

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 2d Sess.**

**S. 1542**

To support the internationally recognized human rights of Uyghurs and members of other minority groups residing primarily in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, to safeguard their distinct identity, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. CURTIS

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-  
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Uyghur Policy Act of  
5 2026”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The People’s Republic of China (referred to  
9 in this Act as the “PRC”) continues to repress the  
10 distinct Islamic, Turkic identity of Uyghurs and

1 members of other ethnic and religious minority  
2 groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region  
3 (referred to in this Act as the “XUAR”) in north-  
4 western China and other areas in which they have  
5 habitually resided.

6 (2) Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim  
7 ethnic minorities historically making up the majority  
8 of the XUAR population have maintained a distinct  
9 religious and cultural identity throughout their his-  
10 tory.

11 (3) The PRC—

12 (A) ratified the International Covenant on  
13 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, done at  
14 New York, December 16, 1966, and is thereby  
15 bound by its provisions; and

16 (B) signed the International Covenant on  
17 Civil and Political Rights, done at New York  
18 December 19, 1966.

19 (4) PRC authorities manipulated the strategic  
20 objectives of the international war on terror to mask  
21 their increasing cultural and religious oppression of  
22 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority  
23 groups residing in the XUAR.

24 (5) In 2014, PRC authorities launched the  
25 “Strike Hard Against Violent Extremism” cam-

1       paign, in which dubious allegations of widespread ex-  
2       tremist activity were used as justification for viola-  
3       tions of internationally recognized human rights  
4       committed against Uyghurs and members of other  
5       ethnic and religious minority groups in the XUAR.

6               (6) PRC authorities have made use of its legal  
7       system as a tool of repression, including for the im-  
8       position of arbitrary detentions and torture against  
9       members of the Uyghur community and other ethnic  
10      and religious minority groups.

11              (7) Uyghurs and Kazakhs who have secured  
12      citizenship or permanent residency outside of the  
13      PRC have attested to repeated threats, harassment,  
14      and surveillance by PRC officials.

15              (8) Reporting from international news organiza-  
16      tions has found that during the past decade, in  
17      order to silence dissent or to force exiled or other  
18      overseas Uyghurs to return to the PRC, family  
19      members of such Uyghur individuals or members of  
20      other ethnic and religious minority groups living in-  
21      side the PRC have disappeared or been detained by  
22      PRC authorities.

23              (9) In February 2025, Thai authorities refouled  
24      40 detained Uyghurs to Xinjiang, ignoring warnings  
25      from the United States Government and Congress.

1           (10) In 2017, Radio Free Asia’s Uyghur Serv-  
2           ice was the first media organization to report on the  
3           PRC’s vast, mass arbitrary-detention program in the  
4           XUAR.

5           (11) International civil society has compiled  
6           credible evidence that—

7                   (A) more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs and  
8                   members of other ethnic and religious minority  
9                   groups were detained in extrajudicial “voca-  
10                  tional education and training centers”; and

11                   (B) thousands more such individuals con-  
12                  tinue to be coerced to participate in state-led  
13                  forced labor transfer programs.

14           (12) Independent accounts from former detain-  
15           ees of “vocational education and training” centers  
16           describe inhumane conditions and treatment, includ-  
17           ing forced political indoctrination, torture, beatings,  
18           rape, forced sterilization, and food deprivation.

19           (13) Former detainees also confirmed that they  
20           were told by guards that the only way to secure re-  
21           lease was to demonstrate sufficient political loyalty  
22           to the Government of the PRC.

23           (14) Discourse surrounding the ongoing atroc-  
24           ities in the XUAR, including efforts to support the

1 Uyghur community, remains limited in most Muslim  
2 majority nations around the world.

3 (15) Former Secretary of State Michael  
4 Pompeo determined, and both former Secretary of  
5 State Anthony Blinken and Secretary of State  
6 Marco Rubio reaffirmed, that the Government of the  
7 PRC continues to commit genocide and crimes  
8 against humanity against Uyghurs and other ethnic  
9 and religious minorities in the XUAR.

10 (16) Multiple foreign government bodies have  
11 declared that atrocities by the Government of the  
12 PRC against Uyghurs and members of other ethnic  
13 and religious minority groups in the XUAR con-  
14 stitute genocide, including the European Parliament  
15 and the parliaments of Belgium, Canada, Czech Re-  
16 public, France, Ireland, Lithuania, the Netherlands,  
17 and the United Kingdom, respectively.

