

TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED

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BEFORE THE

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TSUNAMI RESPONSE: LESSONS LEARNED

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2005

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met at 9:32 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Coleman, Murkowski, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, and Obama.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order.

Today the committee meets to discuss our Nation's response to the tsunami that struck on December 26, 2004, causing death and destruction in at least 12 countries. The tsunami created a humanitarian tragedy of incredible proportions. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development, more than 160,000 people are confirmed dead; 140,000 people are still missing; and countless people were injured. More than 1 million people remain homeless.

Beyond the comprehensive casualty figures, the tsunami has left deep scars on the societies of the Indian Ocean region. For example, the Government of Indonesia estimates that 700 to 1,100 of its schools were destroyed and that 1,750 primary school teachers are dead or missing. Nearly 180,000 students have no schools to attend.

The United Nations International Labor Office estimates that the tsunami wiped out jobs for 600,000 people in Indonesia alone, and more than 400,000 in Sri Lanka. An additional 100,000 are thought to be out of work in Thailand. Many of the people who lost their jobs were fishermen, farmers, shopkeepers, or workers in the tourism industry. The tsunami destroyed fishing boats and nets, and wiped out acres of farmland, leaving behind high concentrations of sea salt that must be washed out before crops can grow again.

Statistics, however, cannot quantify the psychological impact of the disaster. They cannot convey the grief of the fisherman who has lost his family and his livelihood. They cannot explain the defeat of an elderly woman who has lost everything she has worked her whole life to earn. They cannot capture the fear and disorientation of children who experienced this disaster.

On behalf of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, I want to express our deepest sympathy to the victims of this tragedy. While financial and in-kind assistance cannot compensate for the huge loss of life that countries in the region have suffered, the contributions of the United States and many other nations can help stabilize the region and assist survivors in rebuilding their lives. As the world leader in international disaster assistance, the United States is working closely with the international community to implement the most effective response possible in the coming months. In addition, American citizens, businesses, and organizations have donated an estimated \$700 million directly to international relief efforts.

Beyond the compelling humanitarian reasons for swift action, a stable and prosperous Asia is essential to the global effort on a range of shared challenges, including weapons proliferation, terrorism, narcotics, and contagious diseases. The economic and political consequences of this natural disaster could be even more severe unless we commit ourselves to advancing a strong recovery in the region.

President Bush has requested \$950 million in tsunami disaster relief. I am confident that Congress will come to an agreement on this aid package. We also must ensure that the United States contribution to tsunami relief does not come at the expense of our other international commitments, including those related to poverty-stricken Africa.

The Foreign Relations Committee has been working with the executive branch to develop legislative initiatives that will assist in the tsunami recovery. Committee staff members have traveled to Indonesia and Sri Lanka to observe the United States and international relief response firsthand. Their reports will be included in this hearing record.

[The committee travel reports follow:]

TSUNAMI TRIP REPORT SUBMITTED BY JONAH BLANK, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

The following is a brief summary of activities during my recent StaffDel to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. More detailed findings have been presented to the ranking member, and staff members of both minority and majority sides.

SUMMARY OF TRIP

From August 2–16, 2005, I conducted a fact-finding trip to Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Maldives. The primary focus was post-tsunami reconstruction efforts, with secondary focus on political issues including Aceh peace accords (Indonesia) and counterterrorism (all three countries). During a brief stopover in London (August 16), I consulted with British Foreign Office officials on counterterrorism issues, particularly focused on alleged linkages between the July 7 Underground bombings and the Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba.

KEY FINDINGS

INDONESIA

Tsunami reconstruction: In meetings in Medan (base for much of the post-tsunami reconstruction effort for Aceh, as well as nearly all reconstruction effort in Nias), local NGO workers, government officials, journalists, and civil society representatives made broadly congruent points:

- The U.S. naval assets and other military personnel deployed to the region had a tremendously positive impact on local sentiment regarding America. U.S. military personnel were described as very efficient, very effective, and excellent good-will ambassadors. The efforts of the U.S. military had a ripple effect, in

that they prompted the Indonesian military (TNI) to become more effective in order to avoid being shamed by comparison. Moreover, the human touch brought by U.S. military personnel helped put a new face on the image of America generally presented to the Indonesian public by news from Iraq and elsewhere: Pictures of servicemen and servicewomen playing with children, helping rescue elderly people, digging wells, etc., provided better public diplomacy than any effort currently underway.

- In general, however, reconstruction efforts are not proceeding quickly enough to satisfy the hundreds of thousands of displaced citizens. Acehese interlocutors said that as of August, only 10 percent of the post-tsunami promises regarding reconstruction projects had been kept; they warned that a failure to meet the expectations of the populace could cause the agreement between the government and GAM (the Acehese rebel group), signed August 15, to fall apart. Journalists agreed that popular dissatisfaction with the pace of reconstruction was growing. There was also concern about possible relocation of fishing communities to inland sites, where they would be forced to live on handouts rather than being able to earn a living. According to several interlocutors, the Multidonor Trust Fund (MDTF) had significant amounts of money available for projects, but access was delayed by Ministry of Finance redtape, and by poor coordination between the various ministries, donor countries, and NGOs. The BRR (government coordinating branch) is well-intentioned, but hasn't yet done sufficient coordination. More local government input and local autonomy was advocated.
- Religious issues were raised regarding certain foreign NGOs, with some Christian groups accused of proselytization or attempts to place Muslim orphans with Christian families abroad. Some 300 orphans were reportedly flown to a Christian-run orphanage in Jakarta during the early days of the crisis, leading to a new federal instruction that all orphans be given to the charge only of Muslim groups. The hardline Islamist Islamic Defenders Front (FDI) was working in Aceh and Medan with the Islamist political party PKS, but extremist groups like Laskar Jihad and Laskar Mujaheddin are said to have failed in their efforts to establish a foothold in Aceh. Despite concerns about the motives of certain Christian NGOs, foreign NGOs in general were seen in a more favorable light than local groups. "Local NGOs want to enrich themselves," said one interlocutor. Among the foreign NGOs and other organizations cited as being most widely appreciated were IOM, the United Nations, the Red Cross/Red Crescent, Oxfam, Mercy Corps, and Save the Children.

Site visits in and around Banda Aceh

Over the course of 3 days (Friday, August 5–Sunday, August 7) I visited various sites within the city of Banda Aceh, and at several villages in the vicinity. The purpose was to see a representative sample of the devastation wreaked by the tsunami, and the reconstruction efforts underway. My hosts were the personnel of the USAID mission, accompanied by implementing partners from the NGO subcontractors.

- Village of Gurah: This prosperous seaside community was almost entirely obliterated by the first wave. The cupola of a mosque was carried approximately 2 kilometers inland by the water, and deposited (intact) in the middle of a rice paddy. The village had about 650 inhabitants before the tsunami, of whom only 155 survived. The economy of the village was based on rice farming and fishing.
- Bazaar around Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh: This site, the economic and religious center of Aceh's capital, had been a scene of devastation broadcast around the world in December and January. Now, the sight was far more benign. The mosque itself sustained little major damage, with the most enduring damage limited to a freestanding minaret. The debris that had blanketed the mosque grounds and all surrounding streets after the tsunami has been largely cleared away. The bazaar, located very close to the masjid, has been moved from a two-storey building into a set of stalls directly abutting the mosque. The site of the old bazaar remains ruined: The lower level is still full of waterlogged debris, while the upper level is filled with incinerated waste (trash on the upper level dried out and could be incinerated, but there was no easy way of disposing of the waste at ground-level). Throughout the city of Banda Aceh, much of the worst-afflicted buildings have been destroyed or rebuilt. Many, however, remain unrepaired: Often this is due to legal challenges regarding ownership (owners deceased, or documents establishing ownership destroyed and courts unable to render quick judgements among various claimants).
- Village of UI Lee Lee: More than 7 months after the tsunami, this (like many villages) remains virtually a wasteland. According to USAID staff, 85 percent of population here were killed, and 80 percent of houses destroyed.

- Village of Lapunk: According to USAID staff, this village suffered devastation similar to that of UI Lee Lee. About 80 percent of the houses were destroyed, and about 855 inhabitants were killed. The local mosque was left standing—giving rise to varying interpretations (either supernatural causes, or superior building materials).

Meetings in Jakarta

My meetings with Indonesian legislators focused on a recently passed House bill, requesting a State Department report on legality of Indonesian control of West Papua. This issue caused considerable concern among Indonesian parliamentarians of all political parties. My discussions and statements backed up the message being put forward by the U.S. Embassy and other administration officials.

I also had meetings with U.S. Government personnel on a variety of topics. Appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek a detailed debrief.

SRI LANKA

Tsunami reconstruction site visits

On a 2-day trip outside the capital, I visited sites in the region around Galle, Mathura, and Dondra. USAID and NGO staff emphasized that these southern sites had not been as badly affected as sites in the north and northeast, which suffered from the direct tsunami wave rather than the washback.

- CHF transitional housing site. Houses here have concrete foundation and wall-base, with metal frame and plywood walls covered by USAID plastic sheeting, topped by an aluminum roof. Houses are laid out at angles, rather than like rows of barracks or trailer parks: This provides more privacy (not staring right into neighbor's house), and also avoids the stigma of resembling barracks set up for plantation workers during colonial times. This last point is of great cultural significance, since the local Sinhalese population maintains significant cultural taboos regarding association with the Tamil plantation workers. In the days immediately after the tsunami, a local political party (the JVP) set up barracks-type housing, and it was shunned as soon as the inhabitants were able to find alternate places to camp.
- Transitional housing built by Irish NGO GOAL. Here the structures were similar to those of CHF, but with wooden frame substituted for metal ones, and sited in rows rather than at angles. Locations were sometimes problematic: One camp was located so far from the ocean that the residents (members of a fishing community) would have to take a bus to reach their fishing boats every morning.
- Saw, but did not visit, transitional housing built by WorldVision (between Colombo and Galle). According to local interlocutors, these structures were not well designed: The combination of small size and corrugated tin walls made them into "convection ovens." Moreover, WorldVision's evangelical outlook (and policy of mandating staff attendance at daily prayer meetings) was cited as an irritant with the local (predominantly Buddhist) population. Catholic Relief Service, by contrast, was described as a good model of a religiously affiliated organization that managed to keep its doctrinal identity strictly segregated from its humanitarian mission.

In discussions with NGO workers at these sites, several common threads of comment emerged:

- Where to put the displaced people? Land is scarce, and almost all of it is already occupied by other families. Fishing communities can't be relocated inland.
- Government-mandated setbacks are problematic. On the southern coasts, no new construction is permitted within 100 meters of the high-water mark. In the north and northeast, the setback is 200 meters. These restrictions puts an enormous amount of scarce land off limits. It also raises equity issues, and the suspicion that the government is favoring Sinhalese (who predominate the southern areas) over Tamils and Muslims (who predominate in the north and northeastern areas). There is also suspicion that the setback ordinance is a ploy, in order to clear fishing communities from prime seafront land in order to clear the way for development of tourist resorts.
- Equity issues with other poor people. IDPs from the long-running civil war have been displaced for years, even decades—yet they get leapfrogged by tsunami IDPs. And ordinary poor people, who are often equally destitute, get nothing at all from the new aid influx.
- Unneeded material aid is a burden. Well-meaning, but unprofessional, donors have sent vast amounts of material to Sri Lanka—everything from tinned food to children's toys to clothing. Much of this material is culturally or climatically

inappropriate (even ski parkas have been received by this tropical nation). Uncoordinated donations of goods and services by a raft of miscellaneous groups often does more harm than good: The professional NGOs not only must spend significant time sorting out the useful from the useless donations, but it finds the planning and carrying out of reconstruction projects impeded by ad-hoc efforts of amateurs. When an amateur group slaps up a dangerously substandard housing or well project (for example), this causes popular resentment against professionals who must work more slowly, and who may have to tear down a poorly built structure in order to rebuild it correctly.

Meeting in Colombo with Foreign Minister Lakhsman Kadirgamar

On Thursday, August 11, I met (together with Chargé d'Affaires James Entwistle) with Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakhsman Kadirgamar. We had a productive discussion on a variety of topics, including tsunami reconstruction, government-LTTE ceasefire, and other political issues. When I asked the Foreign Minister what he considered the most important message he would like me to take back to Washington, he cited the importance of keeping the LTTE on the FTO list, and of pressuring our European, Asian, and Canadian allies to join in cutting off foreign sources of LTTE support. He noted that his own residence had been aggressively surveilled by LTTE cadres, apparently bent on assassination.

On Friday, August 12, Foreign Minister Kadirgamar was shot and killed while swimming at his personal residence. The sniper (according to public accounts) had carried out the operation with great professionalism, staking out the residence for a long period from a neighboring building, and targeting the Foreign Minister with a barrage of 7.62mm bullets fired from an automatic rifle equipped with a custom-built tripod, a silencer, and a night-vision scope. Sri Lankan and international observers have attributed the action to the LTTE.

MALDIVES

Program in the Maldives centered around two issues: Tsunami reconstruction, and the threat of Islamist extremism.

Tsunami reconstruction

- Site visit to tsunami-hit island, Kaf Guraidhoo. At the height of the tsunami, approximately 80 percent of the nation of the Maldives was submerged. Some islands were hit worse than others, and many of the worst-affected are located too far from the international airport on Male to be reached in a visit as brief as the one I was able to make. Kaf Guraidhoo was chosen as a site visit not for the intensity of its damage so much as for the logistics: It could be visited from Male by speedboat, rather than chartering an expensive seaplane.
- On Kaf Guraidhoo, a very small community, 43 houses were destroyed, four people were killed, and 400 individuals were (and still are) displaced. The housing is being rebuilt by the UNDP, but progress is going slowly. During our visit, the frustration of the inhabitants was readily visible: We witnessed an angry tirade by the village headman, directed at the Maldives Government officials who accompanied us. He demanded to know why, 7 months on, the community members still were living in tents that provide little shelter from the sweltering heat and monsoon rain.
- Traditional building material on the atolls is coral, and the older buildings still use this as their wall material. It has the advantage of being light, airy, and free—but has been banned by the government in an attempt to preserve the nation's one irreplaceable natural resource (without vibrant coral reefs, the Maldives would lose its vital tourist revenue). Logistical challenges of getting substitute material (concrete or cinderblocks) out to the remote, far-flung atolls, however, are not insubstantial.
- A UNDP team was visiting Kaf Guraidhoo during our site visit, and we consulted with them about the difficulties they faced. They were well aware of the popular discontent at the pace of reconstruction, but noted that this was only one among an enormous number of sites to be rebuilt. During the tsunami, this entire island had been submerged, up to the level of a person's knees. The primary UNDP effort was the building of a community center. In the meantime, inhabitants took what shelter they could beneath the plastic sheeting bearing the symbol of USAID—and of the Saudi relief agency.
- Flooding was not limited to the smaller islands. According to government interlocutors, the capital city of Male was entirely flooded as soon as the wave hit at about 9:20 a.m.

Impact of Islamist ideology

The Maldives is an overwhelmingly (indeed, constitutionally) Muslim nation, but has traditionally been socially and religiously moderate. Several official interlocutors expressed concern at the rise of Islamist ideology, and worried about the impact this might have upon the nation's fledgling move toward democratization.

- Minister of Atolls Development Mohamed Waheed Deen (essentially the Minister of Interior for islands beyond Male) noted that many wealthy gulf residents came to Maldives on holiday. While this provides jobs and income, it also fuels resentment at the disparities of wealth evident between the local inhabitants and their neighbors from the Middle East.
- Minister of Defense and National Security Ismail Shafeeu noted the problem of drugs, which was closely tied to the rapid opening of the Maldives to visitors from South Asia and the Middle East. Unprocessed heroin is a major threat, he noted, with the adult addict population estimated by some studies as high as 200,000–500,000 (about 10 percent of overall population). Due to the Maldives' open economy, it is easy to launder money here: "We're in a bad spiral now, fighting it, but not making headway." This issue is linked with the extremist threat, since various groups have used criminal enterprises to raise money for terrorism in other parts of the world. During the 1980s and 1990s, many Maldivian boys went to Pakistani madrasas, often sponsored and funded by Saudi charities. Many have now come back home, and retained the ideology of their "sponsoring agencies." This is a potential threat for the future, he said.

UNITED KINGDOM

On August 16, en route from Sri Lanka back to Washington, I had discussions in London with officials from the British Foreign Office who specialize on South Asia and counterterrorism issues. The focus of these discussions was putative linkage between the July 7 bombings in the London Underground and the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e Taiba.

These discussions were informative and useful. Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, appropriately cleared staff are encouraged to seek a detailed debrief from me in an appropriately secure setting.

ITINERARY

August 2	Depart Washington.
August 4	Arrive Medan, Indonesia. Meeting at U.S. consulate, on logistics of tsunami/earthquake aid provision via Medan and other parts of Sumatra. Participants: R. Simanjuntak, Abo Mutalib Lugus.
	Meeting at U.S. Consulate: Acehnese elders.
August 5	Meeting with journalists and NGO workers. Afternoon: Transit to Banda Aceh.
August 6	Aceh: Site tours of USAID projects and NGO sites in Banda Aceh and environs. Visit to village of Gurah. Meeting with subcontractor Muhammad Najib. Meeting with Asia foundation's Human Hamid.
August 7	Site tours in Banda Aceh and villages: Village of UI Lee Lee, Village of Lapunk, Transit to Jakarta.
August 8	Jakarta: Embassy brief, meeting with Amb Pascoe, and meetings with Indonesian Government officials (Sudjandnan Parnohadiningrat and others).
August 9	Transit to Sri Lanka.
August 10	Site visits between Colombo and Mathura (CHF and GOAL).
August 11	Site visits between Galle and Colombo (Mercy Corps and others). Meeting with Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.
August 12	Transit to Maldives. Meeting with Atolls Minister Mohamed Waheed Deen and other Maldivian officials.
August 13	Site visit to tsunami-hit Kaf Guraidhoo.
August 14	Meetings with Maldives Government officials, including Minister of Defense and National Security Ismail Shafeeu. Transit to Sri Lanka.
August 15	Depart Sri Lanka. Transit to U.K.
August 16	Meetings at British Foreign Office. Transit to Washington.
End Mission	

TSUNAMI TRIP REPORT SUBMITTED BY NILMINI RUBIN, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE PROFESSIONAL STAFF MEMBER

From January 8–17, 2005, SFRC staffer Nilmini Rubin traveled to Sri Lanka to observe the impact of the December 26, 2004, tsunami and the effectiveness of the relief and aid response. As part of Congressman Leach's delegation¹ for 2 days, I traveled to the south of the island and participated in official meetings. Afterward, I traveled to the mid-eastern part of Sri Lanka with CARE USA President Peter Bell to observe relief operations and then joined USAID staff to look at recovery in the southeast part of the island. I made a point to observe the impact on affected people in Sinhalese, Tamil, Muslim and Burgher towns and neighborhoods.

The tsunami affected most of Sri Lanka's coastline, killing more than 30,000 people and destroying more than 100,000 homes leaving nearly 600,000 displaced.² This disaster hit 2 years after the ceasefire between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Government which stopped the violence, mainly in the north and east, that had resulted in more than 64,000 deaths since 1983.³ In addition, the country was recovering from the loss of between 25,000 and 50,000 people as a result of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) insurrection in the south in the 1970s and 1980s.⁴

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

- Special Envoy. The creation of a Special Envoy could maintain pressure on both sides to wage peace.
- Financial Controls. Insistence that all World Bank-proposed financial controls are accepted by the Sri Lankan Government and that the central Sri Lankan Government set up a system to consult with the district governments on spending could thwart corruption.
- Housing and land titling. Permanent housing should become the main development focus as it was in terrible need. Land issues are very difficult and Sri Lanka is a very densely populated country with serious titling problems.
- Early Warning System. An early warning system for tsunamis and other types of danger should be established. It would have saved lives in Sri Lanka. As the destruction was in a ring less than a mile wide around the island, even a 15-minute warning would have allowed people to move to a safe area.

IMPRESSIONS

I learned that there are three levels of response to this and other disasters: Immediate relief; intermediate rehabilitation; and long-term recovery. While there has been a tremendous focus on immediate relief, the major challenge will be long-term recovery. One aid worker stated "we need to do more than restore people to their impoverished state." He asserted that economic development is, in part, disaster mitigation as the poor tend to be inordinately affected by natural disasters. Most observers agreed that the tsunami hit the poorest.

There are a number of complexities in Sri Lanka. Housing and land for internally displaced people from the ongoing ethnic conflict is still pending—many of them have been living for years in shacks. Also, many of the villages near the affected areas are very poor and there are concerns about the fairness of helping the tsunami victims and not their poor neighbors.

The Sri Lankan Government and Sri Lankan civil society were the first responders to the tsunami disaster before the international community was in place. While many acknowledged that the Sri Lankan Government was doing the best it could to respond to the tsunami disaster, there was concern that Sri Lanka was taxing aid provided to the victims. According to Tara de Mel, National Operations Coordinator, the Government of Sri Lanka continues to impose duties (averaging 18 percent) on private donations that are sent directly to Sri Lanka, rather than going through international NGOs or governments.

Reportedly, U.N. agencies held a meeting 2 hours after the tsunami hit Sri Lanka. The United Nations helped with information gathering mechanisms and helped the

¹ Congressman Leach's delegation included Senators Brownback and Corzine, Representatives Blumenauer, Faleomavaega, Ferguson, Flake, Garrett, Gilchrest, Shays, Smith, Watson, Pallone, as well as staffers Jamie McCormick, Doug Anderson, Landon Fulmer, and Evan Gottesman.

² Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan: USAID/OFDA: Bringing Hope to People.

³ Bruce Vaughn, "Sri Lanka: Background and U.S. Relations," Congressional Research Service, February 11, 2004.

⁴ Europa World Year Book, page 3934.

government establish the National Operations Center. UNICEF had already been working in many of the affected areas to address the impact of the civil conflict.

NGOS

I found international NGOs like Save the Children partnering with local NGOs to provide assistance. Similarly, CARE, which has been in Sri Lanka since 1956, used its relationships with the communities to provide assistance. I met a number of new international NGOs to Sri Lanka that were trying to help but have no sense of the political situation which makes them vulnerable and could result in unintended consequences. Established NGOs referred to the new international NGOs as “parachuters.”

U.S. GOVERNMENT

Shortly after the tsunami, USAID/OFDA provided more than \$23.3 million to support emergency relief supplies, health, water and sanitation, cash-for-work, transitional shelters, psycho-social support, and child protection activities.⁵

USAID has a base of operations in Ampara, where more than 10,000 died as a result of the tsunami. Along those lines, USAID was one of the few official donors with offices outside of Colombo (in Trincomalee and Ampara) and it has allowed USAID to become a nerve center, providing information to the new groups. USAID had previously worked with fishing communities, so reaching back out to replace boats will be quite easy for them. I saw USAID boats being used to ferrying people in an area where a bridge had been washed out. On the other side of the bridge was a badly affected community.

In Ampara, USAID gave grants in kind and did not distribute any cash so as to impede the misuse of funds. I was very impressed with the USAID staff and the local hires. They were an important resource for other NGOs, had a good understanding of the sensitivities in Sri Lanka and were highly professional.

I also saw U.S. Marines assisting in the recovery, clearing destroyed buildings in preparation for rebuilding.

POLITICIZATION OF THE RECOVERY

According to Peter Harrold of the World Bank, two-thirds of the damage from the tsunami was in the northeast provinces where many Tamil people live. So, the nature of collaboration between the government and the LTTE adds a complicating factor that has to be addressed with care. The World Bank official added that the disaster occurred when the peace process was at its lowest ebb since the ceasefire in October 2002. At first, many were optimistic that the disaster would lead to renewed interest, by both sides, in peace; but worry was setting in.

The politicization of the recovery was clear. The government seemed to be consolidating power—rather than devolving—in the wake of this crisis. I saw internally displaced peoples (IDP) camps that were funded by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (allegedly linked to the LTTE) and by the JVP (a socialist nationalist political party). The JVP and the TRO were separately setting up their own camps. The JVP was driving around passing out rice, lentils, spices, and pumpkins for people to cook. They were cleaning up debris as well.

There was concern about the relief reaching all affected people in Sri Lanka—both in the government-held areas and the LTTE controlled areas. In the East, the Sinhalese (majority) tend to live more inland and the Tamils and Muslims live closer to the coast. Some felt that it was possible that the inflow of tsunami relief would inflame ethnic tensions because some—who may be very poor regardless of their impact by the tsunami—would be left out.

Ampara was the part of Sri Lanka most destroyed by the tsunami—more than 10,000 have died here. However, it was the area where I saw the least help. It takes about 10 hours from Colombo to get to some of the villages that I visited in Ampara. There was a minimal international presence there. Temporary shelter consisted of plastic sheeting on sticks. There was food and water. There was serious and obvious depression—many were afraid to move back to where they lived. The sanitary facilities were poor.

RESPONSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BANKS

The most critical financing issue to watch was that of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) as the MDBs make up a significant portion of the government's

⁵Sri Lanka and Maldives Tsunami Disaster Action Response Plan: USAID/OFDA: Bringing Hope to People.

budget. The World Bank and Asian Development Bank are currently conducting needs assessments in Sri Lanka. The World Bank has announced it will provide \$100 million in initial financial support to Sri Lanka with additional funding for longer term reconstruction efforts.⁶ The Asian Development Bank announced that between \$100 million and \$150 million in new operations could be processed in the short to medium term, devoted to the reconstruction effort in Sri Lanka.⁷

The World Bank Representative, Peter Harrold, explained that the World Bank was pushing for accountability structures for the tsunami relief money. He said the World Bank has asked the Sri Lankan Government to (1) create a web-based system so it is easy to track the money; (2) continue to follow procurement rules and competitive procedures even in the disaster environment; (3) require an international audit; and (4) have citizen accounting system so the people can say if the money has translated into impacts on the ground. The Sri Lankan Government has not yet agreed to this system, Mr. Harrold added.

One accountability structure not mentioned, specifically, by the World Bank in our meeting that was very important according to Nilan Fernando of the Asia Foundation, was the consultation and involvement of local and provincial governments. Some others report that the government was trying to secure direct budget support with minimal controls.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP) CAMPS

I visited a number of camps, with varying design, for people displaced by the tsunami. Many IDPs were in schools and temples where the bathroom facilities are not adequate. I saw one of their camps in a Buddhist temple with more than 800 people and 2 toilets. They were planning to dig more latrines but were inundated with needs.

Most women I spoke to felt safe—the Sri Lankan military has posted officers at some of the camps. Yet still, domestic violence was a problem in the camps. Even though most villages were kept together, domestic violence continues. Statistics do not exist, but CARE responded to 4 domestic violence complaints on the one day that I was traveling with them.

SHELTER

Most of the affected people that I spoke to said that they lost everything they owned. They invested all of their money into the building of their homes. The women purchased gold jewelry as a store of value. I did not meet anyone who had insurance to cover their loss.

Each affected person that I talked to said that they wanted a new home and land. They did not know where the land would come from. Land in Sri Lanka, an island the size of West Virginia, is scarce and the affected area has a concentrated population. Another major problem in Sri Lanka is titling. Many affected people did not have legal title to their homes and some of those who did lost their deeds in the wave.

A significant complication was that many of the people who lost their homes were “fisherfolk” who need to be near the coast. The government’s revised regulation on how close to the coast structures could be rebuilt was in dispute during my visit.

HEALTH

Disease incidence was lower than initially expected because of high immunization rates and successful cholera prevention programs in Sri Lanka according to the World Health Organization representative.

During my 1-week stay in Sri Lanka, I did not observe any public information on HIV/AIDS. I discussed AIDS with a number of Sri Lankans who, despite their ethnic and class differences, all asserted that AIDS was not a problem in Sri Lanka as it was in other countries. Given risk factors in Sri Lanka such as conflict, displacement, tourism, and prostitution, I would be surprised if this assertion was true.

ELDERLY

I did not see any tsunami-relief programs targeted to the needs of the elderly nor did I meet anyone who knew of any programs for the elderly. My concern was that

⁶World Bank website: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20318541-menuPK:34463-pagePK:64003015-piPK:64003012-theSitePK:4607,00.html>.

⁷Asian Development Bank website: http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2005/6619_tsunami_impact_Sri_Lanka/default.asp.

the elderly who are unable to work and have lost family members may fall through the cracks.

During my trip, I was deeply moved by my conversations with elderly people. In Batticaloa, I met an elderly lady named Padida Ismael who asked me what she should do. For years, she had maintained a small corner shop. It was lost in the tsunami, as was her home and all her possessions, including all of her clothes. Mrs. Ismael was wearing a donated sari. She said that "it is too late for me. My whole life's work is gone." Then, she cried.

I met two elderly ladies in Ampara who sat by the rubble that was once their home. They mourned the loss of their community and said they had "no place to go." One woman said that her children are now homeless, too, so she could not depend on them. The other woman said that she lost her son and had no other means of support. They were in profound grief.

Microenterprise and other employment generation mechanisms don't help the infirm—who may worked their whole lives for the little they had. I was deeply touched by the elderly women that I met. Many of them shared a story—she doesn't know what she can do, she is too old to work, and she has no one left to take care of her.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN

In Batticaloa, I saw Muslim, Tamil, and Burgher villages erased by the wave. Women repeatedly approached me to tell me their stories. They often sobbed. They clearly wanted to be heard and to get help.

The National Child Protection Authority was in the process of determining the number of children that are orphaned. They will try to trace family members, then will turn to fostering, adoption, and orphanages according to the UNICEF representative. According to the UNICEF representative, since the tsunami hit on a Sunday, most families were together. According to Tammie Wilcuts of Save the Children, more parents are missing children than children are orphaned.

SCHOOLS

As I visited villages in Ampara with staff from USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives, I could see that a significant percentage of the coastal schools were damaged completely or partially. Some schools can be salvaged but others cannot.

UNICEF was helping some set up temporary schools. UNICEF provides the plastic sheeting for the roof and the parents are scrounging for wood to make frames. UNICEF also provides school kits—a box with a blackboard, notebooks, pencils, etc.—almost everything you need to start classes. However, these temporary schools will be wholly inadequate in the rain. And everyone thinks the temporary schools will be in place for at least 6 months. The Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team was looking at how they can provide engineering expertise to rebuild some of the schools, USAID was coordinating masons and providing tools for volunteers.

ENVIRONMENT AND FISHING

Many argued that the destruction from the tsunami was aggravated by the destruction of coral and mangroves in Sri Lanka.

Reportedly, more than half of the 28,000 vessels in Sri Lanka were damaged or lost in the tsunami. As most of the fishing boats on Sri Lanka are made of fiberglass, repairs are costly. Fishing is an important industry on the island. Not only does it provide the economic base to coastal villages, the industry provides the main source of protein in the common Sri Lankan's diet. The economic ripple effect of the loss of so many seacraft was very evident at camps around the country. Resurrecting this important industry is vital to the interests of the nation's coastal areas.

One problem in Sri Lanka before the tsunami was overfishing—especially near the coast because people here had (and will have again) small boats (40 ft.) that don't allow them to go out far. The FAO was working with people to get them to pool to buy bigger boats that can go out farther and mitigate the coastal problem. The Sri Lankan Prime Minister asserted that fishermen from other countries fish in Sri Lankan waters.

The following persons met with me in Sri Lanka:

U.S. Embassy

Jeffrey Lunstead, Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives

David Williams, Vice Consul

Dean Thompson, Foreign Service Officer

Patricia Mahoney, Foreign Service Officer

Prasad Gajaweera, Political Specialist, U.S. Embassy

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Carol Becker, Mission Director
 Bill Berger, Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
 Justin Sherman, Country Representative, Office of Transition Initiatives
 Benjamin Kauffeld, Health & Humanitarian Assistance Program Manager
 Solita Muthukrishna, Project Management Assistant
 Lionel Jayaratne
 Wayne Brook, Regional Program Manager (Ampara) for Office of Transition Initiatives
 Vani Nalayanee, Grants Specialist for Office of Transition Initiatives
 Al Sadath, Office of Transition Initiatives

Other U.S. Government

Brigadier General Panter, U.S. Marine Corps

Sri Lankan Government

Prime Minister Rajapakse
 Tara de Mel, National Operations Center Coordinator
 U.L. Hashim, Director of Education, Zonal Education
 Commanding Officer Wickramaratne, Air Force Squadron Leader
 M.K. Pathmanathan, Minister of Parliament

International Organizations

Peter Harrold, Country Director, World Bank
 Jeremy Carter, Senior Resident Representative, IMF
 Miguel Bermeo, Resident Representative, UNDP
 Wallaya Pura, Acting Representative, U.N. High Commission for Refugees
 Edward Chaiban, Head of Mission/Representative, UNICEF
 Dr. Denham Paul, Consultant, World Health Organization
 Jeff Taft-Dick, Country Director, World Food Program
 Mazlan Jusoh, Representative, Food and Agricultural Organization

Non-Governmental Organizations

Kushil Gunasekera, Unconditional Compassion
 Peter Bell, President, CARE USA
 Scott Faiia, Country Director, CARE Sri Lanka
 Robert Go, Media Adviser, CARE Sri Lanka
 Vasuki Jayashankar, Project Director, Prevention of Gender-based Violence, CARE Sri Lanka
 Jose Ravano, Emergency Coordinator, CARE Sri Lanka
 Nilan Fernando, Representative in Sri Lanka, The Asia Foundation
 Tammie Wilcuts, Save the Children
 Matthew Parry, Regional Associate, International Disaster Response Unit, American Red Cross
 Lynne Robinson, Mercy Corps

Sri Lankans affected by the Tsunami

P.H. Punayasiri
 Sedhu Segeruma
 Megeni Avama
 Rosalyn Peralya
 M.H. Susilawathie
 K. Punyawathie
 K. Somawathie
 L. Neel Samantha Silva
 R.E. Ganatilaka
 Manel Galage
 D.P. Upasiri
 Alageiedh Sarasinamam
 Padidah Ismael
 Palliani

Other Sri Lankans

P. Perera, KPMG
 A. de Silva, volunteer coordinator of Taiwanese doctors
 S. de Silva, tourist industry
 M. Mahendrajah, retired
 S. Weerasinghe, retired
 D. Weerasinghe, homemaker

Canadian Disaster Assistance Response Team

Bill Wyman, coordinates Canadian Military with NGOs
 Mr. Gilbert, volunteer coordinator
 Mr. Yergeau, field engineer
 Mr. D'arcangelo, water and sanitation
 Mr. Bettis, construction

My Trip Schedule


- 1/8 Departed D.C.
- 1/9 En route to Colombo, Sri Lanka.
- 1/10 Arrived in Colombo, met with Ambassador Lunstead and USAID Mission Director Carol Becker.
- 1/11 Toured tsunami-affected areas in Galle, Hikkaduwa, and Seenigama, witnessed U.S. Marines clearing rubble at a school, a cleanup project with local volunteers, the distribution of aid at a relief center for displaced persons, and a damaged tourist hotel. Observed National Operations Center.
- 1/12 Met with international organizations including the World Bank, UNICEF, U.N. Development Program, the World Health Organization, and the World Food Program.
- 1/13 Toured tsunami-affected areas in Batticaloa, Kattankudy, Kurukkalmadam, Dutch Bar, and Navalady, met with CARE staff, observed a relief distribution in affected community.
- 1/14 Toured tsunami-affected areas in southern Ampara including Oluvil, Palamanai, Akkarapatu, Tirrukkovil, Komari, and Pottuvil. Observed damaged public schools and saw temporary schools supported in part by UNICEF. Visited IDP camps.
- 1/15 Toured tsunami-affected areas in northern Ampara including Kalmunai, Karaitivu, and Nitavur. Saw political groups providing relief.
- 1/16 Meetings with individuals and organizations in Colombo.
- 1/17 Returned to D.C.

*Background on Sri Lanka*⁸

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (formerly known as Ceylon) is an island in the Indian Ocean with a population of about 19 million.

- Sinhalese make up 74 percent of the population and are concentrated in the densely populated southwest.
- Ceylon Tamils, citizens whose South Indian ancestors have lived on the island for centuries, total about 12 percent and live predominantly in the north and east.
- Indian Tamils, a distinct ethnic group, represent about 5 percent of the population. The British brought them to Sri Lanka in the 19th century as tea and rubber plantation workers, and they remain concentrated in the "tea country" of south-central Sri Lanka.
- Other minorities include:
 - Muslims, about 7 percent of the population;
 - Burghers, who are descendants of European colonists, principally from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (U.K.); and
 - Aboriginal Veddahs.
- Most Sinhalese are Buddhist; most Tamils are Hindu. The majority of Sri Lanka's Muslims practice Sunni Islam. Sizable minorities of both Sinhalese and Tamils are Christians, most of whom are Roman Catholic.

⁸Drawn mainly from State Department <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5249.htm>.

Map of Sri Lanka⁹

⁹ <http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/srilanka.html>

The CHAIRMAN. This disaster has taken an incredible toll on children. The United Nations Children's Fund estimates that children comprise more than one-third of all deaths. Tens of thousands of children have lost family members and friends and are coping with unspeakable trauma. Nearly 35,000 children have been orphaned, and many more have been separated from their families. In addition to facing the risks of disease, hunger, and exposure, these children are vulnerable to being trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced labor, conscription, and other purposes.

I would like to highlight three initiatives undertaken by this committee that deal specifically with the problems faced by children and other vulnerable populations.

First, today I am introducing a resolution urging the United States to ratify “The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children,” and the underlying “U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.” U.S. ratification of these agreements would improve our ability to coordinate law enforcement efforts designed to protect children and vulnerable populations. We also must encourage other nations to ratify these agreements, which require parties to criminalize trafficking in persons and to cooperate with international law enforcement responses to trafficking.

Second, today I will reintroduce “The Assistance for Orphans and Other Vulnerable Children in Developing Countries Act of 2005.” I originally introduced this bill in 2004. It would help address the consequences of the catastrophic growth in the number of children orphaned by AIDS and other causes. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, an estimated 14 million children have been orphaned by AIDS, and this number is projected to soar to more than 25 million by 2010. The bill would support community-based organizations assisting these children, reaffirm our commitment to the international school lunch program, and develop ways to reduce school fees so that orphans are not forced to leave school because of cost, and promote the establishment and enforcement of inheritance rights for women and children. Although the bill is aimed at the AIDS orphan crisis, it would be applicable to the orphans who lost their families in the tsunami disaster.

I want to thank the five cosponsors of this bill: Senators Boxer, Chafee, Coleman, Feingold, and Smith. They have been active in the bill’s development and they have demonstrated an unwavering commitment to achieving bipartisan success on this important bill.

Third, Senator Biden and I are working on a bipartisan legislative effort targeted at providing greater protection to women, children, and other vulnerable populations in the context of war or disaster. This is an issue of longstanding interest to Senator Biden, and he introduced the original “Women and Children in Conflict Protection Act” during the last Congress. We are consulting closely on how to craft a bill that would gain broad support within the Senate so it could be passed in this session.

The tsunami disaster has provided a tragic model of what can happen to women, children, the elderly, and the disabled in the aftermath of disaster or conflict. These vulnerable populations face extreme risks during periods of instability or upheaval. In addition to threats from trafficking, abuse, and other predatory activities, vulnerable populations are sometimes blocked from assistance flowing to disaster areas by stronger or more politically connected groups. Our staffs witnessed this problem while traveling in the Indian Ocean region.

And I appreciate Senator Biden’s steadfast leadership on this issue and his commitment to getting this bill passed. I am hopeful that our hearing today will provide additional insights that can be applied to perfecting this legislation.

Today we are joined by three distinguished panels. They will discuss the United States and international responses to the tsunami.

On the first panel, we welcome our friend, the distinguished Senator, Majority Leader Bill Frist, who has traveled to the Indian Ocean region to personally review relief efforts.

On the second panel, we welcome Alan Larson, Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Andrew Natsios, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development. We look forward to the insights of these three friends of the committee and to hearing how their respective agencies are contributing to the relief effort.

On our third panel, we welcome Daniel Toole, Director of the Office of Emergency Programs at UNICEF; Mary McClymont, President and CEO of InterAction; and Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps. They will provide us with perspectives on the role of the United Nations and the NGO community.

We thank all of these witnesses for joining us today and for sharing their thoughts on what has been done in response to the disaster and what can be done better in the future.

I recognize now our distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR
FROM DELAWARE**

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

You listed the witnesses we are about to have. One of the witnesses we are going to hear today is a man who has been before this committee many times and a man whose judgment we relied on over the years in both Republican and Democratic administrations, Alan Larson. He is going to be leaving Government service shortly, and I just want to publicly acknowledge what an incredibly fine job he has done, how well he has served the committee when he has been here, how well he has served the country. He is a model of the professionalism that exists in many places in our Government. I want to publicly acknowledge that at this time.

I also want to explain at the outset, Mr. Chairman, at 10:15 I will have to leave. I am also a member of the Judiciary Committee. It is hard to believe, but 8 years ago I helped draft a bankruptcy bill that I think is rational. We have passed it repeatedly with overwhelming majorities: 89 and 87 and 91 votes, and it is still not in play. It is being marked up again today. So I apologize to the witnesses that because of my long, long investment in this piece of legislation, which I am blamed for having written and I must take part of the blame for, I will be leaving.

The third point I would like to make, before I read my brief statement, is that I have taken out of the statement any of the references that you made about the humanitarian disaster. I do it not to deemphasize how startling and of what biblical proportions this disaster was, but just in the interest of time.

