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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO

Today we are going to talk about arms control, and we have very distinguished witnesses to help us through this. I have a semi-brief opening statement to make. I will then turn it over to Senator Menendez, and we will then talk about questioning from the committee and do a round of questions.

So with that, we are going to talk about arms control today, and treaties, particularly arms control treaties, which can be very, very successful but only—and only—if all parties have a common objective and the parties act in good faith. Arms control is only successful when treaties are honored, and confidence is only achievable when countries behave in a responsible and transparent way.

It is in this context that I commend the administration for its actions regarding Russia’s blatant violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. I also want to thank our NATO allies for their strong support for the U.S. decision to withdraw.

For the past several years, the Russian Government has systematically violated the INF Treaty and deployed systems that undermine the stability that the treaty helped create. Violations of treaty obligations must have consequences. These violations have gone on for a long period of time. They were classified for a period of time, and those of us who wanted to bring these to the public’s attention were very frustrated by the fact that we could not talk about them because they were classified, particularly in light of the fact that those violations help people think through what our relationship should be with a country and how we should or should not deal with the ongoing treaty negotiations, which were ongoing at that time.
Russia’s violations are part of a pattern of aggressive and dishonest behavior that must be taken into account in any future arms control efforts. We have had four agreements with Russia: New START, the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russian compliance is problematic across the board with all of these treaties.

On the Open Skies Treaty, Russia continues to illegally limit our ability to overflight key military areas. Russia changes the subject when it comes to the Chemical Weapons Convention. They have yet to take responsibility for killing a British citizen with an undeclared nerve agent on British soil last year or for their complicity when their ally, Bashar Assad, used chemical weapons against Syrian civilians.

Given this behavior, the U.S. needs to consider more carefully than ever now how we engage Russia regarding any treaty. Russia is modernizing and growing the size and capacity of its nuclear forces. Putin’s arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons is being revamped to make it more useful not just for deterrence but for coercion in support of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.

Russia also claims to be enhancing their strategic systems, developing a new high-yield warhead and new delivery systems that can carry multiple warheads. Why would Russia build a new ballistic missile that can carry more heads than allowed by New START unless they have no regard for New START and no intent of complying with New START?

In fact, Russia’s modernization is almost 70 percent complete. By comparison, U.S. modernization is well behind that. Even further, Russia is developing new systems like a nuclear underwater drone, a nuclear-armed intercontinental range cruise missile, and air-launched cruise missiles. These systems are limited by New START, but Russia rejects even the assertion that they are limited. This is not good faith.

These improvements present significant threats to strategic stability of the United States and our allies.

Going forward, it is important for Putin to understand that we will not allow actions to go unchallenged and that alliance unity on these topics remains strong.

At the same time, the world has changed in the past decade, and U.S. policy must recognize China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of regional challenges and to U.S. interests. China’s growing capabilities and its even greater lack of transparency create uncertainty about Chinese intentions in the Pacific and raise important questions about the role of U.S.-extended nuclear deterrence in the region.

Reports indicate China is on track to double its nuclear stockpile over the next decade. Last year, they launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training than the rest of the world combined. More troubling are China’s plans to deploy tactical nuclear weapons while constantly refusing to even discuss arms control.
This threat is real, and I am disappointed by those who argue that including China in arms control discussions is a poison pill to new agreements with Russia. The opposite is true. A responsible approach to arms control must account for all nuclear threats to the United States, and it is indisputable that Russia is no longer the only nuclear threat to the United States and to global stability.

Arms control is a critical part of addressing these threats, but a strong, modern U.S. nuclear deterrent is also essential to strategic stability. As we consider new approaches to arms control, Congress needs to fully fund, and the administration needs to vigorously implement, all programs needed to modernize our nuclear forces.

In closing, I repeat that the challenges to arms control emanate not from the U.S. but from the numerous and continuing Russian violations, from growing Russian and Chinese capabilities, and from China’s unwillingness to even discuss these topics. Arms control is not an end in and of itself and cannot protect the United States if our treaty partners refuse to abide by their treaty obligations and do not act in good faith.

I thank our witnesses for joining us today and look forward to hearing their clear-eyed assessment of the current status of these issues and the administration’s views on future approaches.

With that, I will turn it over to the ranking member, Senator Menendez, for his opening remarks on arms control.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Before I turn to the topic of the hearing, I feel compelled to address the Trump administration’s latest actions on Iraq and Iran.

This morning I woke up to the news that the administration announced it was ordering the departure of U.S. embassy staff from our embassy in Baghdad and our consulate in Erbil.

There are only two reasons for ordering their departure: we have credible intelligence that our people are at risk or in preparation for military action in Iran.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is charged with writing the laws that authorize the use of military force and of the oversight of the State Department and the safety of those who work there. And yet, the Trump administration has not provided any information to this committee on the intelligence behind their decisions or what they plan to do in Iraq or Iran. And I have repeatedly reminded the administration of its responsibilities to this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I hope you will join me in asking the administration to immediately provide this committee with a briefing on the decision to order the departure of the embassy staff, the intelligence on what Iran may be planning to do, and any plans to go to war with Iran.

I would add that while a briefing for all Senators is rumored for next week, that is no substitute for directly briefing the committee today when there is clearly actionable intelligence available. Nor is that timeline itself acceptable.

Finally, I want to make two points absolutely clear on the policy towards Iran.
First, we need a diplomatic surge on Iran to meaningfully engage our allies and Iran in serious negotiations to end its pathway towards nuclear weapons and its malign activities.

And second, Congress has not authorized war with Iran, and the administration, if it were contemplating military action with Iran, it must come to Congress to seek approval.

I have spent the better part of two decades focused on stopping Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon and attacks against our allies, including Israel. There is a right way to pursue that policy and that goal, which I believe we all share and I know that the chairman and I in that respect have common cause. And there is a wrong way to do it, a way that endangers our allies, our interests, and our people. And I am deeply concerned the administration is pursuing a policy that leads us to that wrong way.

Now, let me thank you, as it relates to this hearing, for convening this on the future of arms control policy. It seems especially appropriate to hold this hearing on a day that we are honoring Senator Richard Lugar, whose civil and effective leadership of this committee is a model that we should all strive to follow in our efforts to advance U.S. interests around the world. Our country and the entire world are safer thanks to Senator Lugar, as well as his ranking Democratic colleague, Senator Sam Nunn, and their collective efforts to promote sustained tough diplomacy that led to the destruction of thousands of nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union.

Under Secretary Thompson and Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg, we welcome you back to committee, but I hope you will be more forthcoming than you were the last time you visited.

In September, you testified that Russia continued to violate the INF Treaty. You provided no indication that the United States was immediately considering withdrawing from the treaty nor that there were any near-term military operational benefits for doing so. Yet, just one month later, after a campaign rally, President Trump suddenly announced, without any notice or consultation with the Senate, that the United States was unilaterally withdrawing.

Unfortunately, this is a part of a troubling pattern with the State Department failing to comply with fundamental legal congressional requirements.

Just last month, the administration submitted an unclassified version of the annual Arms Control Reliance Report which, quote, assesses the U.S.’s and other nations’ compliance to all arms control nonproliferation and disarmament agreements that the United States is a party to. This year’s report fails to even mention a variety of critical arms agreements and was only 12 pages long in comparison to last year’s report which was 45 pages. In your submission to Congress, the Department promises to provide a longer version of the report after a declassification process has occurred. That is unacceptable. The administration has legal requirements it must fulfill.

Given the lack of strategic forethought and planning apparent in the administration’s hasty decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, it is vital that the U.S. Government reemphasizes effective arms control as an integral part of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability. That is why, along with Senator Reed and Senator Warner,
I introduced the New START Policy Act of 2019, which calls for a 5-year extension of the treaty until February 2026 unless the President determines Russia is in material breach of the treaty.

I was very pleased to see a similar bipartisan bill introduced in the House cosponsored by House Foreign Affairs Chairman Engel and his Republican counterpart, Ranking Member McCaul. And I am hopeful we can forge a similar bipartisan approach to arms control here in the Senate.

Extending New START would be, in my mind, an easy decision. Intelligence officials have explained how the treaty’s verification regime, including short-notice and on-site inspections at military bases and facilities, provide the United States with important insight into Russia’s core capabilities, including its strategic nuclear delivery systems, warheads, and facilities. The Commander of the United States Strategic Command, General John Hyten, testified that he was a big supporter of New START and that the treaty provides, quote, insights into the Russians’ capabilities which are hugely beneficial to him.

It is very difficult to understand why the administration would discard the robust constraints, transparency, and verification measures of New START with nothing to replace them.

Finally, I am looking forward to hearing additional details on two other important issues.

First, we continue to wait for the imposition of chemical weapons sanctions on Russia for the assassination attempt on Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom. These sanctions are more than 5 months overdue, and I would like to know why.

Second, I was pleased to hear that the Secretary raised election meddling in his recent meeting with President Putin, and I hope you will provide some insights into whether the Secretary discussed the administration’s new effort to bring both China and Russia into a new arms control effort.

To be clear, I welcome the administration’s efforts to expand the scope of arms control negotiations.

However, given the challenges inherent in reaching new agreements with Russia and China, I strongly believe the limitations and verification measures of New START must remain in place while any such negotiation occurs, and this new initiative must not serve as an excuse for suddenly withdrawing from another international agreement. If new agreements can be reached, they should add, not subtract from our existing arms control architecture.

So I look forward to the witnesses’ testimony and our discussion today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Menendez.

Like you, I look forward to hearing our witnesses testify.

I respectfully disagree regarding the 5-year extension. I was opposed to the New START when it was enacted, as you will recall. I remain opposed to it, and under current circumstances, I cannot fathom why we would extend it another 5 years.

With that, we have Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. Ms. Thompson has been leading State Department efforts on arms control for more than a year. She previously served as Deputy Assistant to the President and
Ms. Thompson also served more than 25 years in the United States Army and retired with the rank of colonel. We look forward to her perspective on how the State Department’s arms control efforts have progressed and what steps the administration is considering for the future.

And with that, Ms. Thompson, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Chairman Risch, Senator Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today. I look forward to continuing our discussion from September when I had the honor of appearing before this committee. There have been important developments, none more so than the U.S. suspension of its obligations and 6-month notice of withdrawal for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, in response to Russia’s longstanding violation.

I would like to begin by recalling a passage from the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which states that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners. For arms control to be an effective tool, it must advance U.S., allied, and partner security, be verifiable and enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations.

As you know, Moscow continues to violate a series of obligations that undermine the trust the United States can place in treaties with Russia, including some that have served global security interests for years. The United States has invested 6 years of diplomatic effort to engage the Russians, including at the highest levels, to convince them to return to compliance with the INF Treaty. I personally have been involved in many of these engagements, including leading a U.S. interagency delegation to Geneva this past January to meet with Russian experts.

In sum, since I last addressed the committee, I have met with Russian counterparts six times and more than 20 times with NATO allies and partners. I can assure you that throughout our years of efforts, we have stressed that Russia’s continuing violation and failure to take concrete steps to return to compliance create an untenable situation whereby the United States complied with the INF Treaty, while Russia violated it. Our allies have been united that Russia’s actions are to blame for the pending demise of the INF Treaty.

If Russia fails to return to full and verifiable compliance before August 2nd, our decision to withdraw will stand and the treaty will terminate. Russia will bear sole responsibility.

Going forward, this administration will continue to work with Congress and our allies to deny Russia any military advantage from its development of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.

Turning now to the New START treaty, we are implementing under the treaty and verifying Russia’s compliance. The adminis-
Central to the administration’s review is whether New START extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the treaty’s expiration would impact U.S. national security in the deteriorating security environment where Russia is developing new strategic offensive arms and expanding its non-strategic nuclear forces and China is modernizing and building up its nuclear forces.

China currently benefits from having the two largest nuclear powers restrained while it can pursue competition on its own terms. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program also raises questions regarding its future intent.

As President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have highlighted, China’s growing capabilities, coupled with its increasingly assertive posture, pose growing threats to the United States and its allies and partners.

We need a new era of arms control to address new and emerging threats that reflect modern reality. Make no mistake, we are in an era of revived great power competition. While we seek to bring Russia and China to the arms control table to deliver meaningful results, we will be relentless in our efforts to advance U.S. and allied interests, ensure our security, and deny our adversaries advantages.

Modern and effective U.S. nuclear capabilities as called for in the NPR are critical. As stated in the NPR’s preface, ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains strong will provide the best opportunity for convincing other nuclear powers to engage in meaningful arms control initiatives.

I thank you all for convening this important hearing and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON

Chairman Risch, Senator Menendez, and distinguished members of the Committee—thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today. I look forward to continuing our discussion from last September, when I had the honor of appearing before this Committee. There have been important developments, none more so than the U.S. suspension of its obligations and announcement of withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in response to Russia’s long-standing violation.

I would like to begin by reminding everyone of a passage from the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which states that “progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners.” The value of any agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation. As you know, Russia has taken actions over the past several years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and deepened the deficit of trust we have with Russia. In the arms control sphere, Moscow continues to violate a series of obligations that undermine the trust the United States can place in treaties with Russia, including some that have served global security interests for years. Russia is not alone in challenging U.S. interests. As President Trump and Secretary Pompeo have highlighted, China’s growing capabilities, coupled with its increasingly assertive posture, pose growing threats to the United States and its allies and partners.

The United States must look at the world as it is, not as the world we wish to see. The 2018 NPR detailed the deteriorating security environment we face. Effective arms control can help us address this worsening security environment, but for
it to be an effective tool, arms control must advance U.S., allied, and partner security; be verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations.

At times, arms control measures have benefited the United States by providing mutual transparency and predictability, constraining certain destabilizing weapons, and enhancing stability. With Russia, we want to continue to leverage these benefits by seeking to utilize a strong military deterrent in combination with arms control to maintain stability. While we have a long established arms control relationship with Russia, China’s continued lack of willingness to engage in bilateral discussions on nuclear risk reduction, confidence building, and arms control, coupled with its plans to grow its nuclear force, requires our attention.

In this environment, the President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems involved. The President has made clear that he wants arms control agreements that reflect modern reality—we should pursue serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies. In order to achieve this, Russia and China must be brought to the table. The world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of missiles. Moving into the future, we need to be creative and agile in how we approach and manage strategic competition, and that includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control agreements, and their interrelationship with our deterrence and defense requirements as well as those of our allies and partners.

In this testimony, I will discuss developments with regard to the INF and New START Treaties, and will close with a few remarks regarding the outlook for arms control in a changing security environment.

THE INF TREATY

I will start with the INF Treaty, and specifically how our diplomatic process has played out. First, I would point out what appears to be Russia's longstanding desire to get out of the INF Treaty. As early as 2004, senior Russian officials approached the United States about mutually withdrawing from the INF Treaty. When the United States did not respond the way Russia wanted, the United States assessed that the Russian government began covert development of an INF-noncompliant missile, the SSC–8, probably in the mid-2000s.

The United States started privately raising concerns with the Russians about their INF Treaty noncompliance in 2013 before publicly announcing Russia’s violation in the 2014 version of the Department of State’s annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. Russia initially denied, for several years, that the missile described by the United States existed before acknowledging in late 2017 that the missile existed but claimed it could not fly to ranges prohibited by the Treaty.

The United States has invested 6 years of diplomatic effort to engage the Russians and convince them to return to Treaty compliance. U.S. officials under two administrations have raised concerns on repeated occasions and at various levels and departments within the Russian Government, including at the highest levels, and provided detailed information to Russia outlining its violation. U.S. efforts continue, numbering more than 30 engagements with Russian officials, six-expert level meetings with Russia, more than a dozen meetings within NATO regarding the INF issue, and Treaty-compliant research and development on potential U.S. conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range systems to show Russia the cost of endangering the INF Treaty. Senators, I assure you that diplomatic engagement remains my priority. Since I last addressed the Committee in September, I have met with Russian counterparts six times; and more than 20 times with NATO allies and partners. Thanks to this engagement, we had unanimous Allied support for our decision to notify Russia of our intent to withdraw from the INF Treaty. Allies continue to fully support our position that Russia must return to full and verifiable compliance to preserve the INF Treaty.

Throughout our years of efforts, we stressed that Russia’s continuing violation and failure to take concrete steps to return to compliance created an untenable situation whereby the United States complied with the INF Treaty while Russia violated it. On December 4, 2018, the Secretary of State declared Russia’s continuing violation to be a material breach of the Treaty and announced the United States would suspend its obligations under the Treaty as a remedy in 60 days unless Russia returned to full and verifiable compliance. I led a U.S. interagency delegation to Geneva on January 15 to meet with Russian experts led by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. Instead of taking advantage of this opportunity, Russia dou-
bled down on denying its violation and making false allegations against the United States. As a result of Russia’s continued refusal to correct its noncompliance and reverse course, the United States on February 2 suspended its obligations under the Treaty and provided six-month notice of U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty.

