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119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION**S. 4708****[Report No. 119-_____]**

To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 8, 2026

Mr. LEE (for himself and Mrs. SHAHEEN) introduced the following bill; which
was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_____, (legislative day, _____), _____

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]**A BILL**

To improve the security of the Arctic, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Arctic Security and
 5 Diplomacy Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

1 (1) The Arctic is a critical domain for the secu-
2 rity and sovereignty of the United States and faces
3 elevated risks related to the threats of territorial ex-
4 pansion and violation; influence operations; sabotage
5 of critical undersea infrastructure; and espionage by
6 foreign adversaries; particularly the People's Repub-
7 lic of China and the Russian Federation.

8 (2) The Russian Federation holds a significant
9 portion of the Arctic; accounting for approximately
10 53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline; and has
11 significantly expanded its military basing infrastruc-
12 ture and capabilities in the region.

13 (3) In 2018, the People's Republic of China de-
14 clared that it is a "Near-Arctic State" with signifi-
15 cant interests in the Arctic and is attempting to be-
16 come a "polar great power" through economic ex-
17 pansion; scientific investments; and dual-use civilian
18 and military infrastructure.

19 (4) The Russian Federation is cooperating with
20 the People's Republic of China to establish a "Polar
21 Silk Road" in the Arctic; and the two countries are
22 working together to strengthen cooperation in polar
23 shipbuilding and ship technology.

24 (5) The People's Republic of China has made
25 multiple attempts to gain strategic footholds in the

1 Arctic, has research stations in Norway's Svalbard
2 archipelago and in Iceland, and consistently at-
3 tempts to co-opt and manipulate civilian science and
4 research activities, university partnerships, and mul-
5 tilateral science and research initiatives throughout
6 the Arctic.

7 (6) The People's Republic of China has ob-
8 server status on the Arctic Council, has significantly
9 increased diplomatic engagement with Nordic coun-
10 tries, and uses investments in cooperative marine
11 scientific research as a form of soft power in the
12 Arctic.

13 (7) The People's Republic of China engages in
14 extensive marine surveying, much of which has dual-
15 use risk for military applications, including seabed
16 mapping, NATO asset monitoring, and other espio-
17 nage-related activity.

18 (8) In 2022, the Danish Security and Intel-
19 ligence Service reported several attempts at espio-
20 nage by the People's Republic of China against Den-
21 mark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.

22 (9) In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence
23 Service warned of espionage activity by the People's
24 Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and
25 the Canadian military discovered and removed buoys

1 in the Arctic owned by the People's Republic of
2 China.

3 (10) In 2025, the head of the National Police
4 Commission in Iceland warned that the China-Ice-
5 land Arctic Science Observatory poses dual-use risks
6 and may be used for espionage.

7 (11) The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by
8 the intelligence community describes the Russian
9 Federation as “our primary challenge in the Arctic
10 : : : Moscow is seeking to expand and deepen its
11 presence in the Arctic through increased maritime
12 trade, natural resource extraction, and military ac-
13 tivity,” while warning that the People's Republic of
14 China “seeks to expand its Arctic presence using sci-
15 entific research, investments, and commercial ven-
16 tures along the Northern Sea Route.”

17 (12) The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy high-
18 lighted the Russian Federation's military build-up in
19 the Arctic and use of hybrid threats like sabotage
20 against critical undersea infrastructure, while warn-
21 ing that the People's Republic of China “is pursuing
22 a military build-up, including rapidly expanding its
23 naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-use mili-
24 tary-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the

1 High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque
2 about its intentions.”

3 ~~(13) According to the Department of Homeland~~
4 ~~Security, an unprecedented number of military and~~
5 ~~research vessels of the People’s Republic of China~~
6 ~~are operating in or near United States Arctic~~
7 ~~waters.~~

8 ~~(14) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to~~
9 ~~cooperatively limit the ability of the People’s Repub-~~
10 ~~lic of China to conduct further espionage in the Arc-~~
11 ~~tic.~~

12 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

13 In this Act:

14 ~~(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the~~
15 ~~meaning given the term “Executive agency” in sec-~~
16 ~~tion 105 of title 5, United States Code.~~

17 ~~(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-~~
18 ~~GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-~~
19 ~~gress” means—~~

20 ~~(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,~~
21 ~~the Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-~~
22 ~~ernmental Affairs, and the Select Committee on~~
23 ~~Intelligence of the Senate; and~~

24 ~~(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the~~
25 ~~Committee on Homeland Security, and the Per-~~

1 manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 ~~(3) ARCTIC.~~—The term “Arctic” has the mean-
4 ing given that term in section 112 of the Arctic Re-
5 search and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).

