Chairman Flake, Ranking Member Markey, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the effectiveness of targeted sanctions in Africa. I applaud you for addressing this important instrument of US and international peace and security policy, but one that does not receive adequate attention.

My comments today are based on my previous experience as Assistant Secretary of Commerce responsible for regulating dual use goods and technology, as well as more recent academic research and initiatives to strengthen the instrument of UN sanctions. The Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University has been engaged in research on UN targeted sanctions for more than 15 years, collaborating with Member States and the Secretariat to make such measures more effective. Along with colleagues at The Graduate Institute in Geneva, we formed the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC), an international group of scholars and practitioners conducting a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the impacts and effectiveness of UN sanctions, which resulted in publication of the book, Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action this April. In addition to developing both qualitative and quantitative databases on the universe of UN sanctions (which also resulted in an online tool, SanctionsApp), I also helped to organize the High Level Review of UN Sanctions which focused on strengthening implementation of UN sanctions. In this capacity, I’ve had the opportunity to engage with the private sector, national regulators, and international policymakers involved in UN and US sanctions. The views expressed today, however, are my own, and not necessarily endorsed by any entity or colleagues with whom I am affiliated.

Due to time constraints and the wealth of experience of other witnesses, this abbreviated statement will focus on the effectiveness of UN sanctions in addressing threats to international peace and security in Africa. I am happy to provide any additional information, including greater statistical analysis based upon our book and other initiatives addressing aspects of US sanctions.

Evolution of UN Sanctions¹

The past quarter century has witnessed a significant transformation in the use of UN targeted sanctions. Instead of comprehensive economic embargoes such as the one employed against Iraq in the early 1990s with resulting injurious humanitarian consequences, the Security Council deliberately shifted to “targeted” or “smart” sanctions as a means of focusing measures on the decision-makers and their principal supporters responsible for violations of international norms. All UN sanctions since 1994 have been targeted in some manner.

¹ For more detailed discussion of the evolution of UN targeted sanctions, see “The Role of Sanctions” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century.
As global threats have evolved, innovation in the design and application of UN sanctions has ensued. From the original focus on primarily cross-border attacks and civil wars in Africa, the rationale for sanctions has expanded to encompass preventing new forms of human rights violations (such as sexual and gender-based violence and recruitment of child soldiers), thwarting the development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, stemming terrorism, countering the financing of conflict through exploitation of natural resources or criminal activities, controlling natural resources to prevent exploitation of mineral development, restoring democratically elected governments, and countering violent extremism. At the same time, UN sanctions are increasingly used along with other crisis management tools—diplomacy, mediation, peacekeeping, referrals to international judicial processes, as well as the imposition of sanctions by entities other than the UN, including regional groups as well as individual countries.

With UN sanctions targeting specific goods, services, individuals and entities, new issues have arisen over time—the need to ensure that UN sanctions are reconciled with the rule of law, particularly respect for due process and human rights; the focus on nonstate actors; new expert mechanisms to monitor implementation; and greater reliance on the private sector to implement sanctions, requiring new partnerships and strategies to ensure effectiveness. These institutional dynamics reflect the need for the Security Council, the Secretariat and UN agencies, Member States, and related international actors to adapt continually to the intricacies of new threats to international peace and security.

Objectives and Types of UN Sanctions in Africa

Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is authorized to take action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Sanctions have been used for a variety of purposes, and have expanded over time as the Security Council has encountered a broader array of threats to international peace and security. Sanctions have been used to neutralize spoilers in conflict and peacekeeping contexts, and the Council has signaled its intention to sanction recruiters of child soldiers, suspected pirates, and groups using natural resources, including wildlife products, to finance conflict. Sanctions have also been focused on actors disrupting peace agreements and peacekeeping missions, those involved in unconstitutional changes of government (Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau).

Today, the UN utilizes sanctions to address six general categories of threats to international peace and security: armed conflict (including support for peace negotiations and peace enforcement), terrorism, WMD proliferation, unconstitutional changes of government, governance of resources, and protection of civilians.

