

Calendar No. _____

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION**S. 3249**

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 20, 2025

Mrs. SHAHEEN (for herself and Mr. BARRASSO) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_____ (legislative day, _____), _____

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To enhance United States Government strategic coordination of the security, installation, maintenance, and repair of international subsea fiber-optic cables.

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 2 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**
- 3 *This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Ca-*
- 4 *bles Act of 2025”.*
- 5

1 SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.**2 The table of contents for this Act is as follows:**

See. 1. Short title.

See. 2. Table of contents.

See. 3. Definitions.

**TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON
SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLES**

See. 101. Findings.

See. 102. Sense of Congress.

See. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International Cable Protection Committee to safeguard United States interests.

See. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to damage to subsea fiber-optic cables.

See. 105. Report on subsea fiber-optic cable activities by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

See. 106. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen subsea fiber-optic cable security.

**TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC
EXPERTISE**

See. 201. Expanding subsea fiber-optic cable expertise at the Department of State.

**TITLE III—SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE COORDINATION,
CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR**

See. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea fiber-optic cables.

See. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea fiber-optic cables.

3 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**4 In this Act:**

5 **(1) AGENCY.**—The term “agency” has the
6 meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44,
7 United States Code.

8 **(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
9 TEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional com-
10 mittees” means—

10 (A) The Department of Commerce.

11 (B) The Department of Defense.

14 (D) The Office of the Director of National
15 Intelligence.

16 (E) The Department of State.

17 (F) The Federal Communications Commis-
18 sion.

19 (G) The Department of the Treasury.

20 (H) The Department of the Judiciary.

(I) Any additional Federal agencies, as determined by the President.

(4) INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE.—The term “interagency committee” means the entity established under section 301(b) of this Act.

15 **TITLE I—INTERNATIONAL CO-**
16 **ORDINATION AND ENGAGE-**
17 **MENT ON SUBSEA FIBER-**
18 **OPTIC CABLES**

19 SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

20 Congress makes the following findings:

21 (1) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in
22 the Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlan-
23 tic Treaty Organization (NATO) established the
24 Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct
25 information and threat intelligence sharing among

1 private and public sector actors to protect subsea ca-
2 bles.

3 (2) On February 21, 2025, the European
4 Union published an EU Action Plan on Cable Secu-
5 rity to include the development and deployment of
6 an Integrated Surveillance Mechanism for Sub-
7 marine cables work to establish a dedicated regional
8 hub in the Baltic Sea to serve as a test bed of the
9 integrated surveillance approach.

10 (3) The Association of Southeast Asian States
11 (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening
12 Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and
13 most recently announced plans to “build a secure,
14 diverse and resilient submarine cable network” and
15 “to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair,
16 maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine
17 cables, between ASEAN Member States”.

18 (4) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by
19 the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met
20 to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership
21 on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meet-
22 ing, the Quad underscored the need for digital infra-
23 structure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables
24 forum to be hosted by the United States and India
25 and encouraging regulatory harmonization between

1 Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad
2 seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and
3 transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-
4 Pacific region.

5 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

6 It is the sense of Congress that—

7 (1) subsea fiber-optic cables constitute the
8 backbone of the global internet and therefore should
9 be treated as a global public good;

10 (2) the United States Government has an im-
11 portant role to play in advancing the United States
12 interests in international bodies that oversee subsea
13 fiber-optic cable protection, promote network resil-
14 ience and redundancy, and advance regulations in
15 support of these goals;

16 (3) the United States Government should play
17 a more active role in the International Cable Protec-
18 tion Committee (ICPC) in order to advance the
19 United States national security and economic inter-
20 ests;

21 (4) the United States should lead efforts to pro-
22 mote the deployment of resilient subsea fiber-optic
23 cable networks, enhance situational awareness,
24 strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective re-

1 responses among allies and partners through enhanced
2 information sharing and coordination; and

3 (5) while the United States and allied foreign
4 governments have a role to play in the protection of
5 subsea fiber-optic cables, cable owners and other as-
6 sociated private sector stakeholders carry significant
7 responsibility in safeguarding subsea cables.

8 SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EN-
9 GAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CABLE
10 PROTECTION COMMITTEE TO SAFEGUARD
11 UNITED STATES INTERESTS.

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
13 nation with the interagency committee, shall seek to in-
14 crease United States Government engagement in the
15 International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) to ad-
16 vance United States national security and economic inter-
17 ests.

18 (b) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
20 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to
21 the appropriate congressional committees that includes the
22 following:

23 (1) A description of how increased the United
24 States Government engagement within the ICPC
25 could support United States national security objec-

1 tives as it relates to the protection of subsea fiber-
2 optic cables.

6 (3) A description of how People's Republic of
7 China entities leverage their engagement within the
8 ICPC to further their strategic interests.

13 SEC. 104. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO
14 DAMAGE TO SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLES.

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in coordination
16 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
17 Treasury, shall impose sanctions described in subsection
18 (e) with respect to any foreign person that the President
19 determines, on or after the date of the enactment of this
20 Act, is responsible for or complicit in damaging subsea
21 fiber-optic cables in a manner that undermines the na-
22 tional security interests of the United States.

23 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days
24 after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person
25 under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the ap-

1 appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on
2 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and
3 the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Rep-
4 resentatives, a report that includes a detailed justification
5 for the imposition of the sanctions.

6 (e) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
7 scribed in this subsection are the following:

8 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
9 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
10 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
11 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
12 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
13 terests in property of a foreign person described in
14 subsection (a), if such property and interests in
15 property are in the United States, come within the
16 United States, or are or come within the possession
17 or control of a United States person.

18 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR
19 PAROLE.—

20 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An
21 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—
22 (i) inadmissible to the United States;
23 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
24 documentation to enter the United States;
25 and

6 (B) CURRENT ~~VISAS~~ REVOKED.—

12 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
13 tion under clause (i) shall—

14 (I) take effect immediately; and
15 (II) automatically cancel any
16 other valid visa or entry documenta-
17 tion that is in the possession of the
18 alien.

19 (d) IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES.—

10 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.

21 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

22 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
23 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the
24 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
25 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

1 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a
2 United States person.