Mr. Chairman, I want to begin by commending you not only for calling this hearing but for your continued leadership. The list of legislation that you have listed today is a testament to how seriously you take your oversight responsibility and how clearly you

understand what the core remaining problems are. The idea that we are going to have millions of homeless children in Africa, that we have the devastation and the homelessness of the young children in this region of South Asia has not only humanitarian impact, it has phenomenal consequences for the development of those countries and phenomenal consequences, quite frankly, for our ultimate security. So I compliment you.

Six weeks ago, to state the obvious, the people of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and at least a half a dozen other countries were struck by a disaster, as I said, of biblical proportions. The scale of the devastation was literally beyond comprehension. I recall when the first reports came by that, maybe, there were 30,000 dead and how absolutely shocked we were and the world was. But, my Lord, we are now talking about something between 160,000 and 180,000, maybe as many as above 200,000 dead. These numbers are mind-numbing, but every single one of these numbers is an individual that represents a dreadful, unique loss for their families and for humanity.

Americans, like people all over the globe, were heartbroken, and like people around the world, we responded with generosity and dedication. The outpouring of private charitable contributions was something wonderful to behold, a sense of commitment that will, I hope—I always hope when these things happen—carry over to other humanitarian crises elsewhere in the world and maybe begin to change our attitudes slightly about how we look at one another.

But I want to just take a moment to comment on our military, the sailors and marines, along with a number of other services, who have earned the deep gratitude not only of the people of the tsunami-hit nations, but all of the world. The deployment of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier group and the military assets demonstrated a point that is of tremendous value: America's military might enables us to be a formidable enemy but also a very, very, very powerful friend. This is a point that, I think, is too often unrecognized. We have shown from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans that our fighting men and women are second to none. We do not always have the opportunity to demonstrate the other side of the coin: Our military's enormous capacity for saving and serving human lives.

I came to this body, not unlike you, Mr. Chairman, a long time ago, a product of the Vietnam generation and not particularly enamored with our military when I arrived in 1972. But I must tell you, in my travels around the world—and I have made it a point, as many of you have, including our first witness, of going to every place of conflict that we have men and women in war, in battle, risking their lives, since I have been a Senator. And without fail, the single most competent people at restoring life—at restoring life—not just taking life, restoring life—have been our military.

I was giving Mr. Natsios a little bit of grief earlier today, in a private meeting here, about why we have not been able to disseminate more of the aid that we voted for for Iraq, the \$18.4 billion. He accurately pointed out AID has done their job well. And I said, what about Fallujah? I said I go over there and talk to the military guys and they say, give me some money, we can help get this done. He said it is being done. We are working with them.

But it is astounding. I just think it is important that our people know that our military—they are the same kids, the second lieutenant who stands there in Brcko in northern Bosnia, that as you see a group of 25 people carrying axes and sickles, literally walking down a street of a neighborhood about to reclaim a home that was theirs, that was a Bosniak home, from a Serb who may be living there. And it is a young second lieutenant standing in the middle of the street, going whoa, wait a minute, fellows, and peacefully taking care of it.

Or the second cavalry in Sadr City, led by Corelli, a general who can shoot straight and kill if he has to, but who stands there and he says, give me PVC pipe and let me run it out of the back of these homes into the Tigris so the sewage does not pile up in their front streets, and when he does it, the incidents of conflict diminish.

So it is not a mere afterthought, that I point out today, that our military is involved in saving lives, as well as defending us and necessarily sometimes taking lives of bad guys.

As a two-star admiral, in command of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* carrier group, told a visiting congressional delegation—and I am paraphrasing because I was not on that delegation. Someone apparently asked him, was this a distraction from all the strains on the military in terms of fighting the wars we have to fight today. And he said, I am told the quote was, this is not a distraction from our job, it is our job.

In humanitarian terms, there is simply no other institution in the world that could have delivered the assets and capabilities of the U.S. military. From helicopters to water desalinization plants, the Navy had it all and they got it on the scene within 1 week of an initial call.

In political terms—and it may not be politically correct to raise this—this represents an example of supremely effective and cost effective public diplomacy in the extreme. It demonstrated a simple, yet often-overlooked point: Good deeds breed good will.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, as I try to shorten this statement, that some of the questions that we should explore include—yesterday the administration announced it will increase our pledge for relief and reconstruction to \$950 million, in other words, an additional \$600 million over the \$350 million already committed and basically spent. I applaud the President for that. But the questions I have are: What can we do to ensure full transparency for our pledge so Americans and the world know that we are spending this money wisely?

What can we do to assure equal transparency on the part of the governments with whom we are working? To be blunt, some of the governments in the affected countries have a history of endemic corruption, and some of their militaries have a poor record with respect to human rights.

What can we do to ensure that our money gets to the affected people themselves long after news cameras have decamped from four other sites?

And what can we do to ensure that our funding does not help fuel civil conflicts rather than resolve them?

Mr. Chairman, this tragedy is a challenge to the United States, a challenge to demonstrate to the world just how generous and open-hearted the American people are and the American Government can be; a challenge to engage in cooperation with the world community, to show the world, and particularly the Muslim world, just what sort of powerful friend we can be. We must meet this challenge, and I believe the administration should be complimented for the way in which they have approached this challenge.

I want to make it clear about accountability. Given the option between taking a risk on not having sufficient accountability but potentially saving thousands of lives or altering the circumstance of the people in the region, I am willing to take that risk. But nonetheless, we still should have transparency, as best we can, as it relates to the use of these moneys by the governments to whom we are providing the money.

Again, I thank you for your leadership. I apologize for delaying the majority leader who has a busy schedule. As I used to tell his predecessor, the job is not worth the car, but I am glad he has it. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the distinguished ranking member. I compliment him on his conscientious attendance over in Judiciary for his important work, even as he does the Lord's work here in this committee.

It is a real privilege to welcome my friend and our distinguished Republican leader, Bill Frist, a gifted physician who has, in fact, throughout his public career, been on the scene to minister to people. Once again, he has done so in this case. We look forward to your testimony. Thank you for coming. Please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, U.S. SENATOR FROM
TENNESSEE**

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be back in this room with you and your members. I will be brief. You have an outstanding series of panels to follow, but I do appreciate the opportunity to share some experiences that I had when I and Senator Mary Landrieu went to South Asia several days after the tsunami struck.

Right up front, from that first day that we set foot in Sri Lanka, it was apparent that the United States was leading in terms of providing relief, assisting with recovery, and the rebuilding of that part of the world. We must all be thankful for and commend our Government agencies, especially the military personnel who Senator Biden so appropriately commented on, and the American people, and all who responded in a timely and immediate way. It was apparent on the ground that the United States was leading that effort.

The death and destruction is not exactly as you see on television and have read about, but actually much worse. The human face of this tragedy is terrible: Over 35,000 orphans; the fact that more than a third of the people who died were children; the fact that the more than 1 million people who have lost their homes are still homeless, now a month and a half later.

I do want to stress the compassion that we saw on the ground: The aid workers, the military men and women, the doctors that

came in, the engineers that arrived from the United States to clear the roads and, indeed, from all over the world. Our friends around the world, as we saw, also contributed generously.

I know you will be talking a lot about the sum of money that the administration has requested, and that I encourage us all to be strongly supportive of. For every dollar that has been requested, there has been a dollar matched by our private charities, by charitable giving in this country. It is totally different when we compare our private sector aid and giving to official assistance from around the world; the degree of generosity and compassion expressed by individual citizens—that outpouring—is somewhere between \$800 million and \$900 million thus far.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take the opportunity to focus on one element that we responded to well, and introduces the success of the short-term response, but what I would encourage this committee to focus on in the future. It involves the absence of clean water and access to clean water and sanitation.

In the tsunami area, lack of clean water emerges as one of the most pressing problems. As the tsunami came in, the salt water contaminated, immediately, the wells along the coast, and water containers that had been held in the homes all along the coast. You would fly for hundreds of miles along this coast with this unending destruction. But water containers were washed away and, of course, shelter and homes were washed away as well.

We visited the refugee camps. Many of them were local schools that were taken over, and clearly not equipped from a sanitation standpoint, or a water supply standpoint, to provide for the people.

Our military response was superb; over 400,000 gallons of fresh water were shipped in. Senator Landrieu and I participated in the delivery of USAID supplies, which focused on water availability, whether it was chlorine or whether it was private sector sachets to clean water, or whether it was infant solution called Pedialyte, where an immediate response of nutrition and water could be provided.

As you flew over the beaches in Sri Lanka, water would come in and large pools would collect—a real potential breeding ground for mosquito-borne diseases: malaria, dengue fever, and the like. An immediate response to prevent disease would be to dredge and remove those pools of water so that we did not have these water-borne illnesses: cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, and the like. We did not see outbreaks, however, because of the immediacy of that response in a number of other areas.

Now, I bring this issue to the attention of this committee in part to applaud this coming together, almost symphonic approach by our military, by our USAID personnel, by the private sector in those first couple of weeks because it prevented what could have been the No. 1 killer after the tsunami itself. I bring to this committee the real challenge—that we have to look at long-term solutions that were highlighted by the tsunami crisis regarding access to clean water. The facts are this.

One million, six hundred thousand children die every year because of lack of access to clean water; 1.6 million children. Lack of clean water is the No. 1 killer of children in the world because of water-borne diseases.

One billion, two hundred million people in the world do not have access to clean water, and this refers back to the bills that the chairman talked about introducing in terms of our focus on relief, and a much broader response to global poverty and overall development.

Two billion, four hundred thousand people in the world do not have access to basic sanitation. Worldwide, in the next 15 years, 135 million people likely will die—135 million people will die in the next 15 years—because of water-borne illnesses.

Now, there are three points I want to make. First, clean water should become a major priority in our development programs. Today, it is not a focus. It is not a major priority. Right now the United States spends about \$600 million a year on clean water programs. That is only about 3 percent of our \$20 billion international aid budget. That proportion is simply not enough as we look at the impact of what prevention can do in terms of limiting water-borne illnesses, the No. 1 killer of children in the world today.

I will be continuing to work with members on this committee and their staff to introduce legislation that will make access to clean water one of our major foreign aid objectives. The legislation will coordinate and focus our clean water efforts. It will establish partnerships with a wide variety of governmental agencies, NGOs, and international bodies. It will require our aid and development agencies to develop an annual strategy to meet specific goals.

Second, I believe that we should leverage private dollars to develop water infrastructure around the world. We know that it would have an impact. Ultimately it is going to be the private companies, not state entities, who will do the hard work in developing infrastructure to deliver clean and abundant water. We saw it in the tsunami ravaged regions. It is the private sector that is coming in, building on the immediate response of the government sector, that ultimately will address long-term issues like housing and, in this case, clean water.

The third point and the last point that I will make, Mr. Chairman, is an issue that really plays out in the three bills that you mentioned, and I commend you for all three of those bills. And it also reflects on the comments of Senator Biden. That is, as we look at diplomacy, issues of health and public health and medicine can be used as a currency of peace. I am absolutely convinced of this. That is why I bring up this issue of water because for the investment up front, the outcome, the influence on peace, I am absolutely convinced there is great promise.

Several things can be done that really center on this personal contact of addressing public health, of addressing medicine as a currency of peace. One would be a piece of legislation that I am working on, again with members on this committee, and that is to establish a global health corps. A global health corps that can be mobilized very quickly to go into areas like the tsunami region; that can be on the ground within hours, but also a global health corps that can take advantage of the compassion, the outpouring of support by my colleagues today who, as physicians, do want to be able to participate on an ongoing basis. Public diplomacy, I believe, can greatly be improved and heightened by focusing on providing public health services abroad.

This global health corps concept is one that I hope to be introducing shortly. An element of that would be having a Peace Corps-like global health corps available for immediate response, like in the tsunami, but on an ongoing basis.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I do believe that increasing the number of people with access to clean water will take time and commitment. The long-term goals are bold. It can be approached with incremental steps, and I would encourage this committee to do just that. The demographic, social, and environmental trends are grim. Over 130 million people will die because of lack of access to clean water. It is totally preventable. It offers a currency of peace that we are all looking for.

So, for the benefit of humanity and for the peace of the world, I think we need to take this challenge head on over the coming weeks and coming months. I do ask my colleagues to support these proposals, to embrace them, to build on them, and to make them work. By doing so, we can save millions of lives and give millions more the opportunity to live healthier, more fulfilling lives.

Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the opportunity to participate in this very important hearing, and I commend you for the legislation that you and the ranking member are introducing to further these causes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Frist, for these very important ideas and for your pledge to work on legislation. I know you will find many supporters in this committee. We look forward to working with you and our colleagues on the health corps idea and likewise on the need to provide water that is clean and sanitary to millions of people. We thank you for using this forum to outline these ideas today.

The chair now calls upon a distinguished panel that will be composed of the Honorable Alan Larson, Under Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs of the Department of State; the Honorable Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense; the Honorable Andrew Natsios, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development. Gentlemen, we welcome you once again as friends of the committee and thank you for coming to offer testimony today in this important hearing.

Let me suggest that you try to bring your comments into a 10-minute framework. The chair will not be excessively rigorous about this, but to the extent that we start in that framework, there will be ample time for questions from members.

I will call upon you in the way that I introduced you to begin with, and that will be, first of all, Secretary Larson, then Secretary Wolfowitz, and then Administrator Natsios. Would you please proceed.

Let me compliment you, along with our distinguished ranking member, for your distinguished service. We hope this will not be your last testimony before our committee, but we thank you for your particular contributions in this current office that you now hold.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Senator Biden and all the distinguished members of this committee for your leadership and for holding this hearing.

I appreciate very much the opportunity to brief you on the administration's response to the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami, but also and more importantly, I would like to sketch out some of the actions and issues that we must face in the future. With your permission, I would summarize my longer written statement which I would like to see submitted.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record in full.

Mr. LARSON. Wonderful.

In our written testimonies, my colleagues and I have outlined how the United States, our military, our foreign assistance officials, and our ambassadors and diplomats worked together quickly, collaboratively, and effectively to save lives and to begin the process of rebuilding.

The President's request for a \$950 million supplemental appropriation will not only replenish the costs incurred to date, but it will also position the United States to continue to play a leading role in rebuilding infrastructure and in helping the victims of this disaster restore their livelihoods. It will also enable the United States to lead in international efforts to create an expanded and improved early warning system for natural disasters and to participate in any debt deferrals, as may be appropriate. We do ask for the support of the Congress in quickly approving the President's request.

Going forward, the State Department will work very closely with all agencies, and particularly with USAID, to establish policy on tsunami relief and recovery funding, and the United States will work closely with host governments, with the United Nations, and with other donors to make sure that our funding is part of a well-coordinated and effective effort.

From the very first hours, our embassies in the field were working with local officials to identify needs, to disburse emergency assistance, to obtain overflight clearances, and otherwise facilitate the work of our military and USAID colleagues.

Here in Washington, the State Department stood up an inter-agency policy task force, and my colleague, Under Secretary Marc Grossman, called together an ad hoc international core group to coordinate the first essential stages of the international response.

At the same time, the State Department's consular affairs officials immediately began responding to over 30,000 requests about the welfare and whereabouts of Americans who could possibly have been affected by the tsunami. We have now narrowed down to 12 the number of unresolved cases. At the moment there are 18 Americans confirmed dead and 15 presumed dead.

If I were to draw, Mr. Chairman, some preliminary lessons today that we have learned and that we want to apply going forward, they would include the following. The ability of all of us—but I will speak specifically of the State Department, our embassies and our consular affairs officials—to respond strongly and effectively was

greatly enhanced by our diplomatic readiness program that increased our surge capacity. We thank the Congress for its support of this diplomatic readiness program and want to work with you to be able to maintain it in the future.

Second, quick, ad hoc, informal, collaborative coordination, both within the U.S. Government and between the U.S. Government and other international players, is crucial at the early stage of a complex emergency.

Third, military-to-military cooperation is critical. For example, our cooperation with the Indonesian military was excellent, but former Secretary Powell commented that it could have been even better if there had been more opportunities for training, interaction, and cooperation through military-to-military cooperative programs.

Fourth, the United Nations organizations, including the Emergency Relief Coordinator, the World Food Program, UNICEF, the World Health Organization, and others, played a crucial role in the international response. We do not see a need for a new international disaster assistance body separate from the Emergency Relief Coordinator. We do believe, however, that the lines of authority and communication within the U.N. system could be strengthened.

Fifth, in an era where Americans travel throughout the world, we are going to need to clarify to the authorities that we need to extend forensic identification and mortuary services to countries that experience natural disasters.

Sixth, as has been commented already, the outpouring of over \$800 million of private contributions has demonstrated the compassion of the American people, and the capabilities that the private sector has, to contributing to disaster relief and to longer term development. And we are going to need to work somewhat more systematically with the private sector through organizations like the Chamber of Commerce to put in place the mechanisms to ensure that this assistance is well channeled and well targeted.

Seventh, perhaps the most important step we can take going forward, is to work with other countries to improve their capacity to respond to natural and manmade disasters. This includes sharing best practices, training first responders, sharing technology. In fact, that is exactly what we are going to be doing as we work to expand and strengthen the international early warning systems for natural disasters such as tsunamis.

In 1993, the General Accounting Office, looking at the United States noted that—and I am quoting here—“fewer Federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic disaster if State and local governments are integral parts of an effective national disaster response system.” That ends the quote.

I think looking internationally and looking into the future, a critical challenge is to improve the capacity of other nations to be effective and integral parts of an international disaster response system. We need to think carefully about how to stimulate these improved capacities, working through networks such as the G-8, APEC, ASEAN, and the various regional organizations.

I think this may be similar in some respects to the lessons we learned after 9/11/2001 about cross-border terrorism. One of those lessons was that we needed to strengthen political will, and the ca-

capacity of other national governments around the world, to combat terrorism, to curtail the flow of financing to terrorist organizations, and to keep their own transportation systems safe and secure. And since then, we have worked very hard with partners around the world on new initiatives to strengthen awareness, political will, and the capacity to deal with these problems.

The final lesson I would draw, Mr. Chairman, is simple; that is, when danger approaches or disaster strikes, there is no substitute for active American leadership and engagement. The American response to the Indian Ocean tsunami has given the world fresh insight to the character of America. We need to build on this foundation, and to do that, the President's supplemental request is of critical importance.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALAN LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Six weeks have passed since a deadly earthquake and tsunamis struck countries in Asia and Africa. The countries and people struck by this disaster are now beginning to turn from the immediate task of saving the lives of family and friends, to the long-term and even more difficult work of rebuilding homes, livelihoods and communities. The best estimates by affected country governments and the United Nations report more than 161,000 dead in seven countries over two continents, and another 139,000 still missing. Over 1.1 million people are displaced.

The U.S. Government, in partnership with the affected countries, the international community, and the United Nations, will continue to provide food, shelter, water and sanitation to those in need. As President Bush said, "The government of the United States is committed to helping the people who suffer. We're committed today and we will be committed tomorrow." Americans have great sympathy and respect for the people of devastated communities, who have come together to search for the living, bury the dead, care for those who have lost families and livelihoods and rebuild their lives.

National and local governments in the countries hit by the tsunami, the multilateral development banks and bilateral donors, including the United States, are working together to assess medium- and long-term damage and needs. Even in the worst hit areas, such as Aceh and the coastline of Sri Lanka, rehabilitation and reconstruction have begun. Preliminary assessments produced jointly by the tsunami-affected governments, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, USAID and other partners place damage and loss costs at \$4.5 billion in Indonesia and \$1.3 billion in Sri Lanka. While Maldives assessment has not yet been completed, Maldives' own assessment is that \$1.3 billion will be required for tsunami reconstruction. We expect refinements of these studies to be produced in the coming weeks.

To help meet these needs, the Administration is seeking \$950 million to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs of the U.S. Government's relief efforts to date. As President Bush said when announcing this request: "From our own experiences, we know that nothing can take away the grief of those affected by tragedy. We also know that Americans have a history of rising to meet great humanitarian challenges and of providing hope to suffering peoples. As men and women across the devastated region begin to rebuild, we offer our sustained compassion and our generosity, and our assurance that America will be there to help." The President and this Administration look forward to working with Congress to provide these funds quickly.

We recognize that the Committee seeks in this hearing to have a preliminary assessment of "lessons learned." The transition period now from relief to reconstruction and recovery provides a useful juncture at which to assess the effectiveness of the immediate response to the tsunami disaster by the U.S. Government, as well as other actors. We appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee some preliminary thoughts. The assessments and recommendations that follow result from informal interagency discussions, information from the State Department's embassies and USAID's missions.

In any disaster, the United States must be coordinated internally, as well as with other responders; these include government officials and non-governmental groups

in impacted countries and regions, the U.N. system, international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other responding nations. The sheer magnitude of the tsunami presented many challenges to all those who sought to provide assistance—many of these difficulties were met with remarkable speed and effectiveness. This is a success story, but as in any complex situation, there is also room to assess how things might have been done even better and how they can be improved in the future.

The United States is uniquely equipped and willing to contribute our resources to employ the many tools at our disposal in responding to international crises. The following series of simultaneous actions undertaken by the United States—often in conjunction with other actors—illustrate our process for responding to the tsunami crisis: (1) Taking care of American citizens; (2) coordinating government-wide mechanisms; (3) engaging the international community; and (4) engaging affected countries.

Taking Care of American Citizens: The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) established within 24 hours of the disaster a consular task force to handle inquiries from American citizens. Over the course of the first week, the Department received over 30,000 inquiries from all over the country and around the world about missing Americans. Of those tens of thousands of initial inquiries, we worked 15,112 inquiries on specific individuals who might have been in harm's way, and nearly all of these cases are resolved. The number of American confirmed dead is currently 18 and the number of presumed deaths is 15. We are hopeful this number will not rise any higher.

This remarkable response was facilitated by CA's standing practice of keeping "fly-away" teams on standby for crisis response. In the tsunami case, given the distance from Washington to the impact zone, CA initially deployed personnel to affected areas from neighboring Asian countries. We then sent in personnel from Washington as well as some from elsewhere who had specific language fluency. As in many crises, consular personnel were frequently assisted by locally resident American citizens who volunteer their services to help fellow citizens through the "warden" program. In this instance, the volunteer wardens were most helpful in getting messages to other Americans to phone home and reassure loved ones that they were okay.

Consular Affairs and embassies report good cooperation overall with local authorities and across Washington agencies to identify Americans who may have been harmed by the disaster. Three groups of issues have emerged that could improve the U.S. Government's ability to assist Americans overseas when a disaster strikes:

- *Technology:* Web-based tools, such as on-line inquiry forms, can help supplement telephone queries about missing Americans and improve our ability to rapidly process and cross check information (e.g., with flight manifests) from a variety of sources. CA will be expanding its use of technology along these lines, and sees no statutory impediment to such action in the context of the Privacy Act.
- *Surge Capacity:* While CA was able to respond quickly with fly-away teams, it is worth noting this capacity depends on the overall diplomatic readiness of the Department. We welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to maintain this capacity.
- *International Coordination:* CA maintains regular contact with key allies on crisis management objectives. We all recognize that our most important objective is to have a prompt, effective means of communicating with each other rather than fixed plans. During a crisis, it is essential that we share information on fast-breaking developments and available resources. Our experience during the tsunami reinforced our belief that this type of regular communication leads to effective coordination.

Coordinating Government-wide Mechanisms: Within the first day after the tsunami struck, U.S. Ambassadors and Embassy staff, including USAID missions, were on the ground working with national and regional governments to disburse emergency funds, identify relief needs, and provide rapid assistance. When the need for transport became apparent in Indonesia, the U.S. Ambassador was on the phone to Washington urgently requesting helicopters and the first sign of relief that victims saw in many regions was the helicopters of the United States Navy, bringing water, food and medicine to those in need. Within 72 hours after the tsunamis struck, the USS *Bonhomme Richard* and the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit had been turned around from their previous mission and sent steaming toward the Indian Ocean.

The State Department played a key role in laying the groundwork for our military and USAID's rapid response, including:

- On December 27 the State Department stood up a policy task force, established simultaneously with counterpart task forces at USAID/Response Management Team, the Department of Defense (DOD) and Pacific Command;
- Immediately after the tsunami struck, my colleague, Under Secretary Marc Grossman, called together and led an international “Core Group” that included Australia, Japan, India, Canada, the Netherlands and the United Nations to coordinate the first stages of the international response. This Core Group ensured one country did not duplicate the efforts of others, identified and filled gaps in the first days and broke logistical bottlenecks. As the United Nations mobilized and took on a central role in the relief response, the core group passed its coordinating functions to the United Nations;
- State worked quickly with DOD on contacting host governments to secure status of forces agreements, permission for our military to use foreign airspace and territorial waters to conduct relief operations;
- Embassies worked with local customs authorities to smooth entry of relief goods;
- The State Department task force processed the voluminous tsunami-related information pouring into Washington from the media and from embassies overseas, summarizing and distributing that information to the interagency via twice-daily situation reports; and
- The State task force also compiled and monitored the extensive USG emergency assistance in each affected country and the USG resources available to bring to bear.

The U.S. military and the U.S. Agency for International Development moved quickly and effectively to help those in need. I especially want to acknowledge the outstanding contributions of the U.S. Pacific Command. My colleagues on the panel will supply you with more details on the remarkable things they accomplished to establish the logistical backbone for the entire relief operation and to facilitate the work of the United Nations, NGOs and other donors.

The coordination effort required for dealing with the tsunami was one of the most complex ever attempted by a State Department task force or by the U.S. Government. The process worked extremely well especially in light of the magnitude of the tragedy. The task force provided vital insight and guidance that helped to shape the overall U.S. response and ensure coordination of U.S. and international relief efforts.

An initial review of our experience in responding to this disaster also suggested areas where the Administration and Congress can work together to ensure the United States has the resources and flexibility needed to speed help to those in need. For example:

- *Mass Casualty Disasters:* This disaster required the United States to respond to a mass casualty incident (other than terrorist-related) involving a large number of victims, both American and foreign, in several foreign countries. Although identifying the dead is not a foreign assistance issue, President Bush is seeking to replenish in the supplemental a special State Department account to fund efforts to identify the remains of Americans killed in a natural disaster overseas.
- *Private Donations:* The outpouring of donations from private U.S. individuals and companies to help in a disaster overseas posed new challenges in matching those who can contribute with those in need and coordinating private efforts with national governments and bilateral and multilateral donors.

There was close interaction between U.S. and foreign militaries during the crisis, and foreign militaries played a vital role in providing relief to the people of the region. In that light, it is worth reviewing U.S. capacity to interact with military forces in response to a humanitarian crisis, and to explore ways the United States can increase our training and capacity building assistance to foreign militaries for such operations.

The foreign military that was faced with the most extreme tsunami-related challenges was the Indonesian armed forces (TNI). As my DOD colleagues can attest, the cooperation between the TNI and the U.S. military was very good. But we believe it could have been better, and I would therefore like to briefly address the present legislative restriction on IMET for Indonesia.

The Department fully supports justice and accountability for the egregious acts of violence committed against our American citizens in Timika, Indonesia in 2002. The Department considers the protection of Americans abroad one of its most important responsibilities. We will continue to emphasize to the Indonesian Government that resolving this case and ensuring the safety of Americans in general are crucial to our overall relationship.

Our concern is not with the intended purpose of the legislative condition, but with the limitation on flexibility that it represents. The United States has many priorities in Indonesia, including strengthening democracy, promoting military reform and enhancing security cooperation, especially against terrorism. IMET is an extremely valuable tool that Congress provides to accomplish these objectives. For that reason Secretary Rice is examining these issues with a view toward working together with Congress to achieve our many critical interests in Indonesia.

Engaging the International Community: The Core Group model discussed above provides several good lessons going forward. First, coordinating donor response in the early stages of a crisis smoothes interactions with authorities in affected regions, maximizing needed assistance while not overwhelming local capacity. Related to this, a clear channel of interaction with the recipient government gives affected regions the opportunity to guide support according to their priorities, which is essential for assistance to be delivered effectively.

Second, including affected countries with extra capacity to help other victims builds regional cooperation and a sense of “ownership” of the relief effort and facilitates good relations with local authorities. For example, the inclusion of India in the core group smoothed the way for excellent military cooperation with India throughout the crisis. India’s participation was also seen, properly, as an acknowledgement by the United States of India’s growing international stature, and recognition of its transformation from being an aid recipient to a strong regional donor.

Finally, a flexible framework is important to responding quickly and effectively to a disaster situation. The State Department was able to rapidly pull together this group, which never had a physical meeting and established no bureaucracy in addressing critical issues. The composition of the Core Group was the right formulation to respond to the tsunami crisis. Core Group members were able to reach out quickly without the structural impediments that any kind of permanent structure might have imposed.

In addition to bilateral outreach, the State Department, along with USAID and DOD, coordinate closely on the ground and at the policy level with a range of U.N. agencies engaged in disaster relief. The U.N. system directs its policy-level and on-the-ground disaster response primarily through the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The ERC has a number of U.N. offices it can utilize to coordinate overall response, in particular the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). On the ground, OCHA sets up Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) to coordinate among U.N. agencies and with the affected countries, bilateral donors, military units and NGOs.

At the same time, independent U.N. agencies, such as the World Food Program (WFP), the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO), take on specific coordination and response leads related to their mandates. For example:

- The International Organization for Migration was there in the first days, and with USAID funding, provided the major share of truck transport and logistics for the crucial first few weeks;
- To combat measles in Aceh, where vaccination coverage was less than 50 percent before the tsunami, UNICEF began a measles campaign to vaccinate approximately 575,000 children;
- WHO established health sector meetings and, along with USAID and the U.S. Navy, initiated a series of assessments along Aceh’s western coast to determine the health profile and relief needs among the affected population; and
- WFP set up a logistic pipeline for rice and food commodities to Aceh and Meulaboh, and began a system of sea transport to reach areas not accessible by road.

At the policy level, the ERC participated in daily coordination calls of the Core Group. In addition, on the day of the Indian Ocean earthquake, the ERC dispatched teams of experts to help Sri Lanka and the Maldives assess the extent of the crisis. Once the multinational forward hub was established at Utapao, Thailand, the United Nations also positioned liaison officers there from WFP and the U.N. Joint Logistics Center (JLC). They worked alongside liaison officers from Thailand and bilateral agencies, including USAID. The HIC was set up quickly to establish coordinating meetings between all actors in the relief operation.

The United States experienced good coordination with the United Nations during the crisis, and the U.N. role was essential to the success of the overall international response. At the same time, it would have been helpful if the United Nations had deployed staff more quickly to the region and set up a more robust command and control operation to meet logistic and coordination requirements. The somewhat decentralized system wherein OCHA coordinates some aspects of the U.N.’s oper-

ations, while independent U.N. agencies simultaneously coordinate specific sectors, can lead to bottlenecks and delays.

The Administration does not believe it is necessary to establish a new disaster body separate from the U.N. Emergency Relief Coordinator and the offices it commands. In our preliminary analysis, however, it would be worthwhile to re-examine how the United Nations conducts disaster planning and response. Some specific ideas might include:

- *Lines of Authority*: Strengthening the ERC's lines of authority would better empower the ERC to manage the U.N. agencies with disaster relief as part of their mandate.
- *Communication*: Encouraging better communication between U.N. agencies and offices; institutionalizing mechanisms for coordination in the wake of a disaster that requires an immediate humanitarian response.
- *Streamlining*: Bringing some existing programs, which currently reside in various U.N. entities, under one existing office or agency instead of a new body. This could save money and improve effectiveness through streamlining, especially if the authority of the ERC were enhanced.

Addressing such reform is currently on the minds of some donors, such as the United Kingdom, which has raised these issues in context of their Presidency of the G-8.

Engaging Affected Countries: The people caught in a disaster are frequently also those who respond most quickly to the immediate needs of those around them. Governments and local authorities in the affected areas also set the priorities and goals for reconstruction and development as rebuilding begins. Thus, one of the most important ways to bolster disaster response capacity is to strengthen the capacity of local and national authorities to prepare for and coordinate their response to disasters.

Across the region hit by the earthquake and tsunamis, neighbors saved lives, brought medical assistance to the injured, and helped each other in heroic fashion. Many local and national governments responded amazingly well, especially given the magnitude of the disaster. For example:

- The governments of India, Malaysia, and Thailand marshaled resources quickly to help their own people and reached out quickly to other affected nations. India, in particular, has benefited from years of USAID funded training and support in emergency and disaster management which has greatly improved their ability to manage disasters on their own;
- The Sri Lankan Air Force, with its limited fleet, flew long hours on relief operations and supported numerous VIP visit requests and aid coordination requests. The Sri Lankan Air Force provided immediate evacuation services to foreign injured in remote parts of the country;
- Many Americans caught in the tsunami, who often showed up at the embassy with only their bathing suits left, were taken in immediately by Sri Lankan families and fed, housed, provided with some basic clothing, and, in some cases, given enough money to get back to Colombo.
- A group of Indonesian students from Java, with no relatives in Aceh, managed to get on a C-130 bound for Aceh to offer their help. Relief organizations quickly utilized them moving supplies.
- Thailand allowed the United States, the United Nations and the international community to use Utapao Air Base in northeast Thailand as a regional hub for humanitarian assistance to the affected areas.

As the United States considers how international capability to respond to disasters can be improved, we need to look first at how to build local disaster response capacity. Our own domestic disaster response model can serve as a reference point. When evaluating U.S. internal disaster response capability, the U.S. General Accounting Office concluded in 1993: "Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic disaster if state and local governments' response capabilities are greater . . . we emphasized that state and local governments are integral parts of an effective national disaster response system. The success or failure of any changes in the federal role in that system will always be heavily affected by the efforts of state and local responders."

Other countries can apply this same concept to augment their own domestic disaster mitigation and emergency response capacities. Within our current resources, the United States can continue to use such mechanisms as:

- *Encouraging countries to review and exercise their disaster response systems*: This will help them to discover ahead of time and prepare for possible problems like bottlenecks in the distribution network.

- *Sharing best practices:* For example, Florida Governor Jeb Bush is discussing with Thailand ways to share Florida's experiences in dealing with the hurricanes that struck Florida last year.
- *Enhancing training for first responders:* In the wake of the Gujarat earthquake that struck India, the United States launched and continues to provide first responder training. In Bangladesh, following the typhoon, we helped the country install storm shelters and initiate first responder training. The United States can also look to other areas where we have provided extensive training. For example, by the end of 2004, the United States had provided, through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, counterterrorism training to almost 41,000 law enforcement personnel in 148 countries.
- *Sharing technology:* We are working with United Nations agencies and other donor nations to develop an early warning system for natural disasters in the Indian Ocean, and the President's supplemental budget request supports this need. We might also consider compiling and exercising internet-based networks and databases to facilitate coordination in responding to disasters.

The U.S. response to the tsunami shows the value of prompt and effective American action, combined with multilateral support for disaster victims. There are a number of areas international disaster response can be improved by streamlining existing mechanisms and, above all, improving the capacity of local authorities to respond to crises. Every disaster presents a unique set of challenges, but by disseminating best response practices, providing training for first responders and ensuring clear lines of communication, the United States and the international community can most effectively deliver its vast quantity of existing support.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Larson.
I would like to call now upon Secretary Wolfowitz.

**STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC, ACCOMPANIED BY BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS**

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing. Thank you for the opportunity to testify and thanks for your leadership and that of the U.S. Congress in helping to lead this international effort in providing relief for what is one of the largest humanitarian disasters in living memory.

As you know, yesterday the President announced a very large request for supplemental funding to help see us not only through this emergency relief effort, which by our account, I think, will cost roughly almost \$350 million, but an additional \$600 million on top of that to support the long-term recovery.

You have my statement. I would just like to make a few summary points.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made complete in the record.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all, just to observe the sheer scale of this disaster. It is commonly said that quantity has a quality all its own, and, I think that is worth thinking about in this circumstance. It hit me first, even before going out to the region, when I met with an Indonesian from Aceh, who works in Washington, who lost his entire family, except for an aunt and uncle who live here, in this disaster. I asked him how many people he lost. He said 200. In other words, it is not just his immediate family, it is his entire extended family. When you think about that and you think about the situation of an orphan in that setting who has not only lost his parents, but probably lost the entire community that in normal circumstances he could look to for support, I think you have a sense of how the scale of this disaster has created qualitatively different problems.

Another illustration—and it bears very much on this request for funding—is the scale of the recovery operation, which is something that I did not fully appreciate until I went out there, and neither did Admiral Fargo, our commander of Pacific forces. Even though we had been extensively briefed on the extent of the damage and we had had detailed briefings in Thailand about the damage to the bridges along the road on the coast, the two impressions that Admiral Fargo and I took away overwhelmingly was, one, how this destruction just goes on for mile after mile after mile. And second, we looked at the 36 bridges and realized that if you repaired all 36 of them, there is still no road in between them. The ground in many places has subsided 2 or 3 feet and there is a question as to whether the road should be rebuilt in the same place at all.

The recovery effort here is going to be huge and no country could undertake that scale of recovery on its own. No developing country certainly.

Second, to say a word about the U.S. military contribution. You have heard a lot about it. I am going to repeat things you have heard already, but I do not think we can say enough good things about what our incredible men and women have been doing. Thanks also to the American taxpayer who has put a huge investment in the ships and aircraft that made this possible. We did a rough count of the 26 ships, 58 helicopters, and 43 fixed-wing aircraft that have engaged in this operation. They represent \$28 billion of American taxpayer investment in our military, just the equipment alone, not to mention the people who are, in many ways, a bigger investment. Without that, even with this supplemental funding, we would not have been able to deliver that emergency assistance. But with that, we were able to deliver 10 million pounds of food and medicine, 400,000 gallons of fresh water. We have been able to treat 2,500 patients and we are still treating some on board the hospital ship *Mercy*.

There is no way to count them, Mr. Chairman, but judging just from the fact that there were 750,000 or more displaced persons and in western Indonesia, those people were in locations that were inaccessible by any other means than helicopter, I think one can safely assume that tens of thousands of lives were saved by that effort. And the kind of medical disaster that we all feared did not happen, probably in no small measure because people were kept healthy.

Third, to emphasize the importance of this recovery effort. As impressive as the emergency relief operation has been and as much as we can compliment our military for their contribution, indeed, the entire international community for coming so quickly to the rescue, it would be like a relay race where the baton is dropped by the next runner if we do not continue what is going to be a huge effort on the recovery side. We have, in my view, very important reasons to make sure that that baton is not dropped, not only because we owe it to the orphans who are trying to face life without their families, without their communities as a purely humanitarian matter, but also having made this large investment in the emergency effort, speaking, at least, for the Department of Defense, we would hate to see people say, well, it was a nice start but the finish was terrible.

But finally—and this would be my last point. I would like to go into some detail—the fact that the largest single disaster area happens to be in Indonesia, I think gives it especial importance. As you know, I was Ambassador to Indonesia for 3 years, but I am not speaking here as a former Ambassador to Indonesia. I am speaking as someone who is very concerned about the larger strategic situation we are in, in the world today, who believes in what the President spoke about, about the importance of freedom and democracy in combating extremism, and the fact, which is often known but insufficiently appreciated, that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country in the world and it combines that with a long tradition of religious tolerance. In fact, Indonesia recognizes not only Islam but Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism as official religions of the country.

Most importantly, starting about 7 years ago, Indonesia has emerged as one of the more successful developing democracies in the third world. It started in 1997 with what was commonly called an economic tsunami that engulfed not only Indonesia but many other countries of South Asia and East Asia which led, more or less directly, to the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in the spring of 1998. That was followed, to summarize a lot in two sentences, by two free and fair Presidential elections, the first in 1999 and the second one completed just last September, as remarkable, I think in its own way, as the elections in Afghanistan and the Palestinian Authority and Iraq that have gotten more international attention.

One of the things that was impressive about that election is that it brought into office a President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who ran on a platform promising effective government, promising to combat corruption, promising to maintain the religious tolerance and inclusiveness of the country. And he earned an overwhelming popular mandate. It speaks to his leadership and it speaks, I think, to the Indonesian voters.

But that government with its new mandate is now put to the test, and clearly meeting that test in responding to the recovery efforts in Aceh, if they can do it successfully, will strengthen democratic institutions in Indonesia and reinforce that country's tradition of tolerance. But it is a huge test and it is a test made all the more difficult because of the specific circumstances of Aceh.

If you will indulge me for just a minute. Aceh is a small province, its people with their own language, a very distinctive culture, a very distinctive and independent history for a long time. The Dutch only began colonizing Aceh, in fact, in the late 19th century.

In recent years, there has been a bitter war because an armed movement, seeking independence in that province, has been fighting the Indonesian military. I believe the United States and all the countries of the Asia Pacific region have an interest in preserving the unity of Indonesia and that the best way to do that is through a peaceful resolution of this ongoing struggle. That is going to be a factor in the recovery efforts. If those tensions between the Government of Indonesia for the Indonesian military on the one hand and the local population on the other are not managed properly, they will interfere with the recovery effort. On the other hand, I am more hopeful that the common interest of all parties in achieving the goal of successful recovery should inspire people to over-

come those tensions, and doing so, I think might provide a platform for what would be in its own region a very important contribution to peaceful diplomacy.

So, I believe, there is a huge stake here. The President obviously believes there is a huge stake, and that is why he is asking the Congress for so much additional support for tsunami recovery.

But while our military role is coming to an end next week, the suffering of the victims of this tragedy will not have ended. This is not a time for short attention spans or donor fatigue. The whole international community, I believe, has an interest in helping to get the tools that these people need to rebuild their shattered lives and we look forward to getting support from the Congress.

