

Calendar No. _____

119TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION**S. 2222****[Report No. 119-_____]**

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 9, 2025

Mr. CURTIS (for himself and Ms. ROSEN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_____ (legislative day, _____), _____

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment and an amendment to the title

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of undersea communication cables vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Undersea
3 Cable Resilience Initiative Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Undersea communication cables (in this Act
7 referred to as “undersea cables”) are critical infra-
8 structure essential for global communication, com-
9 merce, and national security, particularly for Tai-
10 wan, whose economic and security stability relies
11 heavily on undersea cable connectivity.

12 (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of
13 China has increasingly used gray zone tactics to un-
14 dermine the security and sovereignty of Taiwan, in-
15 cluding suspected sabotage of undersea cables in and
16 around Taiwan, such as the incidents involving the
17 severing of cables around the Matsu Islands of Tai-
18 wan and other key regions in 2023 and 2025.

19 (3) Undersea cables are a primary target in the
20 strategy of the Government of the People’s Republic
21 of China to cripple the communication capabilities of
22 Taiwan in the event of a military conflict, as part
23 of broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of un-
24 dersea cables would significantly impact the ability
25 of Taiwan to communicate both domestically and

1 internationally, leading to a breakdown in military,
2 economic, and social functions.

3 (4) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on
4 undersea cables has been compounded by an increas-
5 ing number of foreign vessels suspected of involve-
6 ment in sabotage, including Chinese-linked vessels,
7 which are perceived as direct threats to Taiwan's
8 critical infrastructure.

9 (5) The ability of the Government of the Peo-
10 ple's Republic of China to disrupt or sever undersea
11 cables is a critical element of its military strategy
12 aimed at softening Taiwan's defenses and isolating
13 Taiwan from international support in the event of
14 an invasion or military confrontation.

15 (6) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, par-
16 ticularly the People's Republic of China, have in-
17 creased the risk of sabotage and disruption to un-
18 dersea cables serving Taiwan and other nations. No-
19 tably, in February 2023, the Matsu Islands of Tai-
20 wan experienced major internet disruptions due to
21 two undersea cables being severed, with suspicions
22 pointing toward deliberate external interference.
23 Furthermore, in January 2025, Chunghwa Telecom
24 reported damage to an international undersea cable
25 and identified a "suspicious vessel"—the Chinese-

1 linked cargo ship Shunxin39—near the affected
2 area. The Coast Guard of Taiwan has indicated con-
3 cerns that that vessel may have been involved in de-
4 liberately cutting the cable. In a subsequent inci-
5 dent, Taiwan seized the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58,
6 suspected of deliberately severing an undersea cable.
7 The Coast Guard of Taiwan acknowledged the possi-
8 bility of China’s involvement as part of a “grey area
9 intrusion”.

10 (7) Since 2023, there have been at least 11
11 cases of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan
12 and a similar number in the Baltic Sea, with au-
13 thorities in Taiwan and Europe suspecting Chinese
14 and Russian involvement in several incidents, al-
15 though some damages have been attributed to nat-
16 ural causes. Those incidents highlight the vulner-
17 ability of those critical systems to gray zone tactics
18 and the difficulty of proving sabotage or holding per-
19 petrators accountable.

20 (8) The sabotage of undersea cables constitutes
21 gray zone tactics designed to destabilize and under-
22 mine international security without direct military
23 confrontation.

24 (9) Several regional mechanisms have been es-
25 tablished to bolster the security of undersea cables,

1 including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime
2 domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for
3 Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhanc-
4 ing the security and resilience of undersea cables in
5 the Indo-Pacific.

6 (10) To counter the threats described in this
7 section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is
8 imperative for the United States and its allies to
9 take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for
10 undersea cables and foster international cooperation
11 to protect those critical assets.

12 **SEC. 3. TAIWAN UNDERSEA CABLE RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.**

13 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 360 days after
14 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
15 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
16 Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the
17 Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Sec-
18 retary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initia-
19 tive to be known as the “Taiwan Undersea Cable Resil-
20 ience Initiative” (in this section referred to as the “Initia-
21 tive”).

22 (b) PRIORITY.—The Initiative shall prioritize the pro-
23 tection and resilience of undersea cables near Taiwan,
24 with a focus on countering threats from the People's Re-
25 public of China to the critical infrastructure of Taiwan.