4 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
5 “United States person” means—

6 (A) any United States citizen or an alien
7 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
8 the United States;

9 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
10 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
11 the United States, including any foreign branch
12 of such an entity; or

13 (C) any person in the United States.

14 **SEC. 105. REPORT ON SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE ACTIVI-**

15 **TIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

16 **AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.**

17 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date
18 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
19 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
20 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a
21 report to the appropriate congressional committees that
22 includes the following:

23 (1) A description, with respect to the applicable
24 reporting period, of People's Republic of China and

1 Russian subsea fiber-optic cable manufacturing, in-
2 stallation, and maintenance capabilities.

3 (2) A description of any ongoing People's Re-
4 public of China and Russian efforts to produce ves-
5 sels capable of severing or damaging subsea fiber-
6 optic cables at sea depths of 4,000 meters or great-
7 er.

8 (3) A list of instances during the previous cal-
9 endar year in which the United States, or allies and
10 partners of the United States, documented anomalous
11 behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or
12 operated by the People's Republic of China or Rus-
13 sia, around subsea fiber-optic cable networks, includ-
14 ing—

15 (A) any official United States Government
16 response to counter the anomalous behavior;
17 and

18 (B) any coordinated diplomatic action with
19 allies and partners.

20 (b) CLASSIFICATION.—The report required under
21 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but
22 may include a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 106. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN**2 **SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE SECURITY.**3 (a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—5 (1) as international subsea fiber-optic cable net-
6 works expand, there are increasing challenges to the
7 proper maintenance, repair, and protection of inter-
8 national subsea fiber-optic cables that have the po-
9 tential to undermine United States and foreign part-
10 ner national security interests;11 (2) the United States is uniquely positioned to
12 provide technical, material, and other forms of sup-
13 port to international partners to enhance the resil-
14 ience of international subsea fiber-optic cables; and15 (3) the United States Government should en-
16 hance its diplomatic efforts to work with foreign
17 governments to improve efforts to quickly and effec-
18 tively maintain, repair, and protect international
19 subsea fiber-optic cables.20 (b) **COMMITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND RE-**
21 **SOURCES.**—The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient
22 personnel and resources towards engaging with foreign
23 countries to improve security and reduce barriers to the
24 maintenance and repair of subsea fiber-optic cables.25 (c) **REPORT.**—Not later than 180 days after the date
26 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for

1 the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to
2 the appropriate congressional committees a report that
3 outlines efforts by the United States Government in the
4 prior calendar year to work with international allies and
5 partners to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers
6 to the maintenance, repair, and protection of international
7 subsea fiber-optic cable networks, including—

8 (1) a list of current foreign policies or laws that
9 create barriers to United States-led efforts to main-
10 tain, repair, and protect international subsea fiber-
11 optic cable networks; and
12 (2) progress made in the previous calendar year
13 as a result of United States engagement with allies
14 and partners.

15 **TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF
16 STATE SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC
17 EXPERTISE**

18 **SEC. 201. EXPANDING SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE EXPER-
19 TISE AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall as-
21 sign not fewer than two full-time equivalent individuals,
22 to be located in the Bureau for Cyberspace and Digital
23 Policy, in order to support the Department of State's
24 interagency engagement on matters related to subsea ca-
25 bles, including—

6 (b) ASSIGNMENT.—The Bureau for Cyberspace and
7 Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed per-
8 sonnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement out-
9 lined in subsection (a).

10 (e) **NOTIFICATION.**—Not later than 15 days after ful-
11 filling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Sec-
12 retary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Re-
13 lations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
14 fairs of the House of Representatives.

15 (d) INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON SUBSEA CA-
16 BLES.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
17 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to
18 the appropriate congressional committees a report on how
19 the United States Government plans to prioritize diplo-
20 matic engagement within relevant international bodies to
21 spur increased information sharing between allied and
22 partner governments and relevant private sector compa-
23 nies on subsea fiber-optic cables.

1 **TITLE III—SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC**
2 **CABLE COORDINATION, CON-**
3 **STRUCTION, AND REPAIR**

4 **SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CO-**
5 **ORDINATION OF SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CA-**
6 **BLES.**

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
8 ings:

9 (1) According to a December 2024 Department
10 of Homeland Security white paper, “There currently
11 exists no forum in which the full scope of the
12 [subsea] cable industry can effectively collaborate
13 with the U.S. government to identify and address
14 shared challenges.”

15 (2) United States Federal Government respon-
16 sibilities for the protection of subsea fiber-optic ca-
17 bles, damage reporting, information and intelligence
18 sharing, and emergency response are overseen by
19 various government actors through a multitude of
20 mechanisms spanning several Federal departments
21 and agencies.

22 (3) In order for the subsea fiber-optic cable in-
23 dustry to align with United States economic and se-
24 curity interests, the United States Government must
25 provide the industry a clearer concept of operations,

1 assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastructure, and defined lines of effort in cases of emergency.

4 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than one year after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
6 establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act
7 as the “interagency committee”) comprised of the heads
8 of the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States
9 Government efforts to—

10 (1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
11 fiber-optic cable networks;

12 (2) facilitate subsea fiber-optic cable permitting;
13 and

14 (3) address other matters related to subsea
15 fiber-optic cables deemed appropriate and necessary
16 by the President.

17 (c) COORDINATION.—The President shall direct the
18 interagency committee to conduct an overview of the
19 United States Federal Government’s operational authori-
20 ties for subsea fiber-optic cable security and resilience.

21 The overview shall include—

22 (1) an interagency concept of operations for
23 partnering with non-Federal entities, including
24 subsea fiber-optic cable owners and operators, to se-

1 cure and repair subsea fiber-optic cable systems in
2 a variety of crisis scenarios; and

3 (2) an interagency review and action plan to
4 streamline subsea fiber-optic cable permitting pro-
5 cesses in order to promote United States inter-
6 national leadership in cable connectivity and deploy-
7 ments and risk-based prioritization and standardiza-
8 tion of additional security and resilience assess-
9 ments.

