

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. _____

To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. RISCH) introduced the following bill;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To address issues involving the People’s Republic of China.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the
5 “Strategic Competition Act of 2021”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for
7 this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Findings.
- Sec. 3. Definitions.
- Sec. 4. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 5. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 6. Rules of construction.

TITLE I—INVESTING IN A COMPETITIVE FUTURE

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Subtitle A—Science and Technology

- Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply chain diversification and management.

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure Development

- Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined.
 Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment standards.
 Sec. 113. United States support for infrastructure.
 Sec. 114. Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network.
 Sec. 115. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure.
 Sec. 116. Report on China’s investments in foreign energy development.

Subtitle C—Digital Technology and Connectivity

- Sec. 121. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues.
 Sec. 122. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership.

Subtitle D—Countering Chinese Communist Party Influence

- Sec. 131. Short title.
 Sec. 132. Authorization.
 Sec. 133. Findings on Chinese information warfare and malign influence operations.
 Sec. 134. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program.
 Sec. 135. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination.
 Sec. 136. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation.
 Sec. 137. Global engagement center.
 Sec. 138. Review by Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of certain foreign gifts to and contracts with institutions of higher education.

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters

- Sec. 201. Appropriate congressional committees defined.
 Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.
 Sec. 203. Sense of Congress on cooperation with the Quad.
 Sec. 204. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN.
 Sec. 205. Sense of Congress on enhancing United States–ASEAN cooperation on technology issues with respect to the People’s Republic of China.
 Sec. 206. Report on Chinese influence in international organizations.
 Sec. 207. Regulatory exchanges with allies and partners.
 Sec. 208. Technology partnership office at the Department of State.
 Sec. 209. United States representation in standards-setting bodies.
 Sec. 210. Sense of Congress on centrality of sanctions and other restrictions to strategic competition with China.
 Sec. 211. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 countries on the People’s Republic of China.
 Sec. 212. Enhancing the United States–Taiwan partnership.
 Sec. 213. Treatment of Taiwan government.
 Sec. 214. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic.

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- Sec. 215. Enhancement of diplomatic support and economic engagement with Pacific island countries.
- Sec. 216. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 217. Advancing United States leadership in the United Nations System.

Subtitle B—International Security Matters

- Sec. 221. Definitions.
- Sec. 222. Findings.
- Sec. 223. Sense of Congress regarding bolstering security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 224. Statement of policy.
- Sec. 225. Foreign military financing in the Indo-Pacific and authorization of appropriations for Southeast Asia maritime security programs and diplomatic outreach activities.
- Sec. 226. Foreign military financing compact pilot program in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 227. Additional funding for international military education and training in the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 228. Prioritizing excess defense article transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 229. Prioritizing excess naval vessel transfers for the Indo-Pacific.
- Sec. 230. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea.
- Sec. 231. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners.
- Sec. 232. Report on national technology and industrial base.
- Sec. 233. Report on diplomatic outreach with respect to Chinese military installations overseas.
- Sec. 234. Statement of policy regarding universal implementation of United Nations sanctions on North Korea.
- Sec. 235. Limitation on assistance to countries hosting Chinese military installations.

Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to Counter the People’s Republic of China

- Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the world with respect to the People’s Republic of China.

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- Sec. 246. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens.
- Sec. 247. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada.
- Sec. 248. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

- Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia.
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- Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania.
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TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT

- Sec. 401. Findings and sense of Congress regarding the PRC's industrial policy.
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- Sec. 405. Debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from the International Development Association.

Sec. 406. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections.

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TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY

Sec. 501. Findings on strategic security and arms control.

Sec. 502. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue.

Sec. 503. Report on United States efforts to engage the People's Republic of China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is
4 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili-
5 tary, technological, and ideological power to become
6 a strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the
7 United States. The policies increasingly pursued by
8 the PRC in these domains are contrary to the inter-
9 ests and values of the United States, its partners,
10 and much of the rest of the world.

11 (2) The current policies being pursued by the
12 PRC—

13 (A) threaten the future character of the
14 international order and are shaping the rules,
15 norms, and institutions that govern relations
16 among states;

17 (B) will put at risk the ability of the
18 United States to secure its national interests;
19 and

1 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros-
2 perity, and freedom of the international commu-
3 nity in the coming decades.

4 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with
5 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked
6 to advance the PRC's economic and social develop-
7 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefitted
8 from, the free and open international order. The
9 United States pursued these goals and contributed
10 to the welfare of the Chinese people by—

11 (A) increasing the PRC's trade relations
12 and access to global capital markets;

13 (B) promoting the PRC's accession to the
14 World Trade Organization;

15 (C) providing development finance and
16 technical assistance;

17 (D) promoting research collaboration;

18 (E) educating the PRC's top students;

19 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge
20 technologies and scientific knowledge; and

21 (G) providing intelligence and military as-
22 sistance.

23 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to
24 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an
25 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home

1 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms,
2 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These
3 policies frequently and deliberately undermine
4 United States interests and are contrary to core
5 United States values and the values of other nations,
6 both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to
7 this strategic decision of the CCP, the United States
8 has been compelled to reexamine and revise its strat-
9 egy towards the PRC.

10 (5) The General Secretary of the Chinese Com-
11 munist Party and the President of the People's Re-
12 public of China, Xi Jinping, has elevated the "Great
13 Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" as central to
14 the domestic and foreign policy of the PRC. His pro-
15 gram demands—

16 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership;

17 (B) concentration of military power;

18 (C) a strong role for the CCP in the state
19 and the economy;

20 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking
21 control over broadly asserted territorial claims;

22 and

23 (E) the denial of any universal values and
24 individual rights that are deemed to threaten
25 the CCP.

1 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of gov-
2 ernance, “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, as
3 superior to, and at odds with, the constitutional
4 models of the United States and other democracies.
5 This approach to governance is lauded by the CCP
6 as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a global
7 leader, and to shaping the future of the world. In a
8 2013 speech, President Xi said, “We firmly believe
9 that as socialism with Chinese characteristics devel-
10 ops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that the superi-
11 ority of our socialist system will be increasingly ap-
12 parent . . . [and] our country’s road of development
13 will have increasingly greater influence on the
14 world.”.

15 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish
16 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to
17 use that dominant position to propel the PRC to be-
18 come the “leading world power,” shaping an inter-
19 national order that is conducive to the CCP’s inter-
20 ests. Achieving these objectives requires turning the
21 PRC into a wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by
22 using a strong military and advanced technological
23 capability to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless
24 of other countries’ interests.

1 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter-
2 national order, which is built upon the rule of law
3 and free and open ideals and principles, by con-
4 ducting global information and influence operations,
5 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to
6 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the
7 legitimacy of internationally recognized human
8 rights, and seeking to co-opt the leadership and
9 agenda of multinational organizations for the benefit
10 of the PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the
11 expense of the interests of the United States and the
12 international community. In December 2018, Presi-
13 dent Xi suggested that the CCP views its “historic
14 mission” as not only to govern China, but also to
15 profoundly influence global governance to benefit the
16 CCP.

17 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to
18 follow its model of “socialism with Chinese charac-
19 teristics”. During the 19th Party Congress in 2017,
20 President Xi said that the PRC could serve as a
21 model of development for other countries by utilizing
22 “Chinese wisdom” and a “Chinese approach to solv-
23 ing problems”.

1 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance
2 model and attempting to weaken other models of
3 governance by—

4 (A) undermining democratic institutions;

5 (B) subverting financial institutions;

6 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate
7 the policies of the PRC; and

8 (D) using disinformation to disguise the
9 nature of the actions described in subpara-
10 graphs (A) through (C).

11 (11) The PRC is close to its goal of becoming
12 the global leader in science and technology. In May
13 2018, President Xi said that for the PRC to reach
14 “prosperity and rejuvenation”, it needs to “endeavor
15 to be a major world center for science and innova-
16 tion”. The PRC has invested the equivalent of bil-
17 lions of dollars into education and research and de-
18 velopment and established joint scientific research
19 centers and science universities.

20 (12) The PRC’s drive to become a “manufac-
21 turing and technological superpower” and to pro-
22 mote “innovation with Chinese characteristics” is
23 coming at the expense of human rights and long-
24 standing international rules and norms with respect
25 to economic competition, and presents a challenge to

1 United States national security and the security of
2 allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the
3 PRC advances its illiberal political and social policies
4 through mass surveillance, social credit systems, and
5 a significant role of the state in internet governance.
6 Through these means, the PRC increases direct and
7 indirect government control over its citizens' every-
8 day lives. Its national strategy of "civil-military fu-
9 sion" mandates that civil and commercial research,
10 which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever-
11 aged to develop new military capabilities.

12 (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means
13 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing
14 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-
15 directed industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to
16 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP
17 engages in and encourages actions that actively un-
18 dermine a free and open international market, such
19 as intellectual property theft, forced technology
20 transfers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and
21 mandatory CCP access to proprietary data as part
22 of business and commercial agreements between Chi-
23 nese and foreign companies.

24 (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13)
25 are designed to freeze United States and other for-

1 eign firms out of the PRC market, while eroding
2 competition in other important markets. The heavy
3 subsidization of Chinese companies includes poten-
4 tial violation of its World Trade Organization com-
5 mitments. In May 2018, President Xi said that the
6 PRC aims to keep the “initiatives of innovation and
7 development security . . . in [China’s] own hands”.

8 (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives
9 through a variety of avenues, including its signature
10 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to
11 in this section as “BRI”), which is enshrined in the
12 Chinese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk
13 Road and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes
14 BRI as a straightforward and wholly beneficial plan
15 for all countries. Eventually, it seeks to advance an
16 economic system with the PRC at its center, making
17 it the most concrete geographical representation of
18 the PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the eco-
19 nomic influence of state-owned Chinese firms in
20 global markets, enhances the PRC’s political lever-
21 age with government leaders around the world, and
22 provides greater access to strategic nodes such as
23 ports and railways. Through BRI, the PRC seeks
24 political deference through economic dependence.

1 (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish
2 regional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and dis-
3 place the United States from the region. As a Pa-
4 cific power, the United States has built and sup-
5 ported enduring alliances and economic partnerships
6 that secure peace and prosperity and promote the
7 rule of law and political pluralism in a free and open
8 Indo-Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic
9 and military coercion in the region to secure its own
10 interests.

11 (17) The PRC's military strategy seeks to keep
12 the United States military from operating in the
13 Western Pacific and erodes United States security
14 guarantees.

15 (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclu-
16 sive control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air
17 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually
18 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This
19 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy
20 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security
21 operations in areas permitted under international
22 law.

23 (19) The PRC seeks so-called "reunification"
24 with Taiwan through whatever means may ulti-
25 mately be required. The CCP's insistence that so-

1 called “reunification” is Taiwan’s only option makes
2 this goal inherently coercive. In January 2019,
3 President Xi stated that the PRC “make[s] no
4 promise to renounce the use of force and reserve[s]
5 the option of taking all necessary means”. Taiwan’s
6 embodiment of democratic values and economic lib-
7 eralism challenges President Xi’s goal of achieving
8 national rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai-
9 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island
10 Chain and to project power into the Second Island
11 Chain and beyond.

12 (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe-
13 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that
14 threatens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of
15 commerce, damages the environment, bolsters the
16 PLA power projection capabilities, and coerces and
17 intimidates other regional claimants in an effort to
18 advance its unlawful claims and control the waters
19 around neighboring countries. Despite President Xi’s
20 September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC
21 was not militarizing the South China Sea, during
22 the 2017 19th Party Congress, President Xi an-
23 nounced that “construction on islands and reefs in
24 the South China Sea have seen steady progress”.

1 (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA
2 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior
3 to the United States in terms of equipment and con-
4 duct of modern military operations by shifting its
5 military doctrine from having a force “adequate
6 [for] China’s defensive needs” to having a force
7 “commensurate with China’s international status”.
8 Ultimately, this transformation could enable China
9 to impose its will in the Indo-Pacific region through
10 the threat of military force. In 2017, President Xi
11 established the following developmental benchmarks
12 for the advancement of the PLA:

13 (A) A mechanized force with increased
14 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020.

15 (B) The complete modernization of China’s
16 national defense by 2035.

17 (C) The full transformation of the PLA
18 into a world-class force by 2050.

19 (22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting poli-
20 cies described in this section undermine United
21 States interests, such as—

22 (A) upholding a free and open inter-
23 national order;

1 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter-
2 national institutions with liberal norms and val-
3 ues;

4 (C) preserving a favorable balance of
5 power in the Indo-Pacific;

6 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies;

7 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes;

8 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce
9 through open and transparent markets; and

10 (G) promoting individual freedom and
11 human rights.

12 (23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has in-
13 tensified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s
14 behavior and therefore increased the need for United
15 States global leadership and a competitive posture.
16 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the
17 COVID–19 pandemic by—

18 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong
19 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-
20 called “national security law” on Hong Kong;

21 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the
22 East and South China Seas;

23 (C) contributing to increased tensions with
24 India; and

1 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern-
2 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob-
3 scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up
4 the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion
5 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis-
6 credit the United States, its allies, and global
7 health efforts.

8 (24) In response to the PRC’s strategy and
9 policies, the United States must adopt a policy of
10 strategic competition with the PRC to protect and
11 promote our vital interests and values.

12 (25) The United States’ policy of strategic com-
13 petition with respect to the People’s Republic of
14 China is part of a broader strategic approach to the
15 Indo-Pacific and the world which centers with
16 United States allies and partners to advance shared
17 values and interests and to preserve and enhance a
18 free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules-based, stable,
19 and diverse region.

20 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

21 In this Act:

22 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
23 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
24 mittees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate; and

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
4 the House of Representatives.

5 (2) CCP.—The term “CCP” means the Chinese
6 Communist Party.

7 (3) INDO-PACIFIC REGION.—The terms “Indo-
8 Pacific” and “Indo-Pacific region” mean the 36
9 countries and the surrounding waterways that are
10 under the area of responsibility of the U.S. Indo-Pa-
11 cific Command. These countries are: Australia, Ban-
12 gladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, China,
13 Fiji, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Laos, Malay-
14 sia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mon-
15 golia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, North Korea,
16 Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of
17 Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri
18 Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga,
19 Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam.

20 (4) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The
21 terms “People’s Liberation Army” and “PLA” mean
22 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China.

23 (5) PRC; CHINA.—The terms “PRC” and
24 “China” mean the People’s Republic of China.

1 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United
3 States, in pursuing strategic competition with the PRC,
4 to pursue the following objectives:

5 (1) The United States global leadership role is
6 sustained and its political system and major founda-
7 tions of national power are postured for long-term
8 political, economic, technological, and military com-
9 petition with the PRC.

10 (2) The balance of power in the Indo-Pacific re-
11 mains favorable to the United States and its allies.
12 The United States and its allies maintain unfettered
13 access to the region, including through freedom of
14 navigation and the free flow of commerce, consistent
15 with international law and practice, and the PRC
16 neither dominates the region nor coerces its neigh-
17 bors.

18 (3) The allies and partners of the United
19 States—

20 (A) maintain confidence in United States
21 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa-
22 cific region;

23 (B) can withstand and combat subversion
24 and undue influence by the PRC; and

1 (C) align themselves with the United
2 States in setting global rules, norms, and stand-
3 ards that benefit the international community.

4 (4) The combined weight of the United States
5 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem-
6 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to
7 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene-
8 fits.

9 (5) The United States leads the free and open
10 international order, which is comprised of resilient
11 states and institutions that uphold and defend prin-
12 ciples, including sovereignty, rule of law, individual
13 freedom, and human rights. The international order
14 is strengthened to defeat attempts at destabilization
15 by illiberal and authoritarian actors.

16 (6) The key rules, norms, and standards of
17 international engagement in the 21st century are
18 maintained, including the—

19 (A) protection of human rights, commer-
20 cial engagement and investment, and tech-
21 nology; and

22 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards
23 are in alignment with the values and interests
24 of the United States, its allies and partners,
25 and the free world.

1 (7) Assure that the CCP does not—
2 (A) subvert open and democratic societies;
3 (B) distort global markets;
4 (C) manipulate the international trade sys-
5 tem;
6 (D) coerce other nations via economic and
7 military means; or
8 (E) use its technological advantages to un-
9 dermine individual freedoms or other states' na-
10 tional security interests.

11 (8) The United States deters military con-
12 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to
13 reduce the risk of conflict.

14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
15 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)—

16 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic
17 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic
18 growth, education, scientific and technological inno-
19 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that
20 improve the United States ability to pursue its vital
21 economic, foreign policy, and national security inter-
22 ests;

23 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition
24 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic,
25 development, military, informational, and techno-

1 logical realms that maximizes United States
2 strengths and increases the costs for the PRC of
3 harming United States interests and values of those
4 of United States allies and partners;

5 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter-
6 national system characterized by freedom from coer-
7 cion, rule of law, open markets and the free flow of
8 commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
9 peaceful resolution of disputes, human rights, and
10 good and transparent governance;

11 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli-
12 ances and partnerships, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific
13 and Europe, by pursuing greater bilateral and multi-
14 lateral cooperative initiatives that advance shared in-
15 terests and values and bolster partner countries'
16 confidence that the United States is and will remain
17 a strong, committed, and constant partner;

18 (5) to encourage and aid United States allies
19 and partners in boosting their own capabilities and
20 resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect shared in-
21 terests and values, free from coercion and external
22 pressure;

23 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and
24 healthy competition in United States-China economic
25 relations by—

1 (A) advancing policies that harden the
2 United States economy against unfair and ille-
3 gal commercial or trading practices and the co-
4 ercion of United States businesses; and

5 (B) tightening United States laws and reg-
6 ulations as necessary to prevent the PRC's at-
7 tempts to harm United States economic com-
8 petitiveness;

9 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-
10 led growth in emerging markets around the world,
11 including through the use of United States Govern-
12 ment tools that—

13 (A) support greater private sector invest-
14 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives
15 that are grounded in the rule of law;

16 (B) promote open markets;

17 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory
18 frameworks;

19 (D) improve the management of key eco-
20 nomic sectors;

21 (E) combat corruption; and

22 (F) foster and support greater collabora-
23 tion with and among partner countries and the
24 United States private sector to develop secure
25 and sustainable infrastructure;

1 (8) to lead in the advancement of international
2 rules and norms that foster free and reciprocal trade
3 and open and integrated markets;

4 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy
5 in support of United States companies and busi-
6 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi-
7 tion;

8 (10) to ensure that the United States leads in
9 the innovation of critical and emerging technologies,
10 such as next-generation telecommunications, artifi-
11 cial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconduc-
12 tors, and biotechnology, by—

13 (A) providing necessary investment and
14 concrete incentives for the private sector to ac-
15 celerate development of such technologies;

16 (B) modernizing and harmonizing with al-
17 lies and partners export controls and invest-
18 ment screening regimes and associated policies
19 and regulations;

20 (C) enhancing United States leadership in
21 technical standards-setting bodies and avenues
22 for developing norms regarding the use of
23 emerging critical technologies;

24 (D) reducing United States barriers and
25 increasing incentives for collaboration with al-

1 lies and partners on the research and codevelop-
2 ment of critical technologies;

3 (E) collaborating with allies and partners
4 to protect critical technologies by—

5 (i) crafting multilateral export control
6 measures;

7 (ii) building capacity for defense tech-
8 nology security;

9 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in the
10 supply chains; and

11 (iv) ensuring diversification; and

12 (F) designing major defense capabilities
13 for export to allies and partners;

14 (11) to enable the people of the United States,
15 including the private sector, civil society, universities
16 and other academic institutions, State and local leg-
17 islators, and other relevant actors to identify and re-
18 main vigilant to the risks posed by undue influence
19 of the CCP in the United States;

20 (12) to implement measures to mitigate the
21 risks referred to in paragraph (11), while still pre-
22 serving opportunities for economic engagement, aca-
23 demic research, and cooperation in other areas
24 where the United States and the PRC share inter-
25 ests;

1 (13) to collaborate with advanced democracies
2 and other willing partners to promote ideals and
3 principles that—

4 (A) advance a free and open international
5 order;

6 (B) strengthen democratic institutions;

7 (C) protect and promote human rights;
8 and

9 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re-
10 porting;

11 (14) to demonstrate effective leadership at the
12 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other
13 multilateral organizations and defend the integrity
14 of these organizations against co-optation by illiberal
15 and authoritarian nations;

16 (15) to prioritize the defense of fundamental
17 freedoms and human rights in the United States re-
18 lationship with the PRC;

19 (16) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul-
20 tilateral organizations, leveraging their significant
21 and growing capabilities to build a network of like-
22 minded states that sustains and strengthens a free
23 and open order and addresses regional and global
24 challenges to hold the Government of the PRC ac-
25 countable for—

1 (A) violations and abuses of human rights;

2 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and,

3 (C) undermining and abrogating treaties,

4 other international agreements, and other inter-

5 national norms related to human rights;

6 (17) to expose the PRC's use of corruption, re-

7 pression, coercion, and other malign behavior to at-

8 tain unfair economic advantage and deference of

9 other nations to its political and strategic objectives;

10 (18) to maintain United States access to the

11 Western Pacific, including by—

12 (A) increasing United States forward-de-

13 ployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region;

14 (B) modernizing the United States military

15 through investments in existing and new plat-

16 forms, emerging technologies, critical in-theater

17 force structure and enabling capabilities, joint

18 operational concepts, and a diverse, operation-

19 ally resilient and politically sustainable posture;

20 and

21 (C) operating and conducting exercises

22 with allies and partners—

23 (i) to mitigate the PLA's ability to

24 project power and establish contested zones

25 within the First and Second Island Chains;

1 (ii) to diminish the ability of the PLA
2 to coerce its neighbors;

3 (iii) to maintain open sea and air
4 lanes, particularly in the Taiwan Strait,
5 the East China Sea, and the South China
6 Sea; and

7 (iv) to project power from the United
8 States and its allies and partners to dem-
9 onstrate the ability to conduct contested lo-
10 gistics;

11 (19) to deter the PRC from—

12 (A) coercing Indo-Pacific nations, includ-
13 ing by developing more combat-credible forces
14 that are integrated with allies and partners in
15 contact, blunt, and surge layers and able to de-
16 feat any PRC theory of victory in the First or
17 Second Island Chains of the Western Pacific
18 and beyond, as called for in the 2018 National
19 Defense Strategy;

20 (B) using gray-zone tactics below the level
21 of armed conflict; or

22 (C) initiating armed conflict;

23 (20) to strengthen United States-PRC military-
24 to-military communication and improve de-escalation
25 procedures to deconflict operations and reduce the

1 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-
2 level visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian
3 and military officials and other measures, in align-
4 ment with United States interests; and

5 (21) to cooperate with the PRC if interests
6 align, including through bilateral or multilateral
7 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate.

8 **SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

9 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the
10 policy described in section 4(b) requires the following ac-
11 tions:

12 (1) Strategic competition with the PRC will re-
13 quire the United States—

14 (A) to marshal sustained political will to
15 protect its vital interests, promote its values,
16 and advance its economic and national security
17 objectives for decades to come; and

18 (B) to achieve this sustained political will,
19 persuade the American people and United
20 States allies and partners of—

21 (i) the challenges posed by the PRC;

22 and

23 (ii) the need for long-term competition
24 to defend shared interests and values.

1 (2) The United States must coordinate closely
2 with allies and partners to compete effectively with
3 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners
4 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing
5 and checking the aggressive and assertive behavior
6 of the PRC.

7 (3) The President of the United States must
8 lead and direct the entire executive branch to make
9 the People's Republic of China as the greatest geo-
10 political and geoeconomic challenge for United
11 States foreign policy, increasing the prioritization of
12 strategic competition with the PRC and broader
13 United States interests in the Indo-Pacific region in
14 the conduct of foreign policy and assuring the alloca-
15 tion of appropriate resources adequate to the chal-
16 lenge.

17 (4) The head of every Federal department and
18 agency should designate a senior official at the level
19 of Under Secretary or above to coordinate the de-
20 partment's or agency's policies with respect to stra-
21 tegic competition with the PRC.

22 (5) The ability of the United States to execute
23 a strategy of strategic competition with the PRC will
24 be undermined if our attention is repeatedly diverted

1 to challenges that are not vital to United States eco-
2 nomic and national security interests.

3 (6) In the coming decades, the United States
4 must prevent the PRC from—

5 (A) establishing regional hegemony in the
6 Indo-Pacific; and

7 (B) using that position to advance its as-
8 sertive political, economic, and foreign policy
9 goals around the world.

10 (7) The United States must ensure that the
11 Federal budget is properly aligned with the strategic
12 imperative to compete with the PRC by—

13 (A) ensuring sufficient levels of funding to
14 resource all instruments of United States na-
15 tional power; and

16 (B) coherently prioritizing how such funds
17 are used.

18 (8) Sustained prioritization of the challenge
19 posed by the PRC requires—

20 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con-
21 gress; and

22 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful
23 collaboration and consultation between the exec-
24 utive branch and Congress.

1 (9) The United States must ensure close inte-
2 gration among economic and foreign policymakers,
3 the private sector, civil society, universities and aca-
4 demic institutions, and other relevant actors in free
5 and open societies affected by the challenges posed
6 by the PRC to enable such actors—

7 (A) to collaborate to advance common in-
8 terests; and

9 (B) to identify appropriate policies—

10 (i) to strengthen the United States
11 and its allies;

12 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of
13 a free and open order; and

14 (iii) to push back against detrimental
15 policies pursued by the CCP.

16 (10) The United States must ensure that all
17 Federal departments and agencies are organized to
18 reflect the fact that strategic competition with the
19 PRC is the United States top foreign policy priority,
20 including through the assigned missions and location
21 of United States Government personnel, by—

22 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo-
23 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and
24 in Washington DC, with priorities directly rel-

1 evant to advancing competition with the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China;

3 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign
4 service officers, international development pro-
5 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial
6 service, intelligence professionals, and other
7 United States Government personnel in the
8 Indo-Pacific region; and

9 (C) ensuring that this workforce, both ci-
10 vilian and military, has the training in lan-
11 guage, technical skills, and other competencies
12 required to advance a successful competitive
13 strategy with the PRC.

14 (11) The United States must place renewed em-
15 phasis on strengthening the nonmilitary instruments
16 of national power, including diplomacy, information,
17 technology, economics, foreign assistance and devel-
18 opment finance, commerce, intelligence, and law en-
19 forcement, which are crucial for addressing the
20 unique economic, political, and ideological challenges
21 posed by the PRC.

22 (12) The United States must sustain resourcing
23 for a Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which shall be
24 aligned with the overarching political and diplomatic
25 objectives articulated in the Asia Reassurance Initia-

1 tive Act (Public Law 115–409), and must prioritize
2 the military investments necessary to achieve United
3 States political objectives in the Indo-Pacific, includ-
4 ing—

5 (A) promoting regional security in the
6 Indo-Pacific;

7 (B) reassuring allies and partners while
8 protecting them from coercion; and

9 (C) deterring conflict with the PRC.

10 (13) Competition with the PRC requires the
11 United States skillful adaptation to the information
12 environment of the 21st century. United States pub-
13 lic diplomacy and messaging efforts must effec-
14 tively—

15 (A) promote the value of partnership with
16 the United States;

17 (B) highlight the risks and costs of
18 enmeshment with the PRC; and

19 (C) counter CCP propaganda and
20 disinformation.

21 **SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.**

22 (a) **APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON**
23 **ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.**—Nothing
24 in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super-
25 sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the

1 United States Government under section 620M of the
2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec-
3 tion 362 of title 10, United States Code.

4 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY
5 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author-
6 izing the use of military force.

7 **TITLE I—INVESTING IN A**
8 **COMPETITIVE FUTURE**
9 **Subtitle A—Science and**
10 **Technology**

11 **SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM-**
12 **PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER-**
13 **SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT.**

14 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The
15 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
16 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili-
17 tate the contracting by United States embassies for the
18 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs-
19 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States
20 persons and business entities with supply chain manage-
21 ment issues related to the PRC, including—

22 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating
23 certain production facilities to locations outside the
24 PRC;

1 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef-
2 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside
3 of the PRC;

4 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal-
5 lenges in the course of the activities described in
6 paragraphs (1) and (2); and

7 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc-
8 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including
9 through providing market intelligence, facilitating
10 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate,
11 and other services.

