

Calendar No. _____

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION**S. 4259**

To promote the development, production, and deployment of secure and resilient Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to enhance United States national security and support the defense and resilience of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 26, 2026

Mr. MERKLEY (for himself, Mr. CRUZ, and Mr. CURTIS) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_____ (legislative day, _____), _____

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

A BILL

To promote the development, production, and deployment of secure and resilient Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to enhance United States national security and support the defense and resilience of Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific Region.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Blue Skies for Taiwan
3 Act of 2026”.

4 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

5 In this Act:

6 (1) ~~APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-~~
7 ~~TEES.~~—The term “appropriate congressional com-
8 mittees” means—

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations;
10 the Committee on Armed Services, the Com-
11 mittee on the Budget, and the Committee on
12 Appropriations of the Senate; and

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
14 Committee on Armed Services, the Committee
15 on the Budget, and the Committee on Appro-
16 priations of the House of Representatives.

17 (2) ~~BLUE UAS.~~—The term “Blue UAS” refers
18 to UAS components and systems that comply with
19 Defense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS
20 program and its associated list.

21 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

22 Congress makes the following findings:

23 (1) Taiwan is a longstanding and vital demo-
24 cratic partner whose security is central to United
25 States strategic interests and regional stability in
26 the Indo-Pacific region.

1 (2) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is
2 increasingly employing gray-zone tactics, including
3 routine use of unmanned aerial systems and other
4 low-cost platforms, to pressure Taiwan and under-
5 mine its security.

6 (3) As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of
7 1979 (Public Law 96-8), it is United States policy
8 to maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force
9 or other forms of coercion against Taiwan and pro-
10 vide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.

11 (4) As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resil-
12 ience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117-
13 263), it is the sense of Congress that the United
14 States should support Taiwan's acquisition and em-
15 ployment of capabilities that advance asymmetric
16 strategies.

17 (5) The vast majority of commercially available
18 UAS contain PRC-sourced components, creating sig-
19 nificant cybersecurity, supply chain, and operational
20 risks for both Taiwan and the United States.

21 (6) Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and
22 produce UAS components and systems but faces
23 challenges in competing with PRC commercial com-
24 panies, accessing capital, and meeting United States
25 certification and cybersecurity requirements.

1 (7) The United States should support UAS
2 supply chain development in Taiwan to strengthen
3 Taiwan's asymmetric defense posture and expand
4 United States access to secure, PRC-independent
5 UAS components and systems.

6 (8) The Army Organic Industrial Base, includ-
7 ing its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is
8 undergoing modernization to support emerging tech-
9 nologies and may provide opportunities to support
10 the testing and sustainment of unmanned aerial sys-
11 tems and related components in coordination with
12 allies and partners.

13 **SEC. 4. BLUE UAS WORKING GROUP.**

14 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after
15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
16 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall
17 establish a Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing
18 workstreams and expanding scope as needed, inclusive of
19 government, industry, and academic experts, to—

20 (1) assess Taiwan's domestic drone production
21 capacity, including research and development, legal
22 and regulatory frameworks, testing, certification,
23 and production capacities for dual-use drones;

24 (2) evaluate opportunities for public-private
25 partnerships between the United States and Taiwan

1 for co-development and co-production of UAS sys-
2 tems and components, including pilot programs;

3 (3) identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-
4 manufactured components and systems manufac-
5 tured in Blue UAS programs;

6 (4) identify regulatory, export-control, and cer-
7 tification barriers that impede Taiwan's participa-
8 tion in Blue UAS programs;

9 (5) provide recommendations to expand and im-
10 prove incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue
11 UAS programs;

12 (6) identify specific UAS components or sys-
13 tems that could be integrated into Blue UAS pro-
14 grams within 12 to 24 months;

15 (7) analyze opportunities and impediments to
16 including Taiwan in Replicator programs and similar
17 initiatives; and

18 (8) assess opportunities for collaboration with
19 the Army Organic Industrial Base, including its ar-
20 senals, depots, and ammunition plants, to support
21 the testing, evaluation, production, maintenance, and
22 sustainment of Blue UAS components and systems,
23 including those co-developed or co-produced with
24 Taiwan.

1 (b) **REPORTING.**—Not later than one year after the
2 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
3 for three years, the Working Group shall submit to the
4 appropriate congressional committees an unclassified re-
5 port on its activities, including findings, recommendations,
6 timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mecha-
7 nisms, with a classified appendix as necessary.

