

## NOMINATIONS

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TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Shaheen, Coons, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, and Young.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.

We are here today to consider four important nominations, Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen, to be a Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources at the Agency for International Development, Dr. Karen Donfried to be Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Mary Catherine Phee to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky to be Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.

Congratulations to the four of you on your nominations. We appreciate your willingness to serve our country in these capacities, as well as those members of your family, because we recognize that this is a family sacrifice as well. So we thank them as well.

Ms. Adams-Allen, your lifelong dedication to international development and distinguished career of government service, including as Deputy Assistant Administrator at the Latin American Caribbean Bureau of the United States Agency for International Development, I believe makes you eminently qualified for this position.

If confirmed, your knowledge and experience as a development professional and your distinguished tenure as the President and CEO of the Inter-American Foundation will be needed as you take the role of Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources at USAID.

I am pleased to see that President Biden's budget aims to restore the value and use of international development and foreign assistance as part of the overall goal of achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives. I know Administrator Power is entirely committed to this vital task, and I appreciated her testimony in the budget last week. I have no doubt you will share that commitment.

Dr. Donfried, your nomination is a testament to the Biden administration's efforts to rebuild the trans-Atlantic relationship, which, I believe was significantly damaged during the last administration. If confirmed, I believe your knowledge and experience, including as Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council will serve you and the country well, as the Biden administration works to advance a renewed trans-Atlantic relationship.

It is imperative that this position be filled as soon as possible as we need to see forward movement on critical issues including those related to Russia, Turkey, Belarus, and our support for Ukraine, among others. I look forward to hearing from you about these and other issues.

Ambassador Phee, I am pleased to see you back before the committee, the position you are nominated for to be the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs comes at a critical time for Africa, a Continent with enormous promise and challenges. However, the impacts of the third wave of COVID-19 on top of political and security challenges could roll back years of democratic progress and economic growth.

Indeed, the Biden administration faces a series of challenges in Africa, from China and Russia, which continue to pursue actions that are inimical to U.S. interest to conflict, to instability, and a flawed electoral exercise in Ethiopia, to a fragile transition in Sudan, which could be destabilizing to the entire Horn of Africa.

These are just a few among the many challenges facing Africa and U.S. interests there. In short, the challenges in the region are pressing and vast, I know that you are well equipped, based on your experience, to carry on and meet those challenges, and trust that if confirmed you will do so with skill and commitment.

Ms. Witkowsky, your knowledge and experience, including as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and Humanitarian Affairs will be critical, if you are confirmed, to be the next Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Indeed, your commitment and expertise with many of today's complex conflicts from Burma, Venezuela, Ethiopia, the Sahel, Yemen, to Afghanistan will be needed as CSO develops long-range, strategic policies and plans in order to address ongoing conflicts, as well as to prevent future ones. I will look forward to hearing from you about how you will approach this task.

In closing, while the four of you have a series of challenges ahead, I am confident that your commitment and experience will serve you well, as you take on these new responsibilities upon confirmation. I look forward to your testimonies.

And now I turn to the ranking member for his opening remarks.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,  
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO**

Senator RISCH. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I certainly embrace a number of the issues that are going to be facing these people.

And thank you, each of you, for your willingness to serve, and your families, because they always share the sacrifice.

I want to start with the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for European Eurasian Affairs. For starters, I am concerned the administration has refused to use visa sanctions to shut down the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, this is a continued aggravation for us, and I would like to see that resolved.

Putin has boasted that its completion will be a victory for Russian power. I would also note that any deal with the Russians would be in violation of U.S. law. And I expect to hear more from you on this topic, Dr. Donfried.

On Chinese maligned influence, Europe is a key partner, I have been encouraged to see the increased U.S.-European discussions on working together to combat China's actions.

In Georgia, I am increasingly worried by steps backward. The past weeks more than 50 journalists were beaten. One of them died from his injuries, and several judges were pushed onto the Supreme Court in contravention of the April 19th Agreement.

I know Senator Shaheen shares my concerns in that regard, and we had a number of discussions on that. I hope you will work to address the issues with Georgia's Government.

Ukraine remains a big focus on The Hill. We are disappointed to see the administration refusal to send additional help to Ukraine this spring in order that they might defend from their belligerent neighbor. I hope you will address this today.

On to the nomination of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, the Biden administration has stated that Africa is a priority, but it is unclear where Africa fits in that priority list. First, I am troubled by the conflict and humanitarian situation in Tigray, however, I am concerned that the U.S. is so focused on the Tigray crisis, that it is ignoring the significant challenges to peace, democracy that we face across Ethiopia.

This is a complex challenge. I get that. I look forward to hearing how we navigate Ethiopia's challenges, and the other crises across the Horn of Africa, which is becoming more and more of a focus and a crisis.

Aside from Ethiopia, I remain deeply concerned about the lack of initiative the international community has shown, including our European, French, and African partners, in pushing for a resolution to the crisis in Cameroon, as well as corruption challenges by the regimes in Zimbabwe and South Sudan.

African countries are crucial partners in our fight to combat malign Chinese influence. The United States remains the top contributor of health and humanitarian assistance to Africa, but we must do more to commit ourselves to building strong economic and security partnerships with our African allies.

Next we have the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Like many, I am concerned by this administration's response to the crisis unfolding in Afghanistan. It is clear that the administration had no plans in place to manage the withdrawal and provide for the people that worked side by side with our troops.

President Biden publicly stated that his administration was, "Working closely with Congress to change the authorization legislation in order to expedite the processing of Afghan special immi-

grant visas.” But I have yet to see such outreach on the specific legislative fixes they are seeking.

Finally, we have the nomination of a Deputy Administrator of the USAID for Management and Resources. U.S. foreign assistance can help advance the national security, economic and humanitarian interests of the United States, but it must be thoughtfully targeted and designed to ensure the greatest possible impact. The responsibility for aligning roughly two-thirds of the U.S. foreign assistance budget, with the strategic objectives of the United States overseas falls here.

I am eager to hear about the modernization of USAID’s workforce, and operations to stretch the aid dollars further so we can save lives and advance U.S. interests. We have a lot to cover today.

I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

Okay. So we will turn to our nominees. All of your statements will be included in the record without objection.

We will start with Ms. Adams-Allen, and move down the aisle as I introduce you.

So the floor is yours, Ms. Adams-Allen.

**STATEMENT OF MS. PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE A DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT [MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES]**

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden’s nominee to be Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources of the United States Agency for International Development.

I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power for their trust in me. I am grateful for the opportunity to return to USAID, an agency dear to my heart, at a moment when its leadership and development expertise are so urgently needed.

I am here today before you because of the love and support of so many. My mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who instilled in me a deep sense of fairness and justice; my father, Llewelyn Adams, who I credit for my strong Jamaican work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen, still the best human I know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose creativity and empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank you all.

My international development and diplomacy experience started early, informed by the duality of my upbringing: summers spent in the relative wealth and safety of my mother’s community in the United States, and the school year spent in the beauty and vulnerability of my father’s home country in Jamaica. It was in the jarring journey back and forth between these worlds that I settled on what I wanted to do with my life: pay forward the incredible privilege I have as an American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in communities like the one that helped raise me.

This early decision informed my 20-plus years working in the foreign assistance arena, primarily Latin America and the Caribbean.

During a decade in policy and programming roles at the Organization of American States, I saw the potential of multilateralism to calm tensions between neighboring countries, and mobilize regional support for humanitarian crises like the 2010 earthquake.

But it has been my experience in the federal government, serving in leadership and management positions at USAID, and now as Head of the Inter-American Foundation, where I have been able to effect the change I dreamed of as a child. During a decade of public service, I have had the honor of investing in and learning from young people bravely building peace in El Salvador; smallholder farmers in Colombia selling their coffee to global corporations, and proud grandmothers in Haiti financing businesses through their savings and loans associations.

Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward resources, create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and advance reforms designed to enhance the impact and sustainability of development investments.

And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in U.S. foreign assistance. If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to effectively oversee USAID's management and resources needs.

As the U.S. Government's lead the global development agency, USAID needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-evolving set of geopolitical challenges and crises, and to do so with the management and oversight commensurate with the responsibilities given to it by the American people through the Congress.

If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to further maximize its development impact, by [1] better aligning strategy and resources to deliver results; and [2] expanding the Agency's partner base to include more nontraditional U.S. and local implementing partners with strong in-country knowledge, expertise, and a commitment to sustainability.

In order to maximize impact, we must support and invest in USAID's greatest strength, its people. If confirmed, my focus will be on making sure the Agency has a staff equipped with the right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture, one that recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on USAID, and embraces the values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing USAID's ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of emerging opportunities as conditions change on the ground. There are multiple layers to this goal, but perhaps most important is building on prior efforts to enhance the Agency's procurement capabilities so that it programs resources in a faster, more responsive manner.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Adams-Allen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to be Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources of the United States Agency for International Development.

I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power for their trust in me. I'm grateful for the opportunity to return to USAID, an Agency dear to my heart, at a moment when its leadership and development expertise are so urgently needed.

I am here before you today because of the love and support of so many—my mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who instilled in me a deep sense of fairness and justice; my father, Llewelyn Adams, who I credit for my strong Jamaican work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen, still the best human I know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose creativity and empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank you all.

My international development and diplomacy experience started early, informed by the duality of my upbringing: summers spent in the relative wealth and safety of my mother's community in the United States, and the school year spent in the riotous beauty and vulnerability of my father's home country of Jamaica. It was in the jarring journey back and forth between these worlds that I settled on what I wanted to do with my life: pay forward the incredible privilege I have as an American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in communities like the one that helped raise me.

This early decision informed my 20+ years working in the foreign assistance arena, primarily focused on Latin America and the Caribbean. During a decade in policy and programming roles at the Organization of American States, I saw the potential of multilateralism to calm tensions between neighboring countries and mobilize regional support for humanitarian crises like the 2010 Haiti earthquake. But it has been my experience in the federal government, serving in

leadership and management positions at USAID and now as head of the Inter-American Foundation, where I have been able to affect the change I dreamed of as a child. During a decade of public service, I have had the honor of investing in and learning from young people bravely building peace in El Salvador; small holder farmers in Colombia selling their coffee to global retailers; and proud grandmothers in Haiti financing micro and small businesses through their savings and loans associations.

Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward resources, create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and advance reforms designed to enhance the impact and sustainability of development investments. And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in US foreign assistance. If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to effectively oversee USAID's management and resources needs.

As the U.S. Government's lead global development agency, USAID needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-evolving set of geopolitical challenges and crises—and to do so with the management and oversight commensurate with the responsibilities given to it by the American people through the Congress.

If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to further maximize its development impact, by (1) better aligning strategy and resources to deliver results; and (2) expanding the Agency's partner base to include more non-traditional U.S. implementing partners and local organizations, with strong in-country knowledge, expertise, and a commitment to sustainability.

In order to maximize our impact, we must support and invest in USAID's greatest strength and resource: its people. If confirmed, my focus will be on making sure the Agency has enough staff, equipped with the right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture—one that recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on USAID, and embraces the values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.

And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing USAID's ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of emerging opportunities as conditions change on the ground. There are multiple layers to this goal, but perhaps most important is building on prior efforts to enhance the

Agency's procurement capabilities—so that it programs resources in a faster, more responsive manner.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
Dr. Donfried?

**STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE [EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS]**

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today.

I have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this Committee, dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work on Europe at the Congressional Research Service. If confirmed, it would be a pleasure to work with you from the State Department on issues I care passionately about and on which the United States is and shall remain a force for good.

It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve under Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. If confirmed, I will work enthusiastically to serve the American people, and advance the interests of the United States, to reinvigorate our alliances and partnerships, to strengthen democracy in Europe and Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face around the world.

My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will come from my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah, and our son, Michael. They are an endless source of love and inspiration. Although born in New York City, I spent my early childhood in Heidelberg, where my father, a theologian, did his doctoral work, and my mother worked as a nurse at U.S. Army Headquarters.

That experience gave me the gift of speaking German fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades later, to complete a Master's degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a fellow American studying abroad. Trans-Atlantic relations have been an integral part of my life story.

Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush administration as a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, and in the Obama administration both as the National Intelligence Officer for Europe, and as the Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council. For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

If confirmed, I will have the responsibility, and the honor and joy of leading EUR, covering 50 countries, with 79 posts and 12,000 hard-working, dedicated public servants. I will treat each and every one of them with the care and respect they deserve, as well as work energetically to recruit and develop more diverse talent for the Bureau.

President Biden defines his number one job as ensuring that America's foreign policy benefits the American people and the American middle class. I am eager to support him in achieving this goal, including by revitalizing our alliances and partnerships. The strength of America's alliances is one of our greatest assets. Whether we are confronting the COVID-19 pandemic, economic or social inequality, climate change, corruption, threats to energy security, an aggressive Russia, an increasingly assertive China, cyber threats, or technological competition, the United States is most effective when we cooperate with our allies.

Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners. Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of desta-

bilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of mutual interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and partners must work together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to undermine democracies and democratic institutions.

We must confront Russian aggression against its neighbors by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in Russia. The Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such as Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing.

Additionally, we must work with our allies to counter an assertive China in the political, diplomatic, economic, military, and technological domains. How we manage our relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century.

We must work to preserve the free and open rules-based order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in the wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the most compelling examples of the United States exercising enlightened leadership.

But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that while we applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have made in improving defense investments, we need to do more. The common threats we face demand it.

Allies share values and interests, but we will not always agree. To manage those differences requires trust; if confirmed, I will work to deepen that trust to achieve policy successes that advance U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and this Committee to ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American people.

I look forward to your questions. And thank you for your consideration.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN E. DONFRIED

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this committee, dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work on Europe at the Congressional Research Service. If confirmed, it would be a pleasure to work with you from the State Department on issues I care passionately about and on which the United States is and shall remain a force for good.

It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve under Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR). If confirmed, I will work enthusiastically to serve the American people and advance the interests of the United States, to reinvigorate our alliances and partnerships, to strengthen democracy in Europe and Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face around the world.

My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will come from my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah, and our son, Michael. They are an endless source of love and inspiration. Although born in New York City, I spent my early childhood in Heidelberg, where my father, a theologian, did his doctoral work and my mother worked as a nurse at U.S. Army Headquarters. That experience gave me the gift of speaking German fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades later, to complete a Masters degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a fellow American studying abroad. Transatlantic relations have been an integral part of my life story.

Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush administration as a Member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and in the Obama administration both as the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and as the Senior Director for European

Affairs at the National Security Council. For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

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Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners. Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of destabilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of mutual interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and partners must work together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to undermine democracies and democratic institutions. We must confront Russian aggression against its neighbors by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in Russia; the Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such as Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing. Additionally, we must work with our allies to counter an assertive China in the political, diplomatic, economic, military, and technological domains. How we manage our relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century.

Most importantly, we must work to preserve the free and open rules-based order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in the wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the most compelling examples of the United States exercising enlightened leadership. But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that while we applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have made in improving defense investments, we need to do more. The common threats we face demand it.

Allies share values and interests, but we will not always agree. To manage those differences requires trust. If confirmed, I will work to deepen the trust our partners in Europe have in the United States so we can achieve policy successes that advance U.S. interests.

If confirmed, I will seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and this committee to ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American people. I look forward to your questions and thank you for your consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.  
Ambassador Phee?

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE OF ILLINOIS, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE [AFRICAN AFFAIRS], A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, AND A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION**

Ambassador PHEE. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, distinguished members of the committee; I am honored to be President Biden's nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and grateful to the President and to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.

I began my career as a public servant in these halls in the office of Senator Pat Moynihan. Senator Moynihan kept only two documents on his desk: the U.S. Constitution, and the U.N. Charter. He inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and taught me an abiding respect for this institution, and this committee.

My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the United Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced

to the talent and generosity of the African people. Kenyan politics were also my first exposure to the enduring challenges of governance, security, and sustainable development. Applying U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such challenges has been the dominant theme of my career.

I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of the growing political, economic and cultural power of the diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State Department to translate this recognition into respectful partnerships that advance our shared interests, values, and aspirations.

If confirmed, I will work to support President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement with African governments, institutions such as the African Union, and critically, African publics.

To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has charged us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system to meet the challenges of our interconnected world. Africans agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the Sudanese people in demanding a civilian-led government is another extraordinary example.

Across the Continent we will reinvigorate our focus on human rights, accountability, and good governance. President Biden has declared the fight against corruption, especially the theft of public assets for private gain, to be a core national security interest.

We see a direct correlation between African governments that are authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict, displacement, and migration. Many are contending with an active threat from the Islamic State, and other violent extremists like al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Diverse societies struggle to uphold inclusive and equitable power-sharing arrangements, and collaboration with regional and international partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic, development and security assistance can play a critical role to support peace and security.

This imperative is driving our current intensive effort to urge all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia to implement an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to put a halt to atrocities against civilians.

Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in the Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of thousands, and reckless exploitation threatens the rainforest in the Congo Basin, and the Continent's biological diversity. It is in our mutual interests to work together on environmental sustainability.

Africa is the fastest-growing and the youngest continent. By 2050, one in four persons in the world will be African. Workforce development and job creation will be necessary to tap the ambitions of the youth bulge. We are committed to expanding two-way trade and investment, and

to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector offers innovative American options for green energy, and digital economies, as well as a commitment to social responsibility.

All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating human toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous tradition of investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified by the landmark

PEPFAR program, the White House has just announced the donation of 25 million COVID-19 vaccines for Africa. The Development Finance Corporation is also investing in vaccine production in South Africa and Senegal.

Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the challenges in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy agenda that enlists African partners in building free-market democracies that offer liberty and prosperity and realize the Continent's full potential.

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, with the Strategic Competition Act, you have given us our marching orders and new tools. If confirmed, I commit that U.S. embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to the international rules-based order.

Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a champion of the people of the State Department's Africa Bureau, to unleash their full potential with a vigorous commitment to diversity and inclusion, and to cultivate the special esprit de corps that has traditionally defined the Bureau. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Phee follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be President Biden's nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and grateful to the President and to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.

I began my career as a public servant here in the office of Senator Pat Moynihan. To guide his work, Senator Moynihan kept only two documents on his desk: the U.S. constitution and the U.N. Charter. He inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and taught me an abiding respect for this institution, and this committee.

My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the United Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced to the talent and generosity of the African people, and the beauty and richness of the African landscape. Kenyan politics were also my first exposure to the enduring challenges of governance, security and sustainable development. Applying U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such challenges has been the dominant theme of my career.

I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of the growing political, economic and cultural power of the diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State Department to translate this recognition into respectful partnerships that advance our shared interests, values and aspirations. If confirmed, I will work to support President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement with African governments, institutions such as the African Union, and, critically, African publics.

To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has charged us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system to meet the challenges of our interconnected world. We know that the majority of Africans agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the Sudanese people in demanding a civilian-led government is another extraordinary example. Across the continent we will reinvigorate our focus on human rights, accountability, and good governance. President Biden has declared the fight against corruption, especially the theft of public assets for private gain, to be a core national security interest.

We see a direct correlation between African governments that are authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict, displacement, and migration. Many are contending with an active threat from the Islamic State and other violent extremists like al-Shabaab in Somalia. Diverse societies struggle to uphold inclusive and equitable power-sharing arrangements. In collaboration with regional and international partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic, development and security assistance can play a critical role to support peace and security. This imperative is driving our current intensive effort to urge all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia to implement an immediate and unconditional ceasefire that puts a halt to atrocities against civilians, to

permit the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to restore stability through political dialogue.

Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in the Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of thousands, and reckless exploitation threatens the world's second largest rainforest in the Congo Basin and the continent's wonderland of biological diversity. It is in our mutual interests to work together on environmental sustainability.

Africa is the fastest growing and the youngest continent. By 2050, one in four persons in the world will be African. Workforce development and job creation will be necessary to tap the ambitions of the youth bulge. We are committed to expanding two-way trade and investment and to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental Free Trade Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector offers innovative American options for green energy and digital economies, as well as a commitment to social responsibility.

All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating human toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous tradition of investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified by the landmark PEPFAR program, the White House has just announced the donation of 25 million COVID-19 vaccines for Africa. Earlier the President committed the United States to providing 500 million Pfizer vaccine doses to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, for distribution by COVAX to 92 low- and lower middle-income countries and economies, and the African Union. The Development Finance Corporation is also investing in vaccine production in South Africa and Senegal. This pandemic highlights how our fates are intertwined.

Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the challenges in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy agenda that enlists African partners in building free market democracies that offer liberty and prosperity and realize the continent's full potential. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, with the Strategic Competition Act you have given us our marching orders and new tools. If confirmed I commit that U.S. embassies in sub-Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to the international rules-based order.

Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a champion of the people of the State Department's Africa bureau, to unleash their full potential with a vigorous commitment to diversity and inclusion and to cultivate the special esprit d'corps that has traditionally defined the bureau.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.  
Ms. Witkowsky?

**STATEMENT OF MS. ANNE A. WITKOWSKY, TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE [CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS], AND TO BE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT**

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations, and Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization.

I am deeply grateful to President Biden and to Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me for this nomination.

I am joined here today by my husband, John, and our son Jack, with our daughter Elizabeth watching remotely. I want to underscore how much their love and support means to me, as well as that of my mother, sister, and all family members.

Growing up in the Midwest, I am grateful my parents modeled for me the values of public service. My father served in the Army Corps of Engineers in World War II, and as the first Chairman of the Illinois State Board of Education, while my mother volunteered for many civic organizations.

I have by now had the opportunity to serve in the Executive Branch across four administrations; within the Department of De-

fense, the Department of State, and on the White House National Security Council staff. While I have held positions outside government as well, there has been no greater privilege than to serve alongside the talented and dedicated men and women in the national security community, in the civil service, foreign service, the military services, law enforcement and intelligence.

Throughout, I have learned the critical importance of effectively using all U.S. national security tools, including diplomacy, development and defense to support U.S. policy priorities and advance U.S. interests and values.

