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Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Future of United Nations Peacekeeping

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Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Cardin, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today. I am grateful for this panel's enduring commitment to American leadership at the United Nations and in the world. And I appreciate the rigor that your members bring to ensuring the oversight and effective use of our contributions to the United Nations – a goal we share. I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss why the United States has such a strong interest in the success of UN peacekeeping and the Administration's strategy for strengthening this critical national security instrument.

First, I will discuss the growth and evolution of UN peacekeeping over the last decade, including the changing nature of these missions. Second, I will summarize the Administration's vision for strengthening UN peace operations, including by ensuring that troops and police in UN operations perform professionally and effectively. Third, I will describe U.S. support for peacekeeping, including the pledges made in the recently-issued Presidential Memorandum on U.S. Support to UN Peace Operations and at the recent Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping at the UN.

Evolution of UN Peacekeeping

The United States has a vital interest in strengthening peacekeeping to respond to demands that peacekeepers are currently struggling to meet. We do not want to live in a world where more than 9,000 children worldwide have been recruited in less than a year to become child soldiers, as happened in South Sudan. We do not want to live in a world where religious or ethnic communities who lived together for decades in harmony, such as the Muslims and Christians in the Central African Republic, are induced to hate and fear one another. We do not want to live in a world where violent extremists exploit weak governments and commit acts of terrorism, as

we have seen in Somalia and recently witnessed in Mali. Nor, of course, do America's foreign policy leaders, including the distinguished members of this Committee.

Recognizing that our security and our values prevent us from ignoring these conflicts, the question remains: what can America do to stop them? Even if the United States has an interest in seeing conflict abate or civilians protected, that does not mean that U.S. forces should be doing all of the abating or the protecting. As President Obama said at West Point last year, "America must always lead on the world stage," but "we should not go it alone." It should go without saying that we cannot and we should not send the U.S. military into all of the places conflict is burning, civilians are hurting, or extremists are lurking. Just because we have far and away the most capable military in the world does not mean we should assume risks and burdens that should be shared by the international community.

This is where peacekeeping comes in. As President Obama affirmed at the UN Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping on September 28, 2015, "We know that peace operations are not the solution to every problem, but they do remain one of the world's most important tools to address armed conflict." When boots on the ground are needed to defuse conflict in Congo or Mali, peacekeeping is often the best instrument we have. Peacekeeping operations ensure that other countries help shoulder the burden, both by contributing uniformed personnel and by sharing the financial costs of the operations. Provided that peacekeepers actually deliver on their mandate, multilateral peacekeeping also brings a greater degree of legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and the world. Because missions are made up of troops from multiple countries, with strong representation from the global South, spoilers and militants have a harder time cynically branding them as having imperialist designs.

The UN has been there at critical junctures to consolidate peace and security and provide much needed stability after U.S. forces or our allies have been deployed for peace enforcement or stabilization operations, as in Haiti, Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

We have a compelling interest in curbing violent conflicts and preventing suffering – and we need peacekeeping to work. But precisely at this moment, when we recognize the crucial role peacekeeping can play in shoring up international security interests, our demands on peacekeeping are outstripping what it can deliver. Today, we are asking peacekeepers to do more, in more places, and in more complex conflicts than at any time in history.

The United States, during both Republican and Democratic administrations, has turned to peacekeeping operations to advance our national security interests. There are currently sixteen UN peacekeeping missions worldwide, made up of over 100,000 uniformed personnel, not to mention the 20,000 troops that the African Union currently deploys in Somalia. This is up from fewer than 20,000 fifteen years ago and 50,000 ten years ago.

To stress, this is by far the largest number of peacekeepers deployed in history. But the numbers only tell a small part of the story. Today, two-thirds of peacekeepers are operating in active conflicts, the highest percentage ever. Peacekeepers often deploy to areas where myriad rebel groups and militias have made clear their intention to keep fighting. And the warring parties in

modern conflicts increasingly include violent extremist groups, who terrorize civilians and attack peacekeepers.