10 (d) ANALYSIS OF SUBSEA FIBER-OPTIC CABLE CUTS
11 AND OUTAGES.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct
13 the heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop
14 strategies to coordinate closely within the inter-
15 agency process and with subsea fiber-optic cable in-
16 dustry stakeholders to review subsea fiber-optic cable
17 cuts and outages, including by leveraging analysis
18 from industry-wide data, to—

19 (A) identify trends;

20 (B) refine attributions, particularly in
21 cases where subsea fiber-optic cables have been
22 intentionally damaged by malicious actors;

23 (C) identify high-risk geographic areas for
24 subsea fiber-optic cable construction; and

1 (D) inform future risk mitigation efforts to
2 reduce damage to subsea fiber-optic cable sys-
3 tems.

6 (A) resourcing requirements;

7 (B) coordination with United States allies
8 and partners; and

(C) the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for intentional subsea fiber-optic cable cuts by malicious actors.

12 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after estab-
13 lishing the required interagency committee under sub-
14 section (b), the President shall submit to Congress a re-
15 port that includes the following elements:

16 (1) Any resources required to sufficiently staff
17 the interagency committee and United States Fed-
18 eral agencies overseeing the objectives outlined in
19 subsection (b).

20 (2) A detailed plan for how the interagency
21 committee will advance the objectives outlined in
22 subsection (b).

1 **SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BE-**
2 **TWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND**
3 **PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA FIBER-**
4 **OPTIC CABLES.**

5 (a) **PUBLIC PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHAR-**
6 **ING.**—Consistent with the necessary protections of classi-
7 fied information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence ma-
8 terial, and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agen-
9 cies shall, with the approval of the interagency committee,
10 issue procedures to establish and promote—

11 (1) the timely sharing of classified subsea fiber-
12 optic cable threats and any indications of potential
13 threats held by members of the interagency com-
14 mittee with non-Federal entities that possess the
15 necessary security clearances;

16 (2) the timely sharing between the interagency
17 committee and non-Federal entities of subsea fiber-
18 optic cable threats, information relating to indica-
19 tions of potential threats, or authorized uses under
20 this Act, in the possession of the interagency com-
21 mittee that may be declassified and shared at an un-
22 classified level;

23 (3) the timely sharing between the interagency
24 committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified,
25 including controlled unclassified, subsea fiber-optic
26 cable threats and indications of potential threats

1 held by members of the interagency committee or
2 non-Federal entities; and

3 (4) the timely sharing between the interagency
4 committee and non-Federal entities, when and if ap-
5 propriate, of information relating to indications of
6 potential subsea fiber-optic cable threats or autho-
7 rized uses under this title, held by the interagency
8 committee or non-Federal entities about subsea
9 fiber-optic cable threats, in order to prevent
10 breaches to the security, integrity, or efficacy of the
11 subsea fiber-optic cable network and to mitigate any
12 other potential adverse effects from such subsea
13 fiber-optic cable threats.

14 (b) DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES.—The proce-
15 dures developed under subsection (b) shall—

16 (1) ensure the interagency committee has and
17 maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea
18 fiber-optic cable threats and indications of potential
19 subsea fiber-optic cable threats in real time to the
20 appropriate Federal agencies or non-Federal entities
21 consistent with the protection of classified informa-
22 tion;

23 (2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing
24 processes, roles, and responsibilities of members of
25 the interagency committee and non-Federal entities

1 for information sharing, including subsea fiber-optic
2 cable-specific information sharing and analysis enti-
3 ties; and

4 (3) require members of the interagency com-
5 mittee and other appropriate Federal agencies which
6 are sharing subsea fiber-optic cable threat indicators
7 or defensive measures to employ any applicable secu-
8 rity controls to defend against unauthorized access
9 to or acquisition of such information.

10 (e) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 60
11 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
12 tor of National Intelligence, in consultation with the mem-
13 bers of the interagency committee, shall submit to Con-
14 gress the procedures required under subsection (b).

15 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

16 *This Act may be cited as the “Strategic Subsea Cables
17 Act of 2026”.*

18 **SEC. 2. TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

19 *The table of contents for this Act is as follows:*

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**TITLE I— INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION AND ENGAGEMENT ON
CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE**

Sec. 101. Findings.

Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.

*Sec. 103. Enhancing United States Government engagement at the International
Cable Protection Committee and other relevant international
bodies to safeguard United States interests.*

*Sec. 104. Imposition of sanctions with respect to critical undersea infrastructure
sabotage.*

Sec. 105. Report on activities by the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation.

Sec. 106. Report on potential sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure.

Sec. 107. Engaging foreign partners to strengthen the security of critical undersea infrastructure.

TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE

Sec. 201. Expanding critical undersea infrastructure-related expertise at the Department of State.

TITLE III—SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE COORDINATION, CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR

Sec. 301. Improving United States Government coordination of subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

Sec. 302. Strengthening information sharing between United States Government and private sector actors on subsea telecommunications infrastructure.

1 SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

2 *In this Act:*

3 *(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the meaning given the term in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code.*

6 *(2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means—*

9 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and*

12 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.*

4 (A) *The Department of Commerce.*

6 (C) *The Department of Homeland Security.*

9 (E) *The Department of State.*

12 (G) *The Department of the Treasury.*

13 (H) *The Department of the Judiciary.*

16 (4) CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.—
17 The term “critical undersea infrastructure” refers to
18 both subsea telecommunications infrastructure and
19 subsea energy infrastructure.

1 *in the operation, maintenance, repair, or construction*
2 *of critical subsea infrastructure, including critical*
3 *undersea infrastructure owners.*

4 *(7) SABOTAGE.—The term “sabotage” means ac-*
5 *tions, or preparations for future actions, taken with*
6 *the intent to cause defective production, operation, or*
7 *damage to critical underseas infrastructure, including*
8 *the integrity of data transmitted via subsea tele-*
9 *communications infrastructure.*

10 *(8) SUBSEA ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.—The*
11 *term “subsea energy infrastructure” means a subsea*
12 *cable, pipeline, or other equipment installed on, be-*
13 *neath, or within the seabed, including—*

14 *(A) to transmit electricity, including via*
15 *subsea electricity cables, subsea electricity trans-*
16 *formers, or equipment related to the support of*
17 *offshore energy production installations;*

18 *(B) to transport natural gas, oil, or hydro-*
19 *gen between land-based or off-shore infrastruc-*
20 *ture; and*

