

Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

119<sup>TH</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION**S. 1216**

To support Taiwan's international space, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 31, 2025

Mr. VAN HOLLEN (for himself, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. KIM, and Mr. BENNET) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

\_\_\_\_\_ (legislative day, \_\_\_\_\_), \_\_\_\_\_

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italie*]

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**A BILL**

To support Taiwan's international space, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Allies Fund  
5 Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

1           (1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy  
2 of more than 23,000,000 people and an important  
3 contributor to peace and stability around the world.

4           (2) The People’s Republic of China has engaged  
5 in a years-long campaign to diplomatically isolate  
6 Taiwan on the world stage.

7           (3) Since 2013, the Gambia, São Tomé and  
8 Príncipe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina  
9 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati,  
10 Nicaragua, Honduras, and, most recently in 2024,  
11 Nauru have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-  
12 wan in favor of diplomatic relations with the Peo-  
13 ple’s Republic of China.

14           (4) The People’s Republic of China has used  
15 economic and diplomatic intimidation against coun-  
16 tries pursuing unofficial relations with Taiwan, in-  
17 cluding Lithuania, Czechia, and the United States.

18           (5) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public  
19 Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United  
20 States “to maintain the capacity of the United  
21 States to resist any resort to force or other forms  
22 of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the  
23 social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan”.

24           (6) The Taiwan Allies International Protection  
25 and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019

1 (Public Law 116-135) states that the United States  
2 Government should—

3 (A) “support Taiwan in strengthening its  
4 official diplomatic relationships as well as other  
5 partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific  
6 region and around the world”; and

7 (B) “consider, in certain cases as appro-  
8 priate and in alignment with United States in-  
9 terests, increasing its economic, security, and  
10 diplomatic engagement with nations that have  
11 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-  
12 graded relations with Taiwan”.

13 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

14 It is the sense of Congress that the United States  
15 Government should—

16 (1) advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s pres-  
17 ence on the global stage, including at international  
18 organizations;

19 (2) promote the preservation and expansion of  
20 Taiwan’s official diplomatic relations with countries  
21 around the world;

22 (3) expand Taiwan’s unofficial relations with  
23 countries around the world;

24 (4) encourage countries with unofficial relations  
25 with Taiwan to deepen their engagement; and

1           (5) advance the economic development of coun-  
2           tries that support democratic partners like Taiwan.

3 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN ALLIES FUND.**

4           (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—Of the  
5 amounts made available under the Countering PRC Influen-  
6 ence Fund for each of the fiscal years 2026, 2027, and  
7 2028, there is authorized to be appropriated \$40,000,000  
8 for each such fiscal year to support Taiwan’s international  
9 space.

10          (b) **ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.**—Amounts available pur-  
11 suant to the authorization of appropriations under sub-  
12 section (a) may be used in countries that—

13           (1) maintain official relations with Taiwan or  
14           have meaningfully strengthened unofficial relations  
15           with Taiwan;

16           (2) have been subject to coercion or pressure by  
17           the People’s Republic of China due to their relations  
18           with Taiwan; and

19           (3) lack the economic or political capability to  
20           effectively respond to such coercion or pressure by  
21           the People’s Republic of China without the support  
22           of the United States.

23          (c) **USE OF FUNDS.**—Amounts available pursuant to  
24 the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)

1 may be used to support any of the following activities in  
2 the countries described in subsection (b):

3           (1) To support health initiatives that provide  
4 alternatives to the Health Silk Road.

5           (2) To build the capacity and resilience of civil  
6 society, media, and other nongovernmental organiza-  
7 tions in countering the influence and propaganda of  
8 the People's Republic of China.

9           (3) To diversify supply chains away from the  
10 People's Republic of China.

11           (4) To provide alternatives to People's Republic  
12 of China development assistance and project financ-  
13 ing.

14           (5) To advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-  
15 tion in international fora and multilateral organiza-  
16 tions.