1 ~~(c) KEY FOCUS AREAS.—~~

2 ~~(1) ADVANCED MONITORING AND DETECTION~~
3 ~~CAPABILITIES.—In carrying out the Initiative, the~~
4 ~~Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-~~
5 ~~retary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of~~
6 ~~Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced undersea~~
7 ~~eable monitoring systems for Taiwan capable of de-~~
8 ~~tecting disruptions or potential sabotage in real-~~
9 ~~time, including by informing Taiwan, as appropriate,~~
10 ~~of early warnings from global intelligence networks.~~

11 ~~(2) RAPID RESPONSE PROTOCOLS.—In carrying~~
12 ~~out the Initiative, the Secretary of State shall—~~

13 ~~(A) establish rapid response protocols for~~
14 ~~repairing severed undersea cables or mitigating~~
15 ~~disruptions; and~~

16 ~~(B) work with allies of the United States~~
17 ~~to help Taiwan develop the logistical capacity to~~
18 ~~respond quickly to attacks on undersea cables~~
19 ~~and minimize downtime.~~

20 ~~(3) ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARE-~~
21 ~~NESS.—In carrying out the Initiative—~~

22 ~~(A) the Secretary of the Navy and the~~
23 ~~Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collabora-~~
24 ~~tion with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and re-~~
25 ~~gional allies, shall enhance maritime domain~~

1 awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the de-
2 tection of suspicious vessels or activities near
3 critical undersea cable routes; and

4 (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard
5 shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,
6 particularly in the Taiwan Strait and sur-
7 rounding maritime zones; to monitor potential
8 threats and prevent sabotage.

9 (4) INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRO-
10TECTION.—

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-
12 tiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to es-
13 tablish cooperative frameworks with regional al-
14 lies and global partners to protect the undersea
15 cable networks near Taiwan.

16 (B) ELEMENTS.—The frameworks estab-
17 lished under subparagraph (A) shall provide for
18 participation by the United States in joint
19 drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and col-
20 laborative surveillance operations to enhance
21 collective security against sabotage.

22 (5) TAIWAN-SPECIFIC CABLE HARDENING.—In
23 carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State
24 shall encourage and support the hardening of critical
25 undersea cables near Taiwan, including reinforcing

1 cables, improving burial depths, and using more re-
2 siliant materials to reduce vulnerability to natural
3 disasters and deliberate interference.

4 **SEC. 4. COUNTERING CHINA'S GRAY ZONE TACTICS.**

5 (a) **WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER CHI-**
6 **NESE SABOTAGE.**—The President shall work with Taiwan
7 and like-minded international partners to implement strat-
8 egies that directly counter the use by the Government of
9 the People's Republic of China of undersea cable sabotage
10 as part of its gray zone warfare, including by increasing
11 diplomatic pressure on that Government to adhere to
12 international norms regarding the protection of undersea
13 infrastructure.

14 (b) **RAISING AWARENESS.**—The President shall work
15 with Taiwan to raise global awareness of the risks posed
16 by interference by the Government of the People's Repub-
17 lie of China in undersea cables, including through public
18 diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and international
19 forums that address gray zone tactics and the protection
20 of critical infrastructure.

21 **SEC. 5. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SAB-**
22 **OTAGE OF UNDERSEA CABLES.**

23 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The President shall impose the
24 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any
25 person of the People's Republic of China that the Presi-

1 dent determines is responsible for or complicit in dam-
2 aging undersea cables critical to the national security of
3 Taiwan.

4 (b) ~~SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.~~—The sanctions de-
5 scribed in this subsection are the following:

6 (1) ~~BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.~~—The President
7 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
8 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
9 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
10 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
11 terests in property of a person described in sub-
12 section (a), if such property and interests in prop-
13 erty are in the United States, come within the
14 United States, or are or come within the possession
15 or control of a United States person.

16 (2) ~~INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR~~
17 ~~PAROLE.~~—

18 (A) ~~VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.~~—An
19 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

20 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

21 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
22 documentation to enter the United States;

23 and

24 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
25 or paroled into the United States or to re-

1 receive any other benefit under the Immigra-
2 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
3 seq.).

4 ~~(B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—~~

5 (i) ~~IN GENERAL.—~~The visa or other
6 entry documentation of an alien described
7 in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regard-
8 less of when such visa or other entry docu-
9 mentation is or was issued.