21 *(C) associated landing stations and facili-*
22 *ties.*

23 *(9) SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUC-*
24 *TURE.—The term “subsea telecommunications infra-*
25 *structure” means subsea fiber-optic cables and related*

1 *equipment installed on, beneath, or within the seabed,*
2 *and used to transmit communications, data, voice,*
3 *video, or other electronic signals, as well as associated*
4 *landing stations and facilities.*

5 ***TITLE I— INTERNATIONAL CO-***
6 ***ORDINATION AND ENGAGE-***
7 ***MENT ON CRITICAL UNDER-***
8 ***SEA INFRASTRUCTURE***

9 ***SEC. 101. FINDINGS.***

10 *Congress makes the following findings:*

11 *(1) Sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure*
12 *poses a growing threat to United States and allied se-*
13 *curity and economic prosperity.*

14 *(2) In recent years, numerous critical undersea*
15 *infrastructure sites were destroyed or damaged, in-*
16 *cluding—*

17 *(A) in January 2022, the reported damage*
18 *to subsea telecommunications cables connecting*
19 *the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian ar-*
20 *chipelago of Svalbard, home of SvalSAT, the*
21 *largest commercial satellite ground station on*
22 *Earth;*

23 *(B) in September 2022, the reported dam-*
24 *age to 3 of the 4 trunklines of the Nord Stream*
25 *1 and Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at*

1 *sites northeast and southeast of the Danish is-*
2 *land of Bornholm in the Western Baltic Sea;*

3 *(C) in February 2023, the reported damage*
4 *to subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-*
5 *necting the main island of Taiwan to the Matsu*
6 *Islands in the Taiwan Strait;*

7 *(D) in October 2023, the reported damage*
8 *to the Finland-to-Estonia Balticconnector nat-*
9 *ural gas pipeline spanning the Gulf of Finland,*
10 *in addition to the reported damage to subsea*
11 *telecommunications cables connecting Estonia*
12 *and Sweden and Finland and Estonia;*

13 *(E) in November 2024, the reported damage*
14 *to the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea tele-*
15 *communications cables and the Lithuania-to-*
16 *Sweden BCS subsea telecommunications cable in*
17 *the central Baltic Sea;*

18 *(F) in December 2024, the reported damage*
19 *to the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea elec-*
20 *tricity interconnection cable and nearby subsea*
21 *telecommunications cables in the Gulf of Finland*
22 *;*

23 *(G) in January 2025, the reported damage*
24 *to the Trans-Pacific Express subsea tele-*
25 *communications cable connecting Taiwan to the*

1 *United States, the Republic of Korea, and*
2 *Japan, among other global democracies;*

3 *(H) in February 2025, the reported damage*
4 *to a subsea telecommunications cable connecting*
5 *the main island of Taiwan with the Penghu Is-*
6 *lands in the Taiwan Strait;*

7 *(I) in January 2026, the reported damage*
8 *to subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia*
9 *in the Central Baltic Sea linking Liepāja and*
10 *Šventoji; and*

11 *(J) in January 2026, the reported damage*
12 *to the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Esto-*
13 *nia involving a vessel named the Fitburg.*

14 *(3) Following subsea fiber-optic cable cuts in the*
15 *Baltic Sea in December 2024, the North Atlantic*
16 *Treaty Organization (NATO) established the Critical*
17 *Undersea Infrastructure Network to conduct informa-*
18 *tion and threat intelligence sharing among private*
19 *and public sector actors to protect subsea cables.*

20 *(4) On February 21, 2025, the European Union*
21 *published an EU Action Plan on Cable Security to*
22 *include the development and deployment of an Inte-*
23 *grated Surveillance Mechanism for Submarine cables*
24 *work to establish a dedicated regional hub in the Bal-*

1 *tic Sea to serve as a test bed of the integrated surveillance approach.*

3 *(5) The Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) published guidelines for Strengthening Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables and most recently announced plans to “build a secure, diverse and resilient submarine cable network” and “to facilitate the expeditious deployment, repair, maintenance, removal, and protection of submarine cables, between ASEAN Member States”.*

11 *(6) On July 1, 2025, the Quad, represented by the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, met to reaffirm its commitment to the Quad Partnership on Cable Connectivity and Resilience. In the meeting, the Quad underscored the need for digital infrastructure collaboration, organizing a subsea cables forum to be hosted by the United States and India and encouraging regulatory harmonization between Quad partners. Through this initiative, the Quad seeks to defend and promote resilient, secure, and transparent digital infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.*

22 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

23 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

1 (1) *critical undersea infrastructure represents*
2 *vital strategic and economic links between the United*
3 *States and its partners and allies;*

4 (2) *according to NATO, “undersea cables carry*
5 *an estimated \$10 trillion in transfers every day; two-*
6 *thirds of the world’s oil and gas is either extracted at*
7 *sea or transported by sea; and around 95 percent of*
8 *global data flows are transmitted via undersea ca-*
9 *bles”;*

10 (3) *since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine*
11 *in 2022, there has been a marked increase in high-*
12 *profile suspected sabotage incidents resulting in dam-*
13 *age to critical undersea infrastructure, especially*
14 *across Northern Europe and East Asia;*

15 (4) *the United States Government has an impor-*
16 *tant role to play in advancing United States interests*
17 *in international bodies that oversee the protection of*
18 *critical undersea infrastructure, including promoting*
19 *network resilience and redundancy, and advancing*
20 *regulations in support of these goals;*

21 (5) *the United States Government should play a*
22 *more active role in NATO initiatives such as the*
23 *NATO Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical*
24 *Undersea Infrastructure, the Critical Undersea Infra-*
25 *structure Coordination Call, the Critical Undersea*

1 *Infrastructure Network, and the NATO-EU Task*
2 *Force on the Resilience of Critical Infrastructure, al-*
3 *lied maritime security efforts such as the Joint Expe-*
4 *ditionary Force, Indo-Pacific initiatives, including*
5 *the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Re-*
6 *silience, and international organizations such as the*
7 *International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), in*
8 *order to advance United States national security and*
9 *economic interests;*

10 *(6) the United States should lead efforts to pro-*
11 *mote the deployment of resilient critical undersea in-*
12 *frastructure networks, enhance situational awareness,*
13 *strengthen preparedness, and formalize collective re-*
14 *sponses among allies and partners through enhanced*
15 *information sharing and coordination; and*

16 *(7) while critical undersea infrastructure owners*
17 *and other associated private sector stakeholders carry*
18 *significant responsibility in safeguarding this infra-*
19 *structure, the United States Government and allied*
20 *foreign governments need to play a greater role.*

1 **SEC. 103. ENHANCING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT EN-**
2 **GAGEMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL CABLE**
3 **PROTECTION COMMITTEE AND OTHER REL-**
4 **EVANT INTERNATIONAL BODIES TO SAFE-**
5 **GUARD UNITED STATES INTERESTS.**

6 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
7 nation with the interagency committee, shall seek to in-
8 crease United States Government engagement in inter-
9 national bodies, including the International Cable Protec-
10 tion Committee (ICPC), to advance United States national
11 security and economic interests as it relates to critical un-
12 dersea infrastructure.