We are also asking peacekeepers to take on more responsibilities in support of sustainable political solutions. We ask UN peacekeeping missions to help with peace processes, assist with re-establishing state authority and stabilizing states amid deadly attacks by violent extremists, such as in Mali. We ask them to support the safe delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance, such as escorting emergency shipments of food and medicine to civilians, as peacekeepers have done in South Sudan. We ask them to protect civilians from atrocities, as in the Central African Republic (CAR). We ask them to bolster security in countries emerging from brutal civil wars, such as in Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire, and to bolster regional stability from the Levant to the Great Lakes of Africa.

Precisely at this moment – when we are asking more of peacekeeping than ever before and as we recognize the crucial role it can play in protecting U.S. interests in just about every mission around the world – we see both the promise and the pitfalls of contemporary peacekeeping. We see life-saving impact when peacekeepers are willing and able to fulfill their mandates and the devastating consequences when they are not.

In the 21st century, the challenges to UN peacekeeping have changed, and so the international community's response must change with it. The United Nations is increasingly central to efforts to bring stability to the world's conflict zones, but too many UN peacekeeping operations are struggling to meet the demands placed upon them. Missions suffer from operational challenges, including long and overly complicated mandates, inadequate planning, obstacles to force generation, slow deployments, weak leadership, lack of critical enablers, competing chains of command, uneven commitments among troop- and police- contributing countries to mandate implementation, and political and administrative obstacles to operations created by the governments hosting peacekeepers. Additionally, each mission needs a strong political dialogue and agreement underpinning its efforts, a premise of their success.

U.S. Strategy for Strengthening Peacekeeping

On September 28, the day of the Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping, President Obama issued a new policy Memorandum on U.S. Support to Peace Operations, the first presidential guidance to address U.S. support to peace operations in over twenty years. The policy reaffirms the strong support of the United States for UN peace operations and directs the interagency to take on a wide range of actions to strengthen and modernize UN operations for a new era. Our strategy prioritizes three lines of effort: building partner capacity and strengthening partner accountability; providing U.S. support; and leading reform of UN peacekeeping. I will now outline these efforts in detail.

First, we need to expand and deepen the pool of troop- and police-contributing countries, and bring advanced militaries back into peacekeeping. At the UN Leaders' Summit on Peacekeeping hosted by President Obama, the Secretary-General and eight other Member States, high-level leaders from 49 countries and three international organizations made pledges that far exceeded our expectations.

Twenty-one European countries made pledges, marking a welcome return of Europe to UN peacekeeping. Malaysia announced significant infantry, police, and engineering capabilities. Finland pledged multiple military units, including special forces. Chile – helicopters, hospitals, and engineering units. Colombia declared its intent to deploy multiple infantry battalions over the next few years. And China announced that it will establish a significant standby force that will be ready to deploy immediately in times of crises.

Leaders from every part of the world pledged approximately 12 field hospitals, 15 engineering companies, and 40 helicopters, as well as approximately 20 formed police units and over two-dozen infantry battalions. At the summit, and in the days that followed, countries committed to providing nearly 50,000 additional troops and police to UN peacekeeping. If countries deliver on these contributions – and we will join the UN in ensuring that they do – UN peacekeeping will be positioned to improve significantly its performance. The UN will have the capacity to fill long-standing gaps in operations – from attack helicopters to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units. If a new mission is created or an existing one significantly expanded, as sadly is sometimes the case, the UN will be able to put troops and police more quickly into the field.

Second, we need to ensure that countries with the will to perform 21st century peacekeeping have the capacity they need to do so. Because African leaders see first-hand the consequences of unchecked conflicts, several have been at the forefront of embracing a new approach to peacekeeping, one that seeks to more effectively execute the tasks assigned to peacekeepers and in particular the responsibility to protect civilians. The African Union has demonstrated a commitment to building rapid response capability on the continent, and the United States is leading a coalition of international partners in support of these efforts. Last year, President Obama announced a new initiative at the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit: the African Peacekeeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP). The United States is investing in the capacity of a core group of six countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda.

The idea is to deepen our investment in those militaries that have a track record of deploying troops to peacekeeping operations and that are committed to protecting civilians from violence. To give just one example, Rwanda's troops were among the first boots on the ground when conflicts erupted in the Central Africa Republic. Rwandans understand the importance of getting peacekeeping right, having experienced the catastrophic consequences of it going terribly wrong. And because Rwandans robustly carry out their mission mandates, the people in countries where they serve trust them; troops from other countries who serve alongside them see what robust peacekeeping looks like; and aggressors who would attack civilians fear them.

