuit has seemed irrational or self-defeating in U.S. eyes, whether we are talking about nuclear weapons doctrine, the Pakistani assessment of threat from India, or its calculus regarding both foreign and domestic militant groups.

Pakistani adherence to its perceived interests in fact has persisted irrespective of U.S. administered punishments or inducements. This has generated considerable outrage and frustration looking back over the years on the U.S. side, particularly in recent times in the context of counterterrorism, where the fight against radical Islamic militancy is seen here in both practical and moral terms. Pakistani fear of seeing Islamically inspired militants unite against it and its resulting insistence on making at times overdrawn, in effect, wishful distinctions among militant groups based on the degree of proximate threat to Pakistan as opposed to others has led to U.S. charges, consistent charges, of double-dealing, particularly when the U.S. believes that it is paying the bill. To the U.S., the struggle against violent extremism is a moral imperative, a view which Pakistan, used to making practical compromises with militancy in the context of both foreign and domestic politics, simply does not share in the same way.
U.S. frustration is mirrored on the Pakistani side by its perception of the U.S. as a fickle and inconstant partner, which does not recognize Pakistan's heavy sacrifices in a violent struggle with Pakistani-based extremists, which has been fueled in large measure by Pakistani support for U.S. counterterrorism policy. Now, that assertion may sound jarring to American ears, given the perceived limitations in Pakistani counterterrorism policy, but it is a view which is firmly held by the extremists themselves. Pakistani resentment of America is driven by the perception that the U.S. will never be satisfied by what Pakistan does, and given the serious underlying differences between the two, the Pakistanis are right: the U.S. is unlikely ever to be satisfied and perhaps justifiably so.

Once again, U.S.-Pakistani relations are at an inflection point. In recent years, U.S. relations with Pakistan have been driven largely by U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. But there has been a qualitative change in the nature and the aims of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, and the dynamic of U.S.-Pakistan relations needs to change along with it. I would argue that much of the current frustration with U.S.-Pakistan relations is driven by backward-looking desires and concerns which simply no longer apply in the same way. The U.S./NATO military posture in Afghanistan is a small fraction of what it once was. The U.S. no longer aims to defeat the Taliban. Instead, it hopes merely to keep the Kabul regime from being defeated.

With U.S. ends and means having changed so drastically in Afghanistan, it is highly unrealistic to suppose that Pakistan is going to make up the difference. Pakistan cannot succeed in bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel where 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops and hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars have failed. And what is more, they are simply not going to try. Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, despite longstanding legend to the contrary, is distinctly limited. Pakistan's leadership understands that a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be a strategic disaster for itself, but lacking the means to decisively influence events there and continuing to harbor serious doubts about the strategic orientation of the Kabul regime, it is disinclined to take the risks involved in trying to do so.

As Afghanistan settles into a dynamic stalemate of indeterminate outcome, it is time for the U.S. to refocus on its long-term fundamental interests in South Asia. The reasons for America's post-9/11 obsession with Afghanistan are clear enough. I was present, after all, at the creation. But long-term strategic interests in Pakistan actually dwarf those in Afghanistan. Arguably, we have allowed the tail to wag the dog for too long and it is time to reorient our policy.

Pakistan is now engaged in a long, complicated, twilight struggle against religiously inspired extremism, both internally and across its borders. For Pakistan, this is not simply a matter of finding, fixing, and eliminating committed terrorists. Ultimate victory will necessitate addressing the hold which various forms of extremism have long exerted on large portions of Pakistan's own body politic, and thus the political environment in which important policy decisions are made. Long-term solutions for Pakistan will involve social and educational reforms as much as military action. But I would
say that given Pakistan's importance in global counterterrorism policy, its status as a nuclear-armed state, its troubled relations with India, and its location at the heart of a highly important but politically unstable region of the world, the U.S. has a considerable stake in the outcome of that struggle and would be well advised to maintain a constructive engagement with Pakistan at multiple levels, lest the wrong side win.

In Pakistan, as elsewhere, the U.S. must balance achievable goals with effective means. This may well dictate a lowering of overall U.S. expenditures in Pakistan than we see currently, but the dynamics and motivations behind those spending decisions must fundamentally change.

The CHAIRMAN. Are we coming to a close?
Mr. GRENIER. Yes, sir, we are.
Let me just say that limited U.S. means will have to be calibrated in Pakistan against achievable goals in light of U.S. priorities going forward.

That said, given overarching U.S. interests in the region, there will be many worthy candidates for U.S. assistance, many of which have been touched on here. But in short, the U.S. dares not turn its back on Pakistan as it seeks to protect its serious national security interests in South Central Asia. Wise policy going forward will require the U.S. to rebalance an overly Afghan-centric policy posture of the past and to accept, however reluctantly, those aspects of tactical Pakistani behavior it cannot change, focusing instead on priority long-term goals which can actually be achieved. Such a policy will often feel less than satisfying, but in my view it is the only responsible way forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Grenier’s prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT L. GRENIER

Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the members of the Committee for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss one of America’s most difficult, complicated, trying—and also important—foreign relationships. My knowledge of U.S.-Pakistan relations is primarily informed by my practical experience in helping to manage those relations, dating back to the mid-1990s.

At the start of the Clinton administration, in 1993 and 1994, I was a Special Assistant to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, on loan from CIA, deeply involved in an annual terrorism review which nearly resulted in Pakistan’s being placed on the formal list of state sponsors of terrorism. In 1999, I was posted to Islamabad as the CIA station chief for both Pakistan and Afghanistan. My three-year tenure in that position spanned both the lowest and, arguably, the highest points in recent U.S.-Pakistan relations, when 9/11 propelled Pakistan from being a heavily sanctioned, near-pariah state to a front-line U.S. ally in the then-recently proclaimed “global war on terror.”

After leaving Pakistan in 2002, I later returned to active involvement in U.S.-Pakistan affairs from 2004 to 2006, this time as Director of the CIA Counter-terrorism Center. At that time, Pakistan remained, by far, America’s single most important foreign counter-terrorism partner. It is perhaps emblematic, however, of the deep-seated differences and suspicions which have always lurked just beneath the surface of U.S.-Pakistan relations even in the best of times, that in the five years between my retirement in 2006 and the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011, we went from a situation where the bin Laden raid would undoubtedly have been carried out jointly, to one where the U.S. felt constrained to conduct this operation unilaterally, with good reason in my view, despite the predictable consequences for bilateral ties.

As I look back now at the history of U.S.-Pakistan relations over the past 50 years and more, it is clear that there is a repetitive cycle at work. The reasons for U.S.
dissatisfaction with Pakistan may have evolved over time—from past reluctance to deal with anti-democratic military regimes, to abhorrence of atrocities in East Pakistan in the early 1970s, to concerns over nuclear proliferation and Pakistani support to Kashmiri militants in the '80s and '90s, to today's preoccupation with Pakistan's tolerance of the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. Through it all, however, the U.S. has been willing, episodically, to overlook its concerns with aspects of Pakistani behavior and to subordinate those concerns in the face of what have appeared, at the time, to be overriding national security priorities—only to revert to a more contentious relationship when those interests no longer pertained.