17           (6) To work with the private sector to provide  
18 United States or allied alternatives to People's Re-  
19 public of China information and communications  
20 technology infrastructure and components.

21       (d) LIMITATION ON FUNDS.—A country described in  
22 subsection (b) may not receive more than \$5,000,000 of  
23 funds made available pursuant to the authorization of ap-  
24 propriations under subsection (a) during any fiscal year.

25       (e) IMPLEMENTATION.—

1           (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in  
2           consultation with the Administrator for the United  
3           States Agency for International Development, the  
4           Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, and  
5           the heads other relevant Federal agencies, shall co-  
6           ordinate and carry out activities described in sub-  
7           section (c).

8           (2) AUTHORITIES.—Amounts available pursu-  
9           ant to the authorization of appropriations under  
10          subsection (a) may be considered foreign assistance  
11          under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22  
12          U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) for purposes of making avail-  
13          able the administrative authorities in that Act and  
14          may be transferred to, and merged with, funds made  
15          available for any provision of the Foreign Assistance  
16          Act of 1961 to carry out the purposes of this sec-  
17          tion, except that such funds shall remain available  
18          until expended.

19          (3) COORDINATION WITH TAIWAN.—In order to  
20          maximize cost efficiency and eliminate duplication,  
21          the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Ad-  
22          ministrator for the United States Agency for Inter-  
23          national Development, should work with the Director  
24          of the American Institute in Taiwan to ensure co-

1 ordination with relevant parties of Taiwan, as appro-  
2 priate.

3 (4) ~~COST-SHARING WITH TAIWAN.~~—The Sec-  
4 retary of State should convey to relevant parties of  
5 Taiwan, as appropriate, that Taiwan should con-  
6 tribute commensurate assistance to countries de-  
7 scribed in subsection (b).

8 (5) ~~REPORT.~~—

9 (A) ~~IN GENERAL.~~—Not later than 1 year  
10 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and  
11 annually thereafter for two years, the Secretary  
12 of State shall submit to the appropriate con-  
13 gressional committees a report on activities de-  
14 scribed in this section that were carried out  
15 during the preceding fiscal year.

16 (B) ~~ELEMENTS.~~—Each report required by  
17 subparagraph (A) shall include—

18 (i) with respect to each activity de-  
19 scribed in subsection (c)—

20 (I) the amount of funding for the  
21 activity;

22 (II) the goal to which the activity  
23 relates; and

1                   (III) an assessment of the suc-  
2                   cess of the activity to meet the goal to  
3                   which the activity relates; and

4                   (ii) with respect to this subsection—

5                   (I) the amount of funding for the  
6                   activity provided by Taiwan during  
7                   the preceding year, if any; and

8                   (II) an assessment of whether  
9                   the funding described in subelause (I)  
10                  is commensurate with funding pro-  
11                  vided by the United States.

12           (f) **RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**—Nothing in this sec-  
13           tion may be construed to apply to or limit United States  
14           foreign assistance not provided using amounts available  
15           pursuant to the authorization of appropriations under sub-  
16           section (a).

17           (g) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**  
18           **DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate con-  
19           gressional committees” means—

20                   (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
21                   Senate; and

22                   (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
23                   House of Representatives.

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 *This subtitle may be cited as the “Taiwan Allies Fund*  
3 *Act”.*

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 *Congress makes the following findings:*

6 *(1) Taiwan is a free and prosperous democracy*  
7 *of more than 23,000,000 people and an important*  
8 *contributor to peace and stability around the world.*

9 *(2) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has*  
10 *engaged in a years-long campaign to diplomatically*  
11 *isolate Taiwan on the world stage.*

12 *(3) Since 2013, the Gambia, Sao Tome and*  
13 *Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina*  
14 *Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, Kiribati,*  
15 *Nicaragua, Honduras, and, most recently in 2024,*  
16 *Nauru have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan*  
17 *in favor of diplomatic relations with the People’s Re-*  
18 *public of China.*

