

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 1st Sess.

S. 1731

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People’s Republic of China.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mr. COONS

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-
5 seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced
6 Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-
9 nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-
10 velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and
11 known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—

1 (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas
2 logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA
3 to project and sustain military power at greater dis-
4 tances;

5 (2) a global PLA logistics network could give
6 the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt
7 United States military operations;

8 (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened
9 the first overseas PLA military base near the com-
10 mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

11 (4) in 2019, the PRC also attempted to acquire
12 strategically important port infrastructure at Subic
13 Bay in the Philippines, but was stopped by the Gov-
14 ernments of the United States, the Philippines, and
15 Japan, and by private investors;

16 (5) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and
17 Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia
18 Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Cen-
19 ter and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at
20 Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have
21 been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have
22 been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base
23 since December 2023; and

24 (6) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the
25 PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base

1 in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to
2 additional military facilities to support naval, air,
3 and ground forces projection in many countries.

4 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

5 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-
6 case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC per-
7 manent military presence in several countries, it is the
8 sense of Congress that future efforts to counter the PRC's
9 global basing intentions must—

10 (1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-
11 dress the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;

12 (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination
13 with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-
14 of-government approach;

15 (3) ensure that the United States Government
16 maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive
17 posture in order to maximize strategic decision
18 space;

19 (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions
20 that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-
21 sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-
22 cess to its sovereign territory;

23 (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the
24 PRC's global basing intentions within the context of

1 the overall United States strategic competition with
2 the PRC;

3 (6) consider how the PRC uses commercial and
4 scientific cooperation as a guise for establishing ac-
5 cess for the PLA and other PRC security forces in
6 foreign countries;

7 (7) factor in the potential contributions of key
8 allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's
9 pursuit of global basing, many of which—

10 (A) have historic ties and influence in
11 many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-
12 geting for potential future bases; and

13 (B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-
14 ture to form our baseline understanding of the
15 PRC's global intentions;

16 (8) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing
17 for enduring organizational structures and security
18 and foreign assistance and cooperation efforts to ef-
19 fectively address the issue of PRC global basing in-
20 tentions; and

21 (9) ensure that future force posture, freedom of
22 movement, and other interests of the United States
23 and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued
24 expansion of PRC bases.

1 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

2 In this Act:

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
4 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
5 mittees” means—

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
7 the Senate;

8 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of
9 the Senate;

10 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of
11 the Senate;

12 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
13 the Senate;

14 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
15 the House of Representatives;

16 (F) the Committee on Armed Services of
17 the House of Representatives;

18 (G) the Permanent Select Committee on
19 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
20 and

21 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of
22 the House of Representatives.

23 (2) PLA.—The term “PLA” means the Peo-
24 ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC.

25 (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-
26 ple’s Republic of China.

1 (4) PRC GLOBAL BASING.—The term “PRC
2 global basing” means the establishment of physical
3 locations outside the geographic boundaries of the
4 PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the
5 People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-
6 rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the
7 presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security
8 forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-
9 tion.

10 **SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S C-PRC**
11 **GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.**

12 (a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the
13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
14 Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in
15 classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional
16 committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed
17 by PRC global basing to the United States or to any
18 United States allies with respect to their ability to project
19 power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other
20 interests as a function of the PRC’s current or potential
21 locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

22 (b) STRATEGY.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
24 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
25 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of

1 Defense and other appropriate senior Federal offi-
2 cials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate con-
3 gressional committees that contains the information
4 described in paragraph (2).

5 (2) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under
6 paragraph (1) shall—

7 (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that
8 pose the greatest potential risks, as identified in
9 the assessment required under subsection (a),
10 where the PRC maintains a physical presence,
11 or is suspected to be seeking a physical pres-
12 ence, which could ultimately transition into a
13 PRC global base;

14 (B) include a comprehensive listing of ex-
15 ecutive branch entities currently involved in ad-
16 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, includ-
17 ing estimated programmatic and personal re-
18 source requirements on an agency-by-agency
19 basis to effectively address the issue of PRC
20 global basing intentions, and any relevant re-
21 source constraints;

22 (C) describe in detail all executive branch
23 efforts to mitigate the impacts to the national
24 interests of the United States and partner
25 countries of the locations referred to in sub-

1 paragraph (A) and prevent the PRC from es-
2 tablishing new global bases, including with re-
3 sources described in subparagraph (B); and

4 (D) for each of the locations referred to in
5 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the
6 United States or its allies that would be most
7 effective in ensuring the respective foreign gov-
8 ernments terminate plans for hosting a PRC
9 base.

10 (c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-
11 mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-
12 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
13 fense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall
14 establish an interagency task force—

15 (1) to implement the strategy described in sec-
16 tion (b) to counter the PRC's efforts at the locations
17 of chief concern; and

18 (2) to identify mitigation measures that would
19 prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in lo-
20 cations beyond the locations of chief concern identi-
21 fied pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

22 (d) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not
23 later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy re-
24 quired under subsection (b), and not less frequently than
25 once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in

1 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director
2 of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Fed-
3 eral officials, shall—

4 (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's
5 strategy and overall approach in response to the
6 PRC global basing intentions; and

7 (2) submit the results of such review, including
8 the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the
9 appropriate congressional committees.