Thus, in the 1980s, the U.S. was willing not only to overlook growing evidence of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in deference to joint U.S.-Pak support to the anti-Soviet Afghan Mujahiddin, but also to provide Pakistan with generous economic and military rewards in the bargain. In the 1990s, however, with the Soviets safely expelled from Afghanistan, those rewards were abruptly replaced with Congressionally-mandated sanctions.

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the cycle began again. Needing a platform for operations in Afghanistan and a partner to intercept al-Qa'ida militants fleeing that country, the U.S. was again willing to subordinate its broader concerns with Pakistani-based militancy in Kashmir and with Pakistan's ambivalent attitude toward the Afghan Taliban—which I should note was manifest almost from the start of the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan. Once again, the U.S. was willing to provide extensive financial support to Pakistan, much of it tied at least loosely to Pakistani support of U.S. operations, and to Pak military deployments along its western border. And although much has happened in the interim, that is the essential bargain which has pertained ever since.

As U.S.-Pak relations have gone through these cycles of boom and bust, and as U.S. policy toward Pakistan has alternated between one extreme and the other, some things have remained constant. Pakistan, for its part, has clung stubbornly to its own perceptions of national interest, and has generally refused to compromise those perceived interests, even when their pursuit has seemed irrational or self-defeating to U.S. eyes—whether in the context of nuclear weapons doctrine, in its assessment of the threat from India, or in its calculus regarding both foreign and domestic militant groups. Pakistani adherence to its perceived interests, in fact, has persisted, irrespective of U.S.-administered punishments or inducements. This has generated considerable outrage and frustration on the U.S. side, particularly in recent times on counterterrorism, where the fight against radical Islamic militancy is seen in both practical and moral terms. Pakistani fear of seeing Islamically-inspired militants unite against it, and its resulting insistence on making at times overdrawn and wishful distinctions among militant groups based on the degree of proximate threat they pose to Pakistan as opposed to others, leads to U.S. charges of double-dealing, particularly when the U.S. believes it is paying the bill. To the U.S., the struggle against violent extremism is a moral imperative—a view which Pakistan, used to making practical compromises with militancy in the context of both foreign and domestic politics, simply does not share in the same way.

U.S. frustration is mirrored on the Pakistani side by its perception of the U.S. as a fickle and inconsistent partner, which does not recognize Pakistan's heavy sacrifices in a violent struggle against Pakistan-based extremists which has been fueled, in large measure, by Pakistani support for U.S. counterterrorism policy. That assertion may sound jarring to American ears, given the perceived limitations in Pakistani counterterrorism policy, but it is a view firmly held by the extremists themselves. Pakistani resentment of America is driven by the perception that the U.S. will never be satisfied by what it does, and given the serious underlying differences between the two, the Pakistanis are right: The U.S. is unlikely ever to be satisfied, and perhaps justifiably so.

Once again, U.S.-Pakistan relations are at an inflection point. In recent years, U.S. relations with Pakistan have been driven by the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. But there has been a qualitative change in the nature and aims of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, and the dynamic of U.S.-Pakistan relations needs to change with it. Indeed, I would argue that much of the current frustration in U.S.-Pakistan relations is driven by backward-looking desires and concerns which simply no longer apply. The U.S./NATO military posture in Afghanistan is a small fraction of what it once was. The U.S. no longer aims to defeat the Taliban; instead it hopes merely to keep the Kabul regime from being defeated. With U.S. ends and means having changed so drastically in Afghanistan, it is highly unrealistic to suppose that Pakistan is going to make up the difference. Pakistan cannot succeed in bringing the Afghan Taliban to heel where 150,000 U.S. and NATO troops and hundreds of billions of U.S. dollars have failed, and what's more, they're not going to try. Pakistani influence in Afghanistan, despite long-standing legend to the contrary, is dis-
tinctly limited. Pakistan’s leadership understands that a Taliban victory in Afghanistant would be a strategic disaster for itself, but lacking the means to decisively influence events there—and continuing to harbor serious doubts about the strategic orientation of the Kabul regime—it is disinclined to take the risks involved in trying to do so.

As Afghanistan settles into a dynamic stalemate of indeterminate outcome, it is time for the U.S. to refocus on its long-term fundamental interests in South Asia. The reasons for America’s post-9/11 obsession with Afghanistan are clear enough—

I was present, after all, at the creation—but long-term U.S. strategic interests in Pakistan in fact dwarf those in Afghanistan. Arguably, we have allowed the tail to wag the dog for too long, and it is time to reorient our policy.

Pakistan is now engaged in a long, complicated, twilight struggle against religiously-inspired extremism, both internally and across its borders. For Pakistan, this is not simply a matter of finding, fixing, and eliminating committed terrorists. Ultimate victory will necessitate addressing the hold which various forms of extremism have gained on large portions of its own body politic, and thus the political environment in which important policy decisions are made. Long-term solutions for Pakistan will involve social and educational reforms as much as military action. Given Pakistan’s importance in global counterterrorism policy, its status as a nuclear-armed state, its troubled relations with India, and its location at the heart of a highly important but politically unstable region of the world, the U.S. has a considerable stake in the outcome of this struggle, and would be well advised to maintain a constructive engagement with Pakistan at multiple levels.

In Pakistan as elsewhere, the U.S. must balance achievable goals with effective means. This may well dictate a lower overall level of U.S. expenditure in Pakistan than we see currently, but the dynamics and motivations behind those spending decisions must fundamentally change. Afghanistan will continue to loom large in U.S. calculations, but it will inevitably recede in importance. As the U.S. navigates this shift, it will have to accept that in many areas, Pakistan and the U.S. will simply have to agree to disagree. Although the U.S. and Pakistan share largely similar strategic goals, both at home and in Afghanistan, the disparities in perspective, in priorities and in tactical approach between the two will continue to necessitate an essentially transactional relationship. That relationship will inevitably be contentious, but it need not be cripplingly acrimonious.

Quite frankly, one of the most important challenges limiting effective cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan will be what I regard as an endemic deficit in effective national leadership in Pakistan. The U.S. has a long term interest in encouraging effective civilian governance in Pakistan, and a military leadership fully subordinate to democratic control. Our active pursuit of that long-term aspiration should be limited, however, by two facts: The first is that U.S. ability to effectively influence the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan is distinctly limited, to say the very least. The second is that the civilian political leadership in Pakistan has traditionally been both venal and incompetent, lacking both the moral will and the capacity to do what is necessary to address religious extremism and other overarching national challenges. While the military has not always been distinctly better in this respect, and in fact considerably worse in the foreign context, the fact is that the Pakistan Army is by far the most effective and capable institution in the country. And while the dysfunction at the heart of civil-military relations in Pakistan would take some time to describe, it is often driven by an understandable frustration on the part of the military with the ineffectiveness of its civilian leaders. Frequently, simple considerations of efficacy will continue to necessitate our dealing directly with the Army to get things done.