To address these challenges, the Security Council employs sanctions to achieve three strategic purposes: to coerce targets into changing policies or behavior (the most widely perceived goal of sanctions); to constrain targets in their ability to conduct proscribed activities; and to signal support for an international norm or
stigmatize targets. Such purposes are not mutually exclusive, and most sanctions have multiple objectives.\(^4\) For example, nonproliferation sanctions against Iran and North Korea attempted to change regimes’ behavior and to stigmatize their violations of nonproliferation norms, but primarily focused on constraining access to goods, technology, and finance that could assist WMD programs. All UN sanctions address threats to international peace and security and involve signaling or stigmatizing in some manner.

Sanctions are targeted in variety of ways—against individuals, corporate entities (e.g., firms, political parties, or other nonstate actors such as UNITA, al-Qaeda, ISIL), sectors of an economy (e.g., aviation or arms, financial, or commodities such as oil, diamonds, or timber); or specific regions of a country (as in Darfur in western Sudan). Targeted sanctions attempt to deny targets the means to wage conflict or otherwise threaten international peace and security, while minimizing the impact on innocent civilians and the population as a whole. Specifically, targeted measures include asset freezes, travel or visa restrictions, aviation bans, arms embargoes, and restrictions on commodities such as diamonds, timber, oil, charcoal, and luxury goods. The most frequently utilized sanctions include arms embargoes, and financial and travel measures.

Currently the UN maintains thirteen sanctions regimes, including eight country-based regimes in Africa -- Somalia/Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Libya, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic, Yemen, and South Sudan.\(^5\) The following table provides an overview of sanctions imposed on African countries by the United Nations from 1990 to 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASES</th>
<th>Comprehensive</th>
<th>Targeted</th>
<th>Panel of Experts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms</td>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Travel</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Angola (UNITA)] (1993-2002)</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Rwanda] (1994-2008)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</table>

\(^4\) Notwithstanding the multiple purposes of sanctions, popular discourse remains fixated on the coercive aspect, often to the exclusion of the other purposes. Public commentary usually focuses on whether sanctions “work” in forcing a change of behavior, failing to understand and appreciate the important constraining and signaling functions of UN sanctions.

\(^5\) The remaining regimes include sanctions against al-Qaeda/ISIL and globally affiliated terrorist groups, the Taliban, Iraq, nonproliferation sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and individuals suspected of involvement in the 2005 bombing in Beirut that killed then-Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan I</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sudan II</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2015-2016)</td>
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</table>

Brackets [ ] indicate UN sanctions terminated

i Charcoal exports and imports

ii Oil-related equipment

iii Sanctions against UNITA included diplomatic measures (closing of offices), a ban on the supply of aircraft, spare parts and servicing, prohibition on equipment for mining/mining services, and a transportation ban on motorized vehicles, watercraft, and ground or water-borne services to areas in Angola

iv Commission of Inquiry to collect information on the arms embargo (first expert-panel type mechanism)

v Diplomatic restrictions including reduction in the number and level of staff at Sudanese missions

While more than sixty percent (eight of thirteen) of current UN regimes remain focused on armed conflict and peacebuilding objectives in African countries, sanctions focused on the threat of terrorism (al-Qaeda, ISIL, the Taliban) and the threat of nuclear proliferation (North Korea) receive a disproportionate share of the Security Council’s attention and resources.6

**TSC Research Results**

The Targeted Sanctions Consortium adopted two distinctive conceptual innovations in assessing the impact and effectiveness of UN sanctions: first, the unit of analysis is a case episode rather than a country sanctions regime, some of which have been in existence for more than twenty years. This allows for a more detailed assessment of changes in types and purposes of targeted sanctions over time (as a result, the TSC database includes 23 different country regimes broken down into 63 case episodes for comparative analysis). Secondly, sanctions are assessed according to three different (and frequently simultaneous) purposes: to coerce a change in the target’s behavior; to constrain a target from engaging in proscribed activity (by denying access to critical resources such as financing, technology, etc.); and to signal and/or stigmatize a target or others about the violation of an international norm.

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6 While most UN sanctions are aimed at ending conflict, supporting peacebuilding, or restoring democratically elected governments in Africa (68% of TSC episodes), there is an inverse relationship between the number of sanctions regimes and the resources put at their disposal. See appendices B and C in the chapter by Alix Boucher and Caty Clement, “Coordination of UN sanctions with other actors and instruments,” in Targeted Sanctions.
The following is a brief summary of TSC findings relevant to African sanctions:

Different types of targeted sanctions differ in degree of discrimination.\(^7\) With the exception of the 2011 sanctions on Libya, most UN sanctions largely remain targeted in design. In implementation of sanctions, however, Member States or private sector actors concerned with the reputational risks if found to be noncompliant, may interpret measures in an overly broad manner, which expands the impact and unintended consequences of sanctions.