12 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons
13 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a)
14 shall—

15 (1) be under the authority of the United States
16 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are
17 hired, in accordance with existing United States
18 laws;

19 (2) coordinate with Department of State and
20 Department of Commerce officers; and

21 (3) coordinate with United States missions and
22 relevant local partners in other countries as needed
23 to carry out the services described in subsection (a).

24 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME-
25 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in

1 subsection (a) shall be prioritized to assisting micro-,
2 small-, and medium-sized enterprises.

3 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
4 authorized to be appropriated \$15,000,000 for each of fis-
5 cal years 2022 through 2027 for the purposes of carrying
6 out this section.

7 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY
8 FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated
9 pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity—

10 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in-
11 fluence of the Government of China or the Chinese
12 Communist Party, or other foreign adversary; or

13 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership
14 from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction,
15 direction, or influence of foreign adversaries.

16 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms “foreign ownership,
17 control, or influence” and “FOCI” have the meanings
18 given those terms in the National Industrial Security Pro-
19 gram Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc-
20 cessor document.

1 **Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure**
2 **Development**

3 **SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
4 **FINED.**

5 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate committees of
6 Congress” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
10 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
11 resentatives.

12 **SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL-**
13 **ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND-**
14 **ARDS.**

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
16 gress that the United States should initiate collaboration
17 among governments, the private sector, and civil society
18 to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality
19 global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at
20 Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following
21 issues:

22 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in
23 which infrastructure investments are made.

24 (2) Anti-corruption.

25 (3) Rule of law.

1 (4) Human rights and labor rights.

2 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability.

3 (6) Social and governance safeguards.

4 (7) Transparency.

5 (8) Environmental and energy standards.

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that the United States should launch a series of fora
8 around the world showcasing the commitment of the
9 United States and partners of the United States to high-
10 quality development cooperation, including with respect to
11 the issues as described in subsection (a).

12 **SEC. 113. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR INFRASTRUC-**
13 **TURE.**

14 (a) FINDINGS.—The Global Infrastructure Coordi-
15 nating Committee (GICC) was established to coordinate
16 the efforts of the Department of State, the Department
17 of Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, the De-
18 partment of Energy, the Department of Transportation,
19 the United States Agency for International Development,
20 the United States Trade and Development Agency, the
21 Development Finance Corporation, the Export-Import
22 Bank of the United States, and other agencies to catalyze
23 private sector investments around the world and the de-
24 ployment of United States Government technical assist-

1 ance and development finance tools, including project
2 preparation services and commercial advocacy.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the world’s infrastructure needs, including
6 in the transport, energy, and digital sectors, are vast
7 and growing;

8 (2) total or partial acquisition of, or a signifi-
9 cant financial stake or physical presence in, certain
10 types of infrastructure, including ports, energy grids,
11 5G telecommunications networks, and undersea ca-
12 bles, can provide an advantage to countries that do
13 not share the interests and values of the United
14 States and its allies and partners, and could there-
15 fore be deleterious to the interests and values of the
16 United States and its allies and partners;

17 (3) the United States must continue to
18 prioritize support for infrastructure projects that are
19 physically secure, financially viable, economically
20 sustainable, and socially responsible;

21 (4) achieving the objective outlined in para-
22 graph (3) requires the coordination of all United
23 States Government economic tools across the inter-
24 agency, so that such tools are deployed way to maxi-

1 mize United States interests and that of its allies
2 and partners;

3 (5) the GICC represents an important and con-
4 crete step toward better communication and coordi-
5 nation across the United States Government of eco-
6 nomic tools relevant to supporting infrastructure
7 that is physically secure, financially viable, economi-
8 cally sustainable, and socially responsible, and
9 should be continued; and

10 (6) the executive branch and Congress should
11 have consistent consultations on United States sup-
12 port for strategic infrastructure projects, including
13 how the Congress can support such initiatives in the
14 future.

15 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180
16 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and semi-
17 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination
18 with other Federal agencies that participate in the GICC,
19 and, as appropriate, the Director of National Intelligence,
20 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
21 a report that identifies—

22 (1) current and pending or future infrastruc-
23 ture projects, particularly in the transport, energy,
24 and digital sectors, that the United States is sup-

1 porting or will support through financing, foreign
2 assistance, technical assistance, or other means;

3 (2) a detailed explanation of the United States
4 and partner country interests served by the United
5 States providing support to such projects; and

6 (3) a detailed description of any support pro-
7 vided by other United States allies and partners to
8 such projects.

9 (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub-
10 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may
11 include a classified annex.

12 **SEC. 114. INFRASTRUCTURE TRANSACTION AND ASSIST-**
13 **ANCE NETWORK.**

14 (a) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State is author-
15 ized to establish a program, to be known as the “Infra-
16 structure Transaction and Assistance Network”, under
17 which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other
18 relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on
19 the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may
20 advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and
21 high-quality infrastructure, in the Indo-Pacific region
22 by—

23 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to
24 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and
25 procurement environments, and project preparation

1 capacity of countries that are partners of the United
2 States in such development;

3 (2) providing transaction advisory services and
4 project preparation assistance to support sustainable
5 infrastructure; and

6 (3) coordinating the provision of United States
7 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in-
8 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States-
9 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in-
10 vestment led by the private sector.

11 (b) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the
12 “Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network” de-
13 scribed under subsection (a), the Secretary of State is au-
14 thorized to provide support, including through flexible fi-
15 nancing mechanisms such as the Transaction Advisory
16 Fund, for advisory services to help boost the capacity of
17 partner countries to evaluate contracts and assess the fi-
18 nancial and environmental impacts of potential infrastruc-
19 ture projects, including through providing services such
20 as—

21 (1) legal services;

22 (2) pre-feasibility studies;

23 (3) debt sustainability analyses;

24 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and

1 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de-
2 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high-
3 quality infrastructure.

4 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$75,000,000 to the Infra-
6 structure Transaction and Assistance Network, of which
7 \$20,000,000 is to be provided for the Transaction Advi-
8 sory Fund.

9 **SEC. 115. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN-**
10 **ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com-
12 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con-
13 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory
14 lending and financing by the Government of China, includ-
15 ing support to companies incorporated in the PRC that
16 engage in such activities, in the energy sectors of devel-
17 oping countries.

18 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States
19 to—

20 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted
21 energy needs and capacities of developing countries
22 and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC
23 state-owned industries and other companies incor-
24 porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing
25 labor, and financing of energy projects, including di-

1 rect financing by the Government of China, PRC fi-
2 nancial institutions, or direct state support to state-
3 owned enterprises and other companies incorporated
4 in the PRC;

5 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op-
6 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power
7 sector reforms, to expand the development and de-
8 ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel-
9 oping countries;

10 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants,
11 and other financial products on terms that advance
12 domestic economic and local employment opportuni-
13 ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage
14 private sector growth, and when appropriate United
15 States equity and sovereign lending products as al-
16 ternative to the predatory lending tools offered by
17 Chinese international finance institutions;

18 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter-
19 national financing and multilateral institutions to le-
20 verage investment in advanced energy technologies
21 in developing countries; and

22 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the
23 cooperative development of advanced energy tech-
24 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par-
25 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the

1 effects of energy engagement by the PRC through
2 predatory lending or other actions that negatively
3 impact other countries.

4 (c) **ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.**—

5 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
6 of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec-
7 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En-
8 ergy, shall establish a United States Government strategy
9 to increase United States exports of advanced energy tech-
10 nologies to—

11 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel-
12 oping countries;

13 (2) create open, efficient, rule-based, and trans-
14 parent energy markets;

15 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy
16 trading relationships; and

17 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy.

18 **SEC. 116. REPORT ON CHINA'S INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN**

19 **ENERGY DEVELOPMENT.**

20 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—No later than 180 days after the
21 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
22 for five years, the Administrator of the United States
23 Agency for International Development, in consultation
24 with the Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, shall

1 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-
2 port that—

3 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening
4 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac-
5 cordance with the economic and national security in-
6 terests of the United States and where deeper en-
7 ergy partnerships are most achievable;

8 (2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov-
9 ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in
10 the development, operation, financing, or ownership
11 of energy generation facilities, transmission infra-
12 structure or energy resources in the countries identi-
13 fied in paragraph (1);

14 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and
15 implications for United States national interests and
16 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph
17 (1), with respect to the PRC's involvement and in-
18 fluence in developing country energy production or
19 transmission; and

20 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the
21 United States to partner with the countries identi-
22 fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup-
23 port shared interests between the United States and
24 such countries.

1 (b) TRANSMITTAL.—The assessment required in sub-
2 section (a) shall be published on the United States Agency
3 for International Development’s website and transmitted
4 to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Secretary
5 of State, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United
6 States International Development Finance Corporation.

7 **Subtitle C—Digital Technology and**
8 **Connectivity**

9 **SEC. 121. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY**
10 **ISSUES.**

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON LEADERSHIP IN
12 INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SETTING.—It is the sense of
13 Congress that the United States must lead in international
14 standard-setting bodies that set the governance norms and
15 rules for critical digitally enabled technologies in order to
16 ensure that these technologies operate within a free, se-
17 cure, interoperable, and stable digital domain.

18 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that the United States, along with allies and part-
20 ners, should lead an international effort that utilizes all
21 of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal to
22 combat the expanding use of information and communica-
23 tions technology products and services to surveil, repress,
24 and manipulate populations (also known as “digital
25 authoritarianism”).

1 (c) NEGOTIATIONS FOR DIGITAL TRADE AGREE-
2 MENT.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
3 Trade Representative should negotiate bilateral and
4 plurilateral agreements relating to digital goods with the
5 European Union, Japan, Taiwan, the member countries
6 of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, and other
7 nations, as appropriate.

8 (d) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL
9 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States
10 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor-
11 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish
12 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained
13 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral
14 mechanism for communication.

15 (e) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL-
16 OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN-
17 ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress
18 that the United States should lead a global effort to de-
19 velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards
20 for critical technologies to ensure that the such tech-
21 nologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether they
22 are governments or other entities, and that they do not
23 threaten democratic governance or human rights.

24 (f) FORMATION OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY TRADE
25 ALLIANCE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United

1 States should examine opportunities for diplomatic nego-
2 tiations regarding the formation of mutually beneficial al-
3 liances relating to digitally enabled technologies and serv-
4 ices.

5 **SEC. 122. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
6 **PARTNERSHIP.**

7 (a) **DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY**
8 **PARTNERSHIP.**—The Secretary of State is authorized to
9 establish a program, to be known as the “Digital
10 Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership” to help for-
11 eign countries—

12 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access
13 and digital infrastructure in emerging markets;

14 (2) protect technological assets, including data;

15 (3) adopt policies and regulatory positions that
16 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable,
17 and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi-
18 stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro-
19 competitive and security information communica-
20 tions technology policies and regulations;

21 (4) promote exports of United States informa-
22 tion and communications technology (ICT) goods
23 and services and increase United States company
24 market share in target markets;

1 (5) promote the diversification of ICT goods
2 and supply chain services to be less reliant on Chi-
3 nese imports; and

4 (6) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter-
5 operability, and promote best practices for a national
6 approach to cybersecurity.

7 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180
8 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
9 retary of State shall submit to the appropriate committees
10 of Congress an implementation plan for the coming year
11 to advance the goals identified in subsection (a).

12 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the strategy re-
13 quired by subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall con-
14 sult with—

15 (1) leaders of the United States industry;

16 (2) other relevant technology experts, including
17 the Open Technology Fund;

18 (3) representatives from relevant United States
19 Government agencies; and

20 (4) representatives from like-minded allies and
21 partners.

22 (d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not
23 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
24 this Act, and annually thereafter for five years, the Sec-
25 retary of State shall provide to the Committee on Foreign

1 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign
2 Affairs of the House of Representatives a briefing on the
3 implementation of the plan required by subsection (b).

4 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
5 authorized to be appropriated \$100,000,000 for each of
6 fiscal years 2022 through 2026.

7 **Subtitle D—Countering Chinese**
8 **Communist Party Influence**

9 **SECTION 131. SHORT TITLE.**

10 This subtitle may be cited as the “Countering Chi-
11 nese Communist Party Malign Influence Act”.

12 **SEC. 132. AUTHORIZATION.**

13 (a) COUNTERING CHINESE INFLUENCE FUND.—
14 There is authorized to be appropriated \$300,000,000 for
15 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the Countering
16 Chinese Influence Fund to counter the malign influence
17 of the Chinese Communist Party globally. Amounts appro-
18 priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to
19 remain available until expended and shall supplement, not
20 supplant, amounts otherwise authorized to be appro-
21 priated to counter such influence.

22 (b) CONSULTATION REQUIRED.—The obligation of
23 funds appropriated or otherwise made available to counter
24 the malign influence of the Chinese Communist Party
25 globally, including pursuant to the authorization under

1 subsection (a), shall be subject to prior consultation with,
2 and consistent with section 634A of the Foreign Assist-
3 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1), the regular notifica-
4 tion procedures of—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
6 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
8 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
9 resentatives.

10 (c) POLICY GUIDANCE, COORDINATION, AND AP-
11 PROVAL.—

12 (1) COORDINATOR.—The Secretary of State
13 shall designate an existing senior official of the De-
14 partment at the rank of Assistant Secretary or
15 above to provide policy guidance, coordination, and
16 approval for the obligation of funds authorized pur-
17 suant to subsection (a).

18 (2) DUTIES.—The senior official designated
19 pursuant to paragraph (1) shall be responsible for—

20 (A) on an annual basis, the identification
21 of specific strategic priorities for using the
22 funds authorized to be appropriated by sub-
23 section (a), such as geographic areas of focus or
24 functional categories of programming that
25 funds are to be concentrated within, consistent

1 with the national interests of the United States
2 and the purposes of this Act;

3 (B) the coordination and approval of all
4 programming conducted using the funds au-
5 thorized to be appropriated by subsection (a),
6 based on a determination that such program-
7 ming directly counters the malign influence of
8 the Chinese Communist Party, including spe-
9 cific activities or policies advanced by the Chi-
10 nese Communist Party, pursuant to the stra-
11 tegic objectives of the United States, as estab-
12 lished in the 2017 National Security Strategy,
13 the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and other
14 relevant national and regional strategies as ap-
15 propriate;

16 (C) ensuring that all programming ap-
17 proved bears a sufficiently direct nexus to such
18 acts by the Chinese Communist Party described
19 in subsection (d) and adheres to the require-
20 ments outlined in subsection (e); and

21 (D) conducting oversight, monitoring, and
22 evaluation of the effectiveness of all program-
23 ming conducted using the funds authorized to
24 be appropriated by subsection (a) to ensure
25 that it advances United States interests and de-

1 grades the ability of the Chinese Communist
2 Party, to advance activities that align with sub-
3 section (d) of this section.

4 (3) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The senior
5 official designated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall,
6 in coordinating and approving programming pursu-
7 ant to paragraph (2), seek to—

8 (A) conduct appropriate interagency con-
9 sultation; and

10 (B) ensure, to the maximum extent prac-
11 ticable, that all approved programming func-
12 tions in concert with other Federal activities to
13 counter the malign influence and activities of
14 the Chinese Communist Party.

15 (4) ASSISTANT COORDINATOR.—The Adminis-
16 trator of the United States Agency for International
17 Development shall designate a senior official at the
18 rank of Assistant Administrator or above to assist
19 and consult the senior official designated pursuant
20 to paragraph (1).

21 (d) MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this section, the term
22 “malign influence” with respect to the Chinese Com-
23 munist Party should be construed to include acts con-
24 ducted by the Chinese Communist Party or entities acting
25 on its behalf that—

1 (1) undermine a free and open international
2 order;

3 (2) advance an alternative, repressive inter-
4 national order that bolsters the Chinese Communist
5 Party's hegemonic ambitions and is characterized by
6 coercion and dependency;

7 (3) undermine the national security or sov-
8 ereignty of the United States or other countries; or

9 (4) undermine the economic security of the
10 United States or other countries, including by pro-
11 moting corruption.

12 (e) COUNTERING MALIGN INFLUENCE.—In this sec-
13 tion countering malign influence through the use of funds
14 authorized to be appropriated by subsection (a) shall in-
15 clude efforts to—

16 (1) promote transparency and accountability,
17 and reduce corruption, including in governance
18 structures targeted by the malign influence of the
19 Chinese Communist Party;

20 (2) support civil society and independent media
21 to raise awareness of and increase transparency re-
22 garding the negative impact of activities related to
23 the Belt and Road Initiative;

1 (3) counter transnational criminal networks
2 that benefit, or benefit from, the malign influence of
3 the Chinese Communist Party;

4 (4) encourage economic development structures
5 that help protect against predatory lending schemes,
6 including support for market-based alternatives in
7 key economic sectors, such as digital economy, en-
8 ergy, and infrastructure;

9 (5) counter activities that provide undue influ-
10 ence to the security forces of the People's Republic
11 of China;

12 (6) expose misinformation and disinformation
13 of the Chinese Communist Party's propaganda, in-
14 cluding through programs carried out by the Global
15 Engagement Center; and

16 (7) counter efforts by the Chinese Communist
17 Party to legitimize or promote authoritarian ideology
18 and governance models.

19 **SEC. 133. FINDINGS ON CHINESE INFORMATION WARFARE**
20 **AND MALIGN INFLUENCE OPERATIONS.**

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
22 ings:

23 (1) In the report to Congress required under
24 section 1261(b) of the John S. McCain National De-
25 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Pub-

1 lic Law 115–232), the President laid out a broad
2 range of malign activities conducted by the Govern-
3 ment of China and its agents and entities, includ-
4 ing—

5 (A) propaganda and disinformation, in
6 which “Beijing communicates its narrative
7 through state-run television, print, radio, and
8 online organizations whose presence is prolifer-
9 ating in the United States and around the
10 world”;

11 (B) malign political influence operations,
12 in which “front organizations and agents which
13 target businesses, universities, think tanks,
14 scholars, journalists, and local state and Fed-
15 eral officials in the United States and around
16 the world, attempting to influence discourse”;
17 and

18 (C) malign financial influence operations,
19 characterized as “misappropriation of tech-
20 nology and intellectual property, failure to ap-
21 propriately disclose relationships with foreign
22 government sponsored entities, breaches of con-
23 tract and confidentiality, and manipulation of
24 processes for fair and merit-based allocation of
25 Federal research and development funding”.

1 (2) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
2 fluence operations are ongoing. In January 2019,
3 the Director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats,
4 stated, “China will continue to use legal, political,
5 and economic levers—such as the lure of Chinese
6 markets—to shape the information environment. It
7 is also capable of using cyber attacks against sys-
8 tems in the United States to censor or suppress
9 viewpoints it deems politically sensitive.”.

10 (3) In February 2020, the Director of the Fed-
11 eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, tes-
12 tified to the Committee on the Judiciary of the
13 House of Representatives that the People’s Republic
14 of China has “very active **[malign]** foreign influence
15 efforts in this country,” with the goal of “trying to
16 shift our policy and our public opinion to be more
17 pro-China on a variety of issues”.

18 (4) The People’s Republic of China’s informa-
19 tion warfare and malign influence operations con-
20 tinue to adopt new tactics and evolve in sophistica-
21 tion. In May 2020, the Special Envoy and Coordi-
22 nator of the Global Engagement Center (GEC), Lea
23 Gabrielle, stated that there was a convergence of
24 Russian and Chinese narratives surrounding
25 COVID–19 and that the GEC had “uncovered a new

1 network of inauthentic Twitter accounts” that it as-
2 sessed was “created with the intent to amplify Chi-
3 nese propaganda and disinformation”. In June
4 2020, Google reported that Chinese hackers at-
5 tempted to access email accounts of the campaign
6 staff of a presidential candidate.

7 (5) Chinese information warfare and malign in-
8 fluence operations are a threat to the national secu-
9 rity, democracy and the economic systems of the
10 United States, its allies and partners. In October
11 2018, Vice President Mike Pence warned that “Bei-
12 jing is employing a whole-of-government approach,
13 using political, economic, and military tools, as well
14 as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit
15 its interests in the United States.”.

16 (6) In February 2018, the Director of the Fed-
17 eral Bureau of Investigation, Christopher Wray, tes-
18 tified to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
19 Senate that the People’s Republic of China is taking
20 advantage of and exploiting the open research and
21 development environments of United States institu-
22 tions of higher education to utilize “professors, sci-
23 entists and students” as “nontraditional collectors”
24 of information.

25 (b) PRESIDENTIAL DUTIES.—The President shall—

1 (1) protect our democratic institutions and
2 processes from malign influence from the People’s
3 Republic of China and other foreign adversaries; and

4 (2) consistent with the policy specified in para-
5 graph (1), direct the heads of the appropriate Fed-
6 eral departments and agencies to implement Acts of
7 Congress to counter and deter Chinese and other
8 foreign information warfare and malign influence op-
9 erations without delay, including—

10 (A) section 1043 of the John S. McCain
11 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
12 Year 2019 (Public Law 115–232), which au-
13 thORIZES a coordinator position within the Na-
14 tional Security Council for countering malign
15 foreign influence operations and campaigns;

16 (B) section 228 of the National Defense
17 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Public
18 Law 116–92), which authorizes additional re-
19 search of foreign malign influence operations on
20 social media platforms;

21 (C) section 847 of such Act, which requires
22 the Secretary of Defense to modify contracting
23 regulations regarding vetting for foreign owner-
24 ship, control and influence in order to mitigate
25 risks from malign foreign influence;

1 (D) section 1239 of such Act, which re-
2 quires an update of the comprehensive strategy
3 to counter the threat of malign influence to in-
4 clude the People’s Republic of China;

5 (E) section 5323 of such Act, which au-
6 thORIZES the Director of National Intelligence to
7 facilitate the establishment of Social Media
8 Data and Threat Analysis Center to detect and
9 study information warfare and malign influence
10 operations across social media platforms; and

11 (F) section 119C of the National Security
12 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3059), which authorizes
13 the establishment of a Foreign Malign Influence
14 Response Center inside the Office of the Direc-
15 tor of National Intelligence.

16 **SEC. 134. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE**
17 **FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM.**

18 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 6-
19 year period beginning on September 30, 2021,
20 \$105,500,000, which shall be expended to promote edu-
21 cation, training, research, and foreign language skills
22 through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance with
23 section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural
24 Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)).

1 **SEC. 135. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN**
2 **RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION.**

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
4 ings:

5 (1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pan-
6 demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and
7 those of Asian descent have risen dramatically
8 worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary-
9 General Antonio Guterres said “the pandemic con-
10 tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia,
11 scapegoating and scare-mongering” and urged gov-
12 ernments to “act now to strengthen the immunity of
13 our societies against the virus of hate”.

14 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI)
15 workers make up a large portion of the essential
16 workers on the frontlines of the COVID-19 pan-
17 demic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential
18 healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI
19 workers also make up a large share—between 6 per-
20 cent and 12 percent based on sector—of the bio-
21 medical field.

22 (3) The United States Census notes that Amer-
23 icans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per-
24 cent of the United States population in 2019, and
25 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial

1 group in the United States, projected to represent
2 14 percent of the United States population by 2065.

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
4 gress that—

5 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian
6 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti-
7 ment and racism in the United States and around
8 the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and
9 tolerant world;

10 (2) the United States is a diverse nation with
11 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength
12 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by
13 the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its
14 citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is-
15 landers;

16 (3) the United States Government should en-
17 courage other foreign governments to use the official
18 and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic,
19 as recommended by the World Health Organization
20 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention;
21 and

22 (4) the United States Government and other
23 governments around the world must actively oppose
24 racism and intolerance, and use available and appro-

1 appropriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian rac-
2 ism and discrimination.

3 **SEC. 136. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN-**
4 **TERING DISINFORMATION.**

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
6 ings:

7 (1) China is increasing its spending on public
8 diplomacy including influence campaigns, adver-
9 tising, and investments into state-sponsored media
10 publications outside of China. These include, for ex-
11 ample, more than \$10,000,000,000 in foreign direct
12 investment in communications infrastructure, plat-
13 forms, and properties, as well as bringing journalists
14 to China for training programs.

15 (2) The PRC, through the Voice of China, the
16 United Front Work Department, and UFWD's
17 many affiliates and proxies, has obtained unfettered
18 access to radio, television, and digital dissemination
19 platforms in numerous languages targeted at citi-
20 zens in other regions where China has an interest in
21 promoting public sentiment in support of the Chi-
22 nese Communist Party and expanding the reach of
23 its misleading narratives and propaganda.

24 (3) Even in Western countries, China spends
25 extensively on influence operations, such as a

1 \$500,000,000 advertising campaign to attract cable
2 viewers in Australia and a more than \$20,000,000
3 campaign to influence United States public opinion
4 via the China Daily newspaper supplement.

5 (b) THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR GLOBAL
6 MEDIA.—The United States Agency for Global Media
7 (USAGM) and affiliate Federal and non-Federal entities
8 shall undertake the following actions to support inde-
9 pendent journalism, countering disinformation, and break-
10 ing the firewall and combatting surveillance in countries
11 where the Chinese Communist Party and other malign ac-
12 tors are promoting disinformation, propaganda, and ma-
13 nipulated media markets:

14 (1) Radio Free Asia shall expand domestic cov-
15 erage and digital programming for all RFA China
16 services and other affiliate language broadcasting
17 services.

18 (2) USAGM shall increase funding for Radio
19 Free Asia's Mandarin, Tibetan, Uyghur, and Can-
20 tonese language services.

21 (3) Voice of America shall establish a real-time
22 disinformation tracking tool similar to Polygraph for
23 Russian language propaganda and misinformation.

24 (4) USAGM shall expand existing training and
25 partnership programs that promote journalistic

1 standards, investigative reporting, cybersecurity, and
2 digital analytics to help expose and counter false
3 CCP narratives.

4 (5) The Open Technology Fund shall continue
5 and expand work to support tools and technology to
6 circumvent censorship and surveillance by the CCP,
7 both inside China as well as abroad where China has
8 exported censorship technology, and increase secure
9 peer to peer connectivity and privacy tools.

10 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
11 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
12 2022 through 2026 for the United States Agency for
13 Global Media, \$100,000,000 for ongoing and new pro-
14 grams to support local media, build independent media,
15 combat Chinese disinformation inside and outside of
16 China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and
17 monitor and evaluate these programs.

18 (d) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of
19 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for
20 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and in coordina-
21 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency
22 for International Development, shall support and train
23 journalists on investigative techniques necessary to ensure
24 public accountability related to the Belt and Road Initia-
25 tive, the PRC's surveillance and digital export of tech-

1 nology, and other influence operations abroad direct or di-
2 rectly supported by the Communist Party or the Chinese
3 government.

4 (e) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau
5 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue
6 to support internet freedom programs.

7 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years
9 2022 through 2026, \$170,000,000 for ongoing and new
10 programs in support of press freedom, training, and pro-
11 tection of journalists.

12 **SEC. 137. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER.**

13 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En-
14 gagement Center to “direct, lead, and coordinate efforts”
15 of the Federal Government to “recognize, understand, ex-
16 pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda
17 and disinformation globally”.

18 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National
19 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22
20 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking “the date that
21 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act”
22 and inserting “December 31, 2027”.

23 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand
25 its coordinating capacity through the exchange of liaison

1 officers with Federal departments and agencies that man-
2 age aspects of identifying and countering foreign
3 disinformation, including the National Counterterrorism
4 Center at the Office of the Director of National Intel-
5 ligence and from combatant commands.

6 (d) **HIRING AUTHORITY.**—Notwithstanding any
7 other provision of law, the Secretary of State, during the
8 five year period beginning on the date of the enactment
9 of this Act and solely to carry out functions of the Global
10 Engagement Center, may—

11 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
12 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
13 appointments in the competitive service; and

14 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
15 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
16 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
17 and General Schedule pay rates.