Again, limited U.S. means will have to be calibrated in Pakistan against achievable goals in light of U.S. priorities going forward. That said, given overarching U.S. interests in the region, there will be many worthy candidates for U.S. assistance, both direct and indirect. Social cohesion and stability require Pakistan to address serious deficits in water, energy, and social services—particularly education. Pakistan’s National Action Plan against terrorism will require material resources, as well as political courage and focus. There is a crying, long-term need to fully incorporate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into settled Pakistan, and thus to eliminate long-standing terrorist safehavens. And Pakistan’s conventional military forces will need to be maintained if we are to avoid quick recourse to nuclear weapons at a time when Kashmir remains a social and political tinderbox, and the threat of Indo-Pak war still hangs like an incubus across the region.

In short, the U.S. dares not turn its back on Pakistan as it seeks to protect its serious national security interests in South-Central Asia. Wise policy going forward will require the U.S. to rebalance the overly Afghan-centric policies of the recent past, to accept, however reluctantly, those aspects of tactical Pakistani behavior it
cannot change, and to focus instead on priority, long-term goals which can actually be achieved. Such a policy will often feel less than satisfying, but it is, in my view, the only responsible way forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.

I am going to defer to our ranking member to begin and again say that, look, I think the relationship with Pakistan is important. It has been transactional. It has moved to a more wholesome relationship. Now it is back into, I think, a very transactional relationship. I think in many ways they generate aid from the United States by their bad behavior and threatening issues relative to their nuclear program. But I would agree that it is a very important relationship and that is why we are having this hearing.

Senator Cardin?

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, and let me thank all three witnesses for their testimony.

Let me start by saying that this Congress is not going to take any definitive actions in regards to Pakistan before the elections. We are going to probably vote a continuing resolution that will just continue current policy, and we will not be taking up any vehicle that could affect—the Congress affect this relationship.

So this hearing and I hope the testimony will help us understand what is likely to be considered as we move into the next administration, working with Congress as it relates to the policy with Pakistan.

And I do not have any specific recommendation, but I want to sort of challenge this. Pakistan is one of the largest recipients of development assistance of any country from the United States. And as you pointed out, over a long period of time, we have seen marginal progress in regards to a warm relationship with the United States and the priorities that we believe are important in that bilateral relationship.

They certainly have not been helpful in dealing with the broader issues of counterterrorism. They have been centric to their own country and not really engaged in helping us deal with the problems of terrorism against India or the Haqqani Network and may have been counterproductive, as Chairman Corker pointed out, in supporting these efforts.

You point out in the testimony that their role in Afghanistan may be very marginal right now. They may not be able to do much for us in Afghanistan.

Their anti-American rhetoric is extremely problematic. They have built up a nuclear capacity far beyond what was our believed understanding and show no signs of slowing down their nuclear weapon activity.

They are developing relations with China, which we are watching, which is not necessarily counterproductive to us, but we wonder as to where they see their future.

They are affecting our relationship with India, a country in which we are trying to develop a much more strategic alliance with.

And their human rights record has been moving in the wrong direction.

So why should we not consider a fundamental change in America's relationship with Pakistan and what danger is there? I want
to get an answer to that, but it seems to me that they are going
to fight terrorism in their own country. That is what they are doing
now. They may not have the same capacity without help from the
United States, and we could talk about that. But they are doing it
for themselves. They are not doing it for the region. They are not
doing it for the United States. What are we getting out of this?
Why should we not look at taking a—my staff told me about $600
million a year we do in development assistance—and looking at
countries in which we can get better return? Whoever wants to re-
spend. Don't be bashful.

The CHAIRMAN. They agree with the assessment. They want to
move on. [Laughter.]

Senator CARDIN. If we could have a brief response. Mr. Grenier,
we will start with you.

Mr. GRENIER. Yes, Senator, I think that in fact we do need to re-
view and, if you will, zero-base our relations with Pakistan. You
have already pointed out the many areas in which the Pakistanis
are not moving in concert with our views. In fact, there are certain
areas where they are perhaps undermining U.S. interests. They do
not see their problems in the way that we think they ought to, and
that Pakistani perception is unlikely to change except slowly.

That said, I think we do have an important stake, given the
broadness of our interests.

Senator CARDIN. So how do we direct this? We have tried condi-
tionality. That has not produced the type of results that we
thought. You say start with a zero game. Well, a start with a zero
game means we start with cutting off all of our assistance. Is that
what you are suggesting?

Mr. GRENIER. No. I don't think that we would end up at zero, but
I would recommend that we do a zero-based review. And I think
at the end of the day, we would conclude that in fact it makes
sense for us to support Pakistani military development particularly
in counterterrorism in parts of this country that are——

Senator CARDIN. What do we get out of their counterterrorism?
Remind me. Other than fighting the terrorists in their own coun-
try, what are we getting from them?

Mr. GRENIER. Well, sir, for many years, they have helped us in
a very open-handed manner against Al Qaeda. Now, obviously, the
importance of Al Qaeda——

Senator CARDIN. And we do operations that are regional. They
continue to blast us for that, being offended that we are coming
into their country to clean up the region.

Mr. GRENIER. Yes, sir. And I would say that there are often do-
men political reasons for that.

Senator CARDIN. I hear that all the time. There comes a point
where it becomes real when they say it is just for politics.

Mr. GRENIER. Well, again, I think the Pakistani perspective on
these things is necessarily going to be different from ours.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Markey, do you want to comment briefly?

Dr. MARKEY. Just on the narrow question of security assistance
and Pakistan's behavior on the counterterror front, I would agree
with a lot of the frustration.

There are two points that I make in my testimony about areas
where they have been helpful and I think continue to be but not
in ways that are necessarily public: air corridor into Afghanistan and drone strikes. There are protests by Pakistanis, and I agree with you that that is unhelpful. We would like to get to a place where we can publicly and routinely cooperate.

Senator CARDIN. I have been in closed briefings and I understand that there is a different perspective. But I am wondering how different it really is.

Dr. MARKEY. I am sorry?

Senator CARDIN. How useful their quiet help to us is.

Dr. MARKEY. Well, from someone who is working outside of government and watching drone strikes as they are reported in the media, my impression would be that though the tempo of those strikes has gone down, they do persist. They are useful. And on occasion, they are done, it seems from the outside, without their help, but often there are areas where these strikes——

Senator CARDIN. The drone strikes are very important. Do not get me wrong. And my question is how helpful have the Pakistanis been in regards to that. Some of this we cannot talk about in open session. I fully understand that. But I just raise the value issue. And you look at the investments we are making and whether there are not alternative ways to get some of this help without putting up with the support for activities that are counterproductive to U.S. interests.

Dr. MARKEY. Right.

Senator CARDIN. Dr. Dalton, my time is over. So you have a minute in response.

Dr. DALTON. Very briefly, Senator.

I think that if you consider the security threats to nuclear weapons and the potential that there are still groups in Pakistan that might have interest in nuclear weapons and capability against the government—we have seen this in attacks on military facilities over time. It continues to be in our interest to make sure that those groups are not able to get anywhere near those weapons.

Senator CARDIN. So the more nuclear weapons they produce, the more money we have to give them?

Dr. DALTON. Not necessarily money, but there is a pernicious effect there that Chairman Corker pointed out in terms of threats and rewards.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We reward their bad behavior by more money. So they will conduct more bad behavior.

