

Calendar No. _____

119TH CONGRESS
2^D SESSION**S. 4443****[Report No. 119-_____]**

To increase cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region in order to strengthen energy security and defense capabilities, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 29, 2026

Mr. BOOKER (for himself, Mr. McCORMICK, Ms. ROSEN, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. BANKS, and Mr. SCHIFF) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_____, (legislative day, _____), _____

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To increase cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterranean region in order to strengthen energy security and defense capabilities, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean
3 Gateway Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. PURPOSE.**

5 The purpose of this Act is to support the role of East-
6 ern Mediterranean countries as a strategic gateway in the
7 India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

8 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

9 Congress finds the following:

10 (1) The India-Middle East-Europe Economic
11 Corridor (IMEC), launched at the G20 Summit in
12 2023 with G7 backing, enhances connectivity be-
13 tween Asia, the Middle East, and Europe while serv-
14 ing as a strategic alternative to China’s Belt and
15 Road Initiative.

16 (2) The Eastern Mediterranean region is of
17 strategic importance to the United States and its al-
18 lies, as demonstrated by the United States founding
19 role in the 3+1 framework with Greece, Israel, and
20 Cyprus.

21 (3) Energy projects such as the Great Sea
22 Interconnector, the GreCy Interconnection Project,
23 the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector, and the LNG
24 terminals in the Eastern Mediterranean play a key
25 role in European energy security and provide critical
26 infrastructure that can serve as the backbone for

1 linking India, the Gulf, and Europe through the
2 Eastern Mediterranean.

3 (4) Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Israel are key
4 United States partners in promoting stability, secu-
5 rity, and economic development in the region.

6 (5) Enhanced defense and security cooperation,
7 as well as educational and cultural exchanges, are
8 essential for strengthening bilateral and multilateral
9 ties.

10 (6) According to Presidential Determination
11 2025-03, “the furnishing of defense articles and de-
12 fense services to the Republic of Cyprus will
13 strengthen the security of the United States and
14 promote world peace”.

15 (7) The statement of policy in the Israel Rela-
16 tions Normalization Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8601
17 note), notably that it is the policy of the United
18 States “to expand and strengthen the Abraham Ae-
19 cords to encourage other nations to normalize rela-
20 tions with Israel”, should guide the Secretary of
21 State and other United States actors in their work
22 to promote integration between India, the Middle
23 East and southeast Europe.

24 (8) India has strengthened strategic ties with
25 Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, fostering economic, mar-

1 itime, and security cooperation that aligns with
2 United States regional priorities.

3 (9) The success of the India-Middle East-Eu-
4 rope Economic Corridor depends on infrastructure,
5 security, and innovation partnerships rooted in the
6 Eastern Mediterranean region, which serves as the
7 primary connective hub linking the Gulf and Indian
8 subcontinent to Europe.

9 **SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

10 It is the sense of Congress that—

11 (1) the significance of diplomatic initiatives
12 such as the Greece-Cyprus-Israel-US “3+1” format,
13 the East Mediterranean Gas Forum and the Abra-
14 ham Accords should be recognized and the United
15 States should maintain its leadership role in these
16 diplomatic initiatives;

17 (2) the United States should continue to ac-
18 tively participate in the initiatives of the East Medi-
19 terranean Gas Forum;

20 (3) the Eastern Mediterranean region is a key
21 gateway that can link three continents and the
22 United States should support energy and transpor-
23 tation infrastructure, connectivity initiatives, defense
24 cooperation, and other forms of integration in and
25 around the region;

1 (4) the United States recognizes the unique role
2 of Eastern Mediterranean countries as both a dis-
3 tinct subregion and a central connector within the
4 broader IMEC corridor;

5 (5) the “3+1” diplomatic initiative should re-
6 sume with a meeting of the Secretary of State with
7 the Ministers of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus; and

8 (6) the statement of policy in section 203 of the
9 Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Part-
10 nership Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 2373 note) should
11 guide the Secretary of State in promoting
12 connectivity between India, the Middle East and Eu-
13 rope, including participation in the trilateral dia-
14 logue on energy, maritime security, cybersecurity
15 and protection of critical infrastructure conducted
16 among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

17 **SEC. 5. DIPLOMACY IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION.**

18 (a) STRATEGIC DIALOGUES.—The Secretary of State
19 may institutionalize multilateral strategic dialogues be-
20 tween the United States and IMEC countries, including
21 dedicated formats with Eastern Mediterranean countries,
22 with which the United States has a bilateral strategic dia-
23 logue.