Targeting (the list of specific individuals and entities subject to sanctions) is important and should reflect the purposes of sanctions. Too many, or more commonly in the case of African sanctions, too few, or even wrong targets undermine credibility of sanctions.

Secondary sanctions applied to neighboring states, although applied infrequently (only two times or 6% of cases - against Liberia in the case of its support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, and against Eritrea over its arms exports to Al Shabaab in Somalia), appear to be highly effective.

UN sanctions in Africa constitute the majority of all UN sanctions – about 70%. In the early days, sanctions were often imposed in an *ad hoc* manner, without a coherent coordinated strategy; rather than be part of a well-designed response to address conflict/threats to international peace and security, at times the imposition of sanctions has substituted as a policy. While understandable that during times of crisis, governments want to act quickly, the use of sanctions to show resolve without integrating them into an overall strategy is largely ineffective. Sanctions then take on a life of their own.

For this reason, it is important that the objectives of sanctions are clearly articulated at the outset, for the targets to understand precise actions that need to be taken for sanctions to be lifted. Too often, vague criteria and moving goalposts prolong sanctions unnecessarily. The Security Council (and even Member States) have difficulty terminating sanctions regimes once imposed (for example, in Liberia). Automatic extensions of sanctions regimes diffuse signals as to expected actions, undermining their credibility.

While important progress has been made in making UN sanctions more effective, more needs to be done for sanctions to be used to full effect and be effectual instruments to advance US and international security objectives in Africa.

*Effective targeted sanctions*

Following are characteristics of effective UN sanctions:

**Relationship to other policy instruments**

UN sanctions do not exist in isolation, and in no case have they been put into place without the presence of other policy instrument seeking to achieve related objectives. Diplomatic negotiations occurred more than 95% of the time, and peacekeeping forces are on the ground in 62% of episodes. Some aspects of force (i.e. limited strikes and operations, robust military missions, no fly zone or naval blockages) were used 52% of the time and 7 Degrees of Discrimination (or “comprehensiveness”) of different types of targeted sanctions include the most discriminating/targeted individual sanctions (e.g. travel ban, assets freeze, diplomatic restrictions (in which only one sector of government directly affected), to arms embargoes (which are largely limited to affecting fighting forces) and commodity sanctions (e.g. diamonds, timber, charcoal which tend to affect some regions disproportionately), to broad sectoral sanctions such as oil and financial (which affect an entire population and therefore are the least discriminating of targeted sanctions). Comprehensive sanctions are non-discriminating.
legal tribunals were present in 46% of the cases. Sanctions need to be part of a broader coordinated strategy. (Effective sanctions are associated with multiple (at least 3, closer to 4) policy instruments).

Objectives and types of sanctions
In terms of effectiveness, UN targeted sanctions are effective more than 20% of the time and are nearly three times more effective in constraining or signaling than coercing a change in target behavior.

Arms embargos, the most frequently imposed sanction, especially in African conflicts (in 89% of episodes) are the least effective especially when applied in isolation. Arms embargoes are frequently the first type of sanction imposed.

Most targeted sanctions are employed in combination with other sanctions measures. Travel bans are the next most utilized measure (69% of cases), followed by asset freezes (66%); travel bans are frequently employed in combination with asset freezes (73% of cases). Commodity sanctions are employed in 40% of cases, and nearly always in armed conflict in Africa (77%). Transportation sanctions, most recently shipping provisions, occur in 23% cases. Diplomatic restrictions are rarely used now (10%), bans on proliferation-sensitive goods (11%) and financial restrictions (6%).

Commodity sanctions, such as on diamonds (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Cote d’Ivoire), oil (Libya, Angola, Sierra Leone), charcoal (Somalia), timber (Liberia), when appropriate, appear highly effective, especially for purposes of constraint (69%) and signaling (76%).

Importance of regional sanctions
The past several decades have witnessed an increase in sanctions applied by regional organizations. In 74% percent of the episodes analyzed by the TSC, other regional sanctions of the European Union, the African Union 8, or the Economic Community of West African States preceded initial imposition of UN sanctions. Often resulting from a request by a regional body that has already imposed individual sanctions (travel ban or assets freeze) on targets, UN sanctions often complement pre-existing sanctions, and effectiveness appears enhanced by regional measures. States subject to sanctions are increasingly targeted by a combination of UN and regional measures, and effective coordination among these measures are important.