Senator Perdue?

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate you calling this meeting. I think Pakistan is in a very important place geographically and from a time standpoint too.

You know, in my career, I lived in Asia and worked a good bit in Pakistan in Karachi and Lahore and Islamabad. My friends in Pakistan have been very concerned about the internal politics there for a long time and what is going on next door in Afghanistan.

When I think of Pakistan today, I think of a couple things. One is the Pashtun instability between India and Pakistan, the nuclear capability, which scares me to death frankly, given the anti-democratic ups and downs that you all three have talked about. I think of Afghan security and the Haqqani Network and what Pakistan
is not doing regarding that effort. And then Pakistan is a terrorist haven.

There are a couple of reports that have come out. October 2014, the Pentagon report was the first ever to claim that Pakistan uses Afghanistan-focused insurgents as proxy forces rather than allowing their presence by providing sanctuary and support. That was a damning report.

Then in June of this year in 2016, the Pentagon issued a report on the stability and security in Afghanistan, noting that Pakistan's vital role in reducing the regional threat posed by terrorists and insurgents has not been sustained.

Then in August of this year, the Pentagon announced it would not certify Pakistan's action against the Haqqani Network as sufficient. What that means is that half of our aid over the next year, $300 million, will not be released, and it cannot be waived by the President, as has been past practice.

And so all of a sudden now we are in a situation where, quite frankly, it is a very confused situation between the U.S. and Afghanistan in terms of what we are trying to communicate.

And my question is really more in line with, Dr. Markey, what you said in a Foreign Policy article recently. You said many experts believe that the U.S. aid is often worse than ineffective. It is potentially counterproductive. I would like you to expand on that, but I would like the other two panelists to also help me with this issue right now of what is our objective with Pakistan in terms of the objectives we have of stabilizing Afghanistan. I am very concerned about their lack of cooperation there. We have plenty of DOD information here in public documents and a lot more in classified documents that we know they are not participating, and that is a dangerous threat in Afghanistan. We know the Pashtun issue creates instability between India and Pakistan. You know, there are 200 million people in Pakistan, and the average age is 23. Their birthrate is very high. This a potential hotbed for terrorism.

So with all of those things bubbling around and our strategic interest in Afghanistan long-term, Dr. Markey, would you start it? I would like the three of you just to comment, though, if money is not the answer and we all agree that engagement is still purposeful, wherein lies the answer in terms of how we do—I agree with the zero-based approach on the money, $19 billion. But only $8 billion of that has actually been security efforts. About $11 billion has been humanitarian. So let us put it in perspective. It is not like this is a major battleground for us in terms of money, but on the other hand, I do not know what they are going to do given that we are cutting half of the money, I guess, that we would normally be sending them this year. Dr. Markey?

Dr. Markey. Yes, very briefly I would say my points about the potential counterproductive nature of U.S. assistance to Pakistan relate to observations by many Pakistanis that they do not see necessarily where the resources are going. And many Pakistanis who may be in the more liberal, cosmopolitan crowd often perceive that the money has supported the more repressive, anti-democratic forces in their country and that this, they would say, has been happening over decades. So that is where the counterproductive aspects are.
So what we need I would say broadly is a lot more clarity on precisely what our aims are, and for every dollar that flows from the United States to Pakistan, I would want to assign it a specific use rather than—I would say what we have now is a much more muddled perception——

Senator PERDUE. Would you agree that result versus use would be reasonable, that a specific result as opposed to a specific——

Dr. MARKEY. Yes. What I would say particularly on the security side is that there should be three categories in the way we think about our assistance and the way that we condition it.

Category one, things they want and we want. It was said earlier that they want to fight the Pakistani Taliban, those who are threatening them. We want to fight the Pakistani Taliban. Conditions in that area would be relatively limited because we want the same thing.

Category two. We and they want similar things but they want to do it differently than we think is right. We have concerns about the way they treat civilians in war zones, things like that. Maybe improve their counterinsurgency capabilities. We would want to focus our money there, use stricter conditions.

Category three. Areas where we want to tell them what we think they should do and we believe they are not doing. We hold our resources as inducements with limited expectations that those things will change but demonstrating that we are willing and eager to be partners with them, thereby not closing doors over the long run, but not delivering assistance for things that they do not do.

Senator PERDUE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask your forbearance and just ask Mr. Grenier to respond to that quickly? I am out of time, so I ask for brevity, please.

Mr. GRENIER. Senator, I very much agree with what Dan Markey has just said. When I talk about sort of zero-basing everything, I think we need to look at our assistance to Pakistan in a very tactical way, in the same way that Dan has just described, so that we have clear common purposes to which we are going to put specific aid and plans and deliverables for what that aid is actually going to produce. Now, in some cases, particularly when you are talking about broad economic support, it’s very difficult to point to a specific result. I mean, the social problems in Pakistan are so vast, and the importance of our addressing them jointly is so important. But it is very, very difficult to actually see measurable progress over a short period of time.

That said, I think we have to get away from the pattern that we have been in for so many years where we provide them with broad assistance, which is not accounted for in a very tactical way, and somehow expecting that we can use that as a tool, as a lever to get them to change aspects of their behavior that frankly they simply are not going to change.

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Markey, I want to follow up a little bit on that point because that seems like a fairly straightforward, relatively easy to pursue way to think about assistance to Pakistan. So why have we not done that?
Dr. Markey. I think the short answer would be that the nature of our relationship with Pakistan changed very dramatically after 9/11, and there were a number of assistance programs that were quickly put into place, partly to encourage and partly at the time to reward Pakistan for some significant changes in its counterterrorism strategy. In many ways what we have done is we have layered on top of that over the past 15 years other programs, and often as changes have happened on the ground in terms of the realities or our perceptions of what the Pakistanis are or are not doing we justify different programs for different purposes. So F–16’s at times initially looked like a reward for a strategic shift by Pakistan on Al Qaeda. Subsequently, there became an effort to help them fight their—to engage in counterinsurgency in the FATA. These justifications do not necessarily line up very effectively, and ultimately, as we have seen, they have not been convincing here at home.

And so I think the problem is that history, history of changing relations and assistance programs maybe not keeping up with that, and a desire often to make a political case for specific pots of money, a political case that will appeal to the widest constituency but maybe is not internally consistent in a way that we would like to see.

Senator Shaheen. When you say the widest constituency, are you talking about here in America as opposed to in Pakistan?

Dr. Markey. In some cases both but mainly in terms of justifying it here at home. F–16’s were justified on a number of grounds, for instance, including the desire to simply get face time with senior Pakistani leaders. Which of the justifications was actually true? Are they actually a useful counterinsurgency tool and so on? I think for different people, we have pulled out different reasons. And I think the patience has worn thin on that.

Senator Shaheen. In my visits to Pakistan as Senator, one of the things I have heard everywhere I have gone has been the on again/off again nature of American assistance. Clearly the Pressler amendment had real implications for how Pakistanis viewed their ability to count on the U.S.