24 (b) PRIORITIZATION OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRA-
25 NEAN.—The Secretary of State shall prioritize the East-

1 ern Mediterranean region in United States foreign policy,
2 focusing on energy security and defense cooperation with
3 countries in such region.

4 **SEC. 6. REPORTS AND STUDIES.**

5 (a) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than
6 one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and
7 annually thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in coordina-
8 tion with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the appro-
9 priate congressional committees a report describing the
10 implementation and effect of this Act, including an update
11 on energy projects and defense cooperation that are being
12 carried out pursuant to the authorities of this Act and
13 the amendments made by this Act.

14 (b) REPORT ON MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.—Not
15 later than one year after the date of the enactment of this
16 Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate
17 congressional committees a briefing on each multilateral
18 initiative between the United States and IMEC countries.

19 (c) ANALYSIS OF CYPRUS CENTRE FOR LAND, OPEN
20 SEAS, AND PORT SECURITY.—Not later than one year
21 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
22 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland
23 Security, shall analyze insights gained from the operation
24 of the Cyprus Centre for Land, Open Seas, and Port Secu-

1 rity as a potential model for broad-based multilateral co-
2 operation.

3 (d) ~~STUDY OF PROGRAM CREATION AND EXPAN-~~
4 ~~SION.~~—Not later than one year after the date of the enact-
5 ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation
6 with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appro-
7 priate congressional committees a report describing the
8 cost of, steps to, and feasibility of—

9 (1) ~~creating bilateral programs with Eastern~~
10 ~~Mediterranean countries modeled on bilateral pro-~~
11 ~~grams between the United States and Israel, includ-~~
12 ~~ing—~~

13 (A) ~~the Binational Agriculture Research~~
14 ~~and Development Fund;~~

15 (B) ~~the United States-Israel Binational In-~~
16 ~~dustrial Research and Development Foundation~~
17 ~~(including projects relating to homeland secu-~~
18 ~~rity and cybersecurity);~~

19 (C) ~~the United States-Israel Binational~~
20 ~~Science Foundation; and~~

21 (D) ~~the United States-Israel Science and~~
22 ~~Technology Foundation; and~~

23 (2) ~~expanding bilateral programs between the~~
24 ~~United States and Israel, including the programs~~

1 listed in paragraph (1), to include other Eastern
2 Mediterranean countries and IMEC countries.

3 **SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS.**

4 In this Act:

5 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
6 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
7 mittees” means—

8 (A) the Committee on Energy and Natural
9 Resources and the Committee on Foreign Rela-
10 tions of the Senate; and

11 (B) the Committee on Energy and Com-
12 merce and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
13 the House of Representatives.

14 (2) EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRY.—The
15 term “Eastern Mediterranean country” means any
16 of the following countries:

17 (A) The Arab Republic of Egypt.

18 (B) The Hellenic Republic.

19 (C) The Republic of Cyprus.

20 (D) The State of Israel.

21 (3) IMEC COUNTRY.—The term “IMEC coun-
22 try” means any of the following countries:

23 (A) The European Union.

24 (B) The Federal Republic of Germany.

25 (C) The French Republic.

1 ~~(D) The Italian Republic.~~

2 ~~(E) The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.~~

3 ~~(F) The Republic of India.~~

4 ~~(G) The United Arab Emirates.~~

5 ~~(H) The United States.~~

6 ~~(I) Any other country that the Secretary of~~
7 State designates as an IMEC country for pur-
8 poses of this Act.