18 **SEC. 138. REVIEW BY COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVEST-**
19 **MENT IN THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN**
20 **FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS WITH**
21 **INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.**

22 (a) **AMENDMENTS TO DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT**
23 **OF 1950.**—

1 (1) DEFINITION OF COVERED TRANSACTION.—

2 Subsection (a)(4) of section 721 of the Defense Pro-
3 duction Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. 4565) is amended—

4 (A) in subparagraph (A)—

5 (i) in clause (i), by striking “; and”
6 and inserting a semicolon;

7 (ii) in clause (ii), by striking the pe-
8 riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and

9 (iii) by adding at the end the fol-
10 lowing:

11 “(iii) any transaction described in
12 subparagraph (B)(vi) proposed or pending
13 after the date of the enactment of the
14 Strategic Competition Act of 2021.”;

15 (B) in subparagraph (B), by adding at the
16 end the following:

17 “(vi) Any gift to an institution of
18 higher education from a foreign person, or
19 the entry into a contract by such an insti-
20 tution with a foreign person, if—

21 “(I)(aa) the value of the gift or
22 contract equals or exceeds
23 \$1,000,000; or

24 “(bb) the institution receives, di-
25 rectly or indirectly, more than one gift

1 from or enters into more than one
2 contract, directly or indirectly, with
3 the same foreign person for the same
4 purpose the aggregate value of which,
5 during the period of 2 consecutive cal-
6 endar years, equals or exceeds
7 \$1,000,000; and

8 “(II) the gift or contract—

9 “(aa) relates to research, de-
10 velopment, or production of crit-
11 ical technologies and provides the
12 foreign person potential access to
13 any material nonpublic technical
14 information (as defined in sub-
15 paragraph (D)(ii)) in the posses-
16 sion of the institution; or

17 “(bb) is a restricted or con-
18 ditional gift or contract (as de-
19 fined in section 117(h) of the
20 Higher Education Act of 1965
21 (20 U.S.C. 2011f(h))) that estab-
22 lishes control.”; and

23 (C) by adding at the end the following:

1 “(G) FOREIGN GIFTS TO AND CONTRACTS
2 WITH INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—

3 For purposes of subparagraph (B)(vi):

4 “(i) CONTRACT.—The term ‘contract’
5 means any agreement for the acquisition
6 by purchase, lease, or barter of property or
7 services by a foreign person, for the direct
8 benefit or use of either of the parties.

9 “(ii) GIFT.—The term ‘gift’ means
10 any gift of money or property.

11 “(iii) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDU-
12 CATION.—The term ‘institution of higher
13 education’ means any institution, public or
14 private, or, if a multicampus institution,
15 any single campus of such institution, in
16 any State—

17 “(I) that is legally authorized
18 within such State to provide a pro-
19 gram of education beyond secondary
20 school;

21 “(II) that provides a program for
22 which the institution awards a bach-
23 elor’s degree (or provides not less
24 than a 2-year program which is ac-

1 ceptable for full credit toward such a
2 degree) or a more advanced degree;

3 “(III) that is accredited by a na-
4 tionally recognized accrediting agency
5 or association; and

6 “(IV) to which the Federal Gov-
7 ernment extends Federal financial as-
8 sistance (directly or indirectly through
9 another entity or person), or that re-
10 ceives support from the extension of
11 Federal financial assistance to any of
12 the institution’s subunits.”.

13 (2) MANDATORY DECLARATIONS.—Subsection
14 (b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(aa) of such section is amended by
15 adding at the end the following: “Such regulations
16 shall require a declaration under this subclause with
17 respect to a covered transaction described in sub-
18 section (a)(4)(B)(vi)(II)(aa).”.

19 (3) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.—Subsection
20 (f) of such section is amended—

21 (A) in paragraph (10), by striking “; and”
22 and inserting a semicolon;

23 (B) by redesignating paragraph (11) as
24 paragraph (12); and

1 (C) by inserting after paragraph (10) the
2 following:

3 “(11) as appropriate, and particularly with re-
4 spect to covered transactions described in subsection
5 (a)(4)(B)(vi), the importance of academic freedom at
6 institutions of higher education in the United States;
7 and”.

8 (4) MEMBERSHIP OF CFIUS.—Subsection (k)(2)
9 of such section is amended—

10 (A) by redesignating subparagraphs (H),
11 (I), and (J) as subparagraphs (I), (J), and (K),
12 respectively; and

13 (B) by inserting after subparagraph (G)
14 the following:

15 “(G) In the case of a covered transaction
16 involving an institution of higher education (as
17 defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)), the Secretary
18 of Education.”.

19 (5) CONTENTS OF ANNUAL REPORT RELATING
20 TO CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES.—Subsection (m)(3) of
21 such section is amended—

22 (A) in subparagraph (B), by striking “;
23 and” and inserting a semicolon;

1 (B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the
2 period at the end and inserting a semicolon;
3 and

4 (C) by adding at the end the following:

5 “(D) an evaluation of whether there are
6 foreign malign influence or espionage activities
7 directed or directly assisted by foreign govern-
8 ments against institutions of higher education
9 (as defined in subsection (a)(4)(G)) aimed at
10 obtaining research and development methods or
11 secrets related to critical technologies; and

12 “(E) an evaluation of, and recommenda-
13 tion for any changes to, reviews conducted
14 under this section that relate to institutions of
15 higher education, based on an analysis of dislo-
16 sure reports submitted to the chairperson under
17 section 117(a) of the Higher Education Act of
18 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1011f(a)).”.

19 (b) INCLUSION OF CFIUS IN REPORTING ON FOR-
20 EIGN GIFTS UNDER HIGHER EDUCATION ACT OF 1965.—
21 Section 117 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20
22 U.S.C. 1011f) is amended—

23 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting after “the
24 Secretary” the following: “and the Secretary of the
25 Treasury (in the capacity of the Secretary as the

1 chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Investment
2 in the United States under section 721(k)(3) of the
3 Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
4 4565(k)(3)))”; and

5 (2) in subsection (d)—

6 (A) in paragraph (1)—

7 (i) by striking “with the Secretary”
8 and inserting “with the Secretary and the
9 Secretary of the Treasury”; and

10 (ii) by striking “to the Secretary” and
11 inserting “to each such Secretary”; and

12 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “with the
13 Secretary” and inserting “with the Secretary
14 and the Secretary of the Treasury”.

15 (c) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
16 ments made by subsection (a) shall—

17 (1) take effect on the date of the enactment of
18 this Act, subject to the requirements of subsections
19 (d) and (e); and

20 (2) apply with respect to any covered trans-
21 action the review or investigation of which is initi-
22 ated under section 721 of the Defense Production
23 Act of 1950 on or after that date.

24 (d) REGULATIONS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Committee on Foreign
2 Investment in the United States, which shall include
3 the Secretary of Education for purposes of this sub-
4 section, shall prescribe regulations as necessary and
5 appropriate to implement the amendments made by
6 subsection (a).

7 (2) ELEMENTS.—The regulations prescribed
8 under paragraph (1) shall include—

9 (A) regulations accounting for the burden
10 on institutions of higher education likely to re-
11 sult from compliance with the amendments
12 made by subsection (a), structuring penalties
13 and filing fees to reduce such burdens, and im-
14 plementing any procedures necessary to protect
15 academic freedom; and

16 (B) guidance with respect to the meaning
17 of “control”, as defined in section 721(a) of the
18 Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
19 4565(a)), as that term applies to covered trans-
20 actions described in clause (vi) of paragraph
21 (4)(B) of that section, as added by subsection
22 (a)(1).

23 (3) ISSUANCE OF FINAL RULE.—The Com-
24 mittee shall issue a final rule to carry out the
25 amendments made by subsection (a) after assessing

1 the findings of the pilot program required by sub-
2 section (e).

3 (e) PILOT PROGRAM.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Beginning on the date that
5 is 30 days after the publication in the Federal Reg-
6 ister of the matter required by paragraph (2) and
7 ending on the date that is 570 days thereafter, the
8 Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
9 States shall conduct a pilot program to assess meth-
10 ods for implementing the review of covered trans-
11 actions described in clause (vi) of section
12 721(a)(4)(B) of the Defense Production Act of
13 1950, as added by subsection (a)(1).

14 (2) PROPOSED DETERMINATION.—Not later
15 than 270 days after the date of the enactment of
16 this Act, the Committee shall, in consultation with
17 the Secretary of Education, publish in the Federal
18 Register—

19 (A) a proposed determination of the scope
20 of and procedures for the pilot program re-
21 quired by paragraph (1);

22 (B) an assessment of the burden on insti-
23 tutions of higher education likely to result from
24 compliance with the pilot program;

1 (C) recommendations for addressing any
2 such burdens, including structuring penalties
3 and filing fees to reduce such burdens; and

4 (D) any procedures necessary to ensure
5 that the pilot program does not infringe upon
6 academic freedom.

7 **TITLE II—INVESTING IN**
8 **ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS**
9 **Subtitle A—Strategic and**
10 **Diplomatic Matters**

11 **SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**
12 **DEFINED.**

13 In this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional
14 committees” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
16 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

17 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
18 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives.

20 **SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT**
21 **FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA-**
22 **CIFIC.**

23 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
24 gress that—

1 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the
2 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to
3 the United States and are among the Nation's most
4 precious assets, enabling the United States to ad-
5 vance its vital national interests, defend its territory,
6 expand its economy through international trade and
7 commerce, establish enduring cooperation among
8 like-minded countries, prevent the domination of the
9 Indo-Pacific and its surrounding maritime and air
10 lanes by a hostile power or powers, and deter poten-
11 tial aggressors;

12 (2) the Governments of the United States,
13 Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Aus-
14 tralia, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing
15 a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and
16 tackling challenges with unity purpose, and have col-
17 laborated to advance specific efforts of shared inter-
18 est in areas such as defense and security, economic
19 prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and funda-
20 mental freedoms;

21 (3) the United States greatly values other part-
22 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with
23 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand,
24 and Vietnam as well as regional architecture such as
25 the Quad, the Association of Southeast Asian Na-

1 tions (ASEAN), and the Asia-Pacific Economic
2 Community (APEC), which are essential to further
3 shared interests;

4 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific
5 demands consistent United States and allied com-
6 mitment to strengthening and advancing our alli-
7 ances so that they are postured to meet these chal-
8 lenges, and will require sustained political will, con-
9 crete partnerships, economic, commercial, and tech-
10 nological cooperation, consistent and tangible com-
11 mitments, high-level and extensive consultations on
12 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co-
13 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im-
14 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup-
15 port in the face of political, economic, or military co-
16 ercion;

17 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela-
18 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad-
19 versaries and weaken collective ability to advance
20 shared interests; and

21 (6) the United States will work with allies to
22 prioritize promoting human rights throughout the
23 region.

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
25 of the United States—

1 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu-
2 rity cooperation between and among the United
3 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Phil-
4 ippines, Thailand, and Australia, including through
5 diplomatic engagement, regional development, en-
6 ergy security and development, scientific and health
7 partnerships, educational and cultural exchanges,
8 missile defense, intelligence-sharing, space, cyber,
9 and other diplomatic and defense-related initiatives;

10 (2) to uphold our multilateral and bilateral
11 treaty obligations, including—

12 (A) defending Japan, including all areas
13 under the administration of Japan, under arti-
14 cle V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
15 Security Between the United States of America
16 and Japan;

17 (B) defending the Republic of Korea under
18 article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be-
19 tween the United States and the Republic of
20 Korea;

21 (C) defending the Philippines under article
22 IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
23 United States and the Republic of the Phil-
24 ippines;

1 (D) defending Thailand under the 1954
2 Manila Pact and the Thanat-Rusk communique
3 of 1962; and

4 (E) defending Australia under article IV of
5 the Australia, New Zealand, United States Se-
6 curity Treaty;

7 (3) to strengthen and deepen our bilateral and
8 regional partnerships, including with India, Taiwan,
9 ASEAN, and New Zealand;

10 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of
11 Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia to
12 promote human rights bilaterally and through re-
13 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and

14 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco-
15 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part-
16 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore,
17 Indonesia, and India.

18 **SEC. 203. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COOPERATION WITH**

19 **THE QUAD.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States should reaffirm our com-
22 mitment to quadrilateral cooperation among Aus-
23 tralia, India, Japan, and the United States (the
24 “Quad”) to enhance and implement a shared vision
25 to meet shared regional challenges and to promote

1 a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and healthy Indo-
2 Pacific that is characterized by democracy, rule-of-
3 law, and market-driven economic growth and is free
4 from undue influence and coercion;

5 (2) the United States should seek to expand
6 sustained dialogue and cooperation through the
7 Quad with a range of partners to support the rule
8 of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peace-
9 ful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and
10 territorial integrity, and to uphold peace and pros-
11 perity and strengthen democratic resilience;

12 (3) the United States should seek to expand
13 avenues of cooperation with the Quad, including
14 more regular military-to-military dialogues, joint ex-
15 ercises, and coordinated policies related to shared in-
16 terests such as protecting cyberspace and advancing
17 maritime security; and

18 (4) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad
19 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to
20 the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in-
21 cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac-
22 cine production and equitable access, and to address
23 shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical
24 technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure
25 investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis-

1 aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad-
2 vances the important cooperation among Quad na-
3 tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region.

4 **SEC. 204. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
5 **ASEAN.**

6 It is the policy of the United States to—

7 (1) stand with the nations of Association of
8 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond
9 to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in
10 building capacity to prepare for and respond to
11 pandemics and other public health challenges;

12 (2) support high-level United States participa-
13 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each No-
14 vember;

15 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States-
16 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi-
17 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and
18 support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC)
19 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable
20 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the
21 United States that focuses on innovation and capac-
22 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster
23 management, food security, human rights, and trade
24 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun-
25 tries;

1 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos-
2 ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN
3 community, as well as to foster greater integration
4 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and
5 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of
6 Korea, Australia, the European Union, Taiwan, and
7 India;

8 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic
9 initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect,
10 which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and
11 the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in
12 the region;

13 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar-
14 itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man-
15 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo-
16 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and
17 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent
18 with international law, including through the adop-
19 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea
20 that represents the interests of all parties and pro-
21 motes peace and stability in the region;

22 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime
23 and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region,
24 including the Government of China—

1 (A) to cease any current activities, and
2 avoid undertaking any actions in the future,
3 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca-
4 late disputes through the use of coercion, in-
5 timidation, or military force;

6 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals,
7 and other features, and refrain from new ef-
8 forts to militarize, including the construction of
9 new garrisons and facilities and the relocation
10 of additional military personnel, material, or
11 equipment;

12 (C) to oppose actions by any country that
13 prevent other countries from exercising their
14 sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu-
15 sive economic zones and continental shelves by
16 enforcing claims to those areas in the South
17 China Sea that lack support in international
18 law; and

19 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad-
20 ministrative and military districts in contested
21 areas in the South China Sea;

22 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac-
23 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the
24 marine environment and support the efforts of the
25 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

1 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the
2 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
3 region;

4 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a
5 common approach to reaffirm the decision of the
6 Permanent Court of Arbitration's 2016 ruling in
7 favor of the Republic of the Philippines in the case
8 against the People's Republic of China's excessive
9 maritime claims;

10 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United
11 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt
12 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and
13 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional
14 mechanisms to provide assistance and support to
15 refugees and migrants;

16 (11) support the Lower Mekong Initiative;

17 (12) support newly created initiatives with
18 ASEAN countries, including the Mekong-United
19 States partnership, the United States-ASEAN
20 Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Imple-
21 mentation Project, the United States-ASEAN Inno-
22 vation Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health
23 Futures;

24 (13) encourage the President to communicate
25 to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the

1 rule of law and open and transparent government,
2 strengthening civil society, and protecting human
3 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing
4 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary
5 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free-
6 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom
7 of speech and expression;

8 (14) support efforts by organizations in
9 ASEAN that address corruption in the public and
10 private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en-
11 force bribery criminalization in the private sector,
12 and build beneficial ownership transparency through
13 the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered
14 with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup-
15 tion (SEA-PAC);

16 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead-
17 ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people
18 partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead-
19 ership training to a new generation that will create
20 and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and
21 partnerships, and rise to solve the regional and glob-
22 al challenges of the future;

23 (16) support creating initiatives similar to the
24 Young Southeast Asian Leaders for other parts of

1 the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-people partner-
2 ships with an emphasis on civil society leaders;

3 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments
4 that have fully upheld and implemented all United
5 Nations Security Council resolutions and inter-
6 national agreements with respect to the Democratic
7 People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and ballistic
8 missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN
9 governments to do the same; and

10 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the
11 United States Government to articulate and imple-
12 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup-
13 ports ASEAN centrality and supports ASEAN as a
14 source of well-functioning and problem-solving re-
15 gional architecture in the Indo-Pacific community.

16 **SEC. 205. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ENHANCING UNITED**
17 **STATES-ASEAN COOPERATION ON TECH-**
18 **NOLOGY ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
19 **PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the United States and ASEAN should com-
22 plete a joint analysis on risks of overreliance on Chi-
23 nese equipment critical to strategic technologies and
24 critical infrastructure;

1 (2) the United States and ASEAN should share
2 information about and collaborate on screening Chi-
3 nese investments in strategic technology and critical
4 infrastructure;

5 (3) the United States and ASEAN should work
6 together on appropriate import restriction regimes
7 regarding Chinese exports of surveillance tech-
8 nologies;

9 (4) the United States should urge ASEAN to
10 adopt its March 2019 proposed sanctions regime
11 targeting cyber attacks;

12 (5) the United States should urge ASEAN to
13 commit to the September 2019 principles signed by
14 28 countries regarding “Advancing Responsible
15 State Behavior in Cyberspace”, a set of commit-
16 ments that support the “rules-based international
17 order, affirm the applicability of international law to
18 state-on-state behavior, adherence to voluntary
19 norms of responsible state behavior in peacetime,
20 and the development and implementation of practical
21 confidence building measures to help reduce the risk
22 of conflict stemming from cyber incidents”; and

23 (6) the United States and ASEAN should ex-
24 plore how Chinese investments in critical technology,

1 including artificial intelligence, will impact Indo-Pa-
2 cific security over the coming decades.

3 **SEC. 206. REPORT ON CHINESE INFLUENCE IN INTER-**
4 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.**

5 (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
7 of State, in coordination with the Director of National In-
8 telligence, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
9 tions and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-
10 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Perma-
11 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
12 Representatives a report on the expanded influence of the
13 Government of the People’s Republic of China and the
14 Chinese Communist Party in international organizations.

15 (b) CONTENTS.—The report required by subsection
16 (a) shall include analysis of the following:

17 (1) The influence of the PRC and Chinese
18 Communist Party in international organizations and
19 how that influence has expanded over the last 10
20 years, including—

21 (A) tracking countries’ voting patterns
22 that align with Chinese government voting pat-
23 terns;

24 (B) the number of PRC nationals in lead-
25 ership positions at the D–1 level or higher;

1 (C) changes in PRC voluntary and manda-
2 tory funding by organization;

3 (D) adoption of Chinese Communist Party
4 phrases and initiatives in international organi-
5 zation language and programming;

6 (E) efforts by the PRC to secure legit-
7 imacy for its own foreign policy initiatives, in-
8 cluding the Belt and Road Initiative;

9 (F) the number of Junior Professional Of-
10 ficers that the Government of China has funded
11 by organization;

12 (G) tactics used by the Government of
13 China or the CCP to manipulate secret or oth-
14 erwise non-public voting measures, voting bod-
15 ies, or votes;

16 (H) the extent to which technology compa-
17 nies incorporated in the PRC, or which have
18 PRC or CCP ownership interests, provide
19 equipment and services to international organi-
20 zations; and

21 (I) efforts by China's United Nations Mis-
22 sion to generate criticism of the United States
23 in the United Nations, including any efforts to
24 highlight delayed United States payments or to
25 misrepresent total United States voluntary and

1 assessed financial contributions to the United
2 Nations and its specialized agencies and pro-
3 grams.

4 (2) The purpose and ultimate goals of the ex-
5 panded influence of the PRC and the Chinese Com-
6 munist Party in international organizations, includ-
7 ing an analysis of PRC Government- and Chinese
8 Communist Party strategic documents and rhetoric.

9 (3) The tactics and means employed by the
10 PRC and the Chinese Communist Party to achieve
11 expanded influence in international organizations,
12 including—

13 (A) incentive programs for PRC nationals
14 to join and run for leadership positions in inter-
15 national organizations;

16 (B) coercive economic and other practices
17 against other members in the organization; and

18 (C) economic or other incentives provided
19 to international organizations, including dona-
20 tions of technologies or goods.

21 (4) The successes and failures of PRC and CCP
22 influence efforts in international organizations.

23 (c) FORM.—The report submitted under subsection
24 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in-
25 clude a classified annex.

1 (d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “inter-
2 national organizations” means the following:

3 (1) The African Development Bank.

4 (2) The Asian Development Bank.

5 (3) The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

6 (4) The Bank of International Settlements.

7 (5) The Caribbean Development Bank.

8 (6) The Food and Agriculture Organization.

9 (7) The International Atomic Energy Agency.

10 (8) The International Bank for Reconstruction
11 and Development.

12 (9) The International Bureau of Weights and
13 Measures.

14 (10) The International Chamber of Commerce.

15 (11) The International Civil Aviation Organiza-
16 tion.

17 (12) The International Criminal Police Organi-
18 zation.

19 (13) The International Finance Corporation.

20 (14) The International Fund for Agricultural
21 Development.

22 (15) The International Hydrographic Organiza-
23 tion.

24 (16) The International Labor Organization.

25 (17) The International Maritime Organization.

1 (18) The International Monetary Fund.

2 (19) The International Olympic Committee.

3 (20) The International Organization for Migra-
4 tion.

5 (21) The International Organization for Stand-
6 ardization.

7 (22) The International Renewable Energy
8 Agency.

9 (23) The International Telecommunications
10 Union.

11 (24) The Organization for Economic Coopera-
12 tion and Development.

13 (25) The Organization for the Prohibition of
14 Chemical Weapons.

15 (26) The United Nations.

16 (27) The United Nations Conference on Trade
17 and Development.

18 (28) The United Nations Educational, Sci-
19 entific, and Cultural Organization.

20 (29) The United Nations Industrial Develop-
21 ment Organization.

22 (30) The United Nations Institute for Training
23 and Research.

24 (31) The United Nations Truce Supervision Or-
25 ganization.

1 (32) The Universal Postal Union.

2 (33) The World Customs Organization.

3 (34) The World Health Organization.

4 (35) The World Intellectual Property Organiza-
5 tion.

6 (36) The World Meteorological Organization.

7 (37) The World Organization for Animal
8 Health.

9 (38) The World Tourism Organization.

10 (39) The World Trade Organization.

11 (40) The World Bank Group.

12 **SEC. 207. REGULATORY EXCHANGES WITH ALLIES AND**
13 **PARTNERS.**

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
15 nation with the heads of other participating executive
16 branch agencies, shall establish and develop a program to
17 facilitate and encourage regular dialogues between United
18 States Government regulatory and technical agencies and
19 their counterpart organizations in allied and partner coun-
20 tries, both bilaterally and in relevant multilateral institu-
21 tions and organizations—

22 (1) to promote best practices in regulatory for-
23 mation and implementation;

1 (2) to collaborate to achieve optimal regulatory
2 outcomes based on scientific, technical, and other
3 relevant principles;

4 (3) to seek better harmonization and alignment
5 of regulations and regulatory practices;

6 (4) to build consensus around industry and
7 technical standards in emerging sectors that will
8 drive future global economic growth and commerce;
9 and

10 (5) to promote United States standards regard-
11 ing environmental, labor, and other relevant protec-
12 tions in regulatory formation and implementation, in
13 keeping with the values of free and open societies,
14 including the rule of law.

15 (b) **PRIORITIZATION OF ACTIVITIES.**—In facilitating
16 expert exchanges under subsection (a), the Secretary shall
17 prioritize—

18 (1) bilateral coordination and collaboration with
19 countries where greater regulatory coherence, har-
20 monization of standards, or communication and dia-
21 logue between technical agencies is achievable and
22 best advances the economic and national security in-
23 terests of the United States;

24 (2) multilateral coordination and coordination
25 where greater regulatory coherence, harmonization

1 of standards, or dialogue on other relevant regu-
2 latory matters is achievable and best advances the
3 economic and national security interests of the
4 United States, including with—

5 (A) the European Union;

6 (B) the Asia-Pacific Economic Coopera-
7 tion;

8 (C) the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
9 tions (ASEAN);

10 (D) the Organization for Economic Co-
11 operation and Development (OECD); and

12 (E) multilateral development banks; and

13 (3) regulatory practices and standards setting
14 bodies focused on key economic sectors and emerg-
15 ing technologies.

16 (c) PARTICIPATION BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ENTI-
17 TIES.—With regard to the program described in sub-
18 section (a), the Secretary may facilitate, including through
19 the use of amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection
20 (e), the participation of private sector representatives, and
21 other relevant organizations and individuals with relevant
22 expertise, as appropriate and to the extent that such par-
23 ticipation advances the goals of such program.

24 (d) DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY BY THE SEC-
25 RETARY.—The Secretary of State is authorized to delegate

1 the responsibilities described in this section to the Under
2 Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
3 Environment.

4 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be
6 appropriated \$2,500,000 for each of fiscal years
7 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section.

8 (2) USE OF FUNDS.—The Secretary may obli-
9 gate amounts appropriated pursuant to paragraph
10 (1) in a manner that—

11 (A) facilitates participation by representa-
12 tives from technical agencies within the United
13 States Government and their counterparts; and

14 (B) complies with applicable procedural re-
15 quirements under the State Department Basic
16 Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2651a et
17 seq.) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
18 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.).

19 **SEC. 208. TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP OFFICE AT THE DE-**
20 **PARTMENT OF STATE.**

21 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
22 of the United States to lead new technology policy partner-
23 ships focused on the shared interests of the world's tech-
24 nology-leading democracies.

1 (b) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall
2 establish an interagency-staffed Technology Partnership
3 Office (referred to in this section as the “Office”), which
4 shall be housed in the Department of State.

5 (c) LEADERSHIP.—

6 (1) AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE.—The Office shall
7 be headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
8 nology, who shall—

9 (A) be appointed by the President, by and
10 with the advice and consent of the Senate;

11 (B) have the rank and status of ambas-
12 sador; and

13 (C) report to the Secretary of State, unless
14 otherwise directed.

15 (2) OFFICE LIAISONS.—The Secretary of Com-
16 merce and the Secretary of Treasury shall each ap-
17 point, from within their respective departments at
18 the level of GS–14 or higher, liaisons between the
19 Office and the Department of Commerce or the De-
20 partment of the Treasury, as applicable, to perform
21 the following duties:

22 (A) Collaborate with the Department of
23 State on relevant technology initiatives and
24 partnerships.

1 (B) Provide technical and other relevant
2 expertise to the Office, as appropriate.

3 (d) MEMBERSHIP.—In addition to the liaisons re-
4 ferred to in subsection (c), the Office shall include a rep-
5 resentative or expert detailee from key Federal agencies,
6 as determined by the Ambassador-at-Large for Tech-
7 nology.