From my experience pursuing conventional arms control in Europe at the end of the Cold War, to advancing counterterrorism policies and programs in the post-9/11 period, to supporting the Department of Defense response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, I have learned that the U.S. government is most effective when integrating our policies, programs, and activities to work at common purpose. That is a key lesson I intend to bring to my position as Assistant Secretary, if confirmed.

The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, or CSO, has a vital role to play in developing and carrying out U.S. conflict prevention and stabilization policy and programs, working in close cooperation with USAID and the Department of Defense. Preventing conflict is hard, and outcomes can be tough to measure. Yet, when we do not address instability at the front end, too often we find ourselves having to address it in different, more costly ways at the back end.

The strategic environment for the CSO mission is growing more challenging. The number and duration of violent conflicts is increasing. Democracy is backsliding for the 15th straight year, and authoritarianism is on the rise. We see territory controlled by governments being reduced, as non-state armed actors gain ground.

The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on populations globally. The displacement of people is at a recorded high; climate change, corruption, gender inequality, and the rapid spread of disinformation pose additional underlying challenges.

Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on strengthening the Bureau's contributions to the U.S. government's effectiveness in meeting these challenges.

Policies and best practices should be regularly adapted, drawing from lessons learned. We will deepen and renew U.S. partnerships on these issues, bilaterally and with multilateral organizations, to advance common objectives. And we must work collaboratively with civil society.

If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Members of this committee, including those who have been instrumental in providing new tools to break the costly cycle of conflict. Among those tools are the Global Fragility Act of 2019, and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, as well as the Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017, all bipartisan legislation.

CSO will exercise leadership, working with other State Department bureaus and interagency partners, to advance their implementation, together with the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review.

And as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work of CSO can reinforce support for democratic values and human rights

at the heart of our foreign policy. That work must be anchored in understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine democracies and exploit instability, and the geostrategic challenge of China's ambitions.

Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion.

Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO Bureau, to advance American interests and values toward a more peaceful and safer world.

I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Witkowsky follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANNE A. WITKOWSKY

Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. I am deeply grateful to President Biden and to Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me for this nomination.

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And, as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work of CSO can reinforce support for democratic values and human rights at the heart of our foreign policy. That work must be anchored in understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine democracies and exploit instability, and the geostrategic challenge of China's ambitions.

Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion.

Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO Bureau, to advance American interests and values toward a more peaceful and safer world. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you all very much. So first I have a series of questions on behalf of the committee as a whole, and a simple yes or no to the question by each of you, is what we request. These are questions that speak to the importance that this committee places on responsiveness of all officials in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking from you.

So with a simple yes or no answer: Do you agree to appear before this committee and make officials from your office available to the committee and designated staff when invited?

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes.

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Yes.

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador?

Ambassador PHEE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Do you commit to keeping the committee fully and currently informed about the activities under your purview?

Ambassador PHEE. Yes.

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes.

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Yes.

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I hear a yes from you, Doctor?

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while policies are being developed? Not just providing notification after the fact?

Ambassador PHEE. Yes.

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes.

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Yes.

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And do you commit to promptly responding to request for briefings and information requested by the committee and its designated staff?

Ambassador PHEE. Yes.

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Yes.

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Yes.

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, all.

So we will start a round a five-minute questions. I will start with myself. There is a lot of room, a lot of waterfront to cover here with all four of you. So it will be difficult.

But let me start by focusing with you, Dr. Donfried, on a series of issues that I am very much concerned about. Section 231 of CAATSA is a provision that imposes sanctions on entities that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors. I help write that law. Do you agree to section 231 of CAATSA has prevented significant funding from going to the Russian defense and intelligence sectors? And do you support its full implementation?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, it is such an honor to appear before the committee, and I will turn to your question, but I do not want to let this opportunity pass to thank you for your support of GMF. And as you were giving your opening comments earlier, I had a flashback to 2019 when you delivered an important keynote speech about the importance of trans-Atlantic relations on GMF stage in Brussels. And I just want to thank you for not only your leadership of this committee, but also being such an important public voice on these issues.

You mentioned your role on CAATSA, and I would absolutely agree with you that that legislation has been important in pushing back against Russian influence and countering its malign activities. And if confirmed, I would, indeed, commit to the full implementation of CAATSA.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. Do you commit to regularly engaging with me in efforts to ensure its full implementation?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez? If confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with you on its full implementation.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what do you think about CAATSA sanctions on Turkey unless Ankara gets rid of its Russian S-400 system?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, I would say that we have to keep sanctions on Turkey for as long as it has the S-400s.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. So, let me turn to a few other things. The administration has yet to impose congressionally mandated sanctions in response to the attempted murder of anti-corruption activist, Alexei Navalny, as required under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Act. These sanctions were due on June the 2nd. I will note that they were pending since the past administration and neither have yet acted on it.

If confirmed, will you commit to briefing us on why the administration continues to ignore the law?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, I find Russia's use of chemical weapons chilling and shocking. And if confirmed, I will follow the law and I will stand up to Russia's reckless and aggressive behavior. And I will look forward to the opportunity to consult with you in so doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now let me turn to the Eastern Mediterranean. This is an increasingly important, I think, part of the world, we passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act, which I think enhanced our relationships with critical countries in the region: Greece, Cyprus, Israel, to mention some, and creating a new paradigm in the Eastern Mediterranean in both energy and security.

But we wake up today to see a statement by President Erdogan of Turkey with reference to Cyprus saying that peace talks on the

future of ethnically-divided Cyprus can take place only between two states, only between two states.

Now this is in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 550 that called upon members to not recognize the government in the North, that calls for Varosha to come under U.N. administration, and that considers any attempt to resettle Varosha by other than its inhabitants, to be inadmissible.

And it further violates the U.N. Resolution 789, that called for a significant reduction in foreign troops, that calls for U.N. peacekeepers to be deployed to Varosha, and called for a recommitment to the peace process.

Erdogan is violating all of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions. He is in the north of Cyprus today instigating, and creating a challenge to a country that is part of the European Union. Now I will say that over several administrations, we have been rather passive, from my view, about this engagement. And all we see is Erdogan encroaching in the exclusive economic zone of not only Cyprus, seeking to do so with Greece.

It has played, in my view, a nefarious role in a variety of things in the region. And unless we take an assertive role and push back, we are going to find ourselves with a significant challenge.

Now I would like to hear from you, if you were to be confirmed, what role you would take, what position you would take as it relates to these issues?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, thank you for your engagement on the Eastern Med. It has made a real difference. And I have been following the breaking news from Cyprus as I entered this hearing room, and this latest announcement by the Turkish Cypriot leader and by Turkish President Erdogan about the Turkish Cypriots taking control over parts of Varosha is exactly part of the narrative you are talking about.

This is a move that is clearly inconsistent with U.N. Security Council Resolutions. I do not know if the U.S. Government has yet issued a statement about this, but I am certain this action will be condemned, and these actions are provocative, they are destabilizing for the region, and they are an impediment to any settlement for Cyprus, that will be on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

And if I were to be confirmed, I would want to work closely with you on this. In this particular case of Varosha I think that we need to refer the situation to the U.N. Security Council. We need to encourage the international community to give a strong response to this action. We also need to work to deescalate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and I do appreciate your engagement on this.

The CHAIRMAN. So I have your commitment that if you are confirmed, this will be one of your priorities in your portfolio?

Dr. DONFRIED. Yes, Chairman, it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Risch?

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly want to associate myself with those remarks regarding Erdogan and his actions throughout the globe.

Ms. Donfried, I want to start with our relationship with our friends in Europe, and particularly as it relates to both of ours and Europe's relationship with China. One of the ways, as we push back on the Chinese challenge, is it is going to take a real partners to do that. No country is going to be able to do it alone. If we put our population, Europe's population together, we are still only about a third of what the Chinese population is.

Because we have common and shared values with our European allies, it is the most natural alliance there is to push back against China. I authored a report on this, and I think others have given speeches on it, and also done reports on it. What are your thoughts on how we can work together with Europe to push back on the challenges we are going to get from China?

Dr. DONFRIED. Ranking Member Risch, thank you for that question. I have read your November 2020 Report and I would commend it. The comprehensiveness and breadth of the view you took on how the United States can work more closely with Europe on these key challenges in the relationship with China, I think in many ways is path-breaking.

And I would commit to you that I would look forward to working with you on how we flesh out what you called a concrete agenda for trans-Atlantic cooperation on China. I think there is no better moment for us to be doing this because I think Europe understands today much more than it has over the past decade, the challenge China poses.

And when President Biden made the trip to Europe just last month, at the G7, at the NATO Summit, at the U.S.-EU Summit, we saw this commitment on the part of our allies to work with us on the agenda. I think that we can put U.S. diplomatic muscle to good effect here. Thank you.

Senator RISCH. Well, I appreciate that. And I think we have all got to commit ourselves to getting China to comply with international norms, and rule of law, and enforcement of rule of law. And if we do not, it is going to be a long 21st century for all of us if we do not, if we do not do that.

Let us turn to Georgia for a minute. I and other members of this committee, have been disappointed in what has been happening in Georgia. Senator Shaheen and I were there when they had their elections in October of 2012, which we thought was a new dawn, and a new beginning. And after that we have been regularly disappointed as to what happens there.

And they come to Washington, D.C., all the time, the different parties, and each of them try to engage us and get us to take sides in their political maneuvering, which every country does. And we keep telling them that they have got to resolve this themselves. We are not going to take sides in this.

But they are not making much progress. You get to a point where you wonder whether or not it is time to just reevaluate where you are with this. What are your thoughts Georgia?

Dr. DONFRIED. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch. And I am grateful to you and Senator Shaheen for that trip that you made. And I also would point to the CODEL that Senator Shaheen and Senator Portman took to Georgia quite recently, and I think that broad bipartisan engagement is critical in the relationship.

If confirmed, I would continue to push for the full and prompt implementation of the agreement that was signed on April 19, and urge all parties in Georgia to support that agreement. And I cannot underscore enough how important electoral reform and judicial reform is for Georgia. As you well know, Georgia has made substantial strides to strengthen its democracy, but it has much more distance to travel, and I will press for them to cover that distance.

At the same time, I would reaffirm U.S. support for Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and continue to support for Georgia's integration in the Euro-Atlantic community, which is tied to the strength of Georgia's democracy. And I would look forward to working with you on these issues.

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you. I certainly appreciate those thoughts.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Coons?

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch. And thank you to our nominees today. And particularly to your families who have supported you in your careers in Foreign Service, so far.

Dr. Donfried, if I might? I want to associate myself with the concerns raised by the chairman about Turkey's nefarious role, both in Cyprus and in the region, and my concerns about that. We will have a hearing about Turkey, I believe tomorrow, where we will explore that more thoroughly. And the ranking member raised concerns about China that I might well have just echoed, but I would like to ask you specifically about the path forward in U.S.-German relations.

President Biden just welcomed Chancellor Merkel to the White House. We have long enjoyed a close and positive relationship. There are upcoming elections. I think Germany is one of the central powers in all of Europe. One of our core allies, one of the most important nations in the world in terms of sharing our values and an economy built on advanced manufacturing.

What do you see as the future of U.S.-German relations, and how does our work with them in Europe, around collective security, and in the rest of the world, in terms of pushing back on China, have positive and negative aspects? How do you intend to navigate all this?

Dr. DONFRIED. Senator Coons, thank you very much for that question. And I remember being at a site event at the Munich Security Conference with you in Germany.

Senator COONS. Mm-hmm.

Dr. DONFRIED. And I am mindful of how very knowledgeable you are about these issues as well. As you know, Germany is a critical partner and ally of the United States. It is, of course, the largest and wealthiest member of the European Union. And we just saw Chancellor Merkel visit President Biden last week, where the discussion based on the press conference, seemed to cover many of the issues you just referred to.

There is an election in Germany on September 26th, so as we saw last week, in many ways, this was a farewell visit by Angela Merkel as Chancellor after 16 years in office. So we are all expecting change in this relationship. It may well be that her party, the

center-right party, maintains the chancellery, but the coalition is likely to look different.

And that will matter for German policy, particularly with regard to countries like China and Russia, where if you had the Greens in coalition, I think you would see a greater sensitivity to the human rights violations that we see those countries make. So I think it is an exciting moment for the relationship with Germany. While on the one hand we can celebrate what has been, I think there will be opportunities for the U.S. Government to forge and deepen cooperation on issues like China. Thank you.

Senator COONS. Thank you. And I am looking forward, hopefully, to participating in the Munich Security Conference again with the leadership of this committee and many other colleagues.

Ambassador Phee, if I might? Great to see you again, since we last visited in Juba in 2017. Congratulations on your nomination.

There is so much to discuss across the Continent. Let me just bear down on a few things quickly, if I might. Since my visit to Ethiopia a few months ago, on behalf of our President, the situation in Tigray, and the U.S. bilateral relationship with Ethiopia, has deteriorated significantly.

Could you just, briefly, outline your plans to make progress in opening up humanitarian relief, making progress towards a ceasefire and then, God willing, peace and some reconciliation in Tigray? And what do you think might be the path towards accountability for those who have committed human rights violations, and for possibly rebuilding the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship on the other side of this, if possible?

Ambassador PHEE. Thank you, Senator. And it is an honor and a privilege for me to see you again, in this environment.

I want to thank you and other members of the committee, including Ranking Member Risch who introduced a resolution on Ethiopia, for the efforts you have made to make clear, U.S. concerns about the situation that has resulted from the conflict in Tigray.

Your efforts have been instrumental in making sure that all parties to the conflict understand that the United States urgently seeks an immediate end to hostilities, unconditional humanitarian access, accountability for atrocities, and a new course to achieve the political and economic reforms sought by the Ethiopian people.

And if confirmed, I am committed to using all available tools in partnership with this committee to achieve those critical objectives, and to working with you to help Ethiopia get back on track.

The Prime Minister started his premiership with a positive direction, with important rhetoric that was responsive to the desire of the Ethiopian people for economic and political reforms.

That initial positive start has gone badly off track, and it is in our interest to work across the political spectrum in Ethiopia to get it back on track, both for the immediate concern for the civilians who are suffering, but also so that Ethiopia can regain its leadership role in the Horn. Thank you.

Senator COONS. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. Chairman, could I continue, or should I have a number of additional questions? I did not know if you were doing a second round or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say you have a hundred additional questions?

Senator COONS. A few.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, a few.

Senator COONS. A very few.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I have at least a hundred.

Senator COONS. Maybe two.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, happy to let you go on.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your forbearance.

If I might, Ms. Witkowsky; the Global Fragility Act is a, I think, promising new tool. There are many areas of fragility, Ambassador Phee and I might have gone on at greater length if we had the opportunity about the Sahel, and about Mozambique, and other places where there are significant conflicts.

The CSO Bureau has an important role to play in the implementation of the Global Fragility Act that Senator Graham and I wrote and was signed into law last December. And it tries to come up with strategies that will prevent instability. Can you just briefly share your vision for how you will employ this new tool?

Ms. WITKOWSKY. Senator Coons, thank you very much. And thank you so much for your leadership on this important issue, and for providing the opportunity of this new tool to the U.S. Government, to move forward on the complex and difficult challenges of addressing fragility.

The Global Fragility Act maps an important new way of doing business on fragility, with its ten-year commitments, its emphasis on solutions being locally led, and its requirements for tighter integration among bureaus, agencies, the field, and Washington.

If confirmed, I see that CSO will play a leadership role in the day-to-day implementation, of the Global Fragility Act implementation, one of coordination, and working with all relevant agencies who are participating in moving forward to implement the Act and supporting our embassies, working with civil society. And that process will amass to the higher-level process that you have mandated under the Steering Committee in the Act.

I look forward to drawing in my many years of leading large agency and interagency efforts to move forward successfully with its implementation. And I can assure you that implementing the Global Fidelity Act will be a high priority for me.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Witkowsky.

My last question for Ms. Adams-Allen; you have been involved in the Inter-American Foundation. Ambassador Phee will be on the Board of the Africa Development Foundation, both of them relatively small, agile responsive. One of my real concerns is about increasing localization and flexibility of our assistance programs.

I just visited Guatemala, and had a chance to visit a shelter for trafficked children, a site that I know Samantha Power, the Administrator, also visited. I am really concerned about the lack of credible partners for us to work with in a number of the countries, in Central America, and in other places in the world.

What is your strategy for increasing the localization of assistance programs so that we are not solely reliant on government partners? And what would you think about piloting that in Central America, where I think we are genuinely constrained in terms of the quality

of the government partners we have available to do robust development projects with?

Ms. ADAMS-ALLEN. Thank you for the question, Senator. I could not agree more about the need to localize U.S. foreign assistance and make sure that it is sustainable and it is really locally owned. As you mentioned, this is precisely what The American Foundation does, and it is my contention that there are actually numerous potential local partners across the world.

But I know particularly in Central America that USAID could tap into a pipeline of existing, vetted, tested local partners who are working on issues of livelihoods, crime prevention, peace building, and governance in the affected communities.

In terms of a strategy, you know, if confirmed, I think it will be important for USAID to build on existing efforts, not only looking at the model of the USADF, OIF, but also building on the new Partner's Initiative and the Local Works program that they have been testing at USAID.

I think it is going to be crucial to streamline the procurement processes at USAID so that small local organizations can have access to partnership potentials with USAID.

Third, I think it is going to be crucial to strengthen the capabilities within USAID, in particular, the technical staff, and the contracting staff who are the ones we are going to need to support local organizations.

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panel. Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Van Hollen?

Senator Van Hollen: Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch. Congratulations to all of you on your nominations.

Dr. Donfried, it is good to see you, it was good to catch up with you a little bit the other day. You know, one of the key responsibilities I think of this portfolio you have will be to work with our European partners to counter China's use of unfair economic policies, and trade policies, to establish a set of agreed-upon rules of the road. And I know that it is going to be part of what you are focused on.

I want to also associate myself with the comments the chairman made regarding CAATSA, and the importance of fully enforcing CAATSA, and making sure that, you know, Turkey continues to see those sanctions applied because of the purchase of the S-400s.

I heard in your response to Chairman Menendez, a reference to Erdogan's, President Erdogan's visit to Cyprus today, which of course is the anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion of Cyprus. And he is taking some very provocative steps, including talking about resettling parts of the Varosha, which would be a gross violation of numerous United Nations Security Resolutions, and U.S. policy statements with respect to not changing the status quo, except for through a negotiated settlement.

Senator Menendez and I, and Senator Rubio, and others, sent a letter to the President Biden last week on this issue. It has now come to pass. So in addition to just making strong statements condemning the action, I think it is important that we work with our European allies in the EU to look at other sanctions that can be imposed for the violation of law here, rule of law.

President Biden has sort of recentered U.S. policy on rule of law. So do you agree that it is important to stand firm, together with our partners in the EU, on this violation?

Dr. DONFRIED. Senator Van Hollen, thank you for taking the time last week to meet with me. I appreciated that. And to your question, yes, I do agree we should work closely with the European Union, with our European allies on how we pushed back against this. I think we will be stronger for doing so.

And I also look forward to working closely with you and with the chairman, if confirmed, on these critical issues around stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Senator Van Hollen: I appreciate that. We are going to be having a hearing. I know that the chairman has organized a hearing tomorrow on Turkey specifically. So I will have a greater chance to talk about that. But we just see this series of very provocative moves in Cyprus, in the Eastern Mediterranean, also walking away from the parameters of a bizonal Federation that had defined the talks for peace in Cyprus.

Ambassador Phee, if I could? You have a huge portfolio. I look forward to working with you on all the issues including trying to really increase U.S. investment in Africa. My question relates specifically to Sudan. Senator Coons and I visited Sudan, I think back in May now, and Sudan, of course, is one of those countries where in a world where we see retrenchment, and people moving in the wrong direction, i.e. issues of democracy and rule of law, Sudan is a bright spot.

And I know you agree that we should do everything we can to support their transition from dictatorship to democracy. At the end of June, Prime Minister Hamdok gave a very important speech. And one of the things he focused on was the importance, the urgent importance of consolidating the military, which consists, as you know, of various militia, including the RSF, under a unified command, and that command be under civilian control.

The U.S. continues to have a law in place based on the Bashir Government coup decades ago that limits our ability to engage with the armed forces through security systems.

Would you agree that we should look at ways of changing that? Given the fact that we now have seen a peaceful revolution and where the United States could play, I think, a constructive role, carefully, but a constructive role in helping Sudan, integrate and consolidate its military under unified command under civilian control?

Ambassador PHEE. Senator, it is an honor and pleasure to see you again. And I thank you for your leadership of the Africa Subcommittee. And I thank you for your efforts, such as the recent trip that you took with Senator Coons.

You have perfectly captured, I think, this critical moment in the Sudanese transition. The Senate has already played such a vital role in supporting the transition by giving us the tools, helping to dismantle. As you note, some of the architecture that was put in place during the Bashir regime. And if confirmed, I absolutely commit to review the important option you have suggested here today, about how we might work more effectively with the security forces.

In tandem with the Prime Minister's announcement, there were also statements made by the military leadership about the importance of working together. So there are real opportunities for us to continue to support this very critical transition, which will have such a transformative impact on the Continent. Thank you.

Senator Van Hollen: Well, thank you. I look forward to working with you. And while it has taken a long time, I know AID is finally finalizing its \$700 million commitment. So the committee looks forward to working with you as that moves forward as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. There are presently no other members seeking recognition. But there is one member on their way here, so I have a few extra questions, so I am just going to pursue them now.

Let me go back to you, Dr. Donfried. You have a very large universe to cover. Earlier this year the Biden administration recognized the Armenian genocide. Do you support the administration's decision to recognize the Armenian genocide?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, I do. And I would like to thank you for your leadership on that issue. You have been a long-time champion of the U.S. Government officially recognizing the Armenian genocide. And I think it puts the United States in a very good place to be on the right side of history on this issue.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another issue in the region that is a little more complicated—well, that it took a long time for us to recognize the genocide, but I am glad. And I give credit to President Biden for doing so.