10 (ii) ~~IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—~~A revoca-
11 tion under clause (i) shall—

12 (I) take effect immediately; and

13 (II) automatically cancel any
14 other valid visa or entry documenta-
15 tion that is in the possession of the
16 alien.

17 ~~(c) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—~~

18 (1) ~~IMPLEMENTATION.—~~The President may ex-
19 ercise all authorities provided under sections 203
20 and 205 of the International Emergency Economic
21 Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out
22 this section.

23 (2) ~~PENALTIES.—~~A person that violates, at-
24 tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
25 violation of this section or any regulation, license, or

1 order issued to carry out this section shall be subject
2 to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c)
3 of section 206 of the International Emergency Eco-
4 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same ex-
5 tent as a person that commits an unlawful act de-
6 scribed in subsection (a) of that section.

7 (d) EXCEPTIONS.—

8 (1) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI-
9 TIES.—This section shall not apply with respect to
10 activities subject to the reporting requirements
11 under title V of the National Security Act of 1947
12 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel-
13 ligence activities of the United States.

14 (2) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER-
15 NATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—Sanctions under sub-
16 section (b)(2) shall not apply with respect to the ad-
17 mission of an alien to the United States if such ad-
18 mission is necessary to comply with the obligations
19 of the United States under the Agreement regarding
20 the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at
21 Lake Success on June 26, 1947, and entered into
22 force on November 21, 1947, between the United
23 Nations and the United States, or the Convention on
24 Consular Relations, done at Vienna on April 24,

1 1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967, or
2 other international obligations of the United States.

3 ~~(3) EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF~~
4 ~~GOODS.—~~

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—The authorities and re-
6 quirements to impose sanctions under this sec-
7 tion shall not include the authority or require-
8 ment to impose sanctions on the importation of
9 goods.

10 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
11 the term “good” means any article, natural or
12 manmade substance, material, supply or manu-
13 factured product, including inspection and test
14 equipment, and excluding technical data.

15 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

16 (1) ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN.—The terms
17 “admission”, “admitted”, and “alien” have the
18 meanings given those terms in section 101 of the
19 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).

20 (2) PERSON OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
21 CHINA.—The term “person of the People’s Republic
22 of China” means—

23 (A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
24 tional of the People’s Republic of China; and

1 ~~(B)~~ an entity owned or controlled by the
2 Government of the People's Republic of China,
3 organized under the laws of the People's Re-
4 public of China, or otherwise subject to the ju-
5 risdiction of the Government of the People's
6 Republic of China.

7 ~~(3)~~ UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
8 “United States person” means—

9 ~~(A)~~ any United States citizen or an alien
10 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
11 the United States;

12 ~~(B)~~ an entity organized under the laws of
13 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
14 the United States, including any foreign branch
15 of such an entity; or

16 ~~(C)~~ any person in the United States.

17 **SEC. 6. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.**

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the Presi-
20 dent shall submit to Congress a report detailing—

21 ~~(1)~~ any incidents of interference in undersea ca-
22 bles near Taiwan; and

23 ~~(2)~~ any actions taken in response to such inci-
24 dents.

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 *This Act may be cited as the “Critical Undersea Infra-*
3 *structure Resilience Initiative Act”.*

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 *Congress finds the following:*

6 *(1) The Government of the People’s Republic of*
7 *China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics*
8 *to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the*
9 *status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected*
10 *sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan,*
11 *such as the incidents involving the severing of cables*
12 *around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key*
13 *regions in 2023 and 2025.*

14 *(2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea*
15 *infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Tai-*
16 *wan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple the*
17 *communication capabilities of Taiwan in the event of*
18 *a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of broader hybrid*
19 *warfare tactics. Disruption of critical undersea infra-*
20 *structure would significantly impact the ability of*
21 *Taiwan to communicate both domestically and inter-*
22 *nationally, leading to a breakdown in military, eco-*
23 *nomie, and social functions.*

24 *(3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on*
25 *critical undersea infrastructure has been compounded*
26 *by an increasing number of foreign vessels suspected*

1 *of involvement in sabotage, including PRC-linked ves-*
2 *sels, which pose direct threats to Taiwan’s critical in-*
3 *frastructure.*

