

STATUS OF U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

—————
SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via the World Wide Web:
<http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, *Chairman*

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
MARCO RUBIO, Florida	BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin	JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware
CORY GARDNER, Colorado	TOM UDALL, New Mexico
TODD YOUNG, Indiana	CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming	TIM Kaine, Virginia
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia	EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio	JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon
RAND PAUL, Kentucky	CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey

TODD WOMACK, *Staff Director*

JESSICA LEWIS, *Democratic Staff Director*

JOHN DUTTON, *Chief Clerk*

CONTENTS

	Page
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator From Tennessee	1
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey	2
Thompson, Hon. Andrea L., Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC	5
Prepared statement	6
Trachtenberg, Hon. David J., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense For Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC	10
Prepared statement	12

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio	41
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez	45
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey	48
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley	53
Responses of Hon. Andrea L. Thompson to Questions Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker	54
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio	55
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez	58
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator Edward J. Markey	60
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Merkley	65
Responses of Hon. David J. Trachtenberg to Questions Submitted by Senator Cory A. Booker	66

STATUS OF U.S.-RUSSIA ARMS CONTROL EFFORTS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2018

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Risch, Rubio, Flake, Gardner, Young, Barrasso, Isakson, Portman, Paul, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Coons, Udall, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, and Booker.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank everybody for being here. I think because we need 11 people to vote, we are going to go ahead and give the opening statements. As soon as we get to 11 folks, we will stop and vote on the noms. Again, I want to thank everybody for their cooperation.

But first, I want to thank our witnesses for being here with us today. We are fortunate to have such an experienced and distinguished panel.

As our members know, this is the fourth in a series of hearings on Russia since July, with today's hearing considering the current status of and prospects for arms control efforts.

The current situation is not encouraging. Out of four agreements, New START, the INF Treaty, the Open Skies Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention, we have significant problems with Russian compliance of three of them.

It should come as no surprise to any of us that Russia has been cheating on its treaties. Vladimir Putin's government has annexed Crimea, occupied parts of Russia, interfered with elections, including our own, used chemical weapons to poison individuals on British soil, and even purportedly hacked U.S. utilities.

Given that record, he is not likely to let treaty commitments get in his way either.

The question we need to ask is what we are going to do. Some argue that we should just walk away from the INF Treaty since Russia has been in blatant violation for several years now. Some think that is exactly what Putin hopes for. The last time we deployed intermediate range missiles to West Germany in 1983, a million people protested. That is exactly the kind of division that

Russian information operations are designed to exploit and to intensify.

As we discussed at our meeting on NATO, it is crucial that we remain unified with our European partners on defense and deterrence issues. On the Open Skies Treaty, we are at an impasse with the Russians. We have not had a flight all year. We can live without that data, but it hurts the 32 other countries that do not have the same alternative resources that we do.

Even with New START, which has succeeded in its objectives so far, we should be realistic about our expectations of where we will be with Russia in 2021 when the treaty expires, unless extended.

Nevertheless, we need to be thinking carefully about the effects of new weapons and technologies on strategic stability between the U.S., Russia, and other nations. Putin has boasted about the hypersonic glide vehicles, nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedoes, and Russian advances in cyber warfare, space, and artificial intelligence. Each of these developments introduces new uncertainties into the deterrence calculations of adversaries and none of them is easy to address from an arms control verification and compliance perspective.

But as we devote our own research and development into these areas, we must consider their potential to encourage risk-taking by any country with access to them.

I hope our witnesses today can not only provide an assessment of the status of current agreements but also offer us some assurance that the State and Defense Departments are considering these emerging arms control challenges.

I also hope we can gain a better understanding of any arms control discussions that took place at the Helsinki Summit and what the prospects may be for future arms control agreements.

With that, I want to thank you again for being here.

I still do not think we have 11, so I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, Senator Menendez.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY**

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening today's hearing as part of a series of hearings on the U.S. policy towards the Russian Federation.

Arms control efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear war and limit Russia's nuclear forces are vital for maintaining and strengthening U.S. national security.

Despite a number of inquiries to the Secretary and others, more than 2 months after President Trump's Helsinki meetings with President Putin, we remain largely in the dark as to what the two leaders discussed or agreed to during their 2-hour closed session. We do know that Russian Ambassador to the United States Anatoli Antonov told reporters that, quote, important verbal agreements were reached at the Helsinki Summit on arms control issues, including preservation of the New START and INF Treaty.

We continue to find ourselves in an incredible situation. The American people, the elected officials in this body, and members of the President's own administration hear more from Russian offi-

cials about alleged agreements that the President is making about critical national security issues.

What constitutes an important verbal agreement? Has the President reached key decisions with Russia on key arms control treaties? If so, why has Congress not been informed about this decision?

Along with many others in this body, I have for many years strongly supported policies to confront Russia for its multiple and ongoing transgressions, including military aggression, malign influence, and repressive policies. I believe that we must develop comprehensive strategies to confront our adversaries that ultimately prioritize the safety and security of the United States and its citizens. This requires being clear-eyed about the threats we face and all the tools our adversaries can wield against us. Constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be a core component of our strategy.

Given the reality of Russia's current nuclear capacity, we must collectively use every diplomatic tool in our arsenal, economic, political, and military, to achieve our goals. The stakes could not be higher.

We have historically negotiated and entered into agreements with our adversaries, recognizing that we are dealing with hostile powers that cannot be trusted. We build in metrics that account for a probability of efforts to deceive and dodge. In high stakes agreements, provisions outlining U.S. intelligence verification and compliance are essential. In the universe of arms control agreements with Russia, we conduct onsite inspections of military bases and facilities. We require data exchanges in order to track the status and make-up of their nuclear forces.

Today we know Russia is violating the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty. If we have evidence that a country is violating international commitments, we must be unequivocal in working through the construction of the agreement to bring them back into compliance. We must never lose sight of our objectives with any arms control agreement: to reduce the risk of catastrophic war and to constrain our adversary's ability to threaten us and our allies.

In assessing the value of an arms control agreement, we must consider whether our participation in the agreement further advances our goals. Would withdrawing or walking away from an agreement strengthen our hand or ultimately leave us without a seat at the table without insight into our adversary's stockpile? Safer or less secure?

Finally, I want to remind our members of some of the history surrounding the Senate's ratification of the New START treaty. When the Senate deliberated New START in 2010, some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, including our esteemed chairman, made it clear that they were willing to vote for the treaty but only as part of a deal that modernized our nuclear forces and infrastructure.

Neither an unconstrained nuclear arms race nor blind faith in arms control agreements serve U.S. national security interests. American security is best served with a strong, credible deterrent that operates within the legally binding, stable, and constrained arms control environment.

I hope the Trump administration fully appreciates this vital linkage. Diminishing, for example, the value of arms control and placing all faith in one-dimensional conceptions of increasing nuclear strength to bring the Russians and the Chinese to heel will result in a far more dangerous strategic environment.

I also want to remind the administration that bipartisan support for nuclear modernization is tied to maintaining an arms control process that controls and seeks to reduce Russian nuclear forces, which inevitably means promoting military and fiscally responsible policies on ourselves. We are not interested in writing blank checks for a nuclear arms race with Russia, and we do not want to step off our current path of stability to wander again down an uncertain road filled with potentially dire consequences.

And the final note I would make, Mr. Chairman—I guess we have enough people now to go ahead and vote—is that I hope that as part of our oversight, which I applaud you for having conducted with these hearings, that we will also get to an opportunity to mark up DASKAA and similar related bills. I think it is important for the Congress to speak about Russia's violations of the international order, certainly the undermining of our election.

And since we have very often in this committee taken up sanctions as part of our overall foreign policy tools, which is one of the critical tools of peaceful diplomacy, I would urge you, Mr. Chairman, to make sure that we also keep jurisdictional opportunities as it relates to that and that we can have a markup that sends a, hopefully, united message to the Russians that we will not tolerate their actions both at home and abroad.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. And thank you for that statement.

I think everyone here understands that depending on how you write a bill and what key phrases you use, it determines which committee it goes to. And we are not giving up jurisdiction on anything, but every committee member has to understand if they want it to come to Foreign Relations, they have to write it a certain way. And I know everybody has mastered that art. I know you did on your bill, and it is a bill that is in this committee. So I thank you for referring to that.

With that, I thank everyone for their cooperation in being here. What I would like to do is recess our hearing and move to a very quick business meeting, if we could. And I thank all of you.

I know that it does not mean much too many of us here in some ways to confirm these nominees. It means a whole lot to them, and it means a tremendous amount to the countries that they are going to. And so I thank you.

[Recess.]

The CHAIRMAN. We will begin again the hearing. And I thank all of those for being here.

You completed your opening statement, I think. So let me move to another part.

Our first witness today is the Honorable Andrea Thompson, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. We had a chance to speak in the back, but thank you so much for being here and sharing your expertise with us.

Our second witness is the Honorable David Trachtenberg, Deputy under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I shared the same with you.

Thank you both.

If you could summarize in about 5 minutes, any written materials you have, without objection, it will be entered into the record. We thank you again for being here. It is an important hearing. And if you could just begin in the order introduced, I would appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. THOMPSON. Good morning, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today to discuss arms control with Russia, a topic that is central to our security and indeed the world's.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, quote, "progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners." End quote. The value of any arms control agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. Russia continues to violate a series of arms control obligations that undermine the trust the United States can place in treaties, including some that have served U.S. and allied security interests for years.

As reflected in the administration's National Security Strategy and echoed in our National Defense Strategy, great power competition is reemerging. We can no longer be complacent in the face of challenges by geostrategic competitors. We need to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage our strategic competition with Russia, and that includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control agreements and their interrelationship with our deterrence and defense requirements.

I will begin with the New START treaty.

In February of this year, both countries confirmed compliance with the treaty's central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and their associated warheads. We are committed to implementing the treaty and ensuring Russia stays in compliance. I know this committee has sought the administration's view of extending the treaty. No decision has been made at this time.

Meanwhile, Russia has persisted in its violation of the INF Treaty through Russia's SSC-8 ground-launched cruise missile program. This administration has utilized new diplomatic, economic, and military measures to pressure Russia to return to compliance. The lack of any meaningful steps by Russia to do so diminishes our hope that it wants to preserve the INF Treaty. As we have said many times, the status quo is unsustainable and our patience is not unlimited.

On chemical weapons, Russia has blocked every effort to compel the Assad regime to stop using chemical weapons. Russia too is a perpetrator of chemical weapons-use with its brazen assassination

attempt against the Skripals in Salisbury, U.K. in March using a Novichok chemical agent.

We recently imposed the first round of sanctions on Russia required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act. We have been clear with Moscow that we will continue to execute our mandate under this law.

Meanwhile, the United States and our NATO allies, as reinforced in the 2018 Brussels declaration, remain committed to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the existing Euro-Atlantic conventional arms control regimes and confidence and security building mechanisms.

The Department of State also continues to lead efforts to push back against Russia's troubling behavior in space. Of particular concern, Russia has launched experimental satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counter-space capabilities.

And finally, I would also note that our sanctions policy is an important tool in maintaining pressure on Moscow to abandon its malign activities. We assess that our global campaign to implement section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, or CAATSA, has denied Russia's defense sector several billion dollars in lost sales as states abandon pending arms deals with Moscow. The Department of State remains committed to the ongoing full implementation of CAATSA section 231.

In all, Russia's destabilizing actions include significant transgressions in its adherence to international obligations, namely, arms control treaties and agreements. This has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question Russia's commitment to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability. Russia must take its commitments more seriously if we are to find the ways to shift our relationship to a more stable path.

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss these critical issues with you, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Thompson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members of the Committee: thank you for hosting this hearing and welcoming me here today. The subject of this hearing —the state of arms control with Russia—is of critical importance to U.S. and allied national security, and a timely issue to discuss with the Committee today.

The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review states, “progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself, and depends on the security environment and the participation of willing partners.” The value of any agreement is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. Russia continues to violate a series of arms control obligations that undermine the trust the United States can place in treaties, including some that have served U.S. and allied security interests for years.

We seek to utilize a strong military deterrent in combination with arms control to maintain strategic stability with Russia. Arms control measures have benefited the United States by providing mutual transparency and predictability, constraining certain weapons of immense destructive potential in the Russian arsenal, and enhancing strategic stability. The Department of Defense concluded in the National Defense Strategy, and as reflected in the Trump Administration's National Security Strategy, that great power competition is reemerging. We need to be creative and flexible in how we approach and manage our strategic competition with Russia, and

that includes an evaluation of where we stand with respect to our arms control agreements, and their interrelationship with our deterrence and defense requirements.

As you know, Russia has taken actions over the past few years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and widened the deficit of trust we have with Russia. Russia has used chemical weapons in the United Kingdom and tacitly approved of the Assad regime's abhorrent use of chemical weapons against its own people—even while protecting that regime from accountability for these atrocities. It has also violated its obligations under the INF Treaty and undertaken aggressive actions in outer space while proposing agreements to constrain others. Russia's response to each of these situations is to employ its standard playbook of distraction, misinformation, and counter-accusations. It has sought to blame the United Kingdom and other European countries for the Salisbury incident and supported Syrian claims alternatively blaming "terrorists," Turkey, and the United States for Assad's years of chemical weapons use. Similarly, Russia has falsely accused the United States of not complying with the INF Treaty in order to distract from its own INF violation. The Trump Administration has challenged Russia's systematic misconduct a number of ways. However, it remains in our interest to maintain strategic stability with Russia, and continue arms control agreements that meet U.S. and allied national interests.

I will briefly touch on a few key issues in our arms control relationship with Russia, and will close with a few remarks regarding the Department's implementation of Section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017.

STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL: NEW START AND INF TREATY

I will start with the New START Treaty. The United States will continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian compliance. We benefit from the Treaty's 18 annual on-site inspections of strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, bases, and infrastructure; the comprehensive biannual data exchanges which record the disposition and numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers; and, the almost 16,000 notifications we have exchanged over the life of the Treaty which give us a good idea of where these nuclear weapons are at a given moment in time. The types of weapons that are accountable and limited under New START make up the gross majority of Russia's current and foreseeable strategic nuclear arsenal.

We are committed to implementing the Treaty and ensuring Russia stays in compliance.

In February of this year, both countries confirmed compliance with the Treaty's central limits on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers and their associated warheads. I know this Committee has sought the Trump Administration's view of extending the Treaty. A decision has not been made at this time. Among issues to consider will be Russia's decision to manufacture compliance issues regarding U.S. weapons, and the uncertainty of whether or not Russia's recently announced strategic nuclear weapons will be held accountable under the Treaty. Any decision on New START will take into context Russia's stance on these issues, its behavior in other arms control agreements, and the security needs of the United States and its allies. And it goes without saying: Russia's continued compliance with New START is a requirement for any potential extension of the Treaty.

Meanwhile, Russia has persisted in its violation of the INF Treaty through Russia's SSC8 ground-launched cruise missile program. The Trump Administration has utilized diplomatic, military, and economic measures to pressure Russia to return to compliance. On the diplomatic front, the Administration has sought dialogue with Russia, both at the expert level in the Special Verification Commission, the implementation body for the Treaty, and in bilateral formats, as well as raising the issue at the political level. We have worked closely with our allies and partners in Europe and in Asia to raise the profile of Russia's violation and continued noncompliance. In the area of military responses, the Department of Defense continues to pursue Treaty-compliant research and development on a ground-based missile system that, if completed, would be noncompliant with INF. This system is designed to be a direct counter to Russia, and the United States has made it clear that we will cease pursuing its development if Russia returns to compliance with the Treaty. On the economic line of effort, the Administration added two entities involved in the SSC-8's development and production, Novator Design Bureau and Titan Central Design Bureau, to the Department of Commerce Entity List in December 2017. This action imposes a license requirement for the export, re-export, or transfer of any items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to these entities. Any such li-

cense applications will be reviewed with a policy of presumption of denial. This prior review will enhance the U.S. ability to prevent the use of items subject to the EAR contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.