8 **SEC. 5. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WITH ALLIES.**

9 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
10 nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a co-
11 operative framework, drawing on the Partnership for
12 Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the
13 United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global part-
14 ners to promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply
15 chains and enhance interoperability.

16 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The cooperative framework shall in-
17 clude—

18 (1) support regional allies in the acquisition of
19 Blue UAS components or systems from Taiwan in
20 lieu of PRC-sourced components; and

21 (2) fast-track Blue UAS certification for com-
22 ponents co-developed or co-produced by Taiwan and
23 regional allies.

1 **SEC. 6. FAST-TRACK CERTIFICATION.**

2 (a) ~~IN GENERAL.~~—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
3 nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-
4 track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to ob-
5 tain Blue UAS certification.

6 (b) ~~ELEMENTS.~~—The fast-track certification process
7 shall include the following procedures:

8 (1) ~~Expedited export control reviews and licens-~~
9 ~~ing for Taiwan drone and drone component manu-~~
10 ~~facturers, including streamlined technical reviews for~~
11 ~~components with no PRC-connected subcomponents.~~

12 (2) ~~A fast-track certification procedure for Tai-~~
13 ~~wanese manufacturers, including reciprocal testing~~
14 ~~arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan~~
15 ~~cybersecurity standards where appropriate.~~

16 **SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

17 There are hereby authorized to be appropriated such
18 sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
19 this Act.

20 **SEC. 8. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

21 Nothing in this Act shall be construed—

22 (1) to alter United States policy towards Tai-
23 wan as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979
24 (Public Law 96–8); and

1 ~~(2) to alter the United States Government’s po-~~
2 ~~sition with respect to the international status of Tai-~~
3 ~~wan.~~

4 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

5 *This Act may be cited as the “Blue Skies for Taiwan*
6 *Act of 2026”.*

7 **SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.**

8 *In this Act:*

9 (1) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-*
10 *TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional commit-*
11 *tees” means—*

12 *(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the*
13 *Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on*
14 *the Budget, and the Committee on Appropria-*
15 *tions of the Senate; and*

16 *(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the*
17 *Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on*
18 *the Budget, and the Committee on Appropria-*
19 *tions of the House of Representatives.*

20 (2) *BLUE UAS.—The term “Blue UAS” refers to*
21 *UAS components and systems that comply with De-*
22 *fense Contract Management Agency’s Blue UAS pro-*
23 *gram and its associated list.*

24 **SEC. 3. FINDINGS.**

25 *Congress makes the following findings:*

1 (1) *Taiwan is a longstanding and vital demo-*
2 *cratic partner whose security is central to United*
3 *States strategic interests and regional stability in the*
4 *Indo-Pacific region.*

5 (2) *The People's Republic of China (PRC) is in-*
6 *creasingly employing gray-zone tactics, including*
7 *routine use of unmanned aerial systems and other*
8 *low-cost platforms, to pressure Taiwan and under-*
9 *mine its security.*

10 (3) *As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act of*
11 *1979 (Public Law 96–8), it is United States policy*
12 *to maintain its capacity to resist any resort to force*
13 *or other forms of coercion against Taiwan and pro-*
14 *vide Taiwan with arms of a defensive nature.*

15 (4) *As set forth in the Taiwan Enhanced Resil-*
16 *ience Act (subtitle A of title XII of Public Law 117–*
17 *263), it is the sense of Congress that the United States*
18 *should support Taiwan's acquisition and employment*
19 *of capabilities that advance asymmetric strategies.*

20 (5) *The vast majority of commercially available*
21 *UAS contain PRC-sourced components, creating sig-*
22 *nificant cybersecurity, supply chain, and operational*
23 *risks for both Taiwan and the United States.*

24 (6) *Taiwan is well-positioned to develop and*
25 *produce UAS components and systems but faces chal-*

1 *lenges in competing with PRC commercial companies,*
2 *accessing capital, and meeting United States certifi-*
3 *cation and cybersecurity requirements.*

4 *(7) The United States should support UAS sup-*
5 *ply chain development in Taiwan to strengthen Tai-*
6 *wan's asymmetric defense posture and expand United*
7 *States access to secure, PRC-independent UAS compo-*
8 *nents and systems.*

9 *(8) The Army Organic Industrial Base, includ-*
10 *ing its arsenals, depots, and ammunition plants, is*
11 *undergoing modernization to support emerging tech-*
12 *nologies and may provide opportunities to support*
13 *the testing and sustainment of unmanned aerial sys-*
14 *tems and related components in coordination with al-*
15 *lies and partners.*