8 (e) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the Office shall in-
9 clude responsibilities such as—

10 (1) creating, overseeing, and carrying out tech-
11 nology partnerships with countries and relevant po-
12 litical and economic unions that are committed to—

13 (A) the rule of law, freedom of speech, and
14 respect for an promotion of human rights;

15 (B) the safe and responsible development
16 and use of new and emerging technologies and
17 the establishment of related norms and stand-
18 ards;

19 (C) a secure internet architecture governed
20 by a multi-stakeholder model instead of central-
21 ized government control;

22 (D) robust international cooperation to
23 promote an open internet and interoperable
24 technological products and services that are

1 necessary to freedom, innovation, transparency,
2 and privacy; and

3 (E) multilateral coordination, including
4 through diplomatic initiatives, information shar-
5 ing, and other activities, to defend the prin-
6 ciples described in subparagraphs (A) through
7 (C) against efforts by state and non-state ac-
8 tors to undermine them;

9 (2) harmonizing technology governance regimes
10 with partners, coordinating on basic and pre-com-
11 petitive research and development initiatives, and
12 collaborating to pursue such opportunities in key
13 technologies, including—

14 (A) artificial intelligence and machine
15 learning;

16 (B) 5G telecommunications and other ad-
17 vanced wireless networking technologies;

18 (C) semiconductor manufacturing;

19 (D) biotechnology;

20 (E) quantum computing;

21 (F) surveillance technologies, including fa-
22 cial recognition technologies and censorship
23 software; and

24 (G) fiber optic cables;

1 (3) coordinating with such countries regarding
2 shared technology strategies, including technology
3 controls and standards, as well as strategies with re-
4 spect to the development and acquisition of key tech-
5 nologies to provide alternatives for those countries
6 utilizing systems supported by authoritarian re-
7 gimes;

8 (4) supporting and expanding adherence to
9 international treaties and frameworks governing the
10 responsible use of new and emerging technologies;

11 (5) coordinating the adoption of shared data
12 privacy, data sharing, and data archiving standards
13 among the United States and partner countries and
14 relevant economic and political unions, including
15 complementary data protection regulations;

16 (6) coordinating with other technology partners
17 on export control policies, including as appropriate
18 through the Wassenaar Arrangement On Export
19 Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use
20 Goods and Technologies, done at The Hague Decem-
21 ber 1995, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Aus-
22 tralia Group, and the Missile Technology Control
23 Regime; supply chain security; and investment in or
24 licensing of critical infrastructure and dual-use tech-
25 nologies;

1 (7) coordinating with members of technology
2 partnerships on other policies for the use and control
3 of emerging and foundational technologies through
4 appropriate restrictions, investment screening, and
5 appropriate measures with respect to technology
6 transfers;

7 (8) coordinating policies, in coordination with
8 the Department of Commerce, around the resiliency
9 of supply chains in critical technology areas and ex-
10 plore possible diversification of supply chain compo-
11 nents to countries involved in technology partner-
12 ships with the United States, while also maintaining
13 transparency surrounding subsidies and product ori-
14 gins;

15 (9) sharing information regarding the tech-
16 nology transfer threat posed by authoritarian gov-
17 ernments and the ways in which autocratic regimes
18 are utilizing technology to erode individual freedoms
19 and other foundations of open, democratic societies;

20 (10) administering the establishment of—

21 (A) the common funding mechanism for
22 development and adoption of measurably secure
23 semiconductors and measurably secure semi-
24 conductors supply chains created in and in ac-
25 cordance with the requirements of section 9905

1 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
2 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
3 (Public Law 116–283); and

4 (B) the multilateral telecommunications se-
5 curity fund created in and in accordance with
6 the requirements of section 9202 of such Act;
7 and

8 (11) collaborating with private companies, trade
9 associations, and think tanks to realize the purposes
10 of paragraphs (1) through (10).

11 (f) SPECIAL HIRING AUTHORITIES.—The Secretary
12 of State may—

13 (1) appoint employees without regard to the
14 provisions of title 5, United States Code, regarding
15 appointments in the competitive service; and

16 (2) fix the basic compensation of such employ-
17 ees without regard to chapter 51 and subchapter III
18 of chapter 53 of such title regarding classification
19 and General Schedule pay rates.

20 (g) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
21 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter for
22 the next three years, the Secretary of State shall submit
23 an unclassified report to the appropriate congressional
24 committees, with a classified index, if necessary, about the
25 activities of the Office, including any cooperative initia-

1 tives and partnerships pursued with United States allies
2 and partners, and the results of those activities, initiatives,
3 and partnerships.

4 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ESTABLISHING INTER-
5 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY PARTNERSHIP.—It is the sense
6 of Congress that the Ambassador-at-Large for Technology
7 should seek to establish an International Technology Part-
8 nership for the purposes described in this section with for-
9 eign countries that have—

10 (1) democratic national government and a
11 strong commitment to democratic values, including
12 an adherence to the rule of law, freedom of speech,
13 and respect for and promotion of human rights;

14 (2) an economy with advanced technology sec-
15 tors; and

16 (3) a demonstrated record of trust or an ex-
17 pressed interest in international cooperation and co-
18 ordination with the United States on important de-
19 fense and intelligence issues.

20 **SEC. 209. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND-**
21 **ARDS-SETTING BODIES.**

22 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the
23 “Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G
24 Act of 2021”.

1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
2 gress that—

3 (1) the United States and its allies and part-
4 ners should maintain participation and leadership at
5 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and
6 future generation mobile telecommunications sys-
7 tems and infrastructure;

8 (2) the United States should work with its allies
9 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop-
10 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th
11 and future generation mobile telecommunications
12 systems and infrastructure; and

13 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu-
14 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between
15 the United States and its allies and partners is a na-
16 tional security interest of the United States.

17 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP
18 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SET-
19 TING BODIES.—

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall—

21 (A) establish an interagency working group
22 to provide assistance and technical expertise to
23 enhance the representation and leadership of
24 the United States at international bodies that
25 set standards for equipment, systems, software,

1 and virtually defined networks that support 5th
2 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
3 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the
4 International Telecommunication Union and the
5 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and

6 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri-
7 vate sector to increase productive engagement.

8 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The
9 interagency working group described in paragraph
10 (1)—

11 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of
12 State or a designee of the Secretary of State;
13 and

14 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee)
15 of each Federal department or agency the
16 President determines appropriate.

17 (3) BRIEFINGS.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180
19 days after the date of the enactment of this
20 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided
21 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work-
22 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro-
23 vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional
24 committees that addresses—

1 (i) promotion of United States leader-
2 ship at international standards-setting bod-
3 ies for equipment, systems, software, and
4 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th
5 and future generation mobile telecommuni-
6 cations systems and infrastructure, taking
7 into account the different processes fol-
8 lowed by the various international stand-
9 ard-setting bodies;

10 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies
11 and partners to share security risk infor-
12 mation and findings pertaining to equip-
13 ment that supports or is used in 5th and
14 future generation mobile telecommuni-
15 cations systems and infrastructure and co-
16 operation on mitigating such risks;

17 (iii) China's presence and activities at
18 international standards-setting bodies rel-
19 evant to 5th and future generation mobile
20 telecommunications systems and infra-
21 structure, including information on the dif-
22 ferences in the scope and scale of China's
23 engagement at such bodies compared to
24 engagement by the United States or its al-
25 lies and partners and the security risks

1 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand-
2 ards-setting bodies; and

3 (iv) engagement with private sector
4 communications and information service
5 providers, equipment developers, academia,
6 Federally funded research and development
7 centers, and other private-sector stake-
8 holders to propose and develop secure
9 standards for equipment, systems, soft-
10 ware, and virtually defined networks that
11 support 5th and future generation mobile
12 telecommunications systems and infra-
13 structure.

14 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re-
15 ceiving a request from the Committee on For-
16 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee
17 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa-
18 tives, or as determined appropriate by the chair
19 of the interagency working group established
20 pursuant to paragraph (1), the interagency
21 working group shall provide the requesting com-
22 mittee an updated briefing that covers the mat-
23 ters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of sub-
24 paragraph (A).

1 **SEC. 210. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CENTRALITY OF SANC-**
2 **TIONS AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS TO STRA-**
3 **TEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
5 ings:

6 (1) Sanctions and other restrictions, when used
7 as part of a coordinated and comprehensive strategy,
8 are a powerful tool to advance United States foreign
9 policy and national security interests.

10 (2) Congress has authorized and mandated
11 broad range of sanctions and other restrictions to
12 address malign behavior and incentivize behavior
13 change by individuals and entities in the PRC.

14 (3) The sanctions and other restrictions author-
15 ized and mandated by Congress address a range of
16 malign PRC behavior, including—

17 (A) intellectual property theft;

18 (B) cyber-related economic espionage;

19 (C) repression of ethnic minorities;

20 (D) other human rights abuses;

21 (E) abuses of the international trading sys-
22 tem;

23 (F) illicit assistance to and trade with the
24 Government of North Korea; and

25 (G) drug trafficking, including trafficking
26 in fentanyl and other opioids;

1 (4) The sanctions and other restrictions de-
2 scribed in this section include the following:

3 (A) The Global Magnitsky Human Rights
4 Accountability Act (subtitle F of title XII of
5 Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).

6 (B) Section 1637 of the Carl Levin and
7 Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense
8 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (50
9 U.S.C. 1708).

10 (C) The Fentanyl Sanctions Act (21
11 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.).

12 (D) The Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Pub-
13 lic Law 116–149; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

14 (E) Section 7 of the Hong Kong Human
15 Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public
16 Law 116–76; 22 U.S.C. 5701 note).

17 (F) Section 6 of the Uyghur Human
18 Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–
19 145; 22 U.S.C. 6901 note).

20 (G) The Export Control Reform Act of
21 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.).

22 (H) Export control measures required to
23 be maintained with respect to entities in the
24 telecommunications sector of the People’s Re-
25 public of China, including under section 1260I

1 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
2 Fiscal Year 2020 (Public Law 116–92).

3 (I) Section 311 of the Countering Amer-
4 ica’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of
5 2018 (Public Law 115–44; 131 Stat. 942).

6 (5) Full implementation of the authorities de-
7 scribed in paragraph (4) is required under the re-
8 spective laws described therein and pursuant to the
9 Take Care Clause of the Constitution (article II, sec-
10 tion 3).

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the executive branch has not fully imple-
14 mented the sanctions and other restrictions de-
15 scribed in subsection (a)(4) despite the statutory
16 and constitutional requirements to do so; and

17 (2) the President’s full implementation and exe-
18 cution of the those authorities is a necessary and es-
19 sential component to the success of the United
20 States in the strategic competition with China.

21 **SEC. 211. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7**
22 **COUNTRIES ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
23 **CHINA.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that
25 the President, acting through the Secretary of State,

1 should initiate an agenda with G7 countries on matters
2 relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, including
3 the following:

4 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce-
5 ment.

6 (2) Building support for international infra-
7 structure standards, including those agreed to at the
8 G20 summit in Osaka in 2018.

9 (3) The erosion of democracy and human
10 rights.

11 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications.

12 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec-
13 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa-
14 nies, and other policies and practices.

15 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending
16 that is inconsistent with OECD and Paris Club prin-
17 ciples.

18 (7) International influence campaigns.

19 (8) Environmental standards.

20 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part-
21 ners that are not in the G7.

22 **SEC. 212. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART-**
23 **NERSHIP.**

24 It is the policy of the United States—

1 (1) to recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the
2 United States Indo-Pacific strategy;

3 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its
4 democracy as key elements for the continued peace
5 and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, and
6 a vital national security interest of the United
7 States;

8 (3) to reinforce its commitments to Taiwan
9 under the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8)
10 and the “Six Assurances” and in accordance with
11 the United States “One China” policy;

12 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its
13 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities
14 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept;

15 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense
16 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat-
17 egy;

18 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti-
19 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de-
20 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop
21 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, including
22 anti-ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense,
23 undersea warfare, advanced command, control, com-
24 munications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,

1 and reconnaissance, and resilient command and con-
2 trol capabilities, into its military forces;

3 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan's
4 meaningful participation in the United Nations, the
5 World Health Assembly, the International Civil
6 Aviation Organization, the International Criminal
7 Police Organization, and other international bodies
8 as appropriate; and

9 (8) to promote meaningful cooperation among
10 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded
11 partners.

12 **SEC. 213. TREATMENT OF TAIWAN GOVERNMENT.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Department of State and
14 other United States Government agencies shall engage
15 with the democratically elected government of Taiwan on
16 the same basis, and using the same nomenclature and pro-
17 tocol, as the United States Government engages with other
18 foreign governments. Notwithstanding the continued sup-
19 porting role of the American Institute in Taiwan in car-
20 rying out United States foreign policy and protecting
21 United States interests in Taiwan, the United States Gov-
22 ernment shall not place any restrictions on the ability of
23 officials of the Department of State and other United
24 States Government agencies to interact directly and rou-
25 tinely with counterparts in the Taiwan government.

1 (b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this para-
2 graph shall be construed as entailing restoration of diplo-
3 matic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) or
4 altering the United States Government’s position on Tai-
5 wan’s international status.

6 **SEC. 214. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID-19 PAN-**
7 **DEMIC.**

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
9 gress that—

10 (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the
11 COVID-19 pandemic so the United States can bet-
12 ter prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic
13 health threats in the future;

14 (2) given the impact of the COVID-19 pan-
15 demic on all Americans, the American people deserve
16 to know what information the United States Govern-
17 ment possesses about the origins of COVID-19, as
18 appropriate;

19 (3) Congress shares the concerns expressed by
20 the United States Government and 13 other foreign
21 governments that the international team of experts
22 dispatched to the People’s Republic of China by the
23 World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori-
24 gins of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was “significantly

1 delayed and lacked access to complete, original data
2 and samples”;

3 (4) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Di-
4 rector-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom
5 Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative
6 team had encountered “difficulties” in accessing
7 necessary raw data, that “we have not yet found the
8 source of the virus,” and that “all hypotheses re-
9 main on the table”; and

10 (5) it is critical for independent experts to have
11 full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi-
12 ronmental data, live virus samples, research, and
13 personnel involved in the early stages of the out-
14 break relevant to determining how this pandemic
15 emerged.

16 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days
17 after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intel-
18 ligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, the
19 Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary
20 of Energy, and other relevant executive departments, shall
21 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report
22 consisting of—

23 (1) an assessment of the most likely source or
24 origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a de-
25 tailed review of all information the United States

1 possesses that it has identified as potentially rel-
2 evant to the source or origin of the SARS-CoV-2
3 virus, including zoonotic transmission and spillover,
4 the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), or other
5 sources of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on
6 the information the United States Government has
7 to date;

8 (2) an identification of the leading credible
9 theories of the etiology of the SARS-CoV-2 virus by
10 the United States Government, the steps the United
11 States has taken to validate those theories, and any
12 variance in assessment or dissent among or between
13 United States intelligence agencies, executive agen-
14 cies, and executive offices of the most likely source
15 or origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, and the basis
16 for such variance or dissent;

17 (3) a description of all steps the United States
18 Government has taken to identify and investigate
19 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, including a
20 timeline of such efforts;

21 (4) a detailed description of the data to which
22 the United States and the WHO have requested and
23 have access to in order to determine the origin of
24 the source of the SARS-CoV-2 virus;

1 (5) an account of efforts by the PRC to cooper-
2 ate with, impede, or obstruct any inquiry or inves-
3 tigation to determine the source and transmission of
4 SARS-CoV-2 virus, including into a possible lab
5 leak, or to create or spread misinformation or
6 disinformation regarding the source and trans-
7 mission of SARS-CoV-2 virus by the PRC or CCP,
8 including by national and local governmental and
9 health entities;

10 (6) a detailed account of information known to
11 the United States Government regarding the WIV
12 and associated facilities, including research activities
13 on coronaviruses and gain-of-function research, any
14 reported illnesses of persons associated with the lab-
15 oratory with symptoms consistent with COVID-19
16 and the ultimate diagnosis, and a timeline of re-
17 search relevant to coronaviruses;

18 (7) a list of any known obligations on the PRC
19 that require disclosure and cooperation in the event
20 of a viral outbreak like SARS-CoV-2; and

21 (8) an overview of United States engagement
22 with the PRC with respect to coronaviruses that in-
23 cludes—

24 (A) a detailed accounting of United States
25 engagement with the WIV and similar labs in

1 the PRC specific to coronaviruses, including a
2 detailed accounting United States Government-
3 sponsored research and funding and diplomatic
4 engagements such as “track 1.5” and “track 2”
5 engagements; and

6 (B) an assessment of any additional scru-
7 tiny of United States Government funding to
8 support gain-of-function research in the PRC
9 after the moratorium on such funding was lift-
10 ed in 2017, and whether United States Govern-
11 ment funding was used to support gain-of-func-
12 tion research in China, during the moratorium
13 on gain-of-function research (2014–2017).

14 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
15 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
16 a classified annex.

17 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
23 Senate;

24 (3) the Committee on Health, Education,
25 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

1 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the
2 Senate;

3 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives;

5 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
6 ligence of the House of Representatives;

7 (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of
8 the House of Representatives; and

9 (8) the Committee on Armed Services of the
10 House of Representatives.

11 **SEC. 215. ENHANCEMENT OF DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AND**
12 **ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH PACIFIC IS-**
13 **LAND COUNTRIES.**

14 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The Secretary of State and Sec-
15 retary of Commerce are authorized to hire Locally Em-
16 ployed Staff in Pacific island countries for the purpose of
17 providing increased diplomatic support and promoting in-
18 creased economic and commercial engagement between the
19 United States and Pacific Island countries.

20 (b) **AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.**—

21 (1) **IN GENERAL.**—Of the amounts authorized
22 to be appropriated to the Department of State and
23 the Department of Commerce for fiscal year 2022,
24 not more than \$10,000,000 , respectively, shall be
25 available to carry out the purposes of this section.

1 (2) **TERMINATION.**—The availability of funds in
2 paragraph (1) shall expire on December 31, 2026.

3 (c) **REPORT.**—Not later than one year after the date
4 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
5 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall
6 provide to the appropriate committees of Congress a re-
7 port on the activities of the Department of State and De-
8 partment of Commerce Locally Employed Staff in Pacific
9 island countries, which shall include—

10 (1) a detailed description of the additional dip-
11 lomatic, economic, and commercial engagement and
12 activities in the Pacific island countries provided by
13 Locally Employed Staff; and

14 (2) an assessment of the impact of the activities
15 with respect to the diplomatic, economic, and secu-
16 rity interests of the United States.

17 (d) **EXCEPTION FOR AMERICAN SAMOA.**—The Sec-
18 retary of State may, as appropriate, treat the territory of
19 American Samoa as a foreign country for purposes of car-
20 rying out this section.

21 (e) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
22 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
23 tees of Congress” means—

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
25 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-

1 tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re-
2 sources, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
3 Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Energy and Commerce, the Com-
6 mittee on Natural Resources, and the Committee on
7 Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

8 **SEC. 216. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER-**
9 **SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE**
10 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
12 ings:

13 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of
14 State allocated \$1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific
15 region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance
16 (FA) resources and \$798,000,000 in the fiscal year
17 2020 diplomatic engagement (DE) budget. These
18 amounts represent only 5 percent of the DE budget
19 and only 4 percent of the total Department of State-
20 USAID budget.

21 (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and
22 personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5
23 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged
24 only 4 percent of the total.

1 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a
2 process to realign certain positions at posts to en-
3 sure that its personnel footprint matches the de-
4 mands of great-power competition, including in the
5 Indo-Pacific.

6 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—

7 (1) It shall be the policy of the United States
8 to ensure Department of State funding levels and
9 personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re-
10 gion’s high degree of importance and significance to
11 United States political, economic, and security inter-
12 ests.

13 (2) It shall be the policy of the United States
14 to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of
15 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re-
16 spective to the Department of State’s total budget.

17 (3) It shall be the policy of the United States
18 to increase the number of Defense attaches in the
19 Indo-Pacific region number of to assure coverage of
20 all appropriate Posts.

21 (c) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the
22 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
23 shall provide to the appropriate committees of Congress
24 an action plan with the following elements:

1 (1) Identification of requirements and the per-
2 sonnel budgetary resources needed to meet them, as-
3 suming an unconstrained resource environment.

4 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the De-
5 partment's budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in
6 terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco-
7 nomic, and security assistance.

8 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions
9 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with
10 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a
11 description of increases at each post or bureau, a
12 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of
13 what each new officer will do to advance United
14 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region.

15 (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks
16 that the Department will meet in implementing the
17 action plan.

18 (5) A description of any barriers to imple-
19 menting the action plan.

20 (d) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 90
21 days after the submission of the action plan described in
22 subsection (c), the Secretary shall submit an update and
23 brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the imple-
24 mentation of such action plan, with supporting data and
25 including a detailed assessment of benchmarks reached.

1 (e) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
2 authorized to be appropriated \$2,000,000,000 in bilateral
3 and regional foreign assistance resources to the Indo-Pa-
4 cific region and \$1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement
5 resources to the Indo-Pacific region.

6 (f) SECRETARY OF STATE CERTIFICATION.—Not
7 later than two years after the date of the enactment of
8 this Act, the Secretary of State shall certify whether or
9 not the benchmarks described in the action plan in sub-
10 section (c) have been met. This certification is non-dele-
11 gable.

12 (g) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
13 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
16 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

17 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
18 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
19 resentatives.

20 **SEC. 217. ADVANCING UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP IN THE**
21 **UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM.**

22 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
24 establish, within the Bureau of International Organi-
25 zation Affairs of the Department of State, a Special

1 Representative for Advancing United States Leader-
2 ship in the United Nations (referred to in this sec-
3 tion as the “Special Representative”). The Special
4 Representative shall serve concurrently as a Deputy
5 Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International
6 Organization Affairs of the Department of State.
7 The Special Representative shall report directly to
8 the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Inter-
9 national Organization Affairs, in coordination and
10 consultation with the Representative of the United
11 States to the United Nations.

12 (b) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Special Representative
13 shall assume responsibility for—

14 (1) promoting United States leadership and
15 participation in the United Nations system, with a
16 focus on issue areas where authoritarian nations are
17 exercising increased influence in and determining the
18 agenda of the United Nations system;

19 (2) highlighting how investments in the United
20 Nations advance United States interests and enable
21 stronger coalitions to hold authoritarian regimes to
22 account;

23 (3) ensuring United States emphasis on the
24 need for United Nations employees to uphold the

1 principals of impartiality enshrined in the United
2 Nations charter, rules, and regulations;

3 (4) monitoring and developing and imple-
4 menting plans to counter undue influence, especially
5 by authoritarian nations, within the United Nations
6 system;

7 (5) assessing how United States decisions to
8 withdraw from United Nations bodies impacts
9 United States influence at the United Nations and
10 multilateral global initiatives;

11 (6) promoting participation and inclusion of
12 Taiwan in the United Nations system;

13 (7) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations
14 jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other
15 qualified nationals to promote for these positions;

16 (8) tracking leadership changes in United Na-
17 tions secretariat, funds, programs and agencies, and
18 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of
19 like-minded states are assembled to ensure leader-
20 ship races are not won by countries that do not
21 share United States interests; and

22 (9) advancing other priorities deemed relevant
23 by the Secretary of State to ensuring the integrity
24 of the United Nations system.

1 (c) SUPPORT.—The Secretary of State shall make
2 any necessary adjustments to the current structure of the
3 Bureau of International Organization Affairs, including
4 the respective roles and responsibilities of offices in that
5 Bureau, to ensure appropriate support for the mission and
6 work of the Special Representative.

7 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
8 authorized to be appropriated not less than \$5,000,000
9 for fiscal year 2022 and for each subsequent fiscal year
10 to carry out the responsibilities under subsection (b).

11 **Subtitle B—International Security** 12 **Matters**

13 **SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS.**

14 In this subtitle:

15 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
16 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
17 mittees” means—

18 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
19 the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the
20 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate;
21 and

22 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
23 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
24 and the Committee on Appropriations of the
25 House of Representatives.

1 (2) COMPANY.—The term “company” means
2 any corporation, company, limited liability company,
3 limited partnership, business trust, business associa-
4 tion, or other similar entity.

5 (3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term
6 “other security forces”—

7 (A) includes national security forces that
8 conduct maritime security; and

9 (B) does not include self-described militias
10 or paramilitary organizations.

11 **SEC. 222. FINDINGS.**

12 Congress makes the following findings:

13 (1) The People’s Republic of China aims to use
14 its growing military might in concert with other in-
15 struments of its national power to displace the
16 United States in the Indo-Pacific and establish he-
17 gemony over the region.

18 (2) The military balance of power in the Indo-
19 Pacific region is growing increasingly unfavorable to
20 the United States because—

21 (A) the PRC is rapidly modernizing and
22 expanding the capabilities of the PLA to project
23 power and create contested areas across the en-
24 tire Indo-Pacific region;

1 (B) PLA modernization has largely fo-
2 cused on areas where it possesses operational
3 advantages and can exploit weaknesses in the
4 United States suite of capabilities; and

5 (C) current United States force structure
6 and presence do not sufficiently counter threats
7 in the Indo-Pacific, as United States allies,
8 bases, and forces at sea in the Indo-Pacific re-
9 gion are concentrated in large bases that are
10 highly vulnerable to the PRC's strike capabili-
11 ties.

12 (3) This shift in the regional military balance
13 and erosion of conventional deterrence in the Indo-
14 Pacific region—

15 (A) presents a substantial and imminent
16 risk to the security of the United States; and

17 (B) left unchecked, could embolden the
18 PRC to take actions, including the use of mili-
19 tary force, to change the status quo before the
20 United States can mount an effective response.

21 (4) The PRC sees an opportunity to diminish
22 confidence among United States allies and partners
23 in the strength of United States commitments, even
24 to the extent that these nations feel compelled to
25 bandwagon with the PRC to protect their interests.

1 The PRC is closely monitoring the United States re-
2 action to PRC pressure and coercion of United
3 States allies, searching for indicators of United
4 States resolve.

5 (5) Achieving so-called “reunification” of Tai-
6 wan to mainland China is a key step for the PRC
7 to achieve its regional hegemonic ambitions. The
8 PRC has increased the frequency and scope of its
9 exercises and operations targeting Taiwan, such as
10 amphibious assault and live-fire exercises in the Tai-
11 wan Strait, PLA Air Force flights that encircle Tai-
12 wan, and flights across the unofficial median line in
13 the Taiwan Strait. The Government of the PRC’s
14 full submission of Hong Kong potentially accelerates
15 the timeline of a Taiwan scenario, and makes the
16 defense of Taiwan an even more urgent priority.

17 (6) The defense of Taiwan is critical to—

18 (A) defending the people of Taiwan;

19 (B) limiting the PLA’s ability to project
20 power beyond the First Island Chain, including
21 to United States territory, such as Guam and
22 Hawaii;

23 (C) defending the territorial integrity of
24 Japan;

1 (D) preventing the PLA from diverting
2 military planning, resources, and personnel to
3 broader military ambitions; and

4 (E) retaining the United States credibility
5 as a defender of the democratic values and free-
6 market principles embodied by Taiwan's people
7 and government;

8 (7) The PRC capitalized on the world's atten-
9 tion to COVID-19 to advance its military objectives
10 in the South China Sea, intensifying and accel-
11 erating trends already underway. The PRC has sent
12 militarized survey vessels into the Malaysian Exclu-
13 sive Economic Zone, announced the establishment of
14 an administrative district in the Spratly and Paracel
15 Islands under the Chinese local government of
16 Sansha, aimed a fire control radar at a Philippine
17 navy ship, encroached on Indonesia's fishing
18 grounds, sunk a Vietnamese fishing boat, announced
19 new "research stations" on Fiery Cross Reef and
20 Subi Reef, landed special military aircraft on Fiery
21 Cross Reef to routinize such deployments, and sent
22 a flotilla of over 200 militia vessels to Whitsun Reef,
23 a feature within the exclusive economic zone of the
24 Philippines.

1 (8) On July 13, 2020, the Department of State
2 clarified United States policy on the South China
3 Sea and stated that “Beijing’s claims to offshore re-
4 sources across most of the South China Sea are
5 completely unlawful”.

6 (9) These actions in the South China Sea en-
7 able the PLA to exert influence and project power
8 deeper into Oceania and the Indian Ocean. As Admi-
9 ral Phil Davidson, Commander of Indo-Pacific Com-
10 mand, testified in 2019, “In short, China is now ca-
11 pable of controlling the South China Sea in all sce-
12 narios short of war with the United States.”.

13 (10) The PLA also continues to advance its
14 claims in the East China Sea, including through a
15 high number of surface combatant patrols and fre-
16 quent entry into the territorial waters of the
17 Senkaku Islands, over which the United States rec-
18 ognizes Japan’s administrative control. In April
19 2014, President Barack Obama stated, “Our com-
20 mitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article
21 five [of the U.S.-Japan security treaty] covers all
22 territory under Japan’s administration, including the
23 Senkaku islands.”.

24 (11) On March 1, 2019, Secretary of State Mi-
25 chael R. Pompeo stated, “As the South China Sea

1 is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Phil-
2 ippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South
3 China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations
4 under Article 4 of our Mutual Defense Treaty.”.