But given Azerbaijan's aggression last August in Nagorno-Karabakh war, the administration continued the use of waivers for Section 907 restrictions. I have to be honest with you, and based on the declared meaning of Section 907 as I read it I am not quite sure—it was quite a stretch, to go ahead and waive. What are your views on that?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, if I am confirmed, I would look forward to working closely with you on that issue, of the waivers for that assistance to Azerbaijan. I think it is critical that we make sure that any support we are giving to Azerbaijan is not in any way affecting the balance of power between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that we are committed to resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I appreciate that. The Azerbaijanis are now interfering in the physical territory of Armenia, and a border issue. And it just seems to me they will continue to be aggressive unless they have a clear message that it is not acceptable.

I understand that you have had the chance to review the Ukraine Security Partnership Act. Do you support the legislation which would give increased security assistance to the country?

Dr. DONFRIED. I am grateful for the broad and bipartisan support there is on this committee for U.S. support for Ukraine. And I would read with great interest, the Act, which has many interesting and important ideas captured in it. And if confirmed, I would very much look forward to working with you on how we can increase our support for Ukraine.

The CHAIRMAN. Finally, last week the British Government proposed halting all prosecution of British soldiers and militants involved in three decades of conflict in Northern Ireland, which sparked an angry response from victims' families, and politicians in Belfast and Dublin. The Stormont House Agreement provides a framework to deal with legacy issues from the troubles. Do you support the implementation of the Stormont House Agreement as a way to deal with legacy issues?

Dr. DONFRIED. Chairman Menendez, I mentioned earlier that I spent 10 years at the Congressional Research Service, and one of the issues, I spent a great deal of time on then, was Northern Ireland. And it was a bright time because actually we saw the peace process move forward, and that Stormont House Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement, I think has to be the basis for U.S. policy toward the Island of Ireland to maintain peace there. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ambassador Phee, let me ask you. The situation in Tigray and across Ethiopia is rather bleak. The Ethiopian Government's unilateral cease fire does not appear to be getting much traction, and worryingly, it appears to me that we may be entering a new phase of the conflict characterized by the mobilization of ethnic militia, and even more mass atrocities.

What more can the United States do to get the parties, to reach a negotiated ceasefire? If you were to be confirmed, what advice would you be giving?

Ambassador PHEE. Chairman Menendez, thank you for raising this very disturbing issue, which poses such a threat to the civilians of Ethiopia, and to this stability of the Horn. If confirmed, I would enthusiastically endorse the efforts of our Special Envoy, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, who is working right now to mobilize the support of partner nations in Africa, of the partner nations in the Gulf who are engaged in Ethiopia, our partners in Europe, and our partners in the United Nations.

This problem requires all of us pulling together to help Ethiopia stop the current fighting, to stop the spread that you have correctly identified as a genuine threat, and to work on a national dialogue, to address the political and economic performance that are so desperately needed.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. And I think we have to look at, if the type of atrocities that are being reported are such, I think we have to look about what other consequences for such atrocities. If we look away then, you know, at the end of the day, others in other parts of the world will do it.

Ambassador PHEE. Chairman Menendez, I fully agree with that sentiment. We have, as you know, a longstanding and multifaceted partnership with Ethiopia, and there are options for us to act in that direction if it becomes necessary. And if confirmed, I would commit to pursuing those options to make clear, just as you have said, that this kind of action is unacceptable.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to the situation of the Sahel, which continues to be deeply concerning, with violence in the region fueling what U.N. agencies deemed the world's "fastest-growing displacement crisis". As you may know, I am the lead sponsor of S615,

the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Program Act, which calls for a whole-of-government strategy for the Sahel.

Do I have your commitment, if you are confirmed, to develop a strategic approach to the Sahel?

Ambassador PHEE. Chairman Menendez, you absolutely do. If confirmed, I would address the concerns that are outlined in your legislation, and I would do our best to pull together all the elements of the U.S. Government capability to help support a better outcome in the Sahel.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now, Sudan's civilian-led transition to democracy is in a critical phase of the transitional government led by Prime Minister Hamdok, has initiated laudable reforms over the last two years, but there are several intractable problems that need to be addressed. What in your view are the major obstacles to democratic transition and stability in Sudan?

Ambassador PHEE. Chairman Menendez, in my view, the main obstacle to the transition in Sudan is helping the military understand that there is a new way of governance in the country, and that it is time for the civilians to remain at the forefront. That is the most important challenge we face, and it is incumbent upon us to do all we can to help them realize that transition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Risch?

Senator RISCH. Briefly. Ambassador Phee, I wanted to talk about this one detail that Senator Van Hollen mentioned. And it prodded me into thinking about it some more. And that is, regarding the \$700 million that has been provided for Sudan as a result of the legal peace settlement, what are your thoughts on how the U.S. should use that amount?

Ambassador PHEE. Ranking Member Risch, I understand that we should use that money exactly for the purposes for which you appropriated it, which is to help consolidate support for the transition to help provide economic sustainability in Sudan, so that there is popular support for this transition to continue. I understand there is frustration in the pace of disbursement, and if confirmed, I would undertake to immediately look at that issue.

Senator RISCH. Yeah. Frustration would be an understatement. The mechanics that are in place, are you familiar with those or?

Ambassador PHEE. No, sir. I am not as familiar as I should be.

Senator RISCH. I might do that question for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well thank you.

I do not want our other two nominees think I have no affection for your work. I do. And I will be submitting a series of questions for the record. For that fact, there will be a series of questions to all of the nominees from me, and I am sure from other members.

The CHAIRMAN. I would urge you to answer them fully and expeditiously so that the committee can consider your nominations at a business meeting.

With no other members before the committee, this hearing will be adjourned. The record will remain open until the close of business tomorrow, which, questions for the record will be submitted.

And with thanks to the committee, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

## Additional Material Submitted for the Record

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

### *Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI)*

*Question.* Last July, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report depicting extensive demographic data demonstrating the serious challenges the Agency faces when it comes to building a diverse workforce. The GAO concluded “mixed progress” in the Agency’s efforts to increase diversity, and presented a number of troubling findings, including numerous barriers to promotion for racial and ethnic minorities in early- or mid-career Civil Service positions.

- Will you commit to prioritizing actions to address these problems?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing actions to address these problems.

*Question.* Please describe what actions you believe USAID should prioritize to realize and advance the goals of USAID’s Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion initiative?

Answer. Ensuring USAID remains the world’s leading development agency requires the Agency center the principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion in everything it does—reflecting them in its people, its workplace culture, policies and practices, and funding and program approaches. If confirmed, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how we support and invest in our workforce. The report you referenced, for example, presented data demonstrating that “promotion outcomes at USAID were generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites in early to mid career.” If confirmed, I will engage staff across the agency to understand the challenges facing them as they seek to advance in their USAID careers, solicit their advice on how to create more internal ladders and equitable opportunities for professional development and promotion, and treat these issues with the urgency they demand. I understand that one of Administrator Power’s first acts at the Agency was to approve the new DEI Strategy, affirming her commitment to integrate diversity, equity, and inclusion throughout the Agency’s work with a workforce that reflects the diversity of our country. If confirmed, I commit to implementing this Strategy, including by ensuring that staff’s perspectives and experiences are reflected in USAID’s plans for recruiting, retaining, and investing in a workforce that reflects the rich diversity of our country.

*Question.* That same GAO report indicated significant understaffing in USAID’s Office of Civil Rights and Diversity, a deficiency that reduces USAID’s capacity to respond effectively to allegations of discrimination, identify potential barriers to equal employment opportunity, and submit required reports on diversity and inclusion efforts.

- Will you commit to ensuring that this Office is adequately staffed and empowered to responsibly execute its mission?

Answer. Answer: Yes, if confirmed, I will immediately review staffing and resource needs for USAID’s Office of Civil Rights and Diversity (OCRD) and commit to enhancing its ability to deliver its mandate. I understand the Agency increased OCRD’s operating budget from less than \$400,000 in FY2017 to \$2,723,000 in FY2021, exclusive of salaries and benefits, while doubling OCRD’s staff allocation from 13 to 25 in FY2020. In addition, I understand that OCRD’s Acting Director has a regular channel through which to engage with USAID’s senior management to discuss EEO Program matters, should OCRD have additional needs or seek additional resources in the future. If confirmed, I will ensure that OCRD has the resources and the access needed to address concerns about discrimination and to advance the Agency’s diversity, equity, and inclusion goals.

*Question.* How will you approach restoring expertise and recruiting new talent?

Answer. Attracting and retaining purpose-driven development professionals with deep technical expertise and broad programmatic and management experience is key to the Agency delivering on its mission, and doing so nimbly and effectively in increasingly complicated settings. Rebuilding the Agency’s workforce must include examining what the practice of development will look like 10-15 years from now,

and identifying and recruiting talent to position the agency for the future. If confirmed, I commit to leading a thoughtful, forward-looking workforce planning effort.

Tapping into needed new talent demands that USAID expand its recruitment pipelines beyond traditional sources, to include U.S. community colleges, minority serving institutions, and professional organizations. I understand that USAID is currently engaging and recruiting diverse high-quality talent through targeted outreach and recruitment events and expanded partnerships with organizations serving underrepresented groups. If confirmed, I will focus on expanding the Agency's external recruitment pipelines so as to bolster its staffing overall, as well as prioritizing the retention and promotion of underrepresented groups as part of a broader effort to fill gaps in expertise by tapping into internal talent pools.

*Question.* USAID's greatest asset are the international development and humanitarian experts on staff. How will you establish a culture where the Agency's actions are based on the insights and talents of its experts?

*Answer.* USAID cannot accomplish any of its national security and development priorities without the top-notch development professionals who everyday tackle global development and humanitarian challenges with passion, integrity, and skill, so as to empower partners (communities, governments, local and international organizations) as they build a better world for all of us. I experienced this commitment and expertise firsthand in my time at the Agency and now in my current role at the Inter-American Foundation. Building a culture that draws on and leverages the expertise and experience of development and humanitarian professionals requires that leaders look to the experts and seek out their input into and leadership on policy, programming, and operational considerations.

Throughout my career, I have created and led diverse, purpose-driven teams; fostered open, inclusive, and transparent workplaces; and empowered staff by removing obstacles to growth and success, while relying on their expertise and championing their creativity and know-how. If confirmed, I will continue that approach and work to empower USAID staff by always seeking their input, promoting their leadership, and unlocking the support and resources they need to thrive.

*Question.* Workforce planning is essential to ensuring USAID has expertise and capacities to successfully execute the Agency's wide range of activities and achieve results that often require years of work and engagement.

- Will you commit to advising each Bureau in developing a workforce plan for its programs and missions?

*Answer.* Yes. I agree that comprehensive workforce planning is essential to ensuring that USAID has the expertise and capacities required to address the increasing global needs and manage increasingly complex programs in more than 100 countries. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID's office of Human Capital and Talent Management, Bureaus, and Missions, to conduct comprehensive strategic workforce planning that positions the Agency to meet the needs of the moment, as well as adapt to future challenges and opportunities. This effort must include analyzing the Agency's current workforce, identifying skills gaps, anticipating future staffing and expertise needs, and developing and implementing an Action Plan to secure and support the range of expertise (policy, technical, operational, and management) needed to ensure the Agency's continued success. I look forward to working with you to support that strategy, if confirmed.

*Question.* What do you think USAID can do to improve FSNs' standing within USAID and ensure these hardworking professionals are afforded ample opportunities for professional growth, promotion, and recognition for their work?

*Answer.* Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), which constitute nearly half of USAID's global workforce, are an integral part of achieving the Agency's mission. They are a critical link to cultivating and maintaining trust and strong relationships with local communities, which is the foundation for successful development and humanitarian assistance. I understand that USAID is currently working on various initiatives designed to enhance recognition for the value that FSNs bring to the Agency, and to enhance morale among this critical part of the workforce. Specifically, USAID is working to promote leadership opportunities for FSNs at all levels; increase virtual FSN fellowship programs; increase the number of senior-level FSN-13 positions; expand professional development and training opportunities; and expand the use of ladder positions within the FSN workforce to enhance career development. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID leadership in Washington and its overseas Missions to further advance initiatives that will afford FSNs with

opportunities for inclusion, professional growth, promotion, and recognition for their contributions to the Agency.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

*China and COVAX*

*Question.* Global health is one of the largest parts of USAID's annual budget and, in 2021, the agency received significant additional resources to support U.S. international COVID-19 relief efforts. Importantly, USAID also is responsible for managing U.S. engagement with COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT). Unfortunately, while the United States has made \$4 billion (as well as 580 million vaccine doses) available to COVAX, China has contributed nothing. Worse yet, China now stands to profit from a pandemic that it unleashed upon the world through the sale of its state-owned vaccines to COVAX.

- If confirmed, how will you ensure U.S. contributions to COVAX will not be used to underwrite or subsidize the purchase and distribution of China's state-owned, substandard COVID-19 vaccines?
- If confirmed, will you prioritize resources for bilateral, in-kind contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to COVAX? If not, why not?

*Answer.* I understand that funds from the generous \$4 billion U.S. contribution to Gavi in support of COVAX were not used to purchase vaccines made by Chinese companies. These funds were allocated by Gavi prior to the facility's decision to purchase Sinopharm and Sinovac vaccines. I also understand that there are no further contributions of U.S. funds to COVAX planned at this time. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the U.S. continues to signal concern about procurement of lower-efficacy vaccines, and urges China to pick up its fair share of the global burden on vaccine access rather than simply profiting off of other donors' generosity.

I understand that the decision on when to use bilateral, in-kind contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to COVAX was based on multiple factors including global and domestic vaccine supply variables. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency colleagues to review the current facts, supply projections and needs in order to continue to advance global COVID vaccine availability as fast and safely as possible.

*U.S. International Food Aid and Cargo Preference*

*Question.* The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has released a memo which, among other things, directs the new OMB Made in America Office to "review how best to ensure agency compliance with cargo preference requirements to maximize the utilization of U.S.-flag vessels, in excess of any applicable statutory minimum, to the greatest extent practicable." This is likely to increase pressure upon USAID to exceed existing cargo preference requirements for food aid under the Food for Peace Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) repeatedly has found that such requirements significantly increase the cost of food aid while failing to advance the statutory purpose of the Cargo Preference Act of 1954.

- Do you agree that U.S. cargo preference requirements for food aid have outlived their statutory purpose?
- If confirmed, will you work with OMB to mitigate the deleterious impact of U.S. cargo preference requirements on life-saving food aid?
- In your estimation, how would an increase of cargo preference requirements impact USAID's budget and ability to meet historic levels of need for food aid?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and the interagency, including OMB, to make USAID's food assistance programming as effective and efficient as possible. Each food assistance modality (U.S. in-kind food, locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming) is critical to USAID's ability to appropriately respond to unprecedented global humanitarian needs. An increase in cargo preference requirements would directly result in increased transportation costs for food assistance programs, which would reduce the amount of resources USAID can dedicate to purchasing agricultural commodities to respond to historic levels of global hunger.

*Material Support*

*Question.* The United States has strict laws prohibiting the provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist groups.

- If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that USAID and its implementing partners strictly adhere to all relevant material support laws, regulations, policy directives, and vetting requirements?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID staff and partners to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations. I understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to supporting if I am confirmed.

*Question.* If confirmed, what measures will you seek to put in place to ensure not only that all contracts and agreements contain the required material support clauses, but also that adherence is closely monitored and transparently reported to Congress by USAID?

*Answer.* I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to supporting if I am confirmed.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of State to eliminate ambiguity and ensure that USAID's implementing partners, including USAID's humanitarian assistance partners, have clear guidance on what constitutes material support, how to identify intentional and incidental breaches, and how to respond?

*Answer.* Understanding that USAID does not administer U.S. sanctions programs, if confirmed, I do commit to working with the Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of State to ensure that all implementing partners, including those who support humanitarian programs in some of the most challenging operating environments in the world, have clear guidance about applicable sanctions.

*USAID Staffing*

*Question.* Whether Foreign Service, Civil Service, Foreign Service Limited, Foreign Service National, or other, USAID's most valuable asset is its people. Unfortunately, with at least 22 different hiring mechanisms and outdated assumptions about how specific missions, bureaus, and offices should be supported, the agency is in desperate need of a modernized strategic staffing plan that is flexible and adaptive to today's challenges. The budget request includes an increase for USAID's operating expenses and proposes to increase the number of Foreign Service Limited positions, including for global health and humanitarian assistance.

- If confirmed, how will you approach modernizing USAID's arcane staffing mechanisms?
- Should an increase in resources for additional direct-hire positions be paired with a decrease in the number of contractors USAID retains using program funds? If not, why not?
- If the requested increase for direct-hire positions is approved, how will positions be prioritized? Should the recruitment, hiring, and deployment of competent, field-based contracting and agreement officers (COs and AOs) be a priority?

*Answer.* I understand that USAID is committed to strengthening its global workforce to advance the Agency's mission and U.S. national security priorities. In my experience, USAID has complex requirements and needs to increase both the size and agility of the career workforce while also improving non-career employment mechanisms.

As the administrator stated in her recent testimony before the committee, USAID's staffing has not increased at the same rate as the programmatic needs and requirements. With regard to USAID's Contracting and Agreement Offices, she noted in her testimony that each USAID acquisition and assistance officer has managed over \$65 million annually over the past four years: more than four times the workload of their colleagues at the Department of Defense who manage an average of approximately \$15 million. I will work to rationalize non-career hiring mechanisms and strategically grow the Civil Service and Foreign Service, while building the overall cohesiveness of the Agency's workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to updating you on the Agency's progress in this area.

*USAID Budget Allocations*

*Question.* Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2413) requires that “not later than thirty days after the enactment of any law appropriating funds to carry out any provision of this Act (other than section 451 or 637) or the Arms Export Control Act, the President shall notify the Congress of each foreign country and international organization to which the United States Government intends to provide any portion of the funds under such law and of the amount of funds under that law, by category of assistance, that the United States Government intends to provide to each.” Unfortunately, delays in the appropriations process, the imposition of overlapping spending directives, and other factors relating to the relationship between OMB, the Department of State, USAID, and the Congress have contributed to excessive delays in submission of the mandated 653(a) Report. Moreover, it has become common practice for the relevant agencies to consult only with the committees of Appropriations—rather than with the authorizing committees responsible for oversight of the Foreign Assistance Act—in finalizing such report.

- In your view, what are the chief constraints to delivering the 653(a) report in a timely fashion? How can the process be fixed?
- If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Committees on Foreign Relations in the Senate and Foreign Affairs in the House on the development and execution of the 653(a) report in an open and transparent manner?

*Answer.* Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working in an open and transparent manner with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 653(a) report. As you note, while Section 653(a) of the FAA requires that the report be submitted within 30 days of enactment, I understand that has not been possible in years past. If confirmed, I commit to working within the Agency and with interagency stakeholders to improve the timelines for the submission of the 653(a) report.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

*USAID Transformation*

*Question.* The Trump administration had submitted proposals to Congress under its Transformation initiative to make changes to the Bureau for Management and create a Bureau for Policy, Resources, and Planning (PRP). PRP would have combined the functions of the Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning and the Office of Budget and Resource Management (among others). Congress did not approve such changes and the Biden administration withdrew the proposed changes in May, 2021. Prior to the withdrawal, some international stakeholders had recommended that the Biden administration complete the proposed changes, in particular realizing the PRP Bureau.

- How do you respond to those who advocated for the completion of USAID’s organizational restructuring?
- In your view, do additional structural changes need to be made to USAID’s central bureaus and/or independent offices? If so, what challenges would those changes seek to address?

*Answer.* I understand that USAID successfully completed the majority of its restructuring efforts, co-locating vital capabilities related to humanitarian assistance; food security and water; and the Agency’s technical assistance to the field. I also understand that USAID’s staff were heavily involved in the prior organizational restructuring and so any further changes need to be thoughtfully considered. If confirmed, I will engage with the administrator, my co-deputy, and the Agency’s internal and external stakeholders, to assess the need for any further change to USAID’s organizational structure.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO DR. KAREN DONFRIED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENEDEZ

*Question.* Will you commit to providing vital humanitarian assistance to the people Nagorno-Karabakh including supporting the clearance of unexploded ordnance?

*Answer.* From the onset of last years fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States has worked to meet urgent humanitarian assistance needs for vulnerable populations fleeing the violence and the communities that host them. If confirmed, I will support the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I understand the Department continues to work with other relevant agencies to evaluate the needs of the region and explore opportunities to fund possible programs to clear post-conflict unexploded ordnance in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.

*Question.* I do not support the administration's decision to waive sanctions on Nord Stream 2. I think it was a mistake that will only bolster Russia's position in Europe. The measures announced last week when the German Chancellor visited Washington fall well short of what is needed to support Ukraine right now.

- What specific further measures do you think the U.S. should take to bolster Ukrainian security and energy transit in the wake of the administration's decision to waive sanctions on Nord Stream 2?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue the administration's policy of supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity against Russian aggression in any form. I commit to providing the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself, including lethal weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense requirements. On energy security, I believe an extension to Ukraine's gas transit agreement with Russia will help to preserve gas transit revenues for Ukraine and provide time for Ukraine to eliminate its dependence on Russian gas and transit fees, as it has long sought to do. Ukraine should also diversify its energy resources, with an emphasis on clean and sustainable energy.

*Question.* The Belarusian opposition leader is in Washington this week. The U.S. has yet to announce long overdue sectoral sanctions.

- If confirmed, do you commit to advocate for the imposition of these sanctions?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I commit to advocate for additional measures, including sanctions, to apply continued pressure to the Lukashenka regime to release all political prisoners and start a facilitated dialogue, inclusive of the opposition and civil society, that will lead to free and fair elections.