6 ~~(4) COVERED ACTIVITIES.~~—The term “covered
7 activities” means marine surveys that may pose
8 dual-use risks for civilian and military applications,
9 including—

10 (A) exploration of natural resources;

11 (B) seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys,
12 and oceanographic surveys;

13 (C) data collection related to subsea assets
14 and infrastructure;

15 (D) operation of unmanned maritime sys-
16 tems; and

17 (E) any other activity designated by the
18 Secretary of State as posing a risk to national
19 security.

20 ~~(5) COVERED VESSEL.~~—The term “covered ves-
21 sel” means a foreign vessel that—

22 (A) is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or

23 (B) the Secretary of State reasonably be-
24 lieves to be associated with a foreign adversary

1 in a manner that threatens the security of the
2 United States.

3 ~~(6) EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE.—~~The term
4 “exclusive economic zone” means, with respect to
5 the United States, including the Commonwealth of
6 Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern
7 Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the
8 United States Virgin Islands, and any other terri-
9 tory or possession over which the United States ex-
10 ercises sovereignty, the zone seaward of and adja-
11 cent to the territorial sea, including the contiguous
12 zone, and extending 200 nautical miles from the ter-
13 ritorial sea baseline (except where otherwise limited
14 by treaty or other agreement recognized by the
15 United States) in which the United States has sov-
16 ereign rights and jurisdiction.

17 ~~(7) FOREIGN ADVERSARY.—~~The term “foreign
18 adversary” means any foreign government or foreign
19 nongovernment person engaged in a long-term pat-
20 tern or serious instances of conduct significantly ad-
21 verse to the national security of the United States
22 or the security and safety of United States persons;
23 including—

24 ~~(A) the Democratic People’s Republic of~~
25 Korea;

1 ~~(B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;~~

2 ~~(C) the People's Republic of China; and~~

3 ~~(D) the Russian Federation.~~

4 ~~(8) FOREIGN VESSEL.—The term “foreign ves-~~
5 ~~sel” means any vessel that is—~~

6 ~~(A) owned, operated, or chartered by a for-~~
7 ~~ign government;~~

8 ~~(B) owned or controlled by an entity orga-~~
9 ~~nized under the laws of, headquartered in, or~~
10 ~~otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign~~
11 ~~country; or~~

12 ~~(C) registered under the flag of a foreign~~
13 ~~country.~~

14 ~~(9) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term~~
15 ~~“intelligence community” has the meaning given~~
16 ~~that term in section 3 of the National Security Act~~
17 ~~of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).~~

18 ~~(10) MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.—The~~
19 ~~term “marine scientific research” means any activity~~
20 ~~that is—~~

21 ~~(A) undertaken in the ocean to expand~~
22 ~~knowledge of the marine environment and its~~
23 ~~processes, including data collection activities;~~
24 ~~and~~

1 ~~(B)~~ regulated by the United States under
2 the Presidential Proclamation on Revision to
3 United States Marine Scientific Research Policy
4 of September 2020.

5 ~~(11)~~ TERRITORIAL SEA.—The term “territorial
6 sea” means the waters extending to ~~12~~ nautical
7 miles from the baselines of the United States.

8 ~~(12)~~ UNITED STATES WATERS.—The term
9 “United States waters” means—

10 ~~(A)~~ the territorial sea of the United States;

11 ~~(B)~~ the exclusive economic zone of the
12 United States; and

13 ~~(C)~~ the continental shelf of the United
14 States, as it pertains to marine scientific re-
15 search and other activities on the seabed or
16 subsoil.