Are there areas where we can look to our assistance and say that it has been effective, not military assistance, but economic assistance, and where Pakistanis have said, oh, yes, this has been helpful? One of the things that I have heard mentioned has been our help after the earthquake. That was one of the times when the Pakistani people really appreciated American support. Are there other things that we can cite and ways that we can look where we were successful and we should think about pursuing those kinds of efforts? Anyone?

Dr. Markey. Yes. Humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of earthquakes and other natural disasters can pay a dividend. It is often short-lived, though, in terms of people’s memories.

Other examples of positive efforts by the United States. Support to higher education institutions like the Lahore University of Management Sciences. This is an area where generations now of Pakistan’s leaders and best and brightest have been trained and which would not exist, I believe, if not for significant U.S. startup assistance at the beginning.
Another example would be Pakistan’s systems of canals and dams, which were built in the 1960s and 1970s with considerable global assistance, but much of it actually coming from the United States either directly or through multilateral lending institutions. And those kinds of things have changed the map of Pakistan. So it is not true to say that we have never done anything right by Pakistan or that we have not had a long-lasting benefit to our assistance even on the civilian side.

Senator SHAHEEN. Mr. Dalton, I only have a few minutes left, but I want to pursue your issue that you raised with respect to Pakistan’s nuclear program and why that gives us a significant interest in what goes on there. And I wonder if you could give us your assessment how secure the program is, and I assume that it is in Pakistan’s interest to make sure that none of the materials or bombs get into the hands of terrorists and that they are equally concerned about that as we are.

Dr. DALTON. Thank you, Senator.

I agree with that contention, that they have a strong interest in doing it. Nuclear weapons are one of the few symbols in Pakistan that there is political consensus on. Maybe that and cricket are the only other things that everybody agrees on. Nuclear weapons are great. They are sort of the crown jewels, and so they have undertaken I think fairly significant efforts to make sure that they are well protected. There is a professional division within the strategic plans division that addresses security. In my interactions with them, my sense is that they are a very professional organization. They understand the challenges that they face. They understand the threats that they face. And they have put in place I think as good a system as they can, recognizing the challenges that they face. The challenges are not insubstantial. We move nuclear material on our interstate system under heavy guard, big convoys. You cannot do that in Pakistan because the threat signature becomes too high. So they do face real challenges when it comes to moving material, keeping it secure, making sure that the personnel in the nuclear labs are not having sympathies with non-state groups and so forth. But I think to the extent that is observable from publicly available information, they have done as good a job as they can given their interests.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Gardner?

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today.

Just a quick question on an initiative we have not spent too much time on this morning, North Korea. According to the Department of Defense’s 2015 report on North Korea’s military power, in addition to Iran and Syria, past clients from North Korea’s ballistic missiles and associated technology have included Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen.

The report also asserts that North Korea provided Libya with uranium hexafluoride, the form of uranium used in the uranium enrichment processes to produce fuel for nuclear reactors and nu-
clear weapons via the proliferation network of Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan.

More recently, however, media outlets in India have asserted that the relationship between Pakistan and North Korea persists today.

So could the three of you, any of you, all of you address the relationship, if any, that Pakistan currently has with North Korea? And do you believe that there are ongoing illicit nuclear ties between these two nations today?

Dr. DALTON. Thank you, Senator. Why do I not start and then if others want to join in.

You are absolutely right that there is information to suggest linkages between the Pakistani nuclear program and missile programs in North Korea in the past. After the A.Q. Khan network was dismantled in the early 2000 time frame, most of those suggestions have gone away, and I think there is no sort of accepted public information, aside from what we have seen in Indian media accounts, to suggest that those linkages are ongoing.

And I think if you look at the steps that Pakistan has taken since then to put in place a legal framework, to put in place an export control structure, a system to keep checks on the scientists so that they are not doing things that they are supposed to do, I think they have demonstrated a desire and interest to make sure that this does not happen again. They understand the damage that the Khan network did to their reputation, to their desire that their nuclear program be seen as a legitimate national security tool for the state. And so I think in that context, although I would not rule it out because there is a history, I also think it is not as likely today that we would see that kind of cooperation.

Senator GARDNER. Anybody else wish to address this?

Mr. GRENIER. Yes, Senator. I think there is an important point just looking in there as well because it is not an accident that the relations that Pakistan developed and specifically A.Q. Khan and the facilities that he controlled and developed with North Korea and also with Iran, that that occurred during the 1990s. And that was a period during which Pakistan was sanctioned about as heavily as it possibly could by the United States. It was very clear that Pakistan had a continuing national interest in developing nuclear weapons in order to maintain a threat against India, given the fact that there was no way that they could possibly match conventional military capabilities of India, and absent other means of pursuing what they saw as an overridingly important national security goal, they chose to get help where they could find it in this case, in some cases with North Korea and Iran.

And I would say that to the extent that we can, we need to be very, very careful that we maintain at least some level of engagement with Pakistan. If we treat them as a pariah, we force them into a pariah corner, they are likely to behave as a pariah.

Senator GARDNER. Stepping back a little bit from that question to a more 30,000 foot level view, what is the relationship today between North Korea and Pakistan?

Dr. DALTON. I think it is difficult to characterize. There is not a lot of public information. I did notice recently a news article that the North Korean airlines were not going to be permitted to fly into
Pakistan any longer. It is not entirely clear what the basis for that is, but it does suggest that there is some trouble there and that the trade relations that they have enjoyed in the past may be souring in some way. So it is not clear that there is a strong relationship at this point.

Senator GARDNER. And I would just point out too that it is not just India that is concerned about this. There are articles in the Japan Times as well pointing to evidence of North Korean activities increasing between the two nations and the concern over proliferation activities. I think that is just something that we could continue to look at and make sure that our concerns are not overlooked there.

In terms of China and Pakistan, the port opening, the $46 billion economic corridor, how do you see that relationship growing, changing, and what do you think the likely long-term ramifications are of that growing relationship?

Dr. MARKEY. I was in Pakistan back in February/March of this year, and principally to ask questions about the China-Pakistan relationship and to learn more about it for my research. And I would say that it is perhaps the single most exciting thing that has happened in Pakistan in a semi-positive way for some time. Pakistanis that I met with were almost uniformly eager to talk about the opportunities that they perceive with respect to China, the kinds of investments that are planned and are, in fact, ongoing by the Chinese, the ways in which this may contribute to improving Pakistan’s investment climate not just for Chinese activities but for other international investment, which has been extraordinarily poor in Pakistan, and the ways that ultimately that may contribute to growth and economic opportunity.

So from a U.S. perspective, I think we have to take two looks at this. One is in the short- to medium-term, it is relatively positive. I mean, we have concerns about Pakistan’s political stability, and part of that is related to its economic reality. And if they can get more investment, more jobs, economic growth, there are opportunities to build a country of now 200 million people, going on possibly 300 million, 350 million people by mid century. These are things that should be supported. And so where the Chinese are paving the way, we probably should follow suit.

Over the longer run, we are going to have some questions about what this is going to mean for China’s profile in South Asia, China’s profile leading into Central Asia and the rest of Eurasia. That will depend in many ways on how the United States perceives its broader relationship with China, and as we veer into possibly a more competitive relationship, China’s expansion may come in some ways at our expense. That is how we are going to have to think about it. But that is the longer-term strategic framework.