*Question.* Will you also commit to ensure that the administration produces a new Executive Order on Belarus that would authorize new sanctions?

*Answer.* In the May 28 White House statement following the forced diversion of the RyanAir flight, the U.S. Government previewed the Treasury Department's development of a new draft executive order designed to increase pressure on the Lukashenka regime. If confirmed, I will support these efforts.

*Answer.* How does the Biden administration's public commitment to counter corruption correspond with the U.S.-led effort to push for an amendment to Bosnia's election law, which could significantly strengthen the position of ethnic party leaders?

*Answer.* The administration has made clear that by countering corruption and demonstrating the advantages of transparent and accountable governance, we can secure a critical advantage for the United States and other democracies. Efforts to strengthen democratic processes and reduce corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are mutually reinforcing. If confirmed, I will work with others in the administration to encourage reforms that address corruption and implement relevant decisions of BiH's Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. I will also support efforts to ensure that BiH's electoral system meets international recommendations for electoral integrity, including those made by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Council of Europe.

*Question.* Does this not undercut U.S. efforts to counter patronage and machine politics in the country?

*Answer.* Limited constitutional and election law reforms are necessary to further BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path, a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy for the Western Balkans. The United States welcomes efforts among BiH's political and civic leaders to reach solutions that will increase the integrity, transparency, fairness, and legitimacy of BiH's democratic processes. If confirmed, I will work to bring all actors to the table to forge compromise and local ownership of an improved electoral system that represents and protects the rights of all citizens of BiH.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO DR. KAREN DONFRIED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

*Question.* Which country or countries do you believe are the most important to U.S. interests in Europe?

*Answer.* NATO is indispensable for the advancement of U.S. interests in Europe and to our security. NATO, founded 72 years ago and comprising 30 Allies, is a pillar of stability for the world and the essential forum for Transatlantic security and political issues. The United States is firmly committed to advancing NATO's founding values, enshrined in the Washington Treaty, of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. The United States' commitment to Article 5 is ironclad. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with all of our NATO Allies and the Alliance's partners to safeguard our shared interests in our challenging security environment. The European Union is also a fundamental partner for the United States, as many issues on which we coordinate, including economic security issues, climate policy, and sanctions, among others, are EU competencies.

*Question.* Do you believe that the U.S. should err on the side of undertaking diplomacy with the European Union, or should it focus its diplomatic efforts bilaterally?

*Answer.* The United States and the European Union are natural partners to write the rules of the road for the 21st century economy, rules based on our shared democratic values and harnessing the power of the largest economic relationship in the world. At the June 15 U.S.-EU Summit, the leaders of the European Union and the United States renewed our transatlantic partnership and committed to resolving long-standing disputes in order to work together on common challenges. If confirmed, I will endeavor to support that renewed partnership. The U.S.-EU partnership does not supplant the need for bilateral diplomatic efforts with member states and other likeminded countries. If confirmed, I will pursue diplomacy with the EU and bilaterally to further U.S. policy objectives.

*Question.* How do you believe relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) has changed since the United Kingdom removed itself from that bloc? What challenges has the United Kingdom's departure from the EU presented for American diplomacy?

*Answer.* The Biden administration has already worked in concert with both the EU and the UK on sanctions actions targeting Russian officials linked to the poisoning of Alexey Navalny and Chinese officials due to human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The administration supports a strong UK and a strong EU and welcomed the entry into force of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. The United States has been unequivocal in its support for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, which is an historic achievement that must be protected. If confirmed, I look forward to working with both partners to address the range of global challenges as the UK and the EU continue to adjust to their new post-Brexit relationship. I support the renewed commitment to the U.S.-EU partnership made by leaders at the June 15 U.S.-EU Summit. The UK's post-Brexit foreign policy presents opportunities for even closer cooperation on shared priorities. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with the UK as it works with a broad range of partners to carry out its Global Britain agenda, including global economic, health, and climate priorities.

*Question.* In your opinion, what do you believe the United States will gain from the deal that was recently struck between the United States and Germany that will allow the NordStream 2 pipeline to go forward?

*Answer.* The package announced on July 21 puts in place measures in order to prevent the worst-case scenario—an operational Nord Stream 2 pipeline without any risk-reduction measures for Ukraine or other countries that stand to be impacted by the pipeline. The measures represent a significant commitment by Germany, supported by the United States, to push back against the Kremlin's malign activities and to advance a more secure and sustainable energy future for Ukraine and other frontline NATO and EU countries. It also makes clear that the United States will not allow the Kremlin to weaponize energy resources against our allies and partners and commits Germany to take national measures and pursue measures at the European Union-level to impose costs on Russia should it attempt to use Nord Stream 2 or any other pipeline to achieve aggressive political ends.

*Question.* Which nations do you believe the United States should work most closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and actions around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned with U.S. goals and values vis-à-vis China?

**Answer.** The United States must engage the People's Republic of China (PRC) from a position of strength, which includes acting in close cooperation with our Allies and partners across Europe and Eurasia. There has been a convergence of views among the world's democracies on PRC activities as evidenced by the outcomes of last month's G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU summits. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. Allies and partners to respond to the PRC's non-market practices, speak out against Beijing's human rights abuses and forced labor practices, and address the systemic challenges from the PRC to the rules-based international order.

*Question.* What are your views on the recently agreed-upon EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the United States be engaging with the European Parliament to stop its ratification?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with our EU and European partners on shared concerns about the People's Republic of China (PRC), including through the recently relaunched U.S.-EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. The European Parliament has conditioned any further action on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on the lifting of the PRC's retaliatory sanctions. Ultimately, the onus will be on the PRC to uphold its commitments on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and subsidies.

*Question.* Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe telecommunications companies out of their networks. What do you view as the next priority areas for cooperation between the United States and the EU?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our engagement with European allies and partners on secure development and deployment of 5G networks, including through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. The United States advocates for measures that exclude untrusted vendors, in line with the Prague Proposals and the EU 5G Toolbox. If confirmed, I will continue working with allies and partners to support a diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications equipment and services. This includes support for open, interoperable approaches like Open RAN (radio access network) technologies that promise to increase vendor diversity and market competition and have the potential to lower costs and improve security.

*Question.* To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the United States should try to drive wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do you agree with that analysis?

**Answer.** It is not surprising that Beijing and Moscow would seek to deepen their ties, but we should not overestimate this alignment. Russia and the PRC collaborate when it is mutually beneficial, but a deep-seated lack of trust realistically limits their so-called "strategic comprehensive partnership." Areas of friction between the two suggest they may each have reasons to hedge against over reliance and potentially slow their convergence for their own reasons. If confirmed, I would work closely with European partners and Allies to push back effectively against Russian and PRC actions that run contrary to our values and the international standards of rule-based behavior.

*Question.* It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in occupied Crimea. How should the United States respond, if at all, should Russia place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in your view, dramatically change the way that the United States looks at Black Sea security?

**Answer.** The administration will continue to oppose Russia's occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, which is sovereign Ukrainian territory. If Russia were to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, it would represent a significant escalation of tensions not just with Ukraine, but in the Black Sea region, and in Europe. If confirmed, I will continue to work bilaterally and through NATO with Ukraine and other partners and Allies in the Black Sea region and across the entire Eastern Flank to improve their ability to deter and defend against the full spectrum of Russian military threats.

*Question.* Russia has increased its provocations in the Black Sea and is increasingly turning the region into a Russian lake. Do you believe that the U.S. and NATO responses to Russia's actions and growing militarization of Crimea have been adequate? If yes, why? If no, what more would you like to see done to push back on Russia in the Black Sea?

**Answer.** Russian provocations in the Black Sea and other parts of Europe, including its military build-up and exercises, require robust NATO deterrence and strong support for NATO partners. The United States continues to work bilaterally and

through NATO with our Allies, as well as Ukraine, Georgia, and other NATO partners, to improve their ability to deter and defend against threats to their security. Since Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has implemented the most significant reinforcement of its eastern flank in the post-Cold War era. In the Black Sea region, these crucial deterrence activities include tailored Forward Presence, a series of land, air, and maritime measures that have increased NATO's presence and exercises and improved situational awareness and readiness in Romania and Bulgaria. All of this is a necessary and proportionate response to Russia's aggressive behavior. If confirmed, I will work with our NATO Allies and partners to modernize their militaries and enhance their capabilities in order to enhance deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region.

*Question.* Does Turkey's behavior with regard to increasing ties with Russia change how we and our allies think about future NATO expansion and the evolution of the NATO Strategic Concept?

*Answer.* Turkish-Russian relations are transactional and fraught with strategic rivalries. If confirmed I will urge Turkey not to retain the Russian S-400 system it took delivery of in 2019 and remind Ankara that any new major Russian purchase risks additional CAATSA sanctions. Turkey is a critical ally, it has NATO's second-largest military, and it is a key contributor to Allied missions. Ankara's support for Ukraine's and Georgia's sovereignty, and Turkey's efforts to counter Russia in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya create significant pressure on Turkey-Russia relations. If confirmed I will work to advance the U.S. and Turkey's many shared interests while also being frank with Turkish counterparts on areas of disagreement.

*Question.* Since undersea gas fields were discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean some years ago, littoral nations have been developing strategies to harvest and export it. Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum have emerged as competitors over the future economic development of the zone. How should the U.S. engage with parties to ensure that economic development is executed in a safe, stable, and fair way?

*Answer.* The United States supports regional cooperation to bring durable energy security to the region, create new markets, and provide economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden Administration is committed to ensuring stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. If confirmed, I commit to encouraging peaceful and diplomatic resolutions to disagreements in the region.

*Question.* What are the challenges and threats we face surrounding the issue?

*Answer.* Recent offshore gas discoveries in Israel, Egypt, and the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) have redefined regional relationships, which presents both challenges and opportunities. These new energy sources, if managed well, can continue to improve economic and political cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on Russian and Iranian supplies. This gas would also serve as a useful transition fuel as the region continues to reduce emissions and moves to greater reliance on renewable resources. New routes and types of fuel for European and Middle Eastern partners help to end dependence on Russian gas. Turkey added more LNG to its energy mix in 2020, some of it from the United States, in part to reduce its reliance on Russian and Iranian pipeline gas.

*Question.* What are the security implications in the region?

*Answer.* Long unresolved maritime boundary disputes have led to naval confrontations between littoral states. The United States supports all efforts to reduce tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Resource development in the Eastern Mediterranean should promote cooperation and provide a foundation for durable energy security and economic prosperity throughout the region. The "3+1" format including Greece, Israel, the ROC, plus the United States, and the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which Egypt hosts and in which the United States is an observer, are venues to promote greater cooperation, energy security, and economic prosperity. The United States supports the EMGF as a technical platform.

*Question.* President Biden and his administration have repeatedly made commitments to upholding universal rights at home and abroad. In Turkey, authorities are abusing people's human rights and attacking peaceful dissidents at an alarming rate. How will you work to address human rights violations in Turkey?

*Answer.* President Biden's Administration has elevated democracy, human rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. If confirmed, I will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, fair trials, and association, which are important to any healthy democracy. If confirmed,

I will reinforce at the highest levels of the Turkish government that addressing democratic backsliding could positively impact our bilateral relationship. I will also ensure a continued strong focus in our own assistance on media freedom and freedom of expression and will work with the EU and international partners to defend fundamental freedoms.

*Question.* How is Turkey's declining human rights record impacting its relationship with the United States?

*Answer.* I share your concerns about the steps the Turkish government's has taken which have weakened the freedoms of expression, association, fair trial, and peaceful assembly. Such moves erode the foundations of democratic society, stifle growth, and undermine the rights of Turkish citizens as guaranteed by their constitution. Turkey is a key Ally and critical regional partner. It is in our shared interest to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. That means effectively pressing and supporting Turkey to do more to bolster rule of law, protect human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold the rules-based international order, and stand united with the Transatlantic community in addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and the PRC.

*Question.* Do you believe that the United States should try to drive a wedge between Russia and Turkey? If so, how should we undertake that task?

*Answer.* Russia attempts to harmfully influence domestic processes and drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, corrupt business deals, and disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are dynamic, transactional, and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For example, Russia and Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional conflicts (e.g., Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily dependent upon Russian energy supplies. Russian tourists, construction sector projects, and agricultural purchases are important for the struggling Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work with Turkey to prevent Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally or harming our bilateral relationship with Ankara.

*Question.* If confirmed, how will you work with the EU and its member states to ensure that North Macedonia and Albania are given a true and fair chance at admission to the EU?

*Answer.* The United States recognizes that a prolonged delay in starting accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania will have significant political consequences in both countries and could severely set back recent reform progress in North Macedonia and the entire Western Balkans. Both countries have enacted difficult and essential reforms to meet conditions for opening negotiations and deserve to advance on their accession paths. If confirmed, I will work closely with the EU and its member states as part of our shared political and financial commitment to the Western Balkan region.

*Question.* France and Bulgaria, for two different reasons, have stymied efforts to open accession negotiations with Macedonia and Albania. If confirmed, will you engage with France and Bulgaria on this topic? If so, how?

*Answer.* Although the EU approved opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania in March 2020, Bulgaria has blocked the official start of negotiations since November due to its ongoing dispute with North Macedonia. On June 10 in Paris, French President Macron reaffirmed support for North Macedonia's EU accession without delay. On May 21, the Portuguese EU Council Presidency presented to both countries' leaderships a promising, creative resolution proposal, to which the current Slovenian EU Presidency committed its continued support. If confirmed, I will work with all countries involved to see the EU hold the first Intergovernmental Conferences with North Macedonia and Albania as soon as possible.

*Question.* How do you believe the United States should interact with the EU as we work together to find a solution to the issues between Kosovo and Serbia? Should the United States be in the lead on these efforts? The EU?

*Answer.* From its inception, the United States has strongly supported the EU-facilitated Dialogue to normalize Kosovo-Serbia relations. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate with our EU partners and engage both Kosovo and Serbia to advance the process. A comprehensive normalization agreement remains the only way for Kosovo and Serbia to unlock their EU futures. The United States believes normalization should be centered on mutual recognition, as the best way for these two neighbors to put this dispute behind them. Both parties have re-engaged in the EU-facilitated

talks—the most recent high-level session took place on July 19 in Brussels—and both countries have reiterated their commitments to normalizing their relations.

*Question.* Russia and China have voiced their shared belief that the Office of the High Representative to Bosnia should be shut down in 2022, saying that Bosnia has achieved the progress necessary to have such oversight removed. Do you agree that the Office of the High Representative has outlived its usefulness? If yes, why? If no, what do you believe should be the path forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina?

*Answer.* The United States remains steadfast in our support of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The OHR plays a critical role in pressing for BiH's progress towards reconciliation, consolidation of democratic institutions, and further Euro-Atlantic integration. The conditions for closing the OHR were clearly laid out in 2008 in the 5+2 Agenda with the support of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, including Russia. These conditions have not yet been achieved, and urgent reforms are still necessary. Focus on the fulfillment of the 5+2, plus anti-corruption initiatives, will advance BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path. If confirmed, I will collaborate with incoming High Representative Christian Schmidt on these priorities.

*Question.* Earlier this year, Senator Menendez and I passed the Ukraine Security Partnership Act out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It aims to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian-backed separatists in the east and push the country to continue necessary reforms of its military and defense sectors. In the bill, we propose placing conditions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding. What is your view on Ukraine's historical response to conditionality?

*Answer.* It is my belief that certain types of conditions on assistance, such as those imposed by the IMF or Department of Defense, can be powerful drivers for reform. The Department of Defense, in consultation with the Department of State, has annually certified that Ukraine has met the certification requirements described in Section 1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (c)(2). If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the Department of Defense and my colleagues in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to ensure the conditions placed on future assistance further advance Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and military transformation efforts.

*Question.* Do you believe that increasing conditionality on a portion of military support for the country would provide incentive for further reforms?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will work to advance our objectives of ensuring Ukraine has the military capabilities it needs to defend itself against ongoing Russian aggression, is systematically advancing security sector reform priorities, and is taking full advantage of U.S. assistance programs like IMET. I am committed to working with my colleagues in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs to support a policy approach that most effectively achieves these objectives.

*Question.* What do you believe are the areas that are most ripe for reform in Ukraine?

*Answer.* Ukraine has made tremendous strides in its thirty years of independence, and particularly since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity. These gains have been made often with significant U.S. support. There remains a real need to continue to make progress, and, if confirmed, I will push for further progress on economic and rule of law reforms that address corruption and strengthen the independence, transparency, and integrity of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I will also work with Ukraine to help hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of reforms or try to undermine Ukraine's efforts to ensure a bright, prosperous, and secure future for all Ukrainians.

*Question.* China is increasingly making inroads in Ukraine, wooing it with appealing business deals and the promise of vaccines. What steps should the United States and its allies take to keep Ukraine firmly rooted in the West and to keep Ukraine's valuable technological know-how from falling into the wrong hands?

*Answer.* The United States is committed to ensuring that American companies can operate on an even playing field in Ukraine, providing a meaningful alternative to China's predatory approach as well as promoting entrepreneurship and fair practices. If confirmed, I will focus on supporting Ukraine's economic and corporate governance reforms, countering the PRC's predatory business practices, and leveraging U.S. assistance to ensure outcomes in line with U.S. and Ukrainian national security interests.

*Question.* Ukraine continues to fight two wars: one with the Kremlin and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and independence; and a second with its own demons, particularly the entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions. Should the United States continue to condition certain types of assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms? Should existing conditions for aid be expanded?

*Answer.* It is my belief that certain types of conditionality, such as those imposed by the IMF for financial assistance to Ukraine, can be powerful drivers for economic and anti-corruption reform. At this time, I consider the conditions for continued IMF disbursement, if met by Ukraine, an important motivator of crucial judicial and corporate governance reform and protecting central bank independence. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage Ukraine to address the concerns of the IMF and the U.S. over backsliding on legislative action and empowerment of anticorruption institutions.

*Question.* What further incentives does the United States, along with our European partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its land reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive judiciary?

*Answer.* If confirmed I will continue to work in coordination with our European partners, and directly with Ukraine, to support its chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including by providing assistance and pushing for progress on economic and rule of law reforms that strengthen the independence and transparency of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I welcome the judicial reform laws recently passed by Ukraine's parliament with the strong backing of the President of Ukraine and have been encouraged by Ukraine's willingness to challenge the influence of corrupt oligarchs. For Ukraine to be a strong, secure, and democratic state, it must tackle endemic corruption and ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Ukrainians.

*Question.* Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic reforms and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the EU and NATO. However, over the past few years, the country has suffered democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the judiciary, media, and the ruling political party. What levers can be used to push Georgians, including and especially the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary and complete electoral reforms? Should we consider sanctions?

*Answer.* Much work remains to reverse backsliding and strengthen democratic institutions and norms in Georgia. Deeper electoral and judicial reforms, and the effective implementation of reforms, are needed to level the playing field and introduce transparency, independence, impartiality, and accountability. If confirmed, my team and I will support Georgia in these efforts, employing diplomatic engagement, exchanges, and assistance programs. We will also seek to take lessons learned from across the region to advance important reforms, which will strengthen Georgia's resilience to Russia's aggression and ongoing occupation of 20 percent of Georgia's territory. We will evaluate all available tools and forms of leverage to push Georgia's governing party to complete these reforms inclusively and transparently.

*Question.* Has the political and governance situation in Georgia reached the point at which we should re-evaluate our relationship with the country, including by conditioning certain aid to Georgia?

*Answer.* I share your concern about the current political tensions and lack of progress on urgently needed reforms. It is in the U.S. interest, however, to continue to support Georgia in becoming more democratic, more capable of countering Russian and other malign influence, more able to defend the rights of its citizens throughout its internationally recognized territory (included that occupied by Russia), and more economically prosperous. U.S. foreign assistance programs are an integral part of furthering U.S. strategic interests in Georgia and any proposed conditionality should be approached with this in mind. If confirmed, my team and I will evaluate all available tools and forms of leverage, and I would welcome the opportunity to work closely with you to advance U.S. interests in Georgia.

*Question.* The U.S. Embassy in Russia has been working under duress for a number of years and is now facing extreme pressure due to restrictions on the hiring of locally employed staff. The Russian Embassy in Washington and the Russian government in Moscow have not proved terribly willing to work with the United States to make sure that our embassy is fully staffed and able to continue operations. What

can be done to negotiate a solution with Russia and restore our full embassy operations?

*Answer.* I am disappointed by the decision of the Russian government to impose restrictions on the U.S. mission to Russia. It is at times like these that we need more open channels of communication between our governments, including through our respective embassies. Locally employed staff are key members of our workforce around the world. Their contributions are important to our operations and to our bilateral missions. If confirmed, I am committed to working to put our Mission on better footing to advance our vital national security priorities.

*Question.* What can be done to support our embassy until we reach a solution, or if we cannot?

*Answer.* I look forward to working across the Department to identify how we can best leverage resources—both financial and personnel—to support Embassy Moscow. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring our embassy colleagues receive the support needed to continue executing core functions.

*Question.* What do you believe should be the role of sanctions in the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy? With respect to Russia, how do you believe the sanctions imposed on that country since 2014 have affected the Russia's economic and foreign policy decision-making?

*Answer.* Sanctions are a critical tool in both the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, serving as a key deterrent to Russia as well as conveying U.S. intent. U.S. sanctions on Russia, especially those implemented in coordination with allies, send a clear message: that the international community will not stand by while Russia continues to violate international norms and laws. The sanctions imposed since 2014 have deterred and deprived Russia of the resources to carry out its aggressive and destabilizing activities around the globe. The legislative tools that Congress has created are key to the effective use of sanctions, and if confirmed, I will advocate to use them to promote accountability and impose costs for Russia's harmful activities.

*Question.* Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can the United States (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of more clearly defining the conditions necessary for rolling back or removing sanctions with respect to Russia?