17 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

18 It is the policy of the United States—

19 ~~(1)~~ to limit espionage and influence operations
20 by foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United
21 States waters;

22 ~~(2)~~ to inform allied countries with a presence in
23 the Arctic about the espionage and influence oper-
24 ations of foreign adversaries in the Arctic, including
25 espionage through covered activities;

1 ~~(3)~~ to condition support from the Federal Gov-
2 ernment for marine surveys on cooperation with
3 counterespionage in the Arctic and in United States
4 waters, including limitations on information sharing
5 of data obtained through covered activities in the
6 Arctic and in United States waters; and

7 ~~(4)~~ to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means
8 available to ensure the security of the Arctic and the
9 sovereignty of United States waters through the en-
10 forcement of section 6, including through—

11 ~~(A)~~ demarches;

12 ~~(B)~~ public condemnations;

13 ~~(C)~~ diplomatic sanctions;

14 ~~(D)~~ coordination of multilateral diplomatic
15 pressure;

16 ~~(E)~~ motions to remove an offending coun-
17 try from Arctic-related multilateral bodies and
18 cooperatives; and

19 ~~(F)~~ any other diplomatic means authorized
20 by law.

21 **SEC. 5. STRATEGY.**

22 ~~(a) IN GENERAL.~~—Not later than 180 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
24 in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intel-
25 ligence community and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-

1 rity, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat espio-
2 nage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in the
3 Arctic.

4 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required by paragraph
5 (1) shall include—

6 (1) identifying and countering espionage activi-
7 ties in the Arctic;

8 (2) diplomatic methods to enforce section 6;
9 and

10 (3) as appropriate, enlistment of and coordina-
11 tion with allied countries that have a presence in the
12 Arctic to combat espionage by foreign adversaries.

13 **SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES**
14 **WATERS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—No foreign scientist may conduct
16 a maritime scientific research project in United States
17 waters without prior consent from the United States Gov-
18 ernment provided in accordance with this section and with
19 appropriate international customs as determined by the
20 Secretary of State.

21 (b) REQUIREMENTS; APPLICATIONS.—The Secretary
22 of State, in coordination with the heads of the elements
23 of the intelligence community and the Secretary of Home-
24 land Security, shall—

1 (1) require foreign vessels to obtain prior con-
2 sent to conduct maritime scientific research in
3 United States waters; and

4 (2) implement a process for reviewing applica-
5 tions for such consent.

6 (c) INFORMATION SHARING.—To facilitate the pro-
7 cess for reviewing applications to conduct maritime sci-
8 entific research under this section, the head of each agency
9 shall share information related to such maritime scientific
10 research with the Department of State unless otherwise
11 prohibited by law.

12 (d) PROHIBITION ON COVERED VESSELS.—Except as
13 provided in subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not
14 approve any application submitted under this section for
15 any covered vessel.

16 (e) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may
18 waive the prohibition in subsection (d) on an indi-
19 vidual basis if the Secretary determines that doing
20 so is the national interest of the United States.

21 (2) NOTICE REQUIRED.—Not later than 5 days
22 after any issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1),
23 the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro-
24 priate committees of Congress written notice de-
25 scribing the waiver.

1 (f) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than
2 15 days after the date of any violation of subsection (a),
3 the Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate commit-
4 tees of Congress of such violation, including—

5 (1) the country affiliation of the foreign sci-
6 entist;

7 (2) the nature of the violation; and

8 (3) subsequent action by the Federal Govern-
9 ment to address the violation.

10 **SEC. 7. REPORT.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the
12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
13 in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intel-
14 ligence community and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-
15 rity, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
16 gress a report on espionage and influence operations by
17 foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United States
18 waters.

19 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
20 (a) shall include the following:

21 (1) An assessment of the extent to which cov-
22 ered activities support espionage and influence oper-
23 ations by foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in
24 United States waters.

1 (2) A description of United States Government
2 support for covered activities in the Arctic that in-
3 volve foreign adversaries, including—

4 (A) funding;
5 (B) public-private partnerships;
6 (C) maritime security;
7 (D) technical assistance;
8 (E) information sharing; and
9 (F) any other form of material or technical
10 support.