As the Secretary of State has said, remaining in a treaty that restricts only one side, while the other side cheats with impunity, does not enhance the security interests of the United States and its allies. The United States abided by its INF Treaty obligations, while Russia cheated. During this time, of course, China, Iran, and North Korea, who are not parties to the INF Treaty, were unconstrained to develop formidable arsenals of intermediate-range missiles. If we had maintained the status quo despite Russia’s persistent violation, the future credibility of arms control would have been undercut by demonstrating that there are no real consequences for cheating on agreements.

During our several years of diplomacy, Russia made clear it preferred keeping its INF noncompliant missile system over preserving the Treaty. Rather than move toward compliance, Russia actually moved in the opposite direction. Russia went from producing and testing the SSC–8 to fielding multiple battalions of the system as of late 2018—a system that poses a direct threat to European and global security. Even as recently as this February, President Putin publicly endorsed converting a sea-based, intermediate-range missile of the Kalibr class into a ground-launched missile, which would be inconsistent with the INF Treaty. This is a clear sign that Russia has no intent to try and save the Treaty prior to August 2, the effective date of U.S. withdrawal.

We have been clear to the Russians that returning to compliance requires the verifiable destruction of all SSC–8 missiles, their launchers, and associated support equipment. If Russia fails to return to full and verifiable compliance before August 2, our decision to withdraw will stand, and the Treaty will terminate. Russia will bear sole responsibility for the Treaty’s end.

Our allies are united that Russian actions are to blame for the pending demise of the INF Treaty. When the United States declared Russia in material breach back in December, NATO strongly supported the announcement and agreed “the situation whereby the United States and other parties fully abide by the Treaty and Russia does not, is not sustainable.” Allies, again, “fully supported” the U.S. suspension in February. NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg has reiterated that “A treaty that is respected by only one side cannot be effective and will not keep us safe. If a treaty no longer affects the reality on the ground, then it is nothing more than a piece of paper.”

If the Russians do not return to compliance with the INF Treaty and we find ourselves in a world without its restrictions, we must be ready to ensure U.S. and allied security. To ensure that our adversaries receive no military advantage, the United States is developing its own intermediate-range, conventionally-armed, ground-launched missile systems. To reiterate, these systems are conventional only—not nuclear. This research and development is designed to be reversible, should Russia return to full and verifiable compliance before August 2. Because the United States has been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in a position to immediately field a ground-launched, INF-range system. We are committed to consulting with allies as we move forward, although it is too early to discuss any potential basing at this stage.

If Russia fails to return to full and verifiable compliance, the result will be the demise of the Treaty. As Secretary Pompeo stated on February 2, “Regrettably, the INF Treaty is no longer effective due to Russia’s ongoing material breach.” The deployment of multiple battalions of SSC–8 missiles by Russia poses a threat to international peace and security which this administration takes very seriously. Going forward, this administration will continue to work with Congress and our allies to deny Russia any military advantage from its development of ground-launched intermediate-range missiles.

THE NEW START TREATY

We are implementing the New START Treaty and verifying Russian compliance. In February 2018, each country confirmed its compliance with the Treaty’s central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and their associated warheads and launchers.

I know this Committee has sought the Trump administration’s view of extending the New START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire February 5, 2021. While some may argue that there is an urgent need to extend right now, we must be careful to assess all of the complexities and changes in the evolving security environment since the Treaty was signed in 2010. To be direct: the administration has not made
any decision on a potential extension of New START. Since there are many aspects of our review, I will take time now to walk through some of the considerations.

First, while Russia is complying with the New START Treaty, Russia’s strategic forces are currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization in their force structure, operations, and planning. In a March 1, 2018 speech, President Putin spoke about the development of five new nuclear-armed systems: a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile; a nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicle with intercontinental range; an air-launched ballistic missile; a “gliding wing unit”; and a heavy ICBM. Russian official commentary and media reports indicate that some of these systems could be fielded before New START is scheduled to expire in February 2021. We assess at least two of them, the Sarmat heavy ICBM and Avangard hypersonic system would count as existing types and be subject to New START at the appropriate point in their development cycle. Further, we assess that the other three systems meet the U.S. criteria for what constitutes a “new kind of strategic offensive arms” for purposes of New START. The United States is monitoring the development of these systems and has raised them with Russian officials. Meanwhile, as was noted in the New START Resolution of Ratification, Russia’s large stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear weapons is not subject to the Treaty’s limits and verification regime, and Russia potentially views this stockpile as providing coercive advantage in crises or at lower levels of conflict.

Second, we cannot ignore Russia’s record of being a serial violator and selective implementer of the arms control obligations and commitments that it undertakes. Russia has violated the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Open Skies Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, and the INF Treaty. Its actions have raised serious concerns about its compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. It also has acted inconsistent with its Vienna Document commitments and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991–1992. Russia also professes to support arms control for preventing an arms race in outer space while developing anti-satellite systems.

Third, our decision on extension will carefully consider U.S. and allied security needs. When the Treaty was negotiated, we were in a more benign security environment, where relations between the great powers were less tense and mistrustful. However, in the intervening years, the security environment deteriorated significantly, and increased uncertainty and risk pervade. Russia’s malign actions, including invading and seeking to annex part of Ukraine’s territory, have contributed substantially to this deterioration. We are carefully considering how our deterrence requirements are shaped by the geostrategic realities of today and the future.

Finally, China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent. China has been investing considerable resources to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, which is resulting in an increasingly diverse force with next generation missiles, submarines, and a stealthy, long-range strategic bomber. China also appears to be considering how new types of weapons might fit into its posture, such as low-yield capabilities and hypersonics. These developments, paired with China’s assertive behavior towards its neighbors, disregard for binding international norms, and its unwillingness to engage in meaningful dialogue with the United States on issues of nuclear weapons policy and risk reduction, raise the risks of miscalculation, and instability. The United States has tried to raise mechanisms with the Chinese to discuss these issues but our efforts have so far been rebuffed. China currently benefits from having the two largest nuclear powers restrained while it can pursue competition on its own terms. That status quo is unacceptable.

Central to the U.S. review is whether a New START extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty’s expiration would impact U.S. national security in the deteriorating security environment, where Russia is developing new strategic and nonstrategic offensive arms and China is modernizing and building up its nuclear forces. We will continue to consult with Congress as this administration determines its next steps.

CONCLUSION

There is much work ahead to ensure that our arms control agreements deliver the best security to the United States and our allies and partners. The value of any agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and miscalculation. Russia, unfortunately, has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia’s commitment to arms control. Done correctly, arms control will help us stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability in how our countries address weapons of mass destruction issues and poli-
cies. The President and the Secretary of State have been clear: we need a new era of arms control to address new and emerging threats. In the current security environment, we also must consider how we can bring other countries into our agreements so that the United States is not limited while others, such as China, are unconstrained.

Make no mistake, we are in an era of revived Great Power competition. While we seek to bring Russia and China to the arms control table to deliver meaningful results, we will be relentless in our efforts to advance U.S. and allied interests, ensure our security, and deny our adversaries advantages. Modern and effective U.S. nuclear capabilities as called for in the NPR are critical. As the NPR’s preface stated: ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains strong will provide the best opportunity for convincing other nuclear powers to engage in meaningful arms control initiatives. I thank you for convening this important hearing, and look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Ms. Thompson.

We will now turn to Mr. Trachtenberg. Mr. Trachtenberg is Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Having served in various roles throughout the Department of Defense, Mr. Trachtenberg has deep experience and expertise with NATO, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia nuclear forces and arms control. He is well suited to provide a comprehensive assessment of the current dynamics surrounding arms control and to share with us the actions that the Department of Defense is taking in this area.

Mr. Trachtenberg, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Trachtenberg. Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control.

For decades, the United States has led the world in efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. In addition, the United States is committed to its long-held arms control nonproliferation and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different path and have increased the role of nuclear weapons and their strategies and actively increased the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.

For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps ensure that the United States can deter a nuclear attack and large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states. It also allows us to negotiate from a position of strength.

Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation that can lead to conflict.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reflects the Department of Defense’s strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable, and effective nuclear deterrent. The NPR also declares the U.S. commitment to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security, are verifiable and enforceable, and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations.
The current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader security environment, which has changed significantly in the past decade.

For example, Russia continues to prioritize modernizing its nuclear forces, including every leg of its strategic triad. Just this past Monday, President Vladimir Putin reportedly announced that 82 percent of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces have now been upgraded. And according to the Russian defense minister, this figure will reach 90 percent by 2020.

In March 2018, Putin announced that Russia is developing even more new nuclear weapons capabilities. Moreover, Russia is modernizing and expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on ships, bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces.

China continues its expansive military modernization, including deploying advanced sea-based weapons, developing a new generation of road-mobile missiles, improving its silo-based weapons, testing hypersonic glide vehicles, and developing a nuclear-capable next generation bomber.

These developments make arms control more complex and challenging than nearly a decade ago when the New START treaty was signed.

While we assess Russia to be in compliance with the central limits of New START, the history of Russia’s arms control behavior is sobering. And I will not recount here Russia’s many violations of its treaty obligations and other political commitments.

It is instructive, however, that only a month after the United States and Russia reached the central limits on strategic nuclear systems prescribed by the New START treaty, President Putin with great fanfare announced Russia was developing new long-range nuclear delivery systems. This is troubling given that Russia is also modernizing its growing and increasingly capable arsenal of shorter-range, non-strategic nuclear weapons which are not covered by New START. Members of this committee will remember that Russia’s non-strategic arsenal was of great concern when the New START treaty was ratified and it remains a concern today.

With respect to the INF Treaty, as a consequence of Russia’s clear violation and consistent with the sense of Congress expressed in the fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United States suspended its obligations under the treaty. We also gave notice of our intent to withdraw from it. Let me be clear. It is Russia that has abandoned the treaty as a result of its violation, and our allies fully support these U.S. actions in response.

Consequently, the United States is moving forward with developing conventionally armed ground-launched intermediate-range missile capabilities. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be driven by our assessment of military requirements and in consultation with Congress and with our allies and partners.

Let me conclude by stating that our nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of U.S. national security and underwrites all U.S. military operations and diplomacy across the globe. It is the backstop and foundation of our national defense enabling us to negotiate arms control agreements from a position of strength. The DOD supports
pursuing a prudent arms control agenda, which could include extending the New START treaty, provided the outcome improves the security of the United States and our allies and partners.

The President wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies. To achieve this, we are thinking more broadly both in terms of the countries and weapons systems involved. This may include addressing Russia’s newer strategic systems not captured by New START, seeking to address the significant imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons currently in Russia’s favor, and encouraging China to join in efforts to increase transparency and limit its nuclear weapons ambitions.

Above all, future arms control agreements must make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.

I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG

Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control with Russia.

Today, the United States faces an extraordinarily complex and dangerous global security environment, in which the central challenge to our prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition with China and Russia, which seek to overturn the long-standing rules-based international order and change territorial borders.

For decades, the United States led the world in efforts to reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons. Successive treaties enabled reductions in accountable strategic U.S. nuclear warheads, first to 6,000, and ultimately to 1,550. Thousands of short-range nuclear weapons not covered by any treaty were almost entirely eliminated from the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Overall, the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has drawn down by more than 85 percent from its Cold War high. The United States is committed to its long-held arms control, non-proliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Unfortunately, Russia and China have chosen a different path and have increased the role of nuclear weapons in their strategies and actively increased the size and sophistication of their nuclear forces.

For this reason, a robust and modern U.S. nuclear deterrent helps ensure the United States competes from a position of strength and can deter nuclear attack and large-scale conventional warfare between nuclear-armed states.

THE NUCLEAR THREAT

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflects DoD’s strategic priority to maintain a safe, secure, survivable and effective nuclear deterrent. The NPR also declares the United States’ commitment to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations.

The current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader security environment, which has changed significantly in the past decade.

RUSSIA

For example, over the past decade, Russia has been upgrading the capacity of its nuclear forces.

Russia continues to prioritize high levels of defense spending to upgrade its nuclear forces and pursue advanced weapons specifically designed to counter U.S. military capabilities. Russia’s nuclear modernization program covers every leg of its strategic triad and includes advanced modern road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), new submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and long-range strategic bombers. According to Russia's TASS News Agency, Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu announced on February 21, 2017, that 90 percent of the country's strategic nuclear forces will be armed with modern weaponry by 2020.

In March 2018, only a month after the United States and Russia reached the limits on strategic systems established under the New START Treaty, President Vladimir Putin announced—with great fanfare—that Russia is developing even more new nuclear weapon capabilities, which include: 1) an intercontinental-range, nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle; 2) a maneuverable, nuclear-armed air-launched ballistic missile; 3) a long-range, nuclear-powered cruise missile; 4) a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed underwater unmanned vehicle; and 5) a new heavy intercontinental range ballistic missile, called the SARMAT. President Putin, during this same speech, also announced that Russia developed new laser weapons systems "that have been supplied to the troops since last year."

This past February (2019), President Putin declared that Russia had successfully tested nuclearpropulsion engines that would allow the nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and underwater drones to travel for unlimited distances and evade traditional defenses.

On top of all of this, Russia is modernizing and expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons—often referred to as tactical nuclear weapons—that can be deployed on ships, bombers, tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. None of these are limited by any arms control treaty. In contrast, the United States forward deploys to Europe a small number of just one type of nonstrategic nuclear weapon—the B61 nuclear gravity bomb—which is delivered by dual-capable tactical aircraft. Both the B61 and its delivery aircraft are being modernized, but not increased in number.

Russia's military doctrine emphasizes the coercive nature and military value of nuclear weapons. During its military operation against Crimea, President Putin was getting ready to raise the alert level of Russian nuclear forces, effectively issuing veiled nuclear threats to ensure the West did not intervene. Russia has repeatedly brandished its nuclear sword towards our NATO Allies in recent years. In July 2017, Russian President Putin signed a new naval doctrine that stated, "under conditions of escalation of a military conflict, demonstration of readiness and determination to use force, including the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, is an effective deterrent factor."

CHINA

Russia is not the United States' only strategic competitor pursuing nuclear increases. China continues its expansive military modernization and is focused on establishing regional dominance and expanding its ability to coerce U.S. allies and partners.

China is developing a new generation of mobile missiles, with warheads consisting of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids. In particular, China has developed a new road-mobile strategic ICBM and its most advanced ballistic missile submarine armed with new submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).

China has also announced development of a new nuclear-capable strategic bomber, indicating China's intent to develop a nuclear triad, and has deployed a nuclear-capable precision guided DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of attacking land and naval targets. China also tested a hypersonic glide vehicle in 2014.

China's nuclear forces include a mix of strategic-range systems capable of striking the U.S. homeland as well as theater-range forces capable of threatening allies, U.S. bases, and forces in the region. As China's capabilities both diversify and improve, there is risk China may perceive that these weapons provide it with coercive options in a crisis or conflict. China's modernization is troubling, and the lack of transparency combined with growing Chinese assertiveness in the region is one of the most serious risks to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific.

China is modernizing and rapidly expanding its already considerable nuclear forces, with little to no transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program, and has rebuffed multiple U.S. attempts to engage in a meaningful bilateral dialogue on nuclear posture and risk reduction issues.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY DEVELOPMENTS

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was once a cornerstone of security in Europe. By removing an entire class of weapons from the arsenals of the
United States and the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia and other Soviet successor states, Europe and much of the world enjoyed increased security. But the INF Treaty no longer provided that security when Russia intentionally and blatantly produced, flight-tested, and fielded a missile system subject to the Treaty in direct violation of its legal obligation not to do so. When Russia produced the SSC–8 cruise missile and, after getting caught, fielded it and refused to destroy it, Russia removed a pillar of security for the United States and for our allies. At that point, as a practical matter, the INF Treaty bound our hands while Russia decided it could freely develop what the treaty prohibited.

On February 2, 2019, as a consequence of Russia’s material breach of the INF Treaty, after exhausting every reasonable diplomatic, economic, and military effort to persuade Russia to comply with its treaty obligations, and consistent with the Sense of Congress expressed in the Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United States suspended its obligations under the Treaty. We also gave notice of our withdrawal from it. As NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg asserted, “Russia is in material breach of the INF Treaty and must use the next 6 months to return to full and verifiable compliance or bear sole responsibility for its demise.” Allies fully support the U.S. decision to suspend its obligations under INF and withdraw from the Treaty.