19 *(4) The People’s Republic of China has used eco-*  
20 *nomic and diplomatic intimidation against countries*  
21 *pursuing unofficial relations with Taiwan, including*  
22 *Lithuania, Czechia, and the United States.*

23 *(5) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public*  
24 *Law 96–8) states that it is the policy of the United*  
25 *States “to maintain the capacity of the United States*  
26 *to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion*

1        *that would jeopardize the security, or the social or*  
2        *economic system, of the people on Taiwan”.*

3            *(6) The Taiwan Allies International Protection*  
4        *and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019*  
5        *(Public Law 116–135) states that the United States*  
6        *Government should—*

7            *(A) “support Taiwan in strengthening its*  
8        *official diplomatic relationships as well as other*  
9        *partnerships with countries in the Indo-Pacific*  
10       *region and around the world”; and*

11           *(B) “consider, in certain cases as appro-*  
12       *priate and in alignment with United States in-*  
13       *terests, increasing its economic, security, and*  
14       *diplomatic engagement with nations that have*  
15       *demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-*  
16       *graded relations with Taiwan”.*

17       **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

18        *It is the sense of Congress that the United States Gov-*  
19       *ernment should—*

20           *(1) advocate, as appropriate, for Taiwan’s en-*  
21       *gagement on the global stage, including at inter-*  
22       *national organizations;*

23           *(2) promote the preservation and expansion of*  
24       *Taiwan’s official diplomatic relations with countries*  
25       *around the world;*

1           (3) *expand Taiwan’s unofficial relations with*  
2           *countries around the world;*

3           (4) *encourage countries with unofficial relations*  
4           *with Taiwan to deepen their engagement; and*

5           (5) *advance the economic development of coun-*  
6           *tries that support Taiwan.*

7 **SEC. 4. TAIWAN ALLIES FUND.**

8           (a) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—Of the*  
9           *amounts made available under the Countering People’s Re-*  
10           *public of China Influence Fund for each of fiscal years*  
11           *2026, 2027, and 2028, there is authorized to be appro-*  
12           *priated \$10,000,000 for each such fiscal year to support*  
13           *Taiwan’s international space.*

14           (b) *ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—Amounts available pursu-*  
15           *ant to the authorization of appropriations under subsection*  
16           *(a) may be used in countries that—*

17           (1) *maintain official relations with Taiwan or*  
18           *the Secretary of State certifies to Congress have mean-*  
19           *ingfully strengthened unofficial relations with Tai-*  
20           *wan;*

21           (2) *have been subject to coercion or pressure by*  
22           *the People’s Republic of China due to their relations*  
23           *with Taiwan; and*

24           (3) *lack the economic or political capability to*  
25           *effectively respond to such coercion or pressure by the*

1        *People’s Republic of China without the support of the*  
2        *United States.*

3        (c) *USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts available pursuant to*  
4        *the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a)*  
5        *may be used to support any of the following activities in*  
6        *the countries described in subsection (b) if such activities*  
7        *have a direct linkage to the goal of supporting Taiwan’s*  
8        *international engagement, are aligned with clear and jus-*  
9        *tifiable United States counter-PRC strategic imperatives*  
10       *that guide all programs funded by the Counter PRC Infl-*  
11       *ence Fund, and support United States national interests*  
12       :

13                (1) *To support initiatives that provide alter-*  
14        *natives to the People’s Republic of China health, dig-*  
15        *ital, and energy initiatives.*

16                (2) *To build the capacity and resilience of civil*  
17        *society, media, and other nongovernmental organiza-*  
18        *tions in countering the malign influence of the Peo-*  
19        *ple’s Republic of China.*

20                (3) *To diversify supply chains away from the*  
21        *People’s Republic of China, particularly to mitigate*  
22        *vulnerabilities to PRC economic coercion.*

23                (4) *To provide alternatives to People’s Republic*  
24        *of China development assistance and project financ-*  
25        *ing and to expose the People’s Republic of China’s*