18 (17) On March 12, 2026, China's National Peo-  
19 ple's Congress adopted the Law on Promoting Eth-  
20 nic Unity and Progress, which mandates Mandarin  
21 instruction for minority children beginning in pre-  
22 school and subjects all ethnic affairs to party au-  
23 thority, systematically eroding the linguistic and cul-  
24 tural identity of Uyghurs and other minority groups.

1 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 It is the sense of Congress that—

3 (1) the Government of the PRC should—

4 (A) recognize, and take tangible steps to  
5 protect and preserve, the distinct ethnic, cul-  
6 tural, religious, and linguistic identity of  
7 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and reli-  
8 gious minority groups in the XUAR;

9 (B) immediately cease all government-  
10 sponsored crackdowns, imprisonments, and de-  
11 tentions of people throughout the XUAR aimed  
12 at repressing their ethnic, cultural, political, or  
13 religious identities; and

14 (C) cease all government-sponsored  
15 transnational repression of Uyghurs, including  
16 the detainment, harassment, intimidation, and  
17 surveillance of the family members of exiled  
18 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and mi-  
19 nority groups in the XUAR;

20 (2) the Government of the PRC should imme-  
21 diately open the XUAR to regular, transparent, and  
22 unmanipulated visits by—

23 (A) members of the press;

24 (B) international organizations;

1 (C) academic and research institutions fo-  
2 cused on internationally recognized human  
3 rights; and

4 (D) foreign delegations, including delega-  
5 tions from the United States;

6 (3) it is commendable that countries, including  
7 Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia,  
8 Japan, and Türkiye, have provided shelter and hos-  
9 pitality to Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious  
10 minority group members in exile from the PRC;

11 (4) the Government of the PRC should imme-  
12 diately grant unconditional release of all prisoners  
13 that have been detained for their ethnic, cultural, re-  
14 ligious, and linguistic identities, for expressing their  
15 political or religious beliefs in the XUAR, or for  
16 being related to members of the Uyghur diaspora or  
17 activist community, including—

18 (A) Ekpar Asat, who participated in the  
19 Department of State’s International Visitors  
20 Leadership Program in 2016, was incarcerated  
21 after returning to the XUAR, and is now serv-  
22 ing a 15-year prison sentence on charges of “in-  
23 citing ethnic hatred and ethnic discrimination”;

24 (B) Dr. Gulshan Abbas, a Uyghur retired  
25 medical doctor who was unjustly detained in the

1 XUAR on September 11, 2018, and unfairly  
2 sentenced to 20 years in prison in retaliation  
3 for her sister’s advocacy for Uyghurs;

4 (C) Illham Tohti, a Uyghur economics pro-  
5 fessor who advocated for improving Uyghur-  
6 Han relations and improving the implementa-  
7 tion of regional autonomy laws in the PRC, was  
8 detained on January 15, 2014, and sentenced  
9 to life in prison on charges of “separatism”;  
10 and

11 (D) Rahile Dawut, a professor who re-  
12 searched Uyghur folklore and traditions and  
13 was detained in 2017 and sentenced to life in  
14 prison on charges of “splittism” and “endan-  
15 gering State security”;

16 (5) the Government of the PRC should facili-  
17 tate comprehensive access for international organiza-  
18 tions, to “vocational education and training” cen-  
19 ters, prisons, and factories in the XUAR; and

20 (6) the Department of State should continue to  
21 facilitate the unhindered dissemination of informa-  
22 tion to the international community regarding the  
23 status of internationally recognized human rights,  
24 religious freedom, and transnational repression of

1 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious  
2 minority groups in the XUAR.

3 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES STRENGTHENING OF COORDINA-**  
4 **TION ON UYGHUR ISSUES.**

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State should, as  
6 appropriate—

7 (1) prioritize policies, programs, and projects,  
8 in coordination with other relevant agencies, to sup-  
9 port Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and reli-  
10 gious minority groups in the XUAR;

11 (2) vigorously promote policies to protect the  
12 distinct ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic  
13 identities of the Uyghurs and other minority groups;

14 (3) maintain close contact with Uyghur reli-  
15 gious, cultural, and political leaders, including by  
16 seeking regular travel to the XUAR and visiting  
17 Uyghur diaspora communities around the world;

18 (4) advocate for the release of political pris-  
19 oners in the XUAR who were detained for exercising  
20 their internationally recognized human rights to put  
21 pressure on exiled Uyghurs;

22 (5) regularly consult with Congress regarding  
23 policies relevant to the XUAR and the Uyghurs;

1           (6) engage with counterparts in Europe, Cen-  
2           tral Asia, and member states of the Organisation of  
3           Islamic Cooperation—