To be clear, what prompted the U.S. suspension was not a minor violation or an interpretive difference, but Russia’s production, flight-testing, and fielding of multiple battalions of a ground-launched cruise missile system specifically banned by the INF Treaty. For those concerned that our suspension will cause Russia to develop these systems further, I can only say Russia’s legal obligations under the INF Treaty proved no practical barrier to its pursuit and fielding of a banned system in the first place. To assert that Russia is reacting to our suspension is to ignore the reality of Russia’s conduct under the INF Treaty.

As the President stated in February 2019, the United States is moving forward with developing ground-launched, INF-range missile capabilities. This is a direct consequence of Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. Now that our Treaty obligations are suspended, the United States is developing systems that are conventional in nature, and this work is designed to be reversible should Russia return to compliance by verifiably destroying its INF Treaty-violating missiles, launchers, and associated support equipment. What sort of system we ultimately develop will be driven by our assessment of military requirements and in consultation with Congress and with our allies and partners.

THE NEW START TREATY

As stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. As both the 2018 NPR and the 2018 NATO Brussels Summit Communique noted, we must take account of the prevailing international security environment. In the arms control context, this means Russia and, increasingly, China.

Moreover, Russia is modernizing its growing and increasingly capable arsenal of shorter-range, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are also not covered by New START. Members of this Committee will remember that Russia’s nonstrategic arsenal was of great concern when the New START Treaty was ratified, and it remains a concern today.

That said, the Department supports pursuing a prudent arms control agenda, which could include extending the New START Treaty, provided the outcomes improve the security of the United States and our allies and partners, and effectively help manage strategic competition among states.

FUTURE ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS

Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation that can lead to conflict. Arms control agreements are not something we sign onto for the sake of arms control. We do so to increase our national security.
The President wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies. So the President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems involved. This may include addressing Russia’s newer strategic systems that are not captured by New START; seeking to redress the significant imbalance in non-strategic nuclear weapons currently in Russia’s favor; and encouraging China to join in efforts to increase transparency and limit its nuclear weapons ambitions. The Department of Defense is supporting the National Security Council’s efforts to provide the President with the best options.

CONCLUSION

As a reliable ally and partner, the United States must advocate for effective arms control agreements that make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.

We appreciate the attention of this Committee and the rest of the Congress to these issues, and we will keep you informed of developments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Trachtenberg.

We are now going to do a round of questions, and we will start with Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Thompson, if Russia is in compliance, do you believe it is in the best of the U.S. to extend New START?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, thanks for that question.

I can tell you that under New START at present, both countries are in compliance. We continue to have success with the treaty. I will also tell you that we are undergoing the interagency process on next steps with New START, and we are also engaged with our partners and allies. I just got back——

Senator MENENDEZ. I am sorry. I did not ask you that. I asked you a simple question.

If Russia is in compliance, is it in the best interest of the United States to extend New START? Yes or no.

Ms. THOMPSON. Too soon to tell, Senator. We are in an interagency process. I would tell you that the treaty, as it stands, is postured for today. Is the treaty, as it stands, postured for the safety and security of the American people for the next 5 to 10 years? That I cannot answer today.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, what would it need?

Ms. THOMPSON. Pardon, Senator?

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, what would it need to be postured for the next 5 or 10 years?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is the discussions that we are having right now, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, can you give me an insight as to what it is?

Ms. THOMPSON. I am not going to go through our interagency process in public, Senator, but I can tell you that it is a rigorous process. We are working with the intelligence agencies.

Senator MENENDEZ. I do not know about an interagency process. I mean, you could give insights as to the benchmarks that would be needed, and that is not an interagency process. I am asking you as a representative of the Department of State here, what are the elements of that. And you cannot give it to me.

Have you had a conversation with Russian officials about extending the treaty?
Ms. THOMPSON. We have had discussions with our Russian counterparts on the treaty.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you, if New START expires, could Russia target the United States with hundreds or perhaps even thousands of additional nuclear warheads?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is a good question for Russia, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. No. It is a good question for you.

You know, the disdain that the State Department has when they come here—I do not appreciate it. I am asking legitimate questions with answers so that I can make policy decisions. I am not asking Russia about our national defense. I am asking you.

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, Senator. As our staff——

Senator MENENDEZ. Is it possible that, in fact, if there was no New START, that in fact Russia could aim hundreds or thousands of new weapons? Is that possible?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is a hypothetical, Senator, and I am not going to answer that.

Senator MENENDEZ. Oh, my God.

Ms. THOMPSON. That is a hypothetical. That is not a fair question.

Senator MENENDEZ. It is not a hypothetical. It is what would happen if we cannot verify what they are doing.

If Russia expanded its strategic nuclear forces in a post New START environment, what would be the implications for U.S. nuclear strategy and force posture?

Ms. THOMPSON. Again, Senator, if we are looking to the future here, it depends where the security situation is in the world, what our partners and allies are doing, what our R&D efforts through the Department of Defense are doing. That is all being taken into consideration now as we look through next steps. It is always the safety and security of the American people. It is always about the readiness of our military forces. It is always the security of our partners and allies in those discussions.

Senator MENENDEZ. I am asking you to help me understand—of course, it is the safety and security of the American people. We are on common ground on all of that. That goes without saying. The question is how does one achieve that at the end of the day.

Let me ask you, Deputy Secretary Trachtenberg. My understanding is that China has a total nuclear arsenal of approximately 300 weapons. And the United States and Russia retain at least 6,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenal, 20 times the size of China’s arsenal. Is that about right?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, there have been a number of unclassified estimates, Senator, which clearly show that the Chinese nuclear arsenal is significantly less than those of either the United States or Russia.

Senator MENENDEZ. And my understanding is the Department of Defense in a recent report stated that China has between 50 to 75 strategic delivery systems capable of targeting the United States. Under the New START treaty, the U.S. and Russia are limited to 700 deployed and a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed strategic nuclear systems. Is that about right?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. That sounds about right, Senator. The difficulty we have with respect to China’s arsenal is that China,
among the major nuclear powers, is, I would say, the least transparent in terms of the size of its nuclear arsenal.

Senator Menendez. Well, let me ask you then, if those are about right, given this current imbalance, can you explain to me under what circumstances China would be willing to sign up to a multilateral arms control regime?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Oh, I think it is very much in our national security interests to engage with China on——

Senator Menendez. I did not ask you that. I am asking you what would compel China, who is so disproportionately under-represented in terms of its nuclear arsenal, to agree to something in which we are 20 times larger than them.

Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, I cannot speak to what would compel China because I cannot get into the mind of the Chinese leadership.

Senator Menendez. We have to be thinking, if we are going to negotiate with them, what would induce them. Right?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I can tell you I do believe that China is, of course, modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear capabilities and does pose a threat to the United States. And therefore, under those conditions, it seems to me entirely legitimate and proper for us to seek to engage China in this endeavor.

The Chairman. Ms. Thompson, would you agree with me that in order for New START to give us the protections that we want and expect from it that Russia would have to allow the kind of surveillance and the kind of verifications that are given to us under the Open Skies Treaty? Would you agree with that?

Ms. Thompson. Senator, I would agree that the verification underscores every treaty we have, and if we have those discussions to extend New START or have a different type of New START, the verification is the foundation of it. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. I assume you are familiar with the limitations Russia has put on our use of the Open Skies Treaty to verify.

Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir, very familiar with that.

The Chairman. Would you in your position recommend that we have an extension while they continue to limit our ability to verify under Open Skies?

Ms. Thompson. That has been one of the points we have raised within our process, Senator. When you look at all the other treaties, whether it is CFE, INF, the list that you reviewed in the opening remarks, that Russia is in violation of those treaties, that is always at the table when we have those discussions with our Russian counterparts.

The Chairman. Big problem.

Ms. Thompson. It is, sir.

The Chairman. And especially if you are talking about giving them a gratuitous 5-year extension when they are not allowing us to verify the things we need to verify under New START. Fair statement?

Ms. Thompson. Fair statement, Senator.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Senator Romney, you are up.

Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just note at the outset that I agree with the ranking member about the need for a classified briefing on the matters in Iraq and hope that either the entire committee or perhaps just the chair and the ranking member would be able to have that kind of briefing.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney. The chair has had that kind of briefing. And in the works is a full briefing of the entire United States Senate because this is a very critical issue. There is no question about that.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you. That gives me a heartened feeling. Thank you.

[Laughter.]

The Chairman. I want you to be heartened.

Senator ROMNEY. Yes. Thank you. Thank you.

Of course, our objective—and we speak about this regularly—is to see a world without nukes. But unfortunately, what seems to be occurring is a buildup of nuclear capacity, a proliferation of nuclear weapons. China seeks, based on my reading—I did not mean China. I meant Russia seeks not a balanced nuclear capacity to deter action, but it has got superiority. You indicated that as much as 90 percent of their triad will be modernized by 2021.

Do you have any sense of what—or can you give us an estimate of what percentage of our nuclear triad has been modernized and is in a modern state at this stage?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Sure, Senator Romney. I would say very little of our triad has currently been modernized. We have a modernization program which, if funded, would allow us to modernize all three of the legs, so-called legs, of our something triad, the ICBMs, the sub-launched ballistic missiles, as well as the bombers.

We have, in essence, skipped a generation when it comes to modernization. The last two cycles of our strategic modernization program took place in the 1980s and before that, in the 1960s. And so we are well behind where I believe we should be in terms of the modernization of our own strategic systems which I would assert is essential to maintain our nuclear deterrent.

Senator ROMNEY. I am distressed to hear that and recall that at a time when I was one of the vocal opponents of the New START treaty, those that were in favor of it said you have to understand that we are going to be modernizing our triad. This deal we are doing on New START is associated with this modernization effort, and we still have not funded that. And as a result, we have a nuclear deterrent which is in inferior capacity with regard to its modernization than that of a potential foe.

Another area that concerned me during the time that New START was being negotiated was the fact that Russia had a very dramatic lead in terms of non-strategic nukes. And I made the point that we had a lead on strategic. We had 2,500 strategic nuclear weapons. They had 1,500. We agreed to make 1,500 the new limit. So we cut out 1,000 of ours and they did not change a thing. And the argument was made, well, we will move on to the non-strategic next.

Have we moved on to the non-strategic weapons? Have we been able to limit their stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons?
Mr. TRACHTENBERG. We have not, Senator. Despite our efforts to engage the Russians in discussions with respect to their non-strategic nuclear forces, they have been unwilling to discuss that.

I would say, if I might, while we did reduce—you are absolutely correct. We did reduce to meet the New START levels. The Russians did take an action as well. The action they took was they built up their levels of nuclear forces in order to meet the limits of the New START treaty. When New START was signed, they were below the limits, we were above the limits. And therefore, this was a treaty that required us to reduce while simultaneously it allowed the Russians to increase.

Senator ROMNEY. Yes. One more reason that I was very, very opposed to the agreement as it was negotiated.

One more matter in that regard. I just wanted to raise a question, and that is the concern about bombers. And, as I understand it, the classification of bombers was that if a bomber had, let us say, 10 nuclear warheads on it, it still only counted as one nuclear warhead, which was a strange element at least in my view at that time.

Am I remembering that correctly? And has Russia taken advantage of this loophole in the New START treaty to arm their bombers with substantially more than one nuclear warhead?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, you are correct in the math. They are in compliance with New START. But you raise a great point not only with the count, but as the chairman raised in his opening remarks, equipment has evolved and we have hypersonic glide vehicles and a series of the five systems that Secretary Trachtenberg raised that will not fall under the treaty at this point. And that is why the President has been clear, as has the Secretary, about the need to modernize our discussions and have these discussions with our Russian counterparts to include the systems that we have and, more importantly, the systems that will be fielded shortly.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you.

It is my hope that as we negotiate towards a nuclear agreement with Russia and potentially with China as well that it is fully encompassing of new technologies, as well as technologies that might be developed in the future, and that we are not in a setting where once again we are agreeing to major reductions in our capacity and allowing potential opponents to have major increases in their capacity.

I would also note that I think it is a high priority for this body to make the substantial investment that was promised in our triad. Our ground-based nuclear deterrent is very, very old. It is decades old and needs to be completely updated, and I hope that we will get about that in very short order.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Romney.

Nine years ago at this table Senator Kerry was sitting in this chair and Senator Lugar was sitting in this chair. I was sitting down there somewhere. And we had these discussions regarding the New START. And a number of us were adamantly opposed to it for a lot of the reasons that you have suggested. And one of them that was incredibly important to us was modernization, and we were promised—they did not have enough votes to get over the
hump so they promised these modernization efforts. And it has been a real disaster in that regard. We just have not followed through on it, and it is very unfortunate, one of the many reasons why I oppose a gratuitous 5-year extension given where we are.

So thank you for that.

Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I share the ranking member’s grave concern about the announce-ment this morning regarding the withdrawal of non-emergency person-sonnel from Iraq. It is a vague announcement. This could be consular services. It could be all non-military personnel. We have no idea about the details.

Ms. Thompson, can you share any details with us this morning about exactly what personnel are being withdrawn from Baghdad and other parts of Iraq?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, I do not receive diplomatic security, but I assure you the team will take the questions back for our leadership.

Senator MURPHY. Ms. Thompson, I want to talk to you about Iran for a moment. I just want to confirm what the purpose of our pressure campaign is. Many of us feel that it has been ham-handed without a well-defined end game. But I assume that the purpose of this maximum pressure campaign is, in the end, to compel the Iranians back to the negotiating table, to enter into a new negotia-tion over a set of U.S. objectives. Is that the purpose of this cam-paign?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is an element of the campaign, yes, Sen-ator.

Senator MURPHY. What do you mean that it is an element?

Ms. THOMPSON. The strategy has more details than that. I mean, that is one portion of it. It is also to prevent the continued expan-sion of their malign activity through the region, and the list that the Secretary has been forthcoming with with the 12 items. So that is certainly an element of it.

Senator MURPHY. But we do not imagine that they are going to fulfill those 12 objectives on their own. There will have to be a ne-gotiation with the Iranians over our desire to have them fulfill those 12 U.S.-stated goals.

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct. The Secretary has stated he pre-fers a diplomatic solution on that.

Senator MURPHY. And so this set of goals that the Secretary has laid out, which calls on the Iranians to stop enrichment and never pursue plutonium processing and their ballistic missile program, release all prisoners, end support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic jihad, end support for the Houthis, withdraw forces from Syria, end support for the Taliban, end the IRGC support for mili-tant terrorist groups, and stop threatening behavior—that list re-mains our bottom line. That is what we expect the Iranians to produce either on their own unilaterally or through a negotiated process.

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MURPHY. Let me ask another question of you, Mr. Trachtenberg. Let me try to ask the same question that Senator Menendez asked. A negotiation requires two willing parties. No-
body enters into a negotiation if they are told at the outset that they are going to get nothing from it. And so let me ask the same question that he asked regarding why China would enter into a negotiation with the United States and perhaps with Russia when today reportedly China has 300 warheads and between the United States and Russia, we have thousands.

I am not asking you to sort of lay out what our concessions would be, but give us an idea that you have some plan to make the case to China that there would be a benefit to them to limit their nuclear capability. What general area of concessions might we offer them?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, Senator, I appreciate your question. We are at the beginning of a process right now. And I would say China has envisioned itself as a major power on the world stage. China has been flexing its military muscle. China has been undertaking a number of actions in order to garner respect and attention as a major player.

Now, if China wishes to be treated as a major player, then China should accept the responsibilities of a major power in the world today and that includes engaging with respect to its nuclear arsenal and its nuclear capabilities.

So while we are at the start of this process, I believe that it is entirely legitimate for us to seek ways to engage the Chinese such that they understand if they are going to be a responsible player on the world stage, that they should address these issues in a responsible manner.

Senator MURPHY. So I ask these questions because it appears to me as if the preconditions for negotiations with Iran and what seems to me a very ill-thought-out strategy for engaging China is just an excuse to get no agreement. If you set up a list of requirements for negotiations with Iran that are wholly and completely unrealistic, if you believe that the Chinese should negotiate with us just because they are a great power, you are setting up the negotiations for failure. In fact, you are setting up the inevitability that the negotiations will never begin. And so that is what I think you hear as a worry from many members of this committee, that while we would love for Iran to give up their support for Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, we would love for them to abandon their ballistic missile program, I would love for the Chinese just to decide that because they are a great power, that they should start negotiations with us, when it comes to arms control, hope is not a strategy. And I worry in the end that these are just all excuses for why we are never going to enter into a meaningful dialogue with either. That is why to many of us this seems like escalation with no end game. But I appreciate your candor before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murphy.