Complexity/Unintended Consequences
Targeted sanctions are more complicated to design and implement than comprehensive economic measures; greater technical expertise is required to administer asset freezes, enforce travel sanctions, implement arms embargoes, and calibrate sanctions. In the 2011 sanctions on Libya (with reported assets in excess of $160 billion frozen pursuant to UNSCRs) an unprecedented array of resources and activities were subject to financial sanctions; Libyan students in the United States and Canada had their bank accounts frozen, and telecommunications providers in neighboring countries teetered on the verge of bankruptcy. The volume of assets frozen posed significant complications for the sanctions committee and national governments in requests for exemptions and information. Less targeted financial measures against a central bank or economic sector such as petroleum, affect a greater portion of the population as a whole and can have the effect of making sanctions more comprehensive.

In addition, sanctions can have unintended consequences. TSC research highlighted some of these effects,

8 The African Union is primarily concerned with non-constitutional changes of government and routinely applies sanctions to its own members. ECOWAS has sanctioned about half of its members.
including increases in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, and decline in legitimacy of Security Council. Additional consequences of international policies/sanctions related to countering the financing of terrorism/anti-money laundering appears to be “derisking” or the inability of remitters or money service businesses and charities to access financial services. These problems have been particularly acute in African countries such as Somalia, Sudan, and Angola where humanitarian assistance needs are greatest. Access by nonprofit groups to banks and international funds transfers necessary to get aid into regions of conflict is the subject of new research funded by the Gates Foundation.

Security Council sanctions have played an important role in numerous African countries, helping to end violence, promote peace agreements and transition to post-conflict societies, gain governmental control of natural resources, and support transitions to democratically-elected governments. Appendix 1 provides examples of effective African sanctions for the purposes of coercion, constraint, and signaling. While institutional learning by the Security Council and States over the past two decades in implementing UN sanctions reflect undeniable progress, challenges persist, however, that continue to hamper more effective utilization of the sanctions instrument to limit conflict and build peace.

Challenges to Effective Sanctions

As the international community increasingly relies on United Nations sanctions, problems regarding implementation have become more pronounced. Political will, weak implementation, inadequate monitoring and enforcement, and misperceptions and a lack of understanding constitute the primary obstacles to more effective UN sanctions.

Insufficient Political Will
The UN is inherently a political entity, and sanctions are essentially political instruments that can be neither separated from the politics of the Security Council, nor considered in isolation. Conflicting perspectives among the P5 members regarding the objectives and utility of sanctions often result in a lack of unity of purpose and political will. China and Russia resent the P3’s tendency to use sanctions as punitive rather than as bargaining instruments, and are predisposed against them. With a strong aversion to coercive diplomacy and anything that suggests interference in internal affairs, the two countries view sanctions as ineffective, isolating targets, limiting diplomatic leverage, and increasing risks of instability. Competing political and economic interests especially in Africa often lead to compromises masking differing objectives, resulting in diluted or unclear language in Council resolutions which result in inconsistent interpretations and confusion down the road as member states struggle with national implementation.

Weak Implementation and Capacity
Once sanctions are adopted by the Security Council, practical problems regarding implementation abound. Many countries lack basic legal authority and executive bodies to translate UN sanctions into domestic law and regulations, fundamental to give full force to sanctions. The ability to freeze assets without prior judicial action, exercise appropriate border and visa controls, and enforce restrictions on exports of arms and dual-use goods and technology is often limited or nonexistent. In many cases, failure to implement sanctions boils down to simple lack of capacity at the domestic level. There are no systematic UN attention, resources, and training to support national sanctions capacity, aside from the focus of the CTC and 1540 Committee on counterterrorism and nonproliferation mandates.
Inadequate Monitoring and Enforcement
After expending significant political capital to reach agreement to impose sanctions, Member States often falter in monitoring implementation. Policymakers tend to view sanctions compliance as “technical” and accord it low priority. Outside the work of panels of experts, there is little tracking of sanctions implementation or other means to monitor national compliance efforts. Committees rely on reports by member states, but there is reporting fatigue, and reporting remains spotty for African sanctions regimes. There is no enforcement mechanism or body to address sanctions violations; monitoring of sanctions evasions largely depends on the capabilities of independent panels of experts to assess sanctions compliance. When no consequences result, targets come to regard the threat of coercion as empty, further eroding the credibility of sanctions.