If I might, I would like to introduce Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps, John Allen, who has played the leading role for us in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in coordinating support for this relief effort, and I would like to say the reason you see—not only the reason you see, but the team that you see here, symbolizes the fact that this has been, in my experience, a model of inter-agency cooperation and collaboration, and I look forward to continuing it.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Wolfowitz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

THE EARTHQUAKE/TSUNAMI DISASTER

As you know, this was a double-headed disaster. First was a massive earthquake that registered at 9.0 on the Richter scale, making it one of the 4 or 5 largest earthquakes of the past century. It lifted the ocean floor overlying the thrust fault between the Indian tectonic plate and the overlying Burma plate by up to 10 feet. The earthquake was followed almost immediately, in the case of the northwest shore of the island of Sumatra by a succession of tsunami waves. The region of destruction was extensive, ranging laterally 2,000 miles from east to west, and from north to south nearly 500 miles, or two-thirds the width of the United States and nearly half the distance from the north of the United States to the south. The tsunami waves created great destruction and disruption in lives and property leaving over 160,000 dead and over 140,000 missing in its wake, over 1 million people displaced, and billions of dollars in reconstruction costs. To put a human face on this disaster, shortly before I went to the region to survey the damage and review our military relief effort, I met with an Acehnese who resides here in Washington. This one individual lost 200 members of his immediate family in the tsunami. An aunt and an uncle who live here are his only surviving relatives in the world. The rest of his family was swept away in an instant.

I visited the region 3 weeks ago, just after the calamity. By that time, however, Thailand was already in the recovery stage. Sri Lanka was still conducting some emergency relief, but it was soon to turn the corner and the U.S. military effort was starting to shift elsewhere. In Indonesia they were still reeling from the enormity of this disaster. As terrible as it was throughout the region, the devastation in Indonesia was incomparably greater. Under any other circumstances the toll of over 8,000 dead or missing in Thailand alone would be devastating. Yet in Sri Lanka the losses of over 35,000 dead or missing is more than four times higher than for Thailand. But in Aceh, one small province in Indonesia, whose population at about 4.2 million is about a fifth of Sri Lanka's (20 million), the toll of over 114,000 dead and over 127,000 missing was seven times greater than in Sri Lanka (thirty-one times greater than Thailand).

THE U.S. RESPONSE

Despite the devastation, there was an encouraging amount of good news—the resilience of the people, the willingness of governments to cooperate to help their people and the readiness of the international community to offer assistance. One of the good news stories concerned the interagency coordination and cooperation within the U.S. Government in Washington straight out to the ground level where the execu-

tion was occurring. The success in this cooperation and coordination was almost unprecedented, and it benefited directly from lessons learned in previous crises.

However, there is always room for improvement and we are looking closely at our response effort through an after action review. We have already identified, along with USAID/OFDA, the need to establish some common operating procedures and mechanisms to help smooth our coordinated response to future crises.

The ability of the Department of Defense to respond so quickly would not have been possible without the relationships developed over many years with the militaries of countries in the region, particularly with Thailand. An unexpected consequence of the relief operation was the opportunity to work closely and effectively with the Indian military, with whom we are expanding ties, as well as the Indonesian military (TNI), with whom we have had difficult relations in the past, but with whom we have worked well in this crisis.

Thanks to the Department of State, in cases where we required over flight clearances or status of forces agreements we were able to obtain them in a timely manner. This disaster, and our response to it, has demonstrated the importance of having standing agreements like these where possible, as well as bilateral Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSAs) to enable us to cooperatively respond to humanitarian disasters. The restrictions that many people feared we might encounter from the Indonesian military and bureaucracy were overcome by the decisive leadership of newly-elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his Administration.

Our early relief efforts in Indonesia would have been somewhat more effective if we had more experience working with the Indonesian military (TNI) and if the TNI had better English language capabilities and more modern equipment, but the real point to emphasize is that the Indonesian government recognized immediately the need for help and welcomed all who came forward.

This disaster has no doubt focused the minds of other nations on creating some sort of disaster response capability. The countries in the regional core group were selected to a large extent because they possessed the ability to respond quickly. It is in our interest to expand that capability and the number of our partners in the region who possess it. USPACOM has a program known as the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) to create not a standing response force, but a cadre of individuals who are accustomed to working together on a multinational basis to respond to crises. MPAT experience was put to good use in the response to the tsunami crisis.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE

At the height of the Department of Defense (DOD) effort there were nearly 16,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, 26 ships (including one USCG cutter), 58 helicopters of all kinds, and 43 fixed wing aircraft (mostly transport). The capital investment that the American taxpayers have made in the equipment that made this effort possible reached nearly \$30B. With these state of the art resources our extraordinarily capable men and women delivered over 10 million (10,124,059) pounds of food and supplies and provided over 400,000 (422,324) gallons of fresh water for the people whose lives were endangered by the specter of starvation and disease. As well, our military medical system provided care to over 2,500 patients, and the U.S. hospital ship *Mercy* remains off the coast of Sumatra rendering vital medical assistance.

But the real impact can best be measured in the lives saved and assistance provided to the host nations as they tried to come to grips with a disaster of such scope and extent. It can also be measured by the good will it has generated. Conservatively, the U.S. response to this natural disaster saved thousands, and probably tens of thousands of lives, particularly in Indonesia, and provided desperately needed hope to hundreds of thousands of others.

A little more than 3 weeks ago, as we flew above the northwest coast of Sumatra surveying the damage, the sheer scale of the devastation was overwhelming. The Indonesians were still finding as many as 3,000 human remains a day in the rubble . . . where there was rubble. At the airfield at Banda Aceh, in the heat and humidity, we saw a human chain of magnificent young American men and women loading the helicopters with supplies, food and water. All of them had volunteered to come ashore from the *Abraham Lincoln* Carrier Strike Group and make a difference however they could. In those lines were officers and sailors, Chiefs and fighter pilots, aid workers and Indonesian military (TNI) working side by side to get the food and water on those helicopters and out to the people of Aceh.

As a result of this effort, in Aceh the USS *Abraham Lincoln* and her helicopters have already passed into local legend as the Grey Angels. I had a chance to visit

with the crew of the *Lincoln* during my visit and to share in their zeal for the relief effort. They were quite proud of what they were accomplishing. As one fighter pilot told me—and I should say this is quite an admission coming from a fighter pilot—“we are all helicopter pilots now.”

In Galle, Sri Lanka, we visited a school that had been undermined and rendered unsafe by the waves of the tsunami. In 100-degree heat, Marines and Navy Seabees, working alongside the Sri Lankan Army, operated heavy equipment and bent their backs into clearing the site for a new school. When we asked the teachers what they thought of the Marines and Seabees they burst into smiles and rapid-fire comments of approval.

On the runway at Utapao, Thailand, the young Air Force men and women of the airlift control elements were pressing themselves to the outer edge of their endurance controlling the flow of relief supplies to airfields from Utapao through to Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The efforts of our service men and women have not only saved lives but also generated unbelievable goodwill throughout the region.

As we pass the baton to the affected governments and international relief organizations, we have an interest in staying engaged. This crisis was humanitarian. It has been said that the Chinese character for crisis represents both danger and opportunity. Here then is a danger that failure to properly address the reconstruction needs, particularly in Indonesia, could harm the affected governments. But here too is also opportunity. If reconstruction is done the right way in Aceh, it could bolster the credentials of the Indonesian government. This is also an opportunity for the Indonesian government to show the people of Aceh the good things that Jakarta can do for them and to use the attention of the world to help achieve a political settlement to the longstanding separatist problem. Similarly, another country affected by this disaster, Sri Lanka, is facing a separatist problem. We hope that the opportunity that has been presented to the people of Sri Lanka can contribute to the long-term settlement of its divisions as well.

Any government would be challenged by this crisis and the burden of recovery. Indonesia in particular finds itself—as an emerging democracy—at the time of the tsunami not yet 100 days into the Administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The 1997 economic crisis in Southeast Asia was referred to as an “economic tsunami” and it contributed to the downfall of the Suharto dictatorship. This real tsunami presents an enormous challenge to the still developing democratic government in Indonesia. However, by meeting the challenge successfully there is an opportunity to greatly strengthen democratic government and free institutions in the country that has the largest Muslim-majority population in the world.

We need to support the wave of democracy as it spreads across the Muslim world. The elections held in Indonesia last year, the second democratic elections in the country and the first direct election of a President, are as significant as the elections this year in Afghanistan, Palestine and Iraq. While the new democracy in Indonesia is proving more capable than many thought possible, it must still be nurtured.

President Yudhoyono holds a great deal of promise in terms of increasing good governance, rooting out corruption, and continuing the already significant reforms of the TNI. President Yudhoyono is, by the way, a retired general and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

We have a strong interest in helping this democracy succeed. One of the first ways we can do this is by ensuring that the job of bringing relief and reconstruction to the people of Aceh is accomplished.

We can also support democracy by strengthening the civilian government’s capacity to manage defense and security matters and by supporting the process of reform in the Indonesian military (TNI).

We all recognize why the U.S. Congress and the Administration have put restrictions on military-to-military relations with the TNI. At the same time, I believe we must take a broad approach to relations with a country as important as Indonesia.

Legal restrictions on assistance we can provide to the TNI have contributed to some unfamiliarity and suspicions between our military forces. These restrictions did not overly limit our ability to respond to most of the tsunami-related requirements of the TNI. For example, we had the necessary authorities to provide spare parts for Indonesian C-130 aircraft.

Nevertheless, I believe that many of the restrictions on our defense relations with Indonesia have outlived their usefulness. We need to look forward. The Indonesia of today is simply a different country, and the TNI a significantly different military, from the one that perpetrated the depredations of East Timor.

During my visit to Jakarta, the new civilian Minister of Defense, Juwono Sudarsono, recognized the need for improved defense relations. He specifically asked

for more assistance from the United States to assist his efforts to continue TNI reform. We should assist him in this effort.

CONCLUSION

Through the hard work of the tsunami victims themselves, the affected nations, as well as the United States and the rest of the international community, the situation has evolved to the point at which current assistance needs can now be met by the military and civilian officials from the affected countries in coordination with the U.N. and relief organizations.

The redeployment of U.S. military assets does not signal the departure of U.S. assistance, but rather is a direct result of host nation, U.S. Government agencies, international agencies, U.N. and other NGOs assessments that U.S. military assets and capabilities are no longer required. This is done in close coordination with the host governments and reflects the transition from direct support to recovery and reconstruction.

The lasting result of U.S. efforts should be that we did the right thing, for the right reasons—regardless of the nationality, race, or religion of those afflicted. That when needed, the United States was there to aid in this enormous humanitarian disaster relief effort and we remained only as long as we were needed and could be effective.

Although our military role is coming to an end this week, there is no conclusion to the suffering of the victims of this disaster in South and Southeast Asia. This is no time for short attention spans or donor fatigue. The entire international community has an interest in helping get the tools that they need to rebuild shattered lives. We thank the Congress, and this Committee, for your strong support for this effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Wolfowitz. We applaud the point you have made of the interagency cooperation. We are very pleased that General Allen could accompany you and share the very strong work of your colleagues at the Department of Defense.

I would like to call now upon Administrator Andrew Natsios for his testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW S. NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the committee for this opportunity to testify.

We have this in front of you and there is a PowerPoint presentation I am going to walk through. It looks like this for those of you who want to follow along with the document. We have written testimony that I would like to submit, but let me just go through this.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made complete in the record.

Mr. NATSIOS. Thank you very much.

I think we think of this as a tsunami. It was actually two events, an earthquake and then a tsunami. The earthquake is the fourth worst in recorded history. So, if there had been no tsunami, we still would have had widespread damage to the infrastructure in Aceh. In fact, 70 percent of the bridges in the interior of the island that were unaffected by the tsunami were destroyed by the earthquake. As Paul Wolfowitz just said, some of the roads have subsided 2 or 3 feet. That was not from the tsunami. That is from the earthquake, but to have both of these simultaneously within an hour of each other was simply unprecedented in its magnitude.

[Note.—All slides presented by Hon. Natsios can be found at the end of his statement.]

There is a map here, in the presentation, as to where the areas are that were affected, and the red line are the coast lines of the area affected. This actually even affected Somalia and Kenya. There were people killed. Fishermen were killed in Somalia and Kenya by this tsunami that moved at 500 miles an hour. Most waves travel at 30 to 40 miles an hour. It was not the wave itself that killed people. It was the power of the wave, the force of it at 500 miles an hour that actually killed people.

The next slide indicates the way in which the international humanitarian disaster response system of the U.S. Government operates. Under Federal law of the Foreign Assistance Act, the President names an international coordinator of disaster response. I was named by President Bush, as AID Administrators have for the last 40 years, to take that role. There is a mechanism in Federal regulation that is a State Department AID rule and it says the Ambassador has to declare a disaster before we can mobilize our resources. Those declarations of disaster were done on Sunday, the day of the event itself.

And we mobilized the disaster assistance response team, which is sort of a military-like unit in AID that goes out to the field. It is sort of like a company is, or a battalion is, and it does the response for the U.S. Government. It is composed of people from many Federal agencies but led by USAID.

We focus on four things in all disaster responses, whether they are natural disasters or wars or famines, food, water and sanitation, health, and shelter, because these are the things that kill people in an emergency. This is the emergency response phase.

Then we move into rehabilitation and reconstruction. We used to do these things sequentially, but in the last decade, we have realized these things are all done simultaneously. We will provide humanitarian relief to people 6 months from now, very vulnerable populations like orphans, for example. And we will move into the reconstruction phase. We are already doing reconstruction even a month after the emergency. So these are not sequential. They are simultaneous.

The next slide, No. 4, indicates one thing we did the first week. We began cash-for-work programs with small amounts of money, \$4 or \$5 a day, particularly in Sri Lanka and in India and in Indonesia, to get people moving again. This is both a therapy for people, many of whom are in psychological shock. Their entire neighborhood has been wiped out. Their families have been wiped out. Their businesses are gone. Their jobs are gone. They have no income. Their houses are gone. So we want to get the people back working, doing something constructive, because for psychological reasons, it is very important.

Second, we want to get the economy moving by getting money moving. Most of these people do not have jobs because the businesses were destroyed by the tsunami or by the earthquake. So we did this very rapidly. There were thousands of jobs literally created by our partner organizations with funding from the U.S. Government within the first week.

The next slide. We also moved very rapidly into microfinance. There were some microfinance institutions, one of which in Indonesia that we started many years ago. We stopped funding it years

ago. It has 56,000 chapters to it. This is an AID project from 20 years ago. It is one of the largest microfinance networks in the world spectacularly successful. There were 14 offices in Aceh of this organization, chapters just in the capital city; 13 of them were destroyed. They were small banks basically. They were destroyed. All the staff was killed. All the money is gone and the buildings are all gone. So only one of the offices was left, but we are using the microfinance networks that were established many years ago as a development intervention in Indonesia to begin to recapitalize businesses to get the markets moving and to get money moving through people's families so that the business community can reestablish itself. It is very important.

Senator Frist talked about the importance of water. President Bush has proposed, and we have implemented, the safe water for the poor program, which is a Federal U.S. Government initiative administered by AID, funded by the Congress, which we appreciate very much, to create safe water around the world. It is to purify water not at the source, which is the traditional means, but at the consumption level, because lots of bad things happen to water between a water purification plant and when it gets to people's homes in many developing countries.

We have a plant that produces a little bottle. This little packet is what we use in Latin America. I gave away my last bottle to a media reporter who was interested. It is a little bottle. It costs 50 cents to produce it. That bottle, one capful chlorinates 10 liters of water, which is enough for a family for a day. And we produce 7,000 of those a day, at a factory in Indonesia, for use among the poor who have dirty water that they normally would have to drink around Indonesia. We diverted the production from that plant for Banda Aceh. We moved 70,000 bottles of this and packets of this stuff to Banda Aceh within the first week. We simply took the existing production, moved it in there, using U.S. military transport planes. This is very useful. This is another instance of integration of USAID and the use of military logistics capacity.

What we did was, we did a mass distribution. So 75 percent of the families had these available to them within a few days. It was the NGO community and the U.N. agencies and the IOM, the International Organization for Migration, and our partner organization, DAI, that distributed this, on the retail level, to people in the communities that were displaced.

The next slide shows the relief effort where there is a U.S. Government helicopter, U.S. military helicopter, and AID relief supplies. We have four warehouses around the world, the closest of which to this region is in Dubai, where we moved stuff within a few days into that region. Then the distribution of this into the area was done by the U.S. military. We established a system of validation where AID officers were placed in all of the major military units, and before a logistics task was undertaken by them, we validated it that it conformed to international humanitarian relief protocols because the military said we do not know the protocols. We really want you to help us. We do not know which NGO or which is more important than one other NGO. There are partner organizations that have been trained in this and know how to do this, and we wanted to order these tasks of the U.S. military based on

these protocols that would save the most lives in the shortest amount of time. That is the principle. How do you save the most lives in the shortest period of time? And we did that in a very collaborative, integrated way with the military.

I might add we have never done this with this level of integration before. This was not an individual agency response. This was a U.S. Government response with the State Department, AID, and the U.S. military all functioning as an integrated team, which does not always happen, even though we would like it to. It really did happen in this case. And our offices are reporting to me we need to build this into doctrine so we can do this again the same way.

The budget that President Bush announced yesterday in the supplemental is, we think—we are checking this now—the most generous in the history of the United States for a natural disaster, a single event. Nine hundred and fifty million dollars has been proposed, and I would like to break down for you how on the reconstruction side of this and rehabilitation side of this will be spent.

Three hundred and thirty-nine million dollars will be spent out of this \$950 million for infrastructure reconstruction, roads, schools, water distribution systems, bridges. We are now working with the ministries of the countries that were most severely damaged because they are in charge of their own reconstruction. We need to emphasize this. It is not international agencies. It is not AID agencies. It is not NGOs in charge. It is the government in charge. These are all democratically elected governments. This is not Darfur. This is not Rwanda after the genocide. This is not a post-conflict situation, even though there have been insurgencies in both countries. These are parliamentary democracies. We need to respect their leadership and follow their lead and work with them on what is appropriate, what is not appropriate from our own perspective. We were doing that very cooperatively and very collaboratively.

One hundred and sixty-eight million dollars of this budget will be spent for the transition of victims and survivors back to their communities in the form of food aid, shelter, housing reconstruction, education, and programs that help people get back to work and establish businesses. I just mentioned some of those.

There is \$35 million for disaster early warning systems. I might add the biggest risk in the Indian Ocean is not tsunamis. It is typhoons; 400,000 people died in the great typhoon of 1974, in Bangladesh alone, in 1 hour. We established an early warning system with the U.S. Weather Service and the Bangladesh Government after that emergency that set up an alarm system from our weather satellites. We did the same thing at the request of the Government of Vietnam and all of the South Pacific islands, which are at risk from typhoons. Those systems have saved millions of lives over the years.

What we should do, I think, is to look at a natural disaster vulnerability system, not just tsunamis, but also typhoons, which is a greater risk in this region, so that we have an alarm and early warning system for both simultaneously in the same system.

There are \$62 million to provide technical assistance for planning reconstruction activities. If we are going to spend this much money, we have to ensure that the ministries in the governments

we are working with have the logistical capacity, the planning capacity, and the accountability systems and the financial management systems to make sure this works properly.

And finally, there are \$346 million to replenish costs incurred by USAID and DOD in the provision of immediate relief so that none of our programs in other regions of the world will be adversely affected.

We have already begun housing reconstruction for temporary shelters that will house people until the larger reconstruction program is in full gear, and we are beginning to do that. We hope this budget goes through quickly.

The next slide indicates the work we are doing with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to do assessments. We are doing these jointly with AID staff and the U.S. Army Corps about what the condition is of different elements of the road system in Aceh. That will help us to design, with the Indonesian Government, the infrastructure.

The next slide indicates just a picture of what is left of the major highway in the area of Aceh that was most affected by the earthquake.


We are beginning to focus our attention on the fishing fleets now. Of course, these are coastal areas primarily and they were badly affected by the tsunami and there is a lot of destruction to the boats you see here on the left. But we are bringing new boats in now so they can begin to fish again.


Finally, we have the elements of an early warning system. This will all be done in a coordinated fashion in the international system. We do not do this alone. The governments will have to run the early warning systems. So we have got to make sure that everybody is trained properly and the sensor devices are in place and the sensors have a communication system to the national disaster aid agencies in those countries and then that the communities get a very rapid response and then people know what to do after they hear the alarm. The Japanese have just hosted two conferences on this. We are working with them. They have a lot of expertise in this, and UNESCO at the United Nations is also expert in this. So we are working with all of them in an integrated fashion.

So that is a general summary of what the planning is on how we will spend the \$950 million to deal with this terrible tragedy.

[The slides that were presented and prepared statement of Mr. Natsios follow:]







Cash for work to provide income to families whose livelihoods were destroyed by the Tsunami.

**Microfinance to provide
small loans to small
businesses damaged by
Tsunami.**






USAID grantee (CARE) staff in Aceh demonstrate a home water chlorination kit pioneered by the CDC. USAID provided over 70,000 kits to Aceh.



Safe Water System: Preventing Disease

An internally displaced person practices mixing the safe water system solution in a bucket of water. One capful purifies 20 liters of water.




USAID relief supplies delivered through the U.S. Military for Aceh Tsunami aid recipients.



Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction

Request: \$950 million

- \$339 million for infrastructure reconstruction (roads, schools, and water distribution systems)
- \$168 million to help victims transition back to their communities, (food aid, shelter, housing reconstruction, education, and programs that help victims recover and get back to work)
- \$35 million for disaster early warning systems:
 - improve the international and U.S. tsunami early warning system
 - enhance tsunami early warning and disaster mitigation in the affected countries
- \$62 million for good governance and technical assistance for planning reconstruction activities
- \$346 million to replenish costs incurred by USAID and DoD for provision of immediate relief



**Using relief to foster reconstruction:
building shelter for homeless families**

Providing technical assistance to affected governments: survey and planning work

IMPACTS LEGEND

PASSABLE

DAMAGED

DESTROYED

TO BE ASSESSED

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers





Restoring critical infrastructure such as transportation links

Bridge 3 km North of Calang washed out.

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers



**Helping individuals rejoin workforce:
reviving markets, jobs and livelihoods.**

Early Warning and Community Disaster Awareness

- Detection equipment
- Communications system to national and local governments at risk
- Community education and action in response to alert system



PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW NATSIOS, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about U.S. strategies for relief and reconstruction assistance in response to the recent devastating tsunami.

The U.S. Government (USG) is authorized under section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act to carry out and coordinate international disaster relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction assistance. As USAID Administrator, I am the President's Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. In this role, I can direct all of the Agency's resources, as well as call upon the assistance of other USG departments and offices.

I have delegated the operational coordination for foreign disaster assistance down through the USAID structure to the Director, Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). USAID/OFDA plays a critical role in the international disaster response framework, working at all levels to ensure that an appropriate, effective, and efficient response is provided to those who are suffering. Because the USG provides over 40 percent of all humanitarian assistance funds worldwide from all donor governments, our role in disaster assistance has been long-standing, extensive, and marked by deep involvement.

USAID has developed systems for immediate response to disasters, including rapidly-deployable Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), and Washington, DC-based Response Management Teams to support the field operations. In order to respond quickly and effectively, USAID/OFDA has refined the Incident Command System (ICS), which was developed by the U.S. Forest Service to fight forest fires. ICS is a command and control tool in a disaster response. It provides a means to coordinate the efforts of individual agencies as they work toward the common goal of saving lives, property, and the environment.

This system has since been adopted by many response organizations, both domestically and internationally. Through these mechanisms and over forty years of experience in responding to international disasters, USAID is able to incorporate a wide variety of skills and resources in its response. Clearly, the system works.

USAID consistently has received favorable reviews on its disaster relief operations from the General Accounting Office (GAO) and has helped untold millions of people affected by disasters worldwide.

Organizational reforms at USAID, improved interagency coordination, and flexibility have marked our response to the unprecedented devastation of the Tsunami disaster. The United States responded rapidly and as a team—across USG agency boundaries as well as in partnership with non-government organizations (NGOs), corporations, governments, and other relief agencies. This enabled us to mobilize the people and resources that were crucial to saving lives and alleviating suffering. Let me elaborate on these points.

Coordination

The very day the earthquake hit, USAID mobilized Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) and USAID Mission staff within hours after the disaster hit. Approximately 50 DART members and more than 100 USAID Mission staff in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand were involved in the overall coordination of relief and reconstruction activities, reviewed NGO, U.N. and host government funding requests, and recommended appropriate USG relief efforts. A round-the-clock Response Management Team (RMT) was established in Washington as a backstop to the field staff and point of contact for information, assistance, and coordination.

In disasters of this magnitude, it is absolutely essential to coordinate civilian response activities with those of the U.S. military. Let me take this opportunity to personally thank the President and the military for rapidly committing the assets that were needed to the region. Without their strong logistical support and the staff and equipment they made available, our response would not have been as effective as it was.

Natural disasters and critical military operations have seen cooperation between USAID and the Department of Defense expand dramatically over the last several years. Key to this cooperation has been the creation of effective coordination mechanisms—from the tactical field level all the way up to the strategic headquarters level—that has involved USAID staff at critical points in the decisionmaking process. What we have witnessed over the past several weeks is substantial progress toward the seamless cooperation of both organizations and is the result of hard work long before the earthquake and tsunamis hit. The efforts of both DOD and USAID to build relationships that bring the capabilities and expertise of each into an effective

tive partnership have proven their worth in this disaster, and we will continue this approach of active engagement and planning with DOD.

Let me explain how the relationship is working by citing what took place in Thailand. Thailand generously offered the use of Utapao airbase as the humanitarian assistance hub for Tsunami relief. There, the DART established a Military Liaison Cell to validate and prioritize requests for assistance. This helped ensure that U.S. and other coalition military resources were put to use in the most effective and efficient manner, according to accepted humanitarian relief protocols, as opposed to a "first come, first served" basis. Liaison officers from the affected countries' militaries as well as from militaries of other donor nations and the United Nations also participated in the coordination process. The military's willingness to follow USAID guidance on the best use of their assets to support local governments and NGOs was a milestone in our relationship. I am convinced that this coordination was key to saving lives, feeding people, and relieving great suffering. USAID also placed staff at the Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii, where much of the planning for the U.S. military's role in the relief effort originated under Admiral Tom Fargo's leadership.

As we move from relief to reconstruction, USAID and DOD are already working to ensure a seamless and smooth transition from reliance on military assets to those of civilian agencies. Towards this end, USAID's Deputy Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East, Mark Ward, just returned from a trip with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to the region where they discussed concrete steps to ensure that civilian agencies are in position to assume the functions initially provided by the U.S. military.

One of the more remarkable examples of cooperation involved a USAID Food for Peace Officer, Herbie Smith, and the USS *Abraham Lincoln*. The *Abraham Lincoln*, offshore at Banda Aceh, could produce tens of thousands of gallons of potable water. The only problem was that there was no way to get it to people on shore. Herbie immediately went out and bought a huge number of water jugs from local markets throughout Indonesia and arranged with the military to get the jugs transported to the *Abraham Lincoln*. Military personnel then filled the jugs with clean water, and helicopters distributed the water in Aceh. This is but one example of how USAID's experienced staff, working hand-in-hand with the military, moved assistance to needy people.

Organizational Reforms at USAID Ensure Integrated Response

USAID's relief effort in response to the Tsunami was based on the significant procedural and policy changes that govern how the Agency responds to overseas disasters. We have both revamped our organizational approach and accelerated the time perspective under which we conduct relief operations. These changes have been in the works for the last several years. They are based largely on our experiences with Hurricane Mitch, as well as applying the lessons we learned in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Until recently, a compartmentalized approach was used in responding to disasters overseas. USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) would handle emergency food needs, while USAID's OFDA would respond to immediate non-food necessities. If the disaster struck in a "country in transition," USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) would also be called to respond. After immediate life-saving assistance was provided, USAID's respective regional bureau would step in to work on reconstruction and rehabilitation. This approach was very segmented, both chronologically and organizationally. It resulted in lost opportunities in the use of relief initiatives that could have been used more strategically to accelerate reconstruction, encourage community participation, and build a foundation for development. In contrast to the past, USAID now takes a more holistic approach organizationally and a longer term view operationally.

USAID is now in the position to draw immediately from wide-ranging expertise found throughout the Agency and in the rest of the USG. In effectively spearheading the USG's disaster response, our activities are no longer stove-piped into different offices and bureaus within the Agency. In the Tsunami relief effort, USAID's DART and RMT included staff not only from OFDA, but also from several other USAID offices and bureaus, including FFP, OTI, the Office of Democracy and Governance, the Bureau for Global Health, the Bureau for Asia and the Near East as well as USAID Missions in the affected area and the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs. Staff from USAID Missions in Jakarta, Colombo, New Delhi, and Bangkok were embedded into the DART structure from the beginning. In this regard, it is important to note the value of having a preexisting USAID mission in the region. We have also recruited staff for the DART and RMT from other federal agencies, such as DOD, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and

Human Services, including the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the Department of Agriculture, including the U.S. Forest Service, and the Bureau for Land Management. The DART and RMT also used staff from outside the federal government, including the Fairfax and Los Angeles Search and Rescue teams, the University of Texas, and the Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance.

Quick Response

USAID has drawn upon its long experience in humanitarian relief to establish the relationships and agreements necessary to quickly mobilize all available assets when a disaster strikes. The Agency worked in partnership with the global civilian humanitarian relief community—NGOs and international organizations—and used its pre-positioned food stocks in Dubai to rapidly mobilize relief operations in affected countries. Bringing together the NGO experience, technical skills, and resources adds tremendous value to our response efforts. In the Tsunami disaster, you have seen the fruits of that labor.

The great size and complexity of the response put flexibility and ingenuity at a premium. This was in evidence in actions that USAID undertook in conjunction with two of its partners, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and Development Alternatives (DAI). Prior to the earthquake, humanitarian organizations were not permitted into Aceh province without express permission by the Government of Indonesia. As it turns out, a network of staff from IOM and DAI did manage to retain a strong relationship with provincial officials in spite of this restriction. USAID and other donors capitalized on the influence of IOM and DAI by providing them with funding to help move relief commodities into Aceh from Medan. This was done with the help of 80 trucks contracted by USAID/Indonesia.

The Cuny Principle

USAID's policy of consolidating and coordinating relief efforts within the Agency and across the USG is only part of our new approach. Another is our focus on incorporating development objectives for economic and social change into relief efforts from the very beginning of a response. Our policy is to plan and carry out relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction simultaneously.

More than two decades ago the late, legendary disaster expert, Fred Cuny, published a groundbreaking book, "Disasters and Development" which laid out his long experience in working with the victims of natural disasters around the world. His vision was revolutionary, yet breathtakingly simple. In a nutshell: The talent and resilience of people struck by disaster are the most powerful forces for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of societies struck by disaster. The people in their communities are the first responders. Moreover, they embody strengths that exist in no other group—strengths that absolutely must be harnessed if we are to build positive change in the affected society.

Natural disasters—earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, tsunamis—hurt people and cripple economies. They kill; they maim; and they destroy. But victims are never helpless. These people know their environment. They know their society. They are very likely to have coped with other disasters in their lives. They, more than anyone, want to recover. And, as the shock of the disaster subsides, new opportunities emerge that can be exploited to build a more sustainable, more equitable, and, in many cases, a less violent society. Disaster survivors are often among the strongest voices for change.

External assistance must capitalize on these opportunities. Immediate physical needs have to be met: Clean water and sanitation, health care, food, and shelter. But the best way for outsiders to assist is to provide help that is part of a long-term solution defined by local actors, rather than just a hand-out. In practice, this means that relief assistance efforts should focus on recovery and renewal from the very beginning. While providing life-saving assistance, we need to get markets functioning again through activities such as cash for work that creates a demand for goods and services. In short, a return to normalcy depends on reviving the local economy, and that means restoring local markets.

Relief assistance should help reestablish local government and civil authorities by responding to their priorities in vital relief efforts. Our interventions should aim at restarting social services at the local level—schools, primary health care clinics, water treatment facilities, and so on. And it is vital, early on, that we assist stricken families with the help they need to rehabilitate destroyed housing and restore ruined livelihoods. Again, the assistance effort should focus on development even as it provides short-term relief.

Fred was killed in Chechnya in 1995, almost ten years ago. Yet the Indian Ocean tsunami shows that his vision is as relevant as ever. In brief, we must work to see that something good can emerge out of destruction.

This approach to relief and development assistance forms the cornerstone of USAID's programming strategy. It applies operating principles that I recently codified as USAID's "Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance." For example, the Principle of Ownership states that the affected people themselves own their relief and recovery process. The Principle of Capacity-Building requires that USAID interventions strengthen local institutions. The Principle of Sustainability says that program impact must endure after assistance ends. I am attaching a summary of these principles to this testimony.

Relief Efforts Also Address Trauma and the Increased Risk of Human Trafficking

USAID's programs are helping survivors to deal with trauma and providing for a return to a sense of normalcy and stability in their communities. The family is the cornerstone of psychological well-being and the focus of many of our efforts. USAID is supporting programs that unite dislocated children with extended family members. We are also funding initiatives that restore a sense of security and stability for children by providing them with a structured environment. In such places, children can be supervised while adult family members engage in rebuilding efforts or income-generating activities.

USAID worked with our partners to initiate public awareness campaigns on the added risks that women and children face and their vulnerability to falling victims to traffickers. These risks increase when people are displaced, when children are separated from their families, when livelihoods are ruined, and when infrastructure is destroyed. While so far there is no evidence to suggest that trafficking has increased, we are redoubling our efforts to educate women and children and relief workers to these risks, and to help government organizations in affected countries address issues of protection and abuse among affected populations. In Sri Lanka, for example, USAID has funded UNICEF and Save the Children/UK to establish a registry of orphans. We are also funding the Solidarity Center to provide training for relief workers and to strengthen collaborative efforts on the part of government and civil society to protect children. In Indonesia, similar public awareness campaigns are being targeted to the displaced and training provided for relief workers who come in contact with these populations.

Helping Countries Rebuild: The U.S. Tsunami Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program and USAID's Role

The USG Tsunami Reconstruction Program will support efforts on the part of national governments and local communities to rebuild quickly, restart their economic engines, and harness the unprecedented resources and support that is coming from around the world. The goals are to save lives, support reconstruction, priorities of affected countries and regions and to advance a wide range of development needs and foreign policy interests. The United States will continue to work closely with affected countries and other donors as we assess needs and undertake reconstruction activities.

President Bush is seeking \$950 million as part of the supplemental appropriations request to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian Ocean Tsunami and to cover the costs of the USG's relief efforts to date. This is the most generous USG response to a foreign natural disaster in American history.

Our reconstruction program is built around five themes:

—One, using relief to foster reconstruction, self-sufficiency and build a foundation for future development. Cash-for-work, micro-finance and livelihood programs are helping to get markets working, building individual and community self-sufficiency.

—Two, providing technical assistance to affected governments with immediate survey and planning work to help them make the best decisions about utilizing the considerable contributions from the world community. This assistance will include support to assist local authorities, communities and local civil society organizations and ensure their full participation in planning, prioritizing and undertaking reconstruction programs. Proper emphasis is being placed on inclusion, transparency, and accountability in all such efforts.

—Three, financial and technical support to rebuild and improve infrastructure, including important, high visibility transportation and public utilities projects such as schools, roads, bridges, and water treatment plants, which will serve as major USG interventions. A local communities grants program will support small scale infrastructure reconstruction including clinics, schools, markets and other community-level infrastructure identified by communities.

—Four, helping individuals to rejoin the workforce and return to their communities by helping individuals rebuild their homes, replace lost assets, and get back to work. Grants, small loans, and cash-for-work programs will pump much needed money directly into the hardest hit communities. This will allow disaster victims to take control of their own lives and start rebuilding their businesses and communities. The success of our efforts requires us to expand and build upon ongoing partnerships with U.S. and local NGOs in creating these jobs and income opportunities.

—And, five, building the capacity within the affected governments to prepare for and respond to future disasters. This will include U.S. support for a regional tsunami early warning system being designed collaboratively by other countries and donors. We will also support efforts in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India to strengthen the communications that alert communities to imminent threats, as well as a community-based outreach and training program so that people know what to do when they hear an alarm. We will also aid governments put in place measures to help national, provincial and local government guide reconstruction that will be environmentally-sound and infrastructure that is more resilient to likely natural disasters.

Accountability

As USAID continues to make major improvements in its approach and operations, we have not forgotten one of our fundamental obligations—ensuring the proper and effective use of U.S. Government funding. USAID takes its responsibility as steward of taxpayer money very seriously. For this purpose, USAID meets regularly with host governments and contractors and grantees to ensure that all USAID-funded activities are well coordinated and complement other programs on the ground. USAID staff members make regular field visits to observe the progress of USAID-funded programs. Our missions are also working with civil society organizations in the countries, such as the Forum on Aceh Recovery, to assist efforts of local organizations to track and monitor relief and recovery budgets.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has been present from the inception of our response to ensure high levels of accountability for public funds and to help guard against possible waste, fraud, and corruption. As with USAID projects in Iraq and Afghanistan, the OIG has been asked to conduct “concurrent financial and performance audits.” These audits are conducted as reconstruction or other activities unfold rather than after they are largely complete so that any accountability or program effectiveness issues can be identified and corrected at an early stage. For example, USAID/Indonesia has already requested that OIG Regional Inspector General Office in Manila perform concurrent audits of work being performed by the contractors and grantees in Aceh and Northern Sumatra. Once supplemental moneys for our efforts there are received, auditors will be engaged at all levels of programming for these concurrent audits, from the development of statements of work to implementation of the contracts.

Partnering to Meet the Challenges Ahead

The President, and former Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, have asked people to reach deep into their pockets to help those affected by this disaster. And the response of the American people—individuals, as well as civic associations, churches, and corporations—has been overwhelming. Americans have donated more than \$800 million to humanitarian agencies—a total amount second only to 9/11. As one gauge of public response, it is interesting to note that USAID has had more than a million visitors to our Tsunami website. Some days early on in the crisis registered more than 80,000.

The Agency is also actively working with the community of private voluntary organizations, as well as large corporate partners, to build public-private alliances in support of medium to long-term reconstruction efforts in the region. For example, USAID has already initiated a partnership with Mars, Incorporated, which has generously committed \$1 million to assist vulnerable children in the affected area. Their generosity will be met by a matching grant from USAID. The USAID and Mars partnership to fund will focus on meeting the needs of vulnerable children in the tsunami-affected areas of Indonesia and India. Funds will be channeled to international and local relief organizations that are working in the affected areas. This is a great example of the USG helping channel the generosity of the private sector to help vulnerable children during this crisis.

I would like to thank President Bush, and the two former Presidents as well, for mobilizing this remarkable display of public support. And I would like to thank the American people—for showing the world once again what a compassionate people we truly are.

The compassion of Americans is at the very core of what USAID stands for. By giving the citizens of emerging nations a helping hand as they work to improve their societies and economies, we show the world the best of the United States. As the President said, “Well after the immediate danger passes, USAID is still going to be in the hard-hit areas . . . helping the people improve their schools and develop health services and mitigate conflict and reinvigorate local economies, and help build institutions of democracy, so people can live in peace and freedom.”

The policy changes that I have described here today, the results of which you have seen in the remarkable relief efforts underway in South Asia, are all part of living up to the trust that the American people have placed in us. The world is a complex place, and interventions have to be designed accordingly. We have to stay flexible, keep our eye on the long-term objectives, and work together. This is the only way forward. And this is the new USAID. All Americans can be proud of its performance. Thank you.

PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE

The following nine principles are the key tenets of USAID’s work. The principles are not a checklist. They are a summary of the characteristics of successful assistance programs. They cannot be applied the same way in each situation but should serve as a reference for development practitioners as they design and implement programs.

PRINCIPLE OF OWNERSHIP

Recognize that a country and its people own, and participate in, their social and economic development.

PRINCIPLE OF CAPACITY-BUILDING

Strengthen local institutions and promote appropriate policies essential to economic growth and good governance. Recognize that there are limits to a country’s and its institutions’ ability to absorb large amounts of assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF PARTNERSHIP

Achieve common development objectives through close collaboration with governments, communities, donors, NGOs, international organizations, universities, and the private sector.

PRINCIPLE OF SELECTIVITY

Allocate resources to countries and programs based on need, policy performance and foreign policy interests.

PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABILITY

Design programs in a way that ensures their impact endures after assistance ends.

PRINCIPLE OF AGILITY

Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities and minimize the cost of delivering assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

Assign individual responsibility for managing tax-payer funds, and apply transparent systems for tracking funds and monitoring progress toward objectives.

PRINCIPLE OF ASSESSMENT

Tailor programs based on careful research and understanding of local conditions and best practices in international development assistance.

PRINCIPLE OF RESULTS

Focus resources through programs of sufficient size and scale to achieve clearly defined and measurable objectives critical to a country’s needs. Maximize cost efficiency and timely delivery of services while ensuring objectives are met.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Natsios.
We will now have questions.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Just before questions, could I ask General Allen to say a word on behalf of our wonderful men and women in uniform? He is the one on this panel best positioned to say something on that score.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. General Allen.

STATEMENT OF BG JOHN ALLEN, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity today to speak on behalf of the men and women.

I have been in the service over 30 years at this point, and I have to tell you, sir, I was unprepared for the extent of the devastation that we encountered on the ground in the countries to whom we brought aid. No verbal picture can ever adequately describe it. No camera can ever capture the image of desperate suffering that the populations in this region encountered.