4 *(4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or damage*
5 *critical undersea infrastructure is a critical element*
6 *of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan’s military*
7 *and civil communications and isolating Taiwan in*
8 *the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other attempt*
9 *to force unification with the PRC.*

10 *(5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, par-*
11 *ticularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabotage*
12 *and disruption to critical undersea infrastructure*
13 *servicing Taiwan and other nations, including—*

14 *(A) in February 2023, two vessels registered*
15 *to the PRC severed two undersea cables that ef-*
16 *fectively cut internet access to the 13,000 resi-*
17 *dents of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands, who had to*
18 *rely on microwave radio transmissions to pro-*
19 *vide limited internet access for 50 days until a*
20 *cable ship was able to complete repairs;*

21 *(B) in January 2025, Taiwan’s Chunghwa*
22 *Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable*
23 *north of Taipei and identified a “suspicious ves-*
24 *sel” registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin*
25 *Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross pat-*

1 *tern while dragging its anchor near where the*
2 *cable was damaged;*

3 *(C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged*
4 *vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by*
5 *Taiwan's coast guard after suspicious movements*
6 *off the coast of New Taipei; and*

7 *(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast*
8 *guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58*
9 *near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an undersea*
10 *cable in the area was severed, with the captain*
11 *later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in*
12 *the area and that he "might have broken the*
13 *cable".*

14 *(6) Since 2023, there have been at least 11 cases*
15 *of damage to undersea cables around Taiwan and a*
16 *similar number in the Baltic Sea, with authorities in*
17 *Taiwan and Europe suspecting PRC and Russian in-*
18 *volvement and possible coordination in several inci-*
19 *dents. Those incidents highlight the vulnerability of*
20 *critical undersea infrastructure, as well as the dif-*
21 *ficulty of proving sabotage or holding perpetrators ac-*
22 *countable.*

23 *(7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastruc-*
24 *ture constitutes gray zone tactics designed to desta-*

1 *bilize and undermine international security while*
2 *falling short of direct military confrontation.*

3 (8) *Several regional mechanisms have been estab-*
4 *lished to bolster the security of undersea cables, in-*
5 *cluding the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime*
6 *domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for*
7 *Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhanc-*
8 *ing the security and resilience of undersea cables in*
9 *the Indo-Pacific.*

10 (9) *Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy*
11 *by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in*
12 *the global information and communications tech-*
13 *nology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet*
14 *connectivity or energy security would have a direct*
15 *impact on the world's economy.*

16 (10) *To counter the threats described in this sec-*
17 *tion and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is im-*
18 *perative for the United States and its allies to take*
19 *decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for critical*
20 *undersea infrastructure and foster international co-*
21 *operation to protect those critical assets.*

22 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

23 *In this section:*

24 (1) *CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.—*
25 *The term “critical undersea infrastructure” means—*

1 (A) *subsea energy infrastructure, including*
2 *a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment in-*
3 *stalled on, beneath, or within the seabed, to*
4 *transmit electricity (including via subsea elec-*
5 *tricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or*
6 *equipment related to the support of offshore en-*
7 *ergy production installations) or to transport*
8 *natural gas, oil, or hydrogen between land-based*
9 *or off-shore infrastructure, as well as associated*
10 *landing stations and facilities; or*

11 (B) *subsea telecommunications infrastruc-*
12 *ture, including subsea fiber-optic cables and re-*
13 *lated equipment installed on, beneath, or within*
14 *the seabed, and used to transmit communica-*
15 *tions, data, voice, video, or other electronic sig-*
16 *nals, as well as associated landing stations and*
17 *facilities.*

18 (2) *SABOTAGE.—The term “sabotage” means ac-*
19 *tions, or preparations for future actions, taken with*
20 *the intent to cause defective production of, operation*
21 *of, or damage to critical undersea infrastructure, in-*
22 *cluding the integrity of data transmitted via subsea*
23 *telecommunications infrastructure.*

1 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE**
2 **RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.**

3 (a) *ESTABLISHMENT.*—Not later than 360 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
5 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
6 of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast
7 Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Secretary
8 of State considers relevant, shall establish an initiative to
9 be known as the “Taiwan Critical Undersea Infrastructure
10 Initiative” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).

11 (b) *PRIORITY.*—The Initiative shall prioritize the pro-
12 tection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure
13 near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the
14 PRC.