Moreover, the predominant focus of P5 members on counterterrorism and nonproliferation issues results in disproportionate attention and resources flowing to related sanctions. Those regimes addressing armed conflict, especially in Africa, represent the majority of current sanctions, yet receive little sustained attention and far fewer resources. With distinct challenges posed by African regimes—including inconsistent cooperation with peacekeeping operations and the failure to devote adequate attention to human rights, conflict prevention, and peace enforcement sanctions, these factors translate into weaker enforcement than for counterterrorism and nonproliferation sanctions.

Misperceptions and Lack of Understanding
Notwithstanding the move to targeted measures and significant procedural innovations, public perception remains largely skeptical of sanctions. Many UN conflict resolution actors view sanctions as politically toxic complications for their mandates, and shy away from association, contributing to a lack of coherence and effective implementation of UN peace and security policies.

More broadly, public understanding of the purpose and effects of sanctions is extremely limited. Fears of the consequences of comprehensive economic sanctions persist, despite the fact that the last time the Security Council imposed comprehensive measures was in 1994. Policy debates remain fixated on whether they “work” in forcing a change of behavior, failing to recognize the important constraining and signaling functions of UN sanctions. Perceptions that “sanctions don’t work” especially related to Africa, contribute to a profound cynicism regarding the utility and efficacy of sanctions.

Another challenge relates to nonstate actors as targets. The UN as an intergovernmental body was established to manage interstate conflict, but with increasing frequency, the Council is targeting sanctions on nonstate actors. Sanctions against the Angolan rebel group UNITA in 1993 led the way and were followed by targeted measures against the RUF in Sierra Leone in 1997, al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 1999, and ISIL subsequently. Designations of rebel groups and their leaders have increased significantly in recent years, including al-Shabaab in Somalia, the M23 and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the DRC, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). As a result, the Security Council has had to adjust its practice of dealing exclusively with states.

Notwithstanding progress, innovations, and institutional learning over the past two decades by the Security Council, Secretariat, and member states, further improvement of UN sanctions remains an important and necessary objective for the promise of effective sanctions to be realized.
Recommendations to Strengthen UN Sanctions in Africa

P5 interests will continue to diverge, especially those related to national economic interests which loom large in Africa. Nevertheless, more can and should be done to prioritize and strengthen the implementation of UN sanctions.9 Recommendations for UN sanctions to be more effective instruments of international conflict resolution include:

Improve Implementation and Capacity
Notwithstanding practical limitations on the adoption of new sanctions, as witnessed in the case of Syria, the Council and Member States should vigorously implement and enforce all existing UN sanctions, focusing especially on African sanctions and not just those related to nonproliferation and counterterrorism. Greater US leadership and focus on conflict-related sanctions is important for sustained credibility of the sanctions instrument, and greater capacity among Member States and the Secretariat to provide essential support to implement sanctions is needed.

Because many states simply do not have the capacity to monitor transactions within their borders, new initiatives for development of model legislation, training of national officials on sanctions lists, border controls, financial restrictions and export controls, and new procedures to inspect and interdict proscribed goods are required to help States meet their obligations to implement and enforce UN sanctions. While there has been greater recognition of the need for such assistance, capacity-building initiatives comparable to those for counterterrorism and nonproliferation are still lacking. The UN High Level Review of UN Sanctions recommended that new measures and resources be undertaken for sanctions assistance generally, including cooperation with regional organizations, which could play an important role in strengthening and coordinating efforts to implement asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargos. In particular, the African Union has expressed interest in such assistance previously and represents an ideal opportunity to develop new approaches to capacity-building training and services.

Enhance Sanctions Monitoring and Enforcement
More vigorous monitoring and enforcement of UN sanctions, as well as specific consequences for noncompliance, would strengthen their credibility. Measures should include better utilization of expert panels and systematic implementation of their recommendations, addressing noncompliance, reviving enforcement assistance, and strengthening cooperation with the private sector. When the Security Council determines that a country is deliberately violating Council sanctions, consequences should result, with the Council developing a menu of secondary sanctions against UN members found to violate sanctions. Member States should revive enforcement assistance, particularly initiatives similar to the sanctions assistance missions (SAMs) deployed in the early 1990s to monitor implementation of sanctions against the former republic of Yugoslavia. Rigorous and routine monitoring and enforcement of sanctions should be expanded beyond border controls to enforcement of travel bans, financial sanctions, and arms embargoes.