The lack of any meaningful steps by Russia to return to compliance diminishes our hope that Russia has any interest in preserving the INF Treaty, despite Moscow's public statements to the contrary. Russia has not acknowledged its violation, although last year it acknowledged for the first time that the missile system in question exists. Russia has not attempted to negotiate in good faith and has done nothing to satisfy our concerns or those of our allies. This complete lack of willingness to engage in a meaningful manner leads us to conclude that Russia has no interest in returning to compliance, which presents a new threat to the security of our allies in Europe and Asia. The fact that the United States complies with the treaty and Russia does not is untenable.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION: SYRIA AND RUSSIA

Regarding chemical weapons issues, Russia's destabilizing behavior is also evident. Russia has stood in the way of every effort the United States, our allies, and our partners have taken to compel the Assad regime to stop using chemical weapons. Russia's actions are a betrayal of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and UN Security Council Resolution 2118, as well as its commitments to the United States as a framework guarantor.

Russia continues these obstructionist actions with current efforts to delegitimize the June 26, 2018 Decision of the Fourth Special Conference of the States Parties. Eighty-two responsible States voted to provide the OPCW Technical Secretariat with additional tools to respond to chemical weapons use, including the means to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons attacks in Syria.

Russia, too, is a perpetrator of chemical weapons use with its brazen assassination attempt against the Skripals in Salisbury, U.K., in March using a novichok chemical agent. Multiple British citizens have been exposed to this same substance as a result of this deplorable attack, one of whom ultimately died from exposure to the military-grade nerve agent. Independent reports issued twice by the OPCW, most recently on September 4, confirmed the U.K. assessment in identifying the chemical nerve agent, novichok. Russia's use of a novichok has made it extraordinarily clear that Russia only eliminated its declared chemical weapons stockpile and further substantiates the U.S. finding that Russia itself is in non-compliance with their obligations under the CWC. Rather than accepting responsibility for its actions and changing its harmful and destructive behavior, Russia offers only denials and counteraccusations to deflect attention from its culpability. No one, including Russia, should think they can murder people with chemical weapons and get away with it. As you know, we imposed the first round of sanctions on Russia required by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. Following the fifteen day Congressional notification, these sanctions took effect on August 22nd. We have been clear with Moscow that we will continue to execute our mandate under this law and that it must take action to disclose its chemical weapons activities. We are under no illusion, however, that Russia will take the steps necessary to rescind these sanctions.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

The United States and our NATO Allies, as reinforced in the 2018 Brussels Declaration, remain committed to preserving, strengthening, and modernizing the existing Euro-Atlantic conventional arms control regimes and confidence and security building mechanisms. We remain concerned about specific compliance and implementation issues that limit full territorial access over Russia—a fundamental Treaty principle. While recently Russia has resolved one violation of its obligations, and has made overtures that suggest it could resolve another, Russia remains unwilling to lift its illegitimate limits on the distance Open Skies Treaty parties can fly over the strategically sensitive region of Kaliningrad. In September 2017, we made clear our commitment to addressing Russia's continued noncompliance with the Treaty when we established several reasonable, treaty-compliant measures designed to encourage Russia to resolve its violations. These measures are in effect and will impact any Russian flights over the United States; they will be reversed if Russia returns to full compliance.

Despite efforts by the United States and our Allies to effect a reversal of Russia's 2007 decision to unilaterally "suspend" its implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the status quo unfortunately persists. The United States does not recognize Russia's "suspension" of the CFE. We continue to hold Russia responsible for its obligations under the Treaty and, as a counter-

measure, together with our Allies and partners have ceased implementing CFE vis-a-vis Russia. Russia's disregard for the Treaty's provision on host-nation consent for the stationing of military forces in places like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is a destabilizing element that challenges the basic underpinnings of the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture. Nonetheless, we believe the Treaty still provides valuable transparency about other military forces in Europe that are of interest to the United States and our Allies and partners.

The United States continues to be a leading voice in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). We are championing, along with many of our Allies, several proposals to modernize the 2011 Vienna Document (VDoc), politically-binding confidence and security building measures that contribute to openness and transparency concerning military forces in Europe. However, since 2014, Russia has been increasingly exploiting gaps in the arrangement, especially with regard to large-scale, short-notice exercises and military activities near its borders. Furthermore, Russia has refused in recent years to engage on these issues and professes to see no current need for enhancing military transparency. The proposals for which we and our Allies are advocating aim to address these activities and increase military transparency. Our goal is to demonstrate the value of the VDoc and the commitment of a majority of OSCE participating States to fulfill existing VDoc measures and to improve the effectiveness of the VDoc to rebuild trust.

SPACE SECURITY

More recently, as the Director of National Intelligence noted in February of this year, Russia is continuing to pursue antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons as a means to reduce U.S. and allied military effectiveness. Russia aims to have nondestructive and destructive counterspace weapons available for use during a potential future conflict. The U.S. intelligence community assesses that, if a future conflict were to occur involving Russia, it would justify attacks against U.S. and allied satellites as necessary to offset any perceived U.S. military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems. Military reforms in Russia in the past few years indicate an increased focus on establishing operational forces designed to integrate attacks against space systems and services with military operations in other domains. In addition, Russian destructive ASAT weapons probably will reach initial operational capability in the next few years, and Russia probably has ground-launched ASAT missiles in development and is advancing directed-energy weapons technologies for the purpose of fielding ASAT weapons that could blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors, such as those used for remote sensing or missile defense.

Of particular concern, Russia has launched "experimental" satellites that conduct sophisticated on-orbit activities, at least some of which are intended to advance counterspace capabilities. Some technologies with peaceful applications—such as satellite inspection, refueling, and repair—can also be used against non-cooperative spacecraft in a hostile fashion.

These activities are occurring in spite of the fact that Russia is continuing to publicly and diplomatically promote international agreements on the nonweaponization of space and "no first placement" of weapons in space. However, the Russian proposals are crafted to allow Russia to continue their pursuit of space warfare capabilities while publicly maintaining that space must be a peaceful domain.

The Department of State continues to lead efforts to push back against Russia's troubling behavior in space and its hypocritical proposals. As Assistant Secretary Pobleto noted at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a little over a month ago, the Russian Ministry of Defense is undertaking outer space activities that appear contrary to the provisions of Russia's own draft treaty and its political commitment not to be the first to place weapons in outer space. She noted that, in October of last year, the Russian Ministry of Defense deployed a space object they claimed was a "space apparatus inspector." But its behavior on-orbit was inconsistent with anything seen before from on-orbit inspection or space situational awareness capabilities, including other Russian inspection satellite activities. Russian intentions with respect to this satellite are unclear and are obviously a very troubling development—particularly, when considered in concert with statements by Russia's Space Force Commander who highlighted that "assimilate[ing] new prototypes of weapons [into] Space Forces' military units" is a "main task facing the Aerospace Forces Space Troops."

CAATSA SANCTIONS

I would also note that our sanctions policy is an important element in maintaining pressure on Moscow to abandon its malign activities, and that Section 231 of

the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017, or CAATSA, is an important tool in our sanctions toolkit and in our strategic competition with Russia. Arms sales are not only an important source of revenue for Moscow, but also a means of maintaining or growing its political and military influence around the world. Ending those sales not only applies pressure to Russia to change its behavior, but also helps to curb Russia's access in places where it seeks to maintain or forge such ties. By mandating sanctions on those who are engaging in significant transactions with Russia's defense and intelligence sectors, CAATSA provides us with leverage in working with our partners and allied states, so that they reduce their military ties to Russia, a country that has become an increasingly unreliable and risky security partner. Thus far, we assess that our global campaign to implement CAATSA has denied Russia's defense sector several billion dollars in lost sales as states abandon pending arms deals with Moscow. The Department of State remains committed to the ongoing full implementation of CAATSA Section 231, including through the imposition of sanctions as appropriate.

CONCLUSION

In all, the destabilizing actions Russia has taken are not isolated to interference in the domestic affairs of the U.S. and allies, its activities in Ukraine and Syria, or threatening our allies and partners in Russia's near-abroad, but include significant transgressions in its adherence to international obligations—namely, arms control treaties and agreements. The value of any agreement to the United States is derived from our treaty partners maintaining compliance with their obligations, and avoiding actions that result in mistrust and the potential for miscalculation. Russia, unfortunately, has created a trust deficit that leads the United States to question its commitment to arms control as a way to manage and stabilize our strategic relationship and promote greater transparency and predictability in how our countries address weapons of mass destruction issues and policies. The more benign environment of much of the post-Cold War period allows us to see that there was a better, more effective way to exist than merely relying solely upon massive nuclear armaments, with huge risks for miscalculation and accidental conflict. Russia's actions in recent years raise the specter of a return to the ugly years of cutthroat arms competition. I hope Russia can be reminded of these lessons in the near future so we can find ways to shift our relationship to a more stable path. I thank you for convening this important hearing, and look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control with Russia.

I will not repeat much of what Under Secretary Thompson has already discussed. The bottom line is that arms control with Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility of all international agreements with Russia is at risk.

The United States is committed to its long-held arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception, miscalculation, and conflict.

The Nuclear Posture Review acknowledges that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself. The current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the con-

text of the broader security environment and must include the participation of willing partners. It is difficult to envision progress in a security environment that is currently threatened by Russia's continuing noncompliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments. In this regard, Russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms control agenda.

It would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold Russia responsible for its violations. As a reliable ally and partner, the United States must advocate for arms control agreements that make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.

With respect to New START, the United States assesses that Russia is in compliance with the New START treaty. Both sides met the New START treaty's central limits in February of this year, and I can assure you that the United States will faithfully implement and verify Russian compliance with the treaty.

Moving forward, the United States will consider whether to extend the New START treaty beyond its February 2021 expiration. Any decision on extending the treaty will and should be based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START treaty remains in our national security interest in light of overall Russian arms control behavior.

On INF, the Russian Federation remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty. We have been more than patient and have provided Russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance, but to no avail.

This administration's determination of Russia's violation is no different than the one first announced in July of 2014. We reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. The evidence is conclusive. The violation is real, and it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of the INF Treaty.

This administration has sought to preserve the viability of the treaty by applying pressure on Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. We believed it was in the national security interest of the United States and in our allies' and partners' interest to preserve the INF Treaty, but we recognize that Russia ultimately would determine whether the INF Treaty remains viable.

One thing is certain. We cannot allow our treaty partner to continue to violate a core tenet of the INF Treaty indefinitely. And we will not let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners.

For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed and evaluated systems it could develop if it were not constrained by the INF Treaty. The identification of these capabilities seeks to remind Russia of why it entered into the INF Treaty in the first place. We appreciate the efforts of Congress to help the Department of Defense implement these research and development efforts.

Regardless of whether Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty, there are broader implications for the future of arms control due to the lack of trust that has been created by Russia. It is difficult to envision a way forward for the United States and Russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level of transparency

that could lead to a brighter future for arms control. The onus to create the conditions for this trust falls on both the United States and Russia, but Moscow will bear the burden should these efforts fail as Russia's actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate the opportunity to testify, the attention of this committee and the rest of Congress to these issues, and we will keep you informed of developments.

Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Trachtenberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the current state of arms control with Russia.

RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

I will not repeat much of what Under Secretary Thompson has already discussed: the bottom-line is that arms control with Russia is troubled because the Russian Federation apparently believes it need only abide by the agreements that suit it. As a result, the credibility of all international agreements with Russia is at risk.

The United States is committed to its long-held arms control, non-proliferation, and nuclear security objectives, particularly our commitment to the goals of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Arms control can contribute to U.S. security by helping to manage strategic competition among states, and we are committed to meaningful arms control that decreases the chances of misperception and miscalculation and avoids destabilizing arms competition. To advance our national security objectives, the United States supports effective arms control that is verifiable, enforceable, and consistent with U.S., allied, and partner security objectives. We are committed to complying with our arms control obligations, and we remain open to considering future arms control opportunities that advance U.S. security interests.

However, the Nuclear Posture Review also acknowledges that progress in arms control is not an end in and of itself. The current security environment makes arms control extremely challenging in the near term. Any future arms control arrangement must be pursued in the context of the broader security environment and must include the participation of willing partners. It is difficult to envision progress in a security environment that is currently threatened by Russia's continuing non-compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments. In this regard, Russia poses a series of challenges that do not lend themselves to conditions suitable for the greater trust necessary to engage in a prudent arms control agenda.

The Russian Federation remains in violation of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. It is also either rejecting or avoiding its obligations under the Conventional Armed

Forces in Europe Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, the Helsinki Accords, and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. In addition, Russia remains in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and is selectively implementing the Vienna Document.

It would be irresponsible to ignore these infractions and not hold Russia responsible for its violations. As a reliable ally and partner, the United States must advocate for arms control agreements that make the world more secure and include the willing participation and compliance of all parties.

RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE NEW START TREATY

The United States assesses that Russia is in compliance with the New START Treaty because it values the predictability and transparency it provides, and also because Russia finds the agreement to be in its interest. Both sides met the New START Treaty's Central Limits in February 2018, and I can assure you the United States will faithfully implement and verify Russian compliance with the treaty.

Moving forward, the United States will consider whether to extend the New START Treaty beyond its February 2021 expiration. Many factors will affect this decision, and there are two I want to talk about today.

The first is Russia's broader approach to arms control. This Administration is concerned about Russia's violations of other agreements and Moscow's lack of will to

address these concerns. As the Nuclear Posture Review made clear, the United States take seriously its role in preserving the value of meaningful arms control, and will only enter into and remain in arms control agreements when they further our national security interests in an increasingly complex security environment. Any decision on extending the Treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START Treaty remains in our national security interest, in light of overall Russian arms control behavior.

A second factor is Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which are not captured under any treaty. Russia is modernizing its active stockpile of up to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons—this is many times the number of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommends countering this threat by advocating pursuit of two supplemental capabilities: the low-yield ballistic missile warhead and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. We have opened the door to future arms control discussions with Russia by stating that we would consider forgoing development of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile if Russia is willing to engage in meaningful discussion on non-strategic nuclear arms control.

RUSSIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE INF TREATY

The Russian Federation remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such missiles. This is a conclusion reached by the previous administration more than four years ago and remains the case today. We have been more than patient and have provided Russia with ample opportunities to come back into compliance, to no avail.

We have worked in diplomatic channels to urge Russia to preserve the INF Treaty. We have sought answers to our questions at all levels, but have received no meaningful response. Russia denies any wrongdoing but offers no explanation in response to the evidence we have presented to Russian officials. Instead, it levies false counter-accusations against the United States in an effort to deflect the world's attention from its violation.

This Administration's determination of Russia's violation is no different than the one first announced in July 2014. We reviewed the intelligence and came to the same conclusion as our predecessors. The evidence is conclusive. Russia possesses a missile system, the SSC-8, in direct violation of the INF Treaty. Russia has tested this ground-based system well into the ranges covered by the INF Treaty, produced it, and fielded it. The violation is real, and it goes against the core purpose and restrictions of the INF Treaty.