5 (12) The PLA is modernizing and gaining crit-
6 ical capability in every branch and every domain, in-
7 cluding—

8 (A) positioning the PLA Navy to become a
9 great maritime power or “blue-water” navy that
10 can completely control all activity within the
11 First Island Chain and project power beyond it
12 with a fleet of 425 battle force ships by 2030;

13 (B) increasing the size and range of its
14 strike capabilities, including approximately
15 1,900 ground-launched short- and intermediate-
16 range missiles capable of targeting United
17 States allies and partners in the First and Sec-
18 ond Island chains, United States bases in the
19 Indo-Pacific, and United States forces at sea;

20 (C) boosting capabilities for air warfare,
21 including with Russian-origin Su-35 fighters
22 and S-400 air defense systems, new J-20 5th
23 generation stealth fighters, advanced H-6
24 bomber variants, a long-range stealth bomber,
25 and Y-20 heavy lift aircraft; and

1 (D) making critical investments in new do-
2 mains of warfare, such as cyber warfare, elec-
3 tronic warfare, and space warfare.

4 (13) The PRC is pursuing this modernization
5 through all means at its disposal, including its Mili-
6 tary-Civil Fusion initiative, which enlists the whole
7 of PRC society in developing and acquiring tech-
8 nology with military applications to pursue techno-
9 logical advantage over the United States in artificial
10 intelligence, hypersonic glide vehicles, directed en-
11 ergy weapons, electromagnetic railguns, counter-
12 space weapons, and other emerging capabilities.

13 (14) The United States lead in the development
14 of science and technology relevant to defense is erod-
15 ing in the face of competition from the PRC. United
16 States research and development spending on de-
17 fense capabilities has declined sharply as a share of
18 global research and development. The commercial
19 sector's leading role in innovation presents certain
20 unique challenges to the Department of Defense's
21 reliance on technology for battlefield advantage.

22 (15) The PRC has vastly increased domestic re-
23 search and development expenditures, supported the
24 growth of new cutting-edge industries and tapped

1 into a large workforce to invest in fostering science
2 and engineering talent.

3 (16) The PRC is increasing exports of defense
4 and security capabilities to build its defense tech-
5 nology and industrial base and improve its own mili-
6 tary capabilities, as well as its influence with coun-
7 tries that purchase and become dependent on its
8 military systems.

9 **SEC. 223. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING BOLSTERING**
10 **SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PA-**
11 **CIFIC.**

12 It is the Sense of Congress that steps to bolster
13 United States security partnership in the Indo-Pacific
14 must include—

15 (1) supporting Japan in its development of
16 long-range precision fires, munitions, air and missile
17 defense capacity, interoperability across all domains,
18 maritime security, and intelligence, and surveillance
19 and reconnaissance capabilities;

20 (2) launching a United States-Japan national
21 security innovation fund to solicit and support pri-
22 vate sector cooperation for new technologies that
23 could benefit the United States and Japan's mutual
24 security objectives;

1 (3) promoting a deeper defense relationship be-
2 tween Japan and Australia, including supporting re-
3 ciprocal access agreements and trilateral United
4 States-Japan-Australia intelligence sharing;

5 (4) encouraging and facilitating Taiwan’s accel-
6 erated acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities,
7 which are crucial to defending the islands of Taiwan
8 from invasion, including long-range precision fires,
9 munitions, anti-ship missiles, coastal defense, anti-
10 armor, air defense, undersea warfare, advanced com-
11 mand, control, communications, computers, intel-
12 ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR),
13 and resilient command and control capabilities, and
14 increasing the conduct of relevant and practical
15 training and exercises with Taiwan’s defense forces;
16 and

17 (5) prioritizing building the capacity of United
18 States allies and partners to protect defense tech-
19 nology.

20 **SEC. 224. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

21 It shall be the policy of the United States to—

22 (1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United
23 States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for
24 achieving United States political and military objec-
25 tives in the region;

1 (2) exercise freedom of operations in the inter-
2 national waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific
3 maritime domains, which are critical to the pros-
4 perity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific re-
5 gion;

6 (3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the
7 Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber
8 presence, integrated missile defense capabilities,
9 long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabili-
10 ties, and diversified and resilient basing and rota-
11 tional presence, including support for pre-positioning
12 strategies;

13 (4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and
14 partnerships of the United States to build capacity
15 and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships,
16 modernize communications architecture, address
17 anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase
18 joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;

19 (5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the
20 United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pa-
21 cific region, including longstanding United States
22 policy regarding—

23 (A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Co-
24 operation and Security between the United

1 States and Japan, signed at Washington Janu-
2 ary 19, 1960;

3 (B) Article III of the Mutual Defense
4 Treaty between the United States and the Re-
5 public of Korea, signed at Washington October
6 1, 1953;

7 (C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Trea-
8 ty between the United States and the Republic
9 of the Philippines, signed at Washington Au-
10 gust 30, 1951, including that, as the South
11 China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed at-
12 tack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public ves-
13 sels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual
14 defense obligations under Article IV of our mu-
15 tual defense treaty;

16 (D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zea-
17 land, United States Security Treaty, done at
18 San Francisco September 1, 1951; and

19 (E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
20 Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, to-
21 gether with the Thanat-Rusk Communique of
22 1962; and

23 (6) collaborate with United States treaty allies
24 in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral se-

1 security and defense cooperation with other regional
2 partners;

3 (7) ensure the continuity of operations by the
4 United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific re-
5 gion, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with
6 partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle
7 of freedom of operations in international waters and
8 airspace in accordance with established principles
9 and practices of international law;

10 (8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public
11 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);

12 (9) sustain the “Six Assurances” provided by
13 the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the
14 foundations for United States-Taiwan relations, and
15 to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the exten-
16 sive, close, and friendly relations of the United
17 States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support
18 the development of capable, ready, and modern
19 forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;

20 (10) enhance security partnerships with India,
21 across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the
22 Indo-Pacific;

23 (11) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the
24 PRC against United States and allies’ interests, es-
25 pecially along the First Island Chain and in the

1 Western Pacific, by showing PRC leaders that the
2 United States can and is willing to deny them the
3 ability to achieve their objectives, including by—

4 (A) consistently demonstrating the political
5 will of the United States to deepening existing
6 treaty alliances and growing new partnerships
7 as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched stra-
8 tegic advantage to the PRC's growing military
9 capabilities and reach;

10 (B) maintaining a system of forward-de-
11 ployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the
12 most visible sign of United States resolve and
13 commitment to the region, and as platforms to
14 ensure United States operational readiness and
15 advance interoperability with allies and part-
16 ners;

17 (C) adopting a more dispersed force pos-
18 ture throughout the region, particularly the
19 Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access
20 for United States mobile and relocatable
21 launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and
22 hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific
23 region;

24 (D) fielding long-range, precision-strike
25 networks to United States and allied forces, in-

1 including ground-launched cruise missiles, under-
2 sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air
3 and missile defense in the First Island Chain
4 and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter
5 and prevent PRC coercion and aggression, and
6 to maximize the United States ability to oper-
7 ate;

8 (E) strengthening extended deterrence to
9 ensure that escalation against key United
10 States interests would be costly, risky, and self-
11 defeating; and

12 (F) collaborating with allies and partners
13 to accelerate their roles in more equitably shar-
14 ing the burdens of mutual defense, including
15 through the acquisition and fielding of advanced
16 capabilities and training that will better enable
17 them to repel PRC aggression or coercion; and

18 (12) maintain the capacity of the United States
19 to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial,
20 reputational, and military costs on the PRC for acts
21 of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself
22 and its allies regardless of the point of origin of at-
23 tacks against them.

1 **SEC. 225. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING IN THE INDO-PA-**
2 **CIFIC AND AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-**
3 **TIONS FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA MARITIME SE-**
4 **CURITY PROGRAMS AND DIPLOMATIC OUT-**
5 **REACH ACTIVITIES.**

6 (a) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING FUNDING.—In
7 addition to any amount appropriated pursuant to section
8 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (re-
9 lating to foreign military financing assistance), there is
10 authorized to be appropriated for each of fiscal years 2022
11 through fiscal year 2026 for activities in the Indo-Pacific
12 region in accordance with this section—

- 13 (1) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;
14 (2) \$125,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;
15 (3) \$130,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;
16 (4) \$140,000,000 for fiscal year 2025; and
17 (5) \$150,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

18 (b) SOUTHEAST MARITIME LAW ENFORCEMENT INI-
19 TIATIVE.—There is authorized to be appropriated
20 \$10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026
21 for the Department of State for International Narcotics
22 Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) for the support
23 of the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initia-
24 tive.

25 (c) DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH ACTIVITIES.—There is
26 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State,

1 \$1,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026,
2 which shall be used—

3 (1) to conduct, in coordination with the Depart-
4 ment of Defense, outreach activities, including con-
5 ferences and symposia, to familiarize partner coun-
6 tries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, with
7 the United States' interpretation of international law
8 relating to freedom of the seas; and

9 (2) to work with allies and partners in the
10 Indo-Pacific region to better align respective inter-
11 pretations of international law relating to freedom of
12 the seas, including on the matters of operations by
13 military ships in exclusive economic zones, innocent
14 passage through territorial seas, and transits
15 through international straits.

16 (d) PROGRAM AUTHORIZATION AND PURPOSE.—
17 Using amounts appropriate pursuant to subsection (a),
18 the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary
19 of Defense, is authorized to provide assistance, for the
20 purpose of increasing maritime security and domain
21 awareness for countries in the Indo-Pacific region—

22 (1) to provide assistance to national military or
23 other security forces of such countries that have
24 maritime security missions among their functional
25 responsibilities;

1 (2) to provide training to ministry, agency, and
2 headquarters level organizations for such forces; and

3 (3) to provide assistance to and training to
4 other relevant foreign affairs, maritime, or security-
5 related ministries, agencies, departments, or offices
6 that manage and oversee maritime activities and pol-
7 icy that the Secretary of State may so designate.

8 (e) DESIGNATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance pro-
9 vided by the Secretary of State under this section shall
10 be known as the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
11 tive” (in this section referred to as the “Initiative”).

12 (f) PROGRAM OBJECTIVES.—Assistance provided
13 through the Initiative may be used to accomplish the fol-
14 lowing objectives:

15 (1) Retaining unhindered access to and use of
16 international waterways in the Indo-Pacific region
17 that are critical to ensuring the security and free
18 flow of commerce and achieving United States na-
19 tional security objectives.

20 (2) Improving maritime domain awareness in
21 the Indo-Pacific region.

22 (3) Countering piracy in the Indo-Pacific re-
23 gion.

24 (4) Disrupting illicit maritime trafficking activi-
25 ties and other forms of maritime trafficking activity

1 in the Indo-Pacific that directly benefit organiza-
2 tions that have been determined to be a security
3 threat to the United States.

4 (5) Enhancing the maritime capabilities of a
5 country or regional organization to respond to
6 emerging threats to maritime security in the Indo-
7 Pacific region.

8 (6) Strengthening United States alliances and
9 partnerships in Southeast Asia and other parts of
10 the Indo-Pacific region.

11 (g) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount appropriated
13 pursuant to subsection(a) and section 23 of the
14 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) (relating
15 to foreign military financing assistance), there is au-
16 thorized to be appropriated to the Department of
17 State for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initia-
18 tive and other related regional programs exactly—

19 (A) \$70,000,000 for fiscal year 2022;

20 (B) \$80,000,000 for fiscal year 2023;

21 (C) \$90,000,000 for fiscal year 2024;

22 (D) \$100,000,000 for fiscal year 2025;

23 and

24 (E) \$110,000,000 for fiscal year 2026.

1 (2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The “Indo-Pa-
2 cific Maritime Security Initiative” and funds author-
3 ized for the Initiative shall include existing regional
4 programs related to maritime security, including the
5 Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.

6 (h) ELIGIBILITY AND PRIORITIES FOR ASSIST-
7 ANCE.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
9 use the following considerations when selecting
10 which countries in the Indo-Pacific region should re-
11 ceive assistance pursuant to the Initiative:

12 (A) Assistance may be provided to a coun-
13 try in the Indo-Pacific region to enhance the ca-
14 pabilities of that country according to the objec-
15 tives outlined in (f), or of a regional organiza-
16 tion that includes that country, to conduct—

17 (i) maritime intelligence, surveillance,
18 and reconnaissance;

19 (ii) littoral and port security;

20 (iii) Coast Guard operations;

21 (iv) command and control; and

22 (v) management and oversight of mar-
23 itime activities.

24 (B) Priority shall be placed on assistance
25 to enhance the maritime security capabilities of

1 the military or security forces of countries in
2 the Indo-Pacific region that have maritime mis-
3 sions and the government agencies responsible
4 for such forces.

5 (2) TYPES OF ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING.—

6 (A) AUTHORIZED ELEMENTS OF ASSIST-
7 ANCE.—Assistance provided under paragraph
8 (1)(A) may include the provision of equipment,
9 training, and small-scale military construction.

10 (B) REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF ASSISTANCE
11 AND TRAINING.—Assistance and training pro-
12 vided under subparagraph (A) shall include ele-
13 ments that promote—

14 (i) the observance of and respect for
15 human rights; and

16 (ii) respect for legitimate civilian au-
17 thority within the country to which the as-
18 sistance is provided.

19 (i) JOINT TASK FORCE.—The Department of De-
20 fense shall establish a joint, interagency task force to as-
21 sess, respond to, and coordinate with allies and partners
22 in response to the use of grey zone tactics by state and
23 non-state actors in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain, in-
24 cluding—

1 (1) conducting domain awareness operations,
2 intelligence fusion, and multi-sensor correlation to
3 detect, monitor, and hand off suspected grey zone
4 activities;

5 (2) promoting security, cooperation, and capac-
6 ity building; and

7 (3) coordinating country team and partner na-
8 tion initiatives in order to counter the use of grey
9 zone tactics by adversaries.

10 (j) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Secretary of State and
11 the Secretary of Defense shall jointly submit to the appro-
12 priate committees of Congress each year a report on the
13 status of the provision of equipment, training, supplies,
14 or other services provided pursuant to the Initiative during
15 the preceding 12 months.

16 (k) NOTICE TO CONGRESS ON ASSISTANCE AND
17 TRAINING.—Not later than 15 days before exercising the
18 authority under subsection (a) with respect to a recipient
19 foreign country, the Secretary of State shall submit a noti-
20 fication in writing to the appropriate committees of Con-
21 gress.

22 **SEC. 226. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING COMPACT PILOT**
23 **PROGRAM IN THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

24 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is
25 authorized to be appropriated \$20,000,000 for each of fis-

1 cal years 2022 and 2023 for the creation of a pilot pro-
2 gram for foreign military financing compacts.

3 (b) ASSISTANCE.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is
5 authorized to create a pilot program, for a duration
6 of two years, with an assessment for any additional
7 or permanent programming, to provide assistance
8 under this section for each country that enters into
9 an FMF Challenge Compact with the United States
10 pursuant to subsection (d) to support policies and
11 programs that advance the progress of the country
12 in achieving lasting security and civilian-military
13 governance through respect for human rights, good
14 governance (including transparency and free and
15 fair elections), and cooperation with United States
16 and international counter-terrorism, anti-trafficking,
17 and counter-crime efforts and programs.

18 (2) FORM OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance under
19 this subsection may be provided in the form of
20 grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or no-in-
21 terest loans to the government of an eligible country
22 described in subsection (c).

23 (c) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—A country shall be a can-
2 didate country for purposes of eligibility for assist-
3 ance for fiscal year 2022 and 2023 if—

4 (A) the country is classified as a lower
5 middle income country in the then most recent
6 edition of the World Development Report for
7 Reconstruction and Development published by
8 the International Bank for Reconstruction and
9 Development and has an income greater than
10 the historical ceiling for International Develop-
11 ment Association eligibility for the fiscal year
12 involved; and

13 (B) the Secretary of State determines that
14 the country is committed to seeking just and
15 democratic governance, including with a dem-
16 onstrated commitment to—

17 (i) the promotion of political plu-
18 ralism, equality, and the rule of law;

19 (ii) respect for human and civil rights;

20 (iii) protection of private property
21 rights;

22 (iv) transparency and accountability
23 of government;

24 (v) anti-corruption; and

1 (vi) the institution of effective civilian
2 control, professionalization, respect for
3 human rights by, and accountability of the
4 armed forces.

5 (2) IDENTIFICATION OF ELIGIBLE COUN-
6 TRIES.—Not later than 90 days prior to the date on
7 which the Secretary of State determines eligible
8 countries for an FMF Challenge Compact, the Sec-
9 retary—

10 (A) shall prepare and submit to the appro-
11 priate congressional committees a report that
12 contains a list of all eligible countries identified
13 that have met the requirements under para-
14 graph (1) for the fiscal year; and

15 (B) shall consult with the appropriate con-
16 gressional committees on the extent to which
17 such countries meet the criteria described in
18 paragraph (1).

19 (d) FMF CHALLENGE COMPACT.—

20 (1) COMPACT.—The Secretary of State may
21 provide assistance for an eligible country only if the
22 country enters into an agreement with the United
23 States, to be known as an “FMF Challenge Com-
24 pact” (in this subsection referred to as a “Compact”)
25 that establishes a multi-year plan for achieving

1 shared security objectives in furtherance of the pur-
2 poses of this title.

3 (2) ELEMENTS.—The elements of the Compact
4 shall be those listed in subsection (c)(1)(B) for de-
5 termining eligibility, and be designed to significantly
6 advance the performance of those commitments dur-
7 ing the period of the Compact.

8 (3) IN GENERAL.—The Compact should take
9 into account the national strategy of the eligible
10 country and shall include—

11 (A) the specific objectives that the country
12 and the United States expect to achieve during
13 the term of the Compact, including both how
14 the foreign military financing under the Com-
15 pact will advance shared security interests and
16 advance partner capacity building efforts as
17 well as to advance national efforts towards just
18 and democratic governance;

19 (B) the responsibilities of the country and
20 the United States in the achievement of such
21 objectives;

22 (C) regular benchmarks to measure, where
23 appropriate, progress toward achieving such ob-
24 jectives; and

1 (D) the strategy of the eligible country to
2 sustain progress made toward achieving such
3 objectives after expiration of the Compact.

4 (e) CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION PRIOR TO COM-
5 PACT NEGOTIATIONS.—Not later than 15 days before
6 commencing negotiations of a Compact with an eligible
7 country, the Secretary of State shall consult with the ap-
8 propriate congressional committees with respect to the
9 proposed Compact negotiation and shall identify the objec-
10 tives and mechanisms to be used for the negotiation of
11 the Compact.

12 (f) ASSESSMENT OF PILOT PROGRAM AND REC-
13 OMMENDATIONS.—Not later than 90 days after the con-
14 clusion of the pilot program, the Secretary of State shall
15 provide a report to the appropriate congressional commit-
16 tees with respect to the pilot program, including an assess-
17 ment of the success and utility of the pilot program estab-
18 lished under this subsection in meeting United States ob-
19 jectives and a recommendation with respect to whether to
20 continue on a pilot or permanent basis a further foreign
21 military financing compact program.

1 **SEC. 227. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL**
2 **MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE**
3 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

4 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of
5 fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart-
6 ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise
7 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II
8 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347
9 et seq.) (relating to international military education and
10 training (IMET) assistance), \$45,000,000 for activities in
11 the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act.

12 **SEC. 228. PRIORITIZING EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLE TRANS-**
13 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
15 gress that the United States Government should prioritize
16 the review of excess defense article transfers to Indo-Pa-
17 cific partners.

18 (b) FIVE-YEAR PLAN.—Not later than 90 days after
19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
20 develop a five-year plan to prioritize excess defense article
21 transfers to the Indo-Pacific and provide a report describ-
22 ing such plan to the appropriate congressional committees.

23 (c) TRANSFER AUTHORITY.—Section 516(c)(2) of
24 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.
25 2321j(c)(2)) is amended by inserting “, Thailand, Indo-

1 nesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia” after “and to the Phil-
2ippines”.

3 (d) **REQUIRED COORDINATION.**—The United States
4 Government shall coordinate and align excess defense arti-
5 cle transfers with capacity building efforts of regional al-
6 lies and partners.

7 **SEC. 229. PRIORITIZING EXCESS NAVAL VESSEL TRANS-**
8 **FERS FOR THE INDO-PACIFIC.**

9 (a) **AUTHORITY.**—The President is authorized to
10 transfer to a government of a country listed pursuant to
11 the amendment made under section 228(c) two OLIVER
12 HAZARD PERRY class guided missile frigates on a grant
13 basis under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of
14 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

15 (b) **GRANTS NOT COUNTED IN ANNUAL TOTAL OF**
16 **TRANSFERRED EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—The value
17 of a vessel transferred to another country on a grant basis
18 pursuant to authority provided by this section shall not
19 be counted against the aggregate value of excess defense
20 articles transferred in any fiscal year under section 516
21 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j).

22 (c) **COSTS OF TRANSFERS.**—Any expense incurred by
23 the United States in connection with a transfer authorized
24 by this section shall be charged to the recipient notwith-

1 standing section 516(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
2 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(e)).

3 (d) REPAIR AND REFURBISHMENT IN UNITED
4 STATES SHIPYARDS.—To the maximum extent prac-
5 ticable, the President shall require, as a condition of the
6 transfer of a vessel under this subsection, that the recipi-
7 ent to which the vessel is transferred have such repair or
8 refurbishment of the vessel as is needed, before the vessel
9 joins the naval forces of that recipient, performed at a
10 shipyard located in the United States.

11 (e) EXPIRATION OF AUTHORITY.—The authority to
12 transfer a vessel under this section shall expire at the end
13 of the 3-year period beginning on the date of the enact-
14 ment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 230. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM**
16 **OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER-**
17 **WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC**
18 **AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE**
19 **SOUTH CHINA SEA.**

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress—

21 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions
22 or the use of force to impede freedom of operations
23 in international airspace by military or civilian air-
24 craft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize the
25 Indo-Pacific region;

1 (2) urges the Government of China to refrain
2 from implementing the declared East China Sea Air
3 Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in
4 the South China Sea, which is contrary to freedom
5 of overflight in international airspace, and to refrain
6 from taking similar provocative actions elsewhere in
7 the Indo-Pacific region;

8 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's
9 decision is final and legally binding on both parties
10 and that the People's Republic of China's claims to
11 offshore resources across most of the South China
12 Sea are unlawful; and

13 (4) condemns the People's Republic of China
14 for failing to abide by the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal's
15 ruling, despite Chinese obligations as a state party
16 to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
17 Sea.

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy
19 of the United States to—

20 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al-
21 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ-
22 ing longstanding United States policy regarding Ar-
23 ticle V of the United States-Philippines Mutual De-
24 fense Treaty and reaffirm its position that Article V
25 of the United States-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty

1 applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Is-
2 lands;

3 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights,
4 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace
5 above it, that belong to all nations, and oppose the
6 militarization of new and reclaimed land features in
7 the South China Sea;

8 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the
9 PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely—

10 (A) that PRC claims in the South China
11 Sea, including to offshore resources across most
12 of the South China Sea, are unlawful;

13 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a
14 maritime claim vis-à-vis the Philippines in areas
15 that the Tribunal found to be in the Phil-
16ippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on
17 its continental shelf;

18 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be-
19 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived
20 from islands its claims in the Spratly Islands;
21 and

22 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial
23 or maritime claim to James Shoal;

24 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in
25 destabilizing activities, including illegal occupation

1 or efforts to unlawfully assert administration over
2 disputed claims;

3 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without
4 intimidation, coercion, or force;

5 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust
6 claims in accordance with international law;

7 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and
8 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri-
9 torial seas, must be derived from land features and
10 otherwise comport with international law;

11 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula-
12 tions covering disputed areas in the South China
13 Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the
14 region;

15 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if
16 that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South-
17 east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a
18 vehicle for the People's Republic of China to advance
19 its unlawful maritime claims;

20 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter-
21 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter-
22 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at
23 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs),
24 is sufficient to ensure the safety of navigation be-
25 tween the United States Armed Forces and the

1 forces of other countries, including the People's Re-
2 public of China;

3 (11) support the development of regional insti-
4 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional
5 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister's Meeting
6 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded
7 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera-
8 tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter-
9 national law;

10 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships
11 with other countries in the region for maritime do-
12 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef-
13 forts by the United States Government to explore
14 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha-
15 nisms for a "common operating picture" in the
16 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries
17 that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing
18 behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities;

19 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent
20 any other country from exercising its sovereign
21 rights to the resources of the exclusive economic
22 zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims
23 to those areas in the South China Sea that have no
24 support in international law; and

1 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the
2 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including,
3 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and
4 allies, to reaffirm the principle of freedom of oper-
5 ations in international waters and airspace in ac-
6 cordance with established principles and practices of
7 international law.

8 **SEC. 231. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO-**
9 **PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS.**

10 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and
13 strengthen existing measures under the United
14 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide
15 capabilities to allies and partners consistent with
16 agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles,
17 missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part-
18 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with
19 United States strategic imperatives;

20 (2) the United States should design for export
21 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit-
22 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in
23 the region, including long-range precision fires, air
24 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis-
25 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional

1 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re-
2 connaissance capabilities, and command and control
3 systems;

4 (3) the United States should pursue, to the
5 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology
6 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems
7 described in paragraph (2); and

8 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with
9 the Secretary of Defense, should—

10 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in
11 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con-
12 tingency requirements and avoid the need for
13 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and

14 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such
15 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies'
16 capacity to produce such munitions.

17 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
18 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
19 tees of Congress” means—

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
21 Senate;

22 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
23 Senate;

24 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
25 House of Representatives; and

1 (4) the Committee on Armed Services of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 (c) REPORT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-
7 fense, shall submit a report to the appropriate com-
8 mittees of Congress that describes United States pri-
9 orities for building more capable security partners in
10 the Indo-Pacific region.

11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
12 required under paragraph (1) shall—

13 (A) provide a priority list of defense and
14 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and
15 partners must possess for the United States to
16 be able to achieve its military objectives in the
17 Indo-Pacific region;

18 (B) identify, from the list referred to in
19 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best
20 provided, or can only be provided, by the
21 United States;

22 (C) identify—

23 (i) actions required to prioritize
24 United States Government resources and

1 personnel to expedite fielding the capabili-
2 ties identified in subparagraph (B); and

3 (ii) steps needed to fully account for
4 and a plan to integrate all means of
5 United States foreign military sales, direct
6 commercial sales, security assistance, and
7 all applicable authorities of the Depart-
8 ment of State and the Department of De-
9 fense;

10 (D) assess the requirements for United
11 States security assistance, including Inter-
12 national Military Education and Training, in
13 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means
14 to deliver critical partner capability require-
15 ments identified in subparagraph (B);

16 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet
17 the requirements for United States security as-
18 sistance, and identify resource gaps;

19 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling
20 requirements for United States security assist-
21 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re-
22 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative
23 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe-
24 cific partner countries;

1 (G) identify limitations on the United
2 States ability to provide such capabilities, in-
3 cluding those identified under subparagraph
4 (B), because of existing United States treaty
5 obligations, United States policies, or other reg-
6 ulations;

7 (H) recommend improvements to the proc-
8 ess for developing requirements for partners ca-
9 pabilities; and

10 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec-
11 ommendations for infrastructure and posture,
12 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues.

13 (3) FORM.—The report required under this
14 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a
15 classified annex.

16 **SEC. 232. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS-**
17 **TRIAL BASE.**

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
19 gress that—

20 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated
21 approach, which leverages economies of scale with
22 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re-
23 tain its lead in defense technology;

24 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or trans-
25 fer of defense-related technologies and services to

1 members of the national technology and industrial
2 base (as defined in section 2500 of title 10, United
3 States Code) would advance United States security
4 interests by helping to leverage the defense-related
5 technologies and skilled workforces of trusted allies
6 to reduce the dependence on other countries, includ-
7 ing countries that pose challenges to United States
8 interests around the world, for defense-related inno-
9 vation and investment; and

10 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to
11 continue to increase cooperation with Australia,
12 Canada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain
13 and Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-re-
14 lated technology and services and leverage the in-
15 vestments of like-minded, major ally nations in order
16 to maximize the strategic edge afforded by defense
17 technology innovation.