In the short run, I perceive it as relatively positive.

Senator GARDNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Markey?

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Dr. Dalton, I am very concerned about the risk of nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan’s development of low-yield
tactical nuclear weapons intended for use on the battlefield is especially dangerous. These weapons are meant to make it easier for Pakistan’s military to pull the nuclear trigger. As a result, they will increase the probability that confrontations with India end up spiraling out of control and leading to nuclear catastrophe.

Pakistan has continued to rapidly produce fissile material and it has refused to lift its veto on negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. These policies threaten to accelerate the nuclear arms race in the region.

Pakistan actually has the ultimate responsibility for its dangerous nuclear policies, but the United States played a role, as has India. That is especially true with regard to the deal that we cut with India in 2008 in terms of their continued production of nuclear materials not under full scope safeguards and my warning at the time and others’ that Pakistan would just continue to massively produce nuclear materials if that was going to be our policy. And so that is exactly what has happened.

And now the administration has sought to further water down our nonproliferation policy by admitting India to the Nuclear Suppliers Group despite unambiguous guidelines that Nuclear Suppliers Group members should be parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Not only are we going to grant India an exemption from established global rules, but we are actually seeking to allow India to join the body that decides on those rules. Obviously, Pakistan will not react well to that, as we talk about their nuclear threat.

So from your perspective, Dr. Dalton, do you believe removing the shackles on India’s nuclear program worsen the nuclear competition in South Asia?

Dr. DALTON. Thanks, Senator Markey.

I think there are two points that I would offer in response there. The first point is the availability of information regarding the Indian nuclear program that has some credibility to it makes it quite difficult to come up with an assessment about whether there has been an actual increase in Indian fissile material production for nuclear weapons.

Senator MARKEY. I am talking about the Pakistani response. Do you think it worsened the race for Pakistan? Did Pakistan respond to that?

Dr. DALTON. Yes, absolutely.

Senator MARKEY. And did that make the world more dangerous in that region?

Dr. DALTON. Yes, absolutely.

And I think the point that I would make there is whether there is a real reason for Pakistan to respond or their perception that their security environment is worsening is important. But for them, they have decided that things look bad. They need more weapons.

Senator MARKEY. They said they would do it.

Dr. DALTON. Yes.

Senator MARKEY. And they did it.

Dr. DALTON. Yes.

Senator MARKEY. But it was in response to a policy that we put on the books. Is that correct?

Dr. DALTON. I think that is correct.

Senator MARKEY. Okay. Thank you.
Now, Dr. Dalton, in your written testimony, you warned that Pakistani and Indian officials have expressed skepticism that the other side’s nuclear threats are credible. You note that there is no shared sense of where nuclear redlines might be drawn. That is a very alarming statement in your testimony. If both sides doubt the deterrence of the other’s threats, then nuclear deterrence may fail. What role should the U.S. play to help India and Pakistan prevent unintended nuclear war?

Dr. Dalton. As you pointed out, Senator, the desire by Pakistan in having tactical nuclear weapons is to create a perception that there is a lower threshold for use. In their perspective, that enhances the deterrence value of those weapons and should discourage India from contemplating sort of limited conventional military operations, which the Indian army and others have been contemplating and exercising in recent years. I think that does create a condition where there is ripeness for deterrence failure. The Indian establishment does not believe that Pakistan would use tactical nuclear weapons on its own territory. They think that is not credible. Pakistani officials and experts think that it is not credible that India would use nuclear weapons in response to Pakistan.

Senator Markey. Well, let me just stop you right there. So then we kind of get into this question of how do we deal with that issue. Pakistan’s foreign ministry recently suggested that Pakistan would be willing to enter into a bilateral agreement with India that could bind each country not to conduct additional nuclear test explosions. Currently both countries maintain unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. Neither are signatories to the CTBT. What are the prospects for India and Pakistan to agree on a bilateral non-testing agreement?

Dr. Markey? I just wanted to say that word, “Dr. Markey.” My wife is a physician. She will not take my name. So I just wanted to say “Dr. Markey” to someone. [Laughter.]

Dr. Markey. It is a pleasure to say “Senator Markey.”

Senator Markey. So how can we get the U.S. to help to get a bilateral nuclear test deal between these two countries?

Dr. Markey. I have to say that my read on Pakistan’s statements regarding this desire to make a deal with India strike me as kind of a diplomatic play on Pakistan’s part.

Senator Markey. You do not think they are sincere.

Dr. Markey. I do not. Well, they may well be sincere, but they know that India is also justifying its nuclear posture because of India’s concerns about China. And so they know that India will be reluctant and unlikely to take steps merely to match Pakistan. And so they know that they have a high ground on this issue and that India will not likely respond the way that they would like.

Senator Markey. Do the other two witnesses agree with that, that ultimately it is not something that could ever bear fruit, that we could have a bilateral agreement between the two countries?

Dr. Dalton. It is entirely possible. I think the context depends. In this instance, I agree with Dan that the effort was to try to show the Indians up when it comes to membership criteria for the Nuclear Suppliers Group. This was a diplomatic gambit. On the other hand, one could imagine that if there were a process by which both states could become eligible for NSG membership, this kind of
thing where they would have to demonstrate something more than a unilateral test moratorium might become a requirement, in which case a bilateral agreement could be useful.

Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, sir.

Senator Menendez.

Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.

Let me just say as a preface I think our overall posture towards Pakistan, in addition to the focus of this hearing, however, is much broader. And our stated policy is to support and strengthen a more democratic, stable, and prosperous Pakistan. And I know that many of my colleagues join me in the belief that to truly do so, Pakistan must take meaningful steps to strengthen the rule of law, democratic institutions, to empower civil society actors, and to uphold human rights. And while I recognize this panel may not be in the best position to specifically address those concerns, although they may have views on them, I think we would be remiss not to stress the importance of these needed reforms and actions.

And I have previously raised concerns with Prime Minister Sharif about new laws that would hamper the ability of national and international NGOs that focus on democracy and human rights to successfully operate in Pakistan. And I think we need to give a renewed sense of urgency to the process that is going on—I think the ranking member mentioned it in his opening comments—because while we must focus on national security and cooperation with Pakistan against actors who threaten our interests and Pakistani national security and that of our allies in the region, including India, we cannot overlook the role of governance that civil society plays in developing long-term security. And I hope at some point, Mr. Chairman, we will have some opportunity to focus on that as well.

So I want to wave my saber to our friends in Pakistan about what is going on with national and international NGOs because when we talk about measurements of how we provide security assistance, in my mind, yes, there is security assistance, but there is also the longer range set of needs to develop a populace and civil society underpinnings of what the support for those security operations need to be. And I am worried about what is happening in Pakistan in that regard.

Now, with that having been said, in July 2014, Prime Minister Sharif announced that all foreign fighters and local terrorists will be wiped out without any exception, which is a welcome declaration given the rampant terrorist activity in Pakistan particularly in the FATA and Waziristan regions. What we have seen, however, is a clear prioritization from Pakistani security forces of the Pakistani Taliban, which directly and almost exclusively threatens their interests directly. And I understand that to some degree.