But to this region came the American military, the U.S. men and women of our country. I have spoken to many of these men and women who served in Operation Unified Assistance, and not one was unmoved by the scope and the magnitude of this disaster. Every person, with whom I spoke, was deeply honored to have been a part of this relief effort, but also, at the same time deeply humbled, humbled at the opportunity to contribute and at the courage and the dignity and the gratitude of the victims and the countries themselves.

America's sons and daughters serving in these distant regions embodied all of the finest traditions and the highest values of the United States of America. They came quickly. They served quietly, and they departed without fanfare, seeking no recognition for themselves, deriving pleasure and reward only in the saving of lives and the easing of suffering.

We had the chance to meet with members of all of the services on the ground. Our first day, as we landed from a helicopter, in Banda Aceh, out from the tree line came very quickly, a crowd of about 100 sailors who had come from the *Abraham Lincoln* whose silhouette you could see off the beach. It has now become known as the Gray Angel. Those hundred sailors had all volunteered to come ashore, and there were 100 each day coming ashore to volunteer to do nothing less than to carry food or to carry water, to load the aircraft, to do all that they could. Whether they were otherwise employed on the nuclear power plant of that aircraft carrier or repairing highly sophisticated equipment, they just wanted to help. They did that every day for the entire operation.

We went to Sri Lanka to a school in a town called Galle that had been undermined by the waves and had largely collapsed. And there in the 100-degree heat were marines and seabees working to knock down that school to begin to build a new one. We had the opportunity to speak with the teachers at that school, and we asked them what they thought of those seabees, those young sailors and those young marines. And instantaneously there were spontaneous smiles and words of congratulations and thanks.

On the runway at the Thai naval air base of Uthapalai, United States C-130s were parked wing tip to wing tip being loaded and

offloaded constantly by young Air Force men and women, who were working in high humidity and high heat around the clock, to push those supplies forward as fast as they possibly could, working to the outer edge of their endurance.

And finally, probably one of the most perfect examples came when I had the opportunity to stand in a tent along the runway of the airstrip at Banda Aceh. That runway at Banda Aceh was clearly the single point where all of the aid was coming in to northern Sumatra and coming in and being distributed. It was a true hub. Airplanes were coming in constantly 24 hours a day. Helicopter activity was going on as the distribution to the further points was conducted. And all of that was being orchestrated by young Air Force men and women from the tanker airlift control element, about 20 of them, young airmen. And if that could be called a symphony or an orchestra, they were all the maestros in moving those airplanes along the ground and loading and unloading that cargo. And standing in that tent with a young Air Force major who commanded that group, I observed, largely in tribute, that if those 20 young men and women went away tomorrow, that would be a single point of failure, and this would all grind to a halt.

Now, it had been words of tribute. I think he took it a little differently. He took one step toward me in the half-light of the tent, looked me in the eye, and said, "we will not fail." Those words were emblematic of the can-do attitude of every man and woman in uniform that served in Operation Unified Assistance. Those were courageous words and words that described heroic acts.

Let me close, sir, by offering my sincere thanks first to those who served in this contingency and who are at this very moment, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, still continuing to save lives and to restore hope to a shattered population.

It is also important to note that we could not have been as effective as we were in this operation had it not been for the immediate cooperation of Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia who selflessly, generously, and unhesitatingly made their facilities available for the rescue and the relief operations. Our longstanding and cordial relations with these countries converted quickly into access to airfields and port facilities and made all the difference in the emergency of the early response and our continued efforts today.

Finally, sir, I would be remiss if I did not publicly recognize the role of this committee and the U.S. Congress in supporting the U.S. military in general and Operation Unified Assistance in particular. I can say unequivocally no other country in the world could have responded as did the United States of America. In the earliest moments of this crisis, desperate voices were raised in that region, and there was a cry that went out, who will help us? Who will come? The response was from the United States. It was clear and it was immediate. America will help you. We are coming.

As our military role in this crisis draws to a close, American units are departing the region, even as I speak, some for home and for families and loved ones, and others to continue on with other missions. The fact that we could help, the fact that we could get there so quickly, and the kinds of capabilities we brought to this crisis is a direct result of the support of the U.S. Congress for our

U.S. military. I am not only proud of our services, I am proud of that support, sir, and I am deeply grateful for it.

Thank you for this opportunity to address the committee and thank you for your leadership, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, General Allen. Our hearing is timely because our military forces are still there. We have an opportunity to express appreciation to them, and we appreciate so much your very thoughtful and compelling testimony about their contributions. We have an opportunity to pay tribute today, likewise, to those in our State Department, those in USAID, in NGOs, and others who will be continuing on.

One of the reasons for the hearing is to recognize the extraordinary leadership that in an interagency way, as Secretary Wolfowitz said, has been exemplified, but also to indicate, as the \$950 million the President has asked for, that this is a long trail ahead. So often these emergency situations are overtaken by other emergencies and other compelling needs. This one will not go away. The enormity you have been describing is very clear, and the graphics you have presented to us and to the press and to the public are very important.

Let me suggest that we will have an 8-minute round of questions. If there are more questions after that, we will have another round. We will have another panel following this. So I think members are mindful of that.

Let me start the questioning by asking you, Secretary Larson. You have outlined at least seven task forces that have been in operation at the Federal level. Who is ultimately responsible for coordination of all of these efforts that have been described by the witnesses today?

Mr. LARSON. Now, as we move into a process that, while it continues to have relief elements, is more focused on reconstruction, the structure that we have set up is one where the State Department will be bringing together the agencies that are involved in this and trying to work with everyone to establish policy and priorities for the funding the President is requesting. Obviously, USAID is our principal implementing agency on the ground and is the one that is doing the work going forward.

We have established, within the Economic Bureau of the State Department, a very small task force with a handful of additional people that can help provide the impetus and the ongoing energy that, I think, you and other members of the committee have suggested has to be there for this to be a sustained effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Wolfowitz, you have mentioned, as we talked about the \$950 million supplemental appropriation, that this does not include all of the operation costs already incurred by the Department of Defense for tsunami-related operations. How will those costs be covered?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I believe, actually, they will be covered out of this supplemental, but the original request only covered the specific things that applied from what we call, I guess, ODACA, which is the specific humanitarian relief. But out of this \$950 million, \$346 million, we estimate, will cover already incurred expenses of DOD and USAID. General Allen, do you have the exact numbers? I think it is about a two-thirds/one-third split.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that really answered my question because essentially we know that the other relief expenditures are being covered. So, the point is that other obligations, other activities our country has elsewhere will not suffer. Essentially this appropriation is going to cover the expenditures, and that would be true of our military operations.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That is right, with \$600 million for reconstruction.

It is worth emphasizing too, Mr. Chairman, we are from the Government, but the private sector is doing amazing things. As you know, former Presidents Bush and Clinton have led a fundraising effort, which I am told—I do not mean that effort alone, but the American people in their various voluntary ways have already pledged something like \$700 million of private assistance. I think that also deserves a special mention.

The CHAIRMAN. It certainly does. Dr. Frist mentioned that the meter is still running. It may be moving toward the \$800 million or the \$900 million figure.

Secretary Wolfowitz, the seeds of democracy have been implanted and have been taking hold in Indonesia for some time. As you mentioned, you served as our distinguished Ambassador to the country, and it was my privilege to visit with you during that period of time.

But now, one of the consequences of this transition is a new role for the Indonesian military, the TNI. Now, please provide the committee, today, with your assessment of TNI's changing role. In addition, would it be helpful to have a level of cooperation with our authorities in connection with the ongoing Timika investigation, as well as the cooperation that we are hopeful that we will have, as our military leaves, as our civilians are still there? The complications of all of this are enormous and beyond this hearing today. But give us some impression of what our goals ought to be with regard to both democracy and the military, including an increased level of our participation or cooperation with both.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me take a stab at it. As you know, it is a big and complicated question, and I know Secretary Rice is engaged currently and, I think, over the coming week or two in consultation with Members of the Congress about this issue, which is a sensitive issue. Both the executive branch and the Congress have imposed a number of restrictions in the past on our cooperation with the Indonesian military, largely in reaction to some pretty significant human rights abuses and most significantly the atrocities that were committed in East Timor in 1998.

I am not about to sit here and tell you that everything is fine now by any means, but I would say two important points of progress that really need to be noted. No. 1, most importantly, it is a different government there now, and it is a government that is democratically elected that I believe is deeply committed to the goals of democratic reform and civilian control of the military. They have, for only the second time in their history, a civilian Defense Minister, and he happens to be the same one who was the first civilian Defense Minister, someone I know from my time in Jakarta, who is very committed to the idea of civilian control and has a big job in front of him. It is a government, I think, that wants us to

develop a better relationship with the Indonesian military and deserves our support.

Second, while the record is far from perfect, it is certainly worth noting that the Indonesian military has stayed in the background, as it should have, but as some people might have been surprised, Indonesia transformed to a country that had once been largely run by the military to one that is now run by democratically elected government, and, in fact, the 100 seats that they used to have assigned to military in the Indonesian Parliament have been taken away. There is a lot of change, in short, and, I think, as important as it is to work for an accounting of things that were done in the past, I do think this is a new era and the challenges of responding to the tsunami just underscore the importance of making sure that we have the right tools going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Do you have a comment? Yes, Secretary Larson.

Mr. LARSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I could just add a couple of brief comments to what Secretary Wolfowitz said. Clearly, we want to continue to work hard to ensure accountability and ensure a strong human rights performance and to make sure there is accountability for the past abuses. We do feel that the cooperation on the Timika investigations has been constructive and we welcome that. We do feel that the experience with the tsunami has indicated areas in which having had more contact cooperation with the Indonesian military could have had some advantages. No decisions have been made, but as Secretary Wolfowitz said, the Secretary of State is examining this issue and will be interested, I know, in continuing to consult the Congress on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I think it is an extremely important hearing.

On Tuesday, we had a meeting of the Maryland delegation with some of the NGOs. Some of the leading NGOs are headquartered in our State and are very much involved in the tsunami relief. We met with them and heard what they are doing, the efforts they are making, the problems they foresee, and so forth.

I might say to you, General Allen, that they were quite complimentary about the role that our military had played and the essential logistics support the military had provided. They even pointed out while we did not need the military to build the school, it was a nice touch that they went in there and did that, and it made quite an impression on the populace. So I just want to state that up front.

I am concerned, though, that the well-deserved attention on the tsunami and the tremendous response may end up diverting funds and attention away from other humanitarian needs, and particularly from development efforts, which have been worked out carefully with local agents on the ground. It takes quite an effort just to get the confidence of people to enter into these development plans. And then, if money is not forthcoming to carry through on that, we lose the momentum that has been built up and sometimes it is very difficult to reconstruct it.

So I am seeking an assurance that the supplemental request will completely reimburse USAID for all tsunami-related expenses so that we will not have a short-changing of other ongoing programs. Now, where do we stand on that? I commend the administration's statement, just yesterday, about increasing the U.S. contribution.

Of course, we have had a tremendous outpouring from the private sector, a truly staggering response. I think that reflects something very good about the American people.

But I want to ensure that these other efforts will continue. Where are we on reimbursements for the tsunami-related expenses?

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, we worked with the OMB and with the White House on that and provided them the detailed accounting of what we spent, which is \$123 million to date. I was very concerned myself about this, but the President made very early on a public statement that all of the money AID has spent on this will be reimbursed. He did not say in a supplemental, but as we know, yesterday he announced the supplemental. If this budget is passed, we will be whole.

I would say something, though, just in terms of timing. For reasons that may be well understandable, if this part of the budget does not pass until the third quarter, we will have severe stress on our humanitarian budget, and then it will affect our operations elsewhere. But if this budget passes in a reasonably smooth way, then we will be fine. All the money we have spent will be reimbursed and it will not affect any operations anywhere else in the world.

Senator SARBANES. Has it up to this point affected those operations to some extent?

Mr. NATSIOS. We are in the beginning of the second quarter of the fiscal year, and so our humanitarian relief budget has a lot more money in it, that we can spend this quarter, for other efforts elsewhere in the world. However, our budget is under severe stress not because of the tsunami but because of Darfur, but because there is a major food emergency in east Africa right now in Ethiopia. And we are working on it, and we are working with OMB. There is money in the budget for Sudan, \$150 million for food for Darfur in southern Sudan. So money is in this for other emergencies that is not in our regular budget, and I would commend that to you. There is also \$100 million for the reconstruction of southern Sudan, in addition to what is already in the budget.

So there is also money in the budget for Afghanistan and Iraq. Much of that will go to us. So it is not just the tsunami we are interested in, in this budget. It is all the other accounts that also fund many of our programs around the world.

Senator SARBANES. Let me give you a specific example that I am concerned about with respect to long-term development programs. Since emergency food aid needs were greater than anticipated last year, you reduced the amount of food aid used to support long-term development. The budget that was just released cut food aid by another \$300 million and transferred it over to disaster relief. But that, again, raises the question of cutting sustainable development programs. How are we going to address that problem?

Mr. NATSIOS. Well, Senator, the budget was not cut \$300 million. It was transferred into an account to do something very innovative and new, which many of us have been lobbying for when I was in the NGO community in the nineties for many years. The President has taken a bold move to change the whole structure of the food aid account. I will give you an example.

In Afghanistan, we invested United States Government money that you appropriated in an agricultural development program that produced a surplus wheat crop 2 years ago, the greatest in the history of Afghanistan. Prices collapsed as a result of that and we imported U.S. Government food under title II bought in the United States, shipped it in, 200,000 tons, when we could have, if we had the money, purchased the local food and kept the price at an average level. What happened is that many of those farmers who were growing wheat said, I am losing money, I am going to grow poppy now. That is what they did because we could not use our food account to do local purchase of food.

The President has proposed of the \$1.2 billion budget for food aid, that \$300 million of it be used to allow us to do local purchase of food in development situations, but mostly emergency situations to help stimulate agricultural production in many countries.

There has been no cut in the food aid budget. The food aid budget, in fact, will be able to buy more food because 30 to 40 percent of our food aid budget is for transportation. It costs a lot of money to move food from the United States into rural Afghanistan. If the food is next door, produced locally, there is very little transportation cost. So this is an innovation. It is not a cut in the food aid budget. If anything, we will be able to buy more food if the budget goes through the way it is.

In addition, though, we do recognize there is a problem with total food because of an emergency. So, in the President's budget, there is \$150 million for additional food aid for Sudan because there is a food emergency in Sudan, not just in Darfur. There was a 60-percent crop loss because of a drought in eastern Sudan, the south, and even in Kordofan Province which is not in the middle of a conflict. So that is in this budget; the supplemental budget.

Senator SARBANES. All too often in emergencies, women and children have found themselves doubly victimized. They flee conflict or disaster, end up in camps where they are vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse, as well as, sometimes, discrimination in the distribution of food and medical supplies. What steps are we taking to provide specific protection for women and children in the wake of this crisis?

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, that is a very good question because that is a serious problem. When we do drops of food—and that is the last alternative. We have no other way of doing it—we will air drop food into emergencies, and typically the people who are strongest get it. So our doctrine over the years has been to ensure that there is a competent NGO on the ground that knows how to do this or a U.N. agency like the World Food Program that receives the food and ensures the most vulnerable get it. We typically target female heads of household in emergencies because they are the most vulnerable in terms of income and also because of protection issues. Human traffickers will go after women whose spouses are not

around to protect them, and they will particularly go after orphaned children or children who have been separated from their families.

We have been giving money, \$2 million, to UNICEF, to Catholic Relief Services, and to a number of NGOs to set up a protection system and a registration system for unaccompanied children or children who have lost their parents in Banda Aceh and in Sri Lanka because of this problem. In many countries in the developing world, there is no birth recording system to record births, and so there is no record that any of these children exist except for the parents saying, well, I had six kids and these are the kids' names. The parents are dead and the kid is 2 years old. How do we know who the kid belongs to? The kid cannot even talk yet.

So what is happening now, the NGOs on the ground, with funding from the U.S. Government to set up such a registration system in the areas where there has been the largest loss of life to ensure that we know who the kids are. We do not allow traffickers to go in and prey on these children.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I also want to commend you for having this very, very timely hearing. It is important as the mission is not over. There is a lot more to be done.

I also want to commend Senator Sarbanes, my colleague, for the question that he asked. It was a very, very important question. I am glad that he brought our attention to it.

General, you talked about the fact that we could provide help and get there so quickly and how critical that was. It was either yourself or Secretary Wolfowitz.

I had a chance to be in the area with the Senate majority leader. He was in Sri Lanka. Then we were together in India. We talked about the Indian response, which was really tremendous. Even though they suffered great casualties, they had a tremendous military presence. And there were two observations I had, and then I will get to my question.

One is that the perception of American military might was, in many ways, kind of transformed in the region. People saw it as a tremendous positive. They understood the importance of that military might and the way it can be used in a humanitarian capacity.

The second observation—and I got a sense of this when I had a chance to visit with the Secretary General of NATO at the end of our trip, after we were in India, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and then, ultimately, in Brussels. He was talking about the European response or perhaps lack of military response, lack of ability to move there so quickly, and indicated that that was cause for reflection on the part of NATO of its capacity.

What does NATO need to do? It is one, obviously, about ensuring peace. It is also about being able to respond to humanitarian situations.

I would be interested in your reflection of the impact of our response, what it is having in NATO, what it is having upon our European allies in terms of the way they configure their forces, in terms of the kind of equipment that they may be looking at, the kind of training that they may be doing. Do you see any kind of

long-term impact on our allies in terms of their ability to be able to respond, as they viewed what we were able to do and what, in fact, the Indians were able to do?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I wish I could say I have seen an impact, but I think we are dealing with the problem with our NATO allies that their defense budgets just keep declining, and very few of them now have the capacity to do even things that they have been trying to do already. I do not want to diminish it. We have got a significant NATO contribution in Afghanistan, but they still fall short of what they would like to be doing there. Maybe this will be an extra impetus.

I am going to be going to the Wehrkunde conference in Germany this weekend. You make a very good point that there is no reason why our European allies—and they did contribute. The French had an aircraft carrier off the Indonesian coast, but, I think, it was 3 or 4 weeks after we got there. The Singaporeans, to pick a different ally, demonstrated even small countries can make a big difference if they put their minds to it.

I guess it is worth commenting. We thank the Congress and the American taxpayer for their support. We thank the American people for their generosity. It has been noticed, I have to tell you, in Indonesia, that there has been very little generosity so far from parts of the Muslim world that are big on talking about jihad and other things, but when 200,000 people, all of them Muslims in the case of Indonesia, die in this catastrophe, there is not much help forthcoming. I hope those people might think a little bit about what they have done and what they have not done also.

Senator COLEMAN. I really do hope that there is an opportunity here to look at what we were able to do, look at the nature of our forces, look at the type of equipment that we have. I got a sense, in talking to Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer from NATO that there is some reflection going on about whether they could have responded quicker; what type of equipment do they need to be able to do that. Again, the history has been one of not making the commitment in terms of the budget, but perhaps the public might be raising their voice to say, you know, there is a purpose for having forces that can respond quickly.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, and I think the point is worth making. It is not just a matter of the size of the budget, it is a matter of where you direct it. We are finding, even with an enormous effort on transforming our forces, a lot of things that we do that are kind of legacies from the cold war and do not make a lot of sense anymore. The chairman is familiar with the debates about whether NATO would go out of area or out of business. And it is worth commenting, no one at the time ever dreamed that NATO would be deploying forces to Afghanistan.

So, even though the budgets are declining, there is a greater sense of a worldwide mission for the alliance. I think, maybe, if we say, OK, we do think more resources should go to NATO defense budgets, but within the resources you have let us allocate them in a way that can allow you to respond in situations that, during the cold war, we would never have dreamed of having a NATO response in Afghanistan, much less in Southeast Asia. But it is a different world, and, I think, there is room for progress on that front.

Senator COLEMAN. I am hopeful that this terrible tragedy provides an opportunity for an awakening or a reflection on the type of force that can be effective today, again not just in fighting wars, but in meeting humanitarian needs.

There was very brief mention of the impact of this disaster on east Africa. I represent a community that has a very significant Somali population. I am not sure if this is for Administrator Natsios or Secretary Larson. But with the very difficult political situation in Somalia, can you tell me what kind of presence there we have, if any? Have we been able to assess the damage? What kind of response have we been able to offer?

Mr. NATSIOS. We have given grants to an NGO and to the World Food Program and I believe—let me just look here. I think it is \$1 million to Somalia. We do know there was damage, but it is certainly not on the scale of what happened in Sri Lanka or Aceh. I have the grants right here. I can read them to you.

Senator COLEMAN. My hope is it is on the radar screen.

Mr. NATSIOS. We have given money to UNICEF, UN OCHA, World Concern, and the World Food Program, and the UNHCR, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, \$1,034,000 for the response in Somalia.

Somalia has a regular AID program in it, but we run it out of Nairobi because there are still serious security problems. It is a modest humanitarian program with some development parts to it, but we cannot send our officers in because the situation is not secure. But we work through partner organizations, the NGO community, and U.N. agencies.

Mr. LARSON. Going forward, of course, we will be informed by the needs assessments that are currently underway, led by the World Bank, in which we are participating. That will help us make judgments about the division of our funding across countries, as well as across sectors.

Senator COLEMAN. One last question to you, Secretary Larson. The impact of relief in terms of dealing with some of these areas where there has been conflict, Greece/Turkey, 1999, the earthquake, and there seemed to be some positive impact from that great tragedy. Sri Lanka, Aceh, Somalia. Do you get any sense that the humanitarian response is having some impact on lessening some of the civil discord?

Mr. LARSON. There is an opportunity. It has been very notable in Sri Lanka that the government and the Tamil Tigers have essentially had a cease-fire and that there has been cooperation in getting relief flowing to where it needs to go.

Similarly, in Aceh, the Indonesian Government has opened up Aceh. It has cooperated with all of the groups, governments, and NGOs that are trying to provide humanitarian relief. There have been some continuing difficulties, but we do believe that it is a moment of opportunity we have to seize to try to work toward developing a peace process in these countries that will resolve these longstanding conflicts, even as we go about the task of rebuilding the damaged areas with them.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you.

Mr. NATSIOS. I would just add, Senator, that the peace agreement that was just signed between north and south Sudan—Sec-

retary Powell and I were at the signing ceremony in Nairobi 3 weeks ago, coming back from the tsunami region. That whole peace process started after a humanitarian cease-fire was declared in the Nuba Mountains, which the State Department and AID helped negotiate, just to bring humanitarian relief in because it was the worst affected area of the entire country in terms of people dying. But that led to an improvement in the trust that people had to sit down and talk and then things improved from there, and it led to this peace agreement. So it can, in fact, have a profound effect, but you have to take the opportunity when it is in front of you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman.

Senator Feingold.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one comment? I mentioned the French, but it is worth noting Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom, as well as France, have made contributions in different forms in this effort, and I will give you the details for the record. Most importantly, the countries of the region have really stepped up, and India has taken a real lead not only in dealing on its own with its own problems, but providing contributions and help to others. It has been outstanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the witnesses. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

I do not think we can say, obviously, too often how profoundly saddened the American people were by the loss that so many communities experienced in the tsunami. I want to commend both the domestic and international response efforts to date, and I want to say to my colleagues that I will certainly remain committed to working on this with them.

I want to especially commend our troops. Brigadier General Allen, I really appreciated your comments, and let me just extend my thanks for their heroic work on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, the phrase that is probably being used the most here is "window of opportunity," and, I think, there are very positive windows of opportunity connected with this issue, but I think we also have to be careful to be absolutely sure that there are not inappropriate or perhaps unripe windows of opportunity that come out of this. I remember this was an issue a little bit in the confirmation of Secretary Rice. We have to be careful how we speak about this disaster in terms of it being a window of opportunity.

So I had not planned on discussing the issue of our military relationship with Indonesia at this hearing, but it was raised by Secretary Wolfowitz in his testimony. The chairman raised it as a question, and in light of that, I feel compelled to make a few remarks.

I applaud the tremendous effort that the Indonesian authorities, including the military authorities, have made to address the horrible tsunami tragedy. Again, I want to commend the U.S. military efforts to assist in that response.

Mr. Chairman, this does not mean that there is not an ongoing, urgent need for military reform in Indonesia. We have not seen progress, in my view, on accountability for some very grave human

rights abuses. We have not seen a real effort to rein in the many murky financial and business relationships in which the military engages. I do not think this mission is even close to being accomplished. And that is why, actually, Secretary Wolfowitz, I strongly support the E-IMET training that Indonesia currently gets because it builds capacity to address these critical issues.

I noticed, Mr. Secretary, that you mentioned the President's statement in his inaugural. I will tell you one of the things that I thought of, as I sat there, was the repressive tactics that the military in Indonesia has used in the past not only with regard to East Timor, which you and I have discussed over the years, but also within its own borders, including in particular in Aceh. I think the President's words should have a meaning with regard to the problem that has existed with regard to the Indonesian military.

So, Secretary Wolfowitz, I appreciated your testimony and obviously appreciate your commitment to Indonesia. I want to reiterate that because I do think that this topic is essentially a separate discussion about whether the existing restrictions overly limit our ability to respond to this crisis. And you were candid enough to indicate that certain things were able to be done under the current rules, but you seem to be concerned about the restrictions that led to what you called a climate of unfamiliarity and suspicion when our forces arrived to work with the Indonesians.

As you well know, though, the Indonesian military is the largest beneficiary of the counterterrorism fellowship program. Indonesia's military participates with ours in scores of PAYCOM theater security cooperation program activities. In fact, more than 132 such activities involving Indonesia are programmed for fiscal year 2005. And Indonesia currently is eligible for and receives, as I have indicated, expanded IMET training. So, I think, we have ample opportunity now to overcome unfamiliarity. I do think that is a good thing.

So, as you and I discussed before, we hope this will lead to a constructive discussion about where our military relationship with Indonesia goes, but I think that is something that we should pursue in the future.

I do want to say a word about one other aspect of this, which is the Timika incident. I am glad that we finally have an indictment in the Timika case. I believe that the evidence suggests that Indonesian cooperation did improve significantly after Congress took action to link this issue to IMET. I want to thank the chairman for his willingness to allow me time and various opportunities to make that case here.

But it seems to me that the indictment in this case is only a first step. The FBI considers this an ongoing investigation, and the FBI has not exonerated anyone. A number of questions remain unanswered, and clearly other conspirators were involved. Most importantly, I believe the resolution of this case means that efforts are made to hold those responsible for the ambush accountable for their actions in a court of law. But even the one individual indicted by the United States remains at large and has been neither indicted nor arrested by Indonesian authorities. So, in my view on this particular matter, apart from the other issues, more remains

undone than has been accomplished, and I certainly do not consider that to be something that has been resolved.

Finally, on this point, Secretary Wolfowitz, I heard your comments about language and how English training is so important. My understanding is that there is a difference of opinion or interpretation between those who created the authorities for E-IMET in the Congress and the way the administration interprets those authorities with respect to English language training. I think you will find, as we talk constructively in the future, that there is a great deal of willingness, here in Congress, to ensure that English language training is available to the Indonesian military, even among those who, like me, believe it would be a mistake, at this point, to abandon all conditions and create an anything-goes signal to the TNI, particularly when we still have ongoing investigations into the murder of Americans in Timika to deal with.

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your willingness to allow me to get into that subject a bit.

I want to commend Senator Coleman for his reference to Somalia and Africa with regard to this matter, and I thank you for that response and want to express my ongoing interest and interest of the members of this committee in the African aspect of this disaster.

Now, I would like to ask Mr. Larson and Mr. Natsios what mechanisms are in place, not simply to ensure that there is transparency in the use of relief and reconstruction funds, but also to ensure that the people in affected countries and communities actually have some kind of access to this information. For example, information that is apparent to those of us in Washington, who can read English language documents on line, may not be so accessible or useful to people from the affected villages. Could each of you respond to that? Mr. Natsios.

Mr. NATSIOS. Certainly, Senator. In terms of accountability, the business model that AID went to, perhaps a decade and a half ago, is to go through, what I would call, civil society organizations, NGOs, international organizations, contractors, labor unions, faith-based groups, farmers' cooperatives. We put very little money—I think there are only four or five countries which are geostrategically important to the United States in the Muslim world where we actually transfer our money into the coffers of any government. We work with the governments. We put technical specialists in government ministries. We plan with them, but we do not move money through their accounts. We did that for 30 years, and we had some bad problems. So the accountability level of our money is not dependent on problems of corruption in any of these countries.

In fact, the Government of Indonesia knows they have a problem. They have announced they are considering setting up an independent separate account just for money that will go from some donor governments and international agencies through their ministries so that they can account for it properly. So I want to commend the efforts of the Indonesian Government to recognize they have a problem and deal with it through this accounting system. But our money will go through the traditional mechanisms of partner organizations that we use.

The third thing that we have done, in terms of accountability, is I asked the Inspector General to move in, at the same time the relief teams do, to do concurrent audits of everything we were doing, and if they saw something wrong in terms of process or record-keeping, they were to inform us immediately on the spot and not wait till after everything was all over to tell us we made a mistake. So the Inspector General has played an integrated role as a member of our team to ensure there were high levels of management and accountability.

Finally, Price Waterhouse offered, as a gift to UN OCHA, the coordination unit of the United Nations Secretariat, an accounting system to account not only for all donor government contributions, but all private contributions to the tsunami response. So we have an integrated system for accountability. Now, this is untested. It is a new system, but I want to commend the United Nations and Price Waterhouse for the contribution of that system because that, in fact, could improve the whole accountability of the entire system over the longer term.

The last question you asked, Senator, I forgot.

Senator FEINGOLD. People's ability to access this information given the fact that it is usually in English.

Mr. NATSIOS. The partner organizations we work through and our own staffs speak the local languages or we would not send them there. So, the NGO staffs, the AID staffs speak the local languages in the countries that we are working in and they talk with them. They deal with people.

There is actually a public information campaign effort, that we go through at the community level, to inform people of how this system works and to work with them on planning what is done with the money. We do not just go into a village and say, oh, we are going to rebuild something for you. We have to ask them. Do you want this building rebuilt? Where do you want it rebuilt, and how do you want it? Are you going to participate in this with us? We are not going to do this for you. You have to do this with us. It is a community-based approach. It is the most successful approach because then, if there is a problem, they know they own the problem along with us. It is a much better approach. So we work with them in a very integrated fashion at the local level to do any reconstruction, not just here but anywhere else in the world as well.

Mr. LARSON. Just a few quick followups, if I could. Indonesia's separate account that Mr. Natsios mentioned—they imagine having the World Bank play a key role in running that and basically providing the fiduciary role. So that is going to be very helpful.

Both Thailand and Indonesia have come to us and asked for help in management of the ongoing reconstruction process, advice that we have gained or experience we have gained from responding to natural disasters in the United States, and we are pursuing that sort of advice with them.

In Sri Lanka, where the Millennium Challenge Corporation is also acting, we have a requirement for a very full process of outreach to the communities so it is a sort of community-informed set of priorities.

And finally, beyond the immediate efforts of our assistance workers, we are working very hard to get the message out to the broader communities about what the United States is doing. So we put messages from the President, from our Ambassadors into local language media to explain what we are doing. We are going to continue to make the case about the American response through our public diplomacy strategy.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.

Senator Murkowski.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Members of the panel, thank you. I am sorry that I missed your earlier testimony. I have had an opportunity to read through most of your testimonies. I, too, want to take the time to thank you and your agencies and all that you are doing on behalf of the victims, the families, and all the efforts that have been made to date.

If I ask questions that have already been answered, I apologize in advance, but it helps me to have the opportunity at this point in time.

Even with the President's announcement yesterday that the United States has pledged the \$950 million in assistance, we recognize that this probably is not the full picture. I guess this is a question directed to you, Mr. Wolfowitz. In terms of anticipated final costs—and I know we are asking you to look into the crystal ball, but insofar as the military relief operations in Indonesia and the other nations, can you give me any sense as to the military end of it and the costs associated?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I will ask General Allen to correct me, but I believe we have incurred about \$121 million to date and anticipate about \$244 million—have I got the numbers right—before this operation is finished. So it is well within the \$900 million. In fact, our costs, plus AID's cost together, are estimated to be \$346 million for the emergency relief operations. So, basically, the supplemental will cover those costs and provide an additional \$600 million for the reconstruction effort.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And you think that that is realistic then for the duration as we move into the reconstruction.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think it is realistic as a U.S. Government contribution, recognizing that there are many other countries that are contributing, more that probably should contribute, and the American private sector has been spectacularly generous with \$700 million and still collecting. Administrator Natsios is probably the best one to estimate what the total requirements will be, but it should not be the United States that bears the total share of it either.

Andy, do you want to comment?

Mr. NATSIOS. The assessments are now being conducted. They are joint assessments with the ministries of the governments that are involved because they have the lead, with the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the donor governments. For example, the European Commission and AID have officers with the State Department on these teams to do assessments in different categories like infrastructure, community reconstruction at the local level, housing reconstruction, economic interventions to get

the business community recapitalized and markets started, that sort of thing. Those are not all out.

I think we have got some initial assessments in, and my memory is in Aceh—Alan, was it \$4 billion or \$5 billion?

Mr. LARSON. I think the initial estimate in Indonesia is on the order of \$4.5 billion as the estimated total cost of reconstruction over a number of years.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

The Pacific watch center that alerted the authorities in Diego Garcia—I am assuming that that is a similar type of a system as we have up north that gives us our tsunami alert, recognizing that we have got to get those buoys fixed. We are working on that. But the question is: If we were able to notify those in Diego Garcia, why was it not communicated beyond that, or was it?

Mr. NATSIOS. The first thing is you can communicate to people, but what do they do? If you turn an alarm on, they do not even know what the alarm is for. There was no system in place to communicate with people at the village level to tell them not only is a tsunami coming, but this is where you have to go to escape it. If you do not have that system in place, people could go to a more dangerous place.

There are three elements to an early warning system. One is the sensor devices, the scientific equipment, that our scientists, Japanese scientists are particularly expert in because we have had a history of natural disasters. The second part is the communications system to get the information to the community, and the third and the most important part of this, when you think about it, is educating the community on what the alarm system means and how you respond to it. Those systems did not exist.

Diego Garcia was spared not because of the alarm system, but because, as I understand it, the coral reef stopped the tsunami. Where would you go in Diego Garcia? It is 3 feet above sea level. I mean, if the coral reefs had not stopped that tsunami, no alarm system is going to help you out.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Yes. So, really, it is not just having the system, it is the education that goes with the system.

Mr. NATSIOS. Absolutely. That is part of the system.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. My understanding, Senator, is they got an earthquake alert. They knew there was a big earthquake. They had no warning there was a tsunami. And as Mr. Natsios said, the highest place to go, someone said, is the diving board at the swimming pool. There was no tsunami in Diego Garcia. That is why nothing happened.

Mr. LARSON. Recognizing there are two parts of the problem; the detection and then getting the right kind of notice to people who need to be warned, there is an issue going forward about making sure that the detection system that we have in the Pacific and that helps protect Alaska can be expanded and improved. There are a series of active meetings underway. Mr. Natsios has mentioned some in Japan. There will be a meeting next week in Brussels where the scientists and the expert officials who know how these systems work can help develop a coordinated international approach to make sure that all of the information about earthquake events and about the movement of tidal waves over the water can

be systematically collected and made available so that it could be used to warn populations in the Indian Ocean area, which was not the case before. Those buoys were not there and the system was not present.

As Mr. Natsios has said, there is another challenge too and that is making sure that there is right type of civil defense and warning systems in place in these countries.

The President's supplemental request will allow us to be lead participants in the development of both of those types of systems.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Natsios, in the report that you have included in your package here, you make reference to the psychological impact of the tsunami and make reference to some preliminary results from a Save the Children study of parents and caretakers. You indicate that it suggests there is not a mental health crisis. As a result of the tsunami, children displayed common reactions to a traumatic event.

In the testimony that we are going to hear in the next panel—and this will be a question that I will ask the individuals on that panel—there is considerable reference to the psychological effects on the survivors, and particularly the children, suggesting that there is perhaps more of a problem. Can you speak to that?

Mr. NATSIOS. The Save the Children study is very useful but it is for a discrete population. It is not a comprehensive study of all of the survivors. We do know from research that has been done in past natural disasters and manmade disasters that particularly children but even adults who have lost a large number of members of their family—Paul Wolfowitz just mentioned on Sri Lankan was it?

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Indonesian.

Mr. NATSIOS. Indonesian who lost 200 members of their extended family. The notion that has no effect on a person—I mean, it has an effect. If they also were someone who survived but whose home was destroyed, business was destroyed, their school and their neighborhoods were destroyed, it does have an effect.

We do know, in some cases, that people will sort of go into a state of withdrawal. They will simply sit and stare. I have seen this in displaced camps. We do not see any of this happening on a large scale here. But I have been to camps where suicide rates are high. People will commit suicide because they become so desperate and so despondent over what has happened to them.

We need to monitor this. We need to watch this very carefully. We put some money into the NGO community to begin to look at this because we do not want this developing.

I do know a friend of mine, who is a Foreign Minister in East Timor, was telling me, even though East Timor was not affected, that there were rumors every day in the capital for several weeks afterward that there was a tsunami coming, and people would leave the capital city because of the fear. So they do not have any trauma in East Timor, but the event in the media did have an effect on people's behavior in terms of panic.

There was another earthquake yesterday. I do not know if you noticed that in Banda Aceh. These tectonic plates do not just stop once. This is not one event. There are going to be several events potentially. This, fortunately, did not cause any damage and it did

not cause a tsunami. It was not quite large enough an earthquake to cause a tsunami. But there is still fear of repetition of this.

So we need to watch this; monitor it. We are not facing a crisis at this point, but we do not want problems later on.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.

Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the members of the committee. This has been a very informative and timely hearing.

A couple of comments, I guess, I would make before I asked questions. I am encouraged by the testimony indicating that the supplemental should ensure that existing development efforts are sustained and held harmless essentially. I think Senator Sarbanes raised a very important point which is, our credibility oftentimes is on the line, and once we get a project started, to divert it would be a mistake.

A corollary to that is the fact that as significant as this tragedy was—and I am very mindful of it. I, like Secretary Wolfowitz, spent a lot of time in Indonesia. I spent time there as a child. My sister is half Indonesian. So nobody is more sympathetic than I am to the situation.

I think it is important to note that there are a lot of silent crises taking place all over the globe that do not generate the same amount of attention and, as a consequence, do not generate the sort of private giving that we have seen in this circumstance. A lot more people, unfortunately, are dying in Darfur than will have died no matter what the eventual outcome of the tsunami ends up being. I think it is important for all of you, who are in positions to help shape U.S. foreign policy and foreign aid, to think about how do we highlight these other tragedies as they are unfolding and make sure that our response is equally adequate and that we have the same sense of urgency about them. That is a difficult thing to do, but it is one that I think is very important.

Let me just pick up on a couple of questions that have already been raised to see if I can, maybe, put a little more flesh to the bone.

I am very interested in the idea of training military in other countries to respond to these crises, and I am encouraged by that notion that we are going to be trying to do some institution building there with respect to best practices, first responder training and so forth. I do not know if you want to select, maybe, an example of Indonesia or Sri Lanka or a couple of other countries where you think that has already proceeded and what the barriers to that are and what the opportunities are as well, but I would be interested in hearing a little bit more about how that might proceed. Maybe I will start with you, Secretary Larson.

Mr. LARSON. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for your remarks about the importance of staying the course on our commitment to development worldwide. I think Mr. Natsios, and I in particular, have worked hard to launch initiatives like ending the cycle of famine in the Horn of Africa, having effective and increased levels of development assistance. So we are very committed to that.

In terms of expanding capacity in these countries, we have had a very nascent effort in APEC that has begun to discuss this. The Australians have been leaders of this. It seems clear to us that the first responders are always the local people and the local communities and governments. It is going to be important to have the capabilities there that are necessary to respond to natural disasters. We think that the experience of FEMA could be very important for them, and we think we should be looking at ways to translate some of that experience.

The Ambassador of Thailand came to me and he said, you know, we are not asking for international financial assistance, but we know we have a big task of reconstruction and we want to think with you about how to do that. We know that Florida had a very difficult year in responding to the hurricanes. So we have arranged some informal contact between officials in the State of Florida and the Thai Government to think through systematically how you respond.

In other areas of policy, we have been able not only to set up best practices but to begin to set up audit type systems where countries voluntarily say, why do you not come in and help us assess whether we have put in place the things that we need to have to really be effective. Those are among the ideas that we are exploring now generically.

Moving forward, in Indonesia, just to pick up that example, the Indonesians have been very appreciative of the role our military has played. They recognize that they have a very big task ahead of them in coordinating effectively the reconstruction effort, and they have come to talk to us not only about specific projects and specific ideas but how, working with USAID and others, can they make sure that they are managing the entire process of reconstruction in an open, transparent, and effective way. That is just a few examples of the types of things we have in mind.

Mr. NATSIOS. Senator, if I could just mention Darfur. We have been engaged as the first donor in Darfur before any news media was there, I might add. In fact, I had a press conference in Nairobi after my first trip to Darfur 2 years ago when the conflict was just starting, and the only reporters to report what was happening were African reporters. I could not get western media to focus on it. We had press conferences here and the media would not focus on it. They all of a sudden did and many have done an excellent job since then. But we were there long before the American media knew how you spelled Darfur. I am not trying to be insulting here.

But we do not base our humanitarian responses on media coverage. If we did, the most remote places in the world like eastern Congo, for example, is among the worst deaths in an emergency in history, 3.8 million people, according to the International Rescue Committee and other competent NGO studies that indicate a huge loss of life. A huge loss of life. It is not in the media at all, even now.