In responding to this gross breach of the Treaty, this Administration has sought to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty by applying pressure on Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. We believed it was in the national security interest of the United States and in our allies and partners' interest to preserve the INF Treaty, but we recognized that Russia ultimately would determine whether the INF Treaty remains viable. Our response has also focused on preparing the United States for a world without the INF Treaty. We would prefer that Russia cease its noncompliant activity, and eliminate all INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable manner. By doing so, it can preserve the INF Treaty. One thing is certain. We cannot allow our Treaty partner to continue to violate a core tenet of the INF Treaty indefinitely, and we will not let our actions or inaction occur at the expense of our security or that of our allies and partners.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RESPONSE TO RUSSIA'S INF TREATY VIOLATION

For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed and evaluated systems it could develop if it were not constrained by the INF Treaty. This is the Department of Defense's (DoD's) portion of the U.S. Integrated Strategy implemented in the last half of 2017 to respond directly to Russia's violation of the INF Treaty. DoD has identified a number of conventional ground-launched capabilities that it could develop if no longer bound by the INF Treaty—as a means to pressure Russia to return to compliance with its obligations. The identification of these capabilities seeks to remind Russia of why it entered into the INF Treaty in the first place. Such systems could also fill potential gaps in our military capabilities caused, in part, by Russia's violation. The INF Treaty prevents us from possessing and testing these types of missile systems, and we have no intention of doing so while the United States is still bound by the INF Treaty, but it does not prevent us from conducting general research and development. We cannot sit idle while Russia makes a mockery of international agreements at the expense of our security and that of our allies and partners.

We appreciate the efforts of Congress to help the Department of Defense implement these research and development efforts. Together, we are sending a strong message to Russia and any other country violating its obligations: Your actions will result in consequences that will make you less secure, not more. Not complying with agreements unilaterally may provide you some short-term gain, but it will result in long-term costs.

Regardless of whether Russia returns to compliance with the INF Treaty, there are broader implications for the future of arms control due to the lack of trust that has been created by Russia. It is difficult to envision a way forward for the United States and Russia to rebuild that trust and achieve a level of transparency that could lead to a brighter future for arms control. The onus to create the conditions for this trust falls on both the United States and Russia, but Russia will bear the burden should these efforts fail, as Russia's actions created the situation we currently find ourselves in. We support the State Department's "Creating the Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament" approach, which aims to develop "effective measures" to increase confidence and trust, thus beginning to create the conditions for future arms control.

RUSSIAN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

Russia also continues to violate or avoid its obligations with regard to conventional arms control agreements and confidence and security building measures. Most fundamentally concerning is Russia's continued occupation and illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, as well as its arming, training, and fighting alongside anti-government forces in eastern Ukraine. These actions undermine the most basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which are reaffirmed in the Vienna Document.

Russia selectively implements the Vienna Document, and has both failed to report required data about its military forces located in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine, and has improperly reported and failed to report major land and air equipment. Since 2015, Russia has also blocked reasonable updates to the Vienna Document that would provide basic transparency on its exercises.

Russia also continues to be in violation of its obligations under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces (CFE) in Europe. There remains no CFE Treaty basis for Russia's 2007 suspension of CFE Treaty implementation.

Finally, Russia remains in violation of its Open Skies Treaty obligations. The United States and other treaty parties have engaged in years of diplomatic efforts with Russia to resolve concerns about its non-compliance, but to no avail. In June 2017, the United States declared Russia in violation of the Open Skies Treaty and in September 2017 imposed a number of Treaty-compliant, reversible response measures to encourage Russia's return to full compliance with its Treaty obligations. Those efforts continue today, with the support of our allies and partners.

CONCLUSION

We appreciate the attention of this Committee and the rest of the Congress to these issues, and we will keep you informed of developments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for your opening comments and your service.

As is the norm, I am going to turn to our ranking member and withhold my time for interjections. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. And, Mr. Chairman, before I go to questions, I just want to make a comment.

The question of how we wrote DASKAA as not for just jurisdictional purposes. It was written in a way to be comprehensive enough to deal with all of Russia's malign activities. So I do not want you to think that it was just a strategic purpose.

Let me just ask both of you. On the topic of arms control, can you tell us what was discussed during the 2-hour closed meeting with President Trump and President Putin?

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator.

I cannot tell you the specifics of what was discussed in Helsinki. I can tell you that arms control was a topic of conversation.

We have since had dialogue with our Russian counterparts last month, in August. NSA Bolton met with his counterpart. Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Pompeo have had multiple discussions, and I have had discussions as well. So arms control remains a dialogue—

Senator MENENDEZ. As the Russian Ambassador said, verbal agreements. Did verbal agreements get entered into, and if so, what are they?

Ms. THOMPSON. I am not aware of any agreements other than continuing to dialogue, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. So it was discussed. And you know this by virtue of what?

Ms. THOMPSON. I know it was discussed based on feedback through senior representatives in the State Department.

Senator MENENDEZ. Senior representatives. Can you define that for me?

Ms. THOMPSON. Discussions of those that were in attendance at the debrief with Ambassador Huntsman.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask, is there anything different that you can add to that, Mr. Trachtenberg?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No, Senator. I am unaware of any agreements that were reached.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree that Congress has given the directive that links our nuclear modernization program with maintaining a strategic arms control process?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I agree that both are indeed important.

Senator MENENDEZ. But do you agree that Congress has basically set that forth as a link?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I agree that that was part of the discussion in the ratification debate over the New START treaty—

Senator MENENDEZ. If New START disappears and the limitations on Russian forces lapse, what would the implications be for U.S. national security and that of our allies?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I am sorry, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. If New START disappears and the limitations on Russian forces lapse, what would be the implications for U.S. national security and that of our allies?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. From the Department of Defense perspective, I can tell you that that is one of the issues that we are currently considering both within the interagency and with our allies and partners as well.

Senator MENENDEZ. But you cannot give this committee at this point in time any sense of the consequences of that?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would say, Senator, that the issue of New START, which runs until 2021, is an issue that we are very much engaged in in terms of consultations and in terms of implications. You are exactly correct—

Senator MENENDEZ. So would we require a much larger and more expensive force?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I cannot say that at this time.

Senator MENENDEZ. Wait a minute. This worries me. The Department of Defense is the one that always supposedly plans ahead. They do not wait for a situation to happen and then figure out what you are going to do. So you must be thinking as a contin-

gency that if New START lapses and there is no follow-on, clearly to say—what do we do then? You do not believe that it would require a larger and more expensive nuclear force?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, the implications of whether New START continues or whether it lapses are still under discussion. The Department of Defense plans for all kinds of contingencies and considers—

Senator MENENDEZ. I find it incredible that you cannot tell this committee at this point in time what the possibilities would mean. I do not think it takes a rocket scientist to figure that out.

Let me ask you, Ms. Thompson. Let me go through a series of statements here.

In congressional testimony, senior military officials such as Air Force General John Hyten, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command responsible for all nuclear forces, and Vice Chairman General Paul Silva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have voiced enthusiastic support for the New START treaty.

So let me go through a series of questions. If you can just give me a simple yes or no.

Can the United States meet all of our current deterrence requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels of the New START treaty? Yes or no?

Ms. THOMPSON. We are currently meeting obligations, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. I am sorry?

Ms. THOMPSON. We are currently meeting our obligations.

Senator MENENDEZ. So the answer is yes, that we can meet our requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels of the New START treaty.

Ms. THOMPSON. Again, Senator, we have met our central limits, and so we are meeting our obligations.

Senator MENENDEZ. But, you know, the reason we have witnesses here is to give us answers to the questions that we pose. That is not the question I posed to you.

Let me try another one. These are relatively simple.

Does the New START treaty force the United States to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization efforts? Yes or no?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would say no.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Now, does this New START treaty limit in any way our missile defenses? Yes or no?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would defer to the Department of Defense, sir.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No, Senator. It does not.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you agree that the New START treaty meets the standard put forward in the Nuclear Posture Review for arms control treaties and that it fosters transparency, understanding predictability in relations with Russia, thereby reducing the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would say the transparency and verification requirements in the New START treaty are a benefit.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Let me try one more time. My time has expired.

Do you believe that it meets the standard—the New START treaty meets the standard put forward in our Nuclear Posture Review?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, I believe it meets the requirements we have today.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to use the first minute of my time to say that having written the two amendments myself with both missile defense and modernization, that there was a connection. In the resolution of ratification, we made sure that while we were going to reduce the amount of warheads and our ability to deliver them, we also wanted to modernize because there was a huge savings in not keeping this massive inventory spread throughout our country and not knowing whether they actually operate or not, a huge savings in going ahead and modernizing. So the two worked hand in hand.

We passed those amendments on the floor. I actually gave other people's names on them trying to draw them onto the treaty, in some cases successful; in some cases, not.

But there was no doubt a tie between the two, and it has been very important. The essence of this is that the modernization piece and the reduction in warheads piece go hand in hand. So I mean, I think that is self-evident and has been central to the entire agreement.

With that, Senator Paul.

Senator PAUL. Thank you for your testimony.

Ms. THOMPSON, you mentioned that there are ongoing discussions with the Russians both at your level and the level of the National Security Council Director, as well as the Secretary of State.

Do we also have some sort of permanent organization? Did the treaty set up some kind of structure where there is ongoing like—where each side can express their contention that the other side is in violation of treaty? Is there an actual body of people who meet regularly?

Ms. THOMPSON. There are, Senator. For example, with the INF Treaty, we have had, during my time here, one experts meeting. During the course of the administration, there have been two experts meetings. We have the BCC, or the Bilateral Consultative Commission, that gets together on the New START. So each treaty has an organization of experts within our respective governmental representatives that meet.

Senator PAUL. So when we brought forward—and are these separate sort of agencies or entities? Does the INF Treaty organization have one for disputes and then New START has one? Are they different? Is it all together, or how does it work?

Ms. THOMPSON. For the State Department, those representatives all come under my purview in different bureaus, but their experts reside within the State Department, also with partners with DOE, Department of Defense as well.

Senator PAUL. So you said you met once in the last year—that group?

Ms. THOMPSON. For the INF experts meeting.

Senator PAUL. And then there will be another meeting coming up that is scheduled, or what?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. They are fairly regular, regular in the sense that some of the treaties are annually, some are biannually,

some are in conjunction with other conferences. But we have an open line of communication for each of the treaties.

Senator PAUL. So we believe them to be in violation of the INF Treaty. They also complain and say some of our launchers are in violation as well.

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct.

Senator PAUL. Do you think that this can be worked out through discussion, that we are at a point where there could be a resolution of these things, that both sides might have to give a little bit on this? Or do we just acknowledge that there is no way we are in violation of anything?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have not had progress thus far. I would say that we have an interagency process that is looking through that now on what are some of the options that we have available.

Senator PAUL. But it seems to me—and a lot of this is very detailed whether or not something technically is in violation or not—that it seems like an openness to having an ongoing discussion is important.

Now, both of you acknowledged that the New START treaty we are in compliance with. And yet, both of you—it seemed to be the tenor is that you are very concerned could we even go forward because they are in violation of so many other treaties, the INF, etc.

And I guess my only concern is that with the Iran agreement, everybody kept saying they are in compliance with the Iran agreement. Iran is in compliance. But we were still unhappy about other things Iran was doing. And I think there are some similarities here. Many of us think the New START treaty was an advantage and that it brought down the threat of nuclear weapons—we have less nuclear weapons—and that there were good things that came from New START. I guess my concern is that we could be throwing all of that out and saying, well, they are violating the INF or they are violating this, you know, Conventional Forces Treaty and all these other treaties, and we do not like all the stuff they are doing, which is true. But I worry that we then just throw the New START treaty out.

And so I hope that people will think about—we try to get the best that we can and we negotiate from a position of strength. But I am concerned that we would just say, simply, just start over. And it is not always that easy. I think the Iran agreement will actually be very difficult to start again from the very beginning. You know, instead of starting with what are we complying on and going to our differences, let us don't throw everything out. Let us start with what we are complying on. If New START is working, maybe we then look at the INF.

That is the only caution that I would have in looking at this and also just to say that, at least our office, we are very interested in what goes on with these and would like to have you come in and talk to some more to us about how the meetings are going, what the differences are, and what the possibilities of resolving things are.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Cardin.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank our witnesses.

Ms. Thompson, I think the understatement in your written statement about Russia has taken actions over the past few years that have posed real challenges to our bilateral relationship and widened the deficit of trust we have Russia. I think all of us would say that that is a major concern.

And we look at our relationship with Russia on the nuclear front, and we recognize that New START gives us the opportunity to do the inspections not only on active sites but also those sites that are not active. So we really do get to see with our own people what is going on in Russia, which is extremely valuable.

We also have the fact that Russia is in compliance, we are in compliance with the New START treaty.

And then as Senator Paul has said, we know in INF that Russia is in violation with what they have developed on land-based missiles. And you are using the enforcement mechanisms under the INF and diplomacy, which I strongly agree, and not withdrawing from the INF, which I think would be a disaster because it would only isolate us more from what Russia is doing. And we have taken countermeasures through a submarine-based defense system in regards to what Russia is doing on land. So we are taking our steps in compliance with the INF in order to make sure that we are secure.

My point is that in response to Senator Menendez's question, I was surprised that I did not hear a stronger statement as to the national security importance of both the New START and INF. We know North Korea has a nuclear program. What we do not know is the specifics because we do not have inspections. We do not have eyes on the ground. We do not know exactly what is going on in that country.

And, yes, we have international inspections now of Iran, but not with the United States' participation. So we are somewhat limited in understanding what is going on in Iran.

But at least with Russia, we have that capacity to understand their program because of the New START treaty.

We know this administration has a way of surprising us at times with statements made by the President. So that is one of the reasons we had this hearing.

So I would like to get both of your views as to the national security importance to the United States in these tough times with Russia to be able to get our inspectors over in Russia working with theirs, understanding their nuclear program, the importance of that to the United States national security.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator Cardin, if I could.

As I stated, I do believe that the verification and monitoring and onsite inspection provisions provide a level of openness and transparency that is useful and beneficial not just to the United States but to our allies as well.

That said, what I find particularly troubling is the overall nature of Russian arms control behavior and what the Russians seem to be doing in terms of selectively complying with various provisions of treaties and selectively non-complying with others when they feel it is not in their interest. It is that overall kind of behavior

that I think from a national security perspective we at least need to consider.

Senator CARDIN. I do not disagree with that at all. I agree with what you are saying.

My concern is that sometimes we do knee-jerk reactions in this administration and that if we give up our ability to be able to have our inspectors in Russia, because of a violation of the INF, it leads to the end of New START. I think it is not in our national security interest to do that. And I was hoping to get a little bit broader of a response from you as to the importance of our current relationship with Russia on nuclear as it relates to the transparency that you referred to, which is clearly in our interest.

We can counter their violations without pulling out of the agreement. We have already done that in INF. Modernization programs, as the chairman pointed out—we can still do that. We can do our missile defense, and we are not in violation of New START or INF. So we can stay in compliance with the treaties without pulling out.

Yes, we are not satisfied where Russia is today. We have mechanisms to try to counter that through direct enforcement mechanisms within the agreements, as well as our own nuclear program and our own defense programs, in order to counter what Russia is doing. Is that not a fair statement?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think you are exactly correct that we do have mechanisms, indeed. Where I might differ somewhat, Senator, is I believe we are taking a deliberate approach to our assessment of all of these treaties, including the New START treaty. I do not see this as a rush to judgment on the part of the administration's perspective on this. And I think it is perfectly legitimate and appropriate for us to weigh all of the potential—look at all of the potential implications.