The United States remains the largest trainer and equipper of military and police contingents deploying to peacekeeping operations. We have trained hundreds of thousands of peacekeepers in the past decade through the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), launched under President Bush. While we must ensure the GPOI program remains robust and responsive, as it serves as our primary tool for building partner nations' peacekeeping capacities, APRRP is an important supplement. Our military experts will work alongside partners like Rwanda to strengthen their institutions and capabilities so they can rapidly deploy troops when crises

emerge, and supply and sustain their forces in hostile environments. In exchange for this support, these countries have committed to maintain the forces and equipment necessary to undertake those rapid deployments. I strongly encourage the Senate and House to fully fund this important initiative in future years.

Third, we need to ensure that peacekeepers perform what is asked of them. Some troop-contributors disagree with the scope of responsibilities that the Security Council has assigned their troops. These countries sometimes cite the basic principles of UN peacekeeping, and hearken back to the earliest peacekeeping missions – in which blue helmets were deployed at the invitation of warring parties to observe a ceasefire along a demarcated line, such as one between Israel and Syria, or India and Pakistan. In that context, it was absolutely vital that peacekeepers had the states parties' consent, that they behaved impartially, and that they observed and reported infractions.

These missions are still critical, but for more than twenty years, peacekeeping has been evolving. The Security Council first tasked a peacekeeping mission with the responsibility to protect civilians in Sierra Leone in 1999 – in the face of the brutal civil war in that country. While it is national governments' responsibility to take care of their own people, peacekeeping operations have a vital obligation to step in when they fail to do so. This duty is not theoretical. Today, 10 missions – constituting almost 98 percent of UN uniformed personnel across the world – are charged with protecting civilians. If peacekeeping is to be effective in the 21st century, we must close the gap between the mandates the international community asks peacekeepers to undertake, and the willingness and ability of peacekeepers to successfully execute them. If we do not, it not only puts the lives of civilians and peacekeepers at risk, but undermines the credibility and legitimacy of peacekeeping everywhere. This is one of the most important efforts underway today.

The good news is that there is a growing consensus around what modern peacekeeping looks like. In May, drawing on its direct knowledge of what it means when UN peacekeepers do not protect civilians, Rwanda channeled its lessons learned from the field into a set of best practices for the protection of civilians by peacekeeping missions. These "Kigali Principles" call, for example, for troop-contributing countries to ensure that the military commander of a peacekeeping contingent has prior authority to use force as needed. When a commander has to radio back to capital to seek permission, it may mean not being able to react in time to repel a fast-approaching attack on a nearby village.

In the span of just a few months, a diverse group of major troop-contributing countries have endorsed the "Kigali Principles," including Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Senegal, Uruguay, the Netherlands, Italy, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Already, one-third of all troops currently serving in UN and AU peacekeeping operations come from countries that have endorsed the "Kigali Principles" – and that proportion is rising. These principles are a new blueprint for peacekeepers – and especially infantry – deploying into volatile situations.

This growing clarity, together with the significant new contributions announced at the September summit, can change the impact that peacekeepers have in the field. In the past, the scant supply of troops and police meant that neither the UN nor the countries contributing the lion's share of

peacekeepers could afford to be selective without leaving significant gaps in missions. However, the summit pledges of nearly 50,000 troops and police should enable more capable, more willing troops and police to staff peacekeeping missions. Troop- and police-contributing countries that have qualms with particular mandates, or doubts about their capacity to do what is asked of them, no longer need to deploy to missions simply because nobody else will.

For its part, the UN must demonstrate leadership by strengthening its monitoring and evaluation of troops and police in the field. When underperformance results from a lack of appropriate training and equipping, we must help to build those capabilities over time. When it is a matter of misconduct, refusal to follow commands, or implement mandated tasks, or take seriously the imperative to root out misconduct, particularly sexual exploitation and abuse, the UN must repatriate those responsible. For the first time in two decades, the surplus of troops and police allows the UN to do just that.