I have been personally to Darfur four times in the last 2 years, more than any other place in the world, as a matter of fact. And we have spent \$350 million and most of the food going into Darfur is from the United States Government. So we have been out in the forefront. We have led the charge. It is a much more difficult situa-

tion because it is not a natural disaster. It is a manmade disaster and there are malicious people involved committing horrendous atrocities. We believe, working with the State Department, we have an international and diplomatic strategy to deal with what is happening, but it is a highly complex political situation not just a matter of logistically moving things around to help people in a natural disaster.

Senator OBAMA. General, do you have something to add?

General Allen: Yes, Senator, if I may add. All of our warfighting commanders who are major regional commanders have a plan called a theater security cooperation plan. It is a reflection of the guidance given to them by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

The particular plan in this case that covered this region is implemented by the Pacific Commander, ADM Tom Fargo. His plan has been extraordinarily active with regard to having extensive bilateral and multilateral relations with the militaries of the region. So it starts with his own personal relationship with his counterparts, but we exercise frequently with all of these militaries. We do it bilaterally and we have annual major multilateral exercises that benefit from the contribution of forces but liaison officers and observers as well.

So there were habits of functional cooperation, habits of command and control which we had been developing for years which paid off huge dividends early in this crisis. In particular, I will tell you we have an entity known as the multinational planning augmentation team, which is a multinational organization that exists in Pacific Command which can come together, very quickly, to assist a commander in doing the planning necessary to execute whether in a combat situation or, in this case, a horrific natural disaster.

When we had the chance to visit with the commander of the U.S. forces, LTG Rusty Blackman, Marine Corps, at Uttapal, he gave the Secretary and me a briefing, and along the back wall of the briefing room were the liaison officers from 10 different countries. They had come quickly. We knew each other well. We had been exercising well. There was an excellent exchange both at a cultural and a language level, and we think that this was a very, very important early ability of the militaries of the region to stem the potential death toll here.

One other point that I would make is that we are going to continue this kind of a relationship. We are very active in something called the ASEAN Regional Forum, which is an extension of ASEAN. A subject which has come up more frequently of late—and we are going to continue to try to offer our very best advice in this regard—is the dimension of consequence management. We raised this at the last meeting. We will be going to Berlin which will be hosting the next intercessional group of the ASEAN Regional Forum where we are going to continue to talk about the employment of military forces for disaster relief and consequence management.

So we think there has been a very rich experience in terms of expertized experience, and we are going to take advantage of that and capitalize on it in the future.

Senator OBAMA. That is very encouraging, and I very much commend, obviously, our troops and your office and others that are doing an excellent job on this.

I know that I am out of time. I am going to, if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, just lob another question out there since I have been fairly patient and it is related. I will just stop there.

I am interested, No. 1, in terms of reconstruction. I know this is difficult to do in poor countries, but are we able to think about structural engineering or changes in the reconstruction process that anticipate natural disasters and lessen their impact? Again, obviously, this is difficult to carry out where resources are wanting, but I am wondering whether that is something that we are giving some consideration to.

The final question I will just have is, Secretary Wolfowitz, maybe, if you can just flesh out a little bit more the opportunities and challenges we face as we are working with the Indonesian military with respect to the Aceh conflict and whether there are things that we can do to lessen the human-driven dimensions of a disaster in that area.

Mr. NATSIOS. In terms of whether we build disaster mitigation measures into our reconstruction, that is standard AID policy and has been for decades. In the Gujarat earthquake of India which took place several years ago, if you will recall, with a large loss of life, we ensured that in the reconstruction we did, that the housing that was rebuilt was built according to international earthquake standards. We worked with the U.S. Geological Survey. In fact, there have been scientists from the U.S. Geological Survey in the disaster assistance office of AID for a couple decades now. They are normal transfer of personnel. We use our scientists from other Federal agencies to help us not just in earthquakes but also in storm construction.

A lot of the housing codes in Latin America and in the Caribbean were designed through AID mechanisms, working with some universities in Virginia that have expertise at this. Fred Krimgold is one of the leading earthquake architects and storm architects in the country. He is a professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. We use him. We helped work with these countries to design building codes that meet these standards.

Unfortunately, building codes, even in the United States, are not always followed and in developing countries they are frequently not followed. So we have also complemented that with training of contractors in the private sector and of banks and insurance companies to get into private markets and the private system disaster mitigation, particularly with respect to construction standards so that the private sector uses them even if the public sector does not always follow the building codes. So when we do the reconstruction in the countries in this area, we will be following those standards.

Last, I got a call from my good friend, the Sri Lankan Ambassador to the United States, who asked that we send a land-use planning expert from AID because they are now rewriting their land-use planning legislation or statute in Sri Lanka to move people back from the coast. Now, that is more sensitive than it sounds because people are having to give up very valuable land where they had their businesses or their fishing fleet or their homes. So we are

helping them technically. I think the guy is about to go out to help them design the statute and to work with the communities, so this is accepted because it is not just a matter of construction. It is also a matter of land-use regulation that can contribute to better disaster mitigation in the future.

Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, three points. First of all, on your earlier question about military training, I think it is an interesting question, which I am going to look into when we get back, as to whether our IMET programs, military education training programs, sufficiently focus on the possibility of training in this specific area, that is to say, disaster assistance. As General Allen said, we get enormous side benefits just from general military cooperation, but there are lessons to be learned here about whether, maybe, specific programs focused on that function would be valuable.

Second, your question about building local capacity. It was striking to me when I spoke with the Indonesian Minister of Planning, who is in charge of basically economic development, who is in charge of their reconstruction efforts. She is a very impressive economist, very thoughtful. She said one of their biggest challenges is how to develop local capacity in Aceh so that they do not end up with everything going through a Jakarta bureaucracy, and I think that is a commendable goal.

Finally, most importantly, on the question you asked about the role of TNI, the Indonesian military, in this whole thing, they can be part of the problem or they can be part of the solution. Senator Feingold earlier suggested, I think, that I had used the word "window of opportunity," and I do not think one should use those words in connection with something this horrible.

But I did say it is a crisis and crises have elements of danger and opportunity. As you look at the role of the Indonesian military in Aceh, they can continue on the record of the past 10 years, which is a pretty bad one. It is a difficult circumstance, admittedly, fighting an armed insurgency, but there has been a great deal of abuse of the local population. From what I can tell, those practices have largely been set aside, if not entirely set aside, in this immediate crisis. And they have to be set aside if we are going to succeed in this large-scale reconstruction effort. And that is the danger, but the opportunity is if they are set aside, if 6 months, a year from now both the Indonesian Government, the Indonesian Army, and the people of Aceh can say, well, we got together, we dealt with something far more important than these issues we have been fighting over, maybe there is a way to resolve those issues. I think it is a real opportunity.

As I said, I think before you came here, Secretary Rice is consulting with the Congress, currently, about what to do about IMET restrictions. I do not think we are talking about turning a blind eye on crimes of the past. I certainly would not. And I do not think we are talking about anything goes. But I do think, both in terms of the conditions the Congress set already with respect to Timika—we can argue about whether more cooperation is required or not required, but I was stunned, myself, at the level of cooperation the FBI got and the results that they produced. A lot of that is law enforcement-sensitive and cannot be discussed here in open session,

but I think they clearly responded to what we asked for. And there is a little bit of a feeling, well, every time we do what you ask for you, you ask for something else. That is, in my view, not a good way to get people to cooperate.

One final observation, if I could. A friend of mine, who is a journalist in Indonesia, who has taken considerable personal risks over his career fighting for human rights and democracy in his country, said democracy in Indonesia would be much stronger today if there were 10,000 Indonesian officers who had been through American training.

I am not saying that our training is perfect or that no one who goes through our training ever commits abuses, but I think it is a pretty consistent record that exposure to our military, exposure to our system has a positive effect from the point of view of decorum and progress in promoting democracy and freedom. I hope it is in that spirit that these consultations can take place and we can come up with a way forward that supports the objectives that I believe are widely shared on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.

We thank all Senators and thank especially our witnesses for a very comprehensive hearing and excellent responses.

We will now call upon an additional panel composed of Ms. Mary McClymont, President and CEO of InterAction; Mr. Daniel Toole, Director of the Office of Emergency Programs of UNICEF; and Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President of Mercy Corps.

We thank the witnesses for joining us this morning. I would ask, as I suggested to the earlier panel, that if possible, you summarize your comments to within a 10-minute framework. Your full statements will be made a part of the record and questions will follow.

I am going to yield the chair fairly shortly to my distinguished colleague, Senator Murkowski. She is the chairman of our Subcommittee for East Asia and the Pacific. She will continue to conduct the hearing in my absence.

First of all, I would like to call upon the witnesses in the order that I introduced them. That would be Ms. McClymont, then Mr. Toole, and Ms. Lindborg. Ms. McClymont.

**STATEMENT OF MARY McCLYMONT, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ms. McClymont. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before this committee to share some initial thoughts about lessons we have learned in responding to the tsunami to date, as well from other major emergencies. These might be helpful for the longer term recovery phase of the tsunami and for future crises.

The committee is to be commended for launching this reflection so promptly. We also want to commend the President, Members of Congress, and other administration leaders for their public statements of concern and commitment of resources, along with the American people for their generous donations.

Seventy-two of InterAction's one hundred and sixty member groups are engaged in some way in nine of the crisis-affected countries, working directly on the ground and through local partners, or shipping commodities to the region for distribution. Most are en-

gaged in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India, and I base my remarks largely on their experiences.

Many InterAction members have been established for decades in the region, and this is probably what allowed them to respond so quickly to immediate needs with hundreds of their local staff and partners on the ground by providing clean water, food, temporary shelter, and medical care.

Let me first address three aspects of the crisis on the ground.

First, in every natural disaster, there are impediments to overcome in delivering assistance. It was the very magnitude of the crisis itself in the worst hit countries that compounded these problems. As you know, local officials and service providers were killed, injured, or missing. With transportation and communications infrastructures destroyed, access was impossible in some areas. Our members and other aid workers were ready to help, but they faced major logistical problems. With its helicopters, personnel, and commodities, the United States military was able to extend the reach of the humanitarian effort into remote parts of Aceh and Sri Lanka. Their superb performance is a reminder that our Armed Forces have unrivaled logistical assets unique to these situations. As the transition from military to unaided civilian services is now rightly underway, their effort is a fine example of an appropriate kind of role our Armed Forces can play in such settings.

Second, ongoing civil strife in Indonesia and Sri Lanka posed potential challenges for relief delivery. International aid workers had been banned for over a year in Aceh, leaving little NGO capacity. Apprehension that the Indonesian military would ban or impose tight controls on the programs of foreign relief organizations proved unfounded. We hope and trust this will remain the case going forward.

As to relief coordination, it works for us at many levels in all the disasters we operate in through established mechanisms among our own InterAction members with USAID and with relevant U.N. agencies and other NGO consortia. That is what happened here. On the ground, the governments of India and Sri Lanka immediately assumed this responsibility on their own territory and are playing a strong role. The Indonesian authorities sought U.N. help in managing the international relief effort.

Although understandably difficult in the first days, we believe the coordination of relief efforts is becoming more effective each day. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N. officials are sharing responsibility and working together increasingly well, while NGOs, U.N., and government representatives come together to identify issues, conduct sectoral assessments, and rationally allocate resources.

The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to be the large number of inexperienced groups and individuals that have arrived in some of the affected countries. Although apparently well-intentioned, they are unaccustomed to the way the United Nations, Red Cross movement, and established international NGOs and local partners work together so frequently in these kinds of settings. We anticipate that this problem will diminish over the coming weeks as the initial relief phase winds down.

Despite the fact that the humanitarian effort has, fortunately, prevented a second tidal wave of lethal disease among survivors in the region, hundreds of thousands are displaced, vulnerable to infectious disease and profound psychological problems and dependent on donors for basic needs.

As we look forward, I highlight, now, four relevant reminders we could bear in mind during the recovery period.

First, accountability by relief providers. The past 6 weeks have underscored to us the extraordinary generosity of the American people. Sixty InterAction members report today they have received in the aggregate an unprecedented \$765 million in contributions from private donors, most of it from individuals. This provides a sharp reminder of the need for NGO accountability to the public for the careful, transparent, and effective use of these funds. For the past decade, our members have abided by a set of program, financial, and fundraising standards guiding their work and helping assure donors that funds are being well spent. We will work to assure the public has available timely, detailed information on the use of the funds entrusted to us. By the same token, we, and other humanitarian responders on the ground, must be accountable for our actions to those we are seeking to assist by conscientiously applying the internationally accepted sphere standards that guide disaster response.

Second, long-term commitment. Experience with myriad natural disasters has taught us that full recovery and rehabilitation from such devastation takes between 5 and 10 years. We are encouraged that leadership roles for the planning process have been assumed within the United Nations and the international financial institutions.

It will be important that NGOs participate fully in the upcoming donor conferences given the resources we will bring to the table and our long engagement and partnerships with local communities and organizations. Although financial pledges made by the international community have been extraordinary, it is no secret that many commitments go unfulfilled.

We are gratified by the President's announcement yesterday; he will seek \$950 million for relief and longer term reconstruction needs in the tsunami countries. We urge that governmental funding be provided on a multiyear basis and on flexible terms before attention shifts elsewhere.

In addition, it will be critical that national governments and donors fully consult and coordinate with local communities, authorities, and civil society on the ground. Our job is to respect their needs and provide the capacity building support necessary to help them restore their own lives.

Third, forgotten crises. As has been mentioned at this hearing, sadly this disaster reminds us of all the equally tragic crises in the world that are not receiving as much attention, such as Sudan's Darfur region, northern Uganda, and the Congo. Some crises are silent like the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty in the developing world. We hope that our leaders, including Members of Congress, as well as the media, will now seize the moment and take the opportunity to help us further educate and sensitize the

American public to these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme poverty in the world.

Finally, funding needs. With these concerns in mind, we are gratified of the President's announcement and that it will, in part, replenish the USAID development and disaster accounts from which funds were drawn for the initial tsunami response in a timely way, as was underscored by Mr. Natsios. We have also urged that additional funds be provided for humanitarian needs that otherwise go unmet in Sudan, Congo, Uganda, as well as funds to address the major global shortfalls in emergency food aid, to which Senator Sarbanes referred.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. McClymont follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY E. MCCLYMONT, PRESIDENT AND CEO,
INTERACTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify before this Committee on the "Tsunami Response: Lessons Learned." I also want to acknowledge the leadership and support that you, Senator Biden, and many others on this Committee have provided on issues of importance to those of us in the humanitarian and development community. I am grateful for this opportunity to present some of the views and perspectives of InterAction members on the response to the Tsunami crisis.

InterAction is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international development and humanitarian nongovernmental organizations. Our 160 members operate in every developing country and have decades of experience on the ground in working to overcome poverty, exclusion and suffering by advancing social justice and basic dignity for all. While many of our members have a long and successful history of partnership with U.S. Government agencies, collectively, the members receive \$3 billion in annual contributions from private donors, including direct contributions from the American people. Both faith-based and secular, InterAction members are headquartered in 25 states and have branch offices and/or constituencies in every state in the country. Furthermore, when one looks at the donors, sponsors, and supporters of our member organizations, InterAction reaches millions of Americans who care about and support in some form our foreign assistance programs.

The world has not seen in recent memory any natural disaster equal to the magnitude of the Tsunami crisis in sheer geographic scope, level of destruction, unprecedented private giving, and extensive international response. These factors make it all the more important to consider the response and lessons learned to date, as well as those we know from previous experience. We can apply them in our current relief activities, in the long-term recovery and rehabilitation phase in which we will be engaged for years to come, and in the major natural disasters inevitable in the future. The Committee is to be commended for launching this reflection so promptly.

I also wish to commend the President, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Members of the Congress, and USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios, for the personal concern for those affected by the crisis they have demonstrated by their public statements and commitment of resources. The personal visits to the region undertaken by many prominent American leaders, including members of the Senate and this Committee, have underlined the depth of American compassion for those now trying to rebuild their lives and American commitment to assist them. Furthermore, the response of the U.S. military, in collaboration with the civilian agencies, was critical in getting relief to vulnerable populations and saving lives in the initial phase of the crisis response. And finally, I want to thank the American people for their generous donations to help the victims in this crisis.

Reviewing the Humanitarian Response to Date

Seventy-two InterAction organizations, or almost half of our 160 members, are engaged in some way in this crisis, either by responding directly on the ground operationally, working with local or international partners who are operational, shipping commodities for the use of partners in the region, or undertaking advocacy. Although our members are working in nine of the affected countries, most are engaged in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India, which were the worst hit. I therefore will focus my remarks based largely on their experience in these three nations.

Many of our members had a long-established presence in each of these countries when the Tsunami struck. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka, for example, many have

been engaged in humanitarian assistance as well as development for more than a decade, helping to deal with the consequences of the civil strife each of these nations has long endured. With hundreds of local staff working at the village level in these three countries, they were able to respond quickly to immediate needs for clean water and food, to help reunite family members, and to assist survivors in finding temporary shelter. Medical personnel arrived from abroad within days of the Tsunami and began to treat physical injuries. Assessments were initiated of water and sanitation, as well as health needs. Survivors were assisted in digging latrines, collecting the bodies of the deceased, and removing debris from roadways.

In every natural disaster there are impediments to overcome in delivering humanitarian assistance. The magnitude of the crisis in the worst hit countries made some of these obstacles daunting, such as the immediate creation of coordination mechanisms. Many local officials, health and social service providers and educators were among those killed, injured, or missing. In Indonesia's Aceh Province alone, it has been reported that 70 percent of the health care providers and 1,500 teachers were killed, missing, or fled the area. Roads were washed away, bridges collapsed, vehicles were sucked into the sea, communications systems were destroyed and fuel supplies quickly were exhausted. Access to some areas became impossible, except by helicopter. Some airports close to severely affected areas became congested due to staffing, offloading, and storage capacity shortages. Finally, the ongoing civil strife in Indonesia and Sri Lanka posed potential challenges to the delivery of relief. In Aceh Province, for example, international aid workers had been banned for over a year. There was little NGO capacity already in place and a concern that those from elsewhere in Indonesia, as well as those arriving from abroad, might be denied permission to enter the region. It was not clear if the ongoing conflicts there and in Sri Lanka would put survivors at increased risk and imperil relief workers.

While our members were mobilizing staff in the region and assigning personnel from around the world to respond to the emergency, InterAction formed a working group to facilitate the exchange of information and coordination between the members responding to the crisis. Our regular meetings almost immediately were supplemented with weekly meetings hosted by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in which NGOs and USAID officials shared information and concerns. As a member of the InterAgency Standing Committee, the body established by the United Nations General Assembly more than a decade earlier to coordinate responses to emergencies, InterAction began sharing information and engaging regularly with the U.N. agencies responding to the crisis, as well as with the Red Cross movement and our NGO colleagues in Europe.

We initiated several actions to facilitate our work and respond to the overwhelming public interest in assisting those affected by the Tsunami. Within 48 hours after the onset of the crisis, we published the initial list of our members accepting contributions with descriptions of their activities. We posted on our website information on appropriate ways to give, and distributed to the media video and radio news releases we had prepared earlier on the same topic. Our consistent message in such disasters is that cash is best. We also posted on our web site guidance for the American public on considerations in selecting a relief agency to which to contribute. We responded to myriad press inquiries about our members' responses, the situation on the ground and how concerned citizens could help.

In the region, the governments of India and Sri Lanka immediately assumed responsibility for coordination of disaster response activities on their territory. The Indonesian authorities asked the United Nations to assist in managing the international effort even as it directed the domestic reply. Disaster Response Teams from OFDA arrived in the affected countries within days, as the U.N.'s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs sent assessment teams and personnel to assist U.N. officials assigned in the affected countries. U.S. military helicopters, personnel, and commodities from the *Abraham Lincoln* and its escorts extended the reach of the humanitarian community into parts of Aceh cut off by road and addressed other logistic constraints to effective delivery of assistance. U.S. Navy personnel provided similar assistance in Sri Lanka. In each country participants in the civil conflicts seemed to welcome relief activities. Although skirmishes between belligerents have occurred in Aceh, these incidents did not impair the delivery of humanitarian relief. Apprehension that the Indonesian military would ban or impose tight controls on the programs of foreign relief organizations have proved unfounded. We hope and trust that this will continue to be the case as the relief phase moves to recovery.

Today, an estimated 2 million people throughout the affected region are receiving some form of assistance from their own governments and the 4,000 humanitarian personnel who have come from abroad to help them. With over 275,000 known dead or missing, the casualty toll is indeed catastrophic. But the good sanitation practices of local populations, several timely immunization programs, generally adequate nu-

trition, and good fortune have so far prevented a second tidal wave of lethal disease among survivors, many of whom nevertheless remain vulnerable to cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever, measles, malaria, and other contagious illnesses.

The devastating disaster has had major psychological effects on survivors as well, especially children. While the resumption of normal work and living conditions will help survivors to regain their mental and emotional equilibrium, many will need longer-term psychosocial support to deal with the profound trauma, loss and other repercussions of the disaster. The crisis has amplified the psychosocial needs and heightened protection risks to children, such as separation, trafficking, and sexual exploitation. Early fears of trafficking in children, however, have been allayed by measures taken by the extended families of children whose parents were lost and by government bans on travel by children without accompanying family members. But given the prevalence of trafficking in some affected countries this and other protection concerns bear watching in the months ahead, in addition to the ongoing psychosocial needs.

Hundreds of thousands of survivors remain displaced, an estimated 400,000 in Aceh alone. Many have sought refuge in spontaneous settlements. The Indonesian government has plans for moving many of these persons to 24 relocation camps. This may be an appropriate interim solution but past experience suggests that camps are not always the best answer to the needs of displaced populations. They may be particularly inappropriate in Aceh, where local people have been moved into camps in the past for political reasons. Camps should be created only in consultation with the survivors and movement to them should be voluntary.

Although some cash for work programs have been initiated by NGOs, most survivors remain unemployed. As you have read, thousands of fishing boats have been destroyed, and the fields of many farmers have been washed away or damaged by salt water. It will be some time before these people will again be self-sufficient. Meanwhile they will remain dependent on their governments and the donor community for food and other basic necessities.

Coordination of relief efforts is becoming more effective each day, particularly among agencies working in specific sectors. The governments of Sri Lanka and of India are playing strong roles. In Aceh, for example, Indonesian and U.N. officials are sharing responsibility and working together increasingly well. The United Nations has established two offices in Aceh and expects to open two others soon. Regular meetings of humanitarian personnel, including our member groups, around various sectors of concern—primarily water and sanitation, health, shelter—are being hosted increasingly under the joint auspices of the Indonesian government and the United Nations in Aceh. The transition from military to civilian services in key areas such as transportation is going smoothly.

The most serious impediment to good coordination appears to be the large number of inexperienced organizations and individuals that have arrived in some of the affected countries. There are an estimated 400 NGOs now present in the region, 150 in Aceh alone. While U.N. organizations, the Red Cross movement, and established international NGOs and their local partners have been working together on sectoral assessments and a rational allocation of resources, some of the agencies, unaccustomed to these environments in which they are working and the kind of coordination used, have not been as constructive. We hope and anticipate that this problem will diminish over the coming weeks as the initial relief phase winds down. The more experienced international NGOs are making efforts to reach out to those willing to collaborate and to help them benefit from participation in coordination mechanisms.

Learning and Applying Lessons

As we look ahead during the recovery and rehabilitation phases of the Tsunami crisis and as we anticipate other emergencies that surely lie ahead, I highlight below several of the lessons from our experience in responding to this crisis to date, as well as those we know from prior experience and should bear in mind going forward.

Accountability. The past six weeks have reminded us of the extraordinary compassion and generosity of the American people. As of February 7, 60 InterAction members report they have received in the aggregate over \$765 million in contributions from private donors, most of it from individuals. We established the InterAction “Tsunami Barometer” on our website to track these donations. Our members recognize that we are accountable to the public for the careful and effective use of these funds. Members subscribe to a set of standards adopted by the InterAction alliance over a decade ago. They address performance, fundraising, governance, program and financial management. Conformance to these standards guides our members’ work and helps assure donors that funds are being spent in an accountable and effective

way. Members are obliged to “full, honest, and accurate disclosure of relevant information concerning their goals, programs, finances and governance.” We are working with our members to remain true to these important principles, and to provide timely, detailed information on the use of all funds entrusted to them.

Appropriate Giving. In their public comments InterAction and its members promote the theme that cash is the most appropriate contribution a private citizen can make, a message that appears to have been largely accepted by the American people. It certainly helps enormously when that message is delivered from the White House by the President, as it was on several occasions after December 26. In contrast to the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch, when warehouses in Gulf ports were crammed with used clothing and other commodities not urgently needed in Central America, our fellow citizens used their checkbooks, credit cards and wallets to make their contributions this time.

Military Response. The superb performance of the U.S. military personnel assigned to assist the relief effort is a reminder that our armed forces have capabilities that are indeed unique in situations of natural disasters of this magnitude. While the armed forces of over 20 countries responded to this crisis, the reach of our navy and the transport, water purification, and logistic assets it brought to bear are indeed unrivaled. One indicator of how well the humanitarian and military responders worked together is the U.N.’s report that the military forces on the scene replied affirmatively to 97 percent of the specific requests from humanitarians for transportation and other services. Now that the NGOs and the United Nations have had time to lease civilian helicopters, ship in trucks and obtain more water purification equipment, the military will no longer be needed and civilian professionals can carry out relief and reconstruction work unaided. The U.S. military’s role in Tsunami relief serves as a good example of an appropriate role for our armed forces in providing assistance in such settings.

Essential Services. An initial assessment of the response in Aceh, and our recent experiences in the Bam earthquake and in Darfur, indicate the international relief community can provide adequate emergency medical services but is not as well resourced in dealing with sanitation and provision of clean water. U.N. Emergency Response Coordinator Jan Egeland initiated a systematic inventory of the community’s capacities several months before the Tsunami. When the results are available later this year, IASC members and donors will have to consider whether a reallocation of resources and capacities to cover shortfalls in the essential services would be appropriate.

Applying Humanitarian Standards. The humanitarian response to the crisis is far from over. As I already have indicated, hundreds of thousands of those who survived the Tsunami remain displaced, without employment, and still vulnerable to disease. As relief activities continue, NGOs and other humanitarian responders must be careful to maintain a level of care equal to the internationally accepted “Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response.” Incorporated into our InterAction standards, these are recognized by the U.S. Government and throughout most of the international humanitarian community as appropriate guidelines for relief work.

Long-Term Commitment. Experience with myriad natural disasters has taught us that full recovery and rehabilitation from such devastation takes between 5 and 10 years. There is understandable pressure to show quick results, and, as I have indicated, relief activities to date have preserved hundreds of thousands of lives. But the task of rebuilding livelihoods and restoring communities requires planning, strategizing, and realistic timeframes. We are encouraged that leadership roles within the United Nations and the international financial institutions have been identified to consolidate assessments and start reconstruction planning. We hope the Administration and Congress stay the course on what will surely be a lengthy reconstruction effort, building on the goodwill we have generated through our relief efforts.

NGO Participation in Reconstruction Planning. We also must remember that within the InterAction alliance, different agencies perform different functions. Some respond only in the initial short-term relief phase, providing basic clinical and public health services, water and food, temporary shelter, etc. Others remain for the extended recovery and reconstruction phase, helping to rebuild the communities that have been destroyed, either where they were or in more secure locations. Many of the 70 InterAction member agencies responding to the Tsunami are planning to be engaged over the longer-term. Thanks to the generosity of the American public quite a few of our members are at or well on their way to meeting their funding targets, which will enable them to do this. We underscore the importance of NGO participation in the donor conferences expected to be convened later this year. We believe that the resources we will bring to the reconstruction phase, our long engagement

with the local communities, and the partnerships we have with local organizations will enable us to play an important role in the deliberations on reconstruction planning.

Respecting Local Communities and Capacities in the Recovery Process. As we plan for the future we believe it important to remember, in the words of my colleague Peter Bell, President of CARE, USA, that “the largest contribution to the reconstruction effort will come from the hard work, ingenuity and capacity of citizens in affected countries.” It will be important that national governments and donors include in their planning processes consultation and coordination with civil society and local authorities. The role of local communities in their own development and rehabilitation is critical, with a focus on helping them rebuild their capacities. Special attention should be paid to vulnerable groups such as women-headed households, low caste individuals, children, and others who are traditionally outside the formal decisionmaking structures of their communities. Likewise, and particularly in those countries beset by civil wars, recovery programs must be designed and implemented in a manner that is perceived as fair and equitable, so that they do not compound mistrust and existing grievances, especially in conflict areas.

Meeting Pledges. Mr. Chairman, the financial commitments made by the international community to relief and recovery have been extraordinary. But it is no secret that many pledges go unfulfilled and that it sometimes is hard to tell how much funding is “new money.” At this early stage we also have only preliminary estimates of the full cost of recovery and rehabilitation. Judging by what we have heard from Members of Congress, we are gratified by what appears to be broad support for a generous American government contribution to the financing of long-term programs. Furthermore, my colleagues and I are persuaded that governmental funding to assist those affected by this disaster must be provided on a multi-year basis and on flexible terms while memories of the devastation and suffering are fresh. We have been pleased to hear the President and members of the Congress emphasize the need for a long-term approach.

Forgotten Crises. Sadly, this crisis reminds us of all the equally tragic crises in the world that are not receiving as much attention, such as Sudan’s Darfur region, northern Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In just these three countries many millions of lives have been lost and millions of innocent people continue to suffer the deadly consequences of conflict and violence. Some crises are silent, like the 1.2 billion people living in extreme poverty in the developing world. It is our hope that our leaders, including members of Congress, will take the opportunity to further educate and sensitize the American public to these ongoing humanitarian crises and extreme poverty. We will do our best to keep the spotlight on all of these crises. The President was helpful on this front when he underscored to Americans that the funds provided for relief and reconstruction to those affected by the Tsunami should be seen as “extra help” and not as a replacement for donations for other important needs.

Funding Needs. With these concerns in mind, we have recommended that the Congress provide \$2 billion in emergency supplemental funding to meet needs not only in the Tsunami-affected countries but also those elsewhere. We have urged that \$500–\$600 million be used for non-military relief and reconstruction assistance to Tsunami-affected countries, including the replenishment of USAID development and disaster accounts from which funds were drawn for the initial Tsunami response. An additional \$400–\$500 million is needed for other humanitarian needs in Sudan, Congo, Uganda and elsewhere that otherwise would go unmet. Finally, \$1 billion should also be available for addressing the global shortfalls in emergency food aid, some of which is needed in Tsunami affected countries.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your comments and to responding to your questions.

Senator MURKOWSKI [presiding]. Mr. Toole.

**STATEMENT OF DANIEL TOOLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
EMERGENCY PROGRAMS, UNICEF, NEW YORK, NY**

Mr. TOOLE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, members of the committee. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss what UNICEF has been doing for the tsunami disaster, as well as the United Nations as a whole.

I guess I would first take an opportunity, as others before me, to thank the American Government, this administration, President Bush himself, for the extraordinary response to the tsunami crisis.

As an American citizen—and it is not so common in the U.N. system—I take real pride in the tremendous efforts of the United States to alleviate the suffering of the tsunami victims. Americans have opened their hearts, as well as their pocketbook, as has been mentioned many times today. UNICEF has already raised over \$300 million for the crisis and over \$60 million of that has come from the American population itself, in addition to funds from the American Government. I know I speak for the entire humanitarian population and the community of aid workers saying thank you. We are very, very grateful for the steadfast support.

I would add to that the incredible logistics and transport support from the American military that UNICEF has also benefited from, without which we would not have been able to deliver the assistance, as well as technical assistance from the CDC.

I would also thank the committee for its leadership in organizing the hearing and hope you will continue your discussions.

Madam Chair, the events of about 6 weeks, as others have said, were truly cataclysmic. I have traveled to the region twice. I came back just on Sunday from my second trip. No words, no photo, no amateur video can possibly show or demonstrate what has happened. Others have mentioned that before me. I will not repeat it. But communities have suffered enormously and every picture that you see, every video that you see, every scene of destruction that you have seen are lives of people. There are pieces of clothing. There is a CD. There is a photo album or a diploma that you find on the ground. These are people's lives that were disrupted. These are people's jobs that have been ruined. These are children who are, indeed, traumatized.

More than a third of the victims were indeed children. In some communities, UNICEF has found that the number may be as many as half. Those children who have suffered and who are left are vulnerable because of their loss of homes, parents, family. They are hungry. They are liable for disease. They are traumatized and they are at a threat of exploitation and abuse.

Perhaps the saddest portion of the scenes that one sees is that, indeed, there are more parents without children than children without parents. Many, many children lost their lives.

Together with our U.N. and nongovernmental partners, UNICEF is doing everything possible to eliminate the health and other risks to survivors. That is our first job; to keep children alive. We have assumed the lead coordination role in education, child protection, and water and sanitation, as mentioned by others before me. Water and sanitation is one of the most important strategies that we need to pursue in the long term.

Indeed, although the sheer scale of the disaster and the numbers of countries affected has presented enormous logistical problems, coordination of relief efforts has actually been better than in the past. It is better than in Darfur. It is better than it has been in Afghanistan. UNICEF has already delivered more than 8 million dollars' worth of supplies and we have \$45 million of supplies in the pipeline to arrive in the next few weeks.

I will not go into detail, Madam Chair, but I do have a long statement which I am happy to share with you and I am happy to answer questions, should you have any.

Early interventions by aid agencies and the swift response of the international community, as a whole, have given cause for hope. Thanks to the committed response of the international community, media attention, and the strong leadership of the affected governments themselves, early fears of massive deaths after the tsunami have not materialized. For example, though early media reports of trafficking and abuse proved largely unsubstantiated, they nevertheless galvanized a powerful response that may have not emerged as quickly without such attention. Early measures to protect children, many of them taken by the affected governments, doubtless went a long way toward preventing further victimization. This underlies the need to strengthen and accelerate our collective protection response so that it can become more predictable and ultimately more effective. There is a clear need for automatic and prevention-oriented protection responses in times of emergency.

Some of the other lessons that we have seen already. There is a clear message that we need to invest in national capacity to respond, and speakers before me have mentioned that. The strength of the national response in Thailand and India in particular stand testament to what can be achieved when governments have the proper tools in place. Here again preparedness should be the watch word. We know that our assistance cannot stop once these early interventions are over, once the threat of disease subsides, once the first day of school has passed.

In UNICEF we often say we work in countries before, during, and after an emergency. We also work on both sides of crises and conflict, adhering to the universal humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. That is why, if you travel to Sri Lanka or Aceh a year or two from now, you will still find our staff and other NGOs working to help government and civil society to support the long-term rehabilitation and recovery of all the region, whatever their political allegiance may be.

Too often in the past, the international community has allowed its attention to wander; wander away too soon, depleting political will and resources before the job is truly over. Others before me have said that we must not let that happen. I echo that theme. We must invest for the long term. We must invest in a flexible and long-term support to tsunami victims.

One of the most important outcomes that could arise from the disaster would be peace-building, as has been mentioned. Madam Chair, it is clear that despite recent setbacks, an opportunity does exist to pursue negotiated settlements in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I urge this committee to use the tremendous political capital at its disposal to bring conflicting parties together in both of these stricken countries. Indeed, the continued leadership and support of the U.S. Government is vital in every respect. The long-term commitment of the international community, as a whole, is essential to helping tsunami-stricken communities move from relief to recovery. I hope the U.S. Senate will remain engaged in this issue, and for my part, I would be happy to return later to testify and provide an update on what has actually been accomplished.

Madam Chair, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both natural and manmade. Originally we were called the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund. It has always been

a part of our business. It comes out of the shattered past of the Second World War. Much has changed since then, but our fundamental purpose has not. Emergencies today represent 40 percent of our activities. In health, nutrition, water, sanitation, protection, education, as well as the protection against HIV/AIDS our core commitments to children in emergencies are more than a mission statement. They are a humanitarian imperative.

Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected countries, we must help focus public and government attention to other forgotten countries. Sudan with a recent peace agreement gives some cause for hope but also creates the need for rapid, positive change to build confidence and better social services in Liberia, where we must consolidate the initial steps toward peace and normalcy, and in other countries as far afield as Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, or even the Central African Republic.

Madam Chair, members of the committee, thank you on behalf of UNICEF. Thank you on behalf of the United Nations for your continued and strong support. Together we can improve the lives of millions of children in emergencies across the globe by starting with this response in the tsunami.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toole follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAN TOOLE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS, UNICEF, NEW YORK, NY

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss UNICEF's response to aid victims of the tsunami.

Before I begin, however, I would like to take this opportunity on behalf of UNICEF to extend our deepest appreciation for the support and leadership of this Administration, and of President Bush, in responding to the tsunami crisis. As a citizen of this country, I take real pride in the tremendous efforts of the United States to alleviate the suffering of tsunami victims. Americans have opened their hearts—and their pocketbooks—in an unprecedented way; the American public alone has donated over \$60 million to UNICEF in support of the tsunami. I know I speak for the entire humanitarian community when I say that we are all truly grateful for the tremendous support of the United States.

The U.S. military has offered key logistical support, particularly in the Aceh region of Indonesia. The inter-agency health assessment on the West Coast of Indonesia would not have been possible without the USS *Lincoln*. The USNS *Mercy* has now moved into Indonesian coastal waters, and has already begun to assist UNICEF in our efforts to provide primary health care to affected populations there. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has seconded a number of staff to UNICEF Indonesia, offering technical expertise in malaria prevention, diarrheal diseases, and measles.

In this, as in any emergency, UNICEF does not work alone. I would like to thank our partners in the NGO community and our sister U.N. agencies, as well as our government partners around the world for their invaluable support and assistance. Finally, I would also like to commend this Committee for its leadership in remaining focused on this issue, and for holding this hearing today.

Mr. Chairman, the events of 6 weeks ago can only be described as cataclysmic. I have travelled the region twice since the tsunami struck, and I can tell you that no words, no photo, no amateur video could ever capture the devastation I saw there. Indeed, despite more than 20 years of working in development and humanitarian assistance, I have never seen this sort of destruction before.

No doubt you have all heard the figure: Over 5 million people have been affected by this calamity. But even a number like this falls short of describing the enormity of the situation. People have lost family, friends, homes, and livelihoods. They have also lost doctors and teachers, roads and bridges, schools and hospitals. The very lifeblood of their communities has been washed away. In some parts of Aceh, the destruction goes nearly 5 miles inland—scarcely a tree or a building remains. Nor were these "little peasant shacks" or huts on the beach—these were houses made

of reinforced concrete, two and three stories high. Now all that remains of these neighborhoods are ragged walls of perhaps a foot high.

The photos you have seen show miles of rubble, and that is what is left. But remember, the rubble is people's lives. There are bits of clothing—a CD, a photo album, a diploma, an intact bottle of chili sauce and a half case of soda—random bits of thousands of lives now gone.

I flew down the coast to Meulaboh in a helicopter, and—thanks to the U.S. military—returned that way as well. The scene was one of nightmarish destruction. Near Banda Aceh, where the coastline is one of rugged cliffs, a band of white salt marks where the swelling sea reached the height of a four-story building. Where there are depressions and bays, as in Banda Aceh itself, the rushing water destroyed everything in its path. Imagine four waves, each 40 feet high or more, carrying cement, chairs, cars. I could describe for you a litany of surreal images: A bulldozer carried 4 miles inland and discarded in the middle of a withered rice paddy; a huge petroleum barge hurled into someone's home a mile and a half from the coast; palm trees flattened in a row like the tines of a comb.

And this is to say nothing of the damage caused by the earthquake itself. Nine point zero on the Richter scale—it is difficult to imagine. The aftershocks alone, measuring 6.5, tore through Aceh with the same force as the earthquake that devastated Kobe, Japan in 1995. We are only now beginning to assess the damage caused before the waves hit.

But of course it is not the toll upon brick and mortar that is so devastating to see. It is the human stories that tear your heart out, and they are seemingly endless. Despite my many years cultivating a “steely exterior” in emergencies, it was still a tremendous effort not to break up in the face of these tragedies. A woman in Mulatavo Sri Lanka, lost two of her children and her husband in an instant. She managed to get one daughter on a roof and scurry up a tree with her 8-month old, only to have the baby ripped from her arms. Two weeks later, she sobs inconsolably, her face the epitome of horror and despair. What can we say? Another woman lost 34 people in her family—three generations. She is left with a grandson who was away visiting an uncle, and a daughter whose home she was visiting when the waves hit. Story after story, person after person. Random destruction, random horror that has burrowed deep into the mind. People who just stare at the sea or at a roof and who won't speak. It will take a long time to heal; some may never get there.

More than a third of the victims of the tsunami were children. In some communities, UNICEF has found that the number is much higher—as many as half. Those children who survived are left vulnerable by the loss of homes, parents and family. For them, the threat has not yet passed. Hunger, disease, trauma and the threat of exploitation still pose serious risks.

Together with our U.N. and non-governmental partners, UNICEF is doing everything possible to eliminate these risks. We have helped ensure that there is clean water in Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, and even as far away as Somalia. Latrines have been established for the tens of thousands of displaced living in camps or with local communities. We have distributed health kits and basic supplies like clothing and plastic tarps to provide temporary shelter, ensure good nutrition, and guard against disease. We have supported the affected governments and our NGO partners to set up protective environments for children, including those who have lost their parents. And we have undertaken vaccination campaigns against deadly illnesses such as measles. To date, UNICEF has shipped over 2,000 metric tons of relief supplies in response to this emergency, at a total value of over \$8 million. In all, some \$45 million worth of supplies have been ordered.