18 (b) REPORT.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
20 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
21 of State shall submit a report to the appropriate
22 congressional committees that—

23 (A) describes the Department of State's ef-
24 forts to facilitate access among the national
25 technology and industrial base to defense arti-

1 cles and services subject to the United States
2 Munitions List under section 38(a)(1) of the
3 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C.
4 2778(a)(1)); and

5 (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for-
6 eign policy, or other challenges or consider-
7 ations that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to
8 include any gaps in the respective export con-
9 trol regimes implemented by United Kingdom
10 of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aus-
11 tralia, or Canada.

12 (2) FORM.—This report required under para-
13 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
14 classified annex.

15 **SEC. 233. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC OUTREACH WITH RE-**
16 **SPECT TO CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
17 **TIONS OVERSEAS.**

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
19 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
20 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit
21 a report to the appropriate congressional committees re-
22 garding United States diplomatic engagement with other
23 nations that host or are considering hosting any military
24 installation of the Government of the People's Republic
25 of China.

1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
2 quired under subsection (a) shall include—

3 (1) a list of countries that currently host or are
4 considering hosting any military installation of the
5 Government of the People’s Republic of China;

6 (2) a detailed description of United States dip-
7 lomatic and related efforts to countries that are con-
8 sidering hosting a military installation of the Gov-
9 ernment of the People’s Republic of China, and the
10 results of such efforts;

11 (3) an assessment on the adverse impact on
12 United States interests of the Government of the
13 People’s Republic of China successfully establishing
14 a military installation at any of the locations it is
15 currently considering;

16 (4) a description and list of any commercial
17 ports outside of the People’s Republic of China that
18 the United States Government assesses could be
19 used by the Government of the People’s Republic of
20 China for military purposes, and any diplomatic ef-
21 forts with the governments of the countries where
22 such ports are located;

23 (5) the impact of the military installations of
24 the Government of the People’s Republic of China
25 on United States interests; and

1 (6) lessons learned from the diplomatic experi-
2 ence of addressing the PRC's first overseas base in
3 Djibouti.

4 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under
5 subsection (a) shall be classified, but may include a un-
6 classified summary.

7 **SEC. 234. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING UNIVERSAL**
8 **IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS**
9 **SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA.**

10 It is the policy of the United States to sustain max-
11 imum economic pressure on the Government of the Demo-
12 cratic People's Republic of Korea (referred to in this sec-
13 tion as the "DPRK") until the regime undertakes com-
14 plete, verifiable, and irreversible actions toward
15 denuclearization, including by—

16 (1) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
17 implement and enforce existing United Nations
18 sanctions with regard to the DPRK;

19 (2) pressing all nations, including the PRC, and
20 in accordance with United Nations Security Council
21 resolutions, to end the practice of hosting DPRK
22 citizens as guest workers, recognizing that such
23 workers are demonstrated to constitute an illicit
24 source of revenue for the DPRK regime and its nu-
25 clear ambitions;

1 (3) pressing all nations, including the PRC, to
2 pursue rigorous interdiction of shipments to and
3 from the DPRK, including ship-to-ship transfers,
4 consistent with United Nations Security Council res-
5 olutions;

6 (4) pressing the PRC and PRC entities—

7 (A) to cease business activities with United
8 Nations-designated entities and their affiliates
9 in the DPRK; and

10 (B) to expel from the PRC individuals who
11 enable the DPRK to acquire materials for its
12 nuclear and ballistic missile programs; and

13 (5) enforcing United Nations Security Council
14 resolutions with respect to the DPRK and United
15 States sanctions, including those pursuant to the
16 North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act
17 of 2016 (Public Law 114–122), the Countering
18 America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub-
19 lic Law 115–44), the Otto Warmbier North Korea
20 Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019
21 (title LXXI of division F of Public Law 116–92),
22 and relevant United States executive orders.

1 **SEC. 235. LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES**
2 **HOSTING CHINESE MILITARY INSTALLA-**
3 **TIONS.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) although it casts the Belt and Road Initia-
7 tive (BRI) as a development initiative, the People’s
8 Republic of China is also utilizing the BRI to ad-
9 vance its own security interests, including to expand
10 its power projection capabilities and facilitate great-
11 er access for the People’s Liberation Army through
12 overseas military installations; and

13 (2) the expansion of the People’s Liberation
14 Army globally through overseas military installations
15 will undermine the medium- and long-term security
16 of the United States and the security and develop-
17 ment of strategic partners in critical regions around
18 the world, which is at odds with United States goals
19 to promote peace, prosperity, and self-reliance
20 among partner nations, including through the Mil-
21 lennium Challenge Corporation.

22 (b) LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE.—Except as pro-
23 vided in subsection (c), for fiscal years 2022 through
24 2031, the government of a country that is hosting on its
25 territory a military installation of the Government of the
26 People’s Republic of China or facilitates the expansion of

1 the presence of the People’s Liberation Army for purposes
2 other than participating in United Nations peacekeeping
3 operations or for temporary humanitarian, medical, and
4 disaster relief operations in such country shall not be eligi-
5 ble for assistance under sections 609 or 616 of the Millen-
6 nium Challenge Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. 7708, 7715).

7 (c) NATIONAL INTEREST WAIVER.—The President
8 may, on a case by case basis, waive the limitation in sub-
9 section (b) if the President submits to the appropriate con-
10 gressional committees—

11 (1) a written determination that the waiver is
12 important to the national interests of the United
13 States; and

14 (2) a detailed explanation of how the waiver is
15 important to those interests.

16 **Subtitle C—Regional Strategies to**
17 **Counter the People’s Republic**
18 **of China**

19 **SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH**
20 **ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD**
21 **WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC**
22 **OF CHINA.**

23 It is the policy of the United States—

24 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships
25 Europe and with like-minded countries around the

1 globe to effectively compete with the People’s Repub-
2 lic of China; and

3 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and
4 partners—

5 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco-
6 nomic, and military challenges posed by the
7 People’s Republic of China;

8 (B) to deter the People’s Republic of
9 China from pursuing military aggression;

10 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of
11 territorial disputes in accordance with inter-
12 national law;

13 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term
14 economic development while countering efforts
15 by the Government of the People’s Republic of
16 China to leverage predatory economic practices
17 as a means of political and economic coercion in
18 the Indo-Pacific region and beyond;

19 (E) to promote the values of democracy
20 and human rights, including through efforts to
21 end the repression by the Chinese Communist
22 Party of political dissidents and Uyghurs and
23 other ethnic Muslim minorities, Tibetan Bud-
24 dhists, Christians, and other minorities;

1 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the
2 Chinese Communist Party, in contravention of
3 the commitments made under the Sino-British
4 Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law
5 of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of
6 the people of Hong Kong; and

7 (G) to counter the Chinese Communist
8 Party efforts to spread disinformation in the
9 People's Republic of China and beyond with re-
10 spect to the response of the Chinese Communist
11 Party to COVID-19.

12 **PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

13 **SEC. 245. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED**
14 **STATES-CANADA RELATIONS.**

15 It is the sense of Congress that—

16 (1) the United States and Canada have a
17 unique relationship based on shared geography, ex-
18 tensive personal connections, deep economic ties,
19 mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to
20 uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules
21 based international order established after World
22 War II;

23 (2) the United States and Canada can better
24 address China's economic, political, and security in-
25 fluence through closer cooperation on counter-

1 narcotics, environmental stewardship, transparent
2 practices in public procurement and infrastructure
3 planning, the Arctic, energy and connectivity issues,
4 trade and commercial relations, bilateral legal mat-
5 ters, and support for democracy, good governance,
6 and human rights;

7 (3) amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the
8 United States and Canada should maintain joint ini-
9 tiatives to address border management, commercial
10 and trade relations, a shared approach with respect
11 to the People's Republic of China, and transnational
12 challenges, including pandemics and climate change;

13 (4) the United States and Canada should en-
14 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation,
15 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa-
16 ganda efforts;

17 (5) the People's Republic of China's infrastruc-
18 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni-
19 cations technology, extraction of natural resources,
20 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks
21 for the United States and Canada;

22 (6) the United States should share, as appro-
23 priate, intelligence gathered regarding—

24 (A) Huawei's 5G capabilities; and

1 (B) the Chinese Government's intentions
2 with respect to 5G expansion;

3 (7) the United States and Canada should con-
4 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple-
5 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada
6 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development
7 Collaboration; and

8 (8) the United States and Canada must
9 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in
10 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North
11 American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)
12 to effectively defend the Northern Hemisphere
13 against the range of threats by peer competitors, in-
14 cluding long range missiles and high-precision weap-
15 ons.

16 **SEC. 246. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN-**
17 **MENT OF CHINA'S ARBITRARY IMPRISON-**
18 **MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS.**

19 It is the sense of Congress that—

20 (1) the Government of the People's Republic of
21 China's apparent arbitrary detention and abusive
22 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and
23 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov-
24 ernment of Canada's arrest of Meng Wanzhou is
25 deeply concerning;

1 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter-
2 national leadership by—

3 (A) upholding the rule of law and com-
4 plying with its international legal obligations,
5 including those pursuant to the Extradition
6 Treaty Between the United States of America
7 and Canada, signed at Washington December
8 3, 1971; and

9 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar-
10 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
11 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and
12 the European Union and reaffirms well-estab-
13 lished prohibitions under international human
14 rights conventions against the arbitrary deten-
15 tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage
16 in state-to-state relations; and

17 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov-
18 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re-
19 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for
20 due process for Canadian national Robert
21 Schellenberg.

22 **SEC. 247. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
23 **CANADA.**

24 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-

1 mit a strategy to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
2 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the
3 Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
4 Armed Services of the House of Representatives that de-
5 scribes how the United States will enhance cooperation
6 with the Government of Canada in managing relations
7 with the Government of China.

8 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
9 section (a) shall—

10 (1) identify key policy points of convergence
11 and divergence between the United States and Can-
12 ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub-
13 lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco-
14 nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains
15 and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics;

16 (2) include the development coordination efforts
17 with Canadian counterparts to enhance the coopera-
18 tion between the United States and Canada with re-
19 spect to—

20 (A) managing economic relations with the
21 People’s Republic of China;

22 (B) democracy and human rights in the
23 People’s Republic of China;

24 (C) technology issues involving the Peo-
25 ple’s Republic of China;

1 (D) defense issues involving the People's
2 Republic of China; and

3 (E) international law enforcement and
4 transnational organized crime issues.

5 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to
6 work with Canada to counter Chinese projection of
7 an authoritarian governing model around the world;

8 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence
9 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca-
10 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives
11 to Huawei's 5G technology;

12 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora-
13 tion—

14 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana-
15 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in
16 the Arctic Region; and

17 (B) to counter Chinese efforts to project
18 political, economic, and military influence into
19 the Arctic Region; and

20 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can-
21 ada to track and counter Chinese attempts to exert
22 influence across the multilateral system, including at
23 the World Health Organization.

24 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section
25 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be

1 made available to the public, but may include a classified
2 annex, if necessary.

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre-
5 quently than every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of
6 State shall consult with the appropriate congressional
7 committees regarding the development and implementa-
8 tion of the strategy required under this section.

9 **SEC. 248. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM-**
10 **PETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN**
11 **RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN**
12 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
15 in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the
16 Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United
17 States Trade Representative, and the Chief Executive Of-
18 ficer of the United States International Development Fi-
19 nance Corporation, shall submit a multi-year strategy for
20 increasing United States economic competitiveness and
21 promoting good governance, human rights, and the rule
22 of law in Latin American and Caribbean countries, par-
23 ticularly in the areas of investment, equitable and sustain-
24 able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption
25 activities, and infrastructure projects, to—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
2 Senate;

3 (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate;

4 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the
5 Senate;

6 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
7 Senate;

8 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
9 House of Representatives;

10 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the
11 House of Representatives;

12 (7) the Committee on Ways and Means of the
13 House of Representatives; and

14 (8) the Committee on Appropriations of the
15 House of Representatives.

16 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required
17 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ-
18 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to—

19 (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries
20 in the region to advance the sustainable development
21 of equitable economies;

22 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between
23 the countries of the Americas;

1 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and
2 competitive environment for United States busi-
3 nesses in the region;

4 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re-
5 view long term financial sustainability and security
6 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec-
7 tors or services, including transportation, commu-
8 nications, natural resources, and energy;

9 (5) establish competitive and transparent infra-
10 structure project selection and procurement proc-
11 esses that promote transparency, open competition,
12 financial sustainability, adherence to robust global
13 standards, and the employment of the local work-
14 force;

15 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust
16 democratic governance, fair competition, combat cor-
17 ruption, and end impunity;

18 (7) identify and mitigate obstacles to private
19 sector-led economic growth in Latin America and
20 the Caribbean; and

21 (8) maintain transparent and affordable access
22 to the internet and digital infrastructure in the
23 Western Hemisphere.

24 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1
25 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annu-

1 ally thereafter, the Secretary of State, after consultation
2 with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Com-
3 merce, the Attorney General, the United States Trade
4 Representative, and the leadership of the United States
5 International Development Finance Corporation, shall
6 brief the congressional committees listed in subsection (a)
7 regarding the implementation of this part, including exam-
8 ples of successes and challenges.

9 **SEC. 249. ENGAGEMENT IN REGIONAL AND INTER-**
10 **NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LATIN AMER-**
11 **ICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.**

12 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
13 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 tees of Congress” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
16 Senate;

17 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
18 Senate;

19 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
20 Senate;

21 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
22 House of Representatives;

23 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
24 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

1 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
2 House of Representatives.

3 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
6 of State, working through the Assistant Secretary of
7 State for Intelligence and Research, and in coordina-
8 tion with the Director of National Intelligence and
9 the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, shall
10 submit a report to the appropriate committees of
11 Congress that assesses the nature, intent, and im-
12 pact to United States strategic interests of Chinese
13 diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the deci-
14 sions, procedures, and programs of multilateral or-
15 ganizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, in-
16 cluding the World Bank, International Monetary
17 Fund, Organization of American States, and the
18 Inter-American Development Bank.

19 (2) FORM.—The report required under para-
20 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form
21 and shall include classified annexes.

1 **SEC. 250. ADDRESSING CHINA'S SOVEREIGN LENDING**
2 **PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CAR-**
3 **IBBEAN.**

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that—

6 (1) since 2005, the Government of China has
7 expanded sovereign lending to governments in Latin
8 America and the Caribbean with loans that are re-
9 paid or collateralized with natural resources or com-
10 modities;

11 (2) several countries in Latin American and the
12 Caribbean that have received a significant amount of
13 sovereign lending from the Government of China
14 face challenges in repaying such loans;

15 (3) the Government of China's predatory eco-
16 nomic practices and sovereign lending practices in
17 Latin America and the Caribbean negatively influ-
18 ence United States national interests in the Western
19 Hemisphere;

20 (4) the Inter-American Development Bank, the
21 premier multilateral development bank dedicated to
22 the Western Hemisphere, should play a significant
23 role supporting the countries of Latin America and
24 the Caribbean in achieving sustainable and service-
25 able debt structures; and

1 (5) a tenth general capital increase for the
2 Inter-American Development Bank would strengthen
3 the Bank’s ability to help the countries of Latin
4 America and the Caribbean achieve sustainable and
5 serviceable debt structures.

6 (b) SUPPORT FOR A GENERAL CAPITAL INCREASE.—
7 The President shall take steps to support a tenth general
8 capital increase for the Inter-American Development
9 Bank, including advancing diplomatic engagement to build
10 support among member countries of the Bank for a tenth
11 general capital increase for the Bank

12 (c) TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.—The Inter-Amer-
13 ican Development Bank Act (22 U.S.C. 283 et seq.) is
14 amended by adding at the end the following:

15 **“SEC. 42. TENTH CAPITAL INCREASE.**

16 “(a) VOTE AUTHORIZED.—The United States Gov-
17 ernor of the Bank is authorized to vote in favor of a reso-
18 lution to increase the capital stock of the Bank by
19 \$80,000,000,000 over a period not to exceed 5 years.

20 “(b) SUBSCRIPTION AUTHORIZED.—

21 “(1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Gov-
22 ernor of the Bank may subscribe on behalf of the
23 United States to 1,990,714 additional shares of the
24 capital stock of the Bank.

1 “(2) LIMITATION.—Any subscription by the
2 United States to the capital stock of the Bank shall
3 be effective only to such extent and in such amounts
4 as are provided in advance in appropriations Acts.

5 “(c) LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORIZATION OF APPRO-
6 PRIATIONS.—

7 “(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to pay for the in-
8 crease in the United States subscription to the Bank
9 under subsection (b), there is authorized to be ap-
10 propriated \$24,014,857,191 for payment by the Sec-
11 retary of the Treasury.

12 “(2) ALLOCATION OF FUNDS.—Of the amount
13 authorized to be appropriated under paragraph
14 (1)—

15 “(A) \$600,371,430 shall be for paid in
16 shares of the Bank; and

17 “(B) \$23,414,485,761 shall be for callable
18 shares of the Bank.”.

19 (d) ADDRESSING CHINA’S SOVEREIGN LENDING IN
20 THE AMERICAS.—The Secretary of the Treasury and the
21 United States Executive Director to the Inter-American
22 Development Bank shall use the voice, vote, and influence
23 of the United States—

24 (1) to advance efforts by the Bank to help
25 countries restructure debt resulting from sovereign

1 lending by the Government of China in order to
2 achieve sustainable and serviceable debt structures;
3 and

4 (2) to establish appropriate safeguards and
5 transparency and conditionality measures to protect
6 debt-vulnerable member countries of the Inter-Amer-
7 ican Development Bank that borrow from the Bank
8 for the purposes of restructuring Chinese bilateral
9 debt held by such countries and preventing such
10 countries from incurring subsequent Chinese bilat-
11 eral debt.

12 (e) BRIEFINGS.—

13 (1) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 90 days
14 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
15 every 90 days thereafter, the President shall provide
16 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
17 ate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
18 House of Representatives a briefing detailing efforts
19 to carry out subsection (b) and (d) and the amend-
20 ment made by subsection (c).

21 (2) PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE
22 AND SERVICEABLE DEBT STRUCTURES.—Not later
23 than 180 days after the successful completion of a
24 tenth general capital increase for the Inter-American
25 Development Bank, and every 180 days thereafter

1 for a period of 3 years, the President shall provide
2 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
3 ate and the Committee on Financial Services of the
4 House of Representatives a briefing on efforts by the
5 Bank to support countries in Latin American and
6 the Caribbean in their efforts to achieve sustainable
7 and serviceable debt structures.

8 **SEC. 251. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND**
9 **THE CARIBBEAN.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro-
11 priated to the Department of State \$12,000,000 for the
12 International Military Education and Training Program
13 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal
14 years 2021 through 2026.

15 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall
16 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re-
17 ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such
18 programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent
19 choice for international military education and training for
20 Latin American and Caribbean partners.

21 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred
22 to in subsection (a) shall—

23 (1) provide training and capacity-building op-
24 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu-
25 rity services;

1 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks
2 for—

3 (A) improving the functioning and organi-
4 zation of security services in Latin America and
5 the Caribbean;

6 (B) creating a better understanding of the
7 United States and its values; and

8 (C) using technology for maximum effi-
9 ciency and organization; and

10 (3) promote and ensure that security services in
11 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian
12 authority and operate in compliance with inter-
13 national norms, standards, and rules of engagement,
14 including a respect for human rights.

15 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec-
16 tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require-
17 ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of
18 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d).

19 **SEC. 252. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN**
20 **AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING**
21 **ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE**
22 **RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH-**
23 **NOLOGIES.**

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
25 gress that—

1 (1) the Government of China is exporting its
2 model for internal security and state control of soci-
3 ety through advanced technology and artificial intel-
4 ligence; and

5 (2) the inclusion of communication networks
6 and communications supply chains with equipment
7 and services from companies with close ties to or
8 susceptible to pressure from governments or security
9 services without reliable legal checks on govern-
10 mental powers can lead to breaches of citizens' pri-
11 vate information, increased censorship, violations of
12 human rights, and harassment of political oppo-
13 nents.

14 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of
15 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern-
16 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and
17 the Caribbean to—

18 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil
19 liberties posed by technologies and services described
20 in subsection (a); and

21 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate
22 such risks.

23 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex-
24 ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global
25 Media, working through the Open Technology Fund, and

1 the Secretary of State, working through the Bureau of De-
2 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor's Internet Freedom
3 and Business and Human Rights Section, shall expand
4 and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship technology
5 and services to journalists in Latin America and the Car-
6ibbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely access
7 or share digital news and information.

8 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of
9 State, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of
10 State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the
11 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter-
12 national Development, shall work through nongovern-
13 mental organizations to—

14 (1) support and promote programs that support
15 internet freedom and the free flow of information
16 online in Latin America and the Caribbean;

17 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli-
18 able access to internet in Latin America and the
19 Caribbean;

20 (3) provide integrated support to civil society
21 for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy,
22 and applied research programs in Latin America
23 and the Caribbean;

24 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in
25 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative

1 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability
2 and prevent government overreach in the digital
3 sphere;

4 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour-
5 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build
6 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth
7 news reports covering governance and human rights
8 topics;

9 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so-
10 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to
11 improve transparency and accountability in govern-
12 ment and the private sector;

13 (7) provide training on investigative reporting
14 of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business
15 and commercial practices related to China, including
16 the role of the Government of China in such prac-
17 tices;

18 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to
19 strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities
20 described in paragraph (7); and

21 (9) identify local resources to support the pre-
22 ponderance of activities that would be carried out
23 under this subsection.

24 (e) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not more than 180
25 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every

1 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, the Adminis-
2 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
3 velopment, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United
4 States Agency for Global Media shall provide a briefing
5 regarding the efforts described in subsections (c), (d), and
6 (e) to—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
8 Senate;

9 (2) the Committee on Appropriations of the
10 Senate;

11 (3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
12 House of Representatives; and

13 (4) the Committee on Appropriations of the
14 House of Representatives.

15 **PART II—TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE**

16 **SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE TRANSATLANTIC**
17 **ALLIANCE.**

18 It is the sense of Congress that—

19 (1) the United States, the European Union,
20 and countries of Europe are close partners, sharing
21 values grounded in democracy, human rights, trans-
22 parency, and the rules-based international order es-
23 tablished after World War II;

24 (2) without a common approach by the United
25 States, European Union, and countries of Europe on

1 connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup-
2 port for democracy and human rights, the People's
3 Republic of China will continue to increase its eco-
4 nomic, political and security leverage in Europe;

5 (3) the People's Republic of China's deployment
6 of assistance to European countries following the
7 COVID-19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach
8 to aid, but it also highlighted Europe's deep eco-
9 nomic ties to China;

10 (4) as European states seek to recover from the
11 economic toll of the COVID-19 outbreak, the United
12 States must stand in partnership with Europe to
13 support our collective economic recovery and rein-
14 force our collective national security and defend
15 these shared values;

16 (5) the United States, European Union, and
17 other European countries should coordinate on joint
18 strategies to diversify reliance on supply chains away
19 from the People's Republic of China, especially in
20 the medical and pharmaceutical sectors;

21 (6) the United States, European Union, United
22 Kingdom, and the countries of Europe should lever-
23 age their respective economic innovation capabilities
24 to support the global economic recovery from the
25 COVID-19 recession and draw a contrast with the

1 centralized economy of the People's Republic of
2 China;

3 (7) the United States and European Union
4 should accelerate efforts to de-escalate their trade
5 disputes, including negotiating a United States-Eu-
6 ropean Union trade agreement that benefits workers
7 and the broader economy in both the United States
8 and European Union;

9 (8) the United States, European Union, and
10 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address
11 economic challenges posed by the People's Republic
12 of China;

13 (9) the United States, European Union, and
14 countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to
15 counter Chinese disinformation, influence operations,
16 and propaganda efforts;

17 (10) the United States and European nations
18 share serious concerns with the repressions being
19 supported and executed by the Government of
20 China, and should continue implementing measures
21 to address the Government of China's specific
22 abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and
23 should build joint mechanisms and programs to pre-
24 vent the export of China's authoritarian governance
25 model to countries around the world;

1 (11) the United States and European nations
2 should remain united in their shared values against
3 attempts by the Government of China at the United
4 Nations and other multilateral organizations to pro-
5 mote efforts that erode the Universal Declaration of
6 Human Rights, like the “community of a shared fu-
7 ture for mankind” and “democratization of inter-
8 national relations”;

9 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra-
10 structure investments around the world, particularly
11 in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra-
12 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe
13 and the national security of key countries;

14 (13) as appropriate, the United States should
15 share intelligence with European allies and partners
16 on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of
17 the Government of China with respect to 5G expan-
18 sion in Europe;

19 (14) the European Union’s Investment Screen-
20 ing Regulation, which came into force in October
21 2020, is a welcome development, and member states
22 should closely scrutinize Chinese investments in their
23 countries through their own national investment
24 screening measures;

1 (15) the President should actively engage the
2 European Union on the implementation of the Ex-
3 port Control Reform Act regulations and work to
4 align the law’s regulations with European Union pri-
5 orities;

6 (16) the President should strongly advocate for
7 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict
8 dual use exports controlled at the National Security
9 and above level to the People’s Republic of China
10 under the Wassenaar Arrangement;

11 (17) the United States should explore the value
12 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating
13 Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
14 (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate the ex-
15 port of United States and European Union sensitive
16 technologies to the People’s Republic of China; and

17 (18) the United States should work with coun-
18 terparts in Europe to—

19 (A) evaluate United States and European
20 overreliance on Chinese goods, including in the
21 medical and pharmaceutical sectors, and de-
22 velop joint strategies to diversify supply chains;

23 (B) counter Chinese efforts to use
24 COVID–19-related assistance as a coercive tool
25 to pressure developing countries by offering rel-

1 evant United States and European expertise
2 and assistance; and

3 (C) leverage the United States and Euro-
4 pean private sectors to advance the post-
5 COVID–19 economic recovery.

6 **SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO-**
7 **OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO-**
8 **PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief
11 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee
12 on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on
13 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of
14 the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the
15 United States will enhance cooperation with the European
16 Union, NATO, and European partner countries on man-
17 aging relations with the People’s Republic of China.

18 (b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required by subsection
19 (a) shall do the following:

20 (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De-
21 partment of State official that leads United States
22 efforts to cooperate with the European Union,
23 NATO, and European partner countries to advance
24 a shared approach with respect to the People’s Re-
25 public of China.

1 (2) Identify key policy points of convergence
2 and divergence between the United States and Euro-
3 pean partners with respect to the People’s Republic
4 of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco-
5 nomic practices.

6 (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests
7 with European counterparts on—

8 (A) economic challenges with the People’s
9 Republic of China;

10 (B) democracy and human rights chal-
11 lenges with respect to the People’s Republic of
12 China;

13 (C) technology issues with respect to the
14 People’s Republic of China;

15 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo-
16 ple’s Republic of China; and

17 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to
18 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
19 established by the Government of the People’s
20 Republic of China.

21 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms
22 among key regional and functional bureaus within
23 the Department of State and Department of Defense
24 tasked with engaging with European partners on the
25 People’s Republic of China.

1 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts made up to the
2 date on which the date of the briefing and future
3 plans to work with European partners to counter
4 Chinese advancement of an authoritarian governing
5 model around the world.

6 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the
7 date on which the strategy is submitted and future
8 plans to support European efforts to identify cost-
9 effective alternatives to Huawei's 5G technology.

10 (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy
11 tools, including the Global Engagement Center of
12 the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with
13 counterpart entities within the European Union to
14 counter Chinese propaganda.

15 (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources
16 the Department of State dedicates to engagement
17 between the United States and the European Union
18 on the People's Republic of China and provide an
19 assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the
20 strategy.

21 (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro-
22 pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts
23 to exert influence across multilateral fora, including
24 at the World Health Organization.

1 (c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall
2 be classified.

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after
4 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days
5 thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with the
6 appropriate congressional committees regarding the devel-
7 opment and implementation of the strategy.