13 (b) *REPORT.*—Not later than one year after the date
14 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
15 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the
16 appropriate congressional committees that includes the fol-
17 lowing:

18 (1) A description of how increased United States
19 Government engagement within the ICPC could sup-
20 port United States national security objectives as it
21 relates to the protection of critical undersea infra-
22 structure.

23 (2) A description of key objectives for promoting
24 and protecting United States national security inter-
25 ests within the ICPC.

8 (5) *A description of other international bodies*
9 *relevant for critical undersea infrastructure where the*
10 *United States should increase its diplomatic engage-*
11 *ment.*

15 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The President, in coordination
16 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treas-
17 ury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c)
18 with respect to any foreign person that the President deter-
19 mines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,
20 is responsible for acts of sabotage or facilitates acts of sabo-
21 tage against critical undersea infrastructure, including—

22 (1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or op-
23 erator of which knowingly—

24 (A) commits acts of sabotage; or

(A) owns, operates, or manages the vessel or entity described in paragraph (1);

(B) provides underwriting services or insurance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or entity;

(C) facilitates deceptive or structured trans-
actions to support a vessel or entity described in
paragraph (1);

1 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—Not later than 15 days after
2 imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under
3 subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate
4 congressional committees, the Committee on Banking,
5 Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate, and the Com-
6 mittee on Financial Services of the House of Representa-
7 tives, a report that includes a detailed justification for the
8 imposition of the sanctions.

9 (c) *SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.*—The sanctions described
10 in this subsection are the following:

11 (1) *BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.*—The President
12 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
13 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
14 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and pro-
15 hibit all transactions in all property and interests in
16 property of a foreign person described in subsection
17 (a), if such property and interests in property are in
18 the United States, come within the United States, or
19 are or come within the possession or control of a
20 United States person.

21 (2) *INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PA-
22 ROLE.*—

23 (A) *VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.*—An
24 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—
25 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

9 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

22 (d) IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES.—

1 *Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this sec-*
2 *tion.*

3 *(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-*
4 *tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a vio-*
5 *lation of this section or any regulation, license, or*
6 *order issued to carry out this section shall be subject*
7 *to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of*
8 *section 206 of the International Emergency Economic*
9 *Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a*
10 *person that commits an unlawful act described in*
11 *subsection (a) of that section.*

12 *(e) EXCEPTIONS.—*

13 *(1) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-*
14 *TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW EN-*
15 *FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this sec-*
16 *tion shall not apply with respect to the admission or*
17 *parole of an alien to the United States if admitting*
18 *or paroling the alien is necessary—*

19 *(A) to permit the United States to comply*
20 *with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters*
21 *of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success*
22 *June 26, 1947, and entered into force November*
23 *21, 1947, between the United Nations and the*
24 *United States, or other applicable international*
25 *obligations of the United States; or*

(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.

21 (f) *DEFINITIONS.*—In this section:

1 (2) *FOREIGN PERSON*.—The term “foreign person” means an individual or entity that is not a
2 United States person.

4 (3) *UNITED STATES PERSON*.—The term “United States person” means—

6 (A) any United States citizen or an alien
7 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the
8 United States;

9 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
10 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
11 the United States, including any foreign branch
12 of such an entity; or

13 (C) any person in the United States.

14 (g) *NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER*.—The
15 President may waive the application of sanctions under
16 this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President sub-
17 mits to the appropriate congressional committees—

18 (1) a certification in writing that the issuance of
19 the waiver is in the national security interests of the
20 United States; and

21 (2) a report explaining the basis for the certifi-
22 cation.

1 **SEC. 105. REPORT ON ACTIVITIES BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUB-**2 **LIC OF CHINA AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERA-**3 **TION.**

4 (a) *REPORT.*—Not later than 180 days after the date
5 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
6 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
7 heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a re-
8 port to the appropriate congressional committees that in-
9 cludes the following:

10 (1) *A description, with respect to the applicable*
11 *reporting period, of the subsea cable manufacturing,*
12 *installation, and maintenance capabilities of the Peo-*
13 *ple's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Fed-*
14 *eration.*

15 (2) *An analysis of the mission, capabilities, and*
16 *activities of the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Re-*
17 *search (GUGI) of the Armed Forces of the Russian*
18 *Federation, including—*

19 (A) *a description of GUGI operations and*
20 *capabilities in deep water and littoral infra-*
21 *structure surveillance, seabed warfare, and sabo-*
22 *tage, including recent activity trends and devel-*
23 *opment of new weapons systems;*

24 (B) *a description of GUGI's use of ostensi-*
25 *bly civilian research vessels to conduct critical*

1 *undersea infrastructure surveillance, seabed war-*
2 *fare, and potential sabotage;*

3 *(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions*
4 *on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced tech-*
5 *nologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to*
6 *circumvent those sanctions; and*

7 *(D) a list of suspected GUGI research or*
8 *scientific vessels, including vessel names and*
9 *International Maritime Organization and Mari-*
10 *time Mobile Service Identity numbers, and re-*
11 *lated equipment that are suspected of engaging*
12 *in dual-use operations and probing of critical*
13 *undersea infrastructure.*

14 *(3) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and*
15 *activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff*
16 *of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*
17 *(GRU), including—*

18 *(A) a description of GRU operations and*
19 *capabilities related to physical, electronic, and*
20 *cyber surveillance, monitoring, and sabotage of*
21 *critical undersea infrastructure and maritime lo-*
22 *gistics;*