11 (3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of
12 State to enlist allied countries with a presence in the
13 Arctic to combat espionage in the Arctic by foreign
14 adversaries.

15 (4) Recommendations for combating such espio-
16 nage.

17 (e) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
18 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may contain
19 a classified annex.

20 (d) AVAILABILITY.—The report required by sub-
21 section (a) shall be made available on request to any Mem-
22 ber of Congress.

23 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

24 *This Act may be cited as the “Arctic Security and Di-*
25 *plomacy Act”.*

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 *Congress finds the following:*

3 *(1) The United States is an Arctic nation by vir-*
4 *tue of the State of Alaska.*

5 *(2) The Arctic is a critical domain for the secu-*
6 *rity and sovereignty of the United States and faces*
7 *elevated risks related to the threats of territorial ex-*
8 *pansion and violation, influence operations, sabotage*
9 *of critical undersea infrastructure, and espionage by*
10 *foreign adversaries, particularly the People's Republic*
11 *of China and the Russian Federation.*

12 *(3) The Russian Federation holds a significant*
13 *portion of the Arctic, accounting for approximately*
14 *53 percent of the Arctic Ocean coastline, and has sig-*
15 *nificantly expanded its military basing infrastructure*
16 *and capabilities in the region.*

17 *(4) In 2018, the People's Republic of China de-*
18 *clared that it is a "Near-Arctic State" with signifi-*
19 *cant interests in the Arctic and is attempting to be-*
20 *come a "polar great power" through economic expan-*
21 *sion, scientific investments, and dual-use civilian and*
22 *military infrastructure.*

23 *(5) The Russian Federation is cooperating with*
24 *the People's Republic of China to establish a "Polar*
25 *Silk Road" in the Arctic, and the two countries are*

1 *working together to strengthen cooperation in polar*
2 *shipbuilding and ship technology.*

3 (6) *The People's Republic of China has made*
4 *multiple attempts to gain strategic footholds in the*
5 *Arctic, has research stations in Norway's Svalbard*
6 *archipelago and in Iceland, and consistently attempts*
7 *to co-opt and manipulate civilian science and re-*
8 *search activities, university partnerships, and multi-*
9 *lateral science and research initiatives throughout the*
10 *Arctic.*

11 (7) *The People's Republic of China has observer*
12 *status on the Arctic Council, has significantly in-*
13 *creased diplomatic engagement with Nordic countries,*
14 *and uses investments in cooperative marine scientific*
15 *research as a form of soft power in the Arctic.*

16 (8) *The People's Republic of China engages in*
17 *extensive marine surveying, much of which has dual-*
18 *use risk for military applications, including seabed*
19 *mapping, NATO asset monitoring, and other espio-*
20 *nage-related activity.*

21 (9) *The Russian Federation and the People's Re-*
22 *public of China have overlapping priority interests in*
23 *the Arctic, though each have their own distinct inter-*
24 *ests with associated challenges.*

1 (10) *In 2022, the Danish Security and Intel-*
2 *ligence Service reported several attempts at espionage*
3 *by the People’s Republic of China against Denmark,*
4 *Greenland, and the Faroe Islands.*

5 (11) *In 2024, the Canadian Security Intelligence*
6 *Service warned of espionage activity by the People’s*
7 *Republic of China and the Russian Federation, and*
8 *the Canadian military discovered and removed buoys*
9 *in the Arctic owned by the People’s Republic of*
10 *China.*

11 (12) *In 2025, the head of the National Police*
12 *Commission in Iceland warned that the China-Ice-*
13 *land Arctic Science Observatory poses dual-use risks*
14 *and may be used for espionage.*

15 (13) *The 2026 Annual Threat Assessment by the*
16 *intelligence community describes the Russian Federa-*
17 *tion as “our primary challenge in the Arctic . . .*
18 *Moscow is seeking to expand and deepen its presence*
19 *in the Arctic through increased maritime trade, nat-*
20 *ural resource extraction, and military activity,”*
21 *while warning that the People’s Republic of China*
22 *“seeks to expand its Arctic presence using scientific*
23 *research, investments, and commercial ventures along*
24 *the Northern Sea Route.”*