However, now that we have seen successes in those operations, I would like to ask the panel—I know this has been touched upon briefly, but I would like to go greater in depth—do you believe that Pakistani security forces will actually take action against other groups, including the Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-
Mohammad? These networks pose a direct threat to the United States and our allies in the region, but Pakistan seems to have thus far had mixed results on carrying through its pledge to attack all foreign fighters. So if the answer was, well, we have a domestic challenge and we have got to take care of our domestic challenge before we can deal with the foreign fighters issues, now that that largely has been maybe not totally but largely significantly addressed, what is the excuse now? What are our expectations and what can we do as we talk about figuring out how we calibrate this assistance in a way that we understand that there are mutual interests here? What can we do to see those specific elements be pursued?

Mr. GRENIER. Senator, I wish there were a simple answer to a very direct and straightforward question. And I think that as we sort of peel back the layers of the onion in the likely Pakistani response to that question—and we have heard elements of that response any number of times—part of what they say is true. Part of it is sincere. Part of it is mendacious. Part of it is self-serving. And it is a great challenge to somehow compartment all of that and figure out what is a proper way forward, knowing that our track record for influencing Pakistani behavior in these areas is very poor, to say the very least.

I think it is true that as the Pakistanis focus as a matter of priority on those groups that primarily threaten them, they are legitimately very concerned about the possibility of different groups which currently do not cooperate with one another certainly against Pakistani interests in fact cooperating with one another in the future. I think that has been a great consideration for the Pakistanis in the context of North Waziristan. I think that they had to reach certain agreements with certain groups, perhaps to have included the Haqqanis before they felt that they were in a position to actually go into North Waziristan, invade that area, as they had promised to do for years.

I think at the same time, though, it must be said that knowing the Pakistanis as I do, I strongly suspect that they are somewhat loathe to completely undercut the LeT even if it were possible for them in domestic political terms to do so, knowing that the LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad, among others, are very potent potential weapons that they can use in the context of Kashmir.

They are very concerned about the future of Afghanistan. Their tools for affecting events in Afghanistan are not particularly effective.

Senator MENENDEZ. So you are saying that their interests diverge from ours.

Mr. GRENIER. I am sorry?

Senator MENENDEZ. That their interests diverge from ours.

Mr. GRENIER. In a tactical sense, absolutely.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, okay. So that gives me a lot of insight as to how I might deal with them.

Dr. Markey.

Dr. MARKEY. Yes. I would like to make two points.

First, to the extent that they are likely or would ever act against some of these groups, I think we are less likely to see an all-out military push of the sort that we have seen against the TTP than
we might see more law enforcement actions and because particularly LeT does enjoy a certain political clout, that they will be taking steps and they will be justifying these moves on the basis of trying to incorporate parts of these organizations within normal, nonviolent politics in Pakistan.

And that gets back to your broader point about the need to promote a more democratic moderate Pakistan and one that is not inclined to turn to violent militarism or militancy I guess in so many different ways.

And that is the second point I wanted to make, which is basically we need a Pakistan that is more democratic long term to counter the appeal of radical ideologies in that country. You get a legitimate, popularly elected government that can actually deliver. That is the only kind of permanent solution I would imagine to the appeal of a radical revolutionary Islam in the country. And the problem as I see it—I agree with you I think—is that while we have a veneer of a democratic process and we have had, I think fortunately, two rounds of national elections and hopefully upcoming a third, it has not seeped down and it has not become a democratic practice that is necessarily going to provide the kind of legitimacy that the country—that its leadership, that the state needs in order to be effective over the long run. So I am very concerned in exactly the same way.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank our witnesses for really fantastic testimony.

I want to drill down a little bit further on this question of what influences extremism, extremist groups in Pakistan. One terrorism expert who helped the government come up with its response to the Peshawar school attack said, quote, terrorism has different shades, but madrasas have been the nursery.

I know there is no way to paint with a broad brush the type of learning and the type of teaching that happens in madrasas, but there are estimates suggesting that a large percentage of madrasas, many of which have been set up with Saudi money or Gulf money, are preaching a version of Islam that often becomes the foundation for extremist groups who come in to try to pervert those teachings into violence.

And of course, the Pakistanis have recognized this by planning a campaign of registration for these schools. It has gone slowly, my understanding is, in part because it is difficult to pick out the ones that present problems versus the ones that are legitimately teaching Islam.

I will start with you, Mr. Grenier, just to talk a little bit about this issue and how it plays into a broader set of U.S. policies, not just related to the way in which we fund Pakistan, but the way in which we partner with other governments that are putting money into those schools which in many ways are sowing the seeds, becoming the nursery of extremism.

Mr. GRENIER. Yes, Senator. It is a very, very difficult and intractable problem. And there are a lot of different aspects to it. I think it is important that you mentioned that this is something which, as we look at the phenomenon of radical madrasas in Pakistan, it
is not just only a Pakistani problem. As you say, a lot of the money for construction of these madrasas comes from outside, and while there are government elites in other countries, perhaps particularly Saudi Arabia, who recognize that there is a problem with this, it is a very difficult political line for them to take with their own people who feel that they are simply promoting Islam. And what could possibly be wrong with that?

You are right that the Pakistanis recognize the long-term threat here and there is now, as there has been in the past, an effort to try to license these schools, to try to change the curricula of these schools. Under the best of circumstances, that would be a very daunting project in a country with a population the size of Pakistan and the lack of resources that they have. But these are not the best of circumstances, and the Pakistani ability to pursue this kind of a program in a systematic way, in a persistent way is simply nowhere near what it really ought to be.

And I think one of the other aspects to all of this that is extremely important is to recognize that these madrasas, whatever else they may represent, are also a very important social institution within Pakistan. Many of the children who attend these madrasas would not get three meals a day but for their attendance at these madrasas. And so the idea that you are simply going to go and close down noncompliant madrasas is simply a political non-starter in many areas of Pakistan.

Senator Murphy. But let me put it to you, Dr. Markey, in a simpler way. It is not a coincidence that as these schools have multiplied, as the Saudis in particular have sent billions of dollars into parts of Pakistan, that these terrorist organizations have been more successful than ever before in recruitment. I understand all of the difficulties in pulling this apart. But from the standpoint of U.S. policy, we should at least acknowledge that these two trend lines, the increasing money going in to fund these schools and the increasing ability to recruit, is not a coincidence.

Dr. Markey. It is not a coincidence.

I would just step back. There is also a history to this. It goes back in many ways to the Saudi global response to the Iranian revolution. Pakistan has been sort of a proxy battlefield for Iran and Saudi Arabia ever since. And so where Saudis have funded certain things and certain groups inside of Pakistan, the Iranians have at times done similar. And so you have seen bloodletting on both sides.

One other related point. I would not want us to focus too closely only on madrasas or even Saudi-sponsored institutions, which include madrasas, but also to look at the public education system in Pakistan and the curriculum there, which has been widely cited in a number of different reports as having kind of anti-Western, anti-Indian, promoting a lot of narratives that are perhaps not quite the same as promoting terrorism but do create a narrative of Pakistan's place in the region, in the world that is one that is not helpful to us.