15 (c) *KEY FOCUS AREAS.*—

16 (1) *ADVANCED MONITORING AND DETECTION CA-*
17 *PABILITIES.*—In carrying out the Initiative, the Sec-
18 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
19 Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense,
20 shall develop and deploy advanced critical undersea
21 infrastructure monitoring systems capable of detecting
22 disruptions or potential sabotage in real-time, includ-
23 ing by informing Taiwan, as appropriate, of early
24 warnings about risks to Taiwan’s critical undersea
25 infrastructure from global intelligence networks.

26 (2) *RAPID RESPONSE PROTOCOLS.*—

1 (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*In carrying out the Ini-*
2 *tiative, the Secretary of State shall—*

3 (i) *in cooperation with regional part-*
4 *ners, establish rapid response protocols for*
5 *damaged critical undersea infrastructure or*
6 *mitigating disruptions; and*

7 (ii) *work with allies and partners of*
8 *the United States to help Taiwan and re-*
9 *gional partners develop the logistical capac-*
10 *ity to respond quickly to attacks on critical*
11 *undersea infrastructure and minimize*
12 *downtime.*

13 (B) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-*
14 *TIONS.*—*There is authorized to be appropriated*
15 *\$20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027 through*
16 *2032 to carry out subparagraph (A).*

17 (3) *ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARE-*
18 *NESS.*—*In carrying out the Initiative—*

19 (A) *the Secretary of the Navy and the Com-*
20 *mandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration*
21 *with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and regional*
22 *partners, shall enhance maritime domain aware-*
23 *ness around Taiwan, focusing on the ability to*
24 *detect and interdict suspicious vessels or activi-*
25 *ties near critical undersea infrastructure; and*

1 (B) *the Commandant of the Coast Guard*
2 *shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,*
3 *particularly in the Taiwan Strait and sur-*
4 *rounding maritime zones, to monitor potential*
5 *threats and prevent sabotage.*

6 (4) *INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PROTEC-*
7 *TION.—*

8 (A) *IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-*
9 *tiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to estab-*
10 *lish cooperative frameworks with regional and*
11 *global partners to protect undersea cable net-*
12 *works near Taiwan.*

13 (B) *ELEMENTS.—The frameworks estab-*
14 *lished under subparagraph (A) shall provide for*
15 *participation by the United States in joint*
16 *drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and col-*
17 *laborative surveillance operations to enhance col-*
18 *lective security against sabotage.*

19 (5) *TAIWAN-SPECIFIC CABLE HARDENING.—In*
20 *carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State*
21 *shall encourage and support the hardening of critical*
22 *undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including rein-*
23 *forcing cables, improving burial depths, and using*
24 *more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to*
25 *natural disasters and sabotage.*

1 **SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.**

2 (a) *WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER PRC*
3 *SABOTAGE.*—*The President shall work with like-minded*
4 *international partners to implement strategies that directly*
5 *counter the Government of the PRC’s critical undersea in-*
6 *frastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray zone war-*
7 *fare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure on the*
8 *PRC to adhere to international norms regarding the protec-*
9 *tion of critical undersea infrastructure.*

10 (b) *RAISING AWARENESS.*—*The President shall work*
11 *with like-minded international partners to raise global*
12 *awareness of the risks posed by the PRC’s sabotage of crit-*
13 *ical undersea infrastructure, including through public di-*
14 *plomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation in*
15 *international forums that address gray zone tactics and the*
16 *protection of critical undersea infrastructure.*

17 **SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
18 **CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SAB-**
19 **OTAGE.**

20 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The President, in coordination*
21 *with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treas-*
22 *ury, shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c)*
23 *with respect to any foreign person that the President deter-*
24 *mines, on or after the date of the enactment of this Act,*
25 *is responsible for acts of sabotage, or facilitates acts of sabo-*
26 *tage, against undersea infrastructure critical to the security*

1 *of Taiwan or other United States allies or partners, includ-*
2 *ing—*

3 *(1) any foreign vessel or entity the owner or op-*
4 *erator of which knowingly—*

5 *(A) commits acts of sabotage; or*

6 *(B) conducts preparatory surveillance,*
7 *logistical support, security, or other services that*
8 *facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and*

9 *(2) any foreign person that knowingly—*

10 *(A) owns, operates, or manages a vessel or*
11 *entity described in paragraph (1);*

12 *(B) provides underwriting services or insur-*
13 *ance or reinsurance necessary for such a vessel or*
14 *entity;*

15 *(C) facilitates deceptive or structured trans-*
16 *actions to support such a vessel or entity;*

17 *(D) provides port or logistics services or fa-*
18 *cilities for technology upgrades or installation of*
19 *equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of,*
20 *such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanc-*
21 *tions;*

22 *(E) provides documentation, registration, or*
23 *flagging services for such a vessel for the purpose*
24 *of evading sanctions; or*

1 (F) serves as a captain, principal officer, or
2 senior leader of such a vessel or entity.