23 *(B) a description of the use of Russian ci-*
24 *vilian merchant and fishing vessels by the GRU,*
25 *including a list of fishing and merchant vessel*

1 *names and International Maritime Organization*
2 *and Maritime Mobile Service Identity Numbers*
3 *believed to be involved in surveillance or sabotage*
4 *activities; and*

5 *(C) an assessment of the impact of sanctions*
6 *on the ability of GUGI to procure advanced tech-*
7 *nologies and equipment, as well as its efforts to*
8 *circumvent those sanctions.*

9 *(4) An analysis of the missions, capabilities, and*
10 *activities of the People's Liberation Army, the PRC*
11 *Coast Guard, the China Ship Scientific Research*
12 *Center, HMN Technologies, and other PRC-based en-*
13 *tities, including unmarked or dual-use maritime mi-*
14 *litia or commercial vessels related to surveillance,*
15 *monitoring, and sabotage of critical undersea infra-*
16 *structure, including—*

17 *(A) a description of recent capability devel-*
18 *opments related to surveilling or sabotaging crit-*
19 *ical undersea infrastructure, including for both*
20 *deep-sea and littoral purposes; and*

21 *(B) a description of the PRC's use of ostend-*
22 *sibly civilian fishing, merchant, and research*
23 *vessels for sabotage or surveillance of critical un-*
24 *dersea infrastructure, including in the Indo-Pa-*

1 *acific, Africa, Latin America, Europe, and the*
2 *Western Hemisphere.*

3 *(5) An assessment of cooperation between the*
4 *Russian Federation and the PRC on surveillance or*
5 *sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, includ-*
6 *ing—*

7 *(A) any current or planned operational co-*
8 *ordination against United States or allied and*
9 *partner nation targets;*

10 *(B) any joint research, development, testing,*
11 *or evaluation of critical undersea infrastructure*
12 *surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare capa-*
13 *bilities;*

14 *(C) any technology transfers or joint train-*
15 *ing related to critical undersea infrastructure*
16 *surveillance, sabotage, or seabed warfare; and*

17 *(D) any coordination in procurement of ad-*
18 *vanced technologies related to critical undersea*
19 *infrastructure, surveillance, sabotage, or seabed*
20 *warfare, or circumvention of sanctions against*
21 *the Russian Federation.*

22 *(6) A list of instances during the previous cal-*
23 *endar year in which the United States, or allies and*
24 *partners of the United States, documented anomalous*
25 *behavior from vessels, either flagged, crewed, or oper-*

1 ated by the PRC or Russia, around critical undersea
2 infrastructure, including—

(b) INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—The initial report required under subsection (a) shall cover the period between January 1, 2022, through the date of the enactment of this Act. Subsequent reports required by subsection (a) shall cover the previous calendar year for the reporting period.

16 (c) *CLASSIFICATION.*—The report required under sub-
17 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
18 include a classified annex.

19 SEC. 106. REPORT ON POTENTIAL SABOTAGE OF CRITICAL
20 UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.

21 *Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment*
22 *of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordi-*
23 *nation with the Secretary of State and the heads of other*
24 *relevant Federal agencies, shall submit to the Select Com-*
25 *mittee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Permanent Select*

1 *Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives,*
2 *and the appropriate congressional committees a report that*
3 *includes the assessment of the intelligence community, in-*
4 *cluding dissents from individual agencies, of the likely*
5 *cause and, if applicable, the attribution of the following in-*
6 *stances of reported sabotage of critical undersea infrastruc-*
7 *ture:*

8 (1) *In January 2022, the reported damage to the*
9 *subsea telecommunications infrastructure connecting*
10 *the Norwegian mainland with the Norwegian archi-*
11 *pelago of Svalbard.*

12 (2) *The September 2022 sabotage of three of the*
13 *four trunklines of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord*
14 *Stream 2 natural gas pipelines, at sites northeast and*
15 *southeast of the Danish island of Bornholm in the*
16 *Western Baltic Sea, including—*

17 (A) *an assessment of the activities of Rus-*
18 *sian military vessels, including those with un-*
19 *dersea warfare capabilities, at any of the Nord*
20 *Stream blast sites in the months leading up to*
21 *the incident;*

22 (B) *a description of any Russian civilian*
23 *or military vessels intercepted or diverted from*
24 *the blast sites in the aftermath of the sabotage or*

1 *vessels or underwater unmanned vehicles that*
2 *gained access to the blast sites;*

3 *(C) an assessment of the technical feasibility*
4 *of a small group of divers conducting the Nord*
5 *Stream sabotage using the rental boat “Androm-*
6 *eda” in the weather and sea conditions present*
7 *at the time;*

8 *(D) an assessment of whether the Russian*
9 *Federation’s documented practice of recruiting or*
10 *coercing Ukrainians or other third country na-*
11 *tionals to conduct sabotage operations on land*
12 *targets is applicable to a maritime context;*

13 *(E) an assessment of the fees and penalties*
14 *for failure to honor gas delivery contracts that*
15 *Gazprom or other Russian entities potentially*
16 *faced due to the throttling of gas deliveries via*
17 *the Nord Stream 1 pipeline in 2021;*

18 *(F) an assessment of the insurance implica-*
19 *tions for Nord Stream 1 and 2, as well as its in-*
20 *surers and Western financiers, depending on the*
21 *identity of the perpetrator;*

22 *(G) a description of the law enforcement in-*
23 *vestigations by regional governments, the scope of*
24 *their investigations, and their outcomes;*

1 (H) an assessment of whether any Russian
2 vessels documented in close proximity to the
3 Nord Stream blast sites in the months leading
4 up to or immediately after the incident, includ-
5 ing those with undersea surveillance or warfare
6 capabilities, were present at other suspected sab-
7 otage sites either before or after the incident in
8 question; and

22 (5) In November 2024, the reported damage to
23 the Finland-to-Germany C-Lion1 subsea tele-
24 communications cable and the Lithuania-to-Sweden

1 *BCS subsea telecommunications cable in the central*
2 *Baltic Sea.*

3 *(6) In December 2024, the reported damage to*
4 *the Finland-to-Estonia EstLink2 subsea electricity*
5 *interconnection cable and nearby subsea telecommuni-*
6 *cations cables in the Gulf of Finland.*