Senator CARDIN. I agree with you, but we have a specific responsibility as an independent branch of government and this committee particularly on foreign policy. And I think the American people need to understand how important these treaties are to our national security.

And I respect that you are going through a deliberative process. I really do. But we have seen this administration do things that have not been under a deliberative process, decisions made by our President. And it is important that we have a publicly established record as to the importance of these treaties as it relates to America's national security. And I wish you would be a little bit bolder as to the importance of us maintaining those types of relationships.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. I want to follow up on what Senator Cardin just said and Senator Menendez a minute ago because I think this is an important point. It is for me.

When I came to the Senate and came to the Foreign Relations Committee, the first legislation of any import at all was the New START treaty, and I got very involved in it because of, I think, the responsibility it put on me because of everything else we dealt with, that was the most important thing we could do: arms control, verification, limitations of arms with us and Russia. And so I got

really into the weeds, probably too deep for a real estate salesman to be able to comprehend. But I did anyway.

And I finally voted for it, and I did so because it was clearly evident there was no other agreement that we were into with any other adversary or potential adversary or ally in the world that had better verification, better mandated access for the United States of America, and better access for them than us. Am I right on that?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would agree with that, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. I want to carry that forward.

When we did this—the mess we did with Iran here that, as Ben said, did not have any verification, or the verification said we could not verify on military bases and things of that nature. It had gaping holes in it, which is why I voted against it or wanted to vote against it because it just did not add anything to our country's security whatsoever. It diminished it in comparison to what we agreed to with Russia on the START treaty.

So my point is—and I understand, Secretary, you do not want to give away negotiating positions with the Russians. When you answer his question or my question about the START treaty, you do not want to say anything that would cede a point you might have to negotiate in negotiations.

But I too agree with what he said. We ought to be a little bit more pro continuing the benefits the START treaty gives us rather than getting the idea there might be some way we can get out of it because I think knowledge and access is tremendous. We have no-notice access. We have Russians in the United States who have access to come inspect our sites, us in Russia. We have a unique hologram system on the warheads so we can count the warheads and what they can do and where they are. We can catch them. They can catch us.

I mean, if we had insisted at the table with the Iranians, we have a treaty on nuclear weapons with Russia, the two largest nuclear powers in the world. We want to put those verifications in our agreement with you, Iran. Iran, you will be able to inspect ours and we want to be able to come in and inspect yours, unfettered. There was a perfect predicate to do that. Secretary Kerry decided not to do it in that way, but it would have been a great way to get that foot in the door.

So all I am trying to say is when you get worried about compromising your future by talking about what you might get out of if you did not like it, you run the risk of letting them think they could get out from under the responsibility it puts on them, and they would be a lot more willing to take advantage of it than we would. I just wanted to make that point.

Second point. I would like both of you to answer this question. On the Space Force, when the Vice President announced the Space Force and the President announced the Space Force—and you acknowledged some of the experimentation the Russians have done in space of a defensive nature, but potentially offensive as well—would you equalize the Space Force enthusiasm that you have seen so far in our government today to be equal to what was the missile defense system of the Reagan administration?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator Isakson, I do not think we are currently considering a missile defense capability similar to what was proposed during the Reagan administration.

But in terms of the Space Force, the Department of Defense is certainly committed to going forward and implementing the vision expressed by the President and the Vice President also in terms of moving out expeditiously and appropriately to develop those capabilities given the importance of space to our national defense.

Senator ISAKSON. I was hoping that was going to be your answer because when you had addressed it in your remarks—and I have seen some of the other pieces and read some of the stuff about it—the Space Force is the modern day answer to the missile defense system that Reagan used. Reagan used missile defense as an idea for the future. It scared the hell out of the Russians and in fact led to their spending on defense, which put them in the difficulty they fell into in the early 1990s when they did it.

So I think having the Space Force recognized as a future addition to our defense or offense militarily and diplomatically is as equally good a potential tool as missile defense was in its infancy and has been since. And I applaud the administration's boldness in doing that, and I hope it will be something that is a meaningful tool and not a paper tiger.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you both for being here to testify this morning.

I want to go back to the INF Treaty because you both pointed out Russia's violation. I agree with Senator Cardin's point that it is not in our interest to withdraw from the INF Treaty. I do not think that helps solve the Russia problem.

But what other options are being considered to try and push the Russians to again comply with the INF Treaty? Are there things that you can talk about that have been looked at that we might not yet have tried?

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator.

I can assure you that we have used diplomatic means. We have used economic means. Through DOD, we have used military means to try to wield them back into compliance, fulfill their obligations that they set out when they signed the treaty.

Senator SHAHEEN. So can you discuss the specifics of what those diplomatic and military means are?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would prefer to tell you that we are in an inter-agency process now and looking at it holistically throughout the Russia strategy. I would not want to get into specifics as yet because we are still in the developmental stages of that.

Senator SHAHEEN. And so do I take from that that we are actually considering options that have not been tried yet?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, ma'am. That would be a fair assessment.

Senator SHAHEEN. The Nuclear Posture Review—I guess this is for you, Ambassador Trachtenberg. It claims that the other nuclear armed states have modernized their nuclear arsenals far more extensively than the United States so that both China and Russia

have. Do you share that view, and what do we need to do in order to be able to catch up to both of them if we are behind?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I do, Senator. Certainly in the case of Russia, which is the focus of our discussion today, the Russians have for years been engaged in a very extensive strategic modernization program not only of their strategic nuclear forces and systems but of their non-strategic nuclear weapons and systems as well that has, I would argue, far outpaced what the United States has done to date.

I agree with the earlier comments that were made in terms of the importance of the U.S. modernization program. Over the years, we have reduced the levels of our nuclear stockpile by some 85 percent since the height of the Cold War, but we do need to pursue the modernization program that has been referred to earlier. The United States has not built a new nuclear weapon in many, many years. Russia we know has. China has. Other nuclear weapon states have. So I do see a discrepancy there, and I would completely agree with the conclusions reached in the Nuclear Posture Review.

Senator SHAHEEN. So one of the things that Senator Corker pointed out was that part of the agreement around New START was the modernization piece, but the idea was that we would continue to modernize. And I think there is some funding in the current appropriations and authorization in the NDAA bill that were passed that would allow us to look at some other modernization capabilities. But they were also supposed to go hand in hand with continued efforts to reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

Can you talk about what has been done in the last 20 months of this administration that would point to efforts to further reduce nuclear weapons?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, I can tell you, Senator, that we have reduced to the point where we are in compliance with all of our arms control obligations, in particular the New START totals which have put, of course, limitations on three systems, the number of deployed strategic weapons, the number of deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the ICBMs, bombers, and submarines, as well as the total number of deployed and non-deployed systems. So we have taken those obligations seriously.

Senator SHAHEEN. And so can you talk about how much of that has been done since the current administration took office?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I do not have the figures in front of me. I would be happy to take that for the record and get back to you.

Senator SHAHEEN. That would be great. Thank you. If you would share it with the entire committee, that would be helpful.

[Information not available at the time of print]

Senator SHAHEEN. Last week, it was reported that the United States refused to certify the new Russian Tu-214 aircraft for flights under the treaty on Open Skies. We were the only one of 23 nations to vote no. I think this is probably for you, Ms. Thompson. Can you talk about why we took that position?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, Senator. We had technical experts along with over 20 other countries on the certification for the Russian sensor. We did not fail to certify. We came back and had to consult with some additional technical experts, and I would anticipate we

will have a decision on that within the next 24 hours. We have not certified. We will have a decision in the next 24 hours.

Senator SHAHEEN. I am out of time, but if we think we should not certify this aircraft, will we not also argue with some of our allies and those other 23 nations that they also should not certify it?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, ma'am. There is a set process on those deliberations, but again, within the next 24 hours, you will have an answer for the certification.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you, both of you, for what you do. I think it has been said several times here today that what you do is some of the most important work that our country does as far as our national security and keeping us safe.

Having said that, trying to negotiate with people who are not negotiating in good faith is a problem. And so you both have a heavy lift ahead of you. I was one of the ones—indeed, I led the effort—to not ratify the New START not because I do not believe we should deal with the Russians. I think we have to deal with the Russians. I just, as I think a lot of us today, do not have any confidence whatsoever that they are dealing in good faith. They are serial cheaters. They are serial liars. And you have to look at the other things that they are doing in the world to judge what kind of a mind these people have as far as whether they are acting in good faith.

So having said that, the reason I opposed the original New START was simply because I believed that it did not give us the inspections, the confidence that we needed to get to where we wanted to be. I thought there was more we could do. Obviously, we cannot talk about it here, there are covert things that we can do to verify in addition to the things that are included in the treaty, and they do the same thing.

But having said that, as we look forward to renegotiating the treaty when it expires, are there preparations being made as to how we could ratchet up our game as far as being able to verify the things that we suspect and probably know in some instances that they are doing that we cannot even tell them that we know because it would disclose methods and sources? Is there a thought process going into this as to how we are going to up our game, Ms. Thompson?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, Senator. There is a rigorous interagency process ongoing. All options are on the table as we bring in technical expertise on what we know, what we do not know, how we can fill those gaps, again diplomatically from our end, militarily from the Defense Department, economically from our agencies as well. What are things that have not been tried before? What are some options? And that process is ongoing.

Senator RISCH. Mr. Trachtenberg, do you have anything to add to that?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, I would agree with that, Senator. I would also agree with your earlier comments as well in terms of the New START treaty.

I would make this point. Of course, when the New START treaty was negotiated in 2010, at the time we had hoped that it would sort of represent a new relationship with the Russian Federation and would lead to broader cooperation on a number of fronts.

Since that time, what we have seen is a clear deterioration of our relationship with Russia. Though we would like the situation to be different, in fact, I believe to use Ranking Member Menendez's words earlier, we must be clear-eyed about the threats that we face. This administration is trying to be just that in looking at arms control in the context of our overall relationship with Russia.

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you. I am glad to hear that that is the view.

You are absolutely right about the deterioration, and that deterioration should make us think about how we are going to approach this as we go forward in trying to renegotiate.

In addition to the other things that they have done, the poisonings and everything else that they have done, watching them manufacture excuses as to why they are not complying, manufacture accusations against us that we are not complying on certain things really cries out to have us up our game in how we are going to approach this on a New START treaty.

So, again, thank you for your work, and I hope we will approach it differently this time than we did last time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for being here.

Secretary Trachtenberg, part of the support for ratifying the New START—I want to focus a little on that that others have talked about—was that it allowed certain weapons to be updated while also achieving overall reduction in the number of arms both the United States and Russia possess. The national labs located in my home state of New Mexico play a vital role in fulfilling these updates or life extension programs. President Trump has said he wants to strengthen and expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal.

Now, while certain life extension programs are allowed under New START, building new weapons and not drawing down the overall number of weapons in our arsenal would go against the treaty.

Can you clarify the President's position on what he means by strengthen and expand?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, Senator, I believe the best articulation of our policy with respect to our nuclear arsenal going forward can be found in the Nuclear Posture Review that was released in January. And I think what we are talking about, as I mentioned previously, was—

Senator UDALL. Could you focus on the strengthen and expand? If it was in the Nuclear Posture Review, tell me what we mean.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. What the Nuclear Posture Review said specifically was that what we are looking to do is to have a modern, resilient, and capable nuclear force that is capable of effectively deterring attack or aggression against the United States or our interests. I want to be very clear about this. What we are looking at in

connection with our nuclear forces is to preserve the efficacy of our deterrence capability. This is all about deterrence, and the Nuclear Posture Review I believe makes that clear. And so all of our efforts related to modernization of our capabilities, while we, in fact, proceed with the necessary reductions of older systems, are done with a view toward maintaining the efficacy of our overall nuclear deterrent. That is job number one.

Senator UDALL. Now, we talked earlier about the meeting in Helsinki between President Trump and Russian President Putin. What specific arms control issues were discussed there?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, I know that the topic writ large was raised. My belief is, as I have been briefed, the specifics were not addressed. It was in general terms of the importance of two nuclear capable countries that we need to remain open to dialogue between our respective teams to ensure that the obligations are met.

Senator UDALL. Now, in August, a Russian document listing arms control topics for discussion at the July summit between President Trump and President Putin was leaked to the press. According to the document, Putin spoke with President Trump about extending New START for 5 years and about reaffirming commitment to the INF Treaty.

Can you confirm whether or not Putin raised these topics with President Trump?

Ms. THOMPSON. I cannot, Senator.

Senator UDALL. Can you?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No, Senator, I cannot.

Senator UDALL. When you talked about—the knowledge you had was from the briefing that the ambassador had. You were not given any instructions with regard to those.

Ms. THOMPSON. Correct, Senator.

Senator UDALL. Were there any tasks that came out from the meeting with the ambassador to say these are the things we have to do flowing out of the summit?

Ms. THOMPSON. I did not receive any specific taskings. No, sir.

Senator UDALL. What is the status of DOD's research and development on conventional ground-launched intermediate range missile systems?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, we are continuing to work on the research and development based on the congressional guidance that we received, which we very much appreciate. I believe there has been about \$48 million that has been set aside for research and development of the conventional ground-launched cruise missile. The research and development portion of that is entirely compliant with the INF Treaty. If we were to go forward and actually deploy such a system, then that would be non-compliant with the INF Treaty. But no decision, of course, has been made at this time.

Senator UDALL. How much money has DOD spent on this effort to date?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would have to get you the exact figures.

Senator UDALL. Could you do that for the record, please?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Absolutely.

[Information not available at the time of print]

Senator UDALL. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator RUBIO.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you both for being here.

In that March speech, Vladimir Putin unveiled these new weapons. He referred to them over a dozen times as strategic, at least in the Kremlin's English translation. And these new kinds of nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles, nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines.

Under Secretary Thompson, I am glad that you acknowledged in your prepared testimony that the U.S. has to reckon with—and I quote—I think this is right out of your statement—whether or not Russia's recently announced strategic nuclear weapons will be held accountable under—end quote—the New START treaty.

So let me ask just to clarify. Is it the position of the United States that we consider the weapons that were previewed in the speech that are under development that he announced in March, the hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles, the nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, the 100 megaton nuclear torpedo shot from drone submarines, and the like—do we consider those to be strategic nuclear weapons covered under the START treaty?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, I would defer to my technical experts for the firm answer on that. My initial read is they would count as strategic weapons.

Senator RUBIO. Can I ask, have the Russians notified any of these new kinds of strategic nuclear arms featured in that speech to the Bilateral Consultative Commission?

Ms. THOMPSON. They have not been raised through the formal process. No, sir.

Senator RUBIO. Have we asked them to do so?

Ms. THOMPSON. Not to my knowledge, but I can check again on what occurred. So I read the results from the INF technical experts meeting. That was not raised, and we have not had discussions on specifics of New START.

Senator RUBIO. So as far as you know, no one yet has raised with the Russians from our side we saw your speech, we saw what you are talking about developing, we believe that needs to be notified.

Ms. THOMPSON. Those were not notified. The only way we have seen those is in the open press that you—

Senator RUBIO. No. I know they have not been notified. Has anyone from our government asked them, expressed to them our belief that it is their obligation to notify based on what we saw them describe?

Ms. THOMPSON. I have not done so, Senator.

Senator RUBIO. Why not?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have not had the engagement on New START with my counterpart. But I will take that back and—

Senator RUBIO. Your counterpart on the Russian side.

Ms. THOMPSON. Correct.

Senator RUBIO. But beyond that, there are other ways beyond that. You are saying there has been no engagement at all whatsoever. There are not other channels by which this could be raised even through a public statement of some sort?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have had engagement, Senator, but because it was in an unofficial press report and not through official channels, we still have some intelligence to gather on that to confirm/deny. As we have seen before——

Senator RUBIO. Well, it was Putin's speech. That is pretty official.