*Answer.* Sanctions are designed to cause a change in behavior, and the most useful sanctions are those with clearly defined intent. The administration sent a clear message to Russia that its activities against the United States would no longer be tolerated via the sanctions imposed in its April 15 action, "Imposing Costs for Harmful Foreign Activities by the Russian Government" including through the issuance of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. This EO is an important complement to existing legislative sanctions tools, providing the flexibility to target Russian entities engaged in hostile or destabilizing activity around the globe. If confirmed, I will advocate to use all these tools to push back against harmful behavior by Russia.

*Question.* Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect to U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia?

*Answer.* U.S. sanctions on Russia, especially those implemented in coordination with allies, send a clear message: the international community will not stand by while Russia continues to violate international norms and laws. The sanctions imposed since 2014 have imposed a measure of deterrence and diminished the resources to carry out Russia's aggressive and destabilizing activities around the globe. The administration has been clear that it will use every tool available—including economic sanctions—to promote accountability and impose costs on Russia for its continued acts of aggression.

*Question.* As relations between the U.S. and Russia have worsened, the level of people-to-people contact has likewise diminished. If confirmed, what outreach do you intend to undertake with to everyday Russians, if any?

*Answer.* The Russian government has intensified its crackdown on civil society and independent media and is specifically targeting programs promoting cultural and academic exchanges with Western countries, including shutting down Bard College's 25-year-old joint degree program with Russia's Smolny University. It is therefore even more critical now for us to engage with everyday Russians and to share our values and insights from the American experience in democracy. The U.S. Embassy Russia has been able to adopt a wide range of new virtual tools, hybrid engagements, and exchange programming for this purpose. If confirmed, I am com-

mitted to continuing and finding new ways to expand outreach to the Russian people.

*Question.* Are there new, more creative mechanisms (perhaps through technology) that the United States can use to rebuild person-to-person relationships between Americans and Russians?

*Answer.* I support the continued use of new technology and other tools to facilitate person-to-person interaction between Americans and Russians, who continue to be interested in engagement with the West despite obstacles. In addition to the work the U.S. Embassy is already doing with virtual and hybrid engagements, the U.S. Agency for Global Media is exploring ways to enhance its ability to reach Russian audiences, including through the Open Technology Fund, even if the Kremlin forces Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to leave its physical bureau in Russia. If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening civil society partners and people to people engagements to foster mutual understanding.

*Question.* The State Department just released the 2021 Trafficking in Person's Report, which identified a troubling trend of backsliding on trafficking prevention, prosecution, and protection efforts from a number of Western European nations, including Norway, Switzerland, Ireland, Portugal and more. It is clear that something must be done to address this serious, ongoing issue to curb this scourge. If confirmed, please outline what steps you would take in your various bilateral relationships to address this problem.

*Answer.* Trafficking in persons is an appalling crime. If confirmed, I will prioritize bilateral engagement across Europe and Eurasia to press governments, including Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and Switzerland, to address the concerns the Department has highlighted in this year's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, and to take concrete action to combat trafficking. If confirmed, I will call out shortcomings where they exist, and use the annual reports to assist each government to identify priority areas for improvement and encourage each to implement the TIP Report's recommended improvements.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you raise this issue with Foreign Ministries at the first opportunity?

*Answer.* Yes. If confirmed, I will raise this issue with foreign ministries as combating human trafficking is a priority for the United States and will also be a priority of mine.

*Question.* Anti-Semitism is on the rise globally, but especially across Europe. If confirmed, what steps will you take alongside the Office of the Special Envoy To Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism to address this concerning and growing problem?

*Answer.* Anti-Semitism is abhorrent. If confirmed, I will prioritize combating anti-Semitism in the region alongside the Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I intend to work with Congress and implement the following priorities: securing Jewish communities; reporting, investigating, and prosecuting hate crimes; countering anti-Semitism both on- and off-line; promoting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Anti-Semitism; building and strengthening coalitions across different faith communities, civil society, and the private sector; and promoting Holocaust education, remembrance, and commemoration, and combating Holocaust distortion and denial.

*Question.* Across Europe, there are over 100 detained journalists who were imprisoned for simply doing their jobs. In 2021, the Council of Europe notes 6 journalists have been killed in Europe alone. These statistics are staggering and require immediate attention and action from the United States Government. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary, how will you address this problem and assure our partners and allies that we will not allow the abuse and imprisonment of journalists anywhere in the world?

*Answer.* Promoting and defending independent media is key to an informed citizenry and healthy democratic institutions and processes. If confirmed, I will seek to deepen our engagement with partners in Europe to address the challenges facing journalists in Europe and the media globally. This includes working through regional organizations including the Council of Europe. Additionally, I will support efforts to promote accountability for those who commit abuses against journalists through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; public messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and foreign assistance programs, including rapid response resources that support journalists, civil society activists, and human rights defenders under threat.

*Question.* The lack of meaningful progress regarding Cyprus on the political front and the subsequent peacekeeping mission, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is quite troubling.

*Answer.* The status quo is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicomunal federation to benefit all Cypriots and the wider region. The United States appreciates the U.N. Secretary-General's efforts to restart political discussions on Cyprus. If confirmed, I will encourage both sides to demonstrate the necessary openness, flexibility, and compromise to find common ground to restart formal talks. I believe UNFICYP continues to play an important role in preventing a resurgence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, supervising ceasefire lines, maintaining a buffer zone, and supporting the Secretary-General's Good Offices.

*Question.* Do you believe reaching a political settlement is possible?

*Answer.* Yes. But ultimately, the responsibility for finding a solution lies first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves.

*Question.* Turkish President Erdogan's recent behavior regarding Varosha is unacceptable and a flagrant disregard of current international norms and two U.N. Resolutions. If confirmed, what actions would you take to address this issue and growing, illegal Turkish activity in northern Cyprus?

*Answer.* The announcement by Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and Turkish President Erdogan on July 20 regarding the transfer of parts of Varosha to Turkish Cypriot control was clearly inconsistent with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789, provocative, unacceptable, and incompatible with their past commitments to engage constructively in settlement talks. If confirmed, I will work to urge Turkish Cypriots and Turkey to reverse their decision announced on July 20 and all steps taken since October 2020, and work with the international community to give a strong response to this action. I will also underscore the need to avoid provocative unilateral actions that increase tensions on the island and hinder efforts to resume Cyprus settlement talks in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

*Question.* Do you see President Erdogan's calls for "a two-state solution" in Cyprus as feasible?

*Answer.* A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicomunal federation is the only path to lasting peace and stability. This is the only framework with broad international community support and approved by the U.N. Security Council.

*Question.* Maintaining recent stability in Kosovo remains a priority, but some Security Council members (including the United States) have indicated a desire to downsize the mission. If confirmed, would you support a strategic review of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)?

*Answer.* Although the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has operated in Kosovo since its independence in 2008, it has long since fulfilled its original purpose. U.N. engagement with Kosovo in a more appropriate form that acknowledges and strengthens Kosovo's sovereignty could provide an important support for continued development of democratic institutions. If confirmed, I would continue to urge that the U.N. Security Council consider better ways of helping Kosovo to realize its full potential, which a strategic review could identify. It should be noted that Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, unhelpfully insists on UNMIK remaining in its current incarnation. I would also caution that change to the NATO security presence should be conditions-based.

*Question.* Since the August 9th presidential election, Belarusians have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to contest the official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander Lukashenka another term. The government has responded to these peaceful protests with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances, arrests, torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists. Since the protests began, the United States has increased its support of civil society in Belarus. What more can the United States-through USAID and along with our European allies-do to assist Belarusian advocates of democracy?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue to work energetically with partners and Allies to keep pressure on the Lukashenka regime to end repression, release all political prisoners and begin an inclusive dialogue with the opposition (including the Coordination Council led by Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya) that leads to free and fair elections under international observation. Specifically, I plan to continue efforts to coordinate and strengthen economic sanctions, provide assistance and support for

civil society- including those working to support human rights, free press, democracy, and Belarus' independence- and keep pressure on the regime through all bilateral and multilateral diplomatic channels.

*Question.* The International Monetary Fund is in the process of sending around \$1 billion to Belarus as part of its program to use Special Drawing Rights to help the world's poorer countries emerge from the coronavirus pandemic. In Belarus, this money will go right into Lukashenka's pocket and will help keep him in power. What can or should the United States do to make sure that these monies are not given to Mr. Lukashenka?

*Answer.* It is my understanding that the United States retains the right to refuse to purchase Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) from any country that we choose, including those under U.S. sanction regimes. We are working with Treasury to develop a strategy to engage our like-minded allies to do the same. However, these countries will not automatically be able to exchange their SDRs- which are reserve assets- for hard currencies. Belarus would need to find a willing country to provide them with hard currency in exchange for their SDRs. If confirmed, I will continue working with our partners at the Department of Treasury to increase transparency around SDR exchanges.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you commit to working to keep these funds out of Lukashenka's hands?

*Answer.* Yes, I commit to using all tools at my disposal to prevent the Belarusian authorities from exchanging their SDRs for hard currency.

*Question.* How important is it that the United States and its European allies take steps to make our own systems less friendly to kleptocracy and less penetrable by dirty money?

*Answer.* The United States will continue to work with European partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in corruption; combat money-laundering; stem foreign bribery; and empower and protect civil society and independent media. The United States supports the work at the OSCE and Council of Europe to help participating states implement more effective and transparent anticorruption policies and mechanisms and ensure countries are following through on their international anticorruption commitments. If confirmed, I will also support the work of countering corruption in our own system and continued use of sanctions related to the Global Magnitsky Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by President Biden on June 8, 2021, and others.

*Question.* Will the Administration make a concerted push on anti-corruption in the EU and its periphery with the dual purpose of benefitting European citizens and making it more difficult for malign actors like Russia and China to gain a foothold?

*Answer.* The United States remains committed to combatting corruption not only in Europe, but across the globe. Fighting corruption benefits citizens while also making it more difficult for malign actors to exert their influence. If confirmed, I will continue to work with governments across Europe and Eurasia to strengthen anti-corruption efforts, and encourage these countries to work to fulfill their obligations under the U.N. Convention against Corruption, and to implement the recommendations of regional organizations, such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe, to combat corruption. I will also support the continued use of sanctions related to the Global Magnitsky Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by President Biden on June 8, 2021, and others to combat corruption in the region.

*Question.* The United States and France share several overlapping priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa and work together on many fronts, including fighting the terror threat in the Sahel. However, American and French interests in the region do not always align, including with regard to the ongoing conflict in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon. If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to ensure that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various points of leverage and capability the United States and France each bring to the table?

*Answer.* France has significant ties in the Sahel and West and Central Africa, and is a steadfast partner in the fight against terrorism. Our shared priorities include security, governance, economic development, and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I will continue our deep cooperation in Africa with France. I will engage the French on our priorities in West and Central Africa, encouraging them to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural influence toward

long-term stability in these regions. I will work within our interagency to support French efforts when mutually beneficial.

*Question.* How can the United States better coordinate with France to holistically address security threats and improve diplomatic engagements in the Sahel and West and Central Africa from a holistic perspective?

*Answer.* Both France and the United States share security, governance, economic development, and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic as priorities in the Sahel and West and Central Africa. These priorities cannot be achieved independent of one another. If confirmed, I will work strategically and tactically with the French to ensure that our efforts are mutually supportive and reinforcing. I will encourage the French to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural influence to promote the political, security, and democratic reforms that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions, and work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned with ours.

*Question.* How can the United States better coordinate and collaborate with the European Union, as well as individual European governments such as the U.K., to enhance policy consistency and advance mutually-beneficial opportunities for trade, investment, development, and security cooperation with the African Union, regional bodies, African governments, and private sector partners?

*Answer.* The EU and European governments are crucial partners of the United States to advance prosperity and security in Africa. On June 12, President Biden and G7 leaders agreed to launch a global infrastructure initiative called Build Back Better World that will mobilize private sector capital in four areas of focus—climate, health and health security, digital technology and gender equity and equality. The scope of this initiative will include Africa, as well as Latin America, the Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. The June 15 U.S.-EU Summit Joint Statement confirmed that the United States and the EU are committed to peace and sustainable development in Africa, and plan to provide support for a sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic. U.S.-EU cooperation resulted in the U.N. Human Rights Council's July 13 decision to adopt an EU-led and U.S.-cosponsored resolution on the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and to defeat hostile amendments. If confirmed, I will work collaboratively with our European partners to continue our cooperation.

*Question.* Russian malign activity in Africa is increasingly a growing concern, particularly given credible reports of elections interference across the continent and deployment of Russian mercenaries, including through the Wagner Group in Northern Mozambique and through nontransparent transfers of weapons and training via Russian security sector support to the Touadera Administration in the Central African Republic (CAR). From your perspective, how can the Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs coordinate to more effectively counter the malign activities and influence of Russia in Africa generally and, more specifically, of Yevgeny Prigozhin and affiliated mining and security companies (like the Wagner Group) in Africa?

*Answer.* Russian harmful activity in Africa is a matter of grave and growing concern. The use of proxies like Prigozhin's enterprise in the Central African Republic and elsewhere is a particular threat to stability, good governance, and human rights on the continent. I know the Bureaus of European and Eurasian and African Affairs are already working in close coordination on this issue, something I would seek to continue and build upon if confirmed. I would also prioritize collaboration with our European Allies and partners on this issue, as they too are invested in the future of the African continent, directly and via various U.N. programs. The UK and EU have already designated Prigozhin for sanctions, a clear signal that they also take this threat seriously.

*Question.* There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters housed at various detention facilities around the world. This includes at least 2,000 foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) characterizes as "hardcore foreign terrorist fighters." Many of these FTFs are housed at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, like al Hol in northeastern Syria. The al-Hol IDP camp has become fertile ground for ISIS recruitment of vulnerable populations, posing a serious risk to global security. Despite this risk, countries with foreign terrorist fighters have failed to make any progress to date towards repatriating their nationals. Can you commit to using all tools at your disposal to press the Europe and Eurasia region to repatriate nationals from camps for ISIS fighters and affiliates in northeast Syria?

*Answer.* Yes. If confirmed, I intend to encourage countries to repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, including foreign terrorist fighters and associated fam-

ily members, and to prosecute them, as appropriate. As I understand it, the Department holds that repatriation—followed by appropriate prosecution in domestic courts of law—is the best way to keep these fighters off the battlefield and hold them accountable for their crimes. If confirmed, I will also support repatriation of associated family members as a means to rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals into their local communities, as appropriate.

*Question.* How do you plan to engage with EUR countries to advance repatriation efforts, which remains a critical to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I intend to continue our consistent diplomatic outreach to European and Eurasian countries urging them to repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria. I will collaborate with the interagency in their work to support countries' efforts to repatriate their nationals with logistical and planning assistance for repatriations, including the use of U.S. Government assets to transport foreign fighters and associated family members out of the region.

*Question.* United Nations humanitarian assistance program in Syria relies on the border crossings from Turkey to deliver aid to millions of Syrians. Although Russia held off from vetoing the renewal of the last remaining border crossing, it will need to be renewed in December. In the event all border crossings between Turkey and Syria close, what alternatives do we have to get aid to the Syrian people? How could we pressure the Assad regime and Russia to provide aid in our stead?

*Answer.* The United States led a successful diplomatic campaign to overcome Russian opposition and renew the U.N. Security Council's mandate authorizing cross-border humanitarian assistance from Turkey into Syria. I continue to believe that cross-line assistance alone cannot meet existing humanitarian needs, which is why extending the cross-border mandate at Bab al-Hawa for another year was so important. If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to move forward on a political solution in line with U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and continued engagement between the United States, Russia, Turkey, and other key players in Syria.

*Question.* In your assessment, what are the top five most pressing challenges the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to both the United States and Europe?

*Answer.* The most pressing challenge posed by the PRC is its attempt to undermine the rules-based international order, including the multi-lateral U.N. system. If confirmed, I will stand up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. I will work to support Taiwan, a leading democracy and essential partner, in keeping with U.S. commitments. I will make it a priority to support efforts to ensure supply chains for critical supplies are secure and free of forced labor. I will work with Allies and partners to defend access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation under international law. And finally, if confirmed, I will work with Congress and Allies to confront Beijing's coercive economic practices, unfair and illegal trade practices, and cyber theft.

*Question.* What are the areas that the United States and EU have the most opportunity to work together on mutual challenges posed by the PRC, and which areas still require regulatory reform (either U.S. or EU) to better facilitate cooperation?

*Answer.* The United States and EU intend to closely consult and cooperate on the challenges posed by China, including through the U.S.-EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. It is important that the United States and EU work together to confront Beijing on the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang and human rights abuses in Tibet and Hong Kong, protect freedom of navigation in the East and South China Seas, and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I will work with the EU to promote an open, free, secure, and reliable digital space and, along with likeminded partners around the world, work to ensure the rules governing tomorrow's technology are based in democratic values.

*Question.* How do you view Europe's attempts at strategic autonomy, and what challenges does it pose to U.S. cooperation with Europe on issues related to the PRC?

*Answer.* We welcome efforts of our Allies and partners to strengthen their capacity and capabilities, but it is important that these efforts be compatible with our alliances and contribute to Transatlantic security. Together, the United States and its Allies and partners set the global rules of the road, and we must continue to do so. If confirmed, I will seek to resolve difficult issues with our European Allies and partners while safeguarding U.S. interests and ensuring a level playing field for U.S. companies. As Secretary Blinken has noted, the United States will be much more effective in engaging the PRC when we do so with our Allies and partners.

*Question.* The United Kingdom has previously joined U.S. freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea, and France recently announced it would set up a coast guard network with the Pacific Island nations to deter predatory and coercive behavior. What other opportunities are there for the European countries to increase their presence in the Indo-Pacific?

*Answer.* The Biden Administration supports robust engagement by European counterparts in the Indo-Pacific. Some European countries, including Germany and the Netherlands, have published Indo-Pacific strategies, and EU member states have tasked the European Commission and European External Action Service to release an Indo-Pacific strategy by September. The United States supports the UK's "Indo-Pacific Tilt" to the region and its ongoing deployment of the UK-led Aircraft Carrier Strike Group 21 which plans to transit through the South China Sea. If confirmed, I plan to support ongoing efforts by the EU and European counterparts to direct more diplomatic, military, economic, and other resources to the region.

*Question.* In my China-Europe report published last fall, I discuss the importance of overcoming barriers to U.S.-Europe technology cooperation to counter Chinese technology supremacy, including working through competing regulatory approaches on joint-R&D, data transfer, and privacy shields. What steps do the U.S. and Europe each need to take with respect to technology regulations, and what do you see as the hardest obstacles to overcome in this area?

*Answer.* President Biden and his EU counterparts established the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council as a forum to demonstrate to the world how democratic approaches to trade, technology, and innovation can improve the lives of our citizens and counter authoritarian influence in the digital realm. Discussions on an enhanced Privacy Shield framework also underscore our shared commitment to privacy, data protection, and the rule of law; our mutual recognition of the importance of transatlantic data flows to our respective citizens, economies, and societies; and our common interest in aligning against the growing government surveillance ambitions of authoritarian states. If confirmed, I will work to deepen cooperation in these important areas.

*Question.* The latest EU strategy on China mentions "the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan strait." What should the EU do to better support Taiwan in light of an increasingly aggressive PRC?

*Answer.* Taiwan is a leading democracy, a critical U.S. security and economic partner, and a key U.S. partner in addressing shared global challenges. The United States continues to encourage European allies and partners to engage and publicly support Taiwan. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will support the Administration's efforts to support Taiwan and encourage our European Allies and partners to do the same.

*Question.* My China-Europe report, published last fall, covers the growing presence of PRC companies in building undersea cables. The previous administration focused on this issue through its Clean Cable initiative, and by providing financing for specific cable projects in the Indo-Pacific. A PRC company—Huawei Marine (now called HMN Technologies)—is currently constructing an undersea cable that terminates in Marseilles, France. Please describe your understanding of PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications and risks for U.S. and allied interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this area of technology if you are confirmed?

*Answer.* As with 5G networks, the Biden administration views the security of commercial undersea communications cables as a high priority. The secure development and deployment of undersea cables and related infrastructure in both developed and developing economies is of critical concern to the United States. Countries and citizens need to be able to trust that such equipment will not introduce risks that threaten national security, personal privacy, or human rights. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging on this topic with our European allies and partners to promote open, interoperable, reliable, and secure information and communications technology infrastructure.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO  
DR.KAREN DONFRIED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

*Question.* Support for Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights: Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance, which begins with fighting corruption and must continue to be a priority of U.S. policy.

- What more can we do to further these efforts with our European partners, especially on the battle against corruption?

*Answer.* The United States will continue to work with European partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in corruption; combat money-laundering; and stem foreign bribery. If confirmed, I will support the OSCE's work to help participating States create robust anti-money laundering regimes, a solid ethics infrastructure, and sound financial and resource management.

*Question.* How can we better work within the OSCE to address these issues?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would also encourage the OSCE to take a cross-dimensional approach to anticorruption that focuses on building the capacity of law enforcement, strengthening legal frameworks, and defending members of civil society and the media which expose corruption.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

*Question.* Somalia: As you are aware, the Trump administration ended our troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.

- If confirmed, what actions will you take to support a sustainable political transition in Somalia?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I am committed to supporting Somali efforts to complete a timely, peaceful, and transparent electoral process, which is vital for the advancement of political reconciliation and governance, security, and economic reforms. I am prepared to engage with Somali leaders to ensure they follow through with their commitments with respect to the electoral and government formation processes. I also will coordinate closely with other international partners to ensure consistent policies and messages, and to discourage efforts that could exacerbate political tensions or disrupt a political transition.

*Question.* In what specific areas should the United States focus security assistance in Somalia going forward? Are there lessons learned from long running security assistance programs that you believe could be better applied?

*Answer.* The United States supports efforts to advance peace and security in Somalia with a wide range of activities. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing State Department-administered security assistance programs in Somalia to ensure they are effectively and efficiently advancing our policy goals. If confirmed, I will prioritize close coordination with regional and international partners in the security sector, accountability of U.S. security assistance, and mentorship and training of partnered forces.