3 (b) *REPORT REQUIRED.*—Not later than 15 days after
4 imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person under
5 subsection (a), the President shall submit to the appropriate
6 congressional committees a report that includes a detailed
7 justification for the imposition of the sanctions.

8 (c) *SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.*—The sanctions described
9 in this subsection are the following:

10 (1) *BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.*—The President
11 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
12 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
13 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and pro-
14 hibit all transactions in all property and interests in
15 property of a foreign person described in subsection
16 (a), if such property and interests in property are in
17 the United States, come within the United States, or
18 are or come within the possession or control of a
19 United States person.

20 (2) *INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PA-*
21 *ROLE.*—

22 (A) *VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.*—An
23 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—

24 (i) inadmissible to the United States;

1 (ii) *ineligible to receive a visa or other*
2 *documentation to enter the United States;*
3 *and*

4 (iii) *otherwise ineligible to be admitted*
5 *or paroled into the United States or to re-*
6 *ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-*
7 *tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et*
8 *seq.).*

9 (B) *CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—*

10 (i) *IN GENERAL.—The visa or other*
11 *entry documentation of an alien described*
12 *in subsection (a) shall be revoked, regardless*
13 *of when such visa or other entry documenta-*
14 *tion is or was issued.*

15 (ii) *IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-*
16 *tion under clause (i) shall—*

17 (I) *take effect immediately; and*

18 (II) *automatically cancel any*
19 *other valid visa or entry documenta-*
20 *tion that is in the possession of the*
21 *alien.*

22 (d) *IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.—*

23 (1) *IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may exer-*
24 *cise all authorities provided under sections 203 and*
25 *205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers*

1 *Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this sec-*
2 *tion.*

3 (2) *PENALTIES.*—*A person that violates, at-*
4 *tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a vio-*
5 *lation of this section or any regulation, license, or*
6 *order issued to carry out this section shall be subject*
7 *to the penalties set forth in subsections (b) and (c) of*
8 *section 206 of the International Emergency Economic*
9 *Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a*
10 *person that commits an unlawful act described in*
11 *subsection (a) of that section.*

12 (e) *EXCEPTIONS.*—

13 (1) *EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NA-*
14 *TIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT AND LAW EN-*
15 *FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.*—*Sanctions under this sec-*
16 *tion shall not apply with respect to the admission or*
17 *parole of an alien into the United States if admitting*
18 *or paroling the alien is necessary—*

19 (A) *to permit the United States to comply*
20 *with the Agreement regarding the Headquarters*
21 *of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success*
22 *June 26, 1947, and entered into force November*
23 *21, 1947, between the United Nations and the*
24 *United States, or other applicable international*
25 *obligations of the United States; or*

1 (B) *to carry out or assist authorized law*
2 *enforcement activity in the United States.*

3 (2) *EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTELLIGENCE*
4 *ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not*
5 *apply to any activity subject to the reporting require-*
6 *ments under title V of the National Security Act of*
7 *1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any authorized intel-*
8 *ligence activities of the United States.*

9 (3) *EXCEPTION RELATING TO IMPORTATION OF*
10 *GOODS.—*

11 (A) *IN GENERAL.—A requirement to block*
12 *and prohibit all transactions in all property and*
13 *interests in property under this section shall not*
14 *include the authority or requirement to impose*
15 *sanctions on the importation of goods.*

16 (B) *GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,*
17 *the term “good” means any article, natural or*
18 *manmade substance, material, supply or manu-*
19 *factured product, including inspection and test*
20 *equipment, and excluding technical data.*

21 (f) *NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER.—The*
22 *President may waive the application of sanctions under*
23 *this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President sub-*
24 *mits to the appropriate congressional committees—*