These early interventions, and the swift response of the international community as a whole, have given cause for hope. No doubt we all remember the early fears that disease might double the number of casualties, and the alarming media reports of trafficking of children. Thanks to the committed response of the international community and the strong leadership of the affected governments themselves, these fears have largely failed to materialize.

This is thanks in large measure to the unprecedented degree of coordination among humanitarian actors. The sheer scale of this disaster and the number of countries affected has presented an enormous logistical challenge. Even so, however, coordination of relief efforts among U.N. actors—and between the United Nations, NGOs and governments—has shown a vast improvement over previous emergencies. Under OCHA's overall leadership, humanitarian actors have engaged in regular, systematized information-sharing and planning to map out response, helping to ensure that every need is covered without unnecessary duplication. In spite of the large number of agencies operating in the field, we are working well together.

Under this overall umbrella, UNICEF has assumed the leading coordination role in certain key sectors—namely, education, child protection, and water and sanitation. In nutrition, we share a leadership role with our partners in the World Food Program, and in health, we are collaborating with the World Health Organization.

With respect to the latter, vaccination campaigns throughout the affected areas were one of our earliest priorities. In India, measles and vitamin A drives began within days of the disaster, and by January 7th these campaigns had already wrapped up on the mainland. The remote Andaman and Nicobar Islands took longer to reach, but thanks to the cooperation of the Indian government, immunization of children is now well underway.

In the Aceh region of Indonesia, where over 75 percent of health care professionals are still unaccounted for, we are working in close collaboration with key partners including: The World Health Organization, Médecins sans Frontières, IFRC, Care, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to provide measles vaccines and vitamin A supplements to over half a million children between the ages of 6 months and 15 years. We are also providing basic drugs and supplies for health facilities to cover 1.2 million people, including 1 million sachets of oral re-hydration salts, malaria treatment for 3.2 million people, 2,700,000 iron tablets, 68,000 syringes, and 11,500 safety boxes.

UNICEF also participated in the recent inter-agency health assessment on the west coast of Indonesia. This 24-person assessment team, consisting of U.N. agencies and NGOs, was only possible as a result of logistical support from the United States. It covered numerous sites previously unassessed on the West Coast, using four teams operating simultaneously and supported by U.S. helicopters for drop-off and pick-up. The assessment took 6 days in total, hosted on the USS *Lincoln*.

As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, our deepest gratitude goes to the U.S. military for this and other crucial assistance. U.S. military support continues to prove invaluable in Indonesia, and I would especially like to highlight the USNS *Mercy*, a floating hospital of exceptional resources. UNICEF and the crew of the *Mercy* have already begun technical-level discussions to assess the many ways in which the *Mercy* can support key areas of public health such as water quality, malaria prevention and control, emergency obstetrical care and safe motherhood, measles vaccination programs, and psychosocial support.

Needless to say, however, the threat of disease remains. Clean water and proper sanitation are a critical and growing problem, especially for the hundreds of thousands of tsunami survivors living in temporary camps. The risk of water-borne diseases such as cholera and diarrhea is high, especially for children.

The sanitation situation is particularly worrying in Indonesia, where in some areas of Aceh Province, only one in 1,000 people has access to a toilet. This shortage has been exacerbated by heavy rains, which have flooded many toilets in low-lying camps, forcing displaced people to relocate to higher ground. Heavy rains have worsened the situation in Sri Lanka as well, where only 35 percent of people in camps have access to safe sanitation. And in the Maldives, water and sanitation has proven to be the greatest challenge. The extremely low altitude of these islands rendered them especially vulnerable to damage and contamination of water supplies and sewage systems. As early as December 28, UNICEF estimated that one in five islands in the Maldives was without safe drinking water. Compounding the problem, virtually every household on the affected islands reported blocked or damaged sewage systems.

In response, we are working with governments to coordinate aid agency relief efforts across the tsunami-affected countries to restore access to safe water and sanitation. In the Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar Districts of Indonesia, UNICEF is pumping and chlorinating 1,500 wells to benefit 15,000 people, and supplying mobile water treatment units at six locations along both East and West Coasts to benefit 25,000 people. Construction of emergency latrines is ongoing, and we are also providing bathing and washing facilities for 43,000 people in settlements for the displaced.

In Sri Lanka, UNICEF has distributed hundreds of tons of water and sanitation supplies, including bottled drinking water, water purification tablets, water tanks, pumps, jerry cans, and family water kits, to name but a few. We have constructed more than 1,500 temporary latrines, and are supporting the establishment of women's bathing facilities at relocation sites for the displaced.

And in the Maldives, we have distributed Basic Family Water Kits, containing collapsible buckets, bars of soap and purification tablets, including instructions on their use in the local language. We are helping the government to construct latrines, and have supplied hundreds of wheelbarrows, shovels, rakes, disinfectant, and other cleaning equipment to address the problem of garbage disposal. Across the

Maldives, UNICEF and its partners are assisting 69 islands with over 13,000 households.

These and other UNICEF water and sanitation projects will be supported by the Tsunami Water and Sanitation Fund, created last month in partnership with the Clinton Foundation as part of President Bush's campaign for private sector support to the tsunami crisis. The new fund will support a robust series of programs designed not only to restore safe water and sanitation for affected countries, but to improve upon what existed before. And of course, former President Clinton will now support the tsunami effort more broadly as Secretary General Kofi Annan's Special Envoy for Tsunami-affected Countries.

Turning to the issue of protection, UNICEF and other child protection agencies have been deeply concerned over reports of children being exploited or trafficked. For the most part, however, these reports have thankfully remained unsubstantiated. This is in part because the number of separated children—those no longer in the care of their parents—and unaccompanied children—those no longer in the care of an adult—is relatively small. Though it varies among countries, the devastation of the tsunami was such that many children simply did not survive; as a result, there are few children at all in some of the worst hit areas, unaccompanied or otherwise.

In addition, the affected communities generally have a strong tradition of caring for children who have lost parents, and as a result we can say confidently that the number of children requiring full-time care from child protection agencies is very small.

In Indonesia, UNICEF and its partners have registered 440 separated and 31 unaccompanied children. In Sri Lanka, there are 1,500 separated children living with family, and fewer than 50 children are unaccompanied; 4,000 Sri Lankan children have lost at least one parent. In neighboring India, we have identified 361 children who have lost both parents, and over 1,800 who lost one. Approximately 500 children in Thailand have lost one parent or guardian, and 73 lost both parents.

Considering the magnitude of this emergency, the number of unaccompanied children is relatively small; however, it is still crucial to ensure that these children are protected from those who would prey upon their vulnerability. In this regard, UNICEF commends the swift and decisive leadership of the affected governments. Through the imposition of moratoria on international adoptions, the tightening of port and border security and other measures, affected governments have helped ensure that their children are not victimized yet again by the tsunami. In addition, I would like to offer our sincere thanks for the statement issued by the U.S. Government in the early days of the crisis underlining the essential role of extended family and community placement for children who had lost their parents. It was a helpful initiative prompting national governments to strengthen their own measures to protect children from illicit adoption or trafficking.

UNICEF and its partners have also taken protective measures for unaccompanied children. In part through generous support from USAID, child centers have been established throughout the affected areas to register unaccompanied and separated children, and to set up family tracing mechanisms to help locate loved ones. Children who are no longer in the care of their families will be protected and supported through these centers so that they are not abandoned or left to fend for themselves, but have the opportunity to go to school, eat well and play. We are distributing Family Kits to support households who are caring for separated children, and monitoring mechanisms have been put into place to ensure that children living with foster families are being cared for responsibly.

But it is not just separated and unaccompanied children that need our protection. Thousands of children living in displacement camps are vulnerable to exploitation and abuse, and in some cases recruitment into local fighting groups. And virtually every child in the affected areas is experiencing some form of psychological distress arising from the disaster. For these children, it is crucial to re-establish some sense of normalcy, and ensure that there are safe places for them to learn, play, and interact.

Throughout the affected regions, UNICEF has been supporting local governments in their efforts to get children back to school—or, where this is not possible, “back to learning.” We have shipped literally tons of educational materials, including thousands of school tents, school-in-a-box kits, and recreation kits including sports and games. We are supporting teacher training, including training in psychosocial support, and are assisting the Government of Indonesia to recruit teachers to replace the 2,000 education professionals who were killed in the tsunami.

Even once schools have re-opened, however, the psychological impact on “the tsunami generation” is likely to be deep and long term, and will require sustained psychosocial care. Throughout the affected areas, we are supporting community- and

school-based psychosocial responses to help children cope with the enduring impacts of this tragedy.

In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF is training non-governmental partners, teachers and local authorities in psychosocial response, including developing projects where children can help each other. In the districts of Batticaloa, Trincomalee and Kirinda, UNICEF and its partners have established spaces in displacement camps where children can learn and play safely, where they can interact with each other in a stable environment. Thousands of play kits, including toys, puzzles and sports equipment, are being distributed. Through play, drawing and structured recreation activities, children in Sri Lanka and elsewhere are coming to terms with the terrible losses they have suffered.

Thus far, there have been only scattered reports of abuse and trafficking, and those generally unconfirmed. Nevertheless, UNICEF is taking precautionary measures, including extensive awareness-raising campaigns and the training of military and police officers in child protection issues.

Mr. Chairman, one of the most important lessons we can draw from these figures is that, as the old adage goes, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Though early media reports of trafficking and abuse proved largely unsubstantiated, they nevertheless galvanized a powerful response that may not have emerged as quickly otherwise. Just as swift vaccination campaigns, Vitamin A distribution and the provision of clean water helped stave off disease, early measures to protect children—many of them taken by the affected governments themselves—most likely went a long way toward preventing the further victimization of children.

This points to a need which has been increasingly apparent to child protection agencies of late: The need to mainstream our collective protection response so that it becomes more predictable and, ultimately, more efficient. Just as we know from experience to distribute oral re-hydration salts and water purification tablets in times of flood, so too should we have automatic, preventive protection responses in times of emergency.

But our assistance does not stop once these early interventions are over—once the threat of diseases subsides and the first day of school has passed. In UNICEF, we often say we work in a country before, during and after an emergency. We also work on both sides of a conflict, adhering to the universal humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality. That is why, if you travel to Sri Lanka or Aceh in a year or two, you will see our staff helping governments and civil society to reconstruct school buildings and health clinics, and to support the long-term rehabilitation and recovery of all regions, whatever their political allegiance. Too often in the past, the international community has allowed its attention to wander away too soon, depleting political will and resources before the job is truly over. We must not allow that to happen here.

Another lesson we can take away from this tragedy is the importance of investing in national capacity to respond to disasters. The strength of the national response in Thailand and India stand testament to what can be achieved when governments have the proper tools in place. The international community will always respond when disaster strikes, but national capacity is critical. Here again, preparedness is the watchword.

And it is not only governments who need to be prepared. The international humanitarian community also has a responsibility in this regard. So what about us? Were we at UNICEF ready for such a massive emergency? Of course not. No one could have planned for a calamity of this scale. However, the lessons of Darfur, Afghanistan and Liberia have helped us to respond faster and more efficiently. They have also shown all of us in the United Nations the vital importance of coordination. Now we need to carry these lessons forward to other emergencies.

Mr. Chairman, UNICEF has always worked in emergencies, both natural and man-made. Originally called the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the organization was created to provide humanitarian assistance to children living in a world shattered by the Second World War. Much has changed since then, but our fundamental purpose has not. Emergencies still account for 40 percent of our activities. In health and nutrition, water and sanitation, protection, education and HIV/AIDS, our Core Commitments for Children in Emergencies are more than a mission statement—they are a humanitarian imperative.

Therefore, even as we continue our work in tsunami-affected countries, we must help focus public and government attention to other, forgotten countries: Sudan, where the recent peace agreement gives some cause for hope, but also creates a need for rapid and positive change to build confidence and better social services; in Liberia where we must consolidate our initial steps toward peace and normalcy; in Afghanistan where massive support is still necessary to build peace; and in other countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti and the Central African Republic.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you on behalf of UNICEF for your continued strong support. Together, we can improve the lives of millions of children in emergencies across the globe, building better opportunities, better futures, for every child.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Toole.
Ms. Lindborg.

**STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY
CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ms. LINDBORG. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Biden. We appreciate your leadership on this and so many issues and, at this point, your stamina. We appreciate your inviting us to share our early reflections on how the international community has responded to the devastation of the tsunami.

A few weeks ago, I had the opportunity to travel to Sri Lanka and Indonesia and I stood with our team in the village of Miruk Lam Reudeup, which is just outside Banda Aceh in Indonesia. I think it is fair to describe that area as Ground Zero. It suffered from both the earthquake and the devastation of the tsunami. As you have heard throughout the morning, it is a scene of some devastation, the churned debris that covers what used to be homes and villages.

While I was there, we began working with villagers, who had come from nearby displaced camps, in a cash-for-work program that paid the villagers to do the projects that they had deemed the highest priority. In that instance, it was to clear the roads so they could reenter their villages to see what was left and, on a more gruesome note, to enable the Indonesian military to come in and retrieve the bodies that were still under the debris. It was a pretty sobering and pretty desolate sight.

But, just yesterday, I received an e-mail from a member of our team on the ground, and he writes that since my visit, the recovery has really been remarkable. You would not believe this place, if you saw it, he writes. The village has a new well, a generator that runs the water pump, lights that extend the workday well into night. All the roads are cleared. People are returning home and beginning to rebuild. Small businesses that service the reconstruction effort are popping up. Jobs are being generated. Markets are open. The people in the village, he writes, are several steps ahead of the government and the international NGOs.

I wanted to share that reflection with you because it captures a really important point that I would like to make, and that is, relief and recovery works best when it is planned and executed in close partnership with the communities affected by a disaster. Many of these community members, despite the considerable trauma that we have heard quite a bit about today and the enormous loss caused by this disaster, are at this point survivors, and many of them have the will and the know-how to help shape the best response to the disaster.

I was asked to reflect a little bit on where I thought the NGOs were most effective in this response. I would like to just hit three points.

The first is that, because of the long-term investments in development that many of us have made, in partnership with the U.S.

Government, in so many of these countries, we were able to respond quickly through our partnerships with local communities and local governments, with our own staff members who were poised and ready to go in, and with local knowledge, networks, and suppliers. A quick example is that Mercy Corps has worked in Sumatra for several years with a U.S. Department of Agriculture program. Because of our nearby location to Aceh, we were able to be at the border quickly with a seasoned team, with assets, trucks, motorcycles, and office supplies ready to go as the border opened. That is the result of long-term development investments.

Second, I think we have done our best work when we are able to leverage the energy and the ingenuity of the local communities. I cited the cash-for-work example in Aceh. This means being able to see the best ways to support the community as they move forward in their own recovery. It means investing in their efforts. For example, seeing that there is a brick factory that, with a capital investment, can get back up and running, supply bricks for the effort, employ individuals, and give them the capacity to earn income and make their own decisions about how to move forward.

In Meulaboh, for example, we very quickly helped local community members move, within the first 10 days, 28 boats back down to the ocean, repair them, and get them back out to sea. As one fisherman told me, I am still afraid to go too far out, but it feels good to get back into some routine.

Third, as has been noted, there has been an unprecedented response by private donors throughout the world, and Americans have been extraordinarily generous. That incredible pipeline of flexible, fast money has enabled the NGOs to mobilize quickly. From the very first day, we were able to move in with resources and were able to undertake immediate distributions. It has enabled us to be so flexible that as the situation, which is extraordinarily dynamic, has changed, we have been able to adjust our programs to support recovery efforts as quickly as is needed. It has proven to be a remarkable asset, if we ever have had any doubt, in enabling that response.

I would like to comment briefly on two challenges that remain, although, I think we have made great progress on both in this particular response. The first is the challenge of material aid. We have seen this in many emergencies stemming from extreme good will and wonderful motivation. Well-meaning people want to respond by providing things, medicines, clothes and items that, although well-intentioned, end up clogging up our logistical pipelines and are often not appropriate for the environment. For example, I met with a Sri Lankan village leader who was a bit perplexed at a shipment of ties and miniskirts that he had just received. There are many very important uses of material aid, but it has to be demand-driven, well-targeted, appropriate, and prioritized.

The good news is we have made enormous progress with this response. We have seen messages in mainstream publications to please donate cash instead of goods. Great credit is due to Presidents Bush and Clinton for their carrying that message so effectively as well.

Second, we have talked a lot through the morning about coordination, and I think that we were challenged to coordinate because

of the enormity of the response. So, many groups and individuals who have not previously worked in emergency environments, through the best of intentions, showed up. But the good news is that the experienced actors, the U.N. and the NGO community, they were able to quickly, on the ground, reconstitute the international architecture that does exist.

Just to give you a sense of what that looks like on the ground: In Indonesia, when I was there, every morning at 7 o'clock, there was a meeting between U.N. representatives and NGOs to talk about the key issues for a half-hour, followed by sectoral and regional meetings that appropriate NGO representatives then attended through the day. There is also a humanitarian information center established by the United Nations. So, if you are new to the scene, you can plug in, see who is doing what, who has which resources and where.

Just a quick example; a very small example of how that works. In Meulaboh, Mercy Corps was able to bring in several shipments of dried fish. We learned that Catholic Relief Services was distributing a food basket that lacked protein but they had the networks in the displaced camps. We were able to add our fish to their food basket so that there was a complete food basket distributed to those families. Those kinds of examples occur every day in many, many ways.

One way in which all of this coordination becomes very helpful is that it gives us a mechanism to deal with the sensitive issues, one of which is shelter. The whole question of shelter is quite complicated in Aceh where there are 450,000 displaced people. The United Nations, the NGOs, and the Indonesian Government have been able to form an integrated task force to look at how to ensure the best setting for the proposed barracks. So, some of the early concerns have not materialized, although it is an issue that we will all be looking at closely, but with good dialog and good coordination among all the various actors there.

Finally, I would like to end with just two recommendations as we look forward. The first is to really urge that we look again at how to establish funding mechanisms that distribute money much more quickly and effectively over longer time periods. We had a great advantage because of the private resources that were available for the tsunami. We do not always, in fact, we rarely have that advantage. We see what a great benefit that is for ensuring a very fast and effective response that can move to meet changing needs as quickly as the situation demands.

Second—and this is pertinent as you look at both the supplemental request and the FY 2006 budget—it is critical to maintain our solid investments in development. As important as these emergency responses are, it is critical that we do not forget the value of long-term development programming, the value that it played in this response, and also in meeting the many silent tsunamis around the world.

I will not say more because I was very heartened to hear the concern among many of the Senators on this committee that we not forget either of those important areas.

As we reflect on this first period of response, I think there is much to commend. I think that the international community drew

together and we were able to avert some of the biggest fears that we had. We were able to access some of these very difficult areas and meet the immediate needs. Kids are back at school in Aceh and the risk of widespread disease has been averted.

I will say, however, that now is when the hard work begins. These are extraordinarily complex situations and there will be rebuilding efforts that will take us through the next 5 to 8 years. It is important that we not lose that focus. I would urge you all to consider holding a hearing in another 6 to 12 months to check in how that longer term effort is going. In the meantime, we will continue to take our cue from the enormous courage of all the survivors with whom we are working.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY LINDBORG, PRESIDENT, MERCY CORPS,
WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much for inviting me to share my thoughts on the humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. The tsunami delivered a historic and devastating punch through a region that spanned 11 nations, requiring a fast and comprehensive response. This disaster severely tested the international relief infrastructure, and I believe we can draw from this experience valuable lessons that will inform our planning and response to future emergencies. I applaud the committee for taking the time to explore these issues, appreciate as always the leadership of Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden, and look forward to working with you to improve our capacity to respond to future disasters.

A few weeks ago, I traveled to Sri Lanka and Indonesia. I stood with our field staff in the utterly devastated village of Miruk Lam Reudeup in the Aceh Province of Indonesia. I think it's fair to describe that area as Ground Zero for the disaster, as it was affected both by the earthquake and the massive tsunami that followed. Most of us have seen the images of churned debris and devastated landscapes. While I was there, Mercy Corps began working with the villagers in a cash-for-work program that paid them to do projects they identified as most important. They began by clearing the road into their village, so they could pick through the remains of their houses, and most importantly, the Indonesia military could gain access to recover the many bodies under the wreckage. It was a desolate scene, with villagers wearing face masks and laboriously clearing the way to their former homes.

But just yesterday, I got an e-mail from Dan Curran, a member of the Mercy Corps team in Aceh. He writes that since my visit there, the recovery has moved quickly. "You would not believe this place if you saw it," he wrote. The village has a new well, a generator that runs the water pump, and enough lights to extend the work day well into the night. The roads have been cleared. People are returning home and re-building with whatever materials they can salvage. Small businesses that service the reconstruction effort are popping up around town, providing much needed jobs and building supplies. "The people in this village," Dan wrote, "are several steps ahead of the government and the international NGOs."

Dan's observation captures well one of my key points today: Relief and recovery works best when planned and executed in close partnership with the communities affected by a disaster, whether natural or man-made. Many of these communities have the will and the know-how to shape the best response to the situation—the international community needs to fully use and support these local assets.

In responding to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the international NGO community was most effective when it leveraged the energy and ingenuity of the affected communities, when we have made long-term investments in building local capabilities, and when we have the resources and flexibility to support local initiatives.

We have passed the critical first month of response. As we reflect on the response to date, there is much to commend. The world has responded with incredible generosity. Many nations were able to work together to access difficult areas and provide essential services. Schools have reopened in Aceh. Conflicts have abated. Major disease outbreaks have been averted. I think we can be proud of the response.

And now the really hard work begins.

I would like to offer a few comments from the perspective of an NGO, about the NGO response to this tragedy:

1. Ongoing Investments in Longer Term Development Enabled a Fast, Effective Response

First, many of us had a fast and substantial immediate response to the emergency. Because many of us have been working on the ground in India, Sri Lanka, Sumatra and elsewhere, we were in a position to deploy the right people and resources on very short notice. We were able to do so because we have existing networks of local teams, local partners and suppliers. In those critical first hours after the emergency, it is the people on the ground who are able to reach those affected most quickly.

For example, Mercy Corps teams were waiting at the Aceh border as government officials opened that border for the first time in a year and able to cross into Aceh with a seasoned team, an office set-up and supplies. We are able to do so thanks largely to the fact we have several ongoing development focused USDA programs in Sumatra. Through these programs, Mercy Corps distributes soy milk to more than 100,000 schoolchildren and supports local NGOs in microfinance, water and sanitation, capacity building and relief activities. Due to these USDA programs, Mercy Corps was able to quickly redeploy staff, equipment, and resources to Aceh and provide immediate food, temporary shelter, and water to thousands of survivors. Our familiarity with Sumatra and working with the local NGO sector have also proved helpful in our effort to move quickly into community recovery activities, a process that will continue to rely on partnerships with local NGOs and community groups. Within the week, we were distributing food to more than 60,000 individuals using World Food Programme resources.

2. Early Developmental Relief Focus Supported Local Capacity

Second, Mercy Corps, like some other NGOs, sought and implemented innovations that moved the response quickly into recovery programs. As always, Mercy Corps made an effort to be flexible and entrepreneurial. We looked for gaps in the response and moved immediately to fill them. Mercy Corps participated fully in the effort to meet urgent needs—distribution of food, health and hygiene supplies, household kits and other essentials—but we also immediately started working with local communities to determine the necessary next steps for recovery. The cleanup and income needs in affected areas were tremendous, but so were the supply of labor and enthusiasm among local workers.

As I noted earlier, Mercy Corps started a cash-for-work program that paid locals to clear roads, rebuild schools, and maintain IDP camps. We employed more than 1,600 people in Banda Aceh alone, giving families the income to buy much-needed staples and making communities livable again. The NGO community was able to work with communities, to assist kids to return to school, help fisherman repair their boats and support a return to their homes.

3. Ability to Mobilize Private Resources Enabled a Fast and Innovative Response

Third, we benefited from an unprecedented amount of private resources. If we ever had any doubt, this crisis proved the enduring value of fast, flexible resource pipelines. Without having to wait for institutional donors, many NGOs were able to move quickly into the affected areas and begin delivering vital assistance. We are essentially the arms and legs of the international response, and this time around, we were resourced so we could mobilize fully and quickly. All too often, we are scraping for funding early on in a crisis while institutional funding sources get underway.

As importantly, as the situation changed, we were able to identify innovative solutions and work with communities to devise assistance options that most met their needs. For example, Mercy Corps was able to begin cash-for-work programs as soon as community members identified their desire to get back to work. We were then able to begin investing in small entrepreneurial efforts designed to jumpstart the local economies, providing income and jobs. Once these efforts demonstrated an effective approach, we could scale them up. A cash-for-work program that began with 100 villagers in Miruk Lam Reudeup is now employing more than 2,000 workers throughout Aceh, with support from OFDA, OTI and UNDP.

Unfortunately, we can't count on this level of public support, especially for the more complicated and hidden emergencies we typically address.

4. Challenges of Material Aid Remain

One of the chronic problems we face in highly publicized humanitarian efforts is too much material aid. Generous and well-meaning people—though schools, workplaces, places of worship—want to contribute to the relief effort and send clothes, food, and other supplies. Unfortunately, those donated items tend to clog up our finite transportation and logistics systems with goods that may not always be a top

priority. While in Sri Lanka, I spoke with one village leader who noted a supply of neckties and miniskirts he recently received. Although much can be done responsibly with material aid, it must be demand-driven, well-targeted, appropriate and prioritized.

The good news is that we've made significant progress on this issue. Our collective public reminders that cash donations are most effective in such emergencies seem to be getting through. Mainstream publications carried this message as did Presidents Bush and Clinton. But we need to continue driving home that message because the wrong donated goods continue to gum up the works.

5. Coordination Systems Worked

Despite the appearance of chaos, there is an effective international infrastructure for coordinating these responses. It occurs at many levels: Internationally between donors, at a country level, and in each region. Experienced responders know how to constitute this system in each new emergency.

In India and Sri Lanka, the governments managed the coordination, while NGOs worked in sector and regional working groups to share information and resources. In Indonesia, the government designated its military leadership to coordinate with the many international militaries that responded, while asking the United Nations to coordinate the international NGOs and other international organizations.

So what does this look like on the ground? In Indonesia for example, there are regular—at first daily—morning meetings with the key U.N. agencies and NGO representatives to identify top issues of the day. There are then a series of sector specific and regional meetings that appropriate U.N., NGO and government representatives attend. The U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs has set up a Humanitarian Information Center to facilitate information exchange. Finally, there is a group of NGOs that meets each week to identify critical issues as well.

In practice this means that in Meulaboh, for example, Mercy Corps was able to procure several shipments of dried fish. Catholic Relief Services was distributing a food basket from the World Food Programme, and although they had established the distribution network, they lacked any protein component. Aware of this gap, we gave them the fish for their teams to distribute so villagers would receive a complete food basket.

It also means that as difficult and complex issues such as shelter are addressed, there are mechanisms for working together. With nearly 450,000 displaced people in Aceh, the question of shelter is enormous. The majority of those people are living with host families, in a remarkable tribute to the Indonesian concept of "Pella Gandong" or taking care of each other. But even so, there is a need to identify temporary options for nearly 150,000 of the homeless. The Indonesia government, U.N. and NGO community have set up a joint process for an integrated planning approach with the intention to ensure the best site selection, design and operation of the barracks now proposed in 24 sites.

6. Collective Commitment to Accountability and Standards in Place

NGOs have collaborated extensively with one another and with the U.N. community over the past 8 years to develop increased levels of accountability and effectiveness in our relief operations. The results are evident in the standards agreed by InterAction, an association of 160 U.S.-based relief and development organizations, and in the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Mercy Corps field staff in Aceh report that the level of understanding and adherence to the Sphere standards among the established NGOs has been unprecedented, which has brought a greater degree of accountability and uniformity to the effort.

Two critical challenges stem from the inevitable ranks of highly motivated often brand-new organizations and individuals that are compelled to respond. As is often the case, they flocked to the tsunami-affected areas, swelled the ranks and made coordination more difficult. This is not a new phenomenon and usually quiets down after the first few weeks, but it does increase an impression of chaos that can be misleading.

In addition, many new or less experienced organizations that don't meet key standards undermine the effectiveness of our collective response and divert valuable resources from the collective effort.

To conclude, I would offer the following recommendations as we assess our performance in the Indian Ocean region and explore ways to plan and execute better humanitarian responses in the future:

1. Establish a mechanism for rapid disbursement of U.S. Government relief funds. As I mentioned above, this extraordinary tragedy brought about extraordinary generosity from individual donors; as a result, private funds financed our initial re-

sponse and allowed us to be unusually nimble in our programming. In many of the most severe crises though, governments provide the vast majority of the funds. We need to streamline the mechanism for distributing fast, long-term and flexible response funds from the government.

2. Make solid investments in developing countries. Local communities and governments were key to the sound responses in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. When we invest in long-term development—building stronger governance structures, expanding educational opportunities, enhancing the health infrastructure—we improve livelihoods and better equip beneficiary communities to deal with disasters.

Furthermore, these investments allow NGOs like Mercy Corps to establish the kind of presence—a forward position, if you will—that enables us to quickly deploy knowledgeable local and international staff to the crisis area. Country experience among NGO staff was especially important in this crisis, since both Sri Lanka and the Aceh Province of Indonesia have longstanding internal conflict dynamics that affect response strategies and implementation.

For these reasons, development assistance needs to be a top priority for the U.S. Government. As the discussion gets underway on the President's FY2006 budget request, please consider the need to ensure that core development accounts are maintained or improved.

3. Focus immediately on development relief and restoring livelihoods. Delivering food aid and non-food emergency supplies will remain the immediate priority in humanitarian crises. But as Mercy Corps learned on the ground in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, we must simultaneously work to get people back on the job: Farmers to their fields, fishermen to their boats, merchants to their shops, teachers and students to their classrooms. Instead of focusing on a false distinction between “relief” and “recovery” phases, we need to manage the two in parallel.

4. Prioritize local resources and community partnerships. In procuring relief supplies and staffing our missions, we should use local suppliers and talent whenever possible. That ensures the most locally appropriate goods and services and pumps much-needed money into the local economies. Most NGOs do their very best to develop local talent, which is especially important in the two hardest hit areas in the tsunami-affected regions: Because of the dynamics of local conflicts, governments are unlikely to permit international staff to stay indefinitely and we will need to rely heavily on local staff to accomplish recovery goals over the longer term.

Partnerships with local groups and leaders help guarantee that our efforts are meeting the greatest community needs. Mercy Corps worked closely with survivors in the devastated Indonesian town of Meulaboh to determine how we could contribute. The town's profitable fishing fleet was all but demolished by the tsunami, so we worked with leaders to organize the fisherman and pay them to move and repair boats that could be salvaged. Within weeks, fishermen were back on the water generating income for their families.

Challenges Ahead

As I noted earlier, the serious, complex and long-term effort of rebuilding these communities lies ahead. In Sri Lanka and Indonesia, there are tangled conflicts that remain just barely below the surface. These countries will have to grapple with the many complicated issues related to rebuilding an entire human and physical infrastructure. They will have to painstakingly restore whole cadres of government workers killed or wounded by the tsunami.

The role that we as international NGOs can continue to play is a supportive one. We take our cue from the many people who have survived and now lead the way with their determination to rebuild their lives. We can and will continue to help people plug as quickly as possible back into a life in which they can begin the long process of healing, make a living and rebuild both their houses and their community.

SUMMARY OF MERCY CORPS TSUNAMI RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Mercy Corps is concentrating its relief and recovery efforts in three nations: Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and India. At present, our tsunami response operations are assisting more than 250,000 people throughout the region, including over 130,000 in Sri Lanka, over 75,000 in Indonesia, and over 50,000 in India. More than 150 Mercy Corps staff members are engaged in these activities, which focus primarily on economic and livelihood recovery and, where necessary, ongoing emergency relief assistance. Mercy Corps is also exploring recovery needs in northern Somalia with an eye toward providing assistance to tsunami affected communities in that country.

The emphasis during the initial phase of our response has been to meet the most urgent emergency needs through the provision of clean water and repair of sanitation facilities, as well as the provision of sanitation supplies, food, blankets, and other non-food items, shelter materials, tools, and medicines. In addition, we are assisting with psychosocial services, cleanup, and access to other basic services. From the start, we have worked to tie emergency relief with longer term development activities. Cash for work programs are repairing damaged infrastructure, while providing participants with an opportunity to earn income and regain a sense of normalcy. As always, we are working in coordination with other aid agencies, supporting local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) responding to the disaster, and moving as quickly as possible to address the significant economic and livelihood challenges faced by these coastal communities.

Following is a brief summary of Mercy Corps operations in the region:

INDONESIA

A Mercy Corps team was among the first humanitarian workers to gain entry into Banda Aceh, an area of Indonesia that's been closed off to the world for years due to civil war. In addition to helping meet immediate food, water, and shelter needs, Mercy Corps has been making special efforts to address the long-term needs of children, the most vulnerable of those affected by the tsunami. On January 26—1 month after the tsunami—Mercy Corps helped students in Banda Aceh return to 15 local schools. This “back to school” success was made possible by community mobilization and the hard work of local citizens employed in cash for work programs.

Mercy Corps' cash for work programs pay local workers a fair daily wage to help clean up debris and repair critical infrastructure. This approach is helping accelerate economic recovery among Indonesian families, as well as providing a valuable service in rebuilding tsunami-damaged areas. Within 3 months, Mercy Corps plans to employ 6,000 people in cash-for-work programs that will continue to clean up and restore communities. We are also working to facilitate the stable return of at least 1,000 displaced families to several villages by providing shelter materials and ensuring a clean water supply.

In the coming months, Mercy Corps will increasingly focus its efforts on programs that stimulate local business and help communities rebuild. Programs already underway included business activities, such as pallet building and loans for brick enterprises, as well as the recapitalization of local businesses to expand employment. Along these lines, Mercy Corps aims to support at least 100 enterprises in 20 villages in the coming months. Finally, we are supporting the return of at least 1,000 families in several villages, facilitating “go-and-see” visits, distributing family kits for communities in their area of return, providing basic shelter materials, and conducting basic well water chlorination.

SRI LANKA

Mercy Corps staff members are partnering with local organizations to ensure a rapid, efficient response in the areas where assistance is most needed, especially the hard hit Ampara District on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka. Currently, Mercy Corps has eight international aid workers in the country and offices in Colombo, Pottuvil and Trincomalee. Senior Mercy Corps staff members have years of experience in Sri Lanka, and Mercy Corps completed an assessment visit to Sri Lanka in mid-December, less than 2 weeks before the disaster. This presence and expertise allows us to build on a broad and deep foundation of local contacts.

Mercy Corps has provided school materials to children, and supported children's recreation programs in the camps that many on Sri Lanka's eastern coast temporarily inhabit. Mercy Corps is also helping to rehabilitate the severely damaged local maritime economy, by supporting the repair of fishing boats. Mercy Corps has provided materials for cleanup, distributed shelter supplies, initiated a public health information campaign and is implementing cash for work programs in a number of communities throughout the country. Much of Mercy Corps' emergency relief support has been provided in partnership with local non-governmental organizations responding to the disaster.

INDIA

Working with local Indian organizations, Mercy Corps is assisting tens of thousands of people in Tamil Nadu, India. Mercy Corps has partnered with the DHAN Foundation to launch relief and recovery efforts in 20 of 73 villages in Tamil Nadu's Nagappattinam district (population 196,000). Efforts include distribution of temporary shelter and relief supplies, construction of community activity centers, and cash-for-work programs to help improve and reclaim agricultural land and liveli-

hoods and improve local water sources. Working with the national humanitarian organization DMI (Disaster Mitigation Institute), Mercy Corps has completed construction of roughly 350 temporary shelters, with construction of a further 100 now underway. Mercy Corps has also distributed household kits and food to almost 800 tsunami-affected families.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Ms. Lindborg. I think your suggestion about a followup hearing in the not too distant future is a very important one. We do need to continue with the monitoring, knowing what is happening and knowing what else we could be doing better.

Ms. Lindborg, both you and Ms. McClymont mentioned the issue of very good intentions, those who want to come to help but that the inexperience, perhaps some of the newer organizations or just individuals that want to assist can be, in fact, an impediment or get in the way of the operations. I actually had a conversation 2 weeks ago with some friends of the family. He is a dentist in Alaska, and they are looking to go to Indonesia over their son's spring break in March to do what they can to help. What I am gathering from this hearing is they should probably look for another opportunity during that spring break to do what they can to help unless they have already made advance arrangements to assist.

How do you get the message out? We have been talking about coordination, collaboration, just educating people on what is needed to help. Instead you get ties and miniskirts. I read the article about the down jackets going, and they improvised and used them for diapers for some of the infants. How do we deal with this? Is it getting better as we are getting further from the actual tragedy itself? What is the message that needs to go out now?

Ms. MCCLYMONT. Well, let me just begin, Senator, by appreciating your concern about this issue because it is a major one, as Nancy Lindborg has suggested. InterAction has on its website, for starters, a guide to appropriate giving. To the extent people are able to know about our website and come there and understand it better, that is a start.

Second, we have produced a video news release and a radio news release that we have distributed to media outlets to try to get the word out on this. I think what, as Nancy suggested, was so critical this time around—many of us were speaking to the media about this concern. I know Members of Congress spoke to the public about this concern, and as Nancy suggested, it was the powerful voice of the President saying, cash is best. Please rely on the reliable NGOs that are out there doing the work.

Again, I would hope that we could get the word out that, on our website are the list of our member organizations where they describe all they are doing overseas in this disaster and many others with great particularity. I think if people could find their way to these very reliable, sound organizations, at least that comprise our membership, they would find that they would be able to provide funding for certain activities those NGOs might be undertaking that, as your colleagues, they might find a volunteer opportunity. There is a particular website which gives guidance on those individuals who do wish to volunteer, but certainly they can come to our website to observe which of our member organizations might want to use their help. Admittedly, that is infrequent. You need to

be trained. You need to be experienced to go out and work in these difficult situations.

But I think the more we can use your help, the Members of Congress, and the President, to lay out these messages along with us, I think we have just got to keep at it. It certainly, as Nancy suggested, was better this time than it has been in other disaster incidents.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And I appreciate your comments, Ms. Lindborg, about relying on the local communities, relying on the locals first rather than us assuming that we know what to do, but to take that brick factory that is there, get it up, and get it integrated.

You mentioned that you had morning meetings, I guess meetings between the U.N. agencies and the NGO representatives to identify top issues of the day. How did the local community play into that type of a meeting format? Were they involved?

Ms. LINDBORG. They were not involved in that meeting. The government was involved by virtue of the United Nations holding meetings every evening with the government, and they then brought that message forward to the NGOs. The NGOs would bring the community concerns from our meetings with community leaders and religious leaders throughout the course of our work.

It is important to note, however, that one of the really devastating losses in Aceh was of so many of the leaders that comprised the government and community and religious leadership throughout the province. So they are trying to rebuild that, along with the physical infrastructure. But that morning meeting was an opportunity to bring those strands together and share what were the critical concerns and issues to focus on.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So they really were integrated, which is so important.

You also spoke about some kind of a mechanism to get the funding out fast, and the fact that you had flexibility. With all of the private moneys that were coming in, it enabled you to move rapidly. But you believe you would not have had that flexibility had that private funding not been available, recognizing that we might not have it for the next event. How do you recommend that we provide for the flexibility while still having a level of accountability that, of course, we must have?

Ms. LINDBORG. I think that USAID, through the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, has moved this forward immensely in recent years, but there is still a lag time before the funds are actually flowing. During that lag time, the NGOs really rely on the private funds that we are able to raise, and we are not always able to do so if the conflict is not well known by the American public. Darfur presents a very instructive comparison to the tsunami.

This is a conversation that we have had for a number of years, and we would appreciate the opportunity to continue the dialog about how we might structure some sort of prequalified mechanism that would have a fund that accountable partners with agreed-upon measures could draw down from and not just for the 3 months that is often the case because it chews up a lot of time to have to resubmit proposals.

What we found we could do with this emergency was, in a very entrepreneurial way, spot the needs, come up with creative solutions, test them, and then bring them to scale. That is not always possible with more restricted funding.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Mr. Toole.

Mr. TOOLE. If I could just add to that. I think it is something that we have also lived through. I actually called our national committee here in Washington, as well as in London and Berlin, on the 27th and said, basically, I need cash now, and those national committees pull funds from the public sector, the individuals who give, my mother, aunts, et cetera. So I think we cannot underestimate the value of that public commitment.

I would also, however, raise that for each of us and in our case, UNICEF, the U.S. contribution to our regular resources, so the regular budget contributions, are also what allow us to respond quickly. The United States is the largest governmental donor to UNICEF, and the fact that you give to the regular budget means that we have those funds ready to react quickly. So, yes, I agree that we need some sort of standby accounting facility where we can quickly mobilize funds either from the public sector or from governments, but also do not underestimate the value of your regular contributions to some of these organizations, and the fact that that gives us the flexibility we need.

Thank you.

Senator MURKOWSKI. And, Mr. Toole, you had mentioned in your comments that UNICEF has been in these countries before the tragedy, during, and they will be there after. I think that that sets you up certainly to evaluate what we do in between the crises. You have mentioned just one very simple example of making sure that the fundraising is ongoing so that when there is a tragedy, when there is a crisis, you have some flexibility.