Lessons learned applicable to Somalia include biometric enrollment of Somalia National Army (SNA) forces receiving U.S. support, sustained mentorship and training of SNA and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces and the introduction of clear accountability procedures for U.S. assistance when transferred to partners. With regard to lessons learned on mentoring, U.S. security assistance monitoring has identified that the SNA-Danab program improved by recruiting for clan appropriate battalions, increasing the recruitment of women, and ensuring the Federal Government of Somalia and its Member States agree to both support SNA-Danab. Over time, the results have demonstrated increased unit cohesion and pride, successful joint operations with the AU Mission in Somalia Forces, and lower instances of desertion.

*Somalia*

*Question.* As you are aware, the Trump administration ended our troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.

- If confirmed, how will you work to better manage the sometimes of unhelpful engagement of outside actors in Somalia, including neighboring states and countries from the Middle East like Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar? If confirmed, how do you plan to engage the Bureau of Near East Affairs on issues relate to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Corridor?

Answer. The United States has close and constructive relations with many of the external actors engaged in Somalia, including the Gulf states, Turkey, and some of Somalia's neighbors. If confirmed, I would collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to employ U.S. influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to engage strategically to promote long-term security and stability in Somalia specifically and the Horn of Africa more broadly.

#### *Nigeria*

*Question.* Poor governance and leadership have prevented Nigeria from reaching its full potential. Endemic corruption remains a challenge. There is little accountability for extrajudicial killings by security forces. ISIS West Africa Province remains a potent force in the northeast, and, intercommunal violence and banditry plague various parts of the country.

- If confirmed, how will you engage with the Nigerian Government on these challenges?

Answer. The United States has a strong and enduring relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy and economy. Nigeria's stability and economic growth can advance our mutual prosperity as well as that of West Africa and the broader continent. If confirmed, I will continue to raise the profile of our engagement with Nigerian leaders to advance our national security priorities and strengthen our collaboration to address security, economic, and governance challenges. Working with other State Department bureaus and U.S. Government agencies, I will support our investments in training Nigerian security forces to build their effectiveness in fighting common threats and serving the Nigerian people, increase accountability for military or police personnel who commit human rights violations and abuses, and strengthen security forces coordination. Working across the U.S. interagency and in partnership with Nigeria's new Ambassador to the United States as well as civil society stakeholders and the Nigerian diaspora, I will undertake a holistic approach to our bilateral relationship that emphasizes shared values and candid dialogue. Through the annual Bi-National Commission and in other bilateral and multilateral meetings and fora, I will engage actively with Nigerian leaders within and beyond government to champion the strengthening of democratic institutions, diversification of its economy, and pursuit of important reforms.

*Question.* Do you commit to working with the committee to develop a coherent framework in which to provide security assistance before moving forward with additional arms sales and security assistance programs in Nigeria?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to actively reinforce the importance of civilian protection, and respect for human rights in all elements of our security assistance to Nigeria. I will urge the Nigerian Government to hold security force elements accountable for human rights abuses and violations. To help Nigeria reduce the risk of civilian harm, I will support a combination of legal training and advising to provide stronger underpinnings for the Nigerian military and police to address systematic human rights concerns, develop a professional process for military justice and police accountability, and develop more disciplined security forces.

Arms sales and security assistance programs in Nigeria help bring about incremental institutional reform. I will seek to combine military and law enforcement capability sales with comprehensive training and maintenance programs. Our goal, which the Nigerian Government supports, is greater professionalism of Nigerian security services. Recent improvements demonstrate that Nigeria is a willing security partner, making needed investments and security sector institutional reforms that will bring lasting results in combatting a variety of security challenges.

*Question.* If confirmed, what new, innovative approaches will you recommend that administration take to mitigate conflict, stop human rights abuses, counterbalance Russian influence, and help the people of CAR achieve a stable democracy?

Answer. The United States supports CAR's efforts to develop strong institutions and strengthen the rule of law through capacity building and technical assistance. If confirmed, I will work to increase coordination within the Department of State, across the U.S. Government, and with likeminded partners such as the European Union and France to ensure our efforts are aligned and mutually supportive to strengthen the CAR Government's ability to mitigate conflict, stop human rights

abuses and violations, hold those responsible for such actions accountable, and help the country achieve a stable democracy that does not require the support of dubious external actors. Specifically, to counterbalance Russia's influence, I will pursue opportunities to stand up to negative Russian behavior.

*Question.* As the U.S. engages to strengthen accountability, security, and inclusiveness, will you commit to supporting processes and institutions, rather than a specific individual or leader?

*Answer.* Yes. Across administrations, the United States has worked to advance democracy and human rights in the DRC, prevent conflict, and promote economic development. If confirmed, I will work with the DRC Government and our civil society partners, as well as our partners in the region and at the United Nations, to promote political, economic, and security reforms.

The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms. I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. I will also work with our partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt actors with all tools at our disposal.

*Question.* What actions should the administration be taking right now to help support a credible presidential election in 2023, and what specific steps do you plan to take if confirmed to support credible elections?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also continue to work with this committee on issues related to the 2023 elections. Appreciating your longstanding interest in this issue, I will work with you to ensure we take your views on board in advance, and that we have the appropriate resources in place to help our Congolese partners with this important task.

### *Zimbabwe*

*Question.* U.S. policy regarding Zimbabwe has been largely consistent across recent administrations, including the rigorous implementation of ZDERA and other sanctions. Yet the Zimbabwean Government of today is no less authoritarian and corrupt than it was under former president Robert Mugabe.

- If confirmed, how will you approach U.S.-Zimbabwe relations?

*Answer.* I share the committee's deep concern over the Government of Zimbabwe's authoritarian and corrupt practices, including the targeting of opposition political figures, journalists, and members of civil society through harassment, arrests, and detentions. I appreciate the willingness of this committee to publicly call out repression by the Zimbabwe Government. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S. Embassy in Harare issue condemnations when appropriate and publicly voice our support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak out against government corruption and abuses.

The United States supports democratic governance programs that improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes.

But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the situation in Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights. If confirmed, I will also work with our interagency partners to mobilize our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those individuals who are currently active in corruption and human rights abuses.

*Question.* Is it time to rethink our Zimbabwe policy, in your view?

*Answer.* We should continually examine our policy towards Zimbabwe to ensure that it is timely and effective. The United States currently employs a blend of programs and strategies in Zimbabwe to strengthen democratic institutions, promote equitable economic growth, boost public health, and improve food security for the

benefit of the Zimbabwean people. If confirmed, I will review these programs and strategies.

If confirmed, I will be guided by the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act in our efforts to press the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, basic freedoms, and human rights, and to support those citizens who seek to build an open and accountable system. I also will work with this committee, likeminded partners, and subject matter experts within civil society to examine ways to ensure that our policy towards Zimbabwe is relevant and effective.

*Question.* What new measures should the U.S. pursue in advancing democracy and human rights in Uganda?

Answer. This year's flawed elections in Uganda underscored the continuing deterioration of both Uganda's democracy and respect and support for human rights and freedoms. Helping the Ugandan people reverse this trend will take new ideas and increased engagement with Ugandan leaders and the country's beleaguered civil society. If confirmed, I will assess what more the United States can do to promote democracy, human rights, and accountability in Uganda and seek to develop options for advancing these goals and objectives.

*Question.* Given democratic and human rights deficits in Uganda, what will you recommend if confirmed, relative to continued cooperation with the Museveni regime on regional security matters?

Answer. Uganda plays an important role in supporting regional security and counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and elsewhere in the region. During deployments, Ugandan units have been among the most capable and professional in regional missions. The conduct of specific Ugandan troops at home, however, is of concern. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. policy in Uganda appropriately reflects the centrality of democracy and respect for human rights called for by President Biden. In addition to working with the African Union (AU), the United Nations (U.N.), and the Government of Uganda to ensure that personnel are properly vetted, follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect human rights, I support working with the AU and the U.N. to identify potential new troop contributors that would reduce AMISOM's reliance on forces that may be implicated in human rights abuses. There is also a need to engage the AU and the U.N. in a timely and credible process to identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be implicated in human rights abuses.

*Question.* How serious is the new leadership in Tanzania about pursuing genuine political reform?

Answer. President Hassan has taken some encouraging steps in the early days of her administration. These include significant revisions to Tanzania's approach on COVID-19, reengagement with the international community, and overtures to the business community suggesting greater openness to foreign investment. Her initial outreach to opposition political parties and civil society organizations was welcome but needs to be accompanied by significant democratic and human rights reforms. The arrest of leading opposition politicians on July 20 was gravely concerning. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. engagement in Tanzania to encourage rule of law, good governance, political pluralism, and people's freedom to exercise their rights without fear of harassment.

*Question.* What steps will you take if confirmed to incentivize the new Tanzanian leadership to repair the damage of the Magufuli era, both in terms of political reform at home, and Tanzania-U.S. bilateral relations?

Answer. The new Tanzanian leadership has been much more receptive to engagement with both Embassy Dar es Salaam and senior Department of State officials. Such engagement has already contributed to the Hassan administration's increasingly positive steps with regard to its COVID-19 policy. If confirmed, I would work with Embassy leadership to continue to highlight to the Tanzanian Government the additional, potential benefits of closer cooperation with the United States, including renewed support for the country's development and economic recovery efforts. At the same time, I would underscore the democratic and economic reforms that would be required on the part of the Tanzanian Government in order to attain such support and repair in full the Tanzania-U.S. bilateral relationship.

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

*Question.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, what specific actions will you take to meet the administration’s stated goal of prioritizing Africa?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I intend to engage respectfully with African partners to meet global challenges—including security, global health, climate change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. You would see greater attention to our relationships with African states and publics, with regional institutions like the African Union, and with the African bloc in international organizations.

If confirmed, I look forward to participating in an interagency policy process as the Biden-Harris administration develops a fresh U.S. strategy for Africa that enumerates our national interests in Africa and develops operational actions to advance them, guided by the priorities of this committee. Responding to President Biden’s direction, I would highlight the role of democracy and human rights and add a new emphasis on anti-corruption. Without good governance, African states will not be well-positioned to expand peace and security and manage the threats posed by terrorism and migration. I will ensure that we work with our African partners to mitigate and adapt to climate change. I will support programs that promote two-way trade and investment to create opportunities for African youth that benefit workers there and here. In line with this committee’s direction, I will work to advance an affirmative agenda rooted in our values and our longstanding investments in development, security and people to prevail in the strategic competition with China. In this effort, we will seek to expand our partnership with Europe and other likeminded nations to reinforce our collective impact.

I will also capitalize on our soft power—engaging with youth, encouraging education opportunities, and engaging the diaspora. Finally, I will join the U.S. Government campaign to help Africa mitigate the negative impacts of the COVID–19 pandemic.

*Question.* What changes in U.S. posture toward Africa are needed to demonstrate to our African partners that “Africa is a priority”?

*Answer.* We need to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement across the Continent. As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 testimony before this committee, senior-level engagement on a consistent basis will be one important way to demonstrate our commitment. Showing up and showing respect is important. Consistent with our values, we must champion leaders seeking positive change and hold others to account. This approach means reinvigorating our focus on human rights, transparency and accountability, and the fight against corruption which are essential for stability and economic growth. Expanding trade and investment, tackling climate change, and responding to COVID–19 are all shared priorities between the United States and African nations. If confirmed, I will support diplomacy that translates this rhetoric into action.

*Question.* What specific policies and strategies will you pursue to ensure that you and the Bureau of African Affairs are meeting what you’ve indicated as “President Biden’s agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement with African governments, institutions . . . [and] African publics”? What changes, if any, are needed within the Bureau of African Affairs to ensure they are best prepared to carry out this vision?

*Answer.* As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 hearing before this committee, the United States has engaged African countries as partners in pursuing our shared interests and values—including security, global health, climate change, freedom and democracy, and shared prosperity. Expanded senior-level engagement on a consistent basis will be one important way to demonstrate our commitment. If confirmed, I will actively support engagement through senior-level visits to Africa, increased consultations with the African Union and African regional organizations, initiatives and economic opportunities to harness the innovation and energy of Africa’s youth, university partnerships and training opportunities, and active engagement with the African diaspora here in the United States, to name a few. If confirmed, I will closely review the Africa Bureau’s organization, management, staffing, and budget to align our resources to support execution of this vision.

*Question.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by qualified, experience nominees in a timely manner?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Secretary Blinken to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.

*Question.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that first-time career ambassadorial nominees will not be the first choice when identifying nominees for high-profile and strategic U.S. missions in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Answer. The Department of State has a robust process for choosing Chiefs of Mission. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the Secretary and other Department leadership to ensure that we identify highly qualified individuals for every one of these positions in the Bureau of African Affairs.

*Question.* Under your leadership as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently staffed?

Answer. I recognize that the Africa Bureau is chronically understaffed, both in numbers of assigned positions and vacancies in those positions. If confirmed, I will personally prioritize personnel and allocate additional resources to support that effort. I am committed to an inclusive workplace and will build on the Bureau's progress to date in implementing management reforms designed to support diversity in recruitment, hiring, and retention. Other actions I intend to pursue include reviewing staffing levels across the continent with the goal of aligning staffing to our most pressing national interests; exploring options for enhancing incentives for service at hardship posts; and attending to morale and reinvigorating the sense of public service that attracts professionals devoted to making a difference for the United States in Africa.

*Question.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, how will you ensure that the Bureau of African Affairs has the requisite capacity, including sufficient number of trained contract officers and staff, to ensure that it can implement, monitor, and conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I will start by reviewing existing capacity within the Bureau of African Affairs in order to identify any necessary increases in resources necessary to appropriately implement, monitor, and conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs. I will work with the leadership of the Department of State to secure required support. I also commit to working with the committee toward our shared goal of improving the effectiveness, transparency, and oversight of TSCTP. The Africa Bureau has already made a number of changes to respond to the OIG's recommendations. These include, but are not limited to, establishing a TSCTP secretariat to facilitate coordination and implementing best practices around procurement, management, and oversight of AF-funded TSCTP programs. If confirmed, I will review the TSCTP and consult with the committee to ensure we have the appropriate resources, authorities, flexibility, and management controls in place to meet shared objectives for this important program.

*Question.* How can the Department of State, in coordination with other relevant departments and agencies, support our African partners to manage the activities and impacts better of armed groups on populations, economies and governance?

Answer. Tailored U.S. diplomatic, development, and human rights-sensitive security assistance can play a critical role to support peace and security. While security cooperation is necessary, it is not sufficient to address the drivers of violence and extremism. Sustainable gains—whether governance, security, or economic—require a holistic approach across our government and in coordination with African and other partners. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Department of Defense, USAID, other U.S. Government agencies, and our allies and partners to support African efforts to reduce the activities of armed groups and support policies and programs that build democratic governance structures that respect human rights and deliver liberty and prosperity.

*Question.* How can the Department of State better address the cross-border movement of armed groups, including through the development and execution of regional approaches?

Answer. Armed groups and illicit traffickers exploit weak border controls and inadequate surveillance but also often benefit from assistance or indifference from border communities that often are underserved by governance, administration, security, and economic opportunities offered by regional and national governments. Addressing cross-border movement of armed groups requires holistic approaches and regional cooperation and information-sharing. Working with partners to build profes-

sional, capable, and accountable security and intelligence services to monitor and secure often vast and porous borders must complement rather than replace efforts to provide stability and economic opportunities to vulnerable communities along borders. The Department of State and our embassies across Africa are committed to leverage our influence and diplomatic engagements to promote cross-border collaboration, exercises, information sharing, and coordination among security sector and civilian entities from neighboring and regional states to develop improved cross-border protocols, relationships, and operational effectiveness. Programmatically, the Africa Bureau is reinvigorating the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa Counterterrorism (PRACT) in part to strategically identify resources and expertise to address these issues and support regional and sub-regional efforts in West and East Africa to increase border management and security.

*Question.* What are your views on the role trade and investment could and should play in building stronger ties between the United States and the African continent? How should U.S.-Africa trade and investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter China in Africa?

*Answer.* We need to do more to boost trade and investment. We want to be partners in creating responsible and sustainable trade and investment that secures good livelihoods for both Africans and Americans. If confirmed, I will advocate for U.S. companies that provide the world class products, technology, and services that Africans seek to grow their economies. I commit to working with interagency partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government to support this effort and meet the challenges posed by China. The positive economic contributions to Africa that U.S. companies bring—robust training, capital, and high labor and environmental standards—are our best way to compete with strategic competitors such as China.

*Question.* How can the U.S. Government better promote African countries as destinations for U.S. private sector foreign investment? How can the U.S. improve access for African firms seeking to do business here? How can we best engage the U.S. African diaspora?

*Answer.* As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 testimony to this committee, the United States, using our economic diplomacy and the tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and Treasury, will work with the U.S. private sector, African Governments, and international financial institutions to increase trade and investment in Africa and promote U.S. business. If confirmed, I will ensure our Embassy Deal Teams in Africa prioritize trade and investment opportunities, as well as business climate reforms that can provide a strong foundation for economic growth more generally. I will make full use of all U.S. Government tools, including through Prosper Africa, to bring opportunities to the attention of the private sector. If confirmed, I will make full use of USAID's programs to help African firms utilize the preferential access provided by the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. Likewise, I want to ensure we are making full use of the SelectUSA program at the Department of Commerce to promote the United States as an investment destination for African investors. I agree that we need to work robustly to tap the dynamic African diaspora in the United States as a partner in promoting greater two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa. If confirmed, I will promote active outreach to diaspora organizations as a vital piece of our engagement.

*Question.* How can the U.S. Government most effectively support efforts to improve the enabling environment for competitive foreign investment by U.S. firms in Africa? What types of partnerships work best, and how can the U.S. best incentivize reforms and other actions necessary to foster economic opportunity and expand two-way trade and investment with the African continent?

*Answer.* The Prosper Africa initiative can play an important role in ensuring effective coordination of U.S. Government assistance to improve investment and business climates toward the overall goal of expanding trade and investment. U.S. Government programming needs to be targeted at areas where there is strong host country will to reform. I believe there is potential to do more in partnership with our private sector, particularly in the technology area, to incentivize governments to implement needed reforms, given our firms generally have a clear sense of what needs to be done. Successful partnerships require clear goals and expectations. I noted in my testimony the importance of greater efforts on governance, human rights, and anti-corruption. I see these areas as vital components of work to build sound, prosperous economies, and to attract needed investment. If confirmed, I will also support our soft power efforts—engaging with youth and encouraging educational opportunities, that amplify our good governance messaging.

*Question.* Do you agree that countries like Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Somalia are unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper Africa?

Answer. I agree that Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Somalia are currently unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper Africa. I also believe we should support U.S. businesses and investors across Africa wherever possible when they see opportunities for increased trade and investment.

*Question.* If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa be a priority?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, I will prioritize reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa.

*Question.* If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that messaging from the Bureau of African Affairs and its embassies and leadership consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values and interests, including the need to respect democratic institutions and norms, advance human and political rights, and enhance citizen responsive governance?

Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary I commit to ensuring that messaging from the Bureau of African Affairs and its embassies and leadership consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values and interests.

*Question.* If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to ensure that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various points of leverage and capability the United States and France each bring to the table?

Answer. Given its colonial history, France has significant ties in the Sahel and West and Central Africa and concerns about the direct threats posed to Europe from migration and terrorism. Our shared priorities include promoting improved security, governance, economic development, and recovery from COVID-19. France has been a steadfast partner in the fight against Islamic State-Western Sahara (IS-WI) and Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). If confirmed, in line with President Biden's direction to revitalize partnerships with key allies, I will act to sustain and build on the historic strong coordination between the United States and France, aligning our respective comparative advantages to holistically address the security and governance challenges across the region.

*Question.* How can the U.S. better coordinate with France in Africa to holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic engagements, particularly in the Sahel and West and Central Africa, from a holistic perspective?

Answer. Both France and the United States share security, governance, and economic development as priorities in the Sahel and West and Central Africa. These priorities cannot be achieved independent of one another. If confirmed, I will encourage the French to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural influence toward African political, security, and democratic reforms that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions, and work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned with ours. The United States and France regularly coordinate on issues of mutual concern and, if confirmed, I commit to working with France and our other allies and partners in Europe, including the EU, to holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic engagement across the continent. Specifically, I see continued areas for improved coordination with our French partners in the Sahel and towards resolving the crisis in Cameroon. As your report on U.S.-European cooperation noted, the significant demographic and economic shifts underway across the African continent requires a strong transatlantic alliance, in coordination with our African partners, to collaborate on countering malign influence, and promoting the growth of healthier, more stable, democratic societies that share our values and interests.

*Question.* Political and ethnic tensions and violence in Burundi have contributed to instability, human rights abuses, and humanitarian crises in central Africa's Great Lakes region for decades. On June 9, 2020, the government of Burundi announced that sitting President Pierre Nkurunziza (age 55) died suddenly of "cardiac arrest," two and a half months before he was expected to step down following general elections on May 20, 2020. Nkurunziza's elected successor, CNDD-FDD party head Evariste Ndayishimiye, was inaugurated in late August, after the constitutional court upheld his victory with 68% of the vote in the May 2020 elections. How optimistic are you about deepening ties with the new Burundian administration under President Ndayishimiye?

Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the approach of President Ndayishimiye's administration and will review Burundi's progress.

*Question.* Do you feel that upgrading Burundi's ranking in the State Department's 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watch List was warranted based on an objective assessment of progress made in Burundi on TIP issues?

*Answer.* I understand that Burundi's 2021 Trafficking in Persons ranking as Tier 2 Watch List is based on the Burundian Government's overall increasing effort to counter trafficking in persons. This effort included increasing investigations and prosecutions of suspected trafficking offenses, convicting traffickers, and referring victims to assistance. The Government also developed and implemented the country's first-ever national data collection system on law enforcement's efforts to combat human trafficking and trained officials on its use. If confirmed, I will commit to working with Burundi to ensure it continues to prioritize countering trafficking in persons.