Senator Paul. Senator MAVERICK, I agree with Senator Murphy. I mean, you want a ballistic missile deal with Iran. We got rid of the nuclear deal, which took years and years of pressure with international sanctions. We got a nuclear deal, and you say you want a ballistic missile deal. Well, they are not going to do a ballistic missile deal with you ever as long as Saudi Arabia is spending like eight times as much as they do and the Gulf sheikhdoms surrounding them. It is
a complete non-starter. So if that is our goal, it is sort of like saying we are no longer going to have any kind of diplomatic solution with Iran.

With regard to Iran, Mr. Trachtenberg, do you believe the President has the authority to wage war with Iran without congressional authorization?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I believe that every nation has a right to self-defense, and that if attacked, the United States has the ability——

Senator PAUL. That is not the question. The question is not on defending against an attack of sailors on a boat or people in an embassy. I think we all agree with that. We are talking about war. Let us say they attack one of our boats and we defend ourselves. We all agree we should defend ourselves.

Can the President continue to a full-scale war with 120,000 troops? Can we have a full-scale waging of war with Iran without congressional authorization?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Only the Congress has the responsibility to declare war—has the authority to declare war.

Senator PAUL. Right. So the answer is the President cannot do it, and that would be the explicit answer I would hope we would get from the policy person at the State Department.

Ms. Thompson, the Aegis Ashore—is it essentially run by the same system as the Aegis Afloat?

Ms. THOMPSON. Sir, I would actually defer the particulars of the Aegis since it is a military piece of equipment to my DOD counterpart. I can tell you that we have had discussions on the Aegis system with my Russian counterparts, but the ins and outs of the Aegis really is——

Senator PAUL. Are they essentially run by the same system?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I believe the essential components are similar.

Senator PAUL. So this is also what Lockheed Martin says. They make it and they say it is essentially the same system.

We also have folks at—I think it is—the U.S. Naval Institute saying that basically Aegis Ashore could be easily turned into an offensive cruise missile system.

And so I guess my problem is if you really are serious about talking to Russia, it is not that we have to accept that they are telling the truth or that we agree with their points. But, Ms. Thompson, when you say that their response that we are in violation is laughable and the world sees it as a fraud, it sounds to me like you are not really interested in negotiating with the Russians because I think it is a debatable point. It is an arguable point. It has technical details. That is what nuclear arms negotiators and real diplomats are supposed to be discussing.

So if it is essentially the same system and it got converted to a system of offense and we could launch cruise missiles from it, it sounds like the Russians have a point. And it sounds like it is at least a debatable point that we should be discussing before we say, oh, well, it is all the Russian side. That is not what diplomacy is about. Diplomacy is about figuring out what the other side is saying and not just saying they are a bunch of crazy, laughable people and we cannot talk to them. That is a recipe for no diplomacy.
And I think that is what you have set up in Iran, but it is also what you are setting up in Russia in that we are not even willing to discuss whether Aegis Ashore is similar to Aegis Afloat and whether they have an argument or not. I would think that is where we would set down technical people at a table and have a discussion.

Ms. THOMPSON. Is that a question? May I respond to that, Senator?

Senator PAUL. Well, I mean, the question—you say it is laughable. Is that something a diplomat should be saying about something that is the main point Russia is bringing up? I am not saying we accept it. I am not saying it is true. But if that is their main complaint about us and our main complaint is the SSC–8, we would hear each other's complaints, but we would not say to the other side, we would not say in public that their argument is laughable if we wanted to come to an agreement.

Ms. THOMPSON. I can tell you, Senator, in my six engagements with my Russian counterparts since September, I have said that there is a professional discussion. I said that about the Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, whom I have met multiple times. We have met and had candid discussions. We have had technical experts meet. We just had the BCC—and we have given readouts on that about 2 and a half weeks ago up to the Hill—where we have had the discussions, and they have raised the intelligence and we have countered that intelligence with our technical experts——

Senator PAUL. My advice to you is I would not say in public that your adversary's response is laughable. That really goes a long way towards setting back any kind of possible diplomatic solution. And this is important. We are talking about whether or not the world could be destroyed by nuclear weapons, whether we should limit the amount of nuclear weapons. When we say our adversary is laughable, you do a great injustice to the idea of diplomacy. So I hope you will reconsider things you say in public.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is fitting that this committee today is holding a hearing on arms control when you are also celebrating our friend and colleague, Senator Lugar, whose leadership was such a critical step toward limiting nuclear arsenals.

One of the things that I think is important to remember is that one of the benefits of the New START treaty is that it provided a mechanism for us to continue to communicate with Russia and to understand what their capabilities are and for them to understand our capabilities and that that is important as we think about the potential to misread or misunderstand the messages that one nuclear power is sending to another.

But I want to begin actually by sharing the concerns that have already been expressed about the failure to brief this committee and Congress about what is happening with Iran and the decision to withdraw all non-essential personnel from Iraq. And while I appreciate the chair of this committee and probably the chair of other committees have been briefed, I think it is important and a critical enough issue, given the potential threat of war, that everybody on this committee and everybody in Congress should be briefed about
that because I agree with you, Mr. Trachtenberg. I think Congress does have the authority to determine whether we go to war or not.

So let me ask you, Under Secretary Thompson, have you been briefed by the State Department or the administration on the decision to withdraw our personnel from Iraq? I am not asking you what that briefing contained. I am asking you have you been briefed?

Ms. THOMPSON. As it does not pertain to my portfolio at the State Department, no, ma’am, I have not.

Senator SHAHEEN. Have you been briefed, Mr. Trachtenberg?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No, ma’am, I have not.

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you have any idea who has been briefed on this decision, Under Secretary Thompson?

Ms. THOMPSON. It would be speculation. I know the process. We have had it in other posts where our diplomatic security professionals brief the Secretary, provide them with the intelligence, and they make the call.

Again, with overseeing arms control, foreign military sales, and nonproliferation, my portfolio does not include the diplomatic security. But I know that the process involves intelligence information presented to the Secretary, ma’am.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

So can you tell me, Under Secretary Thompson, under this administration, is it still part of U.S. strategy not only to limit nuclear arsenals in the world but also to ensure that there is never a mistake that results in a catastrophic response in error?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. This is a zero defects part of my portfolio, and engaging with partners and allies, sharing best practices on lessons learned so we ensure every nuclear power has that same safety and security and where others do not, to encourage them to do so. Yes, ma’am.

Senator SHAHEEN. So I understood in your testimony that, first, you acknowledged that Russia is complying with the New START treaty, but then you raise some concerns about other nuclear arms systems that they are developing. Did I understand that accurately?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, ma’am. The five systems that President Putin alluded to in his 2018 statement.

Senator SHAHEEN. So under the New START treaty, if the United States wanted to, we could also develop those systems—could we not—and still be in compliance?

Ms. THOMPSON. I defer to DOD, but we have not done the R&D efforts because we have remained in compliance with all of our treaties, ma’am.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, I am still trying to figure out—you are saying that Russia is in compliance and we are in compliance. So if Russia is doing this development and they are in compliance, then we could do the same development and still be in compliance. Is that not true, Mr. Trachtenberg?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Theoretically, we could do any number of things, Senator. But we certainly have no intention of doing the kinds of things that President Putin has announced that the Russians are going forward with.
And in terms of compliance, we have assessed that some of those new systems would fall under the category of accountability.

Senator SHAHEEN. Right, but we are not at the point at which those systems have been developed in a way that would require they fall under that.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. That is correct, Senator.

Senator SHAHEEN. So I am just pointing out that for those people who say that New START prohibits us from doing the kind of R&D that we think we need to do to defend this country, that in fact, it does not. That is a statement. That is not a question.

But I do have a question about how much information the United States receives from Russia through data exchanges, through on-site inspections, and what that benefit is to our understanding of what Russia is doing. Mr. Trachtenberg, can you speak to that?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I can tell you that the verification procedures have been useful, but I would defer to Under Secretary Thompson for specific details on that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Good. Would you like to respond?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, ma'am. They are in compliance. We do get access. Because of the nature of the access, we do get insight into their systems, and they, in turn, get access into ours. Yes, ma'am.

Senator SHAHEEN. So if New START were to lapse, how would the Pentagon and the intelligence community replace the information that we are getting from the New START verification agreement?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think that would be subject to negotiation, Senator. In terms of our approach to future negotiations with Russia and potentially China as well, we would obviously look for any agreement to contain verification and compliance measures in there or measures where we could be reasonably certain the parties would be willing to comply and would, in fact, comply. So that would be part and parcel I believe of any future negotiation.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, that makes sense to me. That is if we decide we are going to renegotiate the New START treaty. But based on the testimony and the questioning, it sounds like there are real questions about whether the administration has made that decision. And given the fact that if that happens, the treaty lapses, we no longer have that verification program, how do we then replace the information that we are getting under that verification program?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, Senator, I would say again that the decision has not been made in terms of the approach to New START, whether it should be extended or should not be extended, if extended, for how long it should be extended, or what to do if it is not extended. This is part of an ongoing interagency discussion that we are having with our State Department colleagues and others in terms of trying to figure out, as I said in my opening statement, sort of the broader strategic context in which we need to look at arms control going forward to incorporate concerns over a number of factors, not just strategic weapons but non-strategic weapons as well.

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your letting me go over my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Those are really important points that you are making. As with all these treaties, like I said at the outset, good faith is absolutely critical. And one of the things also that we all know is verification is essential. Without verification, you do not have anything. And with their violation of the Open Skies Treaty, it causes real problems as far as our ability to verify. Those two are interrelated. The New START just does not stand by itself. You got to have the good faith. But those are good points that you raised regarding verification. Absolutely critical.

Senator Johnson.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Trachtenberg, I want to drill down. I really want to get specific about what we mean by modernization and where we are at a disadvantage to Russia currently in their modernization. So specifically, what do we mean by modernization? What have we not modernized? What have they?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, what we are talking about is essentially upgrading and replacing the existing generation of land-based missiles with a ground-based strategic deterrent it is called and developing a new strategic bomber, as well as the Columbia class strategic submarine, ballistic missile firing submarine. So it would be taking those existing systems which have been actually in place literally for decades and that have had their life extended already, in some cases several times, well beyond their original life expectancy, and moving forward and replacing them with more modern systems.

Senator Johnson. So it is really the delivery system that is primarily what is in need of upgrade.

Mr. Trachtenberg. Absolutely, Senator. Our nuclear capabilities are based on several things. It is not just the nuclear weapons themselves, but it is the delivery systems that carry those weapons.

Senator Johnson. So is Russia more advanced in terms of their missile technology? Are they more advanced in their submarine technology? Are they more advanced in their bomber technology?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, I think it is clear that Russia has invested in developing more systems and more types of systems, ICBMs, stationary silo-based, mobile, SSBNs, new strategic ballistic missile submarines, and basically all of the three legs of its strategic triad. They have gone forward with a rather aggressive modernization program to date.

Senator Johnson. What about the nuclear warhead itself? When Senator Kyl was here—I am not on Armed Services, so I would attend regularly his meetings on modernization. What about the warhead itself and our ability to make sure that that is modern and will be capable?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, Russia continues to develop and produce new nuclear weapons. I believe the United States is the only country of the five major nuclear powers that has not produced a new nuclear weapon in quite some time. So we rely on our existing stockpile of weapons, which need to be certified as reliable and safe on an annual basis.

Senator Johnson. And how well are we keeping up with that? One of the things I learned with Senator Kyl’s meetings is when
you are not building new weapons, you are kind of losing the ability to even theoretically determine how good your current weapons are.

Mr. Trachtenberg. Well, it is true, Senator, that our weapons are aging as much as the delivery platforms have been aging. But I would respectfully defer to the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, the NNSA, that is responsible for our stockpile program and for assessments as to the continued reliability and safety and efficacy of the existing stockpile.

Senator Johnson. So it has been my understanding in Congress certainly even under the Obama administration, they were appropriating funds for modernization. Is that simply not the case? I mean, why were those funds not used to modernize?

Mr. Trachtenberg. No. Those funds were appropriated. The Obama administration did support the nuclear modernization program. The difficulty is that the modernization process itself takes a significant amount of time. We are talking about many years, perhaps in some cases decades, to actually fulfill and complete the current modernization program of record. So there is a long tail to that funding, which is why we very strongly believe and hope that the Congress will continue to provide the resources necessary in order for us to take the actions we need to take to see the modernization program continue.

Senator Johnson. So what do we spend the money on? What did we modernize? What did we get out of the money we spent?

Mr. Trachtenberg. My understanding is we have upgraded some of the guidance control systems in some of the systems that we currently have. But again, the delivery platforms themselves—there is only so much life extension that you can invest in to keep them reliably operational. And that is the difficulty that we are currently facing.

Senator Johnson. Do we still have vacuum tubes in some of these control systems?

Mr. Trachtenberg. That I do not know, Senator. I would have to take that one for the record. But it is clear that because of the age of these systems, I would reiterate that we are in, I think, critical need of moving forward and moving forward deliberately and robustly with the full scope of the modernization effort.

Senator Johnson. Well, consider that a question for the record. I do want some details in terms of where we are, what we are lacking in terms of our modernization program.

Mr. Trachtenberg. Absolutely.

Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Those are all good points that you have made.

So to the American people that are watching, let there be no mistake. The United States of America is in a position to be able to defend itself. We do have aging infrastructure in our nuclear arsenal, but having said that, a trip through the labs in New Mexico would be very enlightening for you, and it would leave you with no question that anyone who is thinking that we cannot take appropriate actions to defend ourselves is making a really, really bad mistake.

So with that, Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And thanks to the witnesses.

I want to ask about an important issue in the future of arms control and that is part 810 authorizations. My staff reached out to each of your staffs 2 days ago to tell you I was going to ask about this, so hopefully you will be prepared to answer my questions.

I am a member of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees.

A part 810 authorization, as you know, is a legally mandated approval that the Department of Energy must give to an American company that wants to transfer nuclear know-how to a foreign country. The DOE is required to get the concurrence of the Department of State prior to such transfers, and they are also required to consult with the Department of Defense before such transfers.

On March 28th, we had a hearing in the Armed Services Committee where I asked Secretary of Energy Perry to provide me information about part 810 transfers that the United States has done during the Trump administration, not proprietary information, but the dates of transfers, the companies who were given permission to transfer, and the countries to whom they were transferring. In the hearing, he committed to do that. That was 48 days ago.

I submitted a question for the record on April 2nd, 43 days ago. Thus far, the Department of Energy has refused to provide any information in response.

On April 10, Mr. Chair, we had a hearing with Secretary Pompeo. He and I talked about it at the hearing. I pointed out that the State Department is required to concur in such transfers, and I asked Secretary Pompeo the same question about when did the State Department concur in the transfers, did the State Department agree that the transfers should be held secret and private contrary to early practice. He committed in the hearing to get me an answer on the Saudi Arabian transfers.

At the close of the hearing, Mr. Chair, you directed the witnesses to answer questions submitted for the record. So the following day, April 11, 34 days ago, I submitted questions for the record to the Department of State asking them to answer the questions that I had directed to Secretary Pompeo during the hearing in this committee. And thus far, I have received no answer from the Department of State either to my oral questions to Secretary Pompeo or in response to my questions for the record.

So I want to start with Secretary Thompson. This is very important for arms control. The reason there is a part 810 process is you would not want to allow unlimited transfers of nuclear know-how to other nations that might be used to proliferate nuclear arms. And that is why the legal requirement is the Department of State has to concur and there has to be consultation with the Department of Defense and other stakeholders.

Can you give me the dates that the Department of State concurred in transfers of nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia pursuant to the part 810 requirement?

Ms. Thompson. I do not have those dates available, but I will take that back to get the answer for you, Senator.

Senator Kaine. Well, we reached out 2 days ago to say I was going to ask exactly this question, which I asked of the Department
of State on April 10th in a hearing and on April 11th in a letter. And the chair of the committee directed the Secretary to answer my question.

So when we reached out 2 days ago and asked you to prepare, did you not do anything? Did you ask whether you were allowed to share that information to me? Or are you now just telling me what everybody is telling me that they will get back to me in the infinite future?

Ms. THOMPSON. No, sir. I am well aware of what the 810 process with our Department of Energy counterparts. I know that we concurred. I did not receive the information that you were going to ask which dates we concurred. So I owe you that answer.

Senator KAINE. Is your office involved in the part 810 process?

Ms. THOMPSON. It is, Senator. I send my Assistant Secretary as part of that concurrence process.

Senator KAINE. So your office would have been involved in the concurrences that I am asking about.

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, sir.

Senator KAINE. The Department of Energy has testified on the record that there have been seven concurrences of transfers to Saudi Arabia. Were you not aware that I had posed this question to the Department of State in writing 35 days ago?

Ms. THOMPSON. I did, Senator. I did not get the feedback that you needed, the dates, but I will get you the dates. I will confirm those dates with you.

It is important also, as you know—and I do not want to use up your time—that it is important to get U.S. companies in the door. And that is a process, the first step in that data exchange, and if we are not there, the Chinese are.