Strengthen Cooperation with Regional Groups and Civil Society
To maximize effectiveness of sanctions overall, greater coordination of regional measures with UN and national sanctions should be enhanced. Civil society, including both the private sector and NGOs, are critical partners in implementing UN sanctions, including enlisting them to advise on, participate in the monitoring of, and even help to enforce sanctions, which could enhance effectiveness. To this end, the Global Compact initiative and the

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9 The 2015 Compendium of the High Level Review of UN Sanctions contains a detailed discussion of these issues and related recommendations.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Corporations are useful foundations on which to build. As part of a follow-up to the “Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect, and Remedy’ Framework”—an initiative led by UN special representative on human rights and business John Ruggie and endorsed unanimously by the General Assembly—focused discussions with relevant groups (especially financial institutions, resource-related corporations, and NGOs) on UN sanctions are necessary. Existing capacities aimed at terrorists and proliferators should be applied to enforcement of arms embargo violators and enablers of atrocities.

Develop Better Analysis and Understanding of Sanctions

Finally, the UN and Member States should promote better understanding and analysis of conditions under which more effectual sanctions are likely to result. Effective implementation of sanctions is made more difficult by the lack of accurate information and misunderstanding about the impacts and effectiveness of targeted sanctions. Informing broader public debate with empirically based information and engaging relevant stakeholders will help address pervasive misperceptions about sanctions and provide a basis for more informed engagement and education of various publics at multiple levels.

Part and parcel of such an initiative is a sound analytical understanding of the optimal conditions under which sanctions are most effective. While UN sanctions have multiple and simultaneous purposes (coercion, constraint, and signaling), the public and even the Council continue to disproportionately focus on the coercive purpose of sanctions. In contrast, UN targeted sanctions are more nearly three times more effective in constraining and signaling targets than in coercing a change of behavior; more resources should be invested in sanctions intended to constrain/signal, given their relative effectiveness. Clear understanding of the purposes for which sanctions are more likely to work, and more realistic expectations as to what sanctions can reasonably be expected to achieve, will likely increase the overall effectiveness of the UN sanctions instrument.

Conclusion

UN targeted sanctions have made important contributions to achieving US policy objectives but to a limited degree and with some significant unintended consequences. Notwithstanding the mixed record of effectiveness of UN sanctions, the fact remains that sanctions are one of the few tools of the international community to promote international peace and security, short of the use of force. Sanctions will continue as an essential component of the Security Council’s response to international threats. Concerted attention, leadership, and action by like-minded states to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of sanction, as well to enhance the capacity of Member States to carry out their obligations, are necessary to make sanctions an even more potent and indispensable tool of collective security in Africa.

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to discuss the effectiveness of U.S. and international sanctions as policy tools in Africa. I look forward to questions and being of assistance to the Subcommittee as you continue to address these critical foreign policy challenges.
APPENDIX 1: Examples of Effective African Sanctions

|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|

**Summary**
Sanctions were suspended on 5 April 1999 once the two Lockerbie suspects were handed over to the special Scottish Court in the Netherlands (as specified in UNSCR 1192) and terminated on 12 September 2003 (UNSCR 1506) once compensation was provided and Libya renounced terrorism.

**Purposes**
Coerce the Government of Libya to provide compensation and renounce terrorism; and signal Libya and international community about norm against state-sponsored terrorism.

**Sanction type**
All sanctions (aviation ban, arms imports embargo, diplomatic sanctions, government asset freeze, and oil services equipment ban) were suspended in April 1999 (seven months after the conditions for suspension were set in UNSCR 1192) but not terminated until September 2003.

**Effectiveness**

**Coercion (Effective)**
- **Policy outcome**: 4/5, Suspects were turned over, trials conducted, compensation provided, and terrorism renounced, but not on the precise terms of the original UNSCRs.
- **UN sanctions contribution**: 4/5, Suspension of sanctions was significant to reinforce legal procedures underway in domestic and international courts regarding compensation.