What else can we do in these in-between times to make sure that we can, to the extent possible, be prepared? This is not only as it relates to how we deal with the natural disaster, but how we deal with the vulnerable populations, such as our children. It is kind of a big question. I do not know if there are easy answers.

Mr. TOOLE. There are certainly not easy answers, but I will try anyway.

I think, first, I would come back to your dentist. The one thing we should not do, in trying to reorient some of the enthusiasm, is squelch that enthusiasm. What we actually need is greater commitment to long-term issues. It is extraordinary to me that, for example, for the tsunami UNICEF requested \$144 million for the relief phase. We have raised \$300 million in about a month. For Sudan, which is a longstanding difficult crisis, we asked for \$288 million back in November. So far we have raised \$20 million. So there is a very different level of commitment. So I think, on the one hand, we need to keep that enthusiasm and help to channel it toward issues that are perhaps more difficult to understand but still can help us.

Second, I would focus on the preparedness. We talked about the early warning mechanisms that are possible for natural disasters. We in the United Nations, but I know also some of the NGOs, are working on similar early warning features for conflict, for changes

in political situations and we track the world through our operation centers, et cetera, to do that.

Could we have foreseen the tsunami? No. It is not possible, nor would it even be desirable to plan on a disaster at that scale, but I think we can look at the early warning systems for natural disasters. We can look and track the world for the kinds of changes that start to happen with markets, with children going to school, et cetera, to watch the world and make sure that we can respond quickly.

Senator MURKOWSKI. One of the things that you know you can count on in a natural disaster, whether it is an earthquake in Alaska or whether it is a tsunami in Indonesia, typhoons, you are always worried about your water source. You are always worried about the safety of your water. I am curious to know about UNICEF's efforts. And I really appreciated the leader's spotlight on how we deal with the water situation and really putting a focus on that for our developing countries.

I am going to sit down with him and remind him that I still have some issues in my State where we do not have safe water and still are carrying our water. We have got to deal with that.

But are we getting closer to that point where we have portable water systems that can move in and respond when we have these natural disasters, when we have these tragedies? That seems to be the one area that we just have not kind of got it right, and it leaves us vulnerable to disease, to infection, and to all kinds of horrors. Are we getting any better?

Mr. TOOLE. Senator, I think we are. Are we there yet? No. I think what was good to see in this particular crisis, whether it was in the Maldives or in Aceh in Indonesia or in Sri Lanka, was that we did actually get water to people pretty quickly. Was it perfect water? No. For example, in Sri Lanka there has not been a single death from a preventable disease since the tsunami. That is extraordinary.

Where we are doing less well is in the complex emergencies. So, for example, in Darfur we, with our partners, have drilled wells and provided water to 800,000 people. As director of emergencies, normally I would be thrilled. That is half the population that we are trying to reach. So we have got a very long way to go. So, I think, in natural disasters, particularly because of some of the military assets, because of the capacity to move in quite quickly, we are responding better than we are in some of the complex emergencies where we need to drill wells, we need to refit springs, have filters or desalinization. It becomes more complicated in those contexts.

Ms. MCCLYMONT. Senator, if I may, just to add to what Mr. Toole said. I know that the United Nations, through the Office of Humanitarian Coordination that is headed by Jon Eglund, has been looking at this question of our capacity, our international response capacity with respect to the fundamentals of international response, water and medical care and so forth. They have determined through their inventory recently that there is a concern about the lack of water and sanitation capacity and resources. Medical care seems to be reasonable in terms of the capacity of the community to respond. But I know he will be following up and we, who work

with the United Nations on this matter, will be following up and probably coming back to the Congress to discuss that further.

I also just wanted to underscore that we, too, were encouraged by the leader's comments about the worry over clean water. We would simply suggest that even as we go forward and try to find more resources and capacity to do that, we cannot forget the accompanying pieces of the puzzle, the whole set of development and disaster response concerns, education, and health care and the like.

I think in response to the question you posed just before, what do we do between crises; I think that it is so much about what Ms. Lindborg said and what we, as the InterAction community have been pushing for, that is to say, to have a very sustainable and adequate level of funding for longer term development assistance so that the members of InterAction and other NGOs that are out there can keep building their local partners on the ground. It is really through that local capacity that those on the ground can respond, and we work very closely with them.

So I wanted to just underscore the point of the need for our attention to this longer term development assistance. We were concerned to see that in the fiscal year 2006 request, there was a cut in the development assistance accounts, part of which is about clean water. So we would want to draw attention to that and see if we can keep pushing ahead and doing better on that score too.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Good points.

I appreciate the comments from the three of you. I appreciate your participation here in the hearing this morning. I think it has been informative for all of us, and I think I certainly will follow up with your suggestion, Ms. Lindborg, and will recommend to the chairman that we do a followup to just kind of check and see how things are going. Hopefully, we will have good reports and we will be able to say that we, indeed, have learned a great deal from this tsunami and how to better respond in the future.

So I thank you for your time, and with that, we are adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS AND OTHER MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST

Human Rights First would like to thank Chairman Lugar and Senator Biden for the opportunity to place this testimony on relief and reconstruction efforts in Aceh into the committee record. In this testimony we will address a fear in policy circles that raising human rights concerns will jeopardize the humanitarian mission. Our belief is that although this is a sensitive issue in Indonesia, as in many countries, such fear underestimates the positive impact of an informed, coordinated approach to human rights issues at an early stage and throughout the reconstruction process.

Human Rights First recognizes that both the committee members and witnesses for this hearing have shown a willingness to publicly address human rights issues while tackling core development challenges in the tsunami-affected region. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has noted the need to support military reform, and Administrator Andrew S. Natsios is among the many participants who have addressed the need for accountability in the aid process. We would like to take this opportunity to add to these lessons by focusing on the role of civil society in Aceh both before and after the tsunami.

Graffiti on a surviving shard of wall in Banda Aceh serves as a record of the disaster: "The earthquake began at 7:55. The ocean rose at 8:30. Only the ruins remain." In Aceh, the tsunami seemingly came out of nowhere. But the relief and re-

construction that follows is taking place in a context of low-level conflict, military control, and weak respect for human rights that long predates December 26, 2004. This context provides lessons from the recent past, but also warning signs in the current environment and a few indications of what the next phase may bring.

Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nongovernmental organization. Since 1978, it has worked to protect and promote fundamental human rights, holding all governments accountable to upholding the standards set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Our Human Rights Defenders program works to support the efforts of human rights activists around the world through advocacy campaigns on behalf of persecuted human rights activists, and activities designed to expand the practical realization of the right to promote and protect human rights.

THE PERSISTENCE OF THE PAST

The Indonesian Government in Jakarta deserves credit for opening Aceh to foreign assistance in the days after the tsunami hit. The Indonesian military has also played an important role in relief activities to date, including food distribution and the recovery of bodies. The arrival of an astounding collection of aid workers and foreign militaries, including American troops, to a province largely closed to outsiders for nearly two years has been accompanied by major changes. These visitors have saved many lives and helped foster a level of openness, in those areas in which the international community is present, that one local activist could only sum up in the word “unbelievable.”

But while many Americans first heard of Aceh in the aftermath of the tsunami, for those who follow human rights in Asia the name was all too familiar. While Aceh had been the site of anticolonial resistance and regional rebellions for much of the 20th century, the current conflict began with a declaration of independence in 1976 and the creation of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM). Counterinsurgency operations peaked in the 1990s and then again when martial law was declared in May 2003.

The continuing impact of abuses committed during this separatist conflict will have important ramifications for the planning and execution of recovery plans. For example, any agency seeking working to address trauma, displacement, or lost livelihoods will find that these problems did not begin on December 26. Three decades of counterinsurgency operations, capped by two years of martial law and civil emergency, provide several important lessons for those working in Aceh today:

The politicization of displacement and attacks on humanitarian workers: Throughout the years of war the Acehnese have acquired long experience with displacement. Even before martial law, villagers often fled the fighting to seek refuge at mosques or soccer fields in nearby towns. Civil society organizations, including women's organizations and student groups, played an important role in providing food and medical care and monitoring the situations in these temporary camps. The camps were viewed by the military as potential bases of support for GAM. Fearing that the guerrillas were using the camps to recruit members, obtain supplies, or maintain a presence in the towns, the military viewed the displaced population with suspicion and targeted those who sought to assist them. Members of student groups and local humanitarian organizations were harassed, beaten, and threatened with death by security forces and their civilian allies. In December 2000 three volunteers with Rehabilitation Action against Torture in Aceh (RATA) were killed together with the torture victim they were assisting, and staff members of the international aid organization Oxfam UK were tortured in August 2000.

For its part, GAM forced many non-Acehnese migrants to seek safety outside the province, where many remain in cramped camps. GAM also reportedly used the IDP population for its own strategic and public relations ends, discouraging some from returning to their homes.

The displaced civilian population was caught between the GAM rebels and the security forces. With as many as 100,000 displaced Acehnese scheduled to be moved to semipermanent relocation camps beginning next week, there is reason to fear that this vulnerable population will again be used as pawns. While access to affected populations has not been problematic to date, if the environment changes due to renewed conflict or tightened security, local organizations assisting or monitoring the relocation sites may be singled out for official harassment.

Undermining civilian government and civil society: There is a common impression that the large military role in Aceh is due to the tsunami's destruction of the civilian bureaucracy and civil society organizations. The disaster did indeed cause major losses: Nearly 1,000 civil servants are dead or missing at the provincial level alone, and 54 of the 241 subdistrict governments are said to be nonfunctioning. More than

40 NGO activists, including several leading human rights defenders, are missing or dead, as well as journalists, teachers, religious leaders, and other community leaders. Several prominent human rights organizations have lost their offices and their records.

But the military's dominance is also the legacy of years of military operations followed by martial law. Even before martial law the army's territorial command structure, reinforced by a series of military operations, created a parallel structure down to the village level that overshadowed the weak civilian bureaucracy. Even as military commanders took control of the economic and political life of the province, many civil servants fled their posts due to fear of GAM attacks. The court system outside of Banda Aceh had largely ceased to function long before the tsunami struck.

Under martial law subdistrict heads in contested areas were replaced with retired military officers. Martial law also had a "humanitarian component" that gave the Indonesian military a central role in assistance to IDPs and severely restricted NGO access. Local organizations were shut out of IDP camps they had worked in previously.

Martial law was downgraded to civil emergency status in May 2004, but access by international organizations and journalists was still severely limited at the time of the tsunami. Under civil emergency the power was formally vested in civilian authorities (a governor later jailed on corruption charges), but troop strength and military operations were not necessarily scaled back. A respected Jakarta NGO has identified 84 civilian deaths and 47 disappearances in the first six months of civil emergency ending November 2004. What's more, authorities are still empowered to summarily restrict freedom of expression and assembly, carry out arbitrary searches, and restrict freedom of movement.

A 6-month extension of civil emergency will end on May 19, the second anniversary of the declaration of martial law. The presidential decree that extended the status calls for a monthly evaluation, but the government has not used this feature to withdraw emergency status.

PRESENT WARNING SIGNS

The dominant role of the Indonesian military

The Indonesian military has played an often welcome role in relief operations. Such a role was required immediately after the tsunami by the lack of alternatives in many areas and the need to reach people in need quickly. But especially as the emergency phase shifts to reconstruction, military participation in the context of Aceh raises serious questions.

At the provincial level, the former commander of operations under martial law, Major General Bambang Darmono (a former martial law commander), serves as head of humanitarian operations for the army, distinct from the security operations. But in Meulaboh, the second biggest hub of humanitarian activity, one colonel has performed both functions. This meant he has run the nightly relief coordination meetings at the base while simultaneously bearing responsibility for ensuring that GAM was defeated militarily. While there is not yet evidence of discrimination impacting suspected GAM sympathizers, this dual role raises fears that food aid or relocation programs could be subordinated to military aims.

In addition there have been several credible reports that local military commanders have required that aid be handed over in whole or in part to be distributed by the armed forces, citing fears that the aid would otherwise end up in guerrilla hands. But this practice could also lead to discrimination, bottlenecks in aid, and corruption.

As the government begins massive relocation into semipermanent barracks, the possibility of an army role is also troubling. Although government officials stated there would be no army role beyond "securing" the barracks, military documents and the military role in aid distribution, management, and security in existing camps raise concerns.

Signs of hostility to humanitarian workers

Given the long track record of hostility toward IDPs and those working to help them, intimidation or other forms of restriction are a particular point of concern. Local and international NGOs have not reported that restrictions have significantly hampered their ability to operate. At the same time, however, there are signs that some in the military are uneasy with the role played by NGOs, especially local ones.

It has been widely reported that the military has formally restricted access by foreign aid workers beyond the two cities of Banda Aceh and Meulaboh, ostensibly as protection from attack. International NGOs are expected to clear their travel in ad-

vance and accept a military escort if required. However, these rules are not strictly enforced, and so far appear to be a form of monitoring rather than control. It is important that these rules are not used to restrict access beyond that required by genuine security concerns. GAM has stated it will not attack foreign aid workers, a pledge that is consistent with its vested interest in a continued international presence in Aceh.

Travel around some west coast towns such as Lamno is especially circumscribed. Indonesian volunteers and one international NGO were prevented from traveling in this region, although this problem was later remedied.

Human Rights First has also learned of isolated, but nevertheless worrisome, efforts to intimidate local NGOs.

- According to press reports on January 10 in the Mata Ie section of Banda Aceh, a volunteer was beaten by soldiers and needed stitches.
- Several local NGOs have been visited by security officers demanding information on their aid distribution activities. Two of the most active NGOs in Banda Aceh were visited within half an hour on the night of January 22, one by police and one by members of the provincial military command in plainclothes.
- Students carrying out a health assessment in Bireuen were approached at an IDP camp by several soldiers. The officers later came to their office and took them to the military post where they were questioned for several hours about their activities before being released.
- The head of the watchdog organization Government Watch, Farid Faqih, was detained on January 27 in Meulaboh, accused of stealing supplies donated by army wives. He was badly beaten by soldiers including an army captain. While his role in the disappearance of the supplies is still unclear, his mistreatment is a worrying sign.

Lack of local participation

Acehnese have a saying that “Buya krueng teudong-dong, buya tamong meuraseuki.” This translates roughly as “the crocodile in the river only watches while other crocodiles eat his food.” Failure to participate in the benefit of Aceh’s natural resources has long been one of the grievances driving separatism in Aceh. The influx of NGOs and businesses from other parts of Indonesia and around the world has raised fears that the main beneficiaries of the billions of dollars pledged for reconstruction will once again not be the Acehnese. Their exclusion from planning their own future led one Acehnese to tell me in frustration: “Sometimes I think it would be better if the wave had just wiped us out, so these people could come and build whatever they want.”

The provincial government has signaled its willingness to involve Acehnese society in the development of a “blueprint” for reconstruction. But participation is not just a matter of good development practice; in the Acehnese context it is also dependent on respect for fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression and assembly.

Civil society organizations, including NGOs, academics, and religious organizations, should be given a central role in the design, delivery, and monitoring of aid efforts. The local nonprofit community is reeling from the destruction, and the loss of several of its leading members. But Aceh’s development and human rights organizations have survived years of war, abuse, and martial law. If conditions allow they will continue to play an important role.

FUTURE ISSUES

The Indonesian government is still developing a master plan for Aceh’s reconstruction, and the international community has engaged government agencies in a dialog on internationally accepted principles and standards. However several issues have already been identified as important and potentially problematic. The role of human rights defenders and other NGO monitors will be critical to efforts to achieve transparency and accountability.

Limits to access: Access in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar district, and Meulaboh remains quite good. But even in those areas the fact that civil emergency status and restrictions on access remain officially in place, coupled with signs of suspicion of humanitarian workers, lead many to fear that the current levels of openness will not be sustained.

Land rights: Land rights are contentious in Indonesia under the best of conditions. But the loss of documents by landowners and the destruction of offices of the regional land board further compounds the problem. An additional source of conflict and uncertainty is the proposed creation of a buffer zone of up to two kilometers from the shoreline, with limited construction along the coast. The displaced popu-

lation has not received any clear information about this plan. If this situation leads to conflict, the military role in relief and reconstruction may become more problematic.

Human rights defenders play a critical role in allowing people to defend their rights in the face of the state, the military, and a private sector that often relies on links to powerful state elites.

Military-linked businesses: Due to a long history of economic exploitation of Aceh's resources by the military, there is widespread concern that army-controlled business and foundations will seek to play a role in reconstruction. Such a role could cause problems especially where reconstruction plans run into opposition from local communities. As early as January 11, the Artha Graha conglomerate, partly owned by the military, arranged an invitation by the local government to provide a blueprint for the reconstruction of the city of Meulaboh, although the offer was later rescinded in deference to the provincial master plan now under development.¹

Military involvement in underground activities such as illegal logging will also be relevant in the construction boom to come.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In the face of these significant concerns, we would offer the following recommendations for all future assistance to Aceh:

1. Support an environment conducive to the participation of Acehnese civil society

The Indonesian Government should revoke civil emergency status and its restrictions on freedoms of expression and assembly. Donors, such as the World Bank, USAID, and United Nations agencies, should include protections for human rights defenders in their dialog with Indonesia on Aceh's reconstruction as a necessary mechanism for transparency and accountability.

2. Ensure access by humanitarian and human rights organizations to all regions of Aceh

The fear that GAM's civilian supporters or even active members are among those seeking aid should not be used as an excuse to unreasonably restrict aid or to intimidate aid workers, whether foreign or domestic. For its part, GAM must not put the camps' civilian populations at risk by using them to operate in any way. Indonesian authorities should continue to give local and international humanitarian assistance groups and also human rights organizations full and free access to all IDP camps to help safeguard the rights of the displaced and ensure that new violations are not allowed to occur.

Access is about more than the distribution of supplies. It is also important that information flows freely in both directions. Displaced people must be aware of their rights and their choices. Human rights defenders need to be able to obtain and provide information about conditions for IDPs and other vulnerable groups throughout Aceh. The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states that everyone has the right "freely to publish, impart or disseminate to others views, information and knowledge on all human rights and fundamental freedoms."

3. Minimize the role of the Indonesian military in humanitarian operations

A central question for the international community is whether it will reinforce the dominance of the military or seek to empower civil society and the civilian government through its policies on aid and reconstruction. Any efforts to improve conditions in Aceh, whether in the area of human rights, development, or conflict-resolution, must attempt to reverse the marginalization of civil society.

This debate reaches beyond Aceh. At the national level, a major obstacle to respect for human rights in Indonesia has been the resistance to military reform. And the biggest sign of military's failure to reform has been its role in Aceh since the declaration of martial law.

Aid agencies and bilateral donors should require clear statements on the nature and extent of the military participation in reconstruction, including through military-linked businesses.

¹ The chair of Artha Graha's relief effort, the retired general Kiki Syahakri, was martial law administrator in East Timor during the worst of the violence and has been indicted for crimes against humanity by the United Nations Serious Crimes Unit in East Timor.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RAYMOND C. OFFENHEISER, PRESIDENT, OXFAM AMERICA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity for Oxfam America to submit written testimony for the record. We appreciate your interest in gathering a variety of perspectives on the important issues of the tsunami response and lessons learned when providing relief in the wake of the terrible tsunami tragedy.

Oxfam America is an international development and relief agency committed to developing lasting solutions to poverty, hunger, and social justice. We are part of a confederation of 12 Oxfam organizations working together in more than 100 countries around the globe with an annual budget over \$400 million dollars.

OXFAM'S RESPONSE

In response to the tsunami, Oxfam has assisted over 300,000 people across the disaster zone. In Indonesia we are working with the Government of Indonesia and UNICEF to oversee the development and management of water and sanitation projects. Nearly 50 percent of the water pipe network was damaged in Meulaboh and 70 percent in Banda Aceh. In India we are working with local partners distributing thousands of hygiene kits, repairing water sources and funding a health institute to train volunteers in psychosocial counseling. In Sri Lanka we are rehabilitating water sources and constructing temporary shelters. We also have programs and are providing assistance in Thailand, Maldives and Somalia.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

The United States Government, local charities, and the American public have responded to the tsunami with unprecedented promises of aid and donations demonstrating our country's compassion and generosity.

It is now over a month after the tsunami and more than 1 million people living in the Indian Ocean region remain displaced. The death toll is over 200,000 and could still increase unless the humanitarian response continues to reach all those in need with appropriate and effective life-saving assistance.

It is important to remember that beyond the immediate threats to life nearly two million people may face the threat of living in poverty unless the massive reconstruction effort of the next few months and years specifically aims to reduce poverty.

QUALITY OF AID NOT QUANTITY MATTERS MOST

Aid groups for the most part have done an admirable job in saving as many lives as possible, and providing survivors with the basic necessities—food, water, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Quick action has so far prevented major outbreaks of waterborne disease that could have doubled the death toll from the disaster.

But the sheer scale and complexity of the humanitarian response have also caused problems that threaten to overwhelm fragile economies and civil society organizations in the affected countries, exacerbate religious and ethnic tensions, and lead to bitterness and recriminations among survivors and their neighboring communities.

Oxfam is working to ensure a more successful outcome. But it will be impossible to mitigate these threats unless steps are taken to ensure that aid programs are designed and implemented as effectively as possible.

First, tsunami survivors must be full participants in planning the rebuilding of their communities. While the emergency phase of relief delivery is mostly a top-down process, the rehabilitation and reconstruction programs now under way must be designed with input from the people whom they are intended to benefit. Too often, their wishes are an afterthought at planning meetings.

Better coordination by the U.N. and government agencies is also essential. The hundreds of aid organizations that flocked to southern Asia vary widely in their experience levels, skills, missions, and operating styles. Without better guidance in coordinating their activities, aid will be distributed unevenly, leading to resentments among beneficiaries. To be successful, aid agencies need comprehensive information about the needs in each affected community to help guide plans for the rebuilding phase and make sure that no community is passed over because of politics or confusion.

National governments, with support from the United Nations, should implement a system to accredit international humanitarian organizations, to ensure that their experience qualifies them for the scope and duration of the work they propose to do. Not every group that shows up at a disaster scene is qualified to help out, and their well-meaning efforts can end up hampering relief.

Aid groups, for their part, should stick to doing what they know best. Faced with myriad urgent needs and fueled by a donation bonanza, some organizations have

been tempted to expand their programs into areas where they have little experience and less expertise. With a surfeit of groups on the ground, they should focus on their core competencies, leaving other tasks to those with the capacity to do them well.

Best practices in humanitarian response have changed a lot in the past couple of decades, with the creation of internationally recognized standards set by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Sphere Project, among others. Yet many aid groups still don't comply with—or even know about—such benchmarks. Thus we continue to see aid distributed without the benefit of proper assessment of needs and resources. Too many groups are simply throwing items out of the back of a truck to an assembled crowd, without any systematic attempt to ensure that they benefit the neediest people.

Finally, too much money reaching an impoverished area can be almost as debilitating as too little. International aid organizations must be careful not to overtax a fragile system of domestic NGOs that lack the capacity to absorb large grants. Nor should they hire away key staff members from domestic groups, but instead should consider recruiting highly trained expatriates to return to their country to help manage rebuilding projects for a specific term. We've already seen how a flood of U.S. dollars in developing economies has caused a steep appreciation of local currencies like the rupee and bhat against the dollar. If not managed closely, that trend could lead to rapid inflation that could cause further economic calamity on par with the tsunami itself.

The large volume of aid available should enable countries affected by the tsunami not only to recover but to put their people on a path toward sustainable long-term development. To merely return survivors to the marginal lives of poverty many of them led before the waves came would be unthinkable, leaving them just as vulnerable as they were on that terrible day.

Each successive major disaster offers the humanitarian aid community lessons in how we can improve our work. But unless those lessons are implemented by the scores of aid groups flocking to southern Asia, our collective "best practices" will be submerged in an anarchy of altruism. That would be a discouraging return indeed on the world's massive investment in rebuilding the lives and communities devastated by the tsunami.

LESSONS LEARNED

It is already possible to draw some lessons from the tsunami, albeit provisional. Oxfam and many others will want to revise these in the coming months, but these six lessons are already clear and should not be ignored.

1. The survivors need appropriate aid, not any aid. Some of the aid provided has not been appropriate. The two fundamental things that must be remembered are the need to ask people what they want—and to meet the internationally accepted "Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards for Disaster Relief." This is not happening as widely as it should and levels of consultation with beneficiaries must be increased.

2. The aid effort must do more to apply the lessons from previous crises. International humanitarian agencies have learned more from the inconsistent humanitarian response to the crises in central Africa in the mid 1990s, than most other emergencies. In order to maintain a consistent response humanitarian guidelines and principles should be followed. As well as the Sphere technical standards for relief, the Code of Conduct for Disaster Relief sets out acceptable principles for relief, the People in Aid program outlines acceptable care of aid workers, and the U.N.'s Guidelines for Internally Displaced People highlights the rights of internally displaced people under international law. All of these are deeply relevant to the post-tsunami response and should be consistently upheld by agencies.

3. The collapse in international attention does not bode well for sustained aid. It may take 5 years—the planning period for Oxfam's Aceh program—or more to rebuild the affected areas. But we have already seen a gap between what is promised and delivered. On paper, 93 percent of the U.N.'s humanitarian appeal has been funded. In reality, governments have donated only about half the total amount needed. Though more than \$4 billion has been promised for reconstruction, will these promises mean more than massive promises of aid after previous disasters in Iran, Mozambique and Central America?

4. The need is just as much to find durable solutions for the displaced survivors as for better early warning to mitigate future disasters. An early warning system may be ready within 18 months. This is vital. But it is easy to ignore the needs of those rebuilding their lives after the tsunami. For example, the 600,000 people displaced in Aceh need more than temporary aid or the temporary camps that are

planned. They must be given a genuine choice in the short, medium and long term to overcome poverty. The Indonesian Government and all warring parties should ensure the end to violence, and commit to negotiating a long-term settlement to Aceh's conflict. In Sri Lanka, those that have been displaced need their leaders, on all sides, to show the same commitment to ensure that life after the tsunami will not be the same as before. Many survivors of the tsunami remain extremely vulnerable to abuse. They need to be protected as well as given immediate aid.

5. Reconstruction plans should look at the needs of women, men and children differently. In Sri Lanka many women who were on beaches or in markets lost their lives. There appears to be large numbers of households in which the father is suddenly a single parent—or the woman a new single mother. So far, there has been insufficient attention placed on the specific needs of these men, women and children, facing surviving the tsunami under very new circumstances.

6. Aid is only the first kind of international support that the survivors of disasters need. To a certain extent this was recognized rather quickly. The Paris Club of creditors welcomed initiatives on debt relief and the access to the EU of tsunami-affected countries' exports. These steps have not yet gone far or wide enough but they show a very positive awareness that a wide range of international policies should be used to help countries recover after catastrophic crises. This could be followed more widely in future crises—after conflicts as well as natural disasters.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE USG

- Stay the course. Oxfam commends President Bush's commitment to public efforts to mobilize funding and long-term reconstruction in the tsunami affected region. However, we have already seen a gap between what has been promised by donors and what has been delivered. On paper 93 percent of the U.N.'s tsunami Flash Appeal has been funded. In reality, governments have donated only about half the total amount needed. The USG still has a critical role to play as a generous funder for relief and long-term rehabilitation.
- Don't forget about other emergencies. The death toll in Darfur has reached 200,000 with close to 2 million people displaced. While we must respond to the tsunami, we can't forget about the millions of people caught up in the midst of other crises. The U.N. global consolidated appeal of \$1.7 billion for the world's 14 other major humanitarian crises has only been 26 percent funded.
- Confirm that all tsunami-related aid will not be taken from current aid budgets underfunding other emergencies. Oxfam is asking for the President's tsunami supplemental to Congress to include a minimum of \$1 billion in emergency assistance to meet the needs of tsunami victims as well as others affected by crises. This would include \$500 million for the relief and reconstruction efforts surrounding the tsunami and \$500 million for other emergencies such as Sudan and Ethiopia.
- Trade and Debt Relief. Reconstruct livelihoods not poverty by providing debt relief to affected countries in addition to money for relief and reconstruction and reduce textile and apparel tariffs:
 - Debt relief. The Paris Club of creditors offered to freeze debt repayments from tsunami-affected countries but should go beyond this and cancel debts above a sustainable level, so long as the proceeds are spent on reconstruction and to reduce poverty. For example, Indonesia spends ten times more on debt repayment than health. Debt relief could potentially release billions of dollars for reconstruction.
 - Trade. In order to ensure that the people in the countries that were affected by the tsunami can begin the process of reconstructing their lives and economies, the United States should reduce textile and apparel tariffs for those countries. Oxfam is supporting S.191—the "Tariff Relief Assistance for Developing Economies Act of 2005" introduced by Senators Smith, Feinstein, Baucus and Santorum that will provide tariff relief to some of the tsunami-affected countries.

CONCLUSION

In the face of this terrible tragedy we commend the United States for its leadership and hope that you will consider these thoughts to ensure a comprehensive and effective response for the millions of people who are victims of this catastrophe as well as other disasters where people are suffering. Thank you again for this chance to share Oxfam's perspectives.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VEENA SIDDHARTH, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA

I would like to thank Chairman Wolf, Chairman Lantos and the members of the House Human Rights Caucus for the opportunity to share information we have collected on human rights in Aceh since the tsunami. Human Rights Watch appreciates your recognition of the links between human rights and post-tsunami reconstruction. Prior to the tsunami, Human Rights Watch had documented a range of abuses in Aceh, including the systematic use of torture against detainees by Indonesian security forces. Because of pre-tsunami prohibitions on access to Aceh, our reports may have underplayed the scale of human rights abuses. Aceh will not successfully rebuild unless there is recognition of the human rights abuses and steps taken to prevent them in the future.

I will briefly list six issues that we are monitoring in this reconstruction phase:

1. Access
2. The role of the military
3. Lack of choice in registration and relocation
4. Land Rights
5. Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
6. Need for coordination and transparency of aid

1. ACCESS

Although there has been access to tsunami-affected areas, it is limited.

- The Indonesian military continues to designate most of the province as insecure for foreign access and is strictly enforcing a no-travel policy to those areas.
- We cannot verify if there are tsunami IDPs in any of these no-travel areas. The general consensus from agencies on the ground was that there are not, but given the difficulties of access, Human Rights Watch cannot confirm this.

2. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

We remain concerned by the continued involvement of the military in camp management, coordination and distribution of aid. As a party to the conflict their involvement cannot be viewed as impartial.

- In Banda Aceh a facade of civilian control is apparent but on the west coast all coordination is still done through the military.
- In Meulaboh the United Nations has its office located directly inside the local military battalion compound, and continues to have daily coordination meetings with the local military commander, Col. Gerhan Lentara, despite the presence of a local civilian head of district. Colonel Lentara was infamously involved in the East Timor Santa Cruz massacre of 1991.
- At the moment, several international NGOs regularly accept “military security escorts” when visiting IDPs.
- While much of the civilian infrastructure was decimated on the west coast, there continues to be an overreliance on the military for logistical support, even when there are alternatives. There are real concerns that if the aid community pushes too hard on access they will lose their position altogether. This may explain why there has not been strong opposition to the military’s assertion that there are no IDPs, tsunami or otherwise, in the no travel zones.

3. REGISTRATION AND RELOCATION OF IDPS: LACK OF INFORMED CHOICE

We are concerned about the manner in which the registration is being carried out, by whom, and the method in which the relocation will be implemented.

- IDPs lack information. According to credible sources on the ground, IDPs are often not aware that the tsunami had affected other countries, let alone the plans for relocation or what their options were.
- Other issues facing IDPs include criteria for site selection, impact on livelihoods, protection mechanisms, sensitivity of the data and fear of military involvement in relocation and camp management.

4. LAND RIGHTS: COMPENSATION, REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

- Disputes over land rights could affect long-term stability in Aceh. This is an area ripe for corruption and arbitrary decisionmaking.
- Compensation: There is still no articulated policy on how compensation will be decided, to whom, and under what criteria. It seems most likely that compensa-

tion will be provided on a sliding scale depending on the destruction of property; but this is not clear.

5. PROTECTION OF IDPS

Despite the amount of money, agencies, and others in Aceh, up to a month after the tsunami many IDPs still had not received supplementary food or nonfood items. Protein and staples are lacking.

- There has been no effort at all to consider protection of IDPs in the current spontaneous camps.
- With regards to the relocation barracks, we are concerned that IDPs have already been moved by the government before donors have sorted out minimum standards.
- Barracks are ill designed, crowded, and without child friendly or community spaces. Aside from a UNICEF initiative there are no reporting mechanisms for the protection of women and children in camps. While there appear to be no problems at the moment it is expected that IDPs will be in these crowded facilities for up to 2 years, in conditions that are ripe for abuse.
- All distribution of aid is being conducted through heads of communities and through heads of households. Both are traditionally male held positions. This process has the potential to exclude women, unaccompanied children, and other vulnerable groups. Very little aid is being distributed directly to IDPs.

6. AID: DELIVERY, COORDINATION AND TRANSPARENCY

Accountability and transparency of the \$4.5 billion that has been pledged for tsunami relief will be essential. While we appreciate that the military has permitted access to Aceh for tsunami relief, we are concerned about their long-term presence and involvement in aid coordination, given their history in the province.

- Given the history of corruption in Aceh, there are concerns that most of the reconstruction contracts will be given to military or government owned businesses.
- There are credible reports of looting by the police and the military.
- While there is still no road access on the west coast (something like 87 bridges out on that road alone), it seems that slow and ineffective coordination is the main reason for the delay in delivery of aid.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While the tsunami has certainly resulted in unprecedented access to some parts of Aceh it does not change the underlying causes and reasons for the ongoing conflict. The TNI continue to wage their war against GAM. While the reported 200 killings since the tsunami is undoubtedly an exaggeration, civilians are still being killed. We call on the U.S. Government to:

- Call for access to all parts of Aceh to ensure that pre-tsunami IDPs receive assistance and that there is a monitoring of potential abuses on either side of the conflict;
- Call for a phase-out of the military's role in camp management, coordination and distribution of aid;
- Ensure that U.S. and multilateral assistance incorporates steps for protection of and equitable treatment of IDPs, including pre-tsunami IDPs;
- Ensure that there is a clear and fair policy on compensation for those who have lost land and property;
- Work with other donors to build in transparency and anticorruption mechanisms into the reconstruction package with genuine involvement of Acehenese civil society in monitoring and shaping the reconstruction process.

Aceh has gone through a tremendous catastrophe with unimaginable loss and devastation. Indonesia's long-term stability rests on confidence by the Acehenese people in the reconstruction process.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) BRIEFING TO STAFF OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

1. Introduction to IOM

- Intergovernmental organization, HQ in Geneva
- Created in 1951—outside of the U.N. system—more responsive, flexible
- 2005 budget is app. US\$800 million of which 92 percent is earmarked for operational activities and funded by voluntary contributions

- Service-oriented: working with migrants of all sorts—displaced persons, refugees, asylum-seekers; economic or labor migrants, trafficked migrants
- Primarily operational, logistical—we see migration as a positive force which can benefit both migrants and societies

2. IOM Activities in Indonesia and Sri Lanka

• *Transport and logistics*

- *Indonesia*—The total number of IOM trucks operating between Jakarta-Medan-Banda Aceh and Medan-Meulaboh currently stands at 350. Since the first deployment of trucks on 30 December 2004, IOM has moved and distributed some 10,324 Metric Tons (MT) of relief items from Medan in north Sumatra to Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. Of that total, IOM has transported 1,670 MT of relief goods to Meulaboh in convoys which began operating on 8 January. IOM relief good delivery routes also include Medan-Biruen, Medan-Nias and Medan-Lhokseumwe. IOM Banda Aceh's truck fleet currently comprises 21 trucks which are used to distribute relief goods in and around Banda Aceh for IOM, U.N. agencies and international and national NGOs. IOM Banda Aceh has distributed humanitarian relief items to more than 20 IDP camps and communities hosting Tsunami affected populations throughout the Districts of Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Aceh Jaya and Pidie.
- *Sri Lanka*—IOM continues to provide free emergency transport assistance to the Government of Sri Lanka, IOs, NGOs and donors. For this purpose IOM currently leases a vehicle fleet of 45 trucks, each with cargo capacity of 10 Metric Tons. Specialized trucks for container shipments, passenger buses, trailers and vans can be supplied on request. To date, IOM has operated 820 round trips for transportation of bottled water, food items, water purification equipment, fishing boats, medical supplies and various other relief items to numerous locations throughout the country. Vans/four-wheel-drive vehicles have been provided 64 times, 20ft container trucks/trailers have been arranged on 7 occasions and 19 passenger buses, transporting a minimum of 435 relief workers have been dispatched.

• *Shelter*

In both Sri Lanka and Indonesia, IOM has been asked by the respective Governments to coordinate and implement shelter activities:

IN SRI LANKA

Batticaloa district:

- IOM has committed to provide temporary shelter for 327 families in Onthachimadam, Kaluwanchikudy DS division. Construction of temporary shelters for 20 families in the division has been completed. Development of other sites is in the initial stages with land leveling and site preparation taking place. Identification of additional land suitable for shelter construction is ongoing.

Ampara district:

- The construction of 100 temporary family shelters (for 100 families) is progressing in Ullai, Pottuvil DS division. A further total of 45 temporary shelters, each consisting of four family units (to house 180 families) are currently under construction on various other sites/divisions in the district.
- Construction of five temporary schools is progressing in Pottuvil, Thambiluvil, Thampattai and Akkaraipattu DS divisions.

Trincomalee district:

- Development of a temporary shelter site for 180 families is in the final stages in Mutur DS division. The site holds 45 temporary shelters, each consisting of four family units. All shelters are completed and ready for occupation while construction of a community centre and additional toilets is still in progress.

Kalutara district:

- IOM agreed to construct temporary shelters for 168 families in Katukurunda and Paiyagala south and north. The families all have land within the 100m “no building zone” so 43 shelters, each consisting of four family units will be built on government allocated land further from the sea. IOM is currently discussing/identifying suitable shelter sites.

Transitional shelters:

- IOM is examining three different designs of transitional shelters in terms of suitability, cost and availability of materials. The designs will be presented at

an agencies shelter coordination meeting at TAFOR (Task Force for Relief) tomorrow.

- IOM is currently committed to constructing 5,608 transitional shelters in Trincomalee (1,200), Batticaloa (1,539), Ampara (2,200) and Kalutara (769) districts.

IN INDONESIA

- The first IOM model temporary shelter unit arrived by truck from Jakarta on 5 February. Assembly was completed by 7 February. The model temporary shelter unit is now on display at the IOM office in Banda Aceh.
- The Ministry of Public Works has proposed to IOM five temporary shelter sites. IOM's shelter experts are currently assessing the viability of the sites. IOM's shelter experts are also traveling to Meulaboh to map sites for the shelter program.
- *Health*
 - To date, IOM's medical team has provided immunizations and Vitamin A supplements to a total of 3,442 children. (Banda Aceh 1,792; Teunom, 1,559 and Lamno 91.) Figures on children immunized in Calang by the IOM medical team will be available shortly.
 - At this point in time there are three IOM immunization teams fielded: (1) Ministry of Health, UNICEF, IOM and GOAL. This team targets schools in a sweeping operation to follow up on missed cases. (2) The second team comprises Ministry of Health, IOM, Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) which is focused on Teunom. (3) The third team comprising IOM and GOAL is currently in Panga, on the west coast close to Teunom, on an assessment mission. The vaccination campaign in Panga is due to begin this week.
 - A six month pilot project entitled "Aceh Mental Health Capacity Building Project," has been funded by IOM and approved by the Indonesian Ministry of Health/Directorate for Mental Health Services. This three-tier training course on basic counseling and early detection of mental health disorder skills is aimed at raising awareness and building competency amongst mental health care personnel, public health caregivers and community leaders. IOM's psychiatrist attended a WHO/Ministry workshop entitled: "Psycho Social and Mental Health Agenda on Aceh" in Jakarta on 7 February.
 - IOM's health care specialist continues to liaise and coordinate IOM's proposed rehabilitation of five health care centers and training of staff and administrators with the Government of Indonesia and potential partners.
- 3. Observations on Protection for Vulnerable Persons
 - With respect to IDPs—Ensuring the voluntariness of relocations of IDPs from public buildings into temporary or transitional shelter is an important area of concern. IOM works closely with the displaced individuals and the Government authorities to assure that all needs are met.
 - Documentation to replace lost IDs is a paramount need to ensure everyone is restored their proper identity—and so are able to register their property and livelihood losses, especially as regards land rights.
 - Important to use the media better, and assure that they are educated on the issues; if media is more informed, then media coverage would be of assistance, rather than letting them focus on nonissues or trying to get new angles on a story.
 - In Sri Lanka, early reports of child abductions, and sexual exploitation and abuse of children that were carried widely in the media have not been verified by either the National Child Protection Authority or the police. Sexual and gender-based harassment and violence has been reported from many camps and hospitals, but only two formal complaints (by adult women) have so far been made to police.
 - With respect to trafficking, IOM is implementing a rapid response trafficking awareness raising project in two of the tsunami-affected countries, i.e., Indonesia and Sri Lanka, with a primary focus on the over one million internally displaced. Utilizing its long-term countertrafficking experiences and its efficient emergency logistics networks already existing in the two countries, IOM will aim to reduce vulnerability and incidences of trafficking of vulnerable populations, particularly women and orphaned children, from and within the tsunami-affected areas, through multilevel mass information campaigns tailored to country-specific post-tsunami realities, in close coordination with national governments, U.N. agencies and NGOs.