But I will get you that answer.

Senator KAINE. You are making a good editorial argument. I am not arguing with the program. I am just arguing—why would you keep it secret?

Ms. THOMPSON. It is not.

Senator KAINE. Earlier administrations have made this information public, to the press, to Congress, to reporters. Reuters had to break the story that you had done these secretly and refused to give information to the press.

Mr. Chair, could I ask you—sometimes we are hearing from agencies that they need not respond unless the request is from the chairman. Could you ask them to answer my question and give me the dates on which the State Department concurred in the seven part 810 authorizations to Saudi Arabia?

The CHAIRMAN. I will, Senator.

Ms. THOMPSON. I will get you the dates, Senator. And if I may, to my knowledge it is not secret. There is a process to request that information through DOE. But I will get you the dates, Senator.

Senator KAINE. Well, does the process include a Member of the Senate asking the Secretary of Energy 48 days ago, please give me this information? I mean, would you consider that a fair process?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would assess it that I will get you the answer, Senator.

Senator KAINE. Do you have any knowledge as to why the State Department has not yet responded to my request, which is now 35
days old? It is seven transfers, seven dates, lists of companies, and they are all about Saudi Arabia. I am not asking for any proprietary information. Do you know why I have not received a response to this date?

Ms. THOMPSON. Sir, I will get you the answer. I can assure you it is somewhere in a stack. It is one of many.

Senator Kaine. When will you get me the answer?

Ms. THOMPSON. It is not my answer to get, for me to coordinate. As soon as I get back we will find out where it is in the process through our Leg Affairs. I will get you the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kaine, let me help you out. I talk regularly with Secretary Pompeo and have over these 48 days on numerous occasions. I have not talked to him about your question on the 810 process. I commit to you in my next conversation with him that that will be on the list.

Senator Kaine. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. You are entitled to that information.

Senator Barrasso.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome back to the committee.

It was 8 months ago when we were here talking, and the questions I had to you specifically had to do with Russia, weaponry. So my concern is not will they or will they not, but can they or can they not in terms of capacity and capability. So kind of following up, the question I started then I am going to start with again today.

In March of 2018, President Putin announced Russia was developing several new nuclear delivery vehicles that could evade or penetrate U.S. ballistic missile defenses. One of the new weapons mentioned by President Putin at the time was a large multiple warhead intercontinental ballistic missile called the Sarmat. The others include a long-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, a long-range nuclear-armed underwater drone, and an air delivery hypersonic cruise missile.

Under article 5 of the New START, parties can raise their concerns about new types of strategic offensive weapons under the bilateral consultative commission.

So would these weapons be covered under the New START?

Ms. THOMPSON. Thanks, Senator. Good to see you again.

So two of the systems will. The Avant Garde and Sarmat would be considered as existing types. We have raised that with our Russian counterparts in discussions and the technical experts. And the other three systems would be considered basically new kinds, and we will have that discussion. We have raised that as well and we will continue to raise it in our engagement with the Russians, Senator.

Senator BARRASSO. So along those lines, how would these new weapons be counted under New START in terms of multiple warheads, all the different components of that?

Ms. THOMPSON. It is early in the process with the two systems if they continue on the glide path of their development. But the technical experts are sitting down and laying that out. The other three will be part of the discussions.
The other takeaway I take, as the Under Secretary overseeing this, is New START, as it stands, again was relevant for its time and the systems that we have. Technology has evolved at such an incredible rate that many of our arms control treaties are no longer relevant. So it is incumbent upon us—you heard it from the President. You heard it yesterday with President Putin and Secretary Pompeo. We are going to have these discussions. We must have these discussions to ensure that we uphold our arms control responsibilities and adapt to make sure we have the safety and security for the American people. And it is a challenge I am up to.

Thanks, Senator.

Senator BARRASSO. Because the question is how the inclusion of these weapons—how critical that would be in our decision on whether to extend New START.

Ms. THOMPSON. Absolutely. The systems that they have now and the systems that they think they will have is being integrated with those interagency discussions. We rely on our DOD counterparts, on our DOE counterparts, the NSC, and the intelligence agencies. And I can assure you that schedule is rigorous and robust.

Senator BARRASSO. So maybe turning over to Deputy Under Secretary Trachtenberg, in terms of President Putin declaring that these new additions to the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal would render, I think he said, U.S. missile defense, in his words, useless, what is our government’s assessment of the level of the maturity and accuracy of these weapons, if you can give this under these settings? And if we have to go to a secure setting, we can have that discussion.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would prefer to address that in a closed session, Senator Barrasso.

You do raise a very substantial and important point here in terms of the capabilities that the Russians say they are developing and the capabilities that they can develop and whether, if, and how they would be accounted for under existing arms control agreements. So you are absolutely right, which is why I noted earlier that we believe it is important in looking at how we approach arms control going forward, that we look at the totality of national security concerns and issues that are being raised in particular by what Russia is doing and factor that into our interagency discussions on what is the best course of action for the United States.

Senator BARRASSO. In a follow-up to this—and I do not know. Mr. Chairman, you may want to think about a closed session so we can get to these specific answers because I want to know what the United States has in terms of a current or prospective missile defense system that could intercept these weapons. And you may be in the same situation of not wanting to discuss it in an open setting.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, sir.

Senator BARRASSO. In terms of what specific actions we as a government can take or are taking to respond to and to counter these new strategic nuclear weapons that Vladimir Putin continues to brag about.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I agree with you, Senator. And that is why I think it is critically important that we roll those into the discussions that we are having within the interagency to figure out what
is the best approach to guarantee our security and the security of our allies going forward in an arms control context.

Senator BARRASSO. Secretary Thompson, anything you would like to add to that?

Ms. THOMPSON. I fully support the efforts of what we are going through in the interagency, and I agree it should be in a classified setting. I would not want our adversaries to know what we have and what we do not have, Senator.

Senator BARRASSO. Great. Thank you so much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. You raise some good points. For your information, the Senate National Security Working Group explored that exact area at some time in the not too distant past, and it is important that people have this information. It is there but it has to be in a classified setting.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Markey.

Senator MARKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

Ms. Thompson, the Trump administration recently expressed interest in engaging China on nuclear arms control. But I am concerned about the Trump administration’s approach in that particular case. The administration seems to believe the best way to engage China on nuclear arms control is to push it to join a multi-lateral agreement with two countries whose nuclear arsenals are of an order of magnitude larger than its own, meaning the United States and Russia, just 10 times larger, 20 times larger than anything that China has right now. So I want to talk about that further.

The Chinese foreign minister stated that Beijing will not participate in three-way nuclear talks with the U.S. and Russia. So why does the Trump administration think that it is a viable path forward?

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator. And if I could just build upon the points that Secretary Trachtenberg raised earlier with the importance of having that dialogue with China. I have had dialogues with my Chinese counterparts. I was in Beijing at the end of January, the beginning of February. I just met a couple weeks ago—I do not remember the date; I need to pull my calendar—up in New York with my Chinese counterpart. We are having that discussion. They want to be a responsible player on the world stage. They want to be part of this great power competition. And with that, comes responsibilities. So we have to have that discussion. The important piece is we may not get there but we may. But we have to have a dialogue.

I raised with my counterpart to have a working group—a strategic working group—on some things that we might be able to agree upon. They have declined at that juncture.

Senator MARKEY. So would you be averse if that just comes to an end, that China will not accept that it is going to engage in those kind of talks? Would you object then to extending New START and separately engaging China on nuclear arms control?

Ms. THOMPSON. We were just at the first step of our engagement with China for its arms control discussions. In fact, I would say it has not even taken a firm first step. Coming back and having the
discussions with the leadership on how we want to go forward with that—I think we have an obligation to have those discussions.

Senator MARKEY. I appreciate that.

Does the administration view China’s participation or non-participation as relevant to New START’s extension?

Ms. THOMPSON. We recognize that to have a legitimate arms control discussion going forward on next terms of arms control, you have to have China in the mix.

Senator MARKEY. So you are saying that you will not extend the New START treaty unless China participates.

Ms. THOMPSON. I did not say that, Senator. I am saying we are early in the discussions with China. We are in the middle of an interagency discussion on next steps with New START. Know that those discussions are being had, but we have not reached a conclusion as yet.

Senator MARKEY. I think it is pretty clear that the attempt to move this to multilateral arms control talks with Russia and then adding in China is really a poison pill to provide an excuse for not extending New START. That is my concern. And the reason that I believe that is that when I look at the administration’s intent to pull out of the Paris Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the arms trade treaty, that this just follows on part of that pattern.

So what confidence can you give us that the Trump administration’s never-ending review of New START or new insistence that arms control be multilateralized is not really just an excuse to kill the New START treaty?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, I can assure you, as I stated in September, but can build on that because we had considerable discussions since that point both with partners and allies and with Russia. Our partners and allies have been very clear as to who is at fault for the demise of the INF Treaty. I have a firm statement from the Secretary-General—in fact, when he briefed Congress during his visit last month—that Russia is at fault for that. We continue to uphold our obligations.

So as the overseer of arms control for the State Department, I am going to always maintain there are consequences when you do not fulfill your obligation. You call out that party. And that is what we have done with Russia and will continue to do with all parties. Arms control only works if you have a responsible partner on the other side.

Senator MARKEY. And I agree with that. But to the extent to which we have an opportunity to extend the New START treaty, then in my opinion we should take advantage of that. As President Kennedy used to say, because you cannot make progress on every front does not mean that you should not make progress on any front. So we have an opportunity here with the New START treaty, and that is our principal nuclear rival, and we have a history of reaching agreements with them. And from my perspective, I think that we should take this opportunity to advance that goal and not allow a China problem, which it is, to deter us from reaching that agreement.

And that is why I have introduced the SAVE Act to ensure that the United States continue adhering to a functioning bilateral nu-
clear arms control agreement that is in our national security interest. I just think it makes the most sense because that is where our biggest problem is, not to say that we should not also engage with China on this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Markey.

With all due respect—and I mean that seriously—I do not think we need to have China as an excuse not to extend. I am absolutely opposed to extension. It has nothing to do with China. I mean, under present circumstances with their cheating and other things that they do, I am opposed to extension. It has nothing to do with China’s participation. But in any event, thank you for those points.

I know Senator Cruz has a couple questions. Senator Menendez, go ahead.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Two comments and then two questions.

The first comment. When I was out, Mr. Chairman, because I had another hearing to attend to, I understand that you stated that you were briefed on the President’s circumstances as it relates to Iran and our embassy in Iraq, and I appreciate that you were briefed. That still leaves the Democratic leader of this committee and every other Democratic member and 49 Democratic Members of the Senate not briefed about what is happening. And I just hope that when it comes to something of such potentially consequential significance that we can be briefed so we can understand what we are dealing with. So I appreciate that the chairman was briefed, but I reiterate my call for all of us to be briefed.

Madam Secretary, let me just say you responded to Senator Kaine that it is not secret. Well, it is secret when you do not know that it exists, because you cannot ask for something if you do not know that it exists. So how does Senator Kaine know to ask for something, in fact, if it was not but for a press report that this transaction took place? We would have known before because as Members of the Senate, we would have been briefed that such a transaction took place. But we were not. And so, therefore, as far as I am concerned, it is secret.

Let me ask Deputy Secretary Trachtenberg, do you agree with Congress’ directive that nuclear modernization is linked to the strategic arms control progress?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I agree, Senator Menendez, that nuclear modernization is important for arms control, but I also agree and believe that our nuclear modernization program stands on its own two legs—in this particular case, three legs.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I do not dispute the triad basis. But my question—let me reiterate it again because maybe my English is not that good.

Congress’ directive—directive—that nuclear modernization is linked to the strategic arms control process—do you agree that that is Congress’ directive?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Forgive me, Senator. Are you talking about a specific provision of law?

Senator MENENDEZ. When the modernization efforts were done, Congress specifically directed that that modernization is linked to a strategic arms control process. Are you not aware of that?
Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think our modernization is linked to a strategic arms control process in that it enables us to engage in strategic arms control.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree that the current nuclear modernization program is predicated on working within the limits of New START?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I am sorry, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree that the current nuclear modernization program is predicated on working within the limits of New START?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think the current nuclear modernization program keeps the United States within the limits of New START. I am not sure I would say it was predicated on the limits of New START, but it is consistent.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree that allowing New START to expire would require us to rethink our nuclear force structure because of the predictability and insights New START provides into Russian strategic nuclear forces?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think the insight that New START provides in terms of insight into Russian strategic nuclear forces is in fact valuable, and I agree with you on that. But again, I would suggest that our nuclear modernization program is critically important and should be carried out——

Senator MENENDEZ. But if we did not know anymore what the Russians had, then we would have to think about our own paradigm of what we think we would need in order to protect our nation. Is that not a fair statement?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think that is a fair statement, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Secretary Thompson, last question. The U.S. asserted Russia was responsible for the chemical weapons attack in the U.K. The Chemical and Biological Weapons Act mandates sanctions be placed on Russia. Those sanctions are now more than 5 months late. Why has the administration failed to implement the mandated second round of sanctions?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have done the analysis with the sanctions, Senator. We have those teed up. I would defer to the Secretary and the President, but my response would be it is part of a larger Russia strategy. But we have done great work. We have called them out. We have had the attribution mechanism, and we continue to call them out with the work that is being done with——

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you believe that when Congress mandates something, you have the discretion not to pursue it?

Ms. THOMPSON. No, Senator. We have teed up the sanctions——

Senator MENENDEZ. The law is pretty clear. It mandates it. It is not a question of a broader Russia policy. It mandates it. And if we are consistently going to find that mandates mean nothing to the administration, then we are going to have to rethink our whole approach to the administration. There is a reason that Congress mandates things.

Ms. THOMPSON. We have been extremely strong and vocal and active on pushing back on Russia's heinous attack on the Skripals in Salisbury, their work with the Assad regime——
Senator MENENDEZ. It is not very significant when there is a mandated sanction that should have been imposed 5 months ago, and all you can tell me is we are still thinking about it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cruz.

Senator CRUZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome.

Under Secretary Thompson, I would like to ask you some questions about the State Department's policy towards Iran. The State Department and, as I understand it, your bureau in particular has advocated for civil nuclear waivers to continue implementing parts of the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal that allowed Iran to conduct nuclear research. Top State Department officials in your bureau have stated that it is your policy to facilitate, quote, international cooperation with Iran on a number of projects contemplated under the JCPOA that provide Iran opportunities to benefit from nuclear technology to signal our appreciation for the security benefits these projects were intended to provide.

Elsewhere, officials, including those in your bureau, have touted the benefits of the so-called transparency as promised in the deal. These positions appear to be in significant tension, if not direct conflict, with the positions of President Trump. I find it troubling that we are continuing to implement parts of the nuclear deal, and I want to understand the basis for these decisions.

Your predecessors in previous administrations suggested that Iran's access to civil nuclear technology hinges on whether Iran is a member in good standing in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. During the Bush administration, acting Under Secretary John Rood said Iran was no longer a, quote, member in good standing of the NPT. Under the Obama administration, Under Secretary Rose Gottemoeller said that Iran had been, quote, brought back into good standing with the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime because of the Iran deal.

I am glad to note that recently the Trump administration appears to have reversed the Obama administration's whitewashing of Iran's conduct. Jeffrey Eberhardt, who has been nominated to be Special Representative for Nuclear Non-Proliferation, recently confirmed to this committee in writing that, quote, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT cannot be described as good. That is a step in the right direction.

First of all, I would like to confirm that assessment. Do you consider Iran to be a member in good standing of the NPT?

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator. And I appreciate the support for Jeff Eberhardt as his nomination process moves forward. He will be a great representative of this administration for our country as we have those key discussions. I have known Jeff for quite a while now.

We have concerns, and we laid out those concerns. We have laid them out publicly and would have more details if we talk at the classified level on some of the concerns that we have with the way Iran is going. And Jeff's reflection is a definite reflection of where we are today.

Senator CRUZ. Let me just try that again. Do you consider Iran to be a member in good standing of the NPT?
Ms. THOMPSON. We have concerns, Senator. We have concerns with where they are going.

Senator CRUZ. Do you agree with Mr. Eberhardt's statement in writing that, quote, Iran's standing as a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT cannot be described as good?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct, and that is what we laid out in the compliance report. And we can give you the background of that in a classified setting. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator CRUZ. So why do you believe we should keep implementing parts of the nuclear deal, allowing Iran to do nuclear research even though Iran is not entitled to those benefits and President Trump has correctly rejected this foolhardy deal?