1 (14) *The 2025 NATO Maritime Strategy high-*
2 *lighted the Russian Federation’s military build-up in*
3 *the Arctic and use of hybrid threats like sabotage*
4 *against critical undersea infrastructure, while warn-*
5 *ing that the People’s Republic of China “is pursuing*
6 *a military build-up, including rapidly expanding its*
7 *naval capabilities, increasing its use of dual-use mili-*
8 *tary-scientific vessels and surging its presence in the*
9 *High North and the Arctic, while remaining opaque*
10 *about its intentions.”*

11 (15) *According to the Department of Homeland*
12 *Security, an unprecedented number of military and*
13 *research vessels of the People’s Republic of China are*
14 *operating in or near United States Arctic waters.*

15 (16) *On May 22, 2026, at the NATO Foreign*
16 *Ministerial in Sweden, the Arctic allies, consisting of*
17 *Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland,*
18 *the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, and*
19 *the United States, issued a joint statement which stat-*
20 *ed that “With Russia’s increased military activity*
21 *and China’s growing strategic interest, we seek to bol-*
22 *ster stability in the Arctic region” and “recognize the*
23 *importance of economic and resource development in*
24 *the Arctic and have tasked our experts to coordinate*

1 *more closely on these issues . . . to achieve our com-*
2 *mon goal of a safe, prosperous, and peaceful Arctic”;*

3 *(17) It is in the interests of Arctic countries to*
4 *cooperatively limit the ability of the Russian Federa-*
5 *tion and the People’s Republic of China to conduct*
6 *further espionage in the Arctic.*

7 *(18) It is in the interest of the United States to*
8 *encourage marine scientific research, as President*
9 *Ronald Reagan noted in his Statement on United*
10 *States Oceans Policy on March 10, 1983.*

11 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

12 *In this Act:*

13 *(1) AGENCY.—The term “agency” has the mean-*
14 *ing given the term “Executive agency” in section 105*
15 *of title 5, United States Code.*

16 *(2) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—*
17 *The term “appropriate committees of Congress”*
18 *means—*

19 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
20 *Committee on Homeland Security and Govern-*
21 *mental Affairs, and the Select Committee on In-*
22 *telligence of the Senate; and*

23 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
24 *Committee on Homeland Security, and the Per-*

1 *manent Select Committee on Intelligence of the*
2 *House of Representatives.*

3 (3) *ARCTIC.*—*The term “Arctic” has the mean-*
4 *ing given that term in section 112 of the Arctic Re-*
5 *search and Policy Act of 1984 (15 U.S.C. 4111).*

6 (4) *COVERED ACTIVITIES.*—*The term “covered*
7 *activities” means marine surveys that may pose dual-*
8 *use risks for civilian and military applications, in-*
9 *cluding—*

10 (A) *exploration of natural resources;*

11 (B) *seabed mapping, hydrographic surveys,*
12 *and oceanographic surveys;*

13 (C) *data collection related to subsea assets*
14 *and infrastructure;*

15 (D) *operation of unmanned maritime sys-*
16 *tems; and*

17 (E) *any other activity designated by the*
18 *Secretary of State as posing a risk to national*
19 *security.*

20 (5) *COVERED VESSEL.*—*The term “covered ves-*
21 *sel” means a foreign vessel that—*

22 (A) *is a vessel of a foreign adversary; or*

23 (B) *the Secretary of State reasonably be-*
24 *lieves to be associated with a foreign adversary*

1 *in a manner that threatens the security of the*
2 *United States.*

(6) *EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE.*—The term “exclusive economic zone” means, with respect to the United States, including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and any other territory or possession over which the United States exercises sovereignty, the zone seaward of and adjacent to the territorial sea, including the contiguous zone, and extending 200 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline (except where otherwise limited by treaty or other agreement recognized by the United States) in which the United States has sovereign rights and jurisdiction.