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, as we have seen before from the rhetoric from President Putin, what he says is not necessarily ground truth.

Senator RUBIO. Yes. I am not saying whether or not some of this was built on hyperbole or not. My point is he gave a speech, he described these weapons. You would think that someone in the United States Government would say to them, hey, we saw the speech by your Putin guy, and if that is true, you need to notify that. That would violate START.

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, we are taking action on it. We have not done it through the formal New START process with our counterparts.

Senator RUBIO. Well, it does not sound like any action has been taken yet in regards to that.

Ms. THOMPSON. We have taken action, Senator, within our own community not through the formal process.

Senator RUBIO. You mean you have talked to each other about it.

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, as a former intelligence officer of 28 years, we have a practice of information is not necessarily intelligence until it is confirmed. So we are working with our agencies and partners and allies to confirm if that information——

Senator RUBIO. I am not saying we should tell them, hey, we know you have something. All I am saying is he gave a speech. He described a series of weapons that, if they were developed at any point in the future, would fall under the START treaty as a strategic weapon. And you would think someone would say, hey, we saw your speech. We are not saying we think it is real or not real, but if that is real, you understand that needs to be notified. And you are saying we have not yet done that.

Ms. THOMPSON. I am saying that we have looked at it internally. I have not met with my counterpart on that discussion, but I will take that back for consideration.

Senator RUBIO. All right.

Let me ask about INF real quick. The treaty puts limits on us in other theaters outside of Europe and with other competitors in particular, especially China, that are not covered by it. So I do not know who this question is appropriately to, but does the INF Treaty, as currently structured, begin to put us at a strategic disadvantage with respect to China, particularly the Indo-Pacific region?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, you raise a good point, and I think that is indeed one of the questions that we are looking at in terms of the overall implications of remaining in compliance with the treaty which the Russians are in clear violation of.

Senator RUBIO. I guess my last question is as far as violating the INF Treaty, it should not be surprising. It is our official position that they are in violation of the INF Treaty. That is correct. Okay.

And it should not be surprising—has it not been widely reported now that the Russians have openly both displayed in exercises and through statements made by military officials a doctrine of escalate to deescalate, including the use in their doctrine of tactical nuclear weapons in the battlefield in essence in order to elevate or in order to exacerbate a crisis in order to escalate it in order to then deescalate it. A nuclear strike on the battlefield—everybody would stop and it would allow them—so the violation of the INF Treaty and the use of intermediate weapons would be fully consistent with that new doctrine. Would it not?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would believe it would be, Senator. Absolutely correct. That is why I believe it is important that we consider why the Russians are violating the INF Treaty in the way they are because they must see some advantage to doing it either militarily, politically, or otherwise.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Murphy.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here today.

Following National Security Advisor John Bolton's meeting with his Russian counterpart in Geneva at the end of August, he stated that the administration was the very early stages of a review regarding the pros and cons of extending the treaty. And then he further commented that there were several options available. One was, of course, extending the treaty. Another was renegotiating it. But a third was jettisoning it and pursuing a different kind of approach, and he made a specific reference to the 2002 Moscow Treaty.

Of course, the Moscow Treaty only limits deployed warheads and it does not include verification provisions. And so to some of us there is a concern about the specific reference to the Moscow Treaty given that it does not have verification.

So why did the administration suggest that the Moscow Treaty may be an option for the path forward on renewing New START?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, I can assure you as the Under Secretary—and one of my bureaus is the Arms Control Verification and Compliance Bureau—that whatever treaty that we engage in with our counterparts has the verification within it. That is an important part of the treaty.

I would never want to speak for Ambassador Bolton, but I can assure you for my team that verification is integrated into the treaties.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, if I might just agree with those comments and also share your view on the importance of verification. I would say I was working in the Defense Department at the time of the Moscow Treaty, and the reason why that treaty did not contain verification measures like most arms control treaties is because we were still operating under the verification provisions in the original START treaty, which did not expire until the end of 2009. So they were still fully in effect.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you both for those answers.

I will stay with you, Secretary Trachtenberg. I wanted to come back to the issue of Open Skies. And I appreciate Senator Shaheen's questions.

Separate and aside from this pending issue of this one certification issue, Secretary Mattis wrote a letter to Senator Fischer here indicating that Open Skies—compliance with it is still in U.S. national security interests.

Do you agree with the statement despite the fact that we have these ongoing Russian compliance issues? Even with the Russian compliance issues, is this treaty still within national security interests for the United States to remain an active part of?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I think the Open Skies Treaty clearly has been in the United States' interest and certainly because of the transparency, it provides the openness, the level of visibility of what other states are doing that it provides not only to us but to our allies as well. We would much prefer to see the Russians get back into compliance with its provisions.

Senator MURPHY. I asked the question because this administration has been in the business of pulling out of several important multilateral security agreements, and I think it is important to understand that even given these Russian compliance problems, we can work through them. We hope to be able to work through them within the construct of the existing treaty.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would agree that we would hope to be able to work with Russia to work through these compliance issues that we have. What I do find disturbing and troubling, Senator, is the fact that, as I mentioned, there does seem to be a sort of a pattern of behavior here on the part of the Russian Federation that does not bode well, I think, in terms of our desire to take arms control to the next level, so to speak. And until Russian behavior changes or at least even if it does not, we need to factor that into our overall consideration of all of these treaties as we look at them to determine what the United States should do going forward.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you.

Finally, switching topics, again back to you, Secretary Thompson. The Trump administration began talks earlier this year on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. Given that you are before the committee, I wondered if you would give us an update on the progress with these negotiations, including the last time that the two sides met, and a confirmation that the administration continues to seek an agreement that contains the gold standard. This committee passed a resolution just a few weeks ago once again expressing our interests that that standard be met to the extent that we eventually reach an agreement with the Saudis.

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes. Thank you, Senator.

I can confirm that there are ongoing negotiations between the United States and Saudi Arabia on the civil nuclear agreement, the 123. I cannot address the specifics of the negotiations since those are ongoing, but what I can assure you as Under Secretary again that oversees that portfolio, that I always seek the strongest standard in those agreements.

Senator MURPHY. Secretary Pompeo said before this committee that we have told Saudi Arabia we want a gold standard section 123 agreement from them. So can you just confirm that that remains the bottom line for the administration?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. The strongest standard possible.

Senator MURPHY. We have a sense of what a gold standard is here, and we passed a resolution making sure that there are no enrichment or reprocessing abilities for the Saudis. Is the gold standard still the bottom line?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, sir. Committed to ensure that the enrichment reprocessing and those technologies do not get proliferated.

Senator MURPHY. Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Before turning to Senator Barrasso, I am going to take one more of my minutes.

In this conversation with Senator Murphy, you were talking about taking things to the next level in what all was happening in the relationship. And I might not have heard you clearly, but if the START treaty is being complied with and it is yielding the benefits to us of not having to have so many nuclear armaments, not knowing whether they work or not, but focusing on the ones we have and making sure that they do so that they are reliable, if it is working for us, we would not consider undoing the START treaty because other treaties are not being adhered to. Would we?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, I think wherever something is of benefit to U.S. interests, then the U.S. should continue to adhere to it or seek to move forward in that respect.

The point that I was trying to make was that when looking at the individual treaties, there does appear to be a pattern of Russian behavior overall in terms of its arms control compliance and Russia's willingness to abide by agreements that have already been signed that I think speaks to sort of how the Russians view their approach to arms control in general. And all I meant to argue was that in our consideration of what is or is not in our interest, we should try to at least take into account how the Russians are viewing arms control and how they are looking at our responses to their violations in terms of determining the overall future for arms control going forward.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Barrasso.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

For both of you, listening to Secretary Trachtenberg, you talked about Russian behavior. And my concern as a member of this committee and as an American citizen is more can they or can they not rather than will they or will they not. And so I like to make sure they have the capacity to do something, whatever their intentions are.

Which brings us to the question that Senator Rubio had talked about when he talked about this new strategic nuclear weapon that is reported. I read about it in March. Vladimir Putin said that the weapons include a nuclear-powered cruise missile, a nuclear-powered underwater drone that could be armed with a nuclear warhead, a hypersonic missile. The headline in one of the papers said high-tech weaponry. Russia's new nuclear weapons are technically plausible. You know, this is something that they could potentially have. I mean, Putin did his boasting and whether it was just an idle boast or real, I am concerned. What is our government's assessment of the level of maturity and accuracy of these weapons? For either of you.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, I cannot speak specifically to the individual systems that President Putin announced. There are probably some of those that may be more mature than others.

I do think it is a worrisome development that he announced these so publicly and made such a presentation of this, which has led us to wonder why the Russians believe that they need to do this given the fact that they have already extensively modernized their strategic nuclear arsenal. So I would look at this in the context of to some degree it may be aspirational. To some degree, there may be a practical element to some of these systems. But I do find it troubling not only from the standpoint of arms control specifically but from the standpoint of our overall relationship with Russia, which I think we would all like to see improve.

Senator BARRASSO. And then again along the same line of can they or can they not, then the question is can we or can we not defend against such things. So the question is, do we have a current or prospective missile defense system to intercept the possibility of these weapons?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. We do not have a missile defense system capable of defending against the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal, nor has it been our policy to do that. The Russians have a tremendous number of nuclear weapons systems, and for a variety of reasons, we have not pursued an active defense against the full range of Russian strategic weapons. We prefer to rely on our deterrence capability when it comes to Russia.

Senator BARRASSO. So at this point, we do not really have any specific actions that we are taking in response to what they are doing as opposed to a deterrence—the other deterrent capacity.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Well, we do believe that proceeding with the nuclear modernization program that we have, by modernizing all three legs of our nuclear triad, the land-based, sea-based, and air breathing components, is critical in order to continue the deterrent effect that we rely on.

Senator BARRASSO. Secretary Thompson, you know, as the country continues to face threats from around the world, not just Russia, I think we should not take any action that is going to hinder our own missile defense systems. We need to always remain in charge, I think, of our missile defense, not Russia or any other country telling us where we can put up and what we can put up in terms of defense.

So I have concerns about the efforts of Russia to limit our missile defense and actions that a previous administration took on this issue.

Can you commit to me that in any arms control discussions with Russia for which you are responsible, that the United States will not agree to limiting our own missile defense programs?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, Senator. And I can assure you that I will stand up for what is in the best interest of the United States people and our partners and allies when appropriate.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you.

Anything, Secretary Trachtenberg, you would like to add to this from the standpoint of the Department of Defense?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. No. I would agree with that statement, Senator. I was also present at the Department of Defense when Presi-

dent Bush made the decision to withdraw from the—or to exercise the withdrawal clause of the ABM Treaty because the world had changed. We faced a variety of ballistic missile threats and felt the need to move forward with at least an initial deployment of missile defenses. So I very much believe that missile defenses can not only defend but can be useful from the deterrence perspective as well in devaluing the currency that others place on ballistic missiles as a threat.

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez.

Thank you to both our witnesses for your long service to our country and for the chance to explore these important issues with you.

Something we have not talked much about in today's hearing is chemical weapons. So let me move to that if I can.

The Trump administration's recent National Security Strategy claims we are in an era of renewed great power competition, in particular with Russia. And I am wondering whether this is an area in which you expect that to reemerge.

The State Department has long claimed that Russia has not yet declared all its chemical weapons and production facilities to the OPCW, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and Russia continues, I think, a despicable practice of supporting or defending the murderous regime of Bashar al Assad and their repeated use of chemical weapons.

Does the administration believe unilateral measures are the best way to counter Russian chemical weapons production and use, or should we, instead, work through international institutions like the OPCW? That is for you, Ms. Thompson.

Ms. THOMPSON. Thank you, Senator.

I think both are appropriate. We have worked hand in glove with the OPCW and our partners and allies of late. Assistant Secretary Poblete was in a conference stating our views, and we had a rigorous engagement with partners and allies to ensure it is not only a U.S. voice but a voice of the global partnership. And we have been very consistent on that and look forward to continued emphasis both bilaterally and through the multilateral engagements primarily with OPCW when it comes to chem. And you can reference in my statement where we stand with the Russians' actions in Syria with the Assad regime.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator COONS. And do you assess that Russia may seek to reconstitute a large scale chemical weapon production capability, or do you think its goal is the smaller scale program that allows it to carry out attacks like the one that recently happened in the United Kingdom? I would be interested in both of your opinions on that.

Ms. THOMPSON. I would anticipate they will continue to build on their existing program and, as we saw from the Novichok attacks, continue to expand for new emerging technologies in that as well.

Senator COONS. Would you agree that there is a distinction between a large scale production in terms of capability to improve

and deploy chemical weapons as opposed to the ability to carry out small scale attacks?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would agree with that assessment.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I would agree with that as well, Senator. I would also think that anything that the Russians do in the area of chemical weapons they will do with a clear intent to try to hide what they are doing from detection. And I think the results of the attack in Salisbury earlier this year was an absolutely atrocious demonstration, regardless of whether they have large or small arsenals. The willingness to actually employ such weapons or to support regimes that employ such weapons is really an atrocity.

Senator COONS. So I will just echo what Senator Isakson said earlier about the importance of having robust verification regimes and the ways in which his support for the New START treaty ultimately was won over because of the breadth and sophistication of the verification regimes involved. Or I will simply speak for myself and say that also was a key part in my supporting New START.

I want to revisit a question Senator Murphy asked earlier about comments made by the National Security Advisor, John Bolton, back in August after meeting with his Russian counterpart where he was suggesting in the early stages of the review that one option in consideration of New START was pursuing a different type of approach such as the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which only limits deployed warheads and does not, I think, verification. You gave an answer about there being a continuing verification regime that made that not necessary.

Let me just ask directly. Is the administration considering in this interagency process a new arms control agreement that does not include verification provisions?

Ms. THOMPSON. No, sir.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Not to my knowledge, Senator.

Senator COONS. And would you support or recommend arms control agreements or reductions that did not include verification procedures at least as robust as New START?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would not. I would want to ensure that verification measures are integrated into any treaty that we seek.

Senator COONS. It is my view, given public statements by Putin and others, that Russia is seeking strategic weapons that would allow them to restart a great power competition with us, and it is just my hope that you will consider Congress a partner and seek our input and assistance as we try to craft a way to both push Russia back into compliance with the INF Treaty and consider how, when, and whether to extend the New START treaty, something that I think is of great concern to all of us.

Thank you both for your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Booker.

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I know that some of this ground was already covered with Senator Shaheen, but I would just like to go through it a little bit again.

There is obviously a dispute over the compliance with the Russians on the INF Treaty. A collapse of the INF Treaty would open

the doors, I would assume, towards further development of arms in terms of the intermediate range missiles and the negative repercussions.

Can you just help me maybe briefly restate the benefits of the INF Treaty, not just to the United States but also to our NATO allies?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator Booker, I think the INF Treaty, when it was negotiated, was a major arms control accomplishment in that it completely eliminated an entire class of nuclear systems, systems that threatened our NATO Europe allies specifically. So there was, indeed, great value to the treaty at the time.

I would also note that the Russians were initially reluctant, if I recall, to engage in any negotiations along those lines until the United States had demonstrated a willingness to at least counter what they were doing with the deployment of their SS-20s in Europe. Now, we had no plans to deploy missiles in Europe, INF missiles in Europe.

The reason I raise that point, however, is to make it clear that Russian behavior occasionally is determined by how they view the United States reacting to their behavior.