Ms. THOMPSON. Again, Senator, we have given the information. Again, it is a rigorous interagency discussion with intelligence, with policy, with where DOD is, with DOE, et cetera. Then we make our recommendation to the Secretary, and he informs that with the President. We can give you the background on that on the classified version behind it. But in some areas—and that is why the Secretary made the determination some of the dates, you know, the length is not the same in some of the areas on where it is our best interest to have some of those waivers for a shorter duration.

Senator CRUZ. How is it possibly in our best interests to allow Iran to continue doing nuclear research in the Fordow bunker that was built into the side of a mountain to be able to develop nuclear weapons to use to murder Americans? How is that in our best interest?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, again, this is a discussion that I would prefer to have in the SCIF on what information we have and what information we do not have.

Senator CRUZ. With all respect, the American people care deeply about this. So I am perfectly happy to have classified briefings, but whether we are allowing Iran to conduct nuclear research in a bunker designed to create weapons of mass destruction to murder Americans is an issue of concern to 28 million Texans. And so the American people are entitled to get an answer. If it is the State Department's position that that is a good idea, the American people are entitled to know that.

Ms. THOMPSON. Absolutely, Senator. So I will give you the answer to the American people, to all those in Texas, and to friends and family back in South Dakota. This President, this Secretary, myself, and everyone in this administration will stand for what is right for the safety and security of the American people, bar none.

Senator CRUZ. With all due respect, that did not remotely answer the question remotely. Is it in our interest to allow Iran to continue to do nuclear research in the Fordow facility?

Ms. THOMPSON. The decision made by this administration and with the Secretary for this last round is always in the interest of the American people, Senator. Thank you.

Senator CRUZ. So it really is the position that every decision State makes is always in the interest of the American people?

Ms. THOMPSON. The safety and security? Yes, sir.

Senator CRUZ. That is a stunning Orwellian position. And let me be the first to say that I do not believe that is true in any administration, that every decision an elected official makes or an ap-
pointed official makes is by definition in the interest of the American people. And that is one of the reasons Congress has oversight responsibility.

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, we will not do a challenge here in public. I will tell you I took an oath, as did you, to the Constitution and to the American people and to enemies, foreign and domestic. My underlying going-in position is always the safety and security of the American people. I did that as a soldier. I did that as the National Security Advisor to the Vice President, and I am doing it as the Under Secretary of State.

Senator CRUZ. As we now know, the nuclear archives seized by the Israelis contained a wealth of new information about Iran’s nuclear program. We know that Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency did not know about these elements of Iran’s nuclear program because the IAEA declared in 2015 that Iran never conducted activities which the archives now clearly show that Iran conducted. They were keeping nuclear weapons blueprints on the shelf to use later.

Do you consider Iran’s past possession of the nuclear archives seized by Israel last year, including the materials in the archives relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-compliance by Iran of any of its nonproliferation obligations?

Ms. THOMPSON. Again, Senator, I would prefer to talk about what is in those documents not to be done in an open forum.

Senator CRUZ. Those documents are now public and have been released to the world.

Ms. THOMPSON. Sir, there is information there that we are protecting sources and methods, and in all candor, I will give you that information.

Senator CRUZ. I tell you what. Just refer to the public part that you can go to the Internet and read. So I am not asking for classified portions. I am asking for the public portions of the archives that the Israelis seized that show Iran in open defiance. Do you agree with that?

Ms. THOMPSON. I agree with the process that they had in the past years of those documents was disconcerting. Absolutely.

Senator CRUZ. Then why would the State Department continue to give waivers to allow them to conduct nuclear research, particularly in the Fordow site? That I find staggering. It is a bunker built in the side of a mountain. It is not a medical research facility. It is not a diaper factory. It is a bunker built to make nuclear weapons. And the State Department has signed waivers saying, Iran, the Ayatollah can continue to do nuclear research there. How is that possibly in the interest of the United States?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would say that is your assessment, Senator. I would not characterize it as such.

Senator CRUZ. Well, that is the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cruz.

Senator Kaine, you had one more question?

Senator Kaine. I did. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for indulging.

And if I could, I would like to introduce in the record an article from the “Washington Post” dated January 21—no—January 23, 2019 entitled “Can Saudi Arabia Produce Ballistic Missiles? Satellite Imagery Raises Questions.”
CAN SAUDI ARABIA PRODUCE BALLISTIC MISSILES? SATELLITE IMAGERY RAISES SUSPICIONS

Satellite images suggest that Saudi Arabia has constructed its first known ballistic missile factory, according to weapons experts and image analysts, a development that raises questions about the kingdom’s increasing military and nuclear ambitions under its 33-year-old crown prince.

If operational, the suspected factory at a missile base in al-Watah, southwest of Riyadh, would allow Saudi Arabia to manufacture its own ballistic missiles, fueling fears of an arms race against its regional rival Iran.

Saudi Arabia currently does not possess nuclear weapons, so any missiles produced at the apparent factory are likely to be conventionally armed. But a missile-making facility would be a critical component of any eventual Saudi nuclear weapons program, hypothetically giving the kingdom capability to produce the preferred delivery systems for nuclear warheads.

“The possibility that Saudi Arabia is going to build longer-range missiles and seek nuclear weapons—we imagine that they can’t. But we are maybe underestimating their desire and their capabilities,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear weapons expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, who discovered the factory with his team when analyzing satellite images from the region.

Two additional experts who reviewed the satellite images for The Washington Post, Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, agreed that the high-resolution photographs of the al-Watah site appear to depict a rocket-engine production and test facility, probably using solid fuel.

It is unclear from the satellite images whether the facility has been completed or is functionally capable of manufacturing missiles. Regardless, the complex—which satellite images suggest broke ground in 2013 when King Salman was defense minister—highlights the nation’s intention to make its own advanced missiles after years of seeking to purchase them abroad, at times successfully.

A spokesman for the Saudi Embassy in Washington declined to comment on the nature of the facility at the missile base. The Pentagon, State Department and CIA also declined to comment.

News of the facility’s existence comes at an inflection point for Saudi Arabia in international affairs. The kingdom has taken a more aggressive approach to military power under its new crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who warned in an interview last year with “60 Minutes” that Saudi Arabia would develop a nuclear bomb if Iran does. The crown prince has been defense minister since 2015.

Saudi Arabia has been pursuing a nuclear power-plant deal with the United States that would potentially include allowing it to produce nuclear fuel. The kingdom’s insistence on domestic fuel production has raised worries among U.S. officials that the kingdom wants the atomic power project not only for civil use but also for covert weapon-making purposes.

The killing last October of Saudi dissident and Washington Post contributing columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the hands of Saudi agents in Istanbul has hardened opposition to the power plant deal in Congress.

A gambit by Saudi Arabia to build a ballistic missile factory would make sense given the rivals in its neighborhood. The kingdom faces an Israel armed with an advanced nuclear and missile program and an Iran that has continued to perfect its own abilities to make ballistic missiles. Should Iran stop abiding by the 2015 nuclear accord’s limitations, many analysts believe the country could attain nuclear warheads in as little as a year.

The Trump administration pulled out of the Iran deal, in part citing missile threats from Tehran that were not covered by the pact.

A functional ballistic missile production facility would allow Saudi Arabia to begin matching some of the domestic missile-making capabilities that Iran has developed over the years and tapped to supply weapons to Houthi rebels fighting Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.

The existence of a Saudi strategic rocket base at al-Watah first became public in mid-2013 after Jane’s Defense Weekly published satellite imagery of the military facility, which was suspected of housing ballistic missiles purchased from China.

But when Lewis and his colleagues David Schmerler and Fabian Hinz looked at satellite images of al-Watah captured by Planet Labs more recently, they discovered, in Lewis’s words: “Whoa, that is not just a missile base anymore.”
The base was still there—with its launchpad, underground tunnels and administrative buildings—but across the road an entirely new facility had emerged, and it looked a lot like a rocket-engine factory designed to make ballistic missiles, they said.

The facility included high-bay buildings, which Lewis says appear to be tall enough for a missile’s motor case to stand on its end and be filled with fuel. Another clue was a barrier around one of the structures for protection against explosions. The site was also dotted with lightning rods, because the tall metal structures can attract lightning strikes that could ignite the propellant. That the facility is in the same location as an existing Saudi missile base bolstered the case.

Above all, what appears to be a rocket-engine test stand set off alarm bells. The horizontal setup, Lewis said, coupled with the lack of pipes or tanks in the images, suggests that the facility was probably designed to produce solid-fuel rockets rather than liquid-fuel ones. Solid-fuel missiles tend to be more sought after because they are easier to conceal, can be launched more quickly and can be stored for a long time, making them more survivable in a conflict. How the Saudis obtained the technological expertise necessary to build the facility is unclear. One potential supplier: China.

The Saudi engine test stand, according to Lewis, looks particularly Chinese. While most countries test rocket engines out in the open, Lewis said, China partially covers the flame shooting out of the engine and cools the test building with water so it does not catch fire. The Saudi test complex appears to replicate that setup, he noted, with a trench for the water next to the stand and what appears to be water runoff.

China has sold ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in the past and has helped supply ballistic missile production capabilities to other nations. In the 1990s, Pakistan secretly built a plant for medium-range missiles using blueprints and equipment supplied by China. The factory in Pakistan has long drawn the attention of top Saudi officials.

What involvement, if any, China or Pakistan had in building the Saudi facility is unclear. Nor is it clear what kind of ballistic missiles Saudi Arabia is manufacturing or preparing to produce.

The Chinese and Pakistani embassies in Washington did not respond to requests for comment.

The plant is smaller than those of other countries, suggesting it could have a limited capacity, said Lewis, Elleman and Bermudez, and recent satellite photos do not show any cars in the parking lot at the site, raising the possibility that the plant is not yet operational. It also has fewer barriers against explosions—earthen mounds known as berms—than similar production facilities in other nations, they said.

Traditionally, the United States formally has sought to prevent the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. Washington at one point sanctioned China, for example, for delivering missile launchers and components to Pakistan in the 1990s.

“Under normal circumstances, we would be doing everything we could possibly do to constrain and convince the Saudis not to do this,” Elleman said. “The U.S. has always been opposed to the transfer of missiles that are inherently capable of carrying nuclear weapons.”

The main way the United States seeks to prevent the spread of drone and missile technology is through the Missile Technology Control Regime, or the MTCR, an informal multicountry pact designed to prevent the transfer of certain missile technologies. China is not a member but has agreed to abide by some of its stipulations.

While the United States sells an array of weaponry to Saudi Arabia, Washington has not sold ballistic missiles to Riyadh, in part because such missiles traditionally have been seen as destabilizing for the region. Saudi Arabia has turned to China in the past when met with refusals from the United States for certain weapons requests.

For example, the United States declined repeated Saudi requests to purchase what are known as category-one American drones, including Predators and Reapers, partly because of MTCR’s regulations. Instead, the kingdom turned to China, first purchasing drones and later striking a deal in which China will build a drone factory that will produce a Chinese copycat of the Predator in Saudi Arabia.

Note

Senator Kaine. The article opens: satellite images suggest that Saudi Arabia has constructed its first known ballistic missile factory, according to weapons experts and image analysts, a development that raises questions about the kingdom's increasing military and nuclear ambitions under its 33-year-old Crown Prince.

The article goes on to describe satellite imagery, quotes various individuals suggesting that the design of the facility appears to be of Chinese origin. It also recounts past history of Saudi purchases or acquisition of missile technology from both Pakistan and China.

What can you tell me from the DOD or the State Department about your conclusions about Saudi Arabia developing a ballistic missile capacity, including manufacture, of such weapons and whether we know whether that is being done via transfers of technology from Pakistan, China, or any other nation?

Mr. Trachtenberg. Senator, that is a good question. From DOD's perspective, I would, with your permission, want to take that one for the record and refresh myself on that particular article that you are citing and get some of the additional background on it, if I may.

Senator Kaine. Fair enough.

[The information follows:]

[The information follows:]

Senator Kaine. How about from the State Department, Secretary Thompson?

Ms. Thompson. Yes, sir. I will take that back. I can tell you with our 123 discussions with that, we have been in discussions with Saudi for, I think it has been 12 years now. So not a new development. But we will take that back for the record.

[The information follows:]

[The information follows:]

Senator Kaine. Great.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine.

Well, this concludes our hearing this morning. A real sincere thank you to our two witnesses. I think this has been a very robust discussion that this body desperately needs to have. We really appreciate your attendance here and your input into this.

For the information of members, the record will remain open until the close of business on Friday, and we would ask that, as quickly as possible, you respond to any of those questions so that we can move forward.

And with that, if there is no further business before the committee, the committee will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES RISCH

CHINA

The United States and Russia have obligated themselves under treaties such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. China meanwhile has fielded large numbers of INF-range missiles, and refused to even discuss arms control. President Xi has directed the modernization of China’s nuclear forces and that the Chinese military will be “fully transformed into a first tier force” by 2050. Chinese stockpiles and delivery systems are growing, and their disposition and posture is troubling.

Question. If it chooses to expand its arsenal, how soon could China reach or exceed U.S. numbers for warheads and delivery systems?

Answer. China is engaged in an ongoing expansion of its nuclear capabilities, presaging a more dangerous future of a considerably larger number of sophisticated delivery systems able to reach the United States and our allies and partners than in the past. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and poses challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment and stable relations. Precisely because China is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapon states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory are difficult. We defer to the Intelligence Community for specific assessments.

Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure that our allies have accurate information on Chinese threats, and to maintain alliance unity?

Answer. The Department of State and Department of Defense engage regularly on deterrence and arms control matters with our Indo-Pacific allies, including through the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan, the Deterrence Strategy Committee and the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group with the Republic of Korea, as well as the recently initiated Strategic Policy Dialogue with Australia, as well as our NATO partners/Allies. Discussions involve threat briefings and policy updates. These forums provide critical venues to work with our allies to improve a shared understanding of nuclear dangers and the corresponding deterrence requirements, as well as advocate for expanded burden sharing within our Alliances.

RUSSIA

Russia has a pattern of cheating on its treaty obligations. It has also made major progress in modernizing its nuclear forces, and is developing new capabilities that present new threats to the U.S. Its tactical nuclear forces are not subject to any arms control limits and threaten U.S. access and extended deterrence for our allies.

Question. How does the administration plan to incorporate Russia’s new technology and delivery systems into arms-control talks? To what extent has the administration talked to Russia about these systems?

Answer. We believe that the “Sarmat” ICBM and the “Avangard” glide vehicle deployed on an existing type of ICBM will be subject to the New START Treaty numerical limits and verification measures at the appropriate time in their development cycle. We consider the other three weapons announced by President Putin on March 1, 2018—the “Poseidon” nuclear torpedo, the “Burevestnik” ground-launched nuclear-powered cruise missile, and the “Kinzhal” air-launched ballistic missile—to be new kinds of strategic offensive arms. We are discussing these systems with Russian officials in the appropriate fora.

Question. What is the State Department doing to ensure our allies have accurate information on Russian threats and violations, and to prevent Russian disinformation from leading to the fracture of NATO and other alliances?

Answer. The Department of State regularly keeps NATO and Indo-Pacific allies apprised of developments regarding Russian threats and violations, as was the case during Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty, and will continue to consult and coordinate regularly with allies in Europe and Asia. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy, provide clear assessments of the Russian threat, and were informed by consultations with and assessments from our allies and partners.
President Trump has reportedly directed his administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and China. One official told CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should include “all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.” The officials criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. I’m glad that the president has recently announced that he wants to add Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future arms control agreement and include China in an arms control discussion. But not at the expense of or as a condition for extending New START:

Question. What does the White House have in mind with the arms control outreach project they leaked last week? What is the administration’s strategy for achieving more comprehensive arms control deals with Russia and China?

Answer. The President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems involved. The President wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies. To achieve this, Russia and China must be brought to the table. The world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of adversary missiles.

Question. AVC clear with EUR, EAP and T. How long does the administration expect it will take to negotiate such comprehensive deals?

Answer. At this stage it would be premature for us to speculate about the duration of any potential negotiations.

Question. What does the administration want China to do on arms control?

Answer. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear build-up raises questions regarding its intent and poses challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment and stable relations. China has rebuffed calls to discuss our respective nuclear postures to reduce risks, promote transparency, and avoid misperception. At the same time, China has exploited the fact that the two largest nuclear powers are constrained by arms control agreements, while China can pursue competition on its own terms.

China’s unwillingness to engage undermines the regional stability that U.S. allies, partners, and others rely on. If China seeks to be a great power, it needs to behave like one by demonstrating the will and ability to alter the upward and destabilizing trajectory of its nuclear build-up.

Question. Would China, which has only about 300 total nuclear warheads compared to the roughly 6,500 total warheads possessed by the United States and Russia, be allowed to build up to the much higher New START levels were it to join the treaty?