And then one last point on this. There is some good news here. Many Pakistanis, in fact, I would think the vast, vast majority, simply want their kids to get a good education. And what you are seeing is actual disgust with a lot of the options that have been
available, including public schools that have been failing, and investments by middle and lower income Pakistanis into private English language teaching schools, opportunities for their kids because what they are looking for is a way for them to actually get decent jobs and compete in a global marketplace, and they are willing to invest in that. So we should not think that this is something, whether madrasas or the school curriculum in the public schools, has the natural and national support of Pakistanis. They actually, I think if left to choose, would want something different.

Senator Murphy. This is an incredibly uncomfortable conversation for us because it puts the United States in the position of appearing to decide what brand of Islam should be taught and what should not. And frankly, it is an inappropriate conversation for us, but it is important. It is important for us to untangle this because getting this right, trying to figure out the influences into extremism frankly is much more important to our battle against these groups than picking who we strike with drones and who we do not on the back end. So I appreciate your answers to the questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Cardin?

Senator Cardin. Mr. Chairman, I just really wanted to make an observation. I thank the panel again for their testimony. It seems to me the Nuclear Suppliers Group might give us an opportunity. Dr. Dalton, I was just impressed by your observation. It is so difficult to get India and Pakistan to have substantive trust in each other and substantive discussions. And the Nuclear Suppliers Group—joining it—it is not just technical, it is also political. It may very well give an opportunity, looking a little bit longer term, to get a much better control over what is happening in India and Pakistan in regards to their nuclear programs. That is something I think the United States, working with some of our partners who are interested in nonproliferation—it may be an area where we can make some progress.

Secondly, we have not talked about the Pakistani Diaspora. I think that also could be helpful to us in trying to establish a more constructive relationship between the United States and Pakistan.

The last point that Senator Menendez raised on good governance I think is critically important. Just because you have elections does not mean you are going to have a government that is going to be respected by the people as taking care of their needs. And if you lose confidence, it does present the void where extremists can prosper. So I do think we need to put a much stronger priority on the governance issues in Pakistan.

But, Mr. Chairman, I thought this was an extremely important panel and I thank you very much for calling the hearing.

The Chairman. Well, thank you. And I want to thank each of you for being here and sharing your expertise and giving us additional insights. You know, I do not think we spend near enough time here. The way the processes work, the appropriations process happens in a very swift manner, governed by a few. I am in no way criticizing them. It is just the lack of staffing that exists there. The authorizing committees, which have the ability to deal with folks like you in a much more in-depth manner and others, really do not
play the roles here in the United States Senate that they should. And I think much of the insight here, as we try to move ahead with aid issues in the future, is going to be very useful. But thank you for being here. I thank you for your testimony. People will want to ask questions in writing. If we could, we will leave the record open, without objection, till Monday. If you all could respond fairly quickly, we would appreciate it. Again, thank you for spending time with us. Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
SUBMITTED TO DR. DANIEL MARKEY BY SENATOR RUBIO

Human Rights

Question 1. The State Department's recently released International Religious Freedom Report focused at length in the executive summary on Pakistan's deeply troubling blasphemy laws noting that more than 40 people remain on death row for blasphemy in Pakistan, many of whom are religious minorities. In fact, Pakistan has the highest number of blasphemy convictions worldwide. Given other strategic interests with Pakistan, to what extent do you think human rights and religious freedom issues are sidelined or marginalized in our own diplomatic efforts? In that same vein, the bipartisan, independent U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom has repeatedly recommended that the President designate Pakistan a Country of Particular Concern for its severe violations of religious liberty. Successive administrations have failed to do so despite the realities on the ground especially as it relates to the minority Christian and Ahmadi Muslim communities. How do you think Pakistan would respond to being designated a CPC? Are we using all of the leverage at our disposal to advance these fundamental human rights?

Answer. Pakistan's religious minorities clearly face enormous difficulties as enumerated in this question. Although I am unfamiliar with the specific procedures involved with designating Pakistan a CPC, I would not be surprised that successive administrations have determined that doing so would hold relatively little prospect of changing the reality on the ground inside Pakistan. In other words, in this case as in others, U.S. leverage to change Pakistan's domestic policies is limited. Moreover, on an issue that raises enormous passion within Pakistan—that of the blasphemy laws—pressure from the United States might even have some potential to make a bad situation worse. Pakistanis who would like to see the blasphemy laws changed or abolished might find themselves tarnished by association with the United States rather than strengthened by the outside pressure. It is noteworthy that even nominally liberal Pakistani People's Party governments have failed to make serious progress in this area and that some of their leaders, including slain Governor Salman Taseer and Minister for Minority Affairs Shahbaz Bhatti, were specifically targeted for their positions on the blasphemy issue. This raises serious questions about whether the battle over blasphemy laws and the oppression of minorities in Pakistan can be won by way of coercive policies leveled at Pakistan's government, given that changes will require a wider transformation of Pakistani society through education and positive social mobilization that is exceptionally difficult to engineer from the outside. Shedding light on Pakistan's problems, as the International Religious Freedom Report does, makes U.S. concern apparent to Pakistani, American, and global audiences. This is important and constructive. In addition to that publicity, however, it is at least arguable that quietly lending support—technical, financial, moral—to Pakistani groups advocating for change will be a more constructive approach than coercion of Pakistan's government.

Question 2. Pakistan's Supreme Court recently set a hearing date, the second week of October, for the final appeal of Asia Bibi, the Christian mother of five sentenced to death for allegedly committing blasphemy. This appeal is the only thing standing between her and execution. This case is systematic of the abuses suffered by Pakistan's minority faith communities and evidence of how the blasphemy laws are often abused and the most vulnerable suffer as a result. U.S. diplomacy to date
has been unsuccessful in yielding a positive outcome in her case. Are you following this case? What more could the U.S. government be doing to advocate for her release and others like her while not putting them in further jeopardy given the internal dynamics in Pakistan?

Answer. As I wrote in my answer to the first question, the challenge for influencing Pakistan’s domestic policies on sensitive matters like the case of Asia Bibi is that even if the United States could place greater pressure on Pakistan’s government, the threat to Pakistani minorities is widespread in Pakistani society, not simply the product of current government policies. Unfortunately, even recent Pakistani governments inclined to take constructive action to protect minority rights have stumbled with implementation. U.S. diplomats should express American concerns about Asia Bibi’s fate and should make it clear that how Pakistan handles her case (and other similar issues) will directly influence how Americans, including powerful policymakers, perceive Pakistan. Americans are, as I noted in my testimony, already extremely skeptical about the value of partnership with Pakistan, so Pakistani leaders must appreciate that the Asia Bibi case will have international ramifications. Yet it is an open question—given the internal dynamics in Pakistan noted in this question—whether conditioning U.S. assistance or taking other coercive steps aimed at Pakistan’s ruling government would strengthen the hand of Asia Bibi’s advocates or play to the advantage of her detractors.