Senator BOOKER. And so they are in violation clearly right now. In terms of our allies, what would it mean if we declared them in material breach and pulled out? What would the implications be?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, the implications of material breach—those have been laid out in the treaty. There are various options with the treaty, and those discussions would be in collaboration with our technical experts here and partners and allies. We are not there yet.

Senator BOOKER. No. And there is obviously an importance in continuing that dialogue. This is just land-based. Obviously, we have the other two prongs of the nuclear triad at our disposal, air and submarine launch. Correct?

So then the bombast, at least my description, not yours obviously, of some of the statements on behalf of the administration seem to me make me worry about the willingness to go forward and continue sort of strategic stability talks.

Can you give me any understanding of what the administration intends to do to continue what is important dialogue to both us and our allies?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes, Senator. I am committed to that. The dialogue is incredibly important. And that was an example. With the President and President Putin in Helsinki was one example of dialogue. Again with Ambassador Bolton and his counterpart, as I alluded to earlier, with Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Lavrov have had discussions. I have had discussions. So as we have seen, despite their rhetoric, despite their breach of their obligations, we continue to keep that door open and remain committed to fulfill our end of the obligation.

Senator BOOKER. But is there going to be some kind of formal follow-up to Helsinki? Are we going to have some efforts to really have more formal discussions coming up?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have had formal discussions. There are inter-agency dialogues on next steps. But it does not get much press, but for example, when we had the INF technical experts meetings, we

engage in the chemical weapons piece and the OPCW, among others. So it does not get as much press, but there are lines of dialogue both from the Defense Department, State Department. DOE Secretary Perry was in country, I believe it was yesterday or the day before. So we continue to have those discussions.

Senator BOOKER. Is there disagreement in the White House, within the administration, about whether they will resume talks on a specific date and time?

Ms. THOMPSON. Not to my knowledge, Senator, no.

Senator BOOKER. And lastly, what would the goals be for those continued conversations?

Ms. THOMPSON. It depends on the treaty, quite candidly. With INF, obviously, we have raised it that they are not in compliance, and we showed them example upon example of that. But as the President addressed in July the fact that we both are nuclear-capable countries, we have an obligation to our people and to our partners to maintain that open line of dialogue.

Senator BOOKER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you very much, both, for continuing to keep us briefed on developments in these very important nuclear conversations.

Under New START, does the United States have access only to declared facilities or to also undeclared facilities that we suspect?

Ms. THOMPSON. To my knowledge, it is both, Senator, but candidly, I will have to take that back to my experts and confirm.

Senator MERKLEY. I do believe it is only declared facilities.

Under the JCPOA, the IAEA has the power to request access to suspect facilities and mandates, I believe, a 24-hour response period. Is that correct?

Ms. THOMPSON. Yes.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I believe we could request it.

Ms. THOMPSON. Request access. We do not necessarily get the access.

Senator MERKLEY. As of this time, we have heard report after report that Iran is in compliance. Is that you all's understanding from all of your examination of the issues?

Ms. THOMPSON. They are in compliance as the IAEA report, not in compliance with all the additional malign activities, but I am sure we will address that later, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. But those are not JCPOA activities that you are talking about. They are in compliance with the JCPOA in your opinion?

Ms. THOMPSON. In the IAEA's opinion, they are in technical compliance, yes.

Senator MERKLEY. But in your opinion.

Ms. THOMPSON. The technical portion, Senator—they are in compliance.

Senator MERKLEY. They are in compliance. Okay. Thank you.

We have the challenge between a vision and the details of an arms control agreement. This is the New START agreement, a pretty hefty package. I could spend a career probably studying it.

And this is the JCPOA, which is also a pretty hefty package. And this is the press release regarding the U.S. and North Korea for denuclearization, and that is all we have. Am I wrong? Is there any package like this, any set of detailed plans yet between the U.S. and North Korea regarding North Korea's program?

Ms. THOMPSON. I could bring in a stack of the intelligence, but I do not think that would be appropriate for this hearing, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, these are public agreements. These are treaties. There is no such treaty worked out. Am I correct that there is no detailed inventory of North Korean assets that have been examined and developed with agreement on both sides?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. Am I correct that there is no schedule for eliminating these nuclear assets that has been agreed to by both sides?

Ms. THOMPSON. Not yet.

Senator MERKLEY. Am I correct that there is no verification regime that has been developed and agreed to by both sides?

Ms. THOMPSON. It has been drafted from our side, not an agreement yet, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, it is hard to have a complete verification regime if you have not worked out what you are actually eliminating.

Ms. THOMPSON. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MERKLEY. This particular statement says the United States and DPRK, meaning North Korea, commit to work toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Now, that working, "to work toward," is a far cry from the standard that Secretary Pompeo set out for, which was—I believe he used the words "complete, irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons." Why would North Korea not agree to language? Or did we insist and try to push language that would be a commitment to complete, irreversible elimination rather than simply to work toward denuclearization?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, the administration stands firm that the final and fully verified denuclearization, and those discussions are ongoing.

Senator MERKLEY. So at the time of this statement, North Korea was unwilling to reach the language we wanted, the complete, irreversible elimination.

Ms. THOMPSON. They have committed to denuclearize the peninsula.

Senator MERKLEY. Well, I am just reading from the document. It says they have committed to work toward. That is quite different. It reminds me actually of the NPT language, the Non-Proliferation Treaty language, where the large nuclear states pledged to—and they used very similar language—undertake to pursue negotiations on complete disarmament. In other words, it is those inserted words that say, no, we do not really have a commitment yet. North Korea is just saying it will work toward that effort.

I stress this because quite a bit of time has passed, and we do not even have the first leg of the journey. The first base is getting to a complete inventory of their program. And North Korea has not even agreed to that. And there was not actually any language in

this one-page document that committed them to it. So it is of real concern.

The other thing is that one thing we said in this document, which was a little unusual, is we specifically called out that we were committed to hold follow-up negotiations led by the U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo and a relevant high-level North Korean official to implement the outcomes. But the outcome is only to work towards something because there is no verification regime to implement. There is no inventory of their nuclear program, and there is no schedule or plan for how that will be eliminated. So what is there exactly to implement?

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, when we talk final and fully verified, I would say that is the last step of—I know you are aware based on your arms control background that once we get the agreement, we get the access to the country. And then there is a series of steps. We have done this in multiple areas. We have got the technical expertise within the ranks of the State Department, DOD, Department of Energy, and partners and allies. So I am confident, when Secretary Pompeo reaches the agreement with the President, that we have the steps that are necessary to final and fully verify—

Senator MERKLEY. I was just trying to understand what there was to implement because this was not to implement what we may someday negotiate. It was to implement the outcome of the summit it says. And I am just a little puzzled by exactly what that meant.

So given that it says that we were fully committed to having Secretary Pompeo do these follow-up negotiations, why was his second trip to hold those negotiations cancelled by the United States?

Ms. THOMPSON. The North Koreans had not taken the appropriate action to justify a visit. That said, the discussions are ongoing with Secretary Pompeo, with our envoy, and through senior leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of follow-up questions, returning to the START treaty.

Has the United States been able to verify Russia's meeting the limitations of the treaty?

Ms. THOMPSON. We did. Both countries met the limits in February, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. And assuming that the United States continues to verify Russia is in compliance, can the United States meet all of our deterrence requirements for the next 5 years if New START is extended?

Ms. THOMPSON. I would defer to the Department of Defense.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, for the next 5 years, it is a bit speculative. I know we can meet those requirements today, but conditions occasionally change quite rapidly. So I would be reluctant to say whether we could or could not 5 years hence.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, the question is, if Russia continues to meet its obligation and is in compliance, you cannot tell me whether we can meet our deterrence requirements under the New START treaty?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Our deterrence requirements may be variable, Senator, and not only directly related to the Russian Federation. There are other countries out there with nuclear weapons. So again, that would be speculative on my part.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me just say that the more I hear the answers to the questions, I do not understand if we can meet all of our current deterrence requirements with a force at or slightly below the levels of the New START treaty. If we are not forced to cut back any of our current nuclear modernization efforts, if we are not in any way limited in terms of our missile defenses, if this meets the standard put forward in the Nuclear Posture Review for arms control, if we have been able to verify Russia is meeting the limitations of the treaty, it seems to me that all of the foundational building blocks of aspiring to a follow-on on this treaty would be in place. But as I listened to your answers, I get a sense that maybe the administration is headed a different way.

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. I am not intending to imply, Senator, that the administration takes a different view of that. You may be absolutely correct in what you say. All I am suggesting is that much can happen in 5 years.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me turn to the chemical weapons question. Obviously, Salisbury—that attack directly contravenes the Chemical Weapons Convention which is a fundamental pillar of international attempts to limit the use of weapons of mass destruction. Now that you have imposed a first round of sanctions, has the Russian Federation taken steps to avoid additional sanctions required under the Chemical and Biological Act?

Ms. THOMPSON. Not that we have seen as yet.

Senator MENENDEZ. So assuming that that goes unabated, then there should be more consequences. Is that a fair statement?

Ms. THOMPSON. That is a fair statement, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, let me finally turn to the INF Treaty. It appears that the Russians have consistently said that they value the INF Treaty and would like to preserve it. We will see. In addition, it appears that Russia and the United States have at least agreed on the missile, the 9M-729, which we have identified as violating the treaty. On the other hand, in March in congressional testimony, General Hyten, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified Russia had increased the production and deployment of the 9M-729, compounding Russia's violations and further threatening European security.

So let me ask you a few questions about the next steps and our attempts to bring Russia back into compliance.

Has the United States asked Russia to halt production of the 9M-729 so that the military situation does not further deteriorate during our discussions?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have had discussions with our Russian counterparts in the INF technical experts meeting on what is their obligations in the compliance and how they are violating the treaty.

Senator MENENDEZ. Have we specifically asked them to halt production of that missile?

Ms. THOMPSON. We have told them to get back into compliance and showed them examples of what that looks like.

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. Would halting production not begin the process of getting them back into compliance?

Ms. THOMPSON. In discussions, Senator, I prefer not to talk about open dialogue of our negotiations in the open setting, but we can—

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, look, you know, hiding behind things that are not classified and calling them classified are beyond the pale.

Let me ask you this. Has the United States asked Russia to provide an exhibition of the missile so U.S. experts can review its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500 kilometers, which would violate the treaty?

Ms. THOMPSON. I have not. I do not know if other agencies have, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do you know of any?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Not to my knowledge, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. What steps does Russia need to take to bring itself back into compliance with the treaty?

Ms. THOMPSON. Fulfill the obligations set forth in the INF Treaty.

Senator MENENDEZ. Which are what? You are the Under Secretary. Why do you not tell me what some of those are?

Ms. THOMPSON. Well, for one, Senator, is they would have to get rid of the SSC-8. That blows the compliance. They have battalions of them. They would have to stop production, among other things, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me just close on this.

Secretary Thompson, you mentioned section 231 of CAATSA in your opening statement. The fiscal year 2019 National Defense Authorization signed into law on August 13th included a provision which requires the administration to submit a report on whether the President has made a determination that significant transactions have taken place with the Russian defense and intelligence sectors. That report is due on November 13th.

Can we have your commitment that this report will be submitted to the committee on or before that date?

Ms. THOMPSON. You have my commitment that that will be submitted. Yes, Senator.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you both for being here and just ask a closing question.

I know that Secretary Thompson referred to some of the rhetoric that has come out of the Russian leader's mouth. Sometimes that is information and not reality.

And then, Secretary Trachtenberg, you have left yourself a lot of room as it relates to some of these treaties.

Are there things out there right now that cause either one of you concerns about strategic stability?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Senator, I am concerned about the overall state of the U.S.-Russia relationship. To the extent that affects stability, absolutely. And I am concerned not just from an arms control perspective, but my concern goes beyond the arms control realm looking into some of the other things that the Russian Federation is doing, some of its actions that sort of span a range of ac-

tivities that I would find counterproductive to American interests across the board.

The CHAIRMAN. So those are all things that we can visibly see and are aware of. Are there other things, though, that you are aware of that they are developing that cause you to feel concern about the strategic stability? Either one of you.

Ms. THOMPSON. Senator, if I may. Particularly to Russia but to other countries as well, as one that oversees the arms control and the treaties writ large, is the emerging technologies. I have talked with some of the staff of late. Artificial intelligence, the hypersonics, cyber, although here, but the further development. And those are the type of technologies that we need to get our arms around with responsible nation states activities and what that looks like. So I see that as being the future of arms control as some of these emerging technologies and how they are integrated into the arms control treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sensing that we are losing an edge in those future technologies or that someone is gaining advantage?

Ms. THOMPSON. Sir, I am confident in our technologies. We have some work in international forums as well on what that means to adherence in arms control as these technologies develop.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to make any comment?

Mr. TRACHTENBERG. Yes, Senator. I would agree with that, and I would say with the support of the Congress that the Department of Defense has had, for which we thank you very much, we believe going forward and investing in these types of technologies that Under Secretary Thompson has talked about are essential to maintaining the United States' military advantages going forward. Otherwise, we do run the risk of falling behind and having that negatively impact our overall national security objectives.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we thank you both.

The record will remain open for written questions through the close of business Thursday. If you could respond to those fairly quickly, we would appreciate it.

We thank you both for being here, for sharing your knowledge and insights.

And with that, the committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

COMPLIANCE ISSUES WITH INF TREATY AND NEW START TREATY

In a March speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled details of new weapons supposedly under development that he described nearly a dozen times as "strategic" in the Kremlin's English translation. These new kinds of strategic nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, and a nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines. I appreciated hearing your view that some, if not all, of these new kinds of Russian strategic nuclear arms, which are said by Putin to be under development, could fall under the New START Treaty's limits on strategic weapons.

Question. For the written record, I wanted to confirm whether or not the United States has ever asked the Russians to notify these new kinds of strategic nuclear arms, or ever otherwise discussed or raised these systems with Russian officials, in

the context of the under the U.S.-Russian bilateral consultative commission (BCC) or via any other channel?

Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified setting.

As you acknowledged in your testimony, Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Rather than own-up to its noncompliance and resolve these issues in good faith, however, the Kremlin has repeatedly tried to change the narrative by accusing the U.S. government of violating the INF Treaty.

Question. What allegations are the Russians making about U.S. violations of the INF Treaty? Is there any truth to these allegations?

Answer. The United States is in full compliance with its INF Treaty obligations. The Russian Federation has raised three main areas of concern regarding U.S. compliance with its obligations: the Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense system; ballistic target missiles; and armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The United States has repeatedly engaged Russian officials in multiple venues, including the Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC), to explain why U.S. actions in these areas are compliant with the Treaty.

The United States has consistently addressed Russia's questions in a transparent, substantive, and constructive manner, while Russian officials have refused to engage in any serious discussion of the U.S. concerns or take steps to return to compliance. Instead, Russia has sought to deflect U.S. concerns by accusing the United States of being the party in violation of the INF Treaty.

Question. Does the Russian government expressly acknowledge that the United States is in full compliance with New START?

Answer. While Russia has raised concerns about U.S. implementation of the New START Treaty, Russia has not accused the United States of violating the Treaty. In its official response to the U.S. Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments covering 2017, the Russian Federation claims that the United States achieved some of its reductions under the New START Treaty "by manipulations that are incorrect from the point of view of contractual practice." Specifically, Russia claims that the United States incorrectly removed some items from New START accountability using conversion procedures that Russian inspectors cannot verify.

The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty. Russia's assertions are baseless. The United States converted and removed these items from the Treaty's accountability in accordance with the Treaty's provisions. The United States has exhaustively addressed Russia's concerns in the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission, and will continue to answer questions related to these issues in the confidential Treaty implementation body designed for such discussions.