9 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

10 *This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean*
11 *Gateway Act”.*

12 **SEC. 2. PURPOSE.**

13 *The purpose of this Act is to support the role of East-*
14 *ern Mediterranean countries as a strategic gateway in the*
15 *India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).*

16 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

17 *Congress finds the following:*

18 (1) *The India-Middle East-Europe Economic*
19 *Corridor (IMEC), launched at the G20 Summit in*
20 *2023 with G7 backing, enhances connectivity between*
21 *Asia, the Middle East, and Europe while serving as*
22 *a strategic alternative to Chinese infrastructure in-*
23 *vestments.*

24 (2) *The Eastern Mediterranean region is of stra-*
25 *tegic importance to the United States and its allies,*

1 *as demonstrated by the United States founding role*
2 *in the 3+1 framework with Greece, Israel, and Cy-*
3 *prus.*

4 *(3) Energy projects such as the Great Sea Inter-*
5 *connector, the Gregy Interconnection Project, the*
6 *Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector, and the LNG termi-*
7 *nals in the Eastern Mediterranean play a key role in*
8 *European energy security and provide critical infra-*
9 *structure that can serve as the backbone for linking*
10 *India, the Gulf, and Europe through the Eastern*
11 *Mediterranean and improve opportunities for United*
12 *States energy security.*

13 *(4) Cyprus, Greece, Egypt, and Israel are key*
14 *United States partners in promoting stability, secu-*
15 *rity, and economic development in the region.*

16 *(5) Enhanced defense and security cooperation,*
17 *as well as educational and cultural exchanges,*
18 *strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties.*

19 *(6) According to Presidential Determination*
20 *2025-03, “the furnishing of defense articles and de-*
21 *fense services to the Republic of Cyprus will strength-*
22 *en the security of the United States and promote*
23 *world peace”.*

24 *(7) The statement of policy in the Israel Rela-*
25 *tions Normalization Act of 2022 (22 U.S.C. 8601*

1 *note), notably that it is the policy of the United*
2 *States “to expand and strengthen the Abraham Ac-*
3 *cords to encourage other nations to normalize rela-*
4 *tions with Israel”, should guide the Secretary of State*
5 *and other United States actors in their work to pro-*
6 *mote integration between India, the Middle East and*
7 *southeast Europe.*

8 *(8) India has strengthened strategic ties with*
9 *Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, fostering economic, mari-*
10 *time, and security cooperation that aligns with*
11 *United States regional priorities.*

12 *(9) The success of the India-Middle East-Europe*
13 *Economic Corridor depends on infrastructure, secu-*
14 *rity, and innovation partnerships rooted in the East-*
15 *ern Mediterranean region, which serves as the pri-*
16 *mary connective hub linking the Gulf and Indian*
17 *subcontinent to Europe.*

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19 *It is the sense of Congress that—*

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21 *as the Greece-Cyprus-Israel-US “3+1” format, the*
22 *East Mediterranean Gas Forum and the Abraham*
23 *Accords should be recognized and the United States*
24 *should maintain its leadership role in these diplo-*
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1 (2) *the United States should continue to actively*
2 *participate in the initiatives of the East Mediterra-*
3 *nean Gas Forum;*

4 (3) *the Eastern Mediterranean region is a key*
5 *gateway that can link three continents and the*
6 *United States should support energy and transpor-*
7 *tation infrastructure, connectivity initiatives, defense*
8 *cooperation, and other forms of integration in and*
9 *around the region;*

10 (4) *the United States recognizes the unique role*
11 *of Eastern Mediterranean countries as both a distinct*
12 *subregion and a central connector within the broader*
13 *IMEC corridor;*

14 (5) *the “3+1” diplomatic initiative should re-*
15 *sume with a meeting of the Secretary of State with*
16 *the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;*
17 *and*

18 (6) *the statement of policy in section 203 of the*
19 *Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partner-*
20 *ship Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 2373 note) should guide*
21 *the Secretary of State in promoting connectivity be-*
22 *tween India, the Middle East and Europe, including*
23 *participation in the trilateral dialogue on energy,*
24 *maritime security, cybersecurity and protection of*