*Question.* What additional tools does the United States have at its disposal to encourage a peaceful and enduring resolution to the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon?

*Answer.* On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. Secretary Blinken's decision to restrict the visas of individuals responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is a concrete example of options the Department of State can exercise to push for peace and dialogue. If confirmed, my focus would be to continue urging all parties to end violence and to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's effort to advance mediation between the Government and separatist armed group leaders and encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move this effort forward. I will also review the different tools we have to hold human rights violators accountable, including sanctions, and continue the practice of reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis. I will continue to pursue engagement with France, other likeminded partners, and U.N. Security Council member states to find ways to promote a peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence.

*Question.* How can the United States more effectively encourage France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the Government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the conflict?

*Answer.* The United States and France share an interest in stability and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa and meet regularly to discuss how to advance those priorities, including the critical effort to press the parties in Cameroon to pursue an inclusive and constructive path toward peace and stability. Secretary Blinken regularly consults with his counterpart French Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian. If confirmed, I will support ongoing U.S. engagement with France, a key partner in Cameroon, as well as with the UK, the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and other allies, to align our efforts in support of dialogue to resolve the Anglophone conflict.

*Question.* How is the Department mobilizing other partners to assist Cameroon to find peace and justice, and how do you plan to lead such an effort once in-country?

*Answer.* The United States regularly engages allies and U.N. Security Council member states at the highest level regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to strongly engage with France, which is key in this process, the UK, the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and other key allies both bilaterally and in multilateral fora to find ways to work together to achieve tangible progress towards peace. If confirmed, I will also make clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to advance mediation between the Government and separatist armed group leaders and encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move this effort forward. The Department of State can support the likeminded countries' effort to support the Swiss Process through coordinated actions and messaging. The process of working with our allies and NGO partners is a regular on-going effort, which I will continue with focus and vigor.

*Question.* What is your perspective on the performance of the Tshisekedi administration to date?

*Answer.* The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility. The recent inauguration of a new

cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining sector and security apparatus.

*Question.* Is it your assessment that the Tshisekedi administration is in a position to continue to advance reforms, including in the areas of anti-corruption and in the security and mining sectors?

*Answer.* The United States supports President Tshisekedi's and the Government's goal of building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility. The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will work with our partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt actors with all tools at our disposal. I will also urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining sector and security apparatus. The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence, including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and human rights abuses and violations to account. If confirmed, I will urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with the U.N. Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in support of the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.

*Question.* In your view, how can the United States continue to support democratic reforms in the DRC, including by enhancing prospects for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2023?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be credible, the 2023 elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. Knowing of your longstanding interest in this issue, I will work with you to ensure we take your views on board in advance, and that we have the appropriate resources in place to help our Congolese partners with this important task.

*Question.* If confirmed, how will you work with Congress and USAID to ensure the \$700 million is programmed efficiently and effectively to support Sudan's ongoing transition?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will stress the importance of timely consultations with Congress by the Africa Bureau and our USAID colleagues on the utilization and effective programming of these appropriated funds. I will also ensure we consult closely with Sudan's civilian led transitional government to ensure these new resources will assist the government to meet the urgent needs of the Sudanese people at this moment in the transition, and to support efforts related to human rights and accountability, conflict mitigation, and democracy and governance, especially in support of marginalized communities long shut out from having a voice in determining Sudan's future.

*Question.* If confirmed, do you commit to work with Congress to ensure the \$700 million is programmed appropriately?

*Answer.* Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress on the programming of these funds, working closely with USAID to ensure that funds are used appropriately and effectively in support of Sudan's transition.

*Question.* Given that the United States is a significant stakeholder in ensuring that South Sudan achieves sustainable peace and development, what diplomatic investments would you make as Secretary of State bilaterally, regionally, and with multi-lateral institutions?

*Answer.* Expedited progress on the integration of security forces, anti-corruption, transitional justice, and a permanent constitutional process leading to post-transitional elections is key to achieving sustainable peace and development in South

Sudan. If confirmed, I will make clear to South Sudan's leaders our serious concerns about delays in implementation of commitments in these areas and look for opportunities to increase pressure on those officials responsible for such delays. I would also invigorate the use of all available diplomatic and development tools to provide support to South Sudanese civil society and non-governmental organizations seeking positive change. Additionally, I would consult with regional and international partners to review critically and comprehensively our current approach towards South Sudan. I intend to collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has the necessary resources and mandate to support accelerated implementation of South Sudan's peace process. Finally, I would continue to prioritize diplomatic efforts to press South Sudan's leaders to do more to facilitate the unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan, to ensure the safety of humanitarian workers in the country, and to hold accountable those responsible for growing violence against humanitarian organizations.

*Question.* What is your perspective on the ongoing U.S. assistance review, announced in 2018, for South Sudan? If confirmed, how would you support a timely conclusion to the assistance review and enable action on its findings?

*Answer.* I understand the Biden-Harris administration continues to evaluate the findings of the assistance review in South Sudan conducted under the last administration to ensure that programs are being implemented efficiently and are consistent with our objectives. If confirmed, I would work to continue this process and ensure that programs are strategic, effective and have adequate oversight. The United States Government continues to work to maximize the impact of our humanitarian assistance in South Sudan and mitigate risks of diversion or obstruction of aid or perpetuation of kleptocratic governance.

*Question.* How would you take a fresh look at U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs?

*Answer.* A stable and prosperous Horn of Africa is critical to U.S. economic and security interests. The external actors who are most engaged in the Horn are U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to employ U.S. influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to engage strategically to foster peace and security in the Horn—a shared goal. I will also consult with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, to review our policy, especially our engagement with regional and international partners, to hone a coherent and integrated U.S. approach.

*Question.* There is broad consensus that U.S. policy toward Somalia needs reconsideration. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?

*Answer.* The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which includes Somaliland. The United States has maintained a positive relationship with the authorities in Hargeisa and has encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland to cooperate on issues of mutual interest and to engage in constructive dialogue on questions related to Somaliland's status. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing U.S. engagement with Somaliland to ensure it effectively advances U.S. interests, including with respect to our relationship with Mogadishu.

*Question.* From your perspective, what tools (including those currently underutilized) does the United States have at its disposal that are underutilized to encourage democratic and economic reforms in Zimbabwe?

*Answer.* I share the committee's deep concern over the human rights abuses, economic mismanagement, and kleptocratic behavior that we continue to see in Zimbabwe. I appreciate this committee's condemnation of the Government of Zimbabwe's abuse of human rights and repression of its people. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S. Embassy in Harare regularly issue similar condemnations and publicly voice our support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak out against government corruption and abuses. The United States supports democratic governance programs that improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes. But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the sit-

uation in Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human rights. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners to use our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those individuals who are currently active in corruption and human rights abuses.

*Question.* An area of considerable debate has been the value of reincorporating political party programming into the portfolio of U.S. democracy assistance to Zimbabwe. Do you commit to reviewing the Department of State's posture on political party support in Zimbabwe?

*Answer.* Since the 2018 election, the Government of Zimbabwe has systematically weakened the opposition through manipulated court rulings, harassment and incarceration of key figures, and thinly veiled actions to install pliant political figures in parliament. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the Department of State's posture on political party support in Zimbabwe.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the appropriateness of Nigeria for this designation?

*Answer.* The Department is reviewing this designation as part of the annual process. That process is underway, and the Department will consider all available information. I take this issue very seriously and do not wish to prejudge the process or the Secretary's decision.

*Question.* What is your assessment of the drivers of conflict in Nigeria? How do the drivers of conflict in Nigeria differ across geographical regions?

*Answer.* Nigeria faces growing insecurity on multiple fronts, including kidnapping and banditry in the North West, insurgency from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Haram in the North East, communal violence including herder-farmer conflict in various regions, attacks by Biafran separatists in the South East, and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. The drivers of conflict are numerous and overlapping, and also vary across regions. Experts have cited the proliferation of small arms, increasing competition over land and water resources, lack of accountability and access to justice, as well as politics, ethnicity, and religion among contributing factors. Ineffective state security responses, poor governance and service delivery, endemic corruption, and lack of economic opportunity also create conditions that are ripe for conflict. The United States is partnering with Nigeria to build more effective and accountable security forces to better respond to the country's security challenges and protect civilians. The U.S. Government also helps Nigerians prevent and mitigate conflict through our diplomacy, police and justice reform programs, peacebuilding programs, early warning and early response programs, dialogue efforts, and development programs.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

*Question.* How can the United States support a peaceful resolution of Cameroon's Anglophone conflict?

*Answer.* I share your concerns about the ongoing violence in Cameroon and the conflict in the Anglophone region. If confirmed, my focus would be to continue urging all parties to end violence and to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to advance mediation between the Government and separatist armed group leaders and encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move this effort forward. I will also review the different tools we have to hold human rights violators accountable, including sanctions. I will continue to pursue engagement with France, key allies, and U.N. Security Council member states, to find ways to promote a peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence.

*Question.* How can the United States balance support for the counterterrorism campaign in the north with efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the Anglophone conflict?

*Answer.* Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic, instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining stability in the region is even more important. Since 2018, the Department has significantly reduced security assistance because the Government of Cameroon had

not taken appropriate action to investigate credible allegations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces and hold the perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I commit to continuing the practice of reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis to ensure the assistance the United States provides aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect for human rights. I will also ensure the Department vets potential recipients of security assistance, consistent with the Leahy laws, and does not provide assistance to Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.

*Question.* Would you advocate the use of sanctions on Cameroonian officials and others responsible for hindering a resolution of the Anglophone conflict?

*Question.* On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon. I understand the Department of State continues to work on expanding visa restrictions on individuals on both sides of the conflict. Secretary Blinken's decision to implement a visa restrictions policy on some of those responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is the first of many possible approaches the Department of State can take to push for peace and dialogue. It has encouraged both the UK and the EU to look at utilizing their new sanctions laws. It is yet another sign of the commitment to back up words with actions. If confirmed, I will consider all the tools at our disposal aimed at promoting a peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence which has resulted in much suffering and threatens to become even more critical day by day.

*Question.* According to the U.N., nearly 5.2 million of the Tigray region's 5.7 million people are in need of emergency food assistance, and more than 2 million have been displaced by violence. U.N. humanitarian agencies have scaled up to meet the needs of civilians in Tigray, distributing food aid to more than 1.4 million people and working to reach people with shelter, clean water, hygiene supplies, and other critical relief items and services. The U.N. is also working to identify and provide support to survivors of gender-based violence, which has been widespread during the conflict. Unfortunately, the U.N. and its partners are only able to help a fraction of the people in need because parties to the conflict—largely the Ethiopian and Eritrean militaries—continue to block humanitarian access to large parts of the region.

- How is the administration working to address this issue?

*Answer.* Intensified conflict in western Tigray and the expansion of conflict into the neighboring Afar region has effectively blocked overland access for humanitarian supplies. In light of these recent developments, the Biden-Harris administration has prioritized the establishment of direct talks between the Ethiopian Government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) with the aim of achieving a negotiated ceasefire. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey Feltman is working in close coordination with international partners to create the necessary conditions for such talks to occur. Ending hostilities is an essential component of ensuring that sufficient humanitarian supplies can reach the Tigray region. In addition, the Biden-Harris administration has taken a number of steps to press all parties to provide unhindered humanitarian access. On May 23, we put in place a visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for any current or former Ethiopian or Eritrean Government officials, members of the security forces, or other individuals—to include Amhara regional and irregular forces and members of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)—responsible for, or complicit in undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray. This includes those who have conducted wrongful violence or other abuses against people in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as those who have hindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in the region. If confirmed, I would carefully review the option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are preventing access to humanitarian assistance. It will also be important to continue to encourage our likeminded partners to support such targeted sanctions.

*Question.* What leverage or pressure points do we have with the Ethiopian Government that can be brought to bear to ensure that the U.N. and other humanitarian actors are able to access vulnerable communities?

*Answer.* Sustained diplomatic engagement with all parties to the conflict is essential to press for unhindered humanitarian access. If confirmed, I would work closely with our Ambassador, Special Envoy Feltman, and international partners to continue to make clear to the Ethiopian Government its responsibility in this regard and the impact of interference with humanitarian assistance on our bilateral rela-

tionship. The Biden-Harris administration has already ended most non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance programming to Ethiopia. The Department of State has established a visa restriction policy including on those who have hindered humanitarian access to those in the Tigray region. If confirmed, I would carefully review the option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are preventing access to humanitarian assistance.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE BY SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

*Question.* What next-level plans and programs does the United States Government have prepared to increase pressure on those who are responsible for perpetuating violence and instability in the region?

*Answer.* In addition to the visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act announced by Secretary Blinken on May 23 with regard to the issuance of visas for any current or former Ethiopian or Eritrean Government officials, members of the security forces, or other individuals-to include Amhara regional and irregular forces and members of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-responsible for, or complicit in, undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray, the Biden-Harris administration has ended most non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance programming to Ethiopia. If confirmed, I would carefully review the option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are undermining resolution of the conflict, who are engaging in human rights abuses, violations, or atrocities, or who are preventing access to humanitarian assistance. These could include Global Magnitsky designations under E.O. 13818 and a new Executive Order (E.O.) establishing a Tigray-specific sanctions regime. It will also be important to continue to encourage our likeminded partners to support such targeted sanctions. The goal of these measures is to increase pressure on all the parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights abuses and violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray region.

*Question.* What measures does the State Department intend to take to hold Prime Minister Abiy accountable for ignoring, misleading, and deflecting the international community while civilians were facing grave human rights abuses?

*Answer.* In concert with international partners, the Biden-Harris administration has consistently called out human rights abuses committed by all parties to the conflict, including the Ethiopian Government, and stressed the need for accountability. Because of concern about human rights violations, abuses, and atrocities, the Biden-Harris administration has suspended most non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance to Ethiopia and established a visa restriction policy. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the feasibility of additional measures, such as imposition of targeted Global Magnitsky sanctions and a new Executive Order establishing a Tigray-specific sanctions regime. At the United Nations, the United States played a leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security Council on July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press for additional action by the Security Council. The United States also worked with partners on the UN Human Rights Council to successfully arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes. Additionally, the Department of State is exploring support for additional documentation and associated accountability and transitional justice options that could be used to address atrocities and other abuses that have been and continue to be committed by parties to the conflict in Tigray. If confirmed, I am committed to employing U.S. leverage and influence to hold all parties to the conflict to account.

*Question.* What are our like-minded partners in Europe and elsewhere doing to help address these concerns?

*Answer.* I understand that the Department of State is working in close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded partners to increase pressure on all parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights abuses and violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray region.

The Department of State is also collaborating with international partners in an effort to open communication among the parties to the conflict with the goal of

achieving an immediate negotiated ceasefire. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and other State Department officials coordinate closely with an Ethiopia contact group of like-minded international partners. Special Envoy Feltman is actively engaging with influential countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, and Sudan. At the United Nations, the United States played a leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security Council on July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press for additional action by the Security Council. The United States also worked with partners on the UN Human Rights Council to successfully arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes. If confirmed, I commit to sustaining these intensive efforts to work with like-minded partners.

*Question.* What is the Biden administration's policy position on Somalia? What role should the United States play in helping to address armed conflict, terrorism, and political crisis in the country? What changes, if any, would you seek to State Department-administered security assistance programs in Somalia?

*Answer.* The Biden-Harris administration supports efforts to advance peace and security in Somalia by countering the threat from al Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia operating in the country. This effort addresses the drivers of instability by promoting democratic governance and market-oriented economic reforms that are necessary for lasting stability. It is imperative that the United States continue to coordinate closely with the Somalis and international partners, such as the United Nations, the African Union, Somalia's neighbors, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Gulf states, to tackle the country's considerable security and political challenges. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing State Department-administered security assistance in Somalia to ensure these programs are effectively and efficiently advancing our policy goals.

*Question.* Two of the largest troop contributing countries to AMISOM, Ethiopia and Uganda, are credibly accused of committing serious human rights violations at home. Has the time come to seek a new configuration and/or new partners for AMISOM?

*Answer.* Somalia continues to require regional and international support to mitigate the threats from al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia and address the drivers of instability. While AMISOM has played an important role during the past 10 years in liberating territory from al-Shabaab and stabilizing parts of Somalia, reconfiguring the mission (1) to better respond to the terrorist threats and (2) to transfer increasing security responsibility to Somalia's security forces must be a priority during upcoming negotiations for a new mandate in 2022. I agree that troubling new developments in the region should also be considered in upcoming negotiations. If confirmed, I commit to working with the African Union, the United Nations, and individual AMISOM troop contributing countries to ensure that personnel are properly vetted, follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect human rights. There is a need to engage the AU and the UN in a timely and credible process to identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be implicated in human rights abuses.

*Question.* Would we not be better off with partners that will not use the threat of pulling their troops from AMISOM as leverage for getting the United States and others to refrain from taking a hard stance on corruption and human rights abuses in their home countries?

*Answer.* AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) participate in the mission because it serves their interests to mitigate the threat from al-Shabaab to their own countries. I am not aware of a serious threat to withdraw troops from Somalia, despite occasional resistance to U.S. efforts to combat corruption and human rights abuses in TCC capitals.

#### *Ethiopia/Sudan Border Dispute*

*Question.* A long simmering border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia in the al-Fashaga region of Sudan appears on the brink of turning hot. The United Arab Emirates had, for a time, taken the lead on mediating this dispute, but their role is no longer clear.

- Who is currently leading the mediation effort in this long-running dispute?

*Answer.* I share your concern about the risk of escalating tension between Sudan and Ethiopia generated by a military buildup and recent violence along the border of Ethiopia and Sudan in the al-Fashaga area. My understanding is that the UAE initiative is currently inactive. If confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy

for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa and Khartoum to encourage both governments to engage in constructive dialogue to de-escalate tensions as part of a U.S. Horn strategy to address the interlinked political, security, and humanitarian crises in the region. I will also engage international and regional partners, including the UAE, to explore ways to persuade the two parties to agree to a mutually acceptable resolution.

*Question.* What is the Department doing to alleviate the pressure on this potential hot spot?

*Answer.* The Department of State continues to engage the two parties to press for a de-escalation of tensions and to call for no further violence. If confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and the U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa and Khartoum to press the two parties to find a mutually acceptable resolution in coordination with international and regional partners.

*Question.* How confident are you in President Tshisekedi's commitment to advance reforms in the mining sector, state security apparatus, and election process?

*Answer.* The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility.

The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining sector and security apparatus.

*Question.* The DRC holds over 51 percent of the global cobalt reserves and produces nearly 70 percent of the total cobalt feedstock globally. Underpinned by huge demand for from the battery sector, competition for control over global cobalt feedstock supply chains has intensified in recent years. What is the Department of State doing to support more responsible trade missions and U.S. commercial delegations to the DRC and to assist the DRC's efforts to improve the transparency of its minerals trade, including strong support for implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), beneficial ownership transparency, and the formalization of the artisanal mining sector?

*Answer.* The United States is working with the DRC Government to bolster economic opportunities for all Congolese, including by establishing conditions that attract American companies to the DRC, expand trade, advance gender equality and women's entrepreneurship, and encourage business climate reforms to promote inclusive development. The reinstatement of the DRC's AGOA eligibility on January 1, 2021, affirmed the Tshisekedi Government's positive progress on reform, and bolstered our effort to expand U.S.-DRC commercial ties to benefit workers in both countries.

The United States supports responsible minerals sourcing and trading and works closely with the private sector to support conflict-free minerals supply chains, emphasizing compliance with section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. The Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals (PPA), forged by the Department of State, USAID, and the Department of Labor and inclusive of U.S. companies and civil society organizations, seeks to improve due diligence and develop the governance systems needed for ethical supply chains of critical minerals in the DRC and Great Lakes region. PPA programming also aims to increase transparency and monitoring of child labor in artisanal mining in the DRC's cobalt supply chain while building government capacity to do the same.

The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the EITI since its founding in 2003. In addition to providing financial support, as well as capacity building to improve EITI's financial management and operational effectiveness, the Department of State serves on the EITI International Board. In a related initiative, the Department of State is supporting improvements to the governance of the DRC's mining royalties with a Fiscal Transparent Innovation Fund grant to the Carter Center.

Finally, the Critical Minerals Security Initiative provides the Department of State with a new tool to engage U.S. companies operating in the critical materials and

minerals supply chain in countries such as the DRC. If confirmed, I commit to supporting and expanding these efforts to promote responsible minerals sourcing and trade.

*Question.* What are the prospects for regional military operations and the imposition of martial law in eastern DRC to address the security and humanitarian crisis in the region?

*Answer.* The United States remains deeply concerned about continued violence, humanitarian crises, and allegations of human rights abuses and violations in eastern DRC. The expanding role of ISIS-DRC and other armed groups in conducting horrific acts against civilians is of particular concern. To tackle these challenges, the United States has called for an end to the violence, justice and accountability for those responsible, the professionalization of state security services, and inclusion of local communities and the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in peace and reconciliation efforts.

The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence, including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and human rights abuses and violations to account. We have reiterated this message since the Government imposed a "state of siege" in two provinces in eastern DRC most affected by the conflict. If confirmed, I will urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with MONUSCO in support of the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians, reduce intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.

We welcome President Tshisekedi's diplomatic outreach to the DRC's neighbors. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic solutions and cross-border cooperation. As appropriate, I will share the U.S. view that any potential regional military cooperation must be conducted in a transparent manner in coordination with the DRC Government and MONUSCO.

*Question.* What changes, if any, would you seek to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in DRC, MONUSCO?