Question. Is the Russian government currently in full compliance with the INF Treaty? And with the New START Treaty?

Answer. Russia remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to produce, possess, or flight-test a ground-launched ballistic or cruise missile with a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States announced this finding in 2014, and has repeated the finding every year since. Russia has taken steps to develop, test, and field a ground-launched cruise missile, the SSC-8 (9M729), that can fly to ranges prohibited by the Treaty. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified briefing.

Russia is in compliance with the New START Treaty. Every six months, the Parties exchange declared data on their strategic offensive arms, which is confirmed via the Treaty's verification regime, including on-site inspections and monitoring through national technical means. The aggregate data from these exchanges is made available on the State Department website. Per the most recent data exchange, Russia had met the Treaty's central limits as of February 5, 2018.

Question. If Russia refuses to do what's required to get in full compliance with the INF Treaty, what should the United States do in terms of the future of the INF Treaty?

Answer. Since 2014, the United States has sought to return Russia to full, verifiable compliance with the Treaty. In 2017, the United States announced its Integrated Strategy to pressure Russia to return to compliance, while ensuring through coordinated action with allies and partners that Russia does not gain a

military advantage from its violation. Russian officials have so far refused to take substantive steps to return to compliance, or persuasively refute the information provided by the United States.

The status quo, whereby the United States remains bound by its INF obligations while Russia continues its violation, is untenable. Since, 2017, the Administration has pursued diplomatic, economic, and military means to increase pressure on Russia to return to compliance, and ensure that the United States is able to defend itself and allies should Russia not return to compliance.

Question. Given Russia's ongoing noncompliance with the INF Treaty, does it make sense to start negotiations for an extension or follow-on to the New START Treaty before Russia comes into full compliance with the INF Treaty?

Answer. Russia's ongoing violation of the INF Treaty creates a deficit of trust in the arms control relationship. The United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S., allied, and partner security. This commitment necessitates that the United States have a partner which is willing to comply responsibly with its obligations. That said, Russia is in compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty, which continues to serve as an example of what both sides can accomplish when Russia lives up to its obligations. The Administration's analysis of whether to support extending the New START Treaty—or negotiate a follow-on agreement—will take into context Russia's behavior in other arms control agreements, and the security needs of the United States and its allies.

Question. What strategy does the United States have for addressing, diplomatically and militarily, the growth of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and other nuclear weapons systems, which the Kremlin is fielding for potential use in military contingencies in Europe, but which are not covered by the New START Treaty or the INF Treaty?

Answer. Diplomatically, the United States remains committed to pursuing future negotiations with Russia to increase transparency of and reduce the threat posed by Russia's nonstrategic nuclear weapons if conditions permit, provided that the outcome would improve the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States remains committed to consulting closely with NATO Allies and will take into account NATO requirements in the context of any discussions with Russia on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Arms control requires a willing partner and a conducive strategic environment. Russia has repeatedly refused to engage in discussions related to its nonstrategic nuclear forces. When this issue has been raised with Russia in the past, it has routinely imposed preconditions on any such discussion. These conditions are unacceptable to the United States and its allies.

Militarily, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review calls for the development of two U.S. supplemental capabilities, a low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile and a sea-launched cruise missile, to counter mistaken Russian perceptions of an exploitable gap in U.S. regional deterrence capabilities. Furthermore, the U.S. pursuit of a sea-launched cruise missile may provide incentive for Russia to negotiate seriously a reduction of its tactical nuclear weapons.

Question. Was the future of the New START treaty discussed during the drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?

Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states that the United States is committed to implementing the New START Treaty and continuing to verify Russian compliance. It also notes that the Treaty may be extended, by mutual agreement, until 2026. The NPR does not take a position on whether to support an extension, as the interagency is currently conducting a review regarding whether extending the Treaty is in the U.S. national security interest. The NPR does seek to ensure that the United States is postured to field nuclear capabilities to deter adversaries in any threat environment, including contributing to the capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.

Question. Are there any ongoing discussions, or plans to hold discussions, in the interagency to determine potential impacts on nuclear modernization and whether the treaty should be extended?

Answer. Any decision whether to support extending the New START Treaty will include an analysis of ongoing U.S. modernization efforts, and a projection of U.S. deterrence requirements over the period of a potential extension. It is critical that we maintain the ability to meet our deterrence and assurance objectives. Constraining adversaries' arsenals through arms control agreements remains a potential tool to help achieve this goal.

Question. If the treaty were not to be extended, would the 2018 NPR require a revision?

Answer. No. The 2018 NPR focused on ensuring U.S. nuclear capabilities are flexible, adaptable, and resilient. It is strategy driven and provides guidance for the nuclear force structure and policy requirements needed now and in the future to maintain peace and stability in a rapidly shifting environment with significant future uncertainty.

CTBT

Some experts have suggested that the Russians, and perhaps also the Chinese, have conducted low-yield events, skirting the definition of a test in the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Question. Has Russia or China ever conducted any nuclear weapons-related events or testing that circumvents the spirit or the letter of the CTBT?

Answer. Neither Russia nor China has publicly defined the scope of its unilateral nuclear testing moratoria. Thus, it is difficult to assess the compliance of any testing activities with either country's moratorium.

Question. Does the State Department view Russia's or China's nuclear weapons-related events or testing activities as violating either the spirit or the letter of the CTBT?

Answer. Neither Russia nor China has publicly defined the scope of its unilateral nuclear testing moratoria. Thus, it is difficult to assess the compliance of any testing activities with either country's moratorium. Any activities conducted in accordance with the U.S. definition of its nuclear weapons explosive test moratorium would be viewed as consistent with spirit and letter of the CTBT.

RUSSIAN CHEMICAL WEAPON ATTACKS

The United Kingdom has formally accused the Russian Federation of being behind the chemical weapons attack with the Novichok nerve agent that targeted Sergey Skripal and his daughter in Salisbury, England, severely injuring both of them and resulting in the death of two other U.K. citizens.

Question. Does the United States agree with Britain's assessment that the Russian Federation is behind the Novichok nerve agent attack in Salisbury?

Answer. The United States agrees with the U.K.'s assessment that Russia is responsible for the use of chemical weapons on U.K. soil. Only Russia has the motive, means, and record to conduct such an attack. Russia developed the class of military-grade nerve agents of the type used in Salisbury and has a record of conducting state-sponsored assassinations. We also have full confidence in the evidentiary basis for the U.K.'s indictment against the two suspects identified by U.K.'s authorities as officers from the Russian military intelligence service, also known as the GRU, and that this operation was almost certainly approved at a senior government level. We have already taken action together to disrupt the activities of the GRU through the largest collective expulsion of undeclared intelligence officers.

Question. Does the United States assess the Russian Federation, a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to be in compliance with or violation of the CWC?

Answer. The United States has certified to Congress that Russia is in non-compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention for declaration of its: (1) chemical weapon production facilities; (2) CW development facilities; and (3) CW stockpiles. The Russian-perpetrated attack with a military-grade nerve agent in Salisbury further reinforces our long-standing view that Russia is not in compliance with its obligations under the CWC. In light of the extraordinary, urgent and grave nature of the attack in the U.K., this event was addressed in the State Department's 2018 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.

Question. Is it accurate that the Kim regime's assassination of Kim Jong-un's half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, using chemical weapons influenced or was a factor in the United States's decision to relist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism?

Answer. On November 20, 2017, the Secretary of State designated the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Secretary determined that the Government of the DPRK has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, as the DPRK has been implicated in assassinations on foreign soil. These terrorist acts are in keeping with the DPRK's wider range of

dangerous and malicious behavior, including continued nuclear and ballistic missile testing and development as well as Kim Jong Un's threats against American cities and territories and those of our allies.

Question. Given that the Russian Federation, like North Korea, has used chemical weapons against political opponents, and give Putin's support for Syria's Assad regime—itsself designated as a state sponsor of terrorism—is the Administration considering adding Russia to the list of state sponsors of terrorism?

Answer. As a matter of law, in order for any country to be designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine after a careful review of all available evidence that the government of that country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. The State Department consistently reviews all of the available information and intelligence, from a variety of sources; it is an ongoing process and all information is evaluated in its entirety and must be credible, verified, and corroborated. The U.S. government has already taken a number of significant and effective steps to indicate our concern about and respond to Russian aggression and destabilizing behavior. We will continue applying pressure until Russia chooses to become a responsible member of the international community.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

OPEN SKIES TREATY

From September 2–10, 2018, experts from the United States and 22 other States Parties met in Russia for the Certification of Russia's Tu-214 Open Skies aircraft and its associated sensor. This was the same sensor the United States previously determined in 2016 met the treaty requirements. At the meeting, all other treaty parties approved the sensor except the United States, which declined to do so. The United States then apparently back tracked on its decision and certified the Russian aircraft.

Question. Did the United States consult our allies before the September meeting about our decision not to certify the plane at that time?

Answer. The United States closely collaborated with our Allies and partners in the Open Skies Treaty throughout the 120-plus day certification process, to include on the ground in Russia during the final Certification Event from September 2–10, 2018.

Question. How did the State Department specifically come to the decision not to certify the plane? And why did it reverse this decision?

Answer. At the conclusion of the Certification Event on September 10, the United States declined to sign the final certification report, citing ongoing discussions in Washington. We made clear that this did not preclude the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft following the completion of those discussions. Subsequently, the United States informed all States Parties on September 18, via formal Open Skies Treaty mechanisms, that we would approve the certification of the Russian aircraft.

Question. What legal and technical issues were identified for not certifying the plane?

Answer. The United States did not sign the Certification Report for Russia's aircraft on September 10, stating that further discussions in Washington were required. On September 18, we informed all States Parties that we would certify the Russian aircraft and on September 24, the United States signed the Certification Report on the margins of the Open Skies Consultative Commission plenary meeting in Vienna. All 23 states participating in the certification event concluded that the Russian aircraft and its associate sensor met the Treaty's requirements for certification.

Question. Is the United States seeking to use certification decisions as a political tool to put pressure on Russia for its Open Skies violations? Would the United States be in violation of our legal obligation under the Open Skies treaty if we held up certification of aircraft and associated sensors without a technical justification for our decision?

Answer. Under the Open Skies Treaty certifications follow a technical process intended to ensure, through extensive and intrusive inspections, that the aircraft and sensor combination being presented for certification meets the relevant require-

ments of the Treaty. The United States has not linked its position on such certifications to the resolution of Russia's violations of the Treaty.

Question. In your testimony in front of the committee U/S Thompson, you stated that the United States has not brought up Russia's newly unveiled systems with the Russian Federation in the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Would you like to correct the record on that issue?

Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified setting.

Question. Has the United States assessed which of the systems President Putin unveiled in March 2018 would be constrained by New START?

Answer. The following categories of strategic offensive arms are subject to the New START Treaty's central limits and verification provisions: ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Regarding new kinds of strategic offensive arms, the New START Treaty states in Article V that, "When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission." As provided in Section I of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty, it is within the authority of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to "[r]esolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm." The United States is in the process of engaging the Russian Federation on whether the new systems announced by President Putin qualify as "new kinds" of strategic offensive arms, and if so, whether and how New START Treaty provisions would apply to these systems.

Question. Has the United States assessed whether the new Russian systems unveiled in March 2018 will be deployed during the lifetime of New START?

Answer. I defer to the Intelligence Community's assessment on this topic.

Question. Has the United States assessed when Russia's newly unveiled systems are likely to be fielded and deployed by the Russian military?

Answer. I defer to the Intelligence Community's assessment on this topic.

Question. As part of our pressure campaign to push the Russian Federation back into compliance, has the United States called upon Russia to halt production of the 9M729?

Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified briefing.

Question. Has the Russian Federation halted production of the 9M729?

Answer. No, to our knowledge the Russian Federation has taken no steps to return to compliance. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified briefing.

Question. Has the United States asked Russia to provide an exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500km, which would violate the treaty?

Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified briefing.

Question. Has the Russian government put forward any proposals to address the United States concerns about the 9M729?

Answer. No.

Question. Has the United States scheduled another meeting of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) or a bilateral meeting with Russia to discuss a diplomatic solution to Russia's INF violation?

Answer. There are no meetings specifically on INF scheduled at this time. The Administration regularly raises Russia's INF Treaty violation and other noncompliance issues in appropriate meetings with Russian officials.

Question. The United States and Russia held a first round of strategic stability talks last September in Helsinki. These talks in the past have been critical for reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. Does the administration support a resumption of strategic stability talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and

to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. Has Russia indicated whether they support resumption of the talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. In future strategic stability talks will the United States raise hypersonic delivery systems and cyberattacks as potential dangers to strategic stability?

Answer. The Administration acknowledges the danger of hypersonic delivery vehicles and cyber-attacks to U.S. security. The United States and Russia will discuss appropriate security topics at the appropriate time.

MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. The Missile Defense Review mandated by Congress was originally scheduled for release alongside the Nuclear Posture Review in February. However, Congress has still not received a copy of this report. When will the Administration publish its Missile Defense Review?

Answer. The MDR is nearing completion, but we refer you to the Department of Defense for the precise timing of its release.

Question. What has delayed the process?

Answer. The Administration's efforts to prepare the MDR have been very thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. These efforts have taken longer than planned.

Question. Do you agree there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and defensive strategic arms?

Answer. The Preamble of the New START Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms.

Question. Have U.S. strategic missile defense deployments influenced the size, capabilities, and posture of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty?

Answer. Russia and China are completing long-term modernization programs for their strategic nuclear forces and developing a range of technologies to ensure the viability of their strategic deterrents. The overall objectives and initiation of these modernization programs are not premised on U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) is defensive in nature. The United States has been open and transparent and stressed that our missile defenses are not directed against Russia or China and will not undermine Russia's or China's strategic deterrence capabilities.

The threat to the populations, territory, and forces of the United States and its friends and allies, posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles continues to increase, and missile defense forms part of a broader response to counter it. U.S. BMD, along with the BMD of friends and allies, enhances regional stability by countering the coercive power of ballistic missiles.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

NEW START TREATY

In comments just a few weeks ago, National Security Advisor Bolton said the Trump administration is “very, very early in the process of considering” what it wants to do about the New START Treaty:

Question. Is this the first time since the Trump administration came into office in January 2017 that the State Department is reviewing its position with regard to the New START Treaty? If so, why is the Trump administration just starting its review now? If not, why is the Trump administration re-reviewing its position with regard to New START?

Answer. The Administration is committed to implementing the New START Treaty, as stated in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review—a DoD-led interagency process in which the Department of State participated. The Administration is currently reviewing whether to extend the New START Treaty beyond its scheduled expiration on February 5, 2021. The Administration began reviewing the status of all arms control treaties and agreement in January 2017, including the New START Treaty. The Administration initially focused on assessing Russia’s current compliance with the New START Treaty, assessing Russian progress toward meeting the central limits by the February 2018 deadline, and Russia’s compliance with other treaties and agreements. Now that we assess that Russia met the central limits by the February 2018 deadline, the Administration is focused on monitoring Russia’s on-going implementation of the New START Treaty and other treaties.

Question. What specifically is being reviewed in the “process” to which Ambassador Bolton referred? What is the timeline for completion of this review?

Answer. The Administration is assessing the value, risks, and consequences to U.S. national security of either extending the New START Treaty beyond February 5, 2021, or not extending it. The Treaty expires on that date unless it is extended for up to five years by mutual agreement between the United States and Russia. There is no timeline for the completion of this review.

Question. Recognizing that the State Department is one of many parties that participates in interagency national security decision-making, what specifically is the State Department’s position with regard to the New START Treaty? Does the State Department believe the New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States? If so, will the State Department recommend to the National Security Council that the United States seek extension of the New START Treaty?