1 *critical infrastructure conducted among Israel,*
2 *Greece, and Cyprus.*

3 **SEC. 5. DIPLOMACY IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN REGION.**

4 (a) *STRATEGIC DIALOGUES.*—*The Secretary of State*
5 *may institutionalize multilateral strategic dialogues be-*
6 *tween the United States and IMEC countries, including*
7 *dedicated formats with Eastern Mediterranean countries,*
8 *with which the United States has a bilateral strategic dia-*
9 *logue.*

10 (b) *PRIORITIZATION OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRA-*
11 *NEAN.*—*The Secretary of State shall prioritize the Eastern*
12 *Mediterranean region in United States foreign policy, fo-*
13 *cusing on energy security and defense cooperation with*
14 *countries in such region.*

15 **SEC. 6. REPORTS AND STUDIES.**

16 (a) *REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.*—

17 (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than one year after*
18 *the date of the enactment of this Act and annually*
19 *thereafter for 5 years and every 2 years thereafter for*
20 *10 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the*
21 *appropriate congressional committees a report de-*
22 *scribing the implementation and effect of this Act, in-*
23 *cluding an update on energy projects and defense co-*
24 *operation that are being carried out pursuant to the*

1 *authorities of this Act and the amendments made by*
2 *this Act.*

3 (2) *CONTENTS.—The report required by para-*
4 *graph (1) shall include an assessment detailing how*
5 *IMEC is helping to boost connections and trade be-*
6 *tween relevant United States partners with the aim*
7 *of countering the influence of the People’s Republic of*
8 *China.*

9 (b) *REPORT ON MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES.—Not*
10 *later than one year after the date of the enactment of this*
11 *Act, the Secretary of State shall provide to the appropriate*
12 *congressional committees a briefing on each multilateral*
13 *initiative between the United States and IMEC countries.*

14 (c) *ANALYSIS OF CYPRUS CENTRE FOR LAND, OPEN*
15 *SEAS, AND PORT SECURITY.—Not later than one year after*
16 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*
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18 *prus Centre for Land, Open Seas, and Port Security as*
19 *a potential model for broad-based multilateral cooperation.*

20 (d) *STUDY OF PROGRAM CREATION AND EXPAN-*
21 *SION.—Not later than one year after the date of the enact-*
22 *ment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation*
23 *with the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appro-*
24 *priate congressional committees a report describing the cost*
25 *of, steps to, and feasibility of—*

1 (1) *creating bilateral programs with Eastern*
2 *Mediterranean countries modeled on bilateral pro-*
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4 *ing—*

5 *(A) the Binational Agriculture Research*
6 *and Development Fund;*

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8 *dustrial Research and Development Foundation*
9 *(including projects relating to homeland security*
10 *and cybersecurity);*

11 *(C) the United States-Israel Binational*
12 *Science Foundation; and*

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14 *Technology Foundation; and*

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16 *United States and Israel, including the programs list-*
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18 *terranean countries and IMEC countries.*

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20 *In this Act:*

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22 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
23 *tees” means—*

24 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of*
25 *the Senate; and*

1 (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the*
2 *House of Representatives.*

3 (2) *EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRY.*—*The*
4 *term “Eastern Mediterranean country” refers to the*
5 *following countries:*

6 (A) *The Arab Republic of Egypt.*

7 (B) *The Hellenic Republic.*

8 (C) *The Republic of Cyprus.*

9 (D) *The State of Israel.*

10 (3) *IMEC COUNTRY.*—*The term “IMEC coun-*
11 *try” means any of the following countries:*

12 (A) *The European Union.*

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15 (D) *The Italian Republic.*

16 (E) *The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.*

17 (F) *The Republic of India.*

18 (G) *The United Arab Emirates.*

19 (H) *The United States.*

20 (I) *Any other country that the Secretary of*
21 *State designates as an IMEC country for pur-*
22 *poses of this Act.*