(7) *FOREIGN ADVERSARY.*—The term “foreign adversary” means any foreign government or foreign nongovernment person engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons, including—

23 (A) the Democratic People's Republic of
24 Korea;

25 (B) the Islamic Republic of Iran;

1 (C) *the People’s Republic of China; and*

2 (D) *the Russian Federation.*

3 (8) *FOREIGN VESSEL.—The term “foreign vessel”*

4 *means any vessel that is—*

5 (A) *owned, operated, or chartered by a for-*
6 *ign government;*

7 (B) *owned or controlled by an entity orga-*
8 *nized under the laws of, headquartered in, or*
9 *otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign*
10 *country; or*

11 (C) *registered under the flag of a foreign*
12 *country.*

13 (9) *INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term “in-*
14 *telligence community” has the meaning given that*
15 *term in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947*
16 *(50 U.S.C. 3003).*

17 (10) *MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.—The term*
18 *“marine scientific research” means any activity that*
19 *is—*

20 (A) *undertaken in the ocean to expand*
21 *knowledge of the marine environment and its*
22 *processes, including data collection activities;*
23 *and*

24 (B) *regulated by the United States under*
25 *the Presidential Proclamation on Revision to*

1 *United States Marine Scientific Research Policy*
2 *of September 2020.*

3 (11) *TERRITORIAL SEA.*—*The term “territorial*
4 *sea” means the waters extending to 12 nautical miles*
5 *from the baselines of the United States.*

6 (12) *UNITED STATES WATERS.*—*The term*
7 *“United States waters” means—*

8 *(A) the territorial sea of the United States;*

9 *(B) the exclusive economic zone of the*
10 *United States; and*

11 *(C) the continental shelf of the United*
12 *States, as it pertains to marine scientific re-*
13 *search and other activities on the seabed or sub-*
14 *soil.*

15 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

16 *It is the policy of the United States—*

17 *(1) to limit espionage and influence operations*
18 *by foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United*
19 *States waters;*

20 *(2) to inform allied countries with a presence in*
21 *the Arctic about the espionage and influence oper-*
22 *ations of foreign adversaries in the Arctic, including*
23 *espionage through covered activities;*

24 *(3) to condition support from the Federal Gov-*
25 *ernment for marine surveys on cooperation with*

1 *counterespionage in the Arctic and in United States*
2 *waters, including limitations on information sharing*
3 *of data obtained through covered activities in the Arc-*
4 *tic and in United States waters; and*

5 *(4) to leverage all appropriate diplomatic means*
6 *available to ensure the security of the Arctic and the*
7 *sovereignty of United States waters through the en-*
8 *forcement of section 6, including through—*

9 *(A) demarches;*

10 *(B) public condemnations;*

11 *(C) diplomatic sanctions;*

12 *(D) coordination of multilateral diplomatic*
13 *pressure;*

14 *(E) any other diplomatic means authorized*
15 *by law; and*

16 *(F) maintaining robust participation of the*
17 *United States in the Arctic Council to limit Chi-*
18 *nese and Russian efforts to undermine the inter-*
19 *ests of the United States in the Arctic.*

20 **SEC. 5. STRATEGY.**

21 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the*
22 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
23 *in coordination with the heads of the elements of the intel-*
24 *ligence community and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-*
25 *rity, shall produce a strategy to identify and combat espio-*

1 *nage and influence operations by foreign adversaries in the*
2 *Arctic.*

3 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The strategy required by paragraph*
4 *(1) shall include—*

5 (1) *identifying and countering espionage activi-*
6 *ties in the Arctic;*

7 (2) *diplomatic methods to enforce section 6; and*

8 (3) *as appropriate, enlistment of and coordina-*
9 *tion with allied countries that have a presence in the*
10 *Arctic to combat espionage by foreign adversaries.*

11 **SEC. 6. MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN UNITED STATES**
12 **WATERS.**

13 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*No foreign vessel may conduct a*
14 *marine scientific research project in United States waters*
15 *without prior consent from the United States Government*
16 *provided in accordance with this section and with appro-*
17 *priate international customs as determined by the Sec-*
18 *retary of State.*

19 (b) *REQUIREMENTS; APPLICATIONS.*—*The Secretary of*
20 *State, in coordination with the heads of the elements of the*
21 *intelligence community and the Secretary of Homeland Se-*
22 *curity, shall—*

