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Thank you Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Murphy, and members of the Committee for calling today's hearing. I am happy to have the opportunity to talk about the strategy that is guiding the Administration's approach to Europe and Eurasia.

Next year will mark three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall. As we celebrate the triumph of Western democracy over communism, we must remind ourselves that this outcome was not inevitable. It was the product of active, intense, and prolonged effort by the United States and our European allies.

History did not end in 1989. Today Europe is once again a theater of serious strategic competition. It faces pressures on multiple fronts: strategic campaigns from Russia and China, record waves of migration, Iranian ambitions in the Mediterranean and Levant, and a crisis of confidence in European institutions.

Our Europe strategy begins by acknowledging that America and Europe must take the reality of geopolitical competition seriously. Our goal, as outlined by President Trump in Warsaw, is to preserve the West. We cannot do so without Europe, which together with the United States *is* the West and the heart of the free world.

Preserving the West begins with strengthening our physical defenses. The United States has demonstrated its resolve by reaffirming our commitment to NATO Article 5 and putting real resources into the defense of Europe. We are providing military assistance to Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, the Baltics and other European and Eurasian countries. For fiscal years 2018 and 2019, the Administration has requested more than \$11 billion in new funds to expand the European Deterrence Initiative.

Our allies are stepping up. At U.S. urging, since January 2017, every NATO member but one has increased defense spending. The number of allies that will spend 2 percent on defense by 2024 has tripled. And the number allocating 20 percent to major equipment has nearly doubled. In that time, the Alliance as a

whole has raised defense spending by 5.1 percent or \$14.4 billion, and we project a further \$10 billion this year – the largest such increase in a generation.

But material strength is only part of the equation. Taking competition seriously requires that the United States and Europe replenish their shared commitment to the cause of freedom that since antiquity has been the West's foremost gift to the world. Russia and China both represent a coherent model – stability founded on authoritarianism and brute force, harnessed to certain aspects of market competition and comingled with state-run politicization of the economy.

Both Russia and China want to break the West: Russia wants to splinter it and China wants to supplant it. One place where they are especially aggressive is in Central and Eastern Europe. Our first priority here is to check Russian aggression. In recent years, a revanchist Kremlin has attempted to forcefully redraw borders, intimidated and attacked neighbors, launched disinformation and cyber campaigns against the West, and engaged in military buildups on its western frontiers.

We seek a better relationship with Russia. But that can only happen when Russia stops its aggressive behavior. We will not compromise our principles or our allies. As Secretary Pompeo has said, the years of soft policy that enabled Russian aggression are over; we will continue to raise the costs of Russian aggression until President Putin chooses a different path.

Since January 2017, we have brought sanctions against 213 Russian individuals and entities. In response to the Skripal attack in the UK, we helped to organize the largest expulsion of Russian spies in recent history and sent more than 150 intelligence officers home to Russia. In partnership with EUCOM, the State Department is leading U.S. government efforts to counter Russian disinformation. We continue to demand that the Russian government uphold its international commitments and allow its citizens to exercise their fundamental freedoms without fear of retribution.

In parallel, we are building up the means of self-defense for frontier states most directly threatened by Russia militarily: Ukraine and Georgia. We lifted the previous administration's restrictions on enhanced defensive assistance and helped both states improve their defensive capabilities. Simultaneously, we are striving to keep Ukraine on the path of reform, most recently by urging its leaders to adopt an anti-corruption court that meets IMF standards and set gas tariffs to market prices. And we are working to strengthen U.S. political, military, and economic engagement with Georgia.

Across the eastern frontier, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and into the heart of the Danubian Basin, we are working to build better long-term bulwarks against the Chinese and Russian inroads that weaken our allies' security and undermine their ties to the democratic West. We are working with allies to strengthen the resilience of their political systems and combat corruption, improve their military readiness, diversify energy supplies through projects like the Southern Gas Corridor, Krk Island and Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria (BRUA) pipeline, and increase regional coordination through projects like the Three Seas Initiative, Visegrad 4 and Bucharest 9.

Throughout this region, we are animated by the urgent need, outlined in the National Security Strategy, to compete for positive influence. Nations here have greater strategic options than in the past. The memory of 1989 is fading. We must be diligent to defend Western principles. But we must also be willing to engage diplomatically much more robustly than we did in the recent past. Criticism bereft of engagement is a recipe for estrangement. We must provide viable alternatives to allies and reach out to them constructively. Or expect to lose them.

Europe's southern frontier – the Mediterranean Basin and its littorals – is another point of strategic focus. Rallying our allies to take Europe's southern frontier more seriously will be a major focus of the upcoming NATO Summit. We are working with allies to increase and coordinate contributions to operations in the Middle East, secure Europe's borders, get NATO more deeply engaged in the counterterrorism business, and project stability in North Africa and the Middle East.

The Eastern Mediterranean poses particular challenges. Russia has increased its naval presence there and is seeking to solidify a sphere of influence. Turkey faces profound external and internal challenges. It is a steadfast partner in Defeat-ISIS efforts and migration, and an indispensable component in counterbalancing Iran. We look forward to working with newly re-elected President Erdogan on these challenges, while also making clear that issues in our bilateral relationship need to be resolved. Our immediate concerns are to secure the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson and other unjustly detained U.S. citizens and local embassy staff; to prevent Turkey's purchase of the Russian S-400 system; and to develop a modus vivendi for our respective forces and local partners in stabilizing Northern Syria and preventing ISIS' return. We also encourage President Erdogan to implement immediately his recent pledge to lift Turkey's ongoing state of emergency, and to

take additional measures to represent the diverse views of all of Turkey's citizens and strengthen Turkey's democracy.

In parallel, we are constructing a long-term strategy to bolster the U.S. presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. We are cultivating Greece as an anchor of stability in the Mediterranean and Western Balkans and working to systematically strengthen security and energy cooperation with Cyprus.

We are also increasing U.S. engagement in the Western Balkans. Through active U.S. diplomacy and close coordination with the EU, we supported the visionary leaders Prime Minister Tsipras and Prime Minister Zaev in achieving a potentially historic breakthrough in the Greece-Macedonia name dispute. We have stepped up communication with both Serbia and Kosovo. And we are promoting reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In all of these areas – anchoring the Western Alliance, securing Central and Eastern Europe, stabilizing the South – we are committed to finding a common way forward. In the past nine months, I have made 29 visits to European countries and given more than 22 speeches. Through this outreach I have seen that what unites the West is far greater than what divides us.

While strong U.S. positions on Iran, trade, burden-sharing, and Nord Stream 2 may not lead to immediate agreement with allies, the long-term costs of neglecting these things far outweigh whatever short-term benefits we get from the appearance of political unity today. On all of these fronts, our message is the same: we must act. We can debate, strategize and coordinate. But we must act. We cannot continue to defer action on things that make the West collectively weaker against serious rivals. Our task is one of *strategic preservation through renovation*: Doing the hard work of shoring up and strengthening the West now so that we don't have to do so later on terms that are less favorable. As Metternich said, "to preserve is to act."

I am committed to doing exactly that. And I am convinced that we will succeed, together. Thank you.