7 *(7) In January 2025, the reported damage to the*
8 *Trans-Pacific Express subsea telecommunications in-*
9 *frastructure connecting Taiwan to the United States,*
10 *the Republic of Korea, and Japan, among other global*
11 *democracies.*

12 *(8) In February 2025, the reported damage to a*
13 *subsea telecommunications cable connecting the main*
14 *island of Taiwan with the Penghu Islands in the Tai-*
15 *wan Strait.*

16 *(9) In January 2026, the reported damage to*
17 *subsea telecommunications cables from Latvia in the*
18 *Central Baltic Sea connecting Liepāja and Šventoji.*

19 *(10) In January 2026, the reported damage to*
20 *the Elisa cable connecting Finland and Estonia in-*
21 *volving a vessel called the Fitburg.*

1 **SEC. 107. ENGAGING FOREIGN PARTNERS TO STRENGTHEN**2 **THE SECURITY OF CRITICAL UNDERSEA IN-
3 FRASTRUCTURE.**4 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.*—It is the sense of Congress

5 that—

6 (1) as international critical undersea infrastruc-
7 ture expands, there are increasing challenges to the
8 proper installation, maintenance, repair, and protec-
9 tion of international subsea cables that have the po-
10 tential to undermine United States and foreign part-
11 ner national security interests;12 (2) the United States is uniquely positioned to
13 provide technical, material, and other forms of sup-
14 port to international partners to enhance the resil-
15 ience of international critical undersea infrastructure;16 (3) the United States Government should en-
17 hance its diplomatic efforts to work alongside trusted
18 allies to help foreign governments improve efforts to
19 quickly and effectively install, maintain, repair, and
20 protect international critical undersea infrastructure;
21 and22 (4) given the importance of critical undersea in-
23 frastructure to United States and allied energy secu-
24 rity and prosperity, adversaries are increasingly
25 prioritizing capabilities designed to target United
26 States and allied subsea energy infrastructure.

1 (b) *COMMITMENT OF PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES.*—

2 *The Secretary of State shall devote sufficient personnel and*
3 *resources towards—*

4 (1) *engaging with foreign countries to improve*
5 *security and reduce barriers to the installation, moni-*
6 *toring, maintenance, and repair of critical undersea*
7 *infrastructure; and*

8 (2) *working with allies and partners to support*
9 *the development of a multinational fleet of cable re-*
10 *pair ships to respond rapidly to incidents of sabotage.*

11 (c) *REPORT.*—*Not later than 180 days after the date*
12 *of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for*
13 *the next 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the*
14 *appropriate congressional committees a report that outlines*
15 *efforts by the United States Government in the prior cal-*
16 *endar year to work with international allies and partners*
17 *to strengthen the security of and reduce barriers to the mon-*
18 *itoring, maintenance, repair, and protection of inter-*
19 *national critical undersea infrastructure networks, includ-*
20 *ing—*

21 (1) *a list of current foreign policies or laws that*
22 *create barriers to United States-led efforts to install,*
23 *maintain, repair, and protect international critical*
24 *undersea infrastructure networks; and*

1 (2) progress made in the previous calendar year
2 as a result of United States engagement with allies
3 and partners.

4 **TITLE II—DEPARTMENT OF
5 STATE CRITICAL UNDERSEA
6 INFRASTRUCTURE EXPERTISE**

7 **SEC. 201. EXPANDING CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUC-
8 TURE-RELATED EXPERTISE AT THE DEPART-
9 MENT OF STATE.**

10 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—The Secretary of State shall assign
11 not fewer than 10 full-time equivalent individuals, of which
12 not fewer than 5 individuals shall be assigned to the Bureau
13 for Cyberspace and Digital Policy to cover subsea tele-
14 communications infrastructure, in order to support the De-
15 partment of State’s interagency engagement on matters re-
16 lated to critical undersea infrastructure protection, includ-
17 ing—

18 (1) protection and resilience;
19 (2) coordination with United States allies and
20 partners; and
21 (3) United States engagement in international
22 bodies that cover critical undersea infrastructure.

23 (b) *ASSIGNMENT.*—The Bureau for Cyberspace and
24 Digital Policy may not dual-hat currently employed per-

1 sonnel in meeting the minimum hiring requirement out-
2 lined in subsection (a).

3 (c) *NOTIFICATION*.—Not later than 15 days after ful-
4 filling the hiring requirement in subsection (a), the Sec-
5 retary of State shall notify the Committee on Foreign Rela-
6 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
7 of the House of Representatives.

8 (d) *INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON CRITICAL UN-*
9 *DERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE*.—Not later than 90
10 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
11 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
12 sional committees a report on how the United States Gov-
13 ernment plans to prioritize diplomatic engagement within
14 relevant international bodies to spur increased information
15 sharing between allied and partner governments and rel-
16 evant private sector companies on critical undersea infra-
17 structure sabotage.

18 **TITLE III—SUBSEA TELE-**
19 **COMMUNICATIONS INFRA-**
20 **STRUCTURE COORDINATION,**
21 **CONSTRUCTION, AND REPAIR**

22 **SEC. 301. IMPROVING UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CO-**
23 **ORDINATION OF SUBSEA TELECOMMUNI-**
24 **CATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

25 (a) *FINDINGS*.—Congress makes the following findings:

1 (1) According to a December 2024 Department of
2 Homeland Security white paper, “There currently ex-
3 ists no forum in which the full scope of the [subsea]
4 cable industry can effectively collaborate with the
5 U.S. government to identify and address shared chal-
6 lenges.”.

7 (2) United States Federal Government respon-
8 sibilities for the protection of subsea telecommuni-
9 cations infrastructure, damage reporting, information
10 and intelligence sharing, and emergency response are
11 overseen by various government actors through a mul-
12 titude of mechanisms spanning several Federal de-
13 partments and agencies.

14 (3) In order for the subsea cable industry to
15 align with United States economic and security inter-
16 ests and help industry prepare security risk mitiga-
17 tion measures, the United States Government must
18 provide the industry a clearer concept of operations,
19 assessed risks to cable supply chain and infrastruc-
20 ture, enhanced and standardized security measures,
21 defined lines of effort in cases of emergency, and de-
22 finitive cost analysis.