8 **SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON**
9 **PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with
11 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among
12 the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada,
13 and the European Development Finance Institutions
14 (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on
15 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development
16 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi-
17 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to
18 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative
19 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as—

20 (1) the European Union Strategy on Con-
21 necting Europe and Asia;

22 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas
23 Initiative Fund;

24 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United
25 States, Japan, and Australia; and

1 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has
2 leveraged \$65,000,000,000 for infrastructure
3 projects and emphasizes transparency standards.

4 (b) COOPERATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS.—The
5 United States and Europe should coordinate efforts to ad-
6 dress the Government of China’s use of the United Na-
7 tions to advance and legitimize BRI as a global good, in-
8 cluding the proliferation of memoranda of understanding
9 between the People’s Republic of China and United Na-
10 tions funds and programs on BRI implementation.

11 (c) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro-
12 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to
13 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the
14 Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for
15 Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel-
16 oping countries.

17 **SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE-**
18 **TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN**
19 **CHINA AND RUSSIA.**

20 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
21 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
22 tees of Congress” means—

23 (1) the Select Committee on Intelligence, the
24 Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on
25 Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce,

1 Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En-
2 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on
3 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com-
4 mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro-
5 priations of the Senate; and

6 (2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
7 ligence, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com-
8 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy
9 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv-
10 ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the
11 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep-
12 resentatives.

13 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di-
16 rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination
17 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
18 fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of
19 Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such
20 other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con-
21 siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com-
22 mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro-
23 priate committees of Congress on cooperation be-
24 tween China and Iran and between China and Rus-
25 sia.

1 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under
2 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

3 (A) An identification of major areas of dip-
4 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan-
5 cial, economic, military, and space coopera-
6 tion—

7 (i) between China and Iran; and

8 (ii) between China and Russia.

9 (B) An assessment of the effect of the
10 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19) pan-
11 demic on such cooperation.

12 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para-
13 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
14 but may include a classified annex.

15 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES
16 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di-
17 rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap-
18 propriate Federal departments and agencies should share
19 the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b)
20 with important allies and partners of the United States,
21 as appropriate.

22 **PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

23 **SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL**
24 **ASIA.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) the United States should continue to stand
2 with friends and partners in South and Central Asia
3 as they contend with efforts by the Government of
4 China to interfere in their respective political sys-
5 tems and encroach upon their sovereign territory;
6 and

7 (2) the United States should reaffirm its com-
8 mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic
9 Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral
10 defense consultations and collaboration with India
11 commensurate with its status as a major defense
12 partner.

13 **SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH**
14 **SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub-
17 mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
18 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com-
19 mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed
20 Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for
21 how the United States will engage with the countries of
22 South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1
23 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of
24 China.

1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
2 section (a) shall include the following elements:

3 (1) A detailed description of the security and
4 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of
5 China poses to the countries of South and Central
6 Asia, including border disputes with South and Cen-
7 tral Asian countries that border China, Chinese in-
8 vestments in land and sea ports, transportation in-
9 frastructure, and energy projects across the region.

10 (2) A detailed description of United States ef-
11 forts to provide alternatives to Chinese investment in
12 infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen-
13 tral Asia.

14 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re-
15 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia
16 on strategies to build resilience against Chinese ef-
17 forts to interfere in their political systems and
18 economies.

19 (4) A detailed description of United States dip-
20 lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af-
21 ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by
22 Chinese investment in the Afghan mineral sector.

23 (5) A detailed description of United States dip-
24 lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan
25 with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Re-

1 public of China, including investments by the Peo-
2 ple's Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt
3 and Road Initiative.

4 (6) In close consultation with the Government
5 of India, identification of areas where the United
6 States Government can provide diplomatic and other
7 support as appropriate for India's efforts to address
8 economic and security challenges posed by the Peo-
9 ple's Republic of China in the region.

10 (7) A description of the coordination mecha-
11 nisms among key regional and functional bureaus
12 within the Department of State and Department of
13 Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of
14 South and Central Asia on issues relating to the
15 People's Republic of China.

16 (8) A description of the efforts being made by
17 Federal departments agencies, including the Depart-
18 ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
19 national Development, the Department of Com-
20 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of
21 the United States Trade Representative, to help the
22 nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and
23 commerce links that will help those nations diversify
24 their trade away from China.

1 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a)
2 shall be submitted in unclassified form that can be made
3 available to the public, but may include a classified annex
4 as necessary.

5 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than
7 annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult
8 with the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com-
9 mittee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee
10 of Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations
11 of the House of Representatives regarding the develop-
12 ment and implementation of the strategy required under
13 subsection (a).

14 **PART IV—AFRICA**

15 **SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE-**
16 **CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB-**
17 **LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA.**

18 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
19 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
20 tees of Congress” means—

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
23 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

24 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
25 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent

1 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
2 Representatives.

3 (b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than
4 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
5 Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director
6 of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com-
7 mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and
8 impact of Chinese political, economic, and security sector
9 activity in Africa, and its impact on United States stra-
10 tegic interests, including—

11 (1) the amount and impact of direct invest-
12 ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans
13 deals, and other preferential trading arrangements;

14 (2) the involvement of Chinese state-owned en-
15 terprises in Africa;

16 (3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo-
17 ple's Republic of China;

18 (4) the involvement of Chinese private security,
19 technology and media companies in Africa;

20 (5) the scale and impact of Chinese arms sales
21 to African countries;

22 (6) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa-
23 cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in
24 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex-

1 tractive resources and wildlife products, from Africa
2 to China;

3 (7) the methods and techniques that China uses
4 to exert undue influence on African governments
5 and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, and to influ-
6 ence African multilateral organizations; and

7 (8) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and
8 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and
9 CCP to seek to expand influence in Africa.

10 **SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE**
11 **UNITED STATES IN AFRICA.**

12 (a) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-**
13 **FINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
14 **tees of Congress”** means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
16 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
17 Finance of the Senate; and

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
19 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
20 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives.

21 (b) **STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.**—Not later than 180
22 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-
23 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary
24 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
25 General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad-

1 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
2 Development, and the leadership of the United States
3 International Development Finance Corporation, submit
4 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting
5 forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States
6 economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in
7 the investment climate in Africa, including through sup-
8 port for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including
9 property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-cor-
10 ruption and governance.

11 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to
12 subsection (a) shall include—

13 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to
14 United States investment in Africa for United States
15 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif-
16 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized
17 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing
18 programs effectively address such barriers;

19 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to
20 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec-
21 ommendations to overcome such barriers;

22 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in
23 the United States that have a comparative advan-
24 tage in Africa markets;

1 (4) a determination of priority African coun-
2 tries for promoting two-way trade and investment
3 and an assessment of additional foreign assistance
4 needs, including democracy and governance and rule
5 of law support, to promote a conducive operating en-
6 vironment in priority countries;

7 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra-
8 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and
9 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue
10 on trade, security, development, and environmental
11 issues of mutual interest; and

12 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af-
13 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and
14 investment, strategic engagement, and security in
15 Africa

16 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
17 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen-
18 eral of the United States shall—

19 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign
20 Commercial Service Officers and Department of
21 State Economic Officers at United States embassies
22 in sub-Saharan Africa; and

23 (2) develop an assessment of whether human
24 resource capacity in such embassies is adequate to
25 meet the goals of the various trade and economic

1 programs and initiatives in Africa, including the Af-
2 rican Growth and Opportunity Act and Prosper Af-
3 rica.

4 **SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT**
5 **TO AFRICA.**

6 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
7 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
8 tees of Congress” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com-
11 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
13 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
14 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
15 Representatives.

16 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER
17 CHINESE CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
19 an interagency Working Group, which shall include
20 representatives of the Department of State, the De-
21 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of
22 National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the
23 United States Government as the President con-
24 siders appropriate, on means to counter Chinese
25 cyber aggression with respect to Africa.

1 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established
2 pursuant to this subsection shall develop a set of
3 recommendations for—

4 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments
5 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data
6 networks and critical infrastructure where ap-
7 plicable;

8 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei;

9 (C) an action plan for United States em-
10 bassies in Africa to offer to provide assistance
11 to host-country governments with protecting
12 their vital digital networks and infrastructure
13 from Chinese espionage, including an assess-
14 ment of staffing resources needed to implement
15 the action plan in embassies in Africa;

16 (D) utilizing interagency resources to
17 counter Chinese disinformation and propaganda
18 in traditional and digital media targeted to Af-
19 rican audiences; and

20 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter
21 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools
22 and assistance to enhance and promote digital
23 democracy.

1 **SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM-**
2 **BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED**
3 **ON THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.**

4 The Secretary of State may station on a permanent
5 basis Department of State personnel at such United
6 States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary
7 considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies
8 and investments of the People's Republic of China in Afri-
9 ca.

10 **SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA-**
11 **TIVE.**

12 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that youth in Africa
13 can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic
14 growth, improve public sector transparency and govern-
15 ance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of
16 focus for United States outreach on the continent.

17 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States,
18 in cooperation and collaboration with private sector com-
19 panies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organiza-
20 tions, and national and regional public sector entities, to
21 commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and
22 leadership skills of African youth with the objective of en-
23 hancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and
24 private sectors in order to help them spur growth and
25 prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and en-

1 hance peace and security in their respective countries of
2 origin and across Africa.

3 (c) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.—

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established
5 the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried
6 out by the Secretary of State.

7 (2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is author-
8 ized to support the participation in the Initiative es-
9 tablished under this paragraph, in the United
10 States, of fellows from Africa each year for such
11 education and training in leadership and profes-
12 sional development through the Department of State
13 as the Secretary of State considers appropriate. The
14 Secretary shall establish and publish criteria for eli-
15 gibility for participation as such a fellow, and for se-
16 lection of fellows among eligible applicants for a fel-
17 lowship.

18 (3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Ini-
19 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such
20 reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabo-
21 ration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1)
22 as the Secretary considers appropriate.

23 (4) REGIONAL CENTERS AND NETWORKS.—The
24 Administrator of the United States Agency for

1 International Development shall establish each of
2 the following:

3 (A) Not fewer than four regional centers in
4 Africa to provide in-person and online training
5 throughout the year in business and entrepre-
6 neurship, civic leadership, and public manage-
7 ment.

8 (B) An online network that provides infor-
9 mation and online courses on, and connections
10 with leaders in, the private and public sectors
11 in Africa.

12 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
13 gress that the Secretary of State should increase the num-
14 ber of fellows from Africa in the Young African Leaders
15 Initiative above the number that participated in the Initia-
16 tive in fiscal year 2020 .

17 **SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS.**

18 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
19 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency
20 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres-
21 sional committees a report on the resources and timeline
22 needed to establish within the Agency an organization
23 whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and
24 institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and
25 relevant news and information to the people of Africa, es-

1 pecially in countries where a free press is banned by the
2 government or not fully established, about the region, the
3 world, and the United States through uncensored news,
4 responsible discussion, and open debate.

5 **PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

6 **SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN,**
7 **AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND**
8 **NORTH AFRICA.**

9 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
10 gress that—

11 (1) the economic influence of the People's Re-
12 public of China through its oil and gas imports from
13 the Middle East, infrastructure investments, tech-
14 nology transfer, and arms sales provide influence
15 and leverage that runs counter to United States in-
16 terests in the region;

17 (2) the People's Republic of China seeks to
18 erode United States influence in the Middle East
19 and North Africa through the sale of Chinese arms,
20 associated weapons technology, and joint weapons
21 research and development initiatives;

22 (3) the People's Republic of China seeks to es-
23 tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi-
24 cally strategic locations in the Middle East and
25 North Africa to further the Chinese Communist Par-

1 ty's Belt and Road Initiative at the expense of
2 United States national security interests; and

3 (4) the export of certain communications infra-
4 structure from the People's Republic of China de-
5 grades the security of partner networks, exposes in-
6 tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of
7 the United States to conduct security cooperation
8 with compromised regional partners, and furthers
9 China's authoritarian surveillance model.

10 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
13 of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
14 the United States Agency for International Develop-
15 ment and the heads of other appropriate Federal
16 agencies, shall jointly develop and submit to the ap-
17 propriate congressional committees a strategy for
18 countering and limiting Chinese influence in, and ac-
19 cess to, the Middle East and North Africa.

20 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under
21 paragraph (1) shall include—

22 (A) an assessment of China's intent with
23 regards to increased cooperation with Middle
24 East and North African countries and how

1 these activities fit into their broader global stra-
2 tegic objectives;

3 (B) an assessment of how governments
4 across the region are responding to Chinese ef-
5 forts to increase Chinese military presence in
6 their countries;

7 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation
8 through foreign military sales, financing, and
9 efforts to build partner capacity and increase
10 interoperability with the United States;

11 (D) an assessment of Chinese joint re-
12 search and development with the Middle East,
13 North Africa, impacts on United States' na-
14 tional security interests, and recommended
15 steps to mitigate Chinese influence;

16 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap-
17 ons technology transfers from the People's Re-
18 public of China to the Middle East and North
19 Africa, impacts on United States' national secu-
20 rity interests, and recommended steps to miti-
21 gate Chinese influence;

22 (F) an assessment of Chinese military
23 sales to the region including lethal and non le-
24 thal unmanned aerial systems;

1 (G) an assessment of People’s Republic of
2 China military basing and dual-use facility ini-
3 tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri-
4 ca, impacts on United States’ national security
5 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate
6 Chinese influence;

7 (H) efforts to improve regional security co-
8 operation with United States allies and partners
9 with a focus on—

10 (i) maritime security in the Arabian
11 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi-
12 terranean;

13 (ii) integrated air and missile defense;

14 (iii) cyber security;

15 (iv) border security; and

16 (v) critical infrastructure security, to
17 include energy security;

18 (I) increased support for government-to-
19 government engagement on critical infrastruc-
20 ture development projects including ports and
21 water infrastructure;

22 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri-
23 vate sector and public-private partnerships in
24 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest-
25 ment in non-energy sectors;

1 (K) efforts to expand youth engagement
2 and professional education exchanges with key
3 partner countries;

4 (L) specific steps to counter increased Chi-
5 nese investment in telecommunications infra-
6 structure and diplomatic efforts to stress the
7 political, economic, and social benefits of a free
8 and open internet;

9 (M) efforts to promote United States pri-
10 vate sector engagement in and public-private
11 partnerships on renewable energy development;

12 (N) the expansion of public-private part-
13 nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri-
14 gation projects; and

15 (O) efforts to warn United States partners
16 in the Middle East and North Africa of the
17 risks associated with Chinese telecommuni-
18 cations infrastructure and provide alternative
19 “clean paths” to Chinese technology.

20 **SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND**
21 **NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT.**

22 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
23 ings:

24 (1) The United States and the international
25 community have long-term interests in the stability,

1 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle
2 East and North Africa.

3 (2) In addition to and apart from military and
4 security efforts, the United States should harness a
5 whole of government approach, including bilateral
6 and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort,
7 and public diplomacy to compete with and counter
8 Chinese Communist Party influence.

9 (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of
10 United States engagement, transparent governance
11 structures, and active civil society engagement help
12 counter predatory foreign investment and influence
13 efforts.

14 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
15 United States that the United States and the international
16 community should, continue diplomatic and economic ef-
17 forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that
18 support reform efforts to—

19 (1) promote greater economic opportunity;

20 (2) foster private sector development;

21 (3) strengthen civil society; and

22 (4) promote transparent and democratic gov-
23 ernance and the rule of law.

1 **PART VI—ARCTIC REGION**

2 **SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY.**

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—

4 It is the sense of Congress that—

5 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment—

6 (A) creates new national and regional secu-
7 rity challenges due to increased military activity
8 in the Arctic;

9 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg-
10 ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing
11 strategic competition;

12 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit-
13 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol
14 the increased vessel traffic in this remote re-
15 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev-
16 els of sea ice;

17 (D) impacts public safety due to increased
18 human activity in the Arctic region where
19 search and rescue capacity remains very lim-
20 ited; and

21 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic's
22 fragile and pristine environment and the unique
23 and highly sensitive species found in the Arc-
24 tic's marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and

25 (2) the United States should reduce the con-
26 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by—

1 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety
2 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un-
3 folding in the Arctic;

4 (B) developing policies and making prep-
5 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and
6 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to
7 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re-
8 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and
9 build Arctic competencies;

10 (C) adequately funding the National Earth
11 System Prediction Capability to substantively
12 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on
13 the time scales necessary to ensure regional se-
14 curity and trans-Arctic shipping;

15 (D) investing in resources, including a sig-
16 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure
17 that the United States has adequate capacity to
18 prevent and respond to security threats in the
19 Arctic region;

20 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with
21 all nations in the Arctic region for—

22 (i) maintaining peace and stability in
23 the Arctic region; and

1 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward-
2 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re-
3 gion; and

4 (F) examining the possibility of recon-
5 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum.

6 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
7 United States—

8 (1) to recognize only the nations enumerated in
9 subsection (c)(1) as Arctic nations, and to reject all
10 other claims to this status; and

11 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a
12 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the
13 interests of United States allies and partners.

14 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

15 (1) ARCTIC NATIONS.—The term “Arctic na-
16 tions” means the 8 nations with territory or exclu-
17 sive economic zones that extend north of the
18 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator,
19 namely Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway,
20 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden,
21 and Iceland.

22 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term “Arctic Re-
23 gion” means the geographic region north of the
24 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator.

1 (d) DESIGNATION.—The Assistant Secretary of State
2 for Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
3 entific Affairs (OES) shall designate a deputy assistant
4 secretary serving within the Bureau of Oceans and Inter-
5 national Environmental and Scientific Affairs as “Deputy
6 Assistant Secretary for Arctic Affairs”, who shall be re-
7 sponsible for OES affairs in the Arctic Region.

8 (e) DUTIES.—The Deputy Assistant Secretary for
9 Arctic Affairs shall—

10 (1) facilitate the development and coordination
11 of United States foreign policy in the Arctic Region
12 relating to—

13 (A) strengthening institutions for coopera-
14 tion among the Arctic nations;

15 (B) enhancing scientific monitoring and re-
16 search on local, regional, and global environ-
17 mental issues;

18 (C) protecting the Arctic environment and
19 conserving its biological resources;

20 (D) promoting responsible natural resource
21 management and economic development; and

22 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in
23 decisions that affect them.

24 (2) coordinate the diplomatic objectives with re-
25 spect to the activities described in paragraph (1),

1 and, as appropriate, represent the United States
2 within multilateral fora that address international
3 cooperation and foreign policy matters in the Arctic
4 Region;

5 (3) help inform, in coordination with the Bu-
6 reau of Economic and Business Affairs,
7 transnational commerce and commercial maritime
8 transit in the Arctic Region;

9 (4) coordinate the integration of scientific data
10 on the current and projected effects of emerging en-
11 vironmental changes on the Arctic Region and en-
12 sure that such data is applied to the development of
13 security strategies for the Arctic Region;

14 (5) make available the methods and approaches
15 on the integration of climate, data, and environ-
16 mental science to regional security planning pro-
17 grams in the Department of State to better ensure
18 that broader decision making processes may more
19 adequately account for the effects of climate change;

20 (6) assist with the development of, and facili-
21 tate the implementation of, an Arctic Region Secu-
22 rity Policy in accordance with subsection (f);

23 (7) use the voice, vote, and influence of the
24 United States to encourage other countries and
25 international multilateral organizations to support

1 the principles of the Arctic Region Security Policy
2 implemented pursuant to subsection (f); and

3 (8) perform such other duties and exercise such
4 powers as the Assistant Secretary of State for
5 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci-
6 entific Affairs shall prescribe.

7 (f) RANK AND STATUS.—The Secretary of State may
8 change the title of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Ar-
9 tic Affairs designated under subsection (c) to Special Rep-
10 resentative or Special Envoy with the rank of Ambassador
11 if—

12 (1) the President nominates the person so des-
13 igned to that rank and status; and

14 (2) the Senate confirms such person to such
15 rank and status.

16 (g) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Bu-
17 reau of European and Eurasian Affairs shall be the lead
18 bureau for developing and implementing the United
19 States' Arctic Region Security Policy, in coordination with
20 the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
21 and Scientific Affairs, the Bureau of Political-Military Af-
22 fairs, embassies, other regional bureaus, and relevant of-
23 fices to advance United States national security interests,
24 including through conflict prevention efforts, security as-
25 sistance, humanitarian disaster response and prevention,

1 and economic and other relevant assistance programs. The
2 Arctic Region Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget
3 for, and implement plans, policies, and actions—

4 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the
5 United States in Arctic nations, including through
6 enhancements to diplomatic missions and facilities,
7 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re-
8 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United
9 States initiatives and assistance programs across
10 agencies to protect the national security of the
11 United States and its allies and partners;

12 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic
13 nations to the effects of environmental change and
14 increased civilian and military activity from Arctic
15 nations and other nations that may result from in-
16 creased accessibility of the Arctic Region;

17 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic
18 Region and Arctic nations that—

19 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic
20 environment; and

21 (B) are strategically significant to the
22 United States;

23 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ-
24 mental change and national security risk and vulner-

1 ability assessments into the decision making process
2 on foreign assistance awards to Arctic nations;

3 (5) to advance principles of good governance by
4 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic nations on
5 collaborative approaches—

6 (A) to responsibly manage natural re-
7 sources in the Arctic Region;

8 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari-
9 time safety in the Arctic Region;

10 (C) to prevent the escalation of security
11 tensions by mitigating against the militarization
12 of the Arctic Region;

13 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul-
14 tilateral policies among Arctic nations on the
15 management of maritime transit routes through
16 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the
17 transit policies for access to and transit in the
18 Arctic Region by non-Arctic nations; and

19 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic
20 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability
21 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu-
22 mane and responsible fashion; and

23 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur-
24 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests
25 and nondefense assets in the Arctic Region.

PART VII—OCEANIA**2 SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN-**
3 GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA.

4 It shall be the policy of the United States—

5 (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a
6 strategic national security and economic priority of
7 the United States Government;

8 (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and
9 democratic governance across Oceania as part of a
10 free and open Indo-Pacific region;

11 (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with
12 the Freely Associated States of the Republic of
13 Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the
14 Federated States of Micronesia through robust de-
15 fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex-
16 changes that promote the goals of individual states
17 and the entire region;

18 (4) to work with the governments of Australia,
19 New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance
20 goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi-
21 ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre-
22 paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish-
23 ing, maritime security, and economic development;

24 (5) to participate, wherever possible and appro-
25 priate, in existing regional organizations and inter-
26 national structures to promote the national security

1 and economic goals of the United States and coun-
2 tries of the Oceania region;

3 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United
4 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement
5 and advance long-term growth and development
6 throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro-
7 tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli-
8 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun-
9 tries of the Oceania region against current and fu-
10 ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se-
11 vere changes in the environment;

12 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign
13 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the
14 political, environmental, social, and economic sta-
15 bility of the people and governments of the countries
16 of Oceania;

17 (8) to improve the local capacity of the coun-
18 tries of Oceania to address public health challenges
19 and improve global health security;

20 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar-
21 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to
22 best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain-
23 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as
24 an alternative to state-directed investments by au-
25 thoritarian governments;

1 (10) to ensure the people and communities of
2 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de-
3 grading munitions hazards and other debris that
4 threaten health and livelihoods; and

5 (11) to work cooperatively with all governments
6 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re-
7 mains of members of the United States Armed
8 Forces that are missing in action from previous con-
9 flicts in the Indo-Pacific region.

10 **SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.**

11 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than
12 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
13 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres-
14 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening
15 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania,
16 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with
17 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared
18 concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security
19 and resiliency in the countries of Oceania.

20 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by
21 subsection (a) shall include the following:

22 (1) A description of United States regional
23 goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in-
24 creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania.

1 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of
2 United States regional goals and concerns that are
3 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in-
4 cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption,
5 maritime and other security issues, environmental
6 protection, fisheries management, economic growth
7 and development, and disaster resilience and pre-
8 paredness.

9 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
10 tives by the governments of the United States, Aus-
11 tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those
12 shared regional goals and concerns, including with
13 respect to the issues described in paragraph (1).

14 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initia-
15 tives by regional organizations and other related
16 intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing
17 the issues described in paragraph (1).

18 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs
19 and resources in pursuit of those shared regional
20 goals and concerns, as appropriate.

21 (6) Recommendations for additional United
22 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources
23 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap.

24 (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers
25 appropriate.

1 **TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR**
2 **VALUES**

3 **SEC. 301. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO-**
4 **MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG.**

5 (a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is
6 authorized to be appropriated \$10,000,000 for fiscal year
7 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
8 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy
9 in Hong Kong.

10 (b) **ADMINISTRATION.**—The Secretary of State shall
11 designate an office with the Department of State to ad-
12 minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de-
13 scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State
14 and across the United States Government.

15 **SEC. 302. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO**
16 **FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR**
17 **AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

18 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
19 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
20 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

21 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (E) as sub-
22 paragraph (F); and

23 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (D) the fol-
24 lowing:

1 “(E) Serious human rights abuses in con-
2 nection with forced labor.”.

3 (b) **EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.**—The amend-
4 ment made by subsection (a)—

5 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
6 this Act; and

7 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
8 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
9 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
10 of enactment.

11 **SEC. 303. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
12 **SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION,**
13 **FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY**
14 **CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE**
15 **XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.**

16 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur
17 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145;
18 22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as amended by section 302, is fur-
19 ther amended—

20 (1) by redesignating subparagraphs (F) as sub-
21 paragraph (G); and

22 (2) by inserting after subparagraph (E) the fol-
23 lowing:

1 “(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion,
2 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive
3 implantation policies and practices.”.

4 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend-
5 ment made by subsection (a)—

6 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of
7 this Act; and

8 (2) applies with respect to the first report re-
9 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human
10 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date
11 of enactment.

12 **TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR**
13 **ECONOMIC STATECRAFT**

14 **SEC. 401. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING**
15 **THE PRC’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY.**

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find-
17 ings:

18 (1) The People’s Republic of China, at the di-
19 rection of the Chinese Communist Party, is advanc-
20 ing an ecosystem of anticompetitive economic and
21 industrial policies that—

22 (A) distort global markets;

23 (B) limit innovation;

1 (C) unfairly advantage PRC firms at the
2 expense of the United States and other foreign
3 firms; and

4 (D) unfairly and harmfully prejudice con-
5 sumer choice.

6 (2) Of the extensive and systemic economic and
7 industrial policies pursued by the PRC, the mass
8 subsidization of Chinese firms, intellectual property
9 theft, and forced technology transfer are among the
10 most damaging to the global economy.

11 (3) Through regulatory interventions and direct
12 financial subsidies, the CCP, for the purposes of ad-
13 vancing national political and economic objectives,
14 directs, coerces, and influences in anti-competitive
15 ways the commercial activities of firms that are di-
16 rected, financed, influenced, or otherwise controlled
17 by the state, including state-owned enterprises, and
18 ostensibly independent and private Chinese compa-
19 nies, such as technology firms in strategic sectors.

20 (4) The PRC Government, at the national and
21 subnational levels, grants special privileges or status
22 to certain PRC firms in key sectors designated as
23 strategic, such as telecommunications, oil, power,
24 aviation, banking, and semiconductors. Enterprises
25 receive special state preferences in the form of favor-

1 able loans, tax exemptions, and preferential land ac-
2 cess from the CCP.

3 (5) The subsidization of PRC companies, as de-
4 scribed in paragraphs (3) and (4)—

5 (A) enables these companies to sell goods
6 below market prices, allowing them to outbid
7 and crowd out market-based competitors and
8 thereby pursue global dominance of key sectors;

9 (B) distorts the global market economy by
10 undermining longstanding and generally accept-
11 ed market-based principles of fair competition,
12 leading to barriers to entry and forced exit from
13 the market for foreign or private firms, not only
14 in the PRC, but in markets around the world;

15 (C) creates government-sponsored or sup-
16 ported de facto monopolies, cartels, and other
17 anti-market arrangements in key sectors, lim-
18 iting or removing opportunities for other firms;
19 and

20 (D) leads to, as a result of the issues de-
21 scribed in paragraphs (A) through (C), declines
22 in profits and revenue needed by foreign and
23 private firms for research and development.