1       *failure to deliver on development promises or other*  
2       *negative aspects of PRC development assistance.*

3           (5) *To support Taiwan's official or unofficial*  
4       *diplomatic presence abroad or advance Taiwan's*  
5       *meaningful participation in international fora and*  
6       *multilateral organizations.*

7           (6) *To provide United States or allied alter-*  
8       *natives to People's Republic of China information*  
9       *and communications technology infrastructure and*  
10       *components, in coordination with the private sector,*  
11       *as appropriate.*

12           (7) *To strengthen the capacity of partner coun-*  
13       *tries to address and reduce the impacts of foreign ma-*  
14       *lign influence operations, propaganda, and other*  
15       *asymmetric informational activities originating from*  
16       *the People's Republic of China.*

17           (8) *To mitigate a country's specific*  
18       *vulnerabilities to the People's Republic of China's co-*  
19       *ercion over the country's relationship with Taiwan.*

20       (d) *LIMITATION ON FUNDS.—A country described in*  
21       *subsection (b) may not receive more than \$5,000,000 of*  
22       *funds made available pursuant to the authorization of ap-*  
23       *propriations under subsection (a) during any fiscal year.*

24       (e) *IMPLEMENTATION.—*

1           (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in*  
2           *consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal*  
3           *agencies, shall coordinate and carry out activities de-*  
4           *scribed in subsection (c).*

5           (2) *AUTHORITIES.*—*Amounts available pursuant*  
6           *to the authorization of appropriations under sub-*  
7           *section (a) may be considered foreign assistance under*  
8           *the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151*  
9           *et seq.) for purposes of making available the adminis-*  
10          *trative authorities in that Act and may be transferred*  
11          *to, and merged with, funds made available for any*  
12          *provision of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to*  
13          *carry out the purposes of this section, except that such*  
14          *funds shall remain available until expended.*

15          (3) *COORDINATION WITH TAIWAN.*—*In order to*  
16          *maximize cost efficiency and eliminate duplication,*  
17          *the Secretary of State should ensure coordination*  
18          *with relevant counterparts in Taiwan, as appro-*  
19          *priate.*

20          (4) *COST-SHARING WITH TAIWAN.*—*The Sec-*  
21          *retary of State shall, to the maximum extent prac-*  
22          *ticable, encourage cost-sharing arrangements with*  
23          *Taiwan for the assistance described in subsection (b)*  
24          *or otherwise complementary assistance.*

25          (5) *REPORT.*—

1           (A) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 1 year*  
2 *after the date of the enactment of this section,*  
3 *and annually thereafter for two years, the Sec-*  
4 *retary of State shall submit to the appropriate*  
5 *congressional committees a report on activities*  
6 *described in this section that were carried out*  
7 *during the preceding fiscal year.*

8           (B) *ELEMENTS.*—*Each report required by*  
9 *subparagraph (A) shall include—*

10                   (i) *with respect to each activity de-*  
11 *scribed in subsection (c)—*

12                           (I) *the amount of funding for the*  
13 *activity;*

14                           (II) *the goal to which the activity*  
15 *relates; and*

16                           (III) *an assessment of the success*  
17 *of the activity to meet the goal to*  
18 *which the activity relates; and*

19                   (ii) *with respect to this subsection—*

20                           (I) *the amount of funding for the*  
21 *activity provided by Taiwan during*  
22 *the preceding year, if any; and*

23                           (II) *an assessment of whether the*  
24 *funding described in subclause (I) is*

1                                   *commensurate with funding provided*  
2                                   *by the United States.*

3           *(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section*  
4 *may be construed to apply to or limit United States foreign*  
5 *assistance not provided using amounts available pursuant*  
6 *to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a).*

7           *(g) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-*  
8 *FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congres-*  
9 *sional committees” means—*

10                   *(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*  
11                   *Senate; and*

12                   *(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*  
13                   *House of Representatives.*