23 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than one year after
24 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
25 establish an interagency committee (referred to in this Act

1 as the “interagency committee”) comprised of the heads of
2 the appropriate Federal agencies, to lead United States
3 Government efforts to—

4 (1) protect and improve the resilience of subsea
5 telecommunications infrastructure;

6 (2) facilitate subsea telecommunications cable li-
7 censing and permitting; and

8 (3) address other matters related to subsea tele-
9 communications infrastructure deemed appropriate
10 and necessary by the President.

11 (c) COORDINATION.—The President shall direct the
12 interagency committee to conduct an overview of the United
13 States Federal Government’s operational authorities for
14 subsea telecommunications infrastructure security and re-
15 silience. The overview shall include—

16 (1) an interagency concept of operations for
17 partnering with non-Federal entities, including
18 subsea telecommunications infrastructure owners and
19 operators, to secure and repair subsea telecommuni-
20 cations infrastructure systems in a variety of crisis
21 scenarios; and

22 (2) an interagency review and action plan to
23 streamline subsea telecommunications infrastructure
24 licensing, funding, and permitting processes in order
25 to promote United States international leadership in

1 *cable connectivity and deployments and risk-based*
2 *prioritization and standardization of additional secu-*
3 *rity and resilience assessments.*

4 *(d) ANALYSIS OF SUBSEA TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN-*
5 *FRASTRUCTURE SABOTAGE.—*

6 *(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the*
7 *heads of the relevant Federal agencies to develop strat-*
8 *egies to coordinate closely within the interagency*
9 *process and with subsea telecommunications infra-*
10 *structure industry stakeholders to review subsea tele-*
11 *communications infrastructure sabotage, including by*
12 *leveraging analysis from industry-wide data, to—*

13 *(A) identify trends;*

14 *(B) refine attributions, particularly in cases*
15 *where subsea telecommunications infrastructure*
16 *has been intentionally damaged by malicious ac-*
17 *tors;*

18 *(C) identify high-risk geographic areas for*
19 *subsea telecommunications infrastructure con-*
20 *struction;*

21 *(D) identify Federal Government functions*
22 *and private sector engagement methods to sup-*
23 *port the security of subsea telecommunications*
24 *infrastructure; and*

1 (E) inform future risk mitigation efforts to
2 reduce damage to subsea telecommunications in-
3 frastructure systems.

6 (A) resourcing requirements;

(C) the necessary technical expertise to make attributions for subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage.

13 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 30 days after establishing
14 the required interagency committee under subsection (b), the
15 President shall submit to Congress a report that includes
16 the following elements:

1 **SEC. 302. STRENGTHENING INFORMATION SHARING BE-**
2 **TWEEN UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND**
3 **PRIVATE SECTOR ACTORS ON SUBSEA TELE-**
4 **COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE.**

5 (a) *PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECTOR INFORMATION SHAR-*
6 *ING.—Consistent with the necessary protections of classified*
7 *information, the sourcing of relevant intelligence material,*
8 *and privacy and civil liberties, all appropriate agencies*
9 *shall, with the approval of the interagency committee and*
10 *in coordination, as appropriate, with intelligence sharing*
11 *partnerships with trusted allies, in support of the mainte-*
12 *nance, repair, and protection of subsea telecommunications*
13 *infrastructure, issue procedures to establish and promote—*
14 (1) *the timely sharing of classified information*
15 *regarding subsea telecommunications infrastructure*
16 *sabotage and any indications of potential sabotage*
17 *held by members of the interagency committee with*
18 *non-Federal entities that possess the necessary secu-*
19 *rity clearances;*
20 (2) *the timely sharing between the interagency*
21 *committee and non-Federal entities of information re-*
22 *lated to subsea telecommunications infrastructure sab-*
23 *otage, information relating to indications of potential*
24 *sabotage, or authorized uses under this Act, in the*
25 *possession of the interagency committee that may be*
26 *declassified and shared at an unclassified level;*

1 (3) the timely sharing between the interagency
2 committee and non-Federal entities of unclassified,
3 including controlled unclassified, information regard-
4 ing subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabotage
5 and indications of potential sabotage held by members
6 of the interagency committee or non-Federal entities;

7 (4) the timely sharing between the interagency
8 committee and non-Federal entities, when and if ap-
9 propriate, of information relating to indications of
10 potential subsea telecommunications infrastructure
11 sabotage or authorized uses under this title, held by
12 the interagency committee or non-Federal entities
13 about subsea telecommunications infrastructure sabo-
14 tage, in order to prevent or mitigate any potential
15 adverse effects from such sabotage; and

16 (5) the timely release of funds to meet cost,
17 schedule, and performance metrics.

18 (b) *DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURES.*—The procedures
19 developed under subsection (b) shall—

20 (1) ensure the interagency committee has and
21 maintains the capacity to identify and inform subsea
22 telecommunications infrastructure sabotage and indi-
23 cations of potential subsea telecommunications infra-
24 structure sabotage in real time to the appropriate

1 *Federal agencies or non-Federal entities consistent*
2 *with the protection of classified information;*

3 *(2) incorporate, whenever possible, existing proc-*
4 *esses, roles, and responsibilities of members of the*
5 *interagency committee and non-Federal entities for*
6 *information sharing, including subsea telecommuni-*
7 *cations infrastructure-specific information sharing*
8 *and analysis entities; and*

9 *(3) require members of the interagency com-*
10 *mittee and other appropriate Federal agencies which*
11 *are sharing subsea telecommunications infrastructure*
12 *sabotage indicators or defensive measures to employ*
13 *any applicable security controls to defend against un-*
14 *authorized access to or acquisition of such informa-*
15 *tion.*

16 *(c) SUBMITTAL TO CONGRESS.—The Director of Na-*
17 *tional Intelligence, in consultation with the members of the*
18 *interagency committee, shall—*

19 *(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the*
20 *enactment of this Act, submit to Congress the proce-*
21 *dures required under subsection (b); and*

22 *(2) not later than one year after submitting such*
23 *procedures, and annually thereafter for 5 years, sub-*
24 *mit to Congress a report on the implementation and*
25 *execution of information sharing with private sector*

- 1 *actors in the previous year pursuant to subsection*
- 2 *(a).*