**Constrain**
- **Policy outcome**: N/A.
- **UN sanctions contribution**: N/A.

**Signaling**
- **Policy outcome**: 3/5, Norms against state-sponsored terrorism were consistently articulated in relevant UNSCRs (1192 and 1506), but Qadhafi was able to mobilize support from the AU, Arab League, Non-Aligned Movement and Organization of the Islamic Conference to limit the extent of his stigmatization.

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10 From Targeted Sanctions Consortium database.
**UN sanctions contribution:** 4/5, Sanctions suspension created an incentive to accept norms against state-sponsored terrorism in order for Libya to be re-legitimized and reintegrated into the international community.

**Unintended consequences**
Strengthening of authoritarian rule

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**Effective Constraint: Liberia**  
**Episode 4 (22 December 2003 – 16 June 2006)**

**Summary**
Following the departure of Charles Taylor (regime change) and progress in the peace process in Sierra Leone, a peace enforcement sanctions regime was established in Liberia to ensure compliance with the comprehensive peace agreement signed in Accra on 18 August 2003 and to support the transitional government of national unity. The Liberian ceasefire was maintained, DDR implemented, and elections were held during this episode. UNSCR 1521 lifted the previous sanctions and immediately re-imposed them in support of a new objective: peace enforcement. The Council also articulated specific criteria for lifting. UNSCR 1532 imposed financial sanctions on Charles Taylor, his family, and other close associates for misappropriating Liberian funds and property and using them to destabilize the transitional government during the early phase of this episode. Taylor appeared before the Sierra Leone Special Court in April 2006 and was extradited to the Hague in June 2006. Elections were held in 2005 with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf taking office January 2006.

**Purpose**
Constrain and signal parties that might threaten the comprehensive peace agreement and the transitional government of national unity.

**Sanction type**
Ongoing arms imports embargo (now exempting internationally trained armed forces and police), ban on exports of rough diamonds, travel ban on individuals undermining peace and stability or supporting armed rebel groups in Liberia and the subregion (including senior members of former President Charles Taylor’s Government, their spouses, and members of Liberia’s former armed forces retaining links to Charles Taylor), and ban on export of timber (until certification schemes are in place). Newly imposed asset freeze on Charles Taylor, his family members, and close associates (from March 2004).

**Effectiveness**

**Coercion (N/A)**  
**Policy outcome:** N/A.
UN sanctions contribution: N/A.

Constraint (Effective)
Policy outcome: 4/5, Panel of Experts concludes that sanctions helped to stabilize the situation in Liberia; elections were held, DDR took place, though Taylor tried to destabilize the process at the outset.
UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Sanctions against the remnants of Taylor’s regime reinforced the peacebuilding efforts of the government of Liberia, but international tribunals (the Sierra Leone Special Court and ICC) played a major role in constraining Charles Taylor.

Signaling (Effective)
Policy outcome: 5/5, Potential spoilers were deterred from destabilizing the regime.
UN sanctions contribution: 3/5, Sanctions reinforced the peacebuilding efforts of the government of Liberia and international tribunals played a major role in constraining the remnants of Charles Taylor’s regime.

Unintended consequences
Increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains, humanitarian consequences, widespread harmful economic consequences.

Effective Signaling: Angola

Summary
The shooting down of the second of two UN aircraft over UNITA controlled territory prompted strong reaction from UNSC (UNSCR 1221). Given the return to full-scale war, UN peacekeepers were removed in February 1999.

Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler assumed chair of Angola Sanctions Committee in January, which sets up two expert panels in May (one on financing of UNITA and another on arms, later merged). This results in a major strengthening of the sanctions regime in terms of implementation at the UN level. The PoE “Fowler Report” is released and created a storm of protest by naming and shaming of African heads of state for their role in undermining UN sanctions. UNSC sets up a mechanism for monitoring sanctions violations (threat of secondary sanctions) in April 2000, but no secondary measures imposed.

Sanctions were continued in December 2000, and there was evidence that sanctions monitoring had disrupted UNITA’s supply lines. A December 2001 offensive against UNITA ended with Savimbi (and his Vice President’s) death in February 2002.

Phase out – A truce quickly followed in March, negotiations in April, and UNITA
dismantled its armed wing in August. UN lifted sanctions in December 2002.