Fourth, we need to press the UN to make bold institutional reforms. Last year, the UN Secretary-General appointed a High-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations to undertake a thorough review of UN peacekeeping and political missions. The Panel released an in-depth report that included reform recommendations, many of which align with long-standing U.S. priorities. In September, the Secretary-General released his report outlining his intentions to implement the Panel's recommendations ranging from improved logistics and sustainment through its Department of Field Support, to a more comprehensive approach to crisis situations that integrates military, police, and civilian tools.

The Administration is currently focused on several key areas of institutional reform.

We are working to strengthen the UN's assessment and planning work, which includes: supporting the use of sequenced mandates; encouraging the review and revision of conflict analysis tools across the system; and, supporting improved assessment analysis and planning capabilities. Better analysis and planning and the sequencing of mandates not only help to tailor peace operations to better suit often dynamic contexts, but we predict could also result in cost savings. For example, more tailored peace operations could help ensure that the UN isn't being asked to deploy expensive state-capacity building components before a host-state government has the credibility or ability to absorb such support.

We are supporting efforts to enhance the UN's ability to undertake strategic force generation and deploy rapidly. This is an area in dire need of improvement, as we have seen in the long lead times getting troops into Mali, CAR and South Sudan. Rapid deployment of peacekeeping missions can be critical to stabilizing crisis situations, yet we have seen continued shortfalls in staffing-up missions such as in the emergency surge the Security Council authorized for the mission in South Sudan. We must look at what structures and arrangements the UN needs to best support the rapid deployment of peacekeepers and equipment.

We are encouraging the Secretary-General and appropriate heads of UN departments and divisions to undertake administrative reform and cultural shifts that will empower the field and allow for flexibility and responsiveness. The UN's ability to respond to needs in the field is

hamstrung by burdensome policies and procedures and a culture overly concerned with compliance on paper versus outcomes in practice.

Getting the right leadership is also critical for mission success. The UN can improve its selection process for senior mission leaders, including by prioritizing leadership and management skills, increasing commitments to gender diversity among qualified leaders, and developing meaningful mandatory training for senior leaders. The UN should also rigorously assess the performance of senior mission leaders and remove ineffective leaders when warranted. We are encouraging these efforts at the UN and working with the UN to enhance its training of senior mission leadership.

We also continue to support vigorously the Secretary-General's implementation of his zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). We have been particularly outraged at those especially egregious cases of SEA that have been reported in CAR, for example. Those who prey on the vulnerable communities they are sent to protect undermine the very foundation of peacekeeping. There is no excuse for inaction, and we must all do more to ensure those responsible for these heinous acts are held accountable.

I greatly appreciate the leadership you've shown on this issue, Mr. Chairman, and am fully aware of how important this issue is to the Committee. Like you, I believe that even a single case of SEA is one too many. The United States has long been a leader in pushing for stronger prevention measures, and concrete steps to ensure accountability for those responsible for SEA.

Despite the horrific incidents that have been recently reported, the UN has come a long way in recent years in responding to the scourge of SEA with strong support from the United States. However, there is a lot of work that still remains in preventing and addressing SEA. We remain concerned that many SEA perpetrators commit these acts, which are often crimes, with impunity and that many SEA victims never report such to the UN.

In order to address this accountability gap, and to improve prevention measures and assistance to victims, the U.S. government is instituting a "full court press." We are working with our partners to ensure that the Secretary-General remains fully committed and empowered to implement this policy. At the President's Peacekeeping Summit at the UN in September, for example, 42 countries signed onto the Summit Declaration, which affirmed support for the Secretary-General's zero tolerance policy, and confirmed commitments to rigorous vetting and training of uniformed personnel, swift and thorough investigations, and appropriate accountability measures and timely reporting to the UN on all allegations.

Because we know that SEA is an issue that affects all member states, we are developing a whole-of-government strategy to improve prevention of SEA and enhance transparency and accountability for perpetrators. President Obama's recent memorandum on UN peacekeeping highlighted the importance of combatting SEA, and some of the initiatives that the U.S. government is undertaking.

To effectively combat SEA, we are working to track individual cases where there is information available, following up with the appropriate authorities, analyzing the strengths and weakness of current policies, and providing support or applying pressure as appropriate to the UN. We are further exploring setting a requirement for rigorous pre-deployment training in the Secretary-

General's zero tolerance policy on SEA. And, we will be highlighting instances of SEA in the annual human rights report. In addition to elevating incidents of SEA, these acts will pressure, incentivize, and enable troop- and police-contributing countries to better handle SEA.