16 **SEC. 4. BLUE UAS WORKING GROUP.**

17 *(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 180 days after*
18 *the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*
19 *in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall estab-*
20 *lish a Blue UAS working group, leveraging existing*
21 *workstreams and expanding scope as needed, inclusive of*
22 *government, industry, and academic experts, to—*

23 *(1) assess Taiwan's domestic drone production*
24 *capacity, including research and development, legal*

1 *and regulatory frameworks, testing, certification, and*
2 *production capacities for dual-use drones;*

3 *(2) evaluate opportunities for public-private*
4 *partnerships between the United States and Taiwan*
5 *for co-development and co-production of UAS systems*
6 *and components, including pilot programs;*

7 *(3) identify barriers to the inclusion of Taiwan-*
8 *manufactured components and systems manufactured*
9 *in Blue UAS programs;*

10 *(4) identify regulatory, export-control, and cer-*
11 *tification barriers that impede Taiwan's participa-*
12 *tion in Blue UAS programs;*

13 *(5) provide recommendations to expand and im-*
14 *prove incorporation of Taiwanese suppliers into Blue*
15 *UAS programs;*

16 *(6) identify specific UAS components or systems*
17 *that could be integrated into Blue UAS programs*
18 *within 12 to 24 months;*

19 *(7) analyze opportunities and impediments to*
20 *include Taiwan in the Defense Autonomous Warfare*
21 *Group and similar initiatives;*

22 *(8) assess opportunities for collaboration with*
23 *the Army Organic Industrial Base, including its arse-*
24 *nals, depots, and ammunition plants, to support the*
25 *testing, evaluation, production, maintenance, and*

1 *sustainment of Blue UAS components and systems,*
2 *including those co-developed or co-produced with Tai-*
3 *wan; and*

4 (9) *institute lessons learned from the war in*
5 *Ukraine, in consultation with the United States Eu-*
6 *ropean Command (EUCOM) and Ukrainian officials.*

7 (b) *REPORTING.*—*Not later than one year after the*
8 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter*
9 *for three years, the Working Group shall submit to the ap-*
10 *propriate congressional committees an unclassified report*
11 *on its activities, including findings, recommendations,*
12 *timelines, resource needs, and potential funding mecha-*
13 *nisms, with a classified appendix as necessary.*

14 **SEC. 5. COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK WITH ALLIES.**

15 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
16 *nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall establish a coop-*
17 *erative framework, drawing on the Partnership for Indo-*
18 *Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), among the United*
19 *States, Taiwan, and regional allies and global partners to*
20 *promote secure, PRC-independent UAS supply chains and*
21 *enhance interoperability.*

22 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The cooperative framework shall in-*
23 *clude—*

1 (1) *support regional allies in the acquisition of*
2 *Blue UAS components or systems from Taiwan in*
3 *lieu of PRC-sourced components; and*

4 (2) *fast-track Blue UAS certification for compo-*
5 *nents co-developed or co-produced by Taiwan and re-*
6 *gional allies.*

7 **SEC. 6. FAST-TRACK CERTIFICATION.**

8 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*The Secretary of State, in coordi-*
9 *nation with the Secretary of Defense, shall develop a fast-*
10 *track process for Blue UAS companies in Taiwan to obtain*
11 *Blue UAS certification.*

12 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The fast-track certification process*
13 *shall include the following procedures:*

14 (1) *Expedited export control reviews and licens-*
15 *ing for Taiwan drone and drone component manufac-*
16 *turers, including streamlined technical reviews for*
17 *components with no PRC-connected subcomponents.*

18 (2) *A fast-track certification procedure for Tai-*
19 *wanese manufacturers, including reciprocal testing*
20 *arrangements or recognition of equivalent Taiwan cy-*
21 *bersecurity standards where appropriate.*

22 **SEC. 7. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

23 *Nothing in this Act shall be construed—*

1 *(1) to alter United States policy towards Taiwan*
2 *as codified in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979*
3 *(Public Law 96–8);*

4 *(2) to alter the United States commitment to the*
5 *One China Policy, including commitments made in*
6 *the Three United States-China Communiqués and the*
7 *Six Assurances to Taiwan; or*

8 *(3) to alter the United States Government’s posi-*
9 *tion with respect to the international status of Tai-*
10 *wan.*