*Answer.* The UN plays a critical role in the stabilization of the DRC, particularly in eastern DRC, where armed group violence remains widespread. The MONUSCO mandate, last renewed in December 2020, prioritizes tasks to protect civilians, support stabilization efforts, and strengthen state institutions. MONUSCO has transitioned out of the Kasai provinces due to favorable gains in security and is scheduled to transition out of Tanganyika province by mid-2022 as part of a responsible, conditions-based transition to allow for more resources to focus on North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces.

The Department of State continues to promote reforms to support the offensive operations mandate of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), including through the addition of new units and improved operational capabilities. If confirmed, I will collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield to encourage MONUSCO to improve its ability to protect civilians, conduct effective quick-reaction operations, and build state capacity in support of sustainable peace in this restive region.

*Question.* What is the Department doing in response to the Government of Nigeria's growing levels of intolerance for universal human rights and freedoms?

*Answer.* President Biden has charged us with restoring democracy and human rights to the forefront of U.S. diplomacy. Advocacy for human rights and fundamental freedoms is foundational to our relationship with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy. The United States is engaging Nigeria's Government at the highest levels to urge Nigerian leaders to uphold their country's constitution and our shared democratic principles. The Department of State spoke clearly when Nigeria recently suspended Twitter operations. If confirmed, I commit to engaging directly about these foundational rights.

The Department of State also supports programs to strengthen the capacity of government institutions and civil society to promote respect for human rights. Of note, the Department of State supported the demands of Nigerian civil society who successfully pressed for the establishment of judicial panels of inquiry in 28 Nigerian states to examine allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Nigeria's now-defunct Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and the Nigerian Police Force.

*Question.* What efforts does the Department have underway and in the planning process to assist journalists and protesters in Nigeria to exercise their rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression?

*Answer.* The Department of State is committed to partnering with Nigerian journalists and civil society activists who, despite facing many hardships and risks, are

highly active and well-established, and in many respects serve as a model for the continent. The Department of State employs a range of foreign policy tools to promote media freedom, including public messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and foreign assistance programming. In addition to multi-donor-funded initiatives like the Lifeline Fund for Embattled CSOs, the Department of State has established emergency mechanisms to respond to specific needs of journalists in crisis. If confirmed, I will prioritize support for and engagement with journalists and civil society.

*Question.* What impacts have reported abuses by Nigerian security forces had on U.S.-Nigeria military relations?

*Answer.* Nigeria faces multiple drivers of instability: a terrorist threat from ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram, entrenched insurgencies, banditry, pastoralist/farmer conflict, ethnic divisions, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, a rising separatist movement in the South, and widespread criminality. In contending with these challenges, Nigerian security forces have committed incidents of human rights violations and abuses. In response, the U.S. Government has limited—in line with our laws and policies—the provision of certain military training and capabilities that could otherwise be useful to Nigeria in combatting these security challenges. To address the parallel priorities of security and human rights, the Biden-Harris administration is committed to engaging with the Nigerian Government and security services to support the institutional reforms and improved professionalism that will promote conduct that respects human rights. In seeking U.S. military sales that include mandatory training and maintenance programs, the Nigerian Government has shown a commitment to the investments and security sector institutional reforms that will enable the expansion of U.S.-Nigeria military relations and the improvement of Nigerian security capabilities.

If confirmed, I will work with the Nigerian Government to actively promote the professionalization of their security forces to reinforce the importance of civilian protection and respect for human rights. I will urge the Nigerian Government to hold security force elements accountable for human rights abuses and violations.

*Question.* To what extent does China's engagement in Africa threaten U.S. interests? How should the United States respond?

*Answer.* As Secretary Blinken has said, there are adversarial, competitive, and cooperative aspects of our relationship with China, and this dynamic applies to our respective partnerships in Africa. Our best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy agenda that enlists African partners in building free market democracies that offer liberty and prosperity and realize the continent's full potential.

Africans and Americans alike support democracy, the rule of law, open competition, and human rights. This robust foundation will help us achieve a mutually beneficial relationship.

If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and interagency partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government to boost socially responsible and climate-friendly trade and investment that secures good livelihoods for both African and American workers. Following the President's lead, I will liaise with the EU, the G-7 and other likeminded partners to engage African partners in the struggle to uphold the international rules-based order, in line with the guidelines in the Strategic Competition Act.

*Question.* Are there any areas where cooperation with China might advance U.S. goals?

*Answer.* Where cooperation might advance U.S. goals, such as efforts to promote peace and stability, we will consider collaboration. If confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure American values and interests prevail.

*Question.* What is the administration's approach to supporting COVID-19 responses in Africa?

*Answer.* Recognizing the devastating human loss and the debilitating second-order economic impacts of COVID-19, the Biden-Harris administration has committed to providing and supporting the rollout of COVID-19 vaccines across Africa. This commitment includes activities that will support public health and case management interventions to stop transmissions and mitigate the impacts of the pandemic across Africa. In May, President Biden committed to sharing 80 million COVID-19 doses from the U.S. supply with the world. In total 25 million of these doses are being shared with Africa and distribution has been coordinated closely with the African Union and COVAX. Of this allotment, more than one million doses have thus far been donated to Africa, with Djibouti being the first African country to receive vaccine doses on July 17. The President subsequently committed the

United States to provide 500 million doses of Pfizer vaccine to Gavi for distribution via COVAX to 92 low- and lower-middle-income economies as defined by Gavi's COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), and to the African Union. Almost half of the COVAX AMC countries are in Africa.

The Biden-Harris administration is also supporting the expansion of vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with international partners, announced on June 30 a financing package for Aspen, Africa's largest manufacturer of pharmaceuticals located in South Africa, to increase production capacity for COVID-19 vaccines, and on July 9 U.S. announced its commitment to support Fondation Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) to boost vaccine production in Senegal.

Finally, since the start of the pandemic, the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development have provided roughly \$541 million in health, humanitarian, and economic support assistance to more than 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden-Harris administration will also provide additional foreign assistance under the American Rescue Plan Act to Sub-Saharan Africa to support COVID-19 vaccine preparedness and delivery activities to ensure 'shots in the arms' of African people. In addition, this funding will support public health efforts, strengthen case management, and interventions to stop and help mitigate the pandemic's effects on economic growth, food security, education, democracy, and women and girls.

*Question.* The Biden administration just announced that it was sending 25 million vaccines to three African countries—Burkina Faso, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. In your view, what are the key challenges to more effective vaccine distribution?

*Answer.* Over the last two decades, the U.S. Government invested roughly \$100 billion in Africa's public health infrastructure. The result is strong systems that allowed partner countries to prepare for and respond rapidly to COVID-19. Rapid and equitable distribution of novel COVID-19 vaccines, however, is a complex operational challenge with legal, regulatory, logistics and cold chain considerations. Thanks to Congressionally-appropriated funding from the American Rescue Plan Act, the U.S. Government is supporting vaccine preparedness in Sub-Saharan Africa, working with international partners and COVAX to provide technical assistance, logistics support, build cold chain capacity, and enhance vaccine absorptive capacity. To date, U.S.-supplied vaccines have been successfully donated to four African countries, and COVAX has delivered vaccines to over 40 sub-Saharan African countries. As in the United States, vaccine hesitancy in Africa remains a concern. To respond, the United States partners every day with national and local African health ministries and services, as well as international and NGO partners, in support of messaging campaigns to address vaccine hesitancy in African populations as well as to confront COVID-19 vaccine mis- and disinformation.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. ANNE A. WITKOWSKY BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

*Stabilization Priorities:*

*Question.* If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when assessing whether the United States should engage more closely in conflict-affected countries and regions?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will continue CSO's efforts to incorporate data, evidence, and quantitative and qualitative methods into policy-making and prioritization when assessing whether the United States should engage more closely in conflict-affected countries and regions. CSO's analytical tools, such as the Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform (IMAP), provide global data analytics on state fragility, instability, and conflict. CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses, and democratic backsliding to understand how these factors impact conflict risk and how targeted interventions might mitigate these trends.

*Question.* With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of occurring where you believe the United States should consider dedicating more resources and attention?

*Answer.* Several countries, such as those laid out in this year's report to Congress pursuant to the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, including Ethiopia and Burma, warrant increased attention and action, and it will be crit-

ical to monitor and address the broader, regional impact of the situations in these countries.

*CSO Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting Stability*

*Question.* In addition to the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other federal agencies, the State Department's regional bureaus, Office of Foreign Assistance, and Chiefs of Mission are responsible for elements of the U.S. Government's efforts to prevent conflict and promote stability abroad.

- With this in mind, if confirmed, in what areas do you anticipate directing the CSO Bureau to play a leading role in these efforts, including through the work of CSO stabilization advisors in the field?

*Answer.* If confirmed, and in support of the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, I will direct CSO to continue its leading role in coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts to implement the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, and Global Fragility Act (2019) while integrating and advancing the Women, Peace, and Security Act (2017) as a cross-cutting priority. CSO informs key U.S. strategies, policies, and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization by combining quantitative data analytics with the qualitative expertise of its stabilization advisors, particularly in peace process support, security sector stabilization, and strategic prevention. Deployed CSO stabilization advisors provide technical conflict and stabilization expertise to DOD Geographic Combatant Commands and to U.S. embassies in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and the Western Hemisphere.

*Question.* Similarly, where is the Bureau better positioned to play a complementary role in efforts led by other agencies and State Department bureaus?

*Answer.* Given its unique conflict expertise and advanced analytics tools, CSO complements other U.S. Government efforts to prevent conflict and promote stability by deploying Stabilization Advisors, harnessing data analytics, and leading, informing, and implementing policy and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. If confirmed, I will continue CSO's close coordination with other State Department bureaus and other agencies, including the J Family Bureaus, the Office of Foreign Assistance, USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Stabilization (CPS), the Department of Defense Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Treasury.

Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Many analysts have expressed concern regarding the potential impacts of COVID-19 on fragile states.

*Question.* How would you prioritize addressing COVID-19-related challenges in the context of the many risk factors capable of exacerbating violence and instability in fragile states?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure CSO continues to consider the impact of COVID-19 as a risk factor for instability and the interacting effects of COVID-19 and other drivers of conflict. CSO is currently monitoring the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on countries experiencing fragility, including through disruptions to remittances and tourism revenues and the general capacity of states' ability to deliver medical and other services to their citizens. CSO is also monitoring state repression through exploiting lockdowns, delays in elections, and other warning signs of democratic backsliding. I will ensure this work continues, and I will work across the department and interagency to investigate how targeted outreach and programming may mitigate COVID-19-related challenges.

Leveraging CSO Data Analytics: Former CSO officials have identified a need to ensure that CSO data analytics tools are utilized by other State Department officials and bureaus in policy and programming decisions.

*Question.* Please share your understanding of how the State Department is currently leveraging CSO's analytics tools, such as its Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform? If confirmed, how, if at all, would you work to ensure these tools are used more widely?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would ensure that CSO's analytics capabilities and tools continue to be incorporated into all aspects of CSO's work, including support for the Global Fragility Act (GFA), the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, and the Women, Peace, and Security Act. Since October 2019, CSO's analytics products have been requested and utilized by more than 50 State Department bureaus and embassies. CSO's Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform (IMAP) provides all State Department employees and select interagency partners with global data analytics on state fragility, instability, and conflict, supporting the adminis-

tration's policy to make evidence-based decisions guided by the best available data. I am eager to work with Congress to ensure that robust analytics continue to play a key role in CSO's work and to expanding opportunities for analytics to improve policies and programs at all levels.

*CSO's Role in Atrocity Prevention*

*Question.* What is CSO's role in interagency efforts related to atrocity prevention? And, what are the specific activities CSO has engaged in related to atrocity prevention?

*Answer.* CSO supports the National Security Council process to coordinate inter-agency implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Elie Wiesel Act) and serves as the Secretariat of the White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. In collaboration with other bureaus and agencies, CSO provides atrocity risk assessments for countries of concern and develops atrocity risk response plans targeted at likely pathways or scenarios to atrocities. CSO produces a classified quarterly Early Warning Assessment that identifies countries at risk of large-scale and deliberate civilian killings, a key indicator of potential atrocity. This assessment is one of three primary risk lists the Task Force uses to guide and prioritize its efforts. CSO funds a small amount of atrocity prevention programming, complementing efforts of other bureaus and agencies. To fulfill the Elie Wiesel Act's mandatory training requirements, CSO worked closely with stakeholders to develop the Department's first virtual atrocity prevention training that has trained over 2,700 Department personnel since its launch in February, 2020.

*Role of Women in Conflict Stabilization*

*Question.* If confirmed, how, if at all, will you direct the CSO Bureau to continue implementing the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security and elements of the Global Fragility Strategy focused on encouraging the meaningful participation of women in processes connected to peace and security?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will support CSO's robust Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) efforts. CSO works closely with the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues, among others, to ensure that conflict-sensitive gender analyses, data on gender-based violence, and meaningful consultations with local women and girls will inform the development, implementation, and monitoring of GFA implementation efforts. CSO developed a new Gender Analysis of Conflict Tool to guide more nuanced assessments of how gender norms drive both men and women towards violence or peace.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. ANNE A. WITKOWSKY BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

*Mission and Mandate*

*Question.* In your view, what is the Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Operations' mandate? Is CSO principally charged with policy formulation, program implementation, both, or none of the above?

- If confirmed, how would you work with the relevant regional and functional bureaus within the Department of State and with the relevant regional and functional bureaus at USAID to clarify roles and responsibilities, ensure unity of effort, and reduce duplication and waste?

*Answer.* CSO's mandate is to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. CSO is charged with both policy formulation and program implementation. Among CSO's highest policy priorities are coordinating interagency implementation of the Global Fragility Act (2019), the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, and Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018.

It is my understanding that CSO coordinates closely with other bureaus and agencies, and I am committed to ensuring unity of effort and preventing duplication, particularly among State, USAID and the Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will reinforce current coordination efforts to implement policy priorities.

*Global Fragility Act*

*Question.* In your view, what role should CSO play in country selection, strategy design, and program implementation under the Global Fragility Act?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with my colleagues in the White House, across the U.S. interagency in Washington and the field, and with multilateral partners and civil society, to ensure full implementation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), including country selection, strategy design, and program implementation. CSO's expertise and coordination role will be critical to innovative implementation of the GFA and will advance ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive management to inform policy and programming decisions.

*Question.* Does CSO have the authority to act as arbiter of disputes between the relevant Federal departments and agencies charged with implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S. embassies in selected partner countries?

*Answer.* CSO does not currently have formal authority to act as arbiter of disputes among the relevant Federal departments and agencies charged with implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S. embassies in selected partner countries. If confirmed, I will work closely with the White House, across the U.S. interagency including embassies and missions in the field, and with multilateral partners and civil society to implement fully the Global Fragility Act. I will work to enhance CSO's coordinating role and build consensus among all involved.

#### *Data, Analytics, and Early Warning*

*Question.* The White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force (the Task Force) was designed to serve as a focal point for the relevant Federal departments and agencies, policy makers, and civil society working to identify and address the early warning signs of atrocities.

- If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that existing and future data analytics and forecasting tools developed and managed by CSO are relevant and readily available for use within the Department, and by overseas missions?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO commits and advocates for the necessary resources to keep its data analytics tools and capabilities freely available to support the Department and its overseas missions. My understanding is that all State Department employees and select interagency partners are able to freely access CSO's Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform (IMAP) which includes global data analytics on conflict and instability, forecasting tools, and past reports and products. I look forward to engaging with you further on evidence-based policy making.

*Question.* What is the task force's role in identifying security priorities and regional policy?

*Answer.* The Atrocity Early Warning Task Force (AEWTF) coordinates a whole-of-government approach to strengthen the U.S. government's ability to forecast, prevent, and respond to atrocities. To inform security and regional policy development, the Task Force conducts global atrocity risk forecasting, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, and shares early warning signs with policy decision-makers. The Task Force has worked closely with relevant regional directorates to conduct atrocity risk assessments and produce corresponding atrocity risk response plans for at-risk countries. The AEWTF is a functional Interagency Policy Committee, for which close and ongoing partnership with regional directorates and policy processes is critical. If confirmed, I will support CSO's role in atrocity prevention, which President Biden reaffirmed as a core moral obligation and national security priority for the United States.

*Question.* How does the task force define success?

*Answer.* My understanding is that the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force defines success as early warning leading to early action. This process includes early identification and communication of atrocity risk, development of atrocity risk assessments and response plans for countries at-risk, and securing long-term attention through integration of atrocity prevention in existing regional policy processes.

*Question.* What efforts can the task force undertake to amplify public messaging on signs of atrocities and/or other conflict indicators?

*Answer.* Pursuant to recommendations engendered by the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force has progressed on improving public messaging through civil society, Hill, and public engagements. The 2021 congressional report - released by Secretary Blinken - sent a clear signal that the U.S. government will publicly call out atrocities that have occurred or are ongoing - a strong risk factor for further atrocities. These efforts can be useful to shed light on, and raise the costs for, perpetrators of potential or ongoing atrocities, but their use must be weighed carefully according to context. If con-

firmed, I will evaluate where CSO should recommend the Task Force amplify its public messaging.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) remains engaged in the Department's efforts to address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan through peace process support, atrocity prevention, and stabilization initiatives. CSO will continue to provide technical support to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) and others involved in the negotiations. CSO will continue to participate in the interagency processes to mitigate atrocity risks facing women and minorities via planning discussions, recommendations for short- and long-term civilian protection, and atrocity risk analysis.

*Question.* If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Tigray?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO contributes to Department efforts to address the on-going crisis in Tigray by urging Ethiopians to come together to confront growing divisions. CSO currently supports efforts to promote a negotiated ceasefire and inclusive political dialogue to end the conflict in Tigray. CSO stands ready to support preparations to assist Ethiopians to advance post-election dialogue and national reconciliation in Ethiopia.

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RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED  
TO MS. ANNE A. WITKOWSKY BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

*Ethiopia*

*Question.* As the second most populous country in the African continent and given its recent transition toward democracy in 2018 with the election of Prime Minister Abiy. With the recent June 21 general election and allegations of irregularities in the voting process, conflict and violence are expected to increase. The political violence has proven to have devastating impacts on the country, from disrupting Ethiopia's response to the COVID pandemic to the famine in the Tigray region which is reported to have spawned the most severe hunger crisis the world has seen in more than a decade. CSO's mission includes both conflict-resolution as well as crisis mitigation in regions determined to be vital to American interests.

- Does the current conflict in Ethiopia pose a threat to American interests and if so, in what ways?

*Answer.* Yes. A secure, stable, peaceful, and developing Horn of Africa is critical to U.S. economic and security interests. Conflict and instability in Ethiopia adversely affect the entire Horn of Africa region. The United States has a strong interest in supporting democracy and human rights overseas, and the current conflict undermines these efforts. For that reason, the Biden-Harris administration has urged all parties to end the hostilities, pursue a negotiated ceasefire and inclusive political solution, and hold accountable all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses.

*Question.* What steps could CSO take to ensure a fair and verifiable election to help secure democracy in Ethiopia and prevent further loss of life in the region? Is there a role for the bureau in such a situation?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO continues to join Department leadership in supporting Ethiopians who exercised their right to vote on June 21. The Department is calling for the September 6 elections to be free and fair. The September 6 elections will cover several areas that did not participate in the June elections due to logistical and security challenges. While elections alone are not a sufficient marker of democracy or true political reform, these elections are part of a democratic political process that should involve dialogue, cooperation, and compromise among all Ethiopians on the future of their country.

*Burma*

*Question.* On February 1, 2021, the military of Burma launched a military coup d'état, endangering their nascent democracy by detaining State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other members of parliament. The situation has been further escalated by gross human rights violations, including the ongoing ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people. The coup has also sought to create "media

blackouts” in the region, preventing information from leaving and entering Burma during a political and public health crisis. Senior generals of the Tatmadaw have been sanctioned by the United States Government for perpetrating gross human rights violations and are subject to ongoing investigations into their conduct by the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

- What steps besides sanctions and investigations could the U.S. Government and its subsidiaries, such as the CSO, be taking to bring about an end to the military coup in Burma, especially considering that, as of today, the coup leaders remain in power and are continuing to persecute the Burmese people and foreign nationals, such as journalists, in what can only be described as authoritarianism in its most severe form?

Answer. The United States has led the international community’s immediate and forceful response to the military coup in Burma. The United States has galvanized allies and partners to take concrete action and urge the regime to end violence, release all those unjustly detained, and restore Burma’s path to democracy. I understand that such efforts include diplomatic outreach to ASEAN members, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and other countries in the region. The administration has worked with international partners to deny the regime access to hundreds of millions of dollars in resources in international financial institutions, and pushed for an arms embargo as well as restrictions on exports of dual use technology. The Department continues to urge all countries to use all available levers to restrict the junta’s access to financial institutions. If confirmed, I will work diligently to ensure that CSO continues to add value to State Department efforts to support the people of Burma.

#### *Stabilization Priorities*

*Question.* With many countries in conflicts to keep a close eye on around the world, it is important to assess how the US will engage in specific regions.

- If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when assessing whether the United States should engage more in conflict-affected countries and regions?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen CSO’s analytical capacities to incorporate data, evidence, and quantitative and qualitative methods into policy-making and priority setting as the Department assesses its engagement in conflict-affected countries and regions. CSO’s analytical tools provide the State Department and interagency partners with a basis for decision making on state fragility, instability, and conflict. I understand that among other factors, CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses, and democratic backsliding, to understand how these factors impact conflict risk, how targeted intervention might mitigate these trends, and what adjustments might be recommended for policy focus and attention.

*Question.* With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of occurring where you believe the United States should consider dedicating more resources and attention?

Answer. It will be critical to monitor and address the broader, regional impact of the situations in those countries laid out in this year’s Elie Wiesel Act report to Congress, including Ethiopia and Burma. If confirmed I will ensure CSO provides full analysis of conflict criteria as the Department determines its engagement in countries or regions where conflict is already evident or at risk of occurring.