Answer. The United States and Russia are in compliance with their New START Treaty obligations. In February of this year, both countries met the Treaty’s central limits. The United States benefits from the Treaty’s 18 annual on-site inspections, notifications, and biannual data exchanges, which give us insight into the number of Russia’s strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty and where they are at any given time. We are committed to implementing the Treaty and verifying Russian compliance.

Question. Does the State Department believe the New START Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States? If so, will the State Department recommend to the National Security Council that the United States seek extension of the New START Treaty?

Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed the United States will continue to implement the New START Treaty and verify Russian compliance. Any decision on supporting an extension of New START beyond 2021 will take into context Russia’s behavior in other arms control agreements, as well as the security needs of the United States and its allies. Russia’s continued compliance with New START is an absolute requirement for any potential extension of the Treaty, and we continue to assess the value, risks, and consequences to U.S. national security of either extending the New START Treaty or not extending it.

Question. What are the diplomatic consequences of not extending the New START Treaty? If New START were to expire, how does the State Department anticipate America’s partners and allies in Europe and elsewhere around the world would react?

Answer. As observed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the United States is committed to arms control efforts that advance U.S. allied, and partner security; are verifiable and enforceable; and include partners that comply responsibly with their obligations. All U.S. allies support implementation of the New START Treaty. Any

decision regarding a potential extension of the New START Treaty will take into account allied and partner views.

INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) TREATY

Last December the Trump administration announced “new diplomatic, military, and economic measures intended to induce” Russia “to return to compliance” with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and “to deny it any military advantage should it persist in its violation.” This included beginning research on “concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems.”

Question. What is the status of the diplomatic efforts referred to? What specific efforts has the State Department undertaken to mobilize European partners and allies to put multilateral pressure on Russia to return to compliance with its INF obligations?

Answer. Since 2013, the United States has sought to induce Russia to return to full, verifiable compliance with the Treaty. In December 2017, the United States announced its Integrated Strategy to pressure Russia to return to compliance while ensuring through coordinated action with allies and partners that Russia does not gain a military advantage from its violation.

The United States has sought a diplomatic resolution through all viable channels, including the INF Treaty’s Special Verification Commission (SVC) established to “resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed.” The SVC most recently met December 12–14, 2017, and previously November 16–18, 2016. The SVC includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, United States, and Ukraine—the Treaty parties who agreed to continue participation in this implementation body after the fall of the Soviet Union. The diplomatic effort has also included bilateral meetings, including a technical experts meeting on June 20–21, 2018. In addition, the United States strives to keep allies informed of our efforts to pressure Russia to return to compliance with the Treaty. This is evidenced by a December 2017 North Atlantic Council statement concerning Russia’s INF compliance, and a statement on the INF Treaty in the Brussels Summit Declaration this summer with the strongest Alliance language to date on NATO’s concerns with Russia’s compliance with the Treaty.

A more detailed accounting of specific engagements on the INF Treaty with allies and Russia is contained in the relevant portions of the classified version of the Report on Noncompliance by the Russian Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty delivered quarterly to Congress.

Question. Is the INF Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. The Administration believes the INF Treaty is in the U.S. national security interest if all parties are in compliance with their obligations.

Question. When will State Department representatives next meet with Russian counterparts to discuss how to resolve Russia’s current noncompliance with the INF Treaty?

Answer. There are no meetings specifically on INF scheduled at this time. The Administration regularly raises Russia’s INF Treaty violation and other noncompliance issues in appropriate meetings with Russian officials.

Question. Has the State Department been instructed to ask European allies and partners to consider hosting a potential U.S. ground-launched, intermediate-range missile system? Have any European allies or partners volunteered to do so?

Answer. No.

OPEN SKIES TREATY

On September 10, 2018 the United States refused to certify the new Russian Tu-214 aircraft for flights under the Treaty on Open Skies. At the time, the United States was the only country to vote against certification. You represented that the reason for this vote was that U.S. experts wanted more time to review additional data before making a final decision:

Question. Who made the decision that additional data was needed before the United States could certify Russia’s new aircraft? What specific data was reviewed and why wasn’t this information available to the United States before the September 10 meeting?

Answer. Technical experts from the United States and 22 other States Parties participated in the Certification Event for Russia’s Tu-214 aircraft from September

2–10, 2018. At its conclusion, the United States declined to consent to the certification due to ongoing discussions in Washington. No additional data was required from the Russian Federation at that time. On September 18, the United States informed all States Parties that it would certify Russia's aircraft.

Question. What instructions did you provide to the State Department delegation before departing Washington, DC to attend the September 10, 2018 meeting regarding certification of Russia's new Open Skies aircraft? Was the delegation specifically instructed to refuse to certify the aircraft and collect additional data, or was that decision made later?

Answer. Prior to the certification team's departure to Russia to participate in the Certification Event, the Senior U.S. Representative received technical guidance for U.S. participation in the inspection of Russia's aircraft and sensor. Prior to the signing ceremony on September 10, the U.S. team was instructed not to sign the Certification Report, pending further discussions in Washington.

Question. Before the vote, did the United States give our European partners or allies like France or Canada or the U.K. and warning of our planned objection? If so, how far in advance?

Answer. The United States closely collaborated with our Allies and partners in the Open Skies Treaty throughout the 120-plus day certification process, to include on the ground in Russia during the final Certification Event from September 2–10, 2018.

Question. In the State Department's view, is the Open Skies Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. Yes, the Department continues to believe the Open Skies Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. The Treaty contributes to stability through the transparency and confidence building it provides among its 34 States Parties. This is particularly important during this time of increased tensions in Europe.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Question. Emerging technologies—such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence—may potentially impact strategic stability. The science and technology behind these weapons is advancing rapidly, while the policy and diplomatic conversation is not. What discussions is the State Department having within the U.S. government to develop a diplomatic strategy for engaging with Russia, China, and others on how these weapons intersect with America's national security and foreign policy? Have you raised the possibility of discussing these issues with Russia, China, or others? Could our strategic stability talks with Russia provide a good platform for having these discussions?

Answer. You are correct. Emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and others, could have the potential to impact strategic stability. This was a driver behind Secretary Pompeo's June 30, 2018, decision to create a new Cyberspace Security and Emerging Technology Bureau that would report to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security. This Bureau will oversee the Department's efforts to pursue international engagements, in bilateral and multilateral venues, to advance U.S. national security interests in these areas. The Department will be raising these issues with our foreign counterparts as opportunities become available, to include potentially at strategic stability talks.

Question. Both the State and Defense Departments appear to support resuming our strategic stability talks with Russia. John Rood, undersecretary of defense for policy, said July 20 at the Aspen Security Forum said that, "we would also like to talk more about strategic stability, making sure there are clear understandings between the United States and Russia about these terribly lethal weapons that we both control and talk about the future of nonproliferation." Despite a Presidential summit and meeting between our national security advisors, no new talks have been scheduled. Why?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where

the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. When does the State Department estimate the next round of strategic stability talks will occur? Who does the State Department anticipate will lead the U.S. and Russian delegations to these talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. The Trump administration has repeatedly asserted that Russia has adopted a policy of escalate to de-escalate—a doctrine in which they would use a nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict they were losing. Has the State Department explicitly asked its counterparts in either the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Russian military about this supposed doctrine? If not, why not?

Answer. As explained in the Administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Russian strategy and doctrine emphasize the potential coercive and military uses of nuclear weapons. Russia mistakenly assesses that the threat of nuclear escalation or actual first use of nuclear weapons would serve to “de-escalate” a conflict on terms favorable to Russia. These mistaken perceptions increase the prospect for dangerous miscalculation and escalation.

The United States has discussed the Nuclear Posture Review with Russia, and has regularly expressed concerns regarding Russia’s nuclear strategy and doctrine to Russian officials. As the two countries hold the preponderance of the world’s nuclear weapons, we have to manage our relations by adopting responsible nuclear doctrines to avoid unnecessary conflict and maintain strategic stability.

Question. The Trump administration began talks earlier this year on a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. In May, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told this committee that “we have told them [Saudi Arabia] we want a gold-standard Section 123 Agreement from them.” What is the status of the administration’s negotiations with Saudi Arabia on a possible 123 agreement?

Answer. The United States and Saudi Arabia have been in negotiations for a 123 agreement since 2012, and the negotiations remain ongoing.

Question. The Atomic Energy Act, which is a U.S. law, requires the President to keep the Senate Foreign Relations Committee “fully and currently informed of any initiative or negotiations relating to a new or amended agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation.” Does the State Department feel it is meeting this standard?

Answer. The Department of State is committed to keeping the relevant committees informed of the status of all 123 Agreement negotiations, consistent with the Department’s statutory obligations under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. Department officials would be available to brief interested Committee Members in a classified setting at an appropriate time.

Question. In the wake of President Trump’s decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir told CNN that “if Iran acquires a nuclear capability, we will do everything we can to do the same.” These remarks echo similar comments by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in March. When asked about al-Jubeir’s comment, the White House press secretary said, “Right now, I don’t know that we have a specific policy announcement on that front, but I can tell you that we are very committed to making sure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons.” Does the administration support the longstanding, bipartisan U.S. policy to actively work against the spread of nuclear weapons to any country, friend or foe, or does the administration’s silence on these threats indicate a change to this policy? If no, then why haven’t we spoken out against Saudi Arabia’s comments? Are we somehow okay with Saudi Arabia potentially pursuing nuclear weapons?

Answer. Saudi Arabia is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a strong security partner of the United States. As an NPT Party, Saudi Arabia has a legal obligation never to acquire nuclear weapons and to apply full scope IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities. The United States remains firmly

committed to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, and attaches great importance to Saudi Arabia's continued fulfillment of all of its nonproliferation obligations, including those under the NPT. In addition, the United States is committed to working cooperatively with Saudi Arabia to address the full range of Iranian malign activities, which pose a serious threat to security and stability in the region.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION (NPT) TREATY

Question. In the spring of 2020, the parties of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will meet for the Treaty's Review Conference. What will the United States present as a demonstration of its commitment to its obligations under Article V of the Treaty?

Answer. Article V of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) deals with the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. This provision has never been invoked. In light of efforts to maintain a worldwide moratorium on all nuclear test explosions, Article V has little practical relevance.

Question. Why hasn't the Administration pursued the ratification of the three Protocols to various Nuclear Weapons Free Zones that are currently available for consideration here in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

Answer. The United States has historically supported Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties as a way for regional states to advance regional security and to reinforce the global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NWFZ treaties and their accompanying protocols provide a vehicle for extending to NWFZ treaty parties a legally binding negative security assurance. The United States has signed the protocols to the NWFZ treaties covering Africa, Central Asia, and the South Pacific, and the previous Administration submitted them to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. The Trump Administration has not completed its policy review with respect to these protocols.

MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. Do U.S. missile defense policies have an effect on strategic stability matters and can those policies have a deleterious effect on arms control?

Answer. Missile defense systems are not destabilizing. Russia develops, deploys, and is modernizing its own strategic and regional missile defense capabilities. Missile defenses provide a capability to protect the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. The current limited numbers of interceptors deployed world-wide do not compare to the thousands of missiles employed by our adversaries. For example, our homeland missile defense system consisting of 44 deployed Ground-Based Interceptors, is no match for Russia's deterrent force of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and 1550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Our homeland missile defense system is not designed to counter Russia's sophisticated ballistic missiles; it is designed to defeat ballistic missile threats posed by countries like North Korea and potentially Iran. For these reasons, our limited homeland missile defenses pose no threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent and do not have a deleterious effect on arms control.

Question. To what extent has the Department of State been involved in the formation of the Missile Defense Review? Are there State representatives present at all meetings related to the formation of the Missile Defense Review? Have you personally been involved in the formation of the Missile Defense Review?

Answer. State representatives up to the level of the Deputy Secretary have participated in the Missile Defense Review process, including interagency meetings overseeing and approving the drafting of the Review. Since my confirmation as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security earlier this year, I have been personally involved in the Missile Defense Review and have had oversight of the Department of State's participation in the Review process.

MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. Have our allies been informed about current deliberations surrounding the Missile Defense Review? Will they be briefed in advance of the release?

Answer. The Departments of State and Defense consulted with allies and partners during the MDR process. We are also collaborating on a plan for rolling out the MDR, which includes briefings to Congress as well as to allies and partners.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

Question. Do you agree that it is vital that the United States and Russia continue to cooperate on issues related to nuclear weapons, even as bilateral relations have deteriorated due to a range of Russian bad behaviors?

Answer. Yes. In Helsinki, the leaders of the United States and Russia affirmed the importance of continuing discussion on nuclear issues, given that our two countries hold the preponderance of the world's nuclear weapons and have a duty to manage our relations responsibly.

Question. In March, President Putin publicly announced the development of three new types of nuclear weapons that are either purported under development or in a testing phase—a hypersonic nuclear armed cruise missile, a new heavy ICBM, and an underwater drone. Would these systems be accountable under the New START Treaty if they are tested to a range of greater than 5,500 kilometers? Would extending New START provide the United States greater transparency into these concerning, new strategic systems?

Answer. The United States has raised questions related to the systems unveiled during President Putin's March 1 address with Russian officials in the appropriate fora. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified setting.

Question. Would the predictability and value to our defense intelligence community relating to U.S. insight into the number, movement and disposition of Russian strategic forces be lost if the New START Treaty was allowed to expire in 2021? Would conclusion of a treaty or agreement that has no verification regime—along the lines of the 2002 Moscow Treaty—provide the same level of insight that is presently offered by New START?

Answer. We refer you to the Intelligence Community for its views on the predictability and value of the current treaty.

Should the Treaty expire, U.S. inspectors would lose their current access to Russian strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems, bases, and infrastructure, as well as the Treaty's biannual exchange of data and associated updates on the location and status of Russia's strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. Should New START expire and the United States and Russia enter into an agreement that has a less robust verification regime, it would not provide the same level of insight into Russian systems as the New START Treaty's verification regime.

Question. Is the administration undertaking a review of the risks to national security if New START expires? If so, when can we anticipate its completion?

Answer. The Administration is undertaking a review of whether extending the New START Treaty is in the U.S. national security interest. This review includes analyzing how the Treaty's expiration would impact U.S. national security. The Treaty does not expire until February 5, 2021, and there is no timeline for the review's completion.

Question. The 2013 U.S. Nuclear Employment Strategy states that the United States could seek up to a 1/3 reduction in its deployed strategic forces below New START and still "ensure the security of the United States and our allies and our partners." Is that still the U.S. position?

Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) describes how the global security environment has deteriorated in recent years and highlights the return of Great Power competition. In his preface to the 2018 NPR, Secretary Mattis stated "we must recognize that the current environment makes further progress toward nuclear arms reductions in the near term extremely challenging." While affirming arms control as a tool that can contribute to maintaining strategic stability, the NPR states "progress is difficult to envision, however, in an environment that is characterized by nuclear-armed states seeking to change borders and overturn existing norms, and by significant, continuing non-compliance with existing arms control obligations and commitments."

Question. Has the administration presented Russia with a roadmap detailing the steps Russia must take to return to compliance with the INF treaty?

Answer. Yes. The Administration is happy to provide additional detail in a classified briefing.

Question. Do the other Parties to the Treaty—Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Belarus—as well as NATO allies support efforts to fix and strengthen the INF Treaty?

Answer. Yes. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus, the other INF Parties who still participate in the Treaty's Special Verification Commission, have recently reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty.

NATO allies have spoken on the need to preserve