24 (6) The CCP incentivizes and empowers Chi-
25 nese actors to steal critical technologies and trade

1 secrets from private and foreign competitors oper-
2 ating in the PRC and around the world, particularly
3 in areas that the CCP has identified as critical to
4 advancing PRC objectives. The PRC, as directed by
5 the CCP, also continues to implement anti-competi-
6 tive regulations, policies, and practices that coerce
7 the handover of technology and other propriety or
8 sensitive data from foreign enterprises to domestic
9 firms in exchange for access to the PRC market.

10 (7) Companies in the United States and in for-
11 eign countries compete with state-subsidized PRC
12 companies that enjoy the protection and power of
13 the state in third-country markets around the world.
14 The advantages granted to PRC firms, combined
15 with significant restrictions to accessing the PRC
16 market itself, severely hamper the ability of United
17 States and foreign firms to compete, innovate, and
18 pursue the provision of best value to customers. The
19 result is an unbalanced playing field. Such an
20 unsustainable course, if not checked, will over time
21 lead to depressed competition around the world, re-
22 duced opportunity, and harm to both producers and
23 consumers.

24 (8) As stated in the United States Trade Rep-
25 resentative's investigation of the PRC's trade prac-

1 tices under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
2 (19 U.S.C. 2411), conducted in March 2018, “When
3 U.S. companies are deprived of fair returns on their
4 investment in IP, they are unable to achieve the
5 growth necessary to reinvest in innovation. In this
6 sense, China’s technology transfer regime directly
7 burdens the innovation ecosystem that is an engine
8 of economic growth in the United States and simi-
9 larly-situated economies.”.

10 (9) In addition to forced technology described
11 in this subsection, the United States Trade Rep-
12 resentative’s investigation of the PRC under section
13 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) also
14 identified requirements that foreign firms license
15 products at less than market value, government-di-
16 rected and government-subsidized acquisition of sen-
17 sitive technology for strategic purposes, and cyber
18 theft as other key PRC technology and industrial
19 policies that are unreasonable and discriminatory.
20 These policies place at risk United States intellectual
21 property rights, innovation and technological devel-
22 opment, and jobs in dozens of industries.

23 (10) Other elements of the PRC’s ecosystem of
24 industrial policies that harm innovation and distort
25 global markets include—

1 (A) advancement of policies that encourage
2 local production over imports;

3 (B) continuation of policies that favor
4 unique technical standards in use by Chinese
5 firms rather than globally accepted standards,
6 which often force foreign firms to alter their
7 products and manufacturing chains to compete;

8 (C) requirements that foreign companies
9 disclose proprietary information to qualify for
10 the adoption of their standards for use in the
11 PRC domestic market; and

12 (D) maintenance of closed procurement
13 processes, which limit participation by foreign
14 firms, including by setting terms that require
15 such firms to use domestic suppliers, transfer
16 know-how to firms in the PRC, and disclose
17 proprietary information.

18 (11) The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and
19 associated industry-specific efforts under this initia-
20 tive, such as the Digital Silk Road, are key vectors
21 to advance the PRC's mercantilist policies and prac-
22 tices globally. The resulting challenges do not only
23 affect United States firms. As the European Cham-
24 ber of Commerce reported in a January 2020 report,
25 the combination of concessional lending to Chinese

1 state-owned enterprises, nontransparent procure-
2 ment and bidding processes, closed digital standards,
3 and other factors severely limit European and other
4 participation in BRI and make “competition [with
5 Chinese companies] in third-country markets ex-
6 tremely challenging”. This underscores a key objec-
7 tive of BRI, which is to ensure the reliance of infra-
8 structure, digital technologies, and other important
9 goods on PRC supply chains and technical stand-
10 ards.

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
12 gress that—

13 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket
14 economy like the PRC’s economy, which has cap-
15 tured such a large share of global economic ex-
16 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re-
17 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term
18 focus and engagement;

19 (2) in order to truly address the most detri-
20 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco-
21 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli-
22 cies that—

23 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel-
24 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of
25 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the

1 United States, foreign markets, and the global
2 economy;

3 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs
4 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior;

5 (C) provide options for affected United
6 States persons to address and respond to un-
7 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in-
8 dustrial policies; and

9 (D) strengthen the protection of critical
10 technology and sensitive data, while still fos-
11 tering an environment that provides incentives
12 for innovation and competition;

13 (3) the United States must work with its allies
14 and partners through the Organization for Economic
15 Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World
16 Trade Organization, and other venues and fora—

17 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac-
18 cepted principles of fair competition and market
19 behavior and address the PRC's anticompetitive
20 economic and industrial policies that undermine
21 decades of global growth and innovation;

22 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted
23 the same treatment as that of a free-market
24 economy until it ceases the implementation of
25 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that

1 provide unfair advantage on PRC firms in fur-
2 therance of national objectives and impose un-
3 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens
4 on market-based international commerce; and

5 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing
6 state-directed subsidization of the private sec-
7 tor, such as advocating for global rules related
8 to transparency and adherence to notification
9 requirements, including through the efforts cur-
10 rently being advanced by the United States,
11 Japan, and the European Union; and

12 (4) the United States and its allies and part-
13 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their
14 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as—

15 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual
16 property rights in markets around the world;

17 (B) fostering open technical standards;

18 and

19 (C) increasing joint investments in over-
20 seas markets.

21 **SEC. 402. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VIOLATORS LIST.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act, and not less frequently
24 than annually thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordi-
25 nation with the Secretary of Commerce, the United States

1 Trade Representative, and the Director of National Intel-
2 ligence, shall create a list (referred to in this section as
3 the “intellectual property violators list”), which identifies
4 all state-owned enterprises that have benefitted from—

5 (1) a significant act or series of acts of intellec-
6 tual property theft that subjected a United States
7 economic sector or particular company incorporated
8 in the United States to harm; or

9 (2) an act or government policy of involuntary
10 or coerced technology transfer of intellectual prop-
11 erty ultimately owned by a company incorporated in
12 the United States.

13 (b) RULES FOR IDENTIFICATION.—To determine
14 whether there is a credible basis for determining that a
15 company should be included on the intellectual property
16 violators list, the Secretary of State, in coordination with
17 the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Rep-
18 resentative, and the Director of National Intelligence,
19 shall consider—

20 (1) any finding by a United States court that
21 the company has violated relevant United States
22 laws intended to protect intellectual property rights;
23 or

1 (2) substantial and credible information re-
2 ceived from any entity described in subsection (e) or
3 other interested persons.

4 (c) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out this section, the
5 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
6 Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and
7 the Director of National Intelligence, may consult, as nec-
8 essary and appropriate, with—

9 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
10 pendent agencies;

11 (2) the private sector; and

12 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
13 pertise.

14 (d) REPORT.—

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall
16 publish, in the Federal Register, an annual report
17 that—

18 (A) lists the companies engaged in the ac-
19 tivities described in subsection (a)(1); and

20 (B) describes the circumstances sur-
21 rounding actions described in subsection (a)(2),
22 including any role of the Government of the
23 PRC; and

24 (C) assesses, to the extent practicable, the
25 economic advantage derived by the companies

1 engaged in the activities described in subsection
2 (a)(1).

3 (2) FORM.—The report published under para-
4 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a
5 classified annex.

6 (e) DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.—The Direc-
7 tor of National Intelligence may authorize the declassifica-
8 tion of information, as appropriate, to inform the contents
9 of the report published pursuant to subsection (d).

10 (f) REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT BUSINESS-CON-
11 FIDENTIAL INFORMATION.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and
13 the heads of all other Federal agencies involved in
14 the production of the intellectual property violators
15 list shall protect from disclosure any proprietary in-
16 formation submitted by a private sector participant
17 and marked as business-confidential information,
18 unless the party submitting the confidential business
19 information—

20 (A) had notice, at the time of submission,
21 that such information would be released by the
22 Secretary; or

23 (B) subsequently consents to the release of
24 such information.

1 (2) NONCONFIDENTIAL VERSION OF REPORT.—

2 If confidential business information is provided by a
3 private sector participant, a nonconfidential version
4 of the report under subsection (d) shall be published
5 in the Federal Register that summarizes or deletes,
6 if necessary, the confidential business information.

7 (3) TREATMENT AS TRADE SECRETS.—Propri-
8 etary information submitted by a private party
9 under this section—

10 (A) shall be considered to be trade secrets
11 and commercial or financial information (as de-
12 fined under section 552(b)(4) of title 5, United
13 States Code); and

14 (B) shall be exempt from disclosure with-
15 out the express approval of the private party.

16 **SEC. 403. GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
17 **CHINA SUBSIDIES LIST.**

18 (a) REPORT.—Not later than one year after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
20 Secretary of State, in coordination with the United States
21 Trade Representative and the Secretary of Commerce,
22 shall publish an unclassified report in the Federal Register
23 that identifies—

24 (1) subsidies provided by the Government of the
25 PRC to enterprises in the PRC; and

1 (2) discriminatory treatment favoring enter-
2 prises in the PRC over foreign market participants.

3 (b) SUBSIDIES AND DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT

4 DESCRIBED.—In compiling the report under subsection
5 (a), the Secretary of State shall consider—

6 (1) regulatory and other policies enacted or pro-
7 moted by the Government of the PRC that—

8 (A) discriminate in favor of enterprises in
9 the PRC at the expense of foreign market par-
10 ticipants;

11 (B) shield centrally administered, state-
12 owned enterprises from competition; or

13 (C) otherwise suppress market-based com-
14 petition;

15 (2) financial subsidies, including favorable lend-
16 ing terms, from or promoted by the Government of
17 the PRC or centrally administered, state-owned en-
18 terprises that materially benefit PRC enterprises
19 over foreign market participants in contravention of
20 generally accepted market principles; and

21 (3) any subsidy that meets the definition of
22 subsidy under article 1 of the Agreement on Sub-
23 sidies and Countervailing Measures referred to in
24 section 101(d)(12) of the Uruguay Round Agree-
25 ments Act (19 U.S.C. 3511(d)(12)).”.

1 (c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State, in co-
2 ordination with the Secretary of Commerce and the United
3 States Trade Representative, may, as necessary and ap-
4 propriate, consult with—

5 (1) other Federal agencies, including inde-
6 pendent agencies;

7 (2) the private sector; and

8 (3) civil society organizations with relevant ex-
9 pertise.

10 **SEC. 404. COUNTERING FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES.**

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-
12 nation with the Attorney General, shall offer to provide
13 technical assistance to establish legislative and regulatory
14 frameworks to combat the bribery of foreign public offi-
15 cials consistent with the principles of the OECD Conven-
16 tion on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
17 International Business Transactions to the governments
18 of countries—

19 (1) that are partners of the United States;

20 (2) that have demonstrated a will to combat
21 foreign corrupt practices responsibly; and

22 (3) for which technical assistance will have the
23 greatest opportunity to achieve measureable results.

24 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 90
25 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

1 of State shall submit a strategy for carrying out the activi-
2 ties described in subsections (a) to the appropriate con-
3 gressional committees.

4 (c) COORDINATION.—In formulating the strategy de-
5 scribed in subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall co-
6 ordinate with the Attorney General.

7 (d) SEMIANNUAL BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not
8 later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this
9 Act, and every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Sec-
10 retary of State shall provide a briefing regarding the ac-
11 tivities described in subsection (a) and the strategy sub-
12 mitted under subsection (b) to the appropriate congres-
13 sional committees.

14 **SEC. 405. DEBT RELIEF FOR COUNTRIES ELIGIBLE FOR AS-**
15 **SISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL DE-**
16 **VELOPMENT ASSOCIATION.**

17 (a) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the
18 United States to coordinate with the international commu-
19 nity to provide debt relief for debt that is held by countries
20 eligible for assistance from the International Development
21 Association that request forbearance to respond to the
22 COVID–19 pandemic.

23 (b) DEBT RELIEF.—The Secretary of the Treasury,
24 in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall engage
25 with international financial institutions and other bilateral

1 official creditors to advance policy discussions on restruc-
2 turing, rescheduling, or canceling the sovereign debt of
3 countries eligible for assistance from the International De-
4 velopment Association, as necessary, to respond to the
5 COVID–19 pandemic.

6 (c) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 45
7 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every
8 90 days thereafter until the end of the COVID–19 pan-
9 demic, as determined by the World Health Organization,
10 or until two years after the date of the enactment of this
11 Act, whichever is earlier, the Secretary of the Treasury,
12 in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall submit
13 to the committees specified in subsection (d) a report that
14 describes—

15 (1) actions that have been taken to advance
16 debt relief for countries eligible for assistance from
17 the International Development Association that re-
18 quest forbearance to respond to the COVID–19 pan-
19 demic in coordination with international financial in-
20 stitutions, the Group of 7 (G7), the Group of 20
21 (G20), Paris Club members, and the Institute of
22 International Finance;

23 (2) mechanisms that have been utilized and
24 mechanisms that are under consideration to provide
25 the debt relief described in paragraph (1);

1 (3) any United States policy concerns regarding
2 debt relief to specific countries;

3 (4) the balance and status of repayments on all
4 loans from the People's Republic of China to coun-
5 tries eligible for assistance from the International
6 Development Association, including—

7 (A) loans provided as part of the Belt and
8 Road Initiative of the People's Republic of
9 China;

10 (B) loans made by the Export-Import
11 Bank of China;

12 (C) loans made by the China Development
13 Bank; and

14 (D) loans made by the Asian Infrastruc-
15 ture Investment Bank; and

16 (5) the transparency measures established or
17 proposed to ensure that funds saved through the
18 debt relief described in paragraph (1) will be used
19 for activities—

20 (A) that respond to the health, economic,
21 and social consequences of the COVID-19 pan-
22 demic; and

23 (B) that are consistent with the interests
24 and values of the United States.

1 (d) COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The committees spec-
2 ified in this subsection are—

3 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
4 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
5 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate;
6 and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
8 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
9 Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

10 **SEC. 406. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE**
11 **GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG**
12 **KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES**
13 **LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

14 Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act
15 of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding
16 at the end the following:

17 **“SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH**
18 **THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS**
19 **HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED**
20 **STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS.**

21 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
22 the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary
23 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
24 committees a report on the manner and extent to which
25 the Government of China uses the status of Hong Kong

1 to circumvent the laws and protections of the United
2 States.

3 “(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
4 (a) shall include the following:

5 “(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com-
6 merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
7 Director of National Intelligence—

8 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
9 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
10 United States export controls; and

11 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
12 which the Government of China used Hong
13 Kong to circumvent such controls during the re-
14 porting period.

15 “(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the
16 Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce—

17 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
18 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
19 duties on merchandise exported to the United
20 States from the People’s Republic of China; and

21 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
22 which the Government of China used Hong
23 Kong to circumvent such duties during the re-
24 porting period.

1 “(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the
2 Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and
3 the Director of National Intelligence—

4 “(A) an assessment of how the Govern-
5 ment of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent
6 sanctions imposed by the United States or pur-
7 suant to multilateral regimes; and

8 “(B) a list of all significant incidents in
9 which the Government of China used Hong
10 Kong to circumvent such sanctions during the
11 reporting period.

12 “(4) In consultation with the Secretary of
13 Homeland Security and the Director of National In-
14 telligence, an assessment of how the Government of
15 China uses formal or informal means to extradite or
16 coercively move individuals, including United States
17 persons, from Hong Kong to the People’s Republic
18 of China.

19 “(5) In consultation with the Secretary of De-
20 fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the
21 Director of Homeland Security—

22 “(A) an assessment of how the intelligence,
23 security, and law enforcement agencies of the
24 Government of China, including the Ministry of
25 State Security, the Ministry of Public Security,

1 Urban Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and
2 the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
3 Senate; and

4 “(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
5 the Committee on Financial Services, the Per-
6 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, and
7 the Committee on Ways and Means of the
8 House of Representatives.

9 “(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign
10 national’ means a person that is neither—

11 “(A) an individual who is a citizen or na-
12 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or

13 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
14 the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic-
15 tion within the People’s Republic of China.

16 “(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting
17 period’ means the 5-year period preceding submis-
18 sion of the report required by subsection (a).

19 “(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
20 ‘United States person’ means—

21 “(A) a United States citizen or an alien
22 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
23 the United States; or

24 “(B) an entity organized under the laws of
25 the United States or of any jurisdiction within

1 the United States, including a foreign branch of
2 such an entity.”.

3 **SEC. 407. ANNUAL REVIEW ON THE PRESENCE OF CHINESE**
4 **COMPANIES IN UNITED STATES CAPITAL**
5 **MARKETS.**

6 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In
7 this section, the term “appropriate committees of Con-
8 gress” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
10 Senate;

11 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
12 Senate;

13 (3) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
14 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

15 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives;

17 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
18 ligence of the House of Representatives; and

19 (6) the Committee on Financial Services of the
20 House of Representatives.

21 (b) REPORT.—

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an-
24 nually thereafter for the following 5 years, the Sec-
25 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of

1 National Intelligence and the Secretary of the Treas-
2 ury, shall submit an unclassified report to the appro-
3 priate committees of Congress that describes the
4 risks posed to the United States by the presence in
5 United States capital markets of companies incor-
6 porated in the PRC.

7 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report
8 required under paragraph (1) shall—

9 (A) identify companies incorporated in the
10 PRC that—

11 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev-
12 eral stock exchanges within the United
13 States, including over-the-counter market
14 and “A Shares” added to indexes and ex-
15 change-traded funds out of mainland ex-
16 changes in the PRC; and

17 (ii) based on the factors for consider-
18 ation described in paragraph (3), have
19 knowingly and materially contributed to—

20 (I) activities that undermine
21 United States national security;

22 (II) serious abuses of internation-
23 ally recognized human rights; or

1 (III) a substantially increased fi-
2 nancial risk exposure for United
3 States-based investors;

4 (B) describe the activities of the companies
5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and
6 their implications for the United States; and

7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the
8 United States Government, State governments,
9 United States financial institutions, United
10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other
11 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed
12 by the presence in United States capital mar-
13 kets of the companies identified pursuant to
14 subparagraph (A).

15 (3) FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION.—In com-
16 pleting the report under paragraph (1), the Presi-
17 dent shall consider whether a company identified
18 pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)—

19 (A) has materially contributed to the devel-
20 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated
21 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military
22 equipment or component parts of such equip-
23 ment;

1 (B) has contributed to the construction
2 and militarization of features in the South
3 China Sea;

4 (C) has been sanctioned by the United
5 States or has been determined to have con-
6 ducted business with sanctioned entities;

7 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of
8 acts of intellectual property theft;

9 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic
10 espionage;

11 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of
12 nuclear or missile technology in violation of
13 United Nations Security Council resolutions or
14 United States sanctions;

15 (G) has contributed to the repression of re-
16 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC,
17 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re-
18 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region;

19 (H) has contributed to the development of
20 technologies that enable censorship directed or
21 directly supported by the Government of the
22 PRC;

23 (I) has failed to comply fully with Federal
24 securities laws (including required audits by the
25 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board)

1 and “material risk” disclosure requirements of
2 the Securities and Exchange Commission; or

3 (J) has contributed to other activities or
4 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi-
5 dent.

6 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub-
7 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
8 may include a classified annex.

9 (d) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the
10 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to
11 the public online through relevant United States Govern-
12 ment websites.

13 **TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC** 14 **SECURITY**

15 **SEC. 501. FINDINGS ON STRATEGIC SECURITY AND ARMS** 16 **CONTROL.**

17 Congress makes the following findings:

18 (1) The United States and the PRC have a
19 shared interest in strategic security through enforce-
20 able arms control and non-proliferation agreements.

21 (2) The United States has long pursued and
22 continues to seek effective, verifiable, and enforce-
23 able arms control and non-proliferation agreements
24 that support United States and allied security by—

1 (A) controlling the spread of nuclear mate-
2 rials and technology;

3 (B) placing limits on the production, stock-
4 piling, and deployment of nuclear weapons;

5 (C) decreasing misperception and mis-
6 calculation; and

7 (D) avoiding destabilizing nuclear arms
8 competition.

9 (3) In May 2019, Director of the Defense Intel-
10 ligence Agency Lieutenant General Robert Ashley
11 stated, “China is likely to at least double the size of
12 its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing
13 the most rapid expansion and diversification of its
14 nuclear arsenal in China’s history.”. The PLA is
15 building a full triad of modernized fixed and mobile
16 ground-based launchers and new capabilities for nu-
17 clear-armed bombers and submarine-launched bal-
18 listic missiles.

19 (4) In June 2020, the Department of State
20 raised concerns in its annual “Adherence to and
21 Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation,
22 and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments”
23 report to Congress that the PRC is not complying
24 with the “zero-yield” nuclear testing ban and ac-

1 cused the PRC of “blocking the flow of data from
2 the monitoring stations” in China.

3 (5) The Department of Defense 2020 Report on
4 Military and Security Developments Involving the
5 People’s Republic of China states that China “in-
6 tends to increase peacetime readiness of its nuclear
7 forces by moving to a launch on warning posture
8 with an expanded silo-based force”.

9 (6) The Department of Defense report also
10 states that, over the next decade, China’s nuclear
11 stockpile—currently estimated in the low 200s—is
12 projected to least double in size as China expands
13 and modernizes its nuclear force.

14 (7) The PRC is conducting research on its first
15 potential early warning radar, with technical co-
16 operation from Russia. This radar could indicate
17 that the PRC is moving to a launch-on warning pos-
18 ture.

19 (8) The PRC plans to use its increasingly capa-
20 ble space, cyber, and electronic warfare capabilities
21 against United States early warning systems and
22 critical infrastructure in a crisis scenario. This poses
23 great risk to strategic security, as it could lead to
24 inadvertent escalation.

1 (9) The PRC's nuclear expansion comes as a
2 part of a massive modernization of the PLA which,
3 combined with the PLA's aggressive actions, has in-
4 creasingly destabilized the Indo-Pacific region.

5 (10) The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), which
6 was elevated in 2015 to become a separate branch
7 within the PLA, has formed 11 new missile brigades
8 since May 2017, some of which are capable of both
9 conventional and nuclear strikes. Unlike the United
10 States, which separates its conventional strike and
11 nuclear capabilities, the PLARF appears to not only
12 co-locate conventional and nuclear forces, including
13 dual-use missiles like the DF-26, but to task the
14 same unit with both nuclear and conventional mis-
15 sions. Such intermingling could lead to inadvertent
16 escalation in a crisis. The United States Defense In-
17 telligence Agency determined in March 2020 that
18 the PLA tested more ballistic missiles than the rest
19 of the world combined in 2019.

20 (11) A January 2021 report from the Institute
21 for Defense Analysis found that many United States
22 and international observers viewed China's no first-
23 use policy with skepticism, especially in the wake of
24 the expansion and modernization of its nuclear capa-
25 bilities.

1 (12) The long-planned United States nuclear
2 modernization program will not increase the United
3 States nuclear weapons stockpile, predates China's
4 conventional military and nuclear expansion, and is
5 not an arms race against China.

6 (13) The United States extended nuclear deter-
7 rence—

8 (A) provides critical strategic security
9 around the world;

10 (B) is an essential element of United
11 States military alliances; and

12 (C) serves a vital non-proliferation func-
13 tion.

14 (14) As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
15 Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Wash-
16 ington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, the PRC
17 is obligated under Article Six of the treaty to pursue
18 arms control negotiations in good faith.

19 (15) The United States has, on numerous occa-
20 sions, called on the PRC to participate in strategic
21 arms control negotiations, but the PRC has thus far
22 declined.

23 (16) The Governments of Poland, Slovenia,
24 Denmark, Norway, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, the
25 Netherlands, Romania, Austria, and Albania, as well

1 as the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlan-
2 tic Treaty Organization, have all encouraged the
3 PRC to join arms control discussions.

4 **SEC. 502. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA-**
5 **LOGUE.**

6 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
7 United States—

8 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United
9 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus-
10 tained and regular engagement with the PRC—

11 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth-
12 er's respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca-
13 pabilities;

14 (B) to improve transparency; and

15 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula-
16 tion and misperception;

17 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov-
18 ernment of China on relevant bilateral issues that
19 lays the groundwork for bringing the People's Re-
20 public of China into an arms control framework, in-
21 cluding—

22 (A) fostering bilateral dialogue on arms
23 control leading to the convening of bilateral
24 strategic security talks;

25 (B) negotiating norms for outer space;

1 (C) developing pre-launch notification re-
2 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation;
3 and

4 (D) expanding lines of communication be-
5 tween both governments for the purposes of re-
6 ducing the risks of conventional war and in-
7 creasing transparency;

8 (3) to pursue relevant capabilities in coordina-
9 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu-
10 rity of United States and allied interests in the face
11 of the PRC's military modernization and expansion,
12 including—

13 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic
14 missiles;

15 (B) integrated air and missile defense;

16 (C) hypersonic missiles;

17 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
18 naissance;

19 (E) space-based capabilities;

20 (F) cyber capabilities; and

21 (G) command, control, and communica-
22 tions;

23 (4) to maintain sufficient force structure, pos-
24 ture, and capabilities to provide extended nuclear de-
25 terrence to United States allies and partners;

1 (5) to maintain appropriate missile defense ca-
2 pabilities to protect threats to the United States
3 homeland and our forces across the theater from
4 rogue intercontinental ballistic missiles from the
5 Indo-Pacific region; and

6 (6) to ensure that the United States declaratory
7 policy reflects the requirements of extended deter-
8 rence, to both assure allies and to preserve its non-
9 proliferation benefits.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
11 gress that—

12 (1) in the midst of growing competition between
13 the United States and the PRC, it is in the interest
14 of both nations to cooperate in reducing risks of con-
15 ventional and nuclear escalation;

16 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other
17 PLA attack on United States early warning sat-
18 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and
19 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a
20 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation;

21 (3) the United States and its allies should pro-
22 mote international norms on military operations in
23 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the
24 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element

1 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and
2 control; and

3 (4) United States allies and partners should
4 share the burden of promoting and protecting such
5 norms by voting against the PRC's proposals re-
6 garding the weaponization of space, highlighting un-
7 safe behavior by the PRC that violates international
8 norms, such as in rendezvous and proximity oper-
9 ations, and promoting responsible behavior in space
10 and all other domains.

11 **SEC. 503. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN-**
12 **GAGE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON**
13 **NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE**
14 **ISSUES.**

15 (a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES-
16 CHINA ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after
17 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
18 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and
19 the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate
20 committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a sepa-
21 rate classified annex, that examines the approaches and
22 strategic effects of engaging the Government of China on
23 arms control and risk reduction, including—

24 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov-
25 ernments of the United States and the People's Re-

1 public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic
2 glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nu-
3 clear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other
4 new strategic domains, which could reduce the likeli-
5 hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to
6 occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the
7 Indo-Pacific;

8 (2) how the United States Government can
9 incentivize the Government of China to engage in a
10 constructive arms control dialogue;

11 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of
12 the People's Republic of China that the United
13 States Government is most concerned about and how
14 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States
15 and allied security interests;

16 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control
17 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military
18 escalation between the United States and the Peo-
19 ple's Republic of China; and

20 (5) opportunities and methods to encourage
21 transparency from the People's Republic of China.

22 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE
23 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
24 CHINA.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the
25 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-

1 tion with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
2 Energy, shall submit to the appropriate committees of
3 Congress a report that describes—

4 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks that
5 includes both the People’s Republic of China and the
6 Russian Federation;

7 (2) if a trilateral arms control dialogue does not
8 arise, what alternative plans the Department of
9 State envisages for ensuring the security of the
10 United States and its allies security from Russian
11 and Chinese nuclear weapons;

12 (3) effects on the credibility of United States
13 extended deterrence assurances to allies and part-
14 ners if the United States is faced with two nuclear-
15 armed peer competitors and any likely corresponding
16 implications for regional security architectures;

17 (4) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of
18 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat-
19 eral or multilateral basis; and

20 (5) the interest level of the Government of
21 China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bi-
22 lateral or multilateral basis.

23 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
24 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
25 tees of Congress” means—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
3 on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate;
4 and

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
6 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee
7 on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep-
8 resentatives.