23 (1) *require foreign vessels to obtain prior consent*
24 *to conduct marine scientific research in United States*
25 *waters; and*

1 (2) *implement a process for reviewing applica-*
2 *tions for such consent.*

3 (c) *INFORMATION SHARING.—To facilitate the process*
4 *for reviewing applications to conduct marine scientific re-*
5 *search under this section, the head of each agency shall*
6 *share information related to such marine scientific research*
7 *with the Department of State unless otherwise prohibited*
8 *by law.*

9 (d) *PROHIBITION ON COVERED VESSELS.—Except as*
10 *provided in subsection (e), the Secretary of State shall not*
11 *approve any application submitted under this section for*
12 *any covered vessel.*

13 (e) *NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—*

14 (1) *IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State may*
15 *waive the prohibition in subsection (d) on an indi-*
16 *vidual basis if the Secretary determines that doing so*
17 *is the national interest of the United States.*

18 (2) *NOTICE REQUIRED.—Not later than 5 days*
19 *after any issuance of a waiver under paragraph (1),*
20 *the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate*
21 *committees of Congress written notice describing the*
22 *waiver.*

23 (f) *CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Not later than 15*
24 *days after the date of any violation of subsection (a), the*

1 *Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate committees*
2 *of Congress of such violation, including—*

- 3 *(1) the country affiliation of the foreign vessel;*
4 *(2) the nature of the violation; and*
5 *(3) subsequent action by the Federal Government*
6 *to address the violation.*

7 *(g) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date*
8 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall*
9 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report*
10 *that details—*

- 11 *(1) how the requirements of this section compare*
12 *to the requirements of existing multilateral marine*
13 *scientific research consent regimes; and*

- 14 *(2) the staffing and resources necessary for the*
15 *Department of State to review applications under*
16 *such consent regime in a manner that is timely and*
17 *continues to encourage marine scientific research and*
18 *scientific diplomacy.*

19 **SEC. 7. REPORT.**

20 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date*
21 *of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co-*
22 *ordination with the heads of the elements of the intelligence*
23 *community and the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall*
24 *submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report*

1 *on espionage and influence operations by foreign adver-*
2 *saries in the Arctic and in United States waters.*

3 *(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a)*
4 *shall include the following:*

5 *(1) An assessment of the extent to which covered*
6 *activities support espionage and influence operations*
7 *by foreign adversaries in the Arctic and in United*
8 *States waters.*

9 *(2) A description of United States Government*
10 *support for covered activities in the Arctic that in-*
11 *volve foreign adversaries, including—*

12 *(A) funding;*
13 *(B) public-private partnerships;*
14 *(C) maritime security;*
15 *(D) technical assistance;*
16 *(E) information sharing;*
17 *(F) scientific research; and*
18 *(G) any other form of material or technical*
19 *support.*

20 *(3) A description of efforts by the Secretary of*
21 *State to enlist allied countries with a presence in the*
22 *Arctic to combat espionage in the Arctic by foreign*
23 *adversaries.*

24 *(4) Recommendations for combating such espio-*
25 *nage.*

1 (5) *An assessment of the feasibility and potential*
2 *utility of establishing a formal Arctic security infor-*
3 *mation-sharing framework, under a new or existing*
4 *framework or mechanism, among allied Arctic coun-*
5 *tries, as appropriate, such as Canada, the Kingdom*
6 *of Denmark (including Greenland), the Kingdom of*
7 *Norway, Finland, the Kingdom of Sweden, and Ice-*
8 *land, including mechanisms for the exchange of infor-*
9 *mation and joint identification of dual-use maritime*
10 *scientific activity, and the development of shared*
11 *watchlists of high-risk vessels, entities, and individ-*
12 *uals.*

13 (6) *An analysis of how existing multilateral*
14 *agreements combat espionage and influence operations*
15 *in the Arctic.*

16 (c) *FORM.—The report required by subsection (a) shall*
17 *be submitted in unclassified form but may contain a classi-*
18 *fied annex.*

19 (d) *AVAILABILITY.—The report required by subsection*
20 *(a) shall be made available on request to any Member of*
21 *Congress.*