Answer. The interagency is currently reviewing potential options to include China in serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate on the exact contours of any deal that we might negotiate.

Question. Is the administration’s position that Russia must agree to limits on its tactical nuclear weapons or that China must limit its nuclear forces in some way as a condition for extending New START?

Answer. The administration has long been concerned by Russia’s continued development and deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, as well as Russia’s serial noncompliance with arms control obligations. It is too early in the process to speculate on any potential conditions for any New START Treaty extension. The administration is continuing its review of the New START Treaty while also looking at fur-
ther options for serious arms control that deliver real security to the American people and our allies.

*Question.* Wouldn't extending New START by 5 years buy additional time to develop U.S. negotiating positions, address issues of mutual concern that impact strategic stability, and avoid new risks from an unconstrained and less transparent U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship?

*Answer.* The administration is evaluating whether extension of the New START Treaty is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty's expiration would affect U.S. national security in a deteriorating security environment, where Russia is developing new strategic offensive arms and is serially noncompliant with its arms control obligations, and China is engaged in an ongoing nuclear build-up.

**RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE**

**SAUDI ARABIA**

*Question.* The Department of Energy has publically stated that Secretary Perry has issued seven authorizations for exports to Saudi Arabia. Please list the dates that the State Department concurred in each of these seven Part 810 authorizations for a U.S. company to conduct work in Saudi Arabia:

Please also provide the name of the company involved in conducting this work.

Who at the State Department provided concurrence for each of these seven authorizations?

*Answer.* Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and data. The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, which has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation matters, oversaw the Department's review of the seven Saudi Arabia-related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May 31, 2018; and January 25, 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices.

Applications for Part 810 authorizations may contain commercial proprietary information. I refer you to the Department of Energy for questions regarding the specific contents of the authorizations.

*Question.* What awareness does the State Department have about the Chinese supply of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and assistance in building a ballistic missile production factory inside Saudi Arabia? Do you share the assessment that Saudi Arabia maintains one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region? What is the Department doing to address this extremely concerning issue? If necessary, provide a classified response.

*Answer.* This response is classified and will be set separately via secure correspondence.

**RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY**

**STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE IN ARM CONTROL POLICY**

*Question.* Please describe the State Department's role in the interagency process on arms control policy?

*Answer.* The State Department's role is to guide the interagency process involving the negotiation, implementation, and verification of international agreements in arms control and international security. This includes the development of arms control policies for the implementation of existing agreements and the negotiation of future agreements.

**RUSSIA AND NEW START TREATY**

*Question.* Has the State Department engaged in arms control negotiations with Russia since the President and his team announced an interest in new arms control agreements?
Answer. While the State Department has not engaged in formal arms control treaty negotiations with Russia since the President's April 4 statement about arms control, since January I have met four times with my Russian counterpart Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov to discuss a variety of arms control issues to include how to modernize arms control. The interagency is reviewing options on how best to proceed.

Question. Who will serve as the State Department's lead negotiator in engaging Russia on extending New START? Will this same individual serve as the administration's lead negotiator for other arms control efforts?

Answer. At this stage, it would be premature to speculate about the personnel involved in any potential negotiations.

Question. What percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty? If New START expires, what percentage of Russia's deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be legally constrained?

Answer. All of Russia's currently deployed strategic nuclear warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty. As of the March 1, 2019, data exchange, Russia's deployed strategic nuclear warheads totaled 1,461, which is below the Treaty's relevant central limit of 1,550. It is too early to speculate about how Russia's deployed or stockpiled strategic nuclear warheads might be addressed under any potential new agreement.

Question. Please compare unclassified estimates of the number of Russia’s nuclear weapons deployed on the delivery systems Putin announced on March 1, 2018 to those deployed on Russia's nuclear Triad today:

Can you describe Russia's interests in U.S. concessions when approached about Non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control or reductions? What U.S. concessions would the State Department recommend in order to achieve an agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia?

Answer. The delivery systems President Putin revealed on March 1, 2018, were in developmental stages at the time of the announcement. We defer to the Intelligence Community for specific assessments regarding the current status of those systems.

In the past, Russia has demanded that the United States return all U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons to the United States, eliminate its non-strategic nuclear weapons infrastructure abroad, and end long-standing NATO arrangements with respect to U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. These preconditions are unacceptable to the United States and NATO. It would be premature to speculate on the exact contours of any deal that we might negotiate.

Question. Does the State Department view reducing or otherwise limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons as a priority, compared to maintaining the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or rotational deployments of U.S. conventional forces in Europe?

Answer. The State Department views the European Phased Adaptive Approach and rotational deployments of U.S. conventional forces in Europe as ironclad commitments to protect deployed U.S. forces and NATO Allies. The State Department also views limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons as a priority.

Question. Is the State Department actively involved in consultations with NATO regarding achieving a non-strategic nuclear weapons agreement with Russia?

Answer. We consult regularly with our NATO Allies regarding arms control and the threat from Russia, including Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons and how best to deter and defend against their potential use.

Question. Do weapons which the U.S. government classifies as Russia’s “non-strategic nuclear weapons” use short- and -intermediate range, ground based missiles as delivery systems?

Answer. The U.S. government currently considers “non-strategic nuclear weapons” to comprise weapons, including those using ground-based missiles as delivery systems, that have a range of less than 5,500 kilometers.

Question. In addition to the SSC–8, Putin and his Defense Minister, Sergey Shoigu, described a new ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, and a hypersonic ground-launched missile. How does the U.S. government plan to respond to these new systems?

Answer. We have long recognized the challenge posed by Russia’s development of a wide variety of intermediate-range weapons, including but not limited to the SSC–
8. We are working with allies and partners to address these threats comprehensively.

Question. Is it possible to dissuade Russia from deploying these weapons, and what is your strategy for doing so?

Answer. We continue to press Russia to verifiably destroy the SSC–8 and call upon Russia to not take any steps to destabilize regional or global stability. We continue to work with our allies and partners to deny Russia any military advantage from its INF Treaty violation and, more generally, its development of a wide variety of intermediate-range weapons.

Question. Please provide a more detailed readout of what specific arms control issues and initiatives Secretary of State Pompeo discussed with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during their recent meeting in Sochi:

Does the State Department believe the New START Treaty remains in [the] national security interest of the United States?

Answer. As Secretary Pompeo has said, the President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, to include countries beyond our traditional U.S.-Russia framework and a broader range of weapon systems. Secretary Pompeo and other senior officials regularly engage Russian leaders about arms control and strategic security issues.

The New START Treaty’s limits on Russia’s strategic nuclear force, establishment of data exchanges—including the locations, numbers, and technical characteristics of weapons systems and facilities—and its verification provisions contribute currently to the national security of the United States. The administration is reviewing whether to seek an extension of the Treaty with Russia. Central to that review is evaluating whether extension is in the U.S. national interest and how the Treaty’s expiration would impact U.S. national security in the evolving security environment. This includes considerations related to Russia’s ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms, non-strategic nuclear weapons, and serial noncompliance with its arms control obligations, as well as China’s continuing nuclear modernization.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

Question. What does the State Department recommend as diplomatic and economic counters to Russia’s likely deployment of additional INF systems after termination of the agreement?

Answer. Russia has already fielded multiple battalions of the INF-violating SSC–8 ground-launched cruise missile. As we have been for the past several years, we are working with our allies and partners to deny Russia any military advantage from its INF Treaty violation and, more generally, its development of a wide variety of intermediate-range weapons.

Question. Did the State Department ever ask the Russian government to consider codifying a ban on arming INF-range missiles with nuclear warheads? If not, why not?

Answer. The INF Treaty banned the development and deployment of all INF-range missiles, including those armed with nuclear warheads. Russia has never disputed this. Beginning in May 2013, the United States raised concerns about Russia’s development of INF-range missiles on more than 30 occasions at senior levels, including at the highest levels of the Russian government. Despite 6 years of U.S. efforts to return Russia to compliance with the INF Treaty, Russia has not taken any demonstrable steps to do so.

NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA

Question. During the hearing, you indicated that you would be working with your staff to provide further information about the part 810 authorizations issued to companies seeking to engage in nuclear cooperation with entities within Saudi Arabia. Please provide the following information about any 810 authorizations the Trump administration has awarded to companies seeking to engage in nuclear cooperation with Saudi Arabia:

- The name of the entity
- The date the 810 authorization was issued
- A summary of the work covered by the entity

Should you choose to withhold this information, please provide both the legal and policy rationale for withholding this information from Congress.
Answer. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and data. The Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation, which has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation matters, oversaw the Department’s review of the seven Saudi Arabia-related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May 31, 2018 (included concurrence on four applications); and January 25, 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices.

Applications for Part 810 authorizations may contain commercial proprietary information. I refer you to the Department of Energy for questions regarding the specific contents of the authorizations.

Question. Congress has a responsibility to conduct rigorous oversight of any potential nuclear cooperation with foreign governments given nuclear energy’s substantial foreign policy and national security implications:

Therefore, please provide a date by which the State Department will furnish to me and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the complete applications and all relevant paperwork for any entities that have received 810 authorizations for potential cooperation with Saudi Arabia or entities within Saudi Arabia. Should you choose to ignore this request, please provide both the legal and policy rationale for withholding this information from Congress.

Answer. Part 810 authorizations differ from 123 agreements in that they do not provide a legal basis to transfer nuclear material or reactors as a 123 agreement does but rather authorize the transfer of nuclear-related technical assistance, subject matter expertise, and data. The Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation, which has responsibility within the Department for civil nuclear cooperation matters, oversaw the Department’s review of the seven Saudi Arabia-related Part 810 applications and provided concurrence on each of them to the Department of Energy on November 29, 2017; March 28, 2018; May 31, 2018 (included concurrence on four applications); and January 25, 2019. These reviews were conducted consistent with U.S. law and standard Department of State practices.

I refer you to the Department of Energy for questions regarding the specific contents of the authorizations.

2019 COMPLIANCE REPORT

The 2019 State Department compliance report recently provided to Congress is woefully devoid of substance and depth. At just 12 pages long, it is significantly shorter than previous reports and is alarming in some of the longstanding arms control verification efforts it chooses to omit:

Question. Did you approve the release of the summary of unclassified version of the 2019 Compliance Report that was so incomplete?

Answer. The 2019 Report was reviewed and approved by the Deputy Secretary of State on behalf of the Department, and represents the Department’s views. As part of the clearance process, the Report was reviewed and approved by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. As indicated in the Department’s April 15 transmittal letter to Congress, the 2019 Report consists of an unclassified Trends section and a classified Annex. A more comprehensive unclassified section of the Report will be submitted to Congress after the appropriate classification downgrade review is complete.

Question. Why did you approve a compliance report that fails to mention even once the New START Treaty? Do you think it’s appropriate that the unclassified summary does not address New START, one of our most important bilateral arms control treaties?

Answer. Consistent with past practice, the Department submitted its annual New START Report to Congress on March 5 pursuant to Section (a)(10) of the Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and referenced it in the 2019 Compliance Report that was sent to Congress.

We also refer you to the classified Annex of the 2019 Report where this treaty is discussed in detail.

Question. Did CIA Director Haspel concur on this report as required by law?
Answer. In keeping with past precedent, the CIA’s Weapons and Counterproliferation Mission Center, on behalf of the Director of CIA and in conjunction other CIA and Intelligence Community components, reviewed the report for substantive accuracy and consistency with relevant intelligence reporting, and cleared on that basis.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

Question. Does the administration share the view expressed by NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg that NATO has “no intention of deploying ground-launched nuclear missiles in Europe”? Will the United States commit that any defense or deterrence steps the United States may make in response to Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will be a consensus decision agreed to by all NATO Members?

Answer. U.S. research and development is focused on conventionally-armed ground-launched missiles, not nuclear. Moreover, because we have been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in a position to immediately field such a ground-launched, INF-range system. As a result, it is too early to discuss basing at this stage, but we are committed to consulting with NATO Allies as we move forward.

Question. Has the United States sought or received an agreement from a host state on NATO territory or the Indo-Pacific region to host a conventional or nuclear armed U.S. ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) or another intermediate-range missile system accountable under the INF Treaty?

Answer. Because we have been abiding by the Treaty, we are not in a position to immediately field a ground-launched, INF-range system. Therefore it is too early to discuss basing at this stage, but we are committed to consulting with our allies and partners as we move forward. U.S. research and development is focused on conventionally-armed ground-launched missiles, not nuclear.

Question. In your written testimony you identify several considerations guiding the U.S. interagency review into potential extension of the New START Treaty. As one consideration, you referenced the new “kinds or types” of Russian nuclear systems not yet deployed that may be eventually accountable under the treaty:

If the treaty were to expire on February 5, 2021, would the United States lose its ability through the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC)—currently provided in Article V of the treaty—to argue that these new Russian strategic systems should be made accountable under the treaty?

Answer. Should the Treaty expire, the BCC would no longer exist. However, the BCC is not the only appropriate forum for discussing these systems with Russia. Any U.S. decision regarding a potential extension of the Treaty will reflect considerations related to Russia’s ongoing development of new strategic offensive arms. Russia’s ongoing development of non-strategic nuclear weapons and new strategic offensive arms not subject to New START are two factors motivating the administration’s consideration of a broader arms control approach.

Question. The S–28 “Sarmat,” a new Russian heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a reported payload of up to 14 nuclear warheads, will be accountable under New START. If the treaty expired, how would the United States place binding limits on this system as well as Russia’s other nuclear systems already accountable under the treaty (i.e., ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers)?

Answer. President Trump has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems involved. This includes constraining Russia’s new strategic arms. State Department officials regularly meet with Russian officials bilaterally and multilaterally to discuss matters relating to arms control. The United States Government has many channels through which it can address concerns related to potential Russian weapon systems. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. In the event of the treaty’s expiration, would the loss of insight into the location, movement, and disposition of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces be in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. We are continuing to review how the Treaty’s extension or expiration would affect U.S. national security in the evolving security environment, including by evaluating the impact of data exchanges and access through on-site inspections to Russian facilities subject to the Treaty.
Question. You also testified to the desire to include China in a future arms control agreement. According to the 2019 Department of Defense report on the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, China currently has 90 deployed ICBMs and 48 deployed SLBMs and non-governmental estimates place China’s number of nuclear warheads at fewer than one-tenth of that possessed by each the United States and Russia:

Given that China has significantly fewer strategic delivery vehicles and nuclear warheads than the United States, what concessions does the administration believe China, Russia and the United States should be willing to make to bring the Chinese government into an agreement related to its strategic nuclear arsenal?

Answer. China is investing considerable resources to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal, which is resulting in an increasingly diverse and sophisticated force with an unknown end state. China’s lack of transparency regarding the scope and scale of its nuclear modernization program raises questions regarding its future intent and poses challenges for efforts to ensure a peaceful security environment and stable relations. As President Trump has said, the United States wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies, and that means Russia and China must be brought to the table to do so. The world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that cover limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of adversary missiles.

Question. As defined by the New START Treaty counting rules, how many of China’s warheads and strategic delivery vehicles would be accountable under the treaty?

Answer. Any discussion of including China in an arms control agreement is hypothetical at this time. Specifics regarding which weapon systems would be limited and how they would be limited are key questions that would have to be agreed upon by all Parties, should such an option be pursued.

Question. Every U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control treaty took no fewer than 2 years to successfully negotiate. Given the New START Treaty expires in fewer than 21 months, and China does not share the decades-long U.S.-Russia institutional history on arms control agreements, how is it practical to conclude a treaty with China prior to February 5, 2021?

Answer. At this stage it would be premature for us to speculate about the duration of any potential negotiations.

Question. What steps has the administration taken to engage China in discussions regarding strategic stability?

Answer. In pursuit of a peaceful security environment and stable relations and following the release of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States proposed establishing a Strategic Capabilities Working Group with China, focused on risk reduction and transparency in the nuclear and strategic capabilities arena. China has repeatedly rejected U.S. efforts to broach these topics through meaningful discussions. China’s unwillingness to engage undermines the regional stability that U.S. allies, partners, and others rely on.

Question. Your testimony says that a “decision on extension will carefully consider U.S. and allied security needs.” Was the New START Treaty among the issues on the April 3–4 NATO Ministerial agenda and if so did allies express support for extending the treaty? Which allies spoke at the 2019 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in favor of extending New START?

Answer. The New START Treaty was not an agenda item at the April 3–4, 2019, NATO Ministerial. At the 2019 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee, many allies spoke in support of New START extension. I personally engaged with several allies at the NPT PrepCom where the extension of New START was a topic in our discussions. We will continue to take into account allied and partner views as we decide next steps on a potential extension of the Treaty, and I remain committed to continued engagement with my diplomatic counterparts.

Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator James Risch

Question. How is DoD addressing the threat of Chinese missiles?

Answer. The United States depends upon strategic deterrence to address threats to the homeland from Chinese intercontinental-range missiles. However, in the event of conflict, we will defend, to the extent feasible, against any ballistic missile attack upon the homeland from any source. With regard to Chinese regional missile
forces, we believe they are intended to restrict our ability to operate in the Indo-Pacific region in support of our defense and security commitments. Missile defenses are a key component within our broader regional posture to protect deployed U.S. forces and allies and partners; to preserve our freedom of action in the face of adversary anti-access/area defense (A2/AD) capabilities; and to assure allies and partners. To this end, we are pursuing a layered approach to address A2/AD that includes additional Patriot, THAAD, and SM–3 missile defenses; integrated air and missile defense (IAMD); attack operations to reduce the scale of missile strikes; and passive defenses.

Question. What threat do Chinese tactical nuclear weapons pose to our allies and interests?

Answer. During the next decade, China is likely to double the size of its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in its history. It is improving its ground- and submarine-based nuclear capability and is pursuing a viable nuclear “triad” with the development of a nuclear—capable, strategic bomber. In addition, it is working to field nuclear, theater-range precision-strike systems capable of reaching U.S. territory, allies, partners, and U.S. forces and bases in the region. The scope and scale of China’s nuclear modernization program, combined with China’s lack of transparency, raise questions regarding its future intent. This not only increases the threat of possible nuclear coercion and conflict for the United States and its allies and partners, but risks miscalculation and misperception.

Question. The Russians are chasing emerging technologies that have potential to revolutionize undersea warfare and U.S. superiority in the maritime domain. This includes the development of Artificial Intelligence backed, maritime big-data networks. Moreover they are pursuing hypersonic missile systems and a nuclear powered underwater drone. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command recently expressed concern with Russia building nuclear capabilities outside the new START Treaty. How might these new Russian weapons affect strategic stability?

Answer. Russia’s new novel nuclear delivery systems are difficult to manage under current arms control agreements and create a strategic challenge for the United States. The United States has engaged Russia on these systems in the context of the New START Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative Commission, and we continue to do so. However, the New START Treaty requires that we protect the confidentiality of those discussions.

Question. How do U.S. allies view the production of low-yield nuclear weapons?

Answer. The United States consulted extensively with allies in developing the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Allies are familiar with the Russian doctrine and strategy that led to the U.S. call for the low-yield supplemental capabilities referenced in the NPR, and they appreciate the assurance and deterrence effects provided by such capabilities.

Question. In light of this, why is nuclear modernization a critical complement to arms control, and an essential component of strategic stability?

Answer. Arms control can be an effective tool for managing competition and reducing risk. Yet arms control is not an end in itself, but must contribute to the security of the United States and its allies and partners. Unfortunately, both Russia and China are well along in their nuclear modernization programs. In contrast, our current nuclear delivery systems, weapons, command and control systems, and infrastructure are rapidly aging into obsolescence. Due to previous deferrals, our nuclear forces are well beyond their original design lives—some decades beyond—and must now be modernized. In this context, it is critical that the United States continue its nuclear modernization program both to ensure effective and credible deterrence, and to posture the United States for possible arms control negotiations when it has a willing partner.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. President Trump has reportedly directed his administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and China. One official told CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should include “all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.” The officials criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. I’m glad that the president has recently announced that he wants to add
Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future arms control agreement and include China in an arms control discussion. But not at the expense of or as a condition for extending New START. What does the White House have in mind with the arms control outreach project they leaked last week? What is the administration’s strategy for achieving more comprehensive arms control deals with Russia and China?

Answer. The President wants serious arms control that delivers real security to the American people and our allies and partners. To achieve this, he believes Russia and China must be brought to the table. The world has moved on from the Cold War and its bilateral treaties that applied to limited types of nuclear weapons or only certain ranges of adversary missiles. Therefore, the President has charged his national security team to think more broadly about arms control, both in terms of the countries and the weapons systems involved. We are attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear arms control initiatives. As for China, if it is the great power its leaders claim it to be, it should increase transparency into Chinese nuclear forces and limit China’s growing nuclear weapons ambitions in order to help manage strategic competition among States.

Question. President Trump has reportedly directed his administration to seek a new arms control agreement with Russia and China. One official told CNN a few weeks ago that the agreement should include “all the weapons, all the warheads, and all the missiles.” The officials criticized the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for only limiting U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons. I’m glad that the president has recently announced that he wants to add Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in a future arms control agreement and include China in an arms control discussion. But not at the expense of or as a condition for extending New START. How long does the administration expect it will take to negotiate such comprehensive deals?

Answer. Negotiating a new agreement that encompasses a broader range of weapons than just strategic systems and includes an effective verification regime will likely take time. Since no specific proposal has been made, it is impossible to predict how long such a negotiation would take.

Question. What does the administration want China to do on arms control?

Answer. We expect China to act responsibly. China insists that it is a great power and demands that it be accorded such a status. If that is true, China must accept the responsibility of any great power—the responsibility of reducing the overall nuclear threat and submitting its forces to inspection and verification regimes similar to those accepted by the United States and Russia. China’s nuclear deterrent cannot be verified in terms of numbers and the quality of its weapons. It refuses to offer transparency into its nuclear force and refuses to participate in any serious talks that would lead to any meaningful transparency.

Question. Would China, which has only about 300 total nuclear warheads compared to the roughly 6,500 total warheads possessed by the United States and Russia, be allowed to build up to the much higher New START levels were it to join the treaty?

Answer. Hypothetically, if China joined an agreement with the same provisions as the New START Treaty, it would be subject to the same numerical limits as the United States and Russia. However, we seek a new agreement that is broader and better fits the security environment we have today. If China wants the status of a great power, it needs to place itself under the accountability of a treaty regime that would verifiably limit its nuclear forces to a level sufficient for its security, enhancing stability among all parties.

Question. What is the administration willing to put on the table in talks with Russia and China on more comprehensive agreements?

Answer. The President has asked his national security team for possible options on more comprehensive agreements with Russia and China, and we are in the midst of developing such options. However, we do not believe it is prudent to discuss our potential negotiating strategies publicly.

Question. Is the administration’s position that Russia must agree to limits on its tactical nuclear weapons or that China must limit its nuclear forces in some way as a condition for extending New START?

Answer. The President has asked for options from his national security team, and we are working to support that process. Whether or not to extend the New START
Treaty is part of that discussion, but the administration has not made any decision yet.

Question. Wouldn’t extending New START by 5 years buy additional time to develop U.S. negotiating positions, address issues of mutual concern that impact strategic stability, and avoid new risks from an unconstrained and less transparent U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship?

Answer. We are not just trying to buy time. We are attempting to address the core impediments to restoring trust with Russia and reestablishing the conditions necessary for further nuclear arms control initiatives. We must consider a multitude of factors before making any decision on whether or not to extend the New START Treaty—for example, Russia’s record of compliance with arms control agreements, its overall malign behavior on other matters such as Ukraine and election interference, and the fact that its nuclear arsenal is growing in areas not covered under the New START Treaty.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM KAINE

Question. The Department of Energy has publicly stated that Secretary Perry has issued seven authorizations for exports to Saudi Arabia. Before these Part 810 authorizations are approved by the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense was consulted by the Department of Energy for each of these seven authorizations and on what dates?

Answer. The Department of Defense reviews Part 810 license authorizations staffed to the Department by the Department of Energy pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) is the entry point for these license reviews under DoD Directive 5105.72. During the period November 3, 2017, to October 23, 2018, the Department of Defense was consulted on all seven authorization requests approved by the Department of Energy to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. DTSA technical experts; the Joint Staff; the Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Reactors; and DoD Regional Policy experts reviewed the requests and concurred with them.

Question. What awareness does the Department of Defense have about the Chinese supply of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia and assistance in building a ballistic missile production factory inside Saudi Arabia? Do you share the assessment that Saudi Arabia maintains one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals in the region? What is the Department doing to address this extremely concerning issue? If necessary, provide a classified response.

Answer. A classified response has been provided separately.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Question. How confident is the Defense Department in its assessment of Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads and launchers? From where does the Defense Department draw this confidence?

Answer. The Department draws its confidence from the assessments provided by the Intelligence Community. The Department cannot provide an unclassified answer on the level of confidence in these assessments. We could provide additional information in a closed setting or classified response.

Question. Would losing New START’s inspection and verifications mechanisms impact U.S. confidence in its assessments of Russia’s strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems?

Answer. The end of the New START Treaty’s verification regime would end one source of information regarding Russia’s strategic forces; however, there are other sources such as national technical means. The resulting impact on U.S. confidence in its assessments of Russia’s strategic forces would be best addressed by the Intelligence Community.

Question. If Russia was no longer constrained by the central limits of the New START Treaty, would the Defense Department’s planning for nuclear contingencies with Russia be impacted? If yes, please describe how. If no, please describe why U.S. planning would not be impacted.
Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that one of the enduring roles of nuclear weapons is to hedge against an uncertain future. The NPR goes on to describe the importance of our strategic capabilities remaining safe, secure, reliable, and flexible enough to meet the ever-changing strategic environment.

Question. Has the Defense Department engaged in arms control discussions with Russia since the President and his team announced an interest in new arms control agreements?

Answer. In April 2019, a U.S. interagency delegation, including representatives of the Defense Department, met with Russia counterparts in a session of the New START Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to discuss ongoing New START Treaty implementation issues. The BCC usually convenes twice a year.

Question. What percentage of Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear warheads are accountable under the New START Treaty? If New START expires, what percentage of Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear warheads would be legally constrained?

Answer. Under the New START Treaty, all of Russia’s deployed strategic nuclear warheads (those on deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and those counted for deployed heavy bombers) are accountable. This includes (as of March 1, 2019) 517 launchers and 1,420 accountable warheads. In addition, Russia is modernizing an active stockpile not accountable under the New START Treaty of up to 2,000 NSNW employable by ships, planes, and ground forces. If the New START Treaty expires, the deployed strategic nuclear warheads of both Parties will no longer be under any legal constraints created by the Treaty.

Question. Please compare unclassified estimates of the number of Russia’s nuclear weapons deployed on the delivery systems Putin announced on March 1, 2018 to those deployed on Russia’s nuclear Triad today.

Answer. Since the systems described by Russian President Putin in 2018 are all in their developmental stages, we do not believe that any nuclear warheads have been deployed on them yet. However, I would defer to the Intelligence Community to provide a more detailed assessment of when these systems could become operational.

Question. Can you describe Russia’s interests in U.S. concessions when approached about non-strategic nuclear weapons arms control or reductions? What U.S. concessions would the Defense Department recommend in order to achieve a non-strategic nuclear weapons agreement with Russia?

Answer. We do not believe it is prudent to discuss publicly our potential negotiating strategy at this time. However, as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, U.S. pursuit of a modern nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile, once developed, may provide an incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Question. Does the Defense Department view reducing or otherwise limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons as a priority, compared to maintaining the European Phased Adaptive Approach, or rotational deployments of U.S. conventional forces in Europe?

Answer. During the last decade, Russia has upgraded the capacity of its nuclear forces, as has China. Russia, in particular, is modernizing and expanding an active stockpile of approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed in a variety of ways, including on ships, bombers, and tactical aircraft, and with ground forces. The doctrine and exercises of Russia and China demonstrate their reliance on such systems in both crisis and conflict. However, none of these weapons are limited by any arms control treaty. Therefore, the Department views the limitation or reduction of such weapons to be a priority in any arms control negotiation. To be clear, the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is not directed against Russia, and is irrelevant to the question of Russia’s nuclear doctrine, capabilities, and expanding non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpile. EPAA protects our deployed forces and NATO Allies from missiles originating in the Middle East. Despite all its rhetoric, Russia understands this, and is unlikely to ever agree to trade away its non-strategic nuclear weapons in exchange for Aegis Ashore in Europe.

Question. Is the Defense Department actively involved in consultations with NATO regarding achieving an non-strategic nuclear weapons agreement with Russia?

Answer. The United States briefs our NATO Allies on a routine and continuing basis on arms control efforts that currently impact or could potentially impact Alli-
ance security. In addition, NATO’s Committees on Proliferation and on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation have responsibility on behalf of all NATO Allies to examine issues associated with the entire array of proliferation and arms control issues potentially affecting the Alliance.

Question. Do weapons which the U.S. government classifies as Russia’s “non-strategic nuclear weapons” use short- and -intermediate range, ground based missiles as delivery systems?

Answer. Yes, among other delivery systems as well.

Question. In addition to the SSC-8, Putin and his Defense Minister, Sergey Shoigu, described a new ground-based version of the Kalibr sea-launched cruise missile, and a hypersonic ground-launched missile. How does the U.S. government plan to respond to these new systems?

Answer. The Department believes there is significant military utility in developing conventional, ground-based missiles previously prohibited by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Fielding such systems is consistent with the National Defense Strategy’s direction to build lethality and enhance the combat credibility and resilience of our forces.

In response to Russia’s material breach, its fielding of the SSC-8 cruise missile, and its potential deployment of additional INF Treaty-range systems, the Department is pursuing ground-based missiles, guided by ongoing work involving all of the relevant DoD capability development processes, so that DoD can determine how these systems best fit within the broader portfolio of long-range strike options available to the Joint Force.

Question. Is it possible to dissuade Russia from deploying these weapons, and what is your strategy for doing so?

Answer. Considering that Russia continues to field the SSC-8 cruise missile after almost 6 years of concerted U.S. diplomatic efforts to convince it to return to compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, it seems unlikely the Russians can be dissuaded from deploying such systems.

Question. Does the Defense Department believe the New START Treaty remains in national security interest of the United States?

Answer. Much has changed in the near-decade since the New START Treaty was signed in 2010, including the expansion of Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities. A decision regarding extension of the New START Treaty has not yet been made, but will be balanced against changes in the strategic environment and broader concerns regarding Russia’s non-compliance with other arms control and nonproliferation commitments. Any extension decision must weigh a variety of factors to ensure the national security of the United States and that of our allies and partners is maintained and strengthened.

Question. What possible responses might the Defense Department recommend to counter Russia’s likely deployment of additional INF systems after termination of the agreement?

Answer. The Department believes there is significant military utility in developing conventional, ground-based missiles previously prohibited by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Fielding such systems is consistent with the National Defense Strategy’s direction to build lethality and enhance the combat credibility and resilience of our forces.

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Question. Did the State Department ever ask the Russian government to consider codifying a ban on arming INF-range missiles with nuclear warheads? If not, why not?

Answer. I am not aware of efforts by the State Department to ask the Russian Government to consider establishing a ban on arming Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty-range missiles with nuclear warheads. Since the INF Treaty prohibits the possession, production, and flight-testing of INF Treaty-range, ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, the type of warhead is irrelevant to this core provision of the INF Treaty.
**Question.** The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that Russia has an “escalate to de-escalate” policy in which it would threaten or possibly use nuclear weapons first on a limited basis in crises or at lower levels of conflict. Russia disputes this characterization of its doctrine. Further, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January that a Russian decision to use nuclear weapons first, on a limited basis or otherwise, would be driven by “the threshold they think the Kremlin would be at risk.”
Do you agree with General Ashley’s assessment? If not, why not?

**Answer.** On May 29, 2019, Lt. Gen. Ashley publicly described Russian nuclear doctrine and policy as follows: “Russia’s large and diverse stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons. Russia assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Russian defense officials have spoken publicly about ‘de-escalating’ a conflict through limited nuclear use and it is a fact that the Russian military has prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use in order to compel an end to a conventional conflict.”
I agree with this assessment and can make additional detail available in a classified forum.

**Question.** The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states that Russia has an “escalate to de-escalate” policy in which it would threaten or possibly use nuclear weapons first on a limited basis in crises or at lower levels of conflict. Russia disputes this characterization of its doctrine. Further, Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in January that a Russian decision to use nuclear weapons first, on a limited basis or otherwise, would be driven by “the threshold they think the Kremlin would be at risk.”
Is it your position that this constitutes an “escalate to de-escalate” nuclear doctrine?

**Answer.** On May 29, 2019, Lt. Gen. Ashley publicly described Russian nuclear doctrine and policy as follows: “Russia’s large and diverse stockpile facilitates a doctrine that envisions the potential coercive use of nuclear weapons. Russia assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to ‘de-escalate’ a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. Russian defense officials have spoken publicly about ‘de-escalating’ a conflict through limited nuclear use and it is a fact that the Russian military has prepared plans and is well trained to transition rapidly to nuclear use in order to compel an end to a conventional conflict.” I believe Lt. Gen. Ashley’s assessment describes an “escalate-to-deescalate” doctrine, and his description is consistent with the text of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.