Perhaps the greatest challenge in our efforts to eliminate SEA has been the lack of transparency on allegations. Although we need to ensure the appropriate procedures are followed and that privacy is respected for all those accused of SEA, the UN and Member States should know the nationality of alleged perpetrators, the status of investigations, and the outcome of disciplinary or prosecutorial action, or of sanctions imposed by the UN. Unfortunately, we rarely have access to this type of information. Our initiatives with the UN have been largely focused on increasing transparency in this regard, specifically to ensure accountability. The lack of data has been very problematic, because it prevents us from following-up with governments and fully analyzing the factors that most contribute to SEA: whether it is a lack of discipline, cultures of tolerance within missions, or lack of training, as these all differ across troop- and police-contributing countries and across UN peacekeeping operations. It has also been difficult to track the UN's follow up on specific cases, since in the past we have not known for sure what country is responsible.

We applaud the Secretary-General's commitment to publicizing the nationality of individuals against whom credible allegations of SEA have been made in his next annual report on this issue. This idea originated in the Secretary-General's 2012 report on SEA, where he noted his intention to "provide country-specific information on the number of credible allegations being investigated by Member States in reports to the General Assembly."

This information will better enable us to use our own diplomatic efforts to ensure accountability. Once we know which country's personnel have been accused of misconduct, we will have a much better understanding of the nature of the problem, the actual size of the accountability gap, and how to better target our response. In cases where countries have repeated SEA violations, we will be able to work bilaterally to address capacity issues and to encourage countries to take appropriate action.

We are also working with the UN to improve standard operating procedures for SEA prevention, reporting, and investigations. The Secretary-General has taken a strong stance and very decisive action on SEA. In response to repeated allegations of SEA in MINUSCA, the UN's peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic, he requested and accepted the resignation of his Special Representative Babacar Gaye in August of this year. His recent reports on SEA in peacekeeping outline very detailed steps he is taking under his own authority to address SEA. These include: community outreach strategies to increase awareness about SEA and reporting mechanisms; establishing Immediate Response Teams to preserve evidence following allegations; tighter timelines for SEA investigations; and, suspending payments to troop and police contributing countries in connection with individuals alleged to have committed SEA. We welcome the Secretary-General's leadership on SEA.

Finally, the United States continues to explore ways to support a more predictable and flexible funding mechanism to support AU peace operations, conditioned on increased AU financing and operational capacities, and compliance with UN regulations, rules, and policies, including financial rules, as well as with international humanitarian and human rights law, as applicable.

These operations provide a creative and oftentimes cost-effective alternative to UN peacekeeping when environments are particularly volatile such as Somalia or early on in CAR.

U.S. Support for UN Peacekeeping

In order to fulfill the first goal outlined above – building partner capacity – the United States must continue to show leadership in supporting peacekeeping operations. Not only is this support good for peacekeeping, it also positions us to be maximally effective in driving changes that will strengthen peacekeeping, and deliver greater results from our investments.

As President Obama said in his remarks at the Summit, "We are here today, together, to strengthen and reform UN peacekeeping because our common security demands it. This is not something that we do for others; this is something that we do collectively because our collective security depends on it." In concert with the other Summit participants' pledges, President Obama announced his intention to significantly increase the number of U.S. personnel serving under the UN flag by working to double our contribution of military staff officers serving as individuals or teams in UN missions.

Additional U.S. commitments announced at the Summit are aimed at supporting UN peacekeeping in three key areas. First, to reduce response time and support rapid response, the United States is prepared to offer access to our unparalleled strategic air- and sealift capabilities to support UN deployments in crisis situations. Second, the United States is prepared to provide engineering support, an important enabler of UN operations and another comparative U.S. strength, which could include technical expertise and making available military engineers for specific projects on a project-by-project basis, where there is an urgent need that the United States is uniquely positioned to address. These units would remain under existing policies on U.S. command and control. Third, the United States plans to pre-position defense equipment to accelerate equipping and deployment of personnel to UN and regional peacekeeping operations, essential in crises. The United States will also factor UN and regional peacekeeping needs as a priority in determining which countries receive appropriate U.S. surplus defense equipment.