UNSCRs during the episode included UNSCR 1221 (January 1999) which expressed outrage and specifically named Savimbi and UNSCR 1237 (May 1999), which created a panels of experts. In March 2000 the “Fowler Report” S/2000/203 was released. Following this, UNSCR 1295 (April 2000), established a monitoring mechanism and UNSCR 1448 (December 2002) terminated sanctions immediately before Angola joined the UNSC.

**Purposes**

Coerce UNITA to cease hostilities and implement the peace agreement; constrain UNITA from being able to act autonomously; stigmatize UNITA and its supporters in other African countries (including heads of state).

**Sanction type**

Ongoing arms imports embargo, petroleum and petroleum products imports ban, and aviation ban on UNITA (except through points of entry named by the Government of Angola), asset freeze on UNITA, senior UNITA officials, and their adult family members, diamond exports ban, prohibition on supply of mining and ground or waterborne transportation services and equipment into UNITA controlled areas. Travel ban on senior UNITA officials and their adult family members and visa cancelation measures were suspended in May 2002 and lifted later that year, in November. Diplomatic sanctions on UNITA in the form of limitations of diplomatic representation persisted until the end of the sanctions regime.

**Effectiveness**

**Coercion (Ineffective)**

Policy outcome: 1/5, Sanctions contributed to shifting the balance of forces, but Savimbi showed no sign of concessions before his death.

UN sanctions contribution: 2/5, Ultimately, the use of force was decisive.

**Constraint (Effective)**

Policy outcome: 5/5, Diplomatic sanctions terminated much of UNITA’s official presence abroad; diamond sanctions weakened the prospects of UNITA’s raising of funds; squeezing the financial sources led to no salt, no beer, and demoralization of Savimbi’s forces.

UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Acknowledgment by the target of the impact of sanctions.

**Signaling (Effective)**

Policy outcome: 5/5, Savimbi became the principal target and was thoroughly isolated by UNSCR 1221.

UN sanctions contribution: 4/5, Diplomatic pressure was also significant.
Unintended consequences
Increase in corruption and criminality, strengthening of authoritarian rule, decline in the credibility and/or legitimacy of UN Security Council, increase in international enforcement capacity in different issue domains.

APPENDIX 2: UN Targeted Sanctions Regimes

Note: UN nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were lifted in January 2106 pursuant to UNSCR 2231 endorsing the JCPOA.
### APPENDIX 3: Primary objective of UN African sanctions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Objective</th>
<th>TSC Episodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism</td>
<td>5 Libya in the 1990s (1–3), Sudan in the 1990s (1–2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good governance</td>
<td>1 Liberia (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy support</td>
<td>3 Sierra Leone (1), Côte d’Ivoire (4), Guinea-Bissau (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict (cease hostilities, negotiation of settlement, peace enforcement, support peacebuilding)</td>
<td>32 Somalia (1–5), Liberia (1–5), Angola (1–4), Rwanda (1–2), Sierra Leone (2–5), Ethiopia-Eritrea (1), DRC (1–4), Sudan over Darfur (1–2), Côte d’Ivoire (1,2,3,5), Libya in 2011 (3), CAR (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of civilians under R2P</td>
<td>2 Libya in 2011 (1–2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43 UN African episodes out of a total of 63 UN Episodes (original TSC database)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# APPENDIX 4: African states sanctioned between 1990 and 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>AU</th>
<th>ECOWAS</th>
<th>SADC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of African states sanctioned</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Member States</td>
<td>193 (54 African)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per cent of states sanctioned</td>
<td>7 (24 if Africa only)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which states</td>
<td>Angola, CAR, <strong>Côte d’Ivoire</strong>, DRC, Eritrea (twice), Ethiopia, <strong>Guinea-Bissau</strong>, Liberia, Libya (twice), Rwanda, <strong>Sierra Leone</strong>, Somalia, Sudan (twice)</td>
<td>CAR, Comoros, <strong>Côte d’Ivoire</strong>, Guinea, <strong>Guinea-Bissau</strong>, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Togo</td>
<td><strong>Côte d’Ivoire</strong>, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, <strong>Sierra Leone</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most sanctioned state</td>
<td>Sudan (twice), Libya (twice), Eritrea (twice)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau (twice), Mauritania (twice)</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau (twice)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: States sanctioned by three or more organizations are emboldened.*