4. Lessons Gathered

IOM Director General was just in Sri Lanka and Indonesia and offers his experienced voice with a few key points:

- The international players must not neglect close coordination with host governments at all levels. This sounds obvious, but there are many instances where agencies went blithely ahead without checking and got themselves in trouble. Both Sri Lanka and Indonesia have real governments that will not be brushed aside. One key to IOM's successful response is precisely our careful attention to working with the host government, at all levels.
- Using national staff in implementing activities can give an agency a big boost. IOM has benefited enormously from having large numbers of Indonesian, Acehnese, and Sri Lankan employees in our ranks.
- From the Sri Lanka experience: what is needed is for the country to establish a response capacity to future sudden natural disasters. But this capacity should be built not only at the national level, but at all levels—even to the level of ordinary people as well so they can depend on their own resources.
- The existence of civil conflict in both Sri Lanka and Aceh is another complication, requiring deft handling by relief agencies. Of course not all agencies can be “old pros” in a particular disaster-struck nation, but it sure helps to have been there and to know some people in advance.
- Coordination of donor responses: Donors often insist that agencies assure proper coordination so as to avoid duplication; they need to learn to practice what they preach and be sure to avoid duplication of contributions in some areas, with other areas experiencing huge gaps. In Sri Lanka, for example, UNICEF and WFP have been overfunded while other agencies have not received enough funds.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NANCY YUAN, VICE PRESIDENT, DIRECTOR, THE ASIA FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, DC

The international response to the earthquake and tsunami that hit South and Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004, has been unprecedented. The efforts to date have, of course, largely focused on immediate and basic food, water, and shelter needs, and maintaining public health. While these priorities continue, many agencies and governments are also turning to the challenges of the medium and long term.

Over the past 6 weeks, the Asia Foundation has focused on medium and long-term reconstruction in the tsunami affected areas of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and India. Some relief activities have been supported through its affiliate organization, Give2Asia.¹ Notably, the Foundation has also been contacted by a few of the larger international NGOs focused on relief as a potential grantee for medium- and long-term programs.

In each affected region, the Foundation has chosen to work with local organizations, as is its usual practice, in order to reach the largest number of people possible and to rebuild the capacity of local institutions. The Foundation is also working to encourage local involvement in planning, by establishing a meaningful dialog with local and central government officials reviewing reconstruction strategies and developing a mechanism for community participation. In some cases, it also means building the capacity of local governments through technical assistance given the number of local government officials lost in the tsunami. Finally, the Foundation is providing technical assistance for disaster preparedness and management to improve the planning and training capacity of disaster management. Since 1995, the Foundation has operated a disaster preparedness training program in the Pacific Islands with the goal of building self-reliance in disaster management.

INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the Asia Foundation is channeling most of its Aceh relief program through Muhammadiyah, one of its long-term local partners. Muhammadiyah is Indonesia's second largest mass-based Muslim organization, with a membership of approximately 25 million. Its main function is to deliver social services at the community level—health and education as well as its religious services. In their nationwide programs, Muhammadiyah has consistently shown their commitment to democratic

¹ Give2Asia, a U.S. nonprofit organization established by the Asia Foundation, facilitates private giving to charitable causes throughout the Asia region. Give2Asia has raised \$1.2 million to date for the Tsunami Recovery Fund. See www.Give2Asia.org for more information.

values of pluralism and tolerance. They are effective in actively promoting these values as they have credibility as well as access to their mass-based extensive network.²

In the Aceh context, the Foundation's decision to work with and through Muhammadiyah is based on our understanding of two important factors: (1) Aceh is and was the site of a serious conflict between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) prior to the disaster; (2) Islam plays a heightened role in Aceh, and is the primary social and cultural force there. Muhammadiyah is one of the most credible and trusted Islamic groups in Indonesia and, crucially, is accepted on both sides of Aceh's conflict. Such community trust and confidence is and will be crucial to the success of relief efforts.

Aside from the government and the military, Muslim-based organizations such as Muhammadiyah are among the very few organizations with an extensive network throughout Aceh. One of the three major universities in Aceh is a Muhammadiyah University, and Muhammadiyah runs almost 60 schools and eight boarding schools for the poor in the province. Because it is a nationwide organization, the Aceh branch of Muhammadiyah has strong backup support from the central board of Muhammadiyah. Precisely because of the nationwide support and extensive activities in pre-tsunami Aceh, Muhammadiyah was one of the first local organizations to mobilize an effective response to the disaster. Its four-level University building, which was not damaged by the disaster, has been transformed into a vital base camp for Muhammadiyah relief operations—including a temporary clinic, a radio station, and a volunteer center.

As part of its near-term response in Aceh, the Foundation provided funding for 150 skilled volunteers—doctors, nurses, forensic specialists, paramedics, child care experts—drawn from Muhammadiyah institutions nationwide for the first month after the disaster. During this time, for example, eight paramedics served over 12,000 people in the IDP camps and assisted IOM with logistics in Banda Aceh.

Communication networks in the affected regions of Indonesia have been devastated by the tsunami, creating a massive obstacle to recovery and relief efforts. With private funding, the Foundation has already been able to help reestablish communications networks through support for Radio 68H, which has established radio communications in 50 IDP camps in Banda Aceh, broadcasting public service announcements about aid distribution, emergency relief coordination, and a missing persons service. A program in Meulaboh has also been established.

Coordination among both local and international organizations responding to the crisis has often been lacking in Aceh. To help address this problem, the Foundation has been leading a collaboration with Save the Children, Oxfam, Hivos and Mercy Corps, to support a website, www.indotsunamirelief.com. The website, dedicated to coordination among funding agencies and civil society organizations working in Aceh, is up and running, though the official launch will be on February 16 in Banda Aceh.

Another concern raised in the field has been how to ensure that there is active participation by Acehnese in the reconstruction and planning phase. The Asia Foundation has also been working with the major organizations active in Aceh, (CARE, Save the Children, PCI, CRS, Oxfam), in the development of a document outlining Common Operating Principles and Guidelines for Tsunami Reconstruction in Aceh. We expect that other organizations, including bilateral donors, will also sign on in the coming weeks.

SRI LANKA

In Sri Lanka, the Foundation has provided assistance through faith-based and private voluntary organizations, including Buddhist, Hindu and Christian groups, along with the Rotary and Lions Clubs. These efforts have included the provision of basic relief supplies and transport in the East and South, and relocation of people from churches, temples and schools which served as refugee camps, to homes and other temporary housing. These organizations will also help to rebuild homes and schools, and purchase fishing boats.

²For example Muhammadiyah produced more than 6,000,000 leaflets focusing on the issue of tolerance and pluralism (e.g. Accepting Differences: Deliberation and Democracy) and distributed through their network of mosques. Muhammadiyah has also been successful in their non-violence campaigns among the youth—a perennial problem among urban youths, particularly in Jakarta. In Aceh, for nearly five years, Muhammadiyah has trained activists to identify and report on human rights violations in the province's conflict-ridden areas. Likewise, in various partnerships with the Foundation, Muhammadiyah has been on the forefront of nonreligious issues such as sound elections, good governance, nonviolence, and civic education.

With USAID funding, the Foundation has supported the Legal Aid Commission in Sri Lanka to assist survivors with lost documents and pressing legal issues. Special help desks have been established and LAC lawyers are providing assistance to local government officials and volunteers from local NGOs to help victims obtain documents, and solve legal issues related to property, adoption, insurance, banking, and other matters.

With OTI funding through the Asia Foundation, psychosocial services are being provided through the Psychosocial Support Programme and Psychosocial Forum. These organizations are providing a range of services, including training, counseling materials for local and international CSOs, translations of materials from Sinhalese into Tamil, a website for district level services, a Missing Persons Desk, and a database within the Psychosocial desk at the Center of National Operations.

In Sri Lanka, we have also been in discussions with donors about operational principles for Tsunami reconstruction, which have been incorporated into a World Bank/ADB/IBIC needs assessment. These principles focus on conflict sensitivity, local elected government involvement in planning, demand driven response, communication and transparency, and coordination between stakeholders.

THAILAND

In Thailand, the Foundation's programs have focused largely on legal aid for tsunami survivors, and involve a range of legal NGOs, Shariah law experts, universities and government officials. A handbook will be developed to detail a variety of government programs available to victims. The Foundation plans to support a one-stop legal aid service center, a call center, and website to provide pro bono service to victims. The Foundation is also working specifically on issues related to the protection of women and children through needs assessments conducted by the Ministry of Social Development and prominent women's groups, such as the Women and the Constitution Network and the Children and Family Affairs Committee of the Islamic Center of Thailand.

INDIA

In India, through private funding raised through Give2Asia, the Foundation has supported CAF India, a local nongovernmental organization, to provide relief supplies, purchase fishing boats and nets, and help local governments to review land use for reconstruction projects such as schools, hospitals, and microenterprise.

As the U.S. Government, in concert with other international donors, national and local governments in the affected regions, and private organizations like the Asia Foundation, work to address the medium- and long-term needs of those areas devastated by the tsunami, it is important to keep a number of important points in mind.

First, recovery will require large-scale reconstruction that addresses the massive destruction of physical infrastructure and the loss of valuable human resources. National governments and local communities have some resources, but the majority of the resources for reconstruction will come through two channels—international donor assistance and private investment, both foreign and domestic. Given the scale of the disaster and the magnitude of the anticipated resource flows, coordinating donor assistance and attracting and accommodating investors will be an enormous challenge, and requires substantial and thoughtful planning.

Second, effective and responsive government will be essential if successful, accelerated reconstruction is to take place. Central governments will play a key role, but local governments in coastal areas will also have major responsibilities. Local government, particularly at the municipal, district, and provincial levels, was weak in many of the affected regions prior to the crisis, and in many areas, capacity has been diminished, or destroyed, by the loss of local government staff. Governing institutions, particularly at the local level, will need substantial and timely assistance if they are to undertake critical large-scale planning and management roles that will be required of them over the next few years.

Third, local credibility and trust will be vital, particularly regarding longer term efforts in areas that have been wracked by conflict in recent years. The Foundation's efforts (both short-term tsunami relief and other long-term program areas) in Aceh, have been successful to date in large part due to the local trust conferred on its local partner, Muhammadiyah.

Finally, consistent and substantial local input must be an essential element of long-term recovery efforts. To further this goal, building the capacity of civil society organizations will also be critical, as such groups can play an important role in launching ongoing public-private dialog for reconstruction and recovery, helping to encourage local ownership, coordination, and effective action at all levels.

In responding to the tsunami tragedy, both in terms of short-term relief efforts and longer term planning, the Asia Foundation has drawn on its years of experience in the region and lessons learned from programs such as enhancing interfaith dialog in Indonesia; managing conflict in Sri Lanka; and promoting legal aid and rights in Thailand. Utilizing the valuable experiences, insights, and credibility of local networks of partner organizations and individuals has been a core element of the Foundation's long-term effectiveness—and likewise such experience can greatly enhance the efficiency and efficacy of long-term recovery efforts on the part of the United States and the entire international community.

Thank you.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PAUL WOLFOWITZ TO QUESTIONS FROM
SENATOR LUGAR

Question. In coordinating the military relief efforts, has the U.S. strategy of “places not bases” in Southeast Asia proven itself valuable? How have the facilities and bases in Thailand and Singapore affected relief operations?

Answer. We have close military relationships with many Southeast Asian nations. These relationships are important to us in many respects and help us to achieve many of our objectives in the region. In the case of Operation Unified Assistance, the tsunami relief operation, our longstanding relationships and habits of cooperation in the region were critical to our ability to quickly set up an international coordination center in Utapao and create other staging areas within the region from which we were able to direct the relief operations. Without the close relationship with Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and others in the region, our relief efforts would have certainly been slower and far less effective. Our efforts likely would have been further enhanced if we had similar ties with other nations in the region, most notably Indonesia.

I should point out as well that this relief operation was a prime demonstration of the validity of our concept of “seabasing” where U.S. forces can be stationed on board U.S. naval vessels offshore while still projecting our capabilities ashore. In this case, seabasing allowed the U.S. military to effectively provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief without creating a large, intrusive, and vulnerable footprint ashore in the affected regions.

Question. Please provide the committee with your impressions of the changing role of TNI during this phase of the transition to democracy in Indonesia. Also, what is your assessment of the level of cooperation being provided to the U.S. authorities reviewing the Timika murder case by Indonesia military authorities?

Answer. The Indonesian military (TNI) continues to wrestle with defining its new role since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime in 1998, as do all the other parts of the Government of Indonesia and most parts of Indonesian society.

This is clearly still a work in progress, but important and sustained reforms have been made by the TNI. The TNI has remained a neutral player throughout two electoral processes and political crises. TNI active duty officers can no longer hold government offices and there are no longer any TNI officers sitting in the Parliament as appointed military representatives. In addition, we have seen important and significant steps taken toward accountability for Suharto-era abuses and an increased emphasis on respect for human rights and professionalism. The TNI's reform is by no means complete, but I believe that progress has been and will continue to be made. Indonesian Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono has specifically requested U.S. assistance in supporting reform through the provision of International Military Education and Training (IMET). We should support him in helping the process of reform, just as the United States is doing for other institutions within the central and local governments in Indonesia.

I would refer you to the FBI for a full assessment of the level of cooperation being provided to the U.S. authorities by the Government of Indonesia and the TNI. Secretary of State Rice on February 25, 2005, made the assessment in a certification to Congress that the Indonesian Government and armed forces are cooperating with the FBI investigation into the August 31, 2002, murders of two American citizens and one Indonesian citizen in Timika, Indonesia.

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY ALAN LARSON TO QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR
LUGAR

Question. In identifying the remains of victims from dozens of countries through DNA testing, the Thai authorities face a challenge similar to the United States fol-

lowing the 9/11 attacks. Are there lessons to be learned from these two experiences that would better prepare us for disaster responses in the future?

Answer. The December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean Tsunami destroyed major tourist areas in southern Thailand and left over 5,000 people dead and 3,000 missing, including 10 confirmed American citizen deaths and 14 Americans who are presumed dead. More than 30 countries provided assistance to the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to establish the Thailand Tsunami Victims Identification (TTVI) center in Phuket, Thailand, to handle the enormous task of identifying the remains of the victims. The United States has assisted in this international effort by deploying forensics experts from the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), the FBI and the medical examiner's office in Onondaga County, New York.

In order to better prepare the United States to respond to a future mass casualty event, consideration should be given to clearly identifying and assigning to a USG agency, with the know-how and personnel, the authorization to provide immediate victim identification services to affected areas overseas. While FEMA possesses many of the capabilities for mass casualty and mass fatality response, its authority for providing assistance is limited to domestic disasters. Currently no USG agency has clear authority or funding to provide mortuary and forensic identification services and assistance to foreign countries in need.

Question. From information we have collected throughout the federal government, it appears at least seven task forces (and perhaps more), have been in operation at the federal level of our government connected to earthquake/tsunami relief. These various task forces have been operating out of USAID, Pacific Command (PACOM), the National Security Council, and the State Department, among others.

Please outline for the committee the total number of U.S. federal task forces which were or are still operating in connection with the earthquake/tsunami disaster and advise as to whom (what person) in the U.S. Federal Government is ultimately responsible to assure proper coordination of these various task forces.

Answer. The U.S. Government mounted a rapid and comprehensive response to the Indian Ocean earthquake and resultant tsunamis. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, seven agencies and departments stood up task forces to offer direct assistance in accordance with their mandates and expertise, and to communicate with the international community and multilateral institutions. As affected countries moved from the relief phase to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the United States responded in parallel, standing up a coordination system to assist tsunami victims with rebuilding their shattered lives. The attached diagrams visually display the relationship between the task forces established in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (Diagram A), as well as the structure for the relief and reconstruction phase (Diagram B).

Immediate Aftermath

The following agencies stood up task forces. All of these entities have stood down:

- Department of State (DOS): DOS stood up 3 task forces within 24 hours of the disaster.
 - Task Force 1: The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) assisted American citizens to locate the welfare and whereabouts of loved ones. CA received over 30,000 calls, which generated over 15,000 cases that required action. Over the course of 8 weeks, CA narrowed the unaccounted for to four cases.
 - Task Force 2: The East Asia and Pacific (EAP) Bureau headed a task force that facilitated interaction between the U.S. military and host governments, accelerated the entry of relief goods into affected countries and acted as the main clearinghouse for information from embassies, other government agencies, and the media.
 - Under Secretary Marc Grossman established the senior level international Core Group (Australia, Japan, India, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Nations).
 - On 6 January 2005, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) created the Tsunami Humanitarian Sharing (THIS) Interagency Working Group to facilitate the management of interagency geospatial information and to coordinate support for field needs related to tsunami relief efforts.
- USAID: USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance stood up a Response Management Team (RMT) as per standard procedure in a natural disaster scenario. The RMT is activated to provide full support to a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART). The DART provides a presence on the ground capable of carrying out sustained response activities. The RMT provides the necessary support to a DART from USAID headquarters and manages USAID response activities and coordinates interagency cooperation in the initial response phase.

USAID also stood up an Agency Tsunami Task Force which is responsible for setting overall USAID policy in response to the disaster in Asia, providing operational guidance of program activities, and recommending resource allocations for all programs.

- Pacific Command (PACOM): PACOM activated the Combined Support Force (CSF) 536, headquartered in Utapao, Thailand as part of the DOD's Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. CSF-536 was the on-scene military headquarters responsible for U.S. forces involved in relief operations. Additionally, PACOM stood up three Combined Support Groups—in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—to transport relief supplies via ground and air to distribution points and remote locations in support of relief agencies and the host governments.
- Department of Defense (DOD): The DOD response was in support of the larger U.S. Government response led by the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and in cooperation with the Department of State and the National Security Council. DOD provided support to indigenous efforts in areas where unique military capabilities could be of use, for example: logistics, air and sea borne transportation, search and rescue, water purification capabilities, and medical support/supplies. In addition, this multifaceted response also involved the host nations, U.N. organizations, partner states, other military forces, and nongovernmental organizations.
- National Security Council (NSC): Beginning December 27 and continuing daily through the first weeks of the crisis, NSC chaired a working level humanitarian response coordination meeting that addressed needs from the field and ensured interagency issues regarding the humanitarian response were addressed. Participants met via secure video teleconference and included all the operational agencies (USAID, Department of Defense, Pacific Command, State, Department of Homeland Security and Department of Health and Human Services). The NSC group was disbanded February 8, 2005, as response coordination no longer required senior level attention.
- Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): HHS created a small headquarters working group on tsunami relief efforts. The working group was led by the Office of Global Health Affairs in the Secretary's Office. Its efforts were coordinated by the NSC as part of the interagency group.
- Department of Homeland Security (DHS): DHS stood up a small workgroup to support the needs expressed by the Department of State and the Department of Defense in their humanitarian relief efforts. For example, in the immediate aftermath, the U.S. Coast Guard deployed air assets in support of the DOD mission to deliver water and food to the impacted region. USCG also provided medical personnel to serve aboard the *Mercy*.

Relief and Reconstruction

The State Department, in close coordination with USAID, is responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government's response in the relief and reconstruction phase. Specifically, Ambassador Doug Hartwick, based in State's Economic Bureau (EB) has been designated as the Tsunami Coordinator. State and NSC convened January 7 the first of a now weekly interagency working group (IAWG) meeting on tsunami reconstruction.

The State Department is working across the U.S. Government to set U.S. reconstruction priorities, coordinating especially closely with USAID's tsunami task force, which is responsible for setting USAID policy in response to the disaster in Asia, providing operational guidance of program activities, and recommending resource allocations for all programs in the affected countries. As necessary, smaller interagency working groups on thematic issues (e.g., early warning systems) are convened and report to Ambassador Hartwick. Externally, DOS and USAID will work with other bilateral donors, the United Nations, the multilateral development banks and the international financial institutions to help tsunami victims rebuild their communities and livelihoods. Affected countries and regions have the lead in reconstruction, and the United States will work to respond to the needs and priorities as identified by these national and local authorities.

[Diagrams A and B follow:]





Diagram B: Relief and Reconstruction



RESPONSE OF USAID ADMINISTRATOR ANDREW S. NATSIOS TO QUESTION FROM
SENATOR LUGAR

Question. Is humanitarian aid reaching all affected areas in Sri Lanka sufficiently, including those areas that have majority Tamil and/or Muslim populations in the North and East of the country?

Answer. The USAID/DART has deployed teams to all nine tsunami-affected districts. These teams have met with the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) officials, implementing partners and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. By and large, all affected people are receiving assistance from one organization or another.

USAID/DART assessments have shown that emergency needs for food, shelter, water, and clothing are being met, although with difficulty in some areas. Given the disaffection between ethnic communities in Sri Lanka, it would be hard to imagine any major operation by the GOSL going uncriticized. For example, a February 7 World Food Program report noted that, "On Friday 4 February a large number of tsunami affected Muslims, mainly fisherman, protested simultaneously in several towns of Ampara district. They claimed that after 41 days since the tsunami struck they had not received adequate relief supplies. They also asked that in the east, Muslims be permitted to handle the distribution of relief supplies as well as the LTTE." The USAID/DART has not encountered any documented cases of malfeasance. USAID does not feel that any community will go without support given the tremendous response to this disaster by the international community.

The infrastructure and agriculture assets of the country are intact, with damage restricted to a narrow band of between 100 meters and 1 km inland from the coast. Therefore, the same support resources are available now that were available prior to the tsunami. That said, the USAID mission in conjunction with the USAID/DART will continue to monitor the situation and report on any developments.

INDIAN OCEAN—EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMIS

USAID Fact Sheet No. 32, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, February 8, 2005

Indonesia	114,000 dead, ¹ 126,000 missing ¹	413,000 displaced ²
Sri Lanka	30,974 dead, 4,698 missing ³	553,287 displaced ³
India	10,749 dead, 5,640 missing ⁴	112,558 displaced ⁴
Maldives	82 dead, 26 missing ⁵	12,698 displaced ⁶
Thailand	5,393 dead, 3,062 missing ⁷	N/A
Malaysia	68 dead, 6 missing ⁸	8,000 displaced ⁸
Somalia	150 dead ⁸	5,000 displaced, ⁸ 54,000 affected ⁹
Seychelles	3 dead ⁸	40 households displaced ¹⁰

Source Legend:

¹ Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.

² Government of Indonesia, 2/7/05.

³ Government of Sri Lanka, Center for National Operations, 2/1/05.

⁴ Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1/18/05.

⁵ Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.

⁶ Maldives National Disaster Management Center, 1/23/05.

⁷ Government of Thailand, 2/4/05.

⁸ U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 1/18/05.

⁹ U.N. Consolidated Appeal, 1/6/05.

¹⁰ U.N./Seychelles and USAID, 1/12/05.

Total USG Humanitarian and Recovery Assistance Pledged	\$350,000,000
Total USAID/OFDA Humanitarian Assistance Committed	82,970,096
Total USG Humanitarian Assistance Committed ¹	123,009,940

¹ This figure includes assistance from USAID (including USAID/OFDA), the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The value of assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Defense is not included in total USG assistance committed.

CURRENT SITUATION

Indonesia Update

- According to the U.N. World Food Program (WFP), the Government of Indonesia (GOI) declared on February 4 that the first phase of the emergency relief operation in Aceh Province was over and reconstruction and recovery activities will begin after the planning phase is completed.
- WFP reported on February 4 that the GOI will register all displaced persons and catalogue their skills in order to facilitate temporary job placements during the reconstruction period. In addition, the GOI indicated that a number of relocation barracks will be built throughout affected areas of Aceh Province for in-

ternally displaced persons (IDPs). International media report that the GOI plans to build 754 barracks in 39 locations with 401 barracks scheduled for completion by the end of February. As of February 8, the USAID/Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) reports that 13 barracks have been constructed.

- According to the USAID/DART, no comprehensive psychological and social assessment of the affected populations has been undertaken to date. However, preliminary results from a Save the Children study of parents and caretakers in the worst affected areas of Banda Aceh and Pidie suggest that there is not a mental health crisis as result of the tsunami. According to focus groups in the study, parents were aware of how their children's attitudes and behaviors have changed. In addition, the study found very few serious cases of impairment or dysfunction among children. Instead, children displayed common reactions to a traumatic event, such as the fear that something bad will happen again and that they will not be with their parents when it does.
- On February 5 and 6, USAID/DART members visited a USAID/OFDA-funded community health clinic and mobile health services in Darussalam, and Rumah Sakit Umum Hospital, the primary referral hospital for Aceh Province. Although international medical personnel continue to provide emergency services to tsunami-affected populations, USAID/OFDA's implementing partners are making a concerted effort to increase local capacity and transition activities to local health providers.
- On February 4, the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta announced the departure of the USS *Abraham Lincoln*, the aircraft carrier that dispatched the first helicopters to provide assistance to Aceh after the tsunami. Since the U.S. military began providing tsunami relief assistance, U.S. military personnel have flown more than 2,800 relief missions, provided medical treatment to more than 2,200 people, and delivered 4,000 tons of supplies.

Sri Lanka Update

- In late January, the Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply issued a public notice stipulating guidelines for development in coastal areas in government-controlled areas in Sri Lanka. According to the guidelines, residential and commercial construction along the western and southern coastal zones from Point Pedro to Dondra must be 100 meters inland from the coast. In the eastern and northern coastal zones, no construction is allowed within 200 meters of the coast. According to the Center for National Operations, the difference in buffer zones between the east and west coasts is due to the high population density in western coastal areas. According to local media reports, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has established a buffer zone of between 300 to 500 meters for construction in LTTE-controlled areas.

India Update

- The Supreme Court of India has relaxed an order banning the removal of timber from protected forests in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for a period of six months in order to meet the immediate requirement for reconstruction/repair of houses. Local officials have stated that temporary housing will be ready for displaced populations by April, the start of the monsoon season in the islands. The local administration reports that 40,962 persons remain in camps in the islands as of February 6.

Maldives

- According to the U.N. country team, multi-sectoral relief activities are underway throughout the islands. The Government of Maldives (GOM) indicates that transport and logistical coordination remain priority concerns given the dispersion of the affected areas and difficult conditions for aid deliveries. Humanitarian assistance must be delivered to each of the 200 islands individually and can only be provided through the use of small boats or other light transport. As a result, the U.N. Resident Coordinator's Office has requested the deployment of U.N. Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) staff to support logistic coordination between the GOM and U.N. agencies in Maldives.

USG ASSISTANCE

USAID Regional Response

- The USAID/DART and the U.S. military continue to conduct needs assessments and provide supplies and essential logistic support for the relief efforts in affected countries.

Indonesia

- To date, the USG has provided more than \$41.1 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, logistics and coordination, and rehabilitation activities for affected communities in Indonesia.
- On February 7, USAID/OFDA committed nearly \$4.1 million for activities in Aceh: \$1.3 million to Mercy Corps for community infrastructure rehabilitation (cash-for-work), micro-finance, and livelihood recovery projects; approximately \$1.3 million to Project Concern International for health, water and sanitation, and livelihood recovery programs; and nearly \$1.5 million to International Relief and Development, Inc. (IRD) for water and sanitation, micro-finance, and livelihood recovery projects.

Sri Lanka

- To date, the USG has provided more than \$62.0 million in emergency food assistance, relief supplies, shelter, water and sanitation, health, livelihoods recovery, psychological and social support, protection and anti-trafficking, logistics and coordination, and cleanup and rehabilitation activities for affected communities in Sri Lanka. USAID/OFDA-funded cash-for-work and micro-finance programs are fully operational. The USAID/DART in Sri Lanka is now focusing on program monitoring and evaluation and ongoing situational assessments.

India

- On January 31, the USAID/DART in India closed out more than four weeks of operations, after providing approximately \$4.1 million for shelter, water and sanitation, cleanup and rehabilitation, education, and cash for work activities for tsunami-affected residents. During the transition to the recovery phase, USAID/India will oversee USAID/OFDA-funded programs, and USAID/OFDA and USAID/India will share responsibility for monitoring.

Maldives

- On January 28, the USAID/DART Field Officer posted to Male' closed out operations in Maldives. USAID staff and military personnel were stationed on the ground in Maldives since January 10, conducting assessments and coordinating and consulting with government officials. During that time, USAID/OFDA provided more than \$1.3 million for health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and emergency relief supplies.

Department of Defense (DOD) Humanitarian Assistance

- As of February 8, 3,594 U.S. military personnel are involved in delivering more than 24.0 million pounds of relief supplies and equipment to the affected region. Of the 688 military personnel currently on the ground, 675 are in Thailand, 8 in Sri Lanka, and 5 in Indonesia. With 8 ships and 25 aircraft, the U.S. military has delivered a total of 9,259,209 pounds of relief supplies to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other affected nations in the last 24 hours.

BACKGROUND

- A magnitude 9.0 earthquake on December 26, off the west coast of Northern Sumatra, Indonesia, triggered massive tsunamis that affected several countries throughout South and Southeast Asia, as well as Somalia, Tanzania, Kenya, and the Seychelles in East Africa. Aftershocks from the December 26 earthquake continue to occur in the region.
- Based on initial findings of USG assessment teams and on the recommendation of Secretary of State Powell and USAID Administrator Natsios, on December 31, President Bush committed \$350 million toward earthquake and tsunami relief and recovery efforts. Dollar amounts in this Fact Sheet are part of the total pledge of \$350 million and refer to specific funding actions that have been committed and programmed.

USAID REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ASIA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
IFRC	Response to emergency appeal	Regionwide	\$4,000,000
U.S. Embassy/JTF ...	Emergency relief supplies (in-kind contribution)	Regionwide	196,631

USAID REGIONAL HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO ASIA—Continued

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
AirServ	Aerial assessment, transport of relief personnel and light cargo	Regionwide	2,436,681
WFP	Logistics, air support and coordination	Regionwide	5,000,000
Multiple	Transport of relief supplies	Regionwide	523,260
	Administrative	468,460
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to region			12,625,032
Total USG assistance to region			\$12,625,032

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
ACF/France	Water and sanitation and emergency household kits	Aceh Province	\$400,000
CARE	Water purification	Aceh, North Sumatra.	256,276
Christian Children's Fund (CCF).	Child protection and psychological and social support	Aceh Province	396,728
Church World Service.	Psychological and social support for children	Aceh Province	221,375
DAI	Immediate relief and rehabilitation interventions through local and international NGOs. \$62,688—Muhammadiyah for school clean-up and cash-for-work in Banda Aceh. \$15,000—SATORLAK for disaster management training in Aceh Province. \$74,725—Yayasan Rumpun Bambu for cash-for-work and rehabilitation in Aceh Province. \$750,000—Mercy Corps for cash-for-work activities in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh. \$13,900—LPPM for clean-up in Campus Darussalam Complex. \$237,000—Project Concern International (PCI) for cash-for-work in West Aceh Province. \$132,000—Panglima Laot for cash-for-work in Aceh Jaya. \$79,465—BEM Sya Kuala for cash-for-work in Banda Aceh. \$47,802—IOM for airport rehabilitation in Banda Aceh Airport.	Aceh Province	5,000,000
IFRC/Indonesian Red Cross.	Emergency relief supplies	Aceh, North Sumatra.	2,200,000
Indonesian Red Cross.	Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution)	Aceh, North Sumatra.	99,050
IMC	Health	Banda Aceh	292,129
IMC	Mobile health units, rehabilitation of local health clinics, malaria control, and psychological and social activities.	Aceh and North Sumatra.	2,000,000
IOM	Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water, and medicine.	Aceh, North Sumatra.	1,000,000
IRC	Water and sanitation, mobile health clinics, support for public health networks, and psychological and social activities.	Aceh Province	2,564,729
IRC/IOM	Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution)	Aceh, North Sumatra.	523,260
IRD	Water and sanitation	Aceh, North Sumatra.	285,428
IRD	Water and sanitation, micro-finance, and livelihoods recovery ...	Aceh Province	1,499,769
Johns Hopkins/JHPIEGO.	Maternal and child health	Aceh, North Sumatra.	254,023
Mercy Corps	Emergency response activities	Aceh, North Sumatra.	292,060
Mercy Corps	Community infrastructure rehabilitation (cash-for-work), micro-finance, and livelihoods recovery.	Aceh Province	1,321,771

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA—Continued

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
PCI	Mobile health clinics	Aceh, North Sumatra.	236,929
PCI	Health, water and sanitation, and livelihoods recovery	Aceh Province	1,327,321
SC/US	Emergency health, sanitation, shelter, and protection	288,533
SC/US	Emergency relief activities	Aceh Province	901,239
USAID/Indonesia**	Emergency grants for water and sanitation, health, and shelter	Aceh, North Sumatra.	136,766
UNICEF	Child protection and psychological and social activities	Aceh Province	1,500,000
UNHCR	Shelter	Aceh, North Sumatra.	2,000,000
WHO	Health surveillance	Aceh, North Sumatra.	291,500
WVI	Shelter and household kits	Aceh, North Sumatra.	249,985
Multiple	Transport of relief supplies	Aceh, North Sumatra.	256,002
	Administrative	114,500
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Indonesia			25,909,373
USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE			
WFP	3,000 MT of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Sumatra	2,438,560
Total USAID/FFP assistance to Indonesia			2,438,560
USAID/INDONESIA ASSISTANCE			
CARDI	Emergency response teams	Aceh Province	99,960
CARE	Water and sanitation	Aceh Province	98,889
ICMC	Targeting/monitoring of emergency relief supplies	Aceh Province	100,000
IOM	Logistics	Aceh Province	208,452
IOM	Emergency relief activities	Aceh Province	1,650,000
IRD	Emergency food assistance	Aceh Province	99,974
Mercy Corps	Shelter, health, water, and trauma counseling	Aceh Province	250,000
Naval Medical Research Unit.	Procurement and staffing of reference laboratory	Banda Aceh	579,000
Nurani Dunia	Emergency relief supplies	Aceh Province	99,669
SC/US	Emergency relief supplies and health	Aceh Province	100,000
Multiple***	Emergency relief activities	Aceh Province	2,087,000
Total USAID/Indonesia assistance to Indonesia			5,372,944
USDA ASSISTANCE			
WFP	9,417 MT of P.L. 416(b) Title I emergency food assistance	Sumatra	7,533,600
Total USDA assistance to Indonesia			7,533,600
STATE/PRM ASSISTANCE			
IOM	Anti-Trafficking Initiatives	Aceh and Medan ...	200,000
Total State/PRM assistance to Indonesia			200,000
Total USG assistance to Indonesia			\$41,454,477

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Indonesia, will be allocated to implementing partners based on assessments.

*** USAID/Indonesia is using existing funds earmarked for activities in Aceh Province to support grants in response to the earthquake and tsunami.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SRI LANKA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
ACF/France	Emergency relief supplies and water and sanitation	Trincomalee, Mulaitiva, Jaffna.	\$403,763
American Center for International Labor.	Psychological and social support including antitrafficking	All Affected Districts.	350,000
The Asia Foundation	Child protection and psychological and social activities	All Affected Districts.	199,408
CARE	Emergency relief supplies, water system rehabilitation	Ampara	1,941,787
CCF	Cash-for-work and community rehabilitation	Ampara, Matara, Hambantota, Trincomalee, Galle.	2,310,294
CHF International ...	Cash-for-work, debris clean-up, repair of schools and public buildings, latrine construction, and water and sanitation.	Kalutara, Galle, Matara.	3,000,000
CRS	Transitional shelter, home repair, latrine construction	Batticaloa, Ampara	3,048,000
USAID/OTI	Relief and recovery projects through existing DAI contract with USAID/OTI.	Affected areas	2,500,000
GOAL	Shelter, water and sanitation, and cash-for-work activities	Ampara, Hambantota, Matara.	3,280,423
IFRC	Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution)	Affected areas	750,699
IOM	Provision of emergency relief supplies, shelter, food, water, and medicine.	Northern, Eastern, and Southern coastal areas.	500,000
Mercy Corps	Cash-for-work and community rehabilitation	Trincomalee, Batticaloa, Ampara, Hambantota, Matara.	1,509,447
Nathan Associates	Community rehabilitation, livelihoods, and microfinance projects	Affected areas	10,000,000
SARVODAYA	Cash-for-work, debris clean-up, repair of buildings, and water and sanitation.	Galle, Hambantota, Ampara.	1,748,120
SC/UK	Shelter, water and sanitation, and emergency relief supplies	Trincomalee, Matara, Galle.	630,620
Shelter for Life	Transitional shelter and latrine construction	Trincomalee	1,026,185
Sri Lanka Red Cross.	Emergency relief supplies, health, and cash-for-work activities	Ampara, Mulaitiva	356,655
UNICEF	Water and sanitation and emergency school kits	All Affected Districts.	1,000,000
UNICEF	Child protection and psychological and social activities	Affected areas	500,000
UNHCR	Shelter	Affected areas	1,000,000
USAID/Sri Lanka	Emergency relief activities	Affected areas	100,000
USAID/Sri Lanka**	Emergency relief activities	Affected areas	95,449
US Navy	Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution)	Affected areas	5,225
WVI	Emergency relief supplies and shelter	Trincomalee, Ampara.	499,849
Multiple	Transport of relief supplies	Affected areas	657,553
	Administrative		76,512
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Sri Lanka			37,489,989
USAID/FFP ASSISTANCE			
WFP	18,220 MT of P.L. 480 Title II emergency food assistance	Affected areas	20,028,340
Total USAID/FFP Assistance to Sri Lanka			20,028,340
USDA ASSISTANCE			
WFP	5,583 MT of P.L. 416(b) Title I emergency food assistance	Countrywide	4,466,400

Total USDA assistance to Sri Lanka	4,466,400
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Total USG assistance to Sri Lanka	\$61,984,729
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* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

** USAID/OFDA funding, provided to USAID/Sri Lanka, is being allocated to implementing partners based on assessments.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO INDIA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
Prime Minister's Relief Fund.	Emergency relief activities	Countrywide	\$50,000
IFRC/Implemented by Indian Red Cross.	Emergency relief activities	Countrywide	50,000
ACTED	Livelihoods	Tamil Nadu	297,934
CARE	Water and sanitation, cash-for-work, and livelihoods	Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.	686,759
CRS	Water and sanitation, psychological and social support	Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh.	1,069,566
EXNORA	Cash-for-work and water and sanitation	Tamil Nadu	115,195
FHI	Livelihoods and debris removal	Tamil Nadu	280,147
GOAL	Cash-for-work and rehabilitation of agricultural land	Tamil Nadu	250,112
PCI	Shelter, livelihoods, and training	Tamil Nadu	440,295
WVI	Shelter and cash-for-work	Tamil Nadu	859,992
	Administrative		33,000
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to India			4,133,000
Total USG assistance to India			\$4,133,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE MALDIVES

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
UNICEF	Emergency relief supplies (In-kind contribution)	Countrywide	\$94,600
UNICEF	Health, nutrition, water and sanitation	Countrywide	1,200,000
Multiple	Transport of relief supplies	Countrywide	68,400
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Maldives			1,363,000
Total USG assistance to Maldives			\$1,363,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
Thai Red Cross	Procurement and distribution of relief items	Countrywide	\$100,000
	Administrative		215,371
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Thailand			315,371

Total USG assistance to Tailand	\$315,371
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* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO MALAYSIA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE			
Malaysia Red Crescent National Disaster Management and Relief Committee.	Procurement/distribution of relief items and shelter materials ...	Northwest Malaysia	\$50,000
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Malaysia			50,000
Total USG assistance to Malaysia			\$50,000

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SEYCHELLES

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
Seychelles Red Cross.	Emergency relief activities	Countrywide	\$50,000
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Seychelles			50,000
Total USG assistance to Seychelles			\$50,000

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

USAID HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO SOMALIA

Implementing partner	Activity	Location	Amount
USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE*			
UNICEF	Health	Puntland	\$50,000
UNICEF	Health	250,000
OCHA	Coordination	Countrywide	141,369
World Concern	Emergency Relief Activities	392,962
UNHCR	Shelter	Puntland	200,000
Total USAID/OFDA assistance to Somalia			1,034,331
Total USG assistance to Somalia			\$1,034,331

* A11 USAID/OFDA funding represent committed and/or obligated amounts as of February 8, 2005.

FURTHER INFORMATION ON USG RESPONSE

More detailed information on USG assistance already provided, including DOD resources, in response to the disaster may be found in previous USAID/OFDA Fact Sheets: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/countries/indian_ocean/et_index.html.

PUBLIC DONATION INFORMATION

Making a Donation to Relief Efforts

- The most effective way people can assist relief efforts is by making cash contributions to humanitarian organizations that are conducting relief operations.
- For a list of humanitarian organizations accepting donations for South Asia relief operations, please see “Tsunami Relief” at www.usaid.gov or www.usafreedomcorps.gov. Or call the Center for International Disaster Information at (703) 276–1914.
- USAID encourages cash donations because they allow aid professionals to procure the exact items needed (often in the affected region); reduce the burden on scarce resources (such as transportation routes, staff time, warehouse space, etc.); can be transferred very quickly and without transportation costs; support the economy of the disaster-stricken region; and ensure culturally, dietary, and environmentally appropriate assistance.

Additional Information

- Information on making effective donations can be found on the following websites:
 - USAID: www.usaid.gov, Keyword: Donations
 - The Center for International Disaster Information: www.cidi.org
 - InterAction: “Guide to Appropriate Giving” at www.interaction.org
- Information on choosing a charity to support can be found on the following websites:
 - Better Business Bureau: www.give.org
 - GuideStar (A National Database of Nonprofit Organizations): www.guidestar.org
 - The American Institute of Philanthropy: www.charitywatch.org
 - Charity Navigator: www.charitynavigator.org
- Information on relief activities of the humanitarian community can be found at www.reliefweb.int.