The United States will endeavor to increase its already substantial contributions to building the capacity of the UN and partner nations that contribute to peace operations in the following areas: in-mission training and mentoring, technology, leadership training, police pre-deployment training and counter-IED training and assessment.

For example, the United States is committing to make available mobile training teams on a case-by-case basis for deployment alongside partners who are contributing forces and deploying into a peace operation. U.S. personnel plan to work directly with UN experts to identify cost-effective technology solutions for needs in countering IEDs, force protection, protection of civilians, collaborative planning, information-led operations, rapid deployment of vanguard forces, and expeditionary logistics. The United States intends to increase its already significant contributions to UN police in peacekeeping by allocating another $2 million – subject to congressional notification – to develop and expand the capability of African partners deploying police personnel, specifically to enhance their ability to meet the challenges of violent extremism in missions such as the one in Mali. The United States is also contributing $2 million

specifically for counter-IED training and intends to offer to deploy U.S. military counter-IED specialists to conduct strategic and operational-level assessments alongside select UN peacekeeping operations. Importantly, these commitments will not require the budgeting of additional funds, as they are all either reimbursable by the UN or funded within existing programs.

In addition, through the GPOI program, the United States is currently helping 50 partner countries and three regional organizations build the capacity to deploy to and effectively perform in UN peacekeeping missions. The GPOI model builds partner countries' training self-sufficiency and supports the development of critically needed enabling capabilities – such as lift, logistics, and medical units. Program activities not only address the short-term requirement of providing capable troops to missions but also provide a lasting foundation to support the peacekeeping needs of the future.

Conclusion

Although we remain focused on the unique opportunity for reform in 2016 and beyond, we should not forget that UN peacekeeping is stronger than it was two decades ago. The UN has improved logistics and sustainment through its Department of Field Support by modernizing its supply chain and asset management systems; it has strengthened lines of communication with headquarters; it has created an inspector-general function to evaluate candidly the UN's performance; it has introduced a capabilities-based reimbursement system for troops; and it has developed a far more integrated approach to crisis situations, drawing on military, police, and civilian tools.

In closing, let me reflect on the budget. The lines of effort I have just described are all critical to ensuring peacekeeping better addresses 21st century challenges. They demonstrate the need for U.S. leadership. And to exercise that leadership, the United States must pay our UN dues in full and on time.

I understand the frustration that many Americans feel with the United States paying a substantial share of the UN's peacekeeping and regular budgets. We agree that the formula should be changed to reflect the realities of today's world. But, until that happens, if we suggest we should pay less and withhold our full dues at this critical moment, we will not only go against our commitments, but we will also dramatically undercut our ability to achieve needed reforms, undermine our leadership and erode our credibility with partners.

This does not mean we should simply sign over a large check and look the other way. On the contrary, as diligent stewards of taxpayer funds, over the last six years, we have pressed hard to improve the cost-efficiency of peacekeeping and to prevent significant new costs. Through U.S.-led reform efforts, the UN has cut the cost per-peacekeeper by roughly 17 percent – that's one-sixth of the cost reduced through efficiencies and streamlining. We have also aggressively fought cost increases, saving hundreds of millions of dollars per year by prevailing on other countries for a more modest increase in the long-frozen reimbursement rate for UN peacekeepers. And we have pressed to streamline and right-size missions where warranted by changing conditions on the ground. In the Ivory Coast, we have cut the number of mandated

troops in half, from around 10,000 to 5,000. In Haiti, we have reduced the number of mandated troops from nearly 9,000 after the 2010 earthquake to just over 2,000 today. We were on course to do the same in Liberia prior to the outbreak of Ebola. These efforts ensure governments do not use peacekeepers as an excuse not to take responsibility for their citizens' own security. And streamlining missions frees up troops and resources that are needed elsewhere.

When the stakes are as high as they are in these conflicts – when shortfalls can result in atrocities committed, communities uprooted, and entire societies split along ethnic or religious lines – getting it right some of the time is not good enough. Peacekeeping must be consistently outstanding. We will keep working with our partners to bring about the kind of reforms upon which the security of millions of people around the world may depend. And we will continue to work relentlessly to make peacekeeping as efficient as possible without undermining its effectiveness, in close coordination with the Congress and especially this critically important Committee.

Thank you.