1 (1) *a certification in writing that the issuance of*
2 *the waiver is in the national security interests of the*
3 *United States; and*

4 (2) *a report explaining the basis for the certifi-*
5 *cation.*

6 (g) *DEFINITIONS.—In this section:*

7 (1) *ADMISSION; ADMITTED; ALIEN; ETC.—The*
8 *terms “admission”, “admitted”, “alien”, and “law-*
9 *fully admitted for permanent residence” have the*
10 *meanings given those terms in section 101 of the Im-*
11 *migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101).*

12 (2) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
13 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
14 *tees” means—*

15 (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*
16 *and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and*
17 *Urban Affairs of the Senate; and*

18 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*
19 *the Committee on Financial Services of the*
20 *House of Representatives.*

21 (3) *FOREIGN PERSON.—The term “foreign per-*
22 *son” means an individual or entity that is not a*
23 *United States person.*

24 (4) *UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term “United*
25 *States person” means—*

1 (A) any United States citizen or an alien
2 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the
3 United States;

4 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
5 the United States or of any jurisdiction within
6 the United States, including any foreign branch
7 of such an entity; or

8 (C) any person in the United States.

9 **SEC. 7. SEMIANNUAL REPORT.**

10 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
11 of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through 2032,
12 the President shall submit to Congress a report detailing—

13 (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage re-
14 lated to critical undersea infrastructure near Taiwan;
15 and

16 (2) any actions taken in response to such inci-
17 dents.

18 **SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR**
19 **CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.**

20 (a) *STATEMENT OF POLICY.*—It is the policy of the
21 United States to be prepared for potential crises involving
22 Taiwan, including an attempt by the People’s Republic of
23 China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through
24 comprehensive interagency contingency planning that ad-

1 *dresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to the*
2 *national security of the United States.*

3 *(b) CROSS-STRAIT CONTINGENCY PLANNING GROUP.—*

4 *(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
5 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the President*
6 *shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning*
7 *Group—*

8 *(A) to be chaired by the National Security*
9 *Council; and*

10 *(B) consisting of senior officials from the*
11 *Department of State, the Department of Defense,*
12 *the United States intelligence community, and*
13 *such other Federal agencies as may be appro-*
14 *priate.*

15 *(2) FUNCTIONS.—The Cross-Strait Contingency*
16 *Planning Group shall—*

17 *(A) conduct scenario-based planning exer-*
18 *cises to prepare for potential crises involving*
19 *Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine sce-*
20 *narios, the seizure of an outlying island, mili-*
21 *tary contingencies, economic coercion, cyber at-*
22 *tacks, and hybrid threats;*

23 *(B) identify critical vulnerabilities in sup-*
24 *ply chains, financial systems, critical infrastruc-*
25 *ture, and security posture of the United States*

1 *and allies and partners of the United States that*
2 *would be affected by a crisis involving Taiwan;*

3 *(C) develop integrated contingency plans*
4 *that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic,*
5 *cyber, and homeland security responses across*
6 *the Group;*

7 *(D) assess the adequacy of existing authori-*
8 *ties, resources, and decision-making processes to*
9 *execute such contingency plans;*

10 *(E) identify gaps in capabilities, authori-*
11 *ties, or coordination mechanisms and rec-*
12 *ommend solutions;*

13 *(F) share risk assessments with allies and*
14 *partners of the United States, as appropriate;*
15 *and*

16 *(G) regularly test and refine contingency*
17 *plans.*

18 *(3) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180*
19 *days after the establishment of the Cross-Strait Con-*
20 *tingency Planning Group under paragraph (1), and*
21 *annually thereafter for 10 years, the Cross-Strait*
22 *Contingency Planning Group shall submit to Con-*
23 *gress a classified report that includes—*

1 (A) a description of contingency scenarios
2 assessed and planning activities conducted by the
3 Group;

4 (B) an assessment of the preparedness of the
5 United States and allies and partners of the
6 United States to respond to a crisis involving
7 Taiwan, including identification of capability
8 gaps and resource requirements;

9 (C) recommendations for legislative action,
10 policy changes, or resource allocation to enhance
11 such preparedness; and

12 (D) a description of exercises conducted and
13 lessons learned by the Group.

Amend the title so as to read: “A bill to enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan’s national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People’s Republic of China, and for other purposes.”.