4                   (A) to promote internationally recognized  
5           human rights and religious freedom for  
6           Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minor-  
7           ity groups in the XUAR; and

8                   (B) to develop and implement joint initia-  
9           tives and programs aimed at promoting aware-  
10          ness and supporting Uyghur victims of deten-  
11          tion, harassment, and transnational repression;

12          (7) develop a strategy to work with foreign  
13          partners to pressure the Government of the PRC—

14                   (A) to close all detention facilities and “vo-  
15          cational education and training” camps housing  
16          Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and reli-  
17          gious minority groups in the XUAR;

18                   (B) to allow unhindered access to detention  
19          facilities and “vocational education and train-  
20          ing” camps in the XUAR by independent  
21          media, researchers, and international organiza-  
22          tions for a comprehensive assessment; and

23                   (C) to protect internationally recognized  
24          human rights and preserve the distinct religious  
25          and cultural identity of the Uyghurs and other

1 religious and ethnic minority communities in  
2 the XUAR;

3 (8) work with international partners—

4 (A) to raise awareness regarding  
5 transnational repression of Uyghur Americans  
6 or Uyghurs who are living in exile in the United  
7 States; and

8 (B) to develop and implement strategies to  
9 prevent and respond to such transnational re-  
10 pression; and

11 (9) establish a mechanism for individuals to re-  
12 port incidents of transnational repression against  
13 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority  
14 groups with ties to the XUAR.

15 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date  
16 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for  
17 the following 3 years, the Secretary of State shall submit  
18 a report to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
19 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
20 House of Representatives, with a classified annex, if nec-  
21 essary, that—

22 (1) lists the actions described in subsection (a)  
23 that were taken by the Secretary during the report-  
24 ing period, including programs and engagements  
25 with foreign governments;

1           (2) describes actions taken by the United States  
2           Government to address and prevent transnational re-  
3           pression against Uyghurs in the United States; and

4           (3) includes recommendations for further legis-  
5           lative or policy measures in support of the inter-  
6           nationally recognized human rights of Uyghurs and  
7           other ethnic and religious minority groups from the  
8           XUAR.

9           (c) SUNSET.—The requirements under this section  
10          shall cease to have any force or effect beginning on the  
11          date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of  
12          this Act.

13       **SEC. 5. NO ADDITIONAL FUNDS AUTHORIZED.**

14          No additional funds are authorized to carry out the  
15          requirements under this Act. Such requirements shall be  
16          carried out using amounts otherwise authorized for similar  
17          purposes.

18       **SEC. 6. REQUIREMENT FOR UYGHUR LANGUAGE TRAINING.**

19          (a) UYGHUR LANGUAGE TRAINING AND STAFFING.—  
20          The Secretary of State shall take such steps as may be  
21          necessary to ensure that—

22               (1) Uyghur language training is available to  
23               Foreign Service officers; and

24               (2) efforts are made to ensure that at least 1  
25               Uyghur-speaking member of the Service (as defined

1 in section 103 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980  
2 (22 U.S.C. 3903)) is assigned to—

3 (A) one United States diplomatic or con-  
4 sular post in the People’s Republic of China;  
5 and

6 (B) one United States diplomatic or con-  
7 sular post in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,  
8 Kyrgyszstan, or Türkiye.

9 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the date  
10 of the enactment of this Act, the Foreign Service Institute  
11 shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Rela-  
12 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs  
13 of the House of Representatives that outlines all of the  
14 steps that have been taken to implement subsection (a).

15 **SEC. 7. UYGHUR CONSIDERATIONS AT THE UNITED NA-**  
16 **TIONS.**

17 The President shall direct the United States Perma-  
18 nent Representative to the United Nations to use the  
19 voice, vote, and influence of the United States at every  
20 United States multilateral mission—

21 (1) to oppose any efforts to prevent consider-  
22 ation of the gross violation of internationally recog-  
23 nized human rights in the XUAR in any body of the  
24 United Nations;

1           (2) to oppose any actions to prevent the partici-  
2           pation of advocates for internationally recognized  
3           human rights of Uyghurs in nongovernmental fora  
4           hosted by, or otherwise organized under the auspices  
5           of, any body of the United Nations; and

6           (3) to support the creation or appointment of a  
7           special rapporteur for the XUAR for the purposes  
8           of—

9                   (A) monitoring violations and abuses of  
10           internationally recognized human rights in the  
11           XUAR; and

12                   (B) making reports containing information  
13           about such violations and abuses available to  
14           the General Assembly of the United Nations  
15           and other United Nations affiliated agencies,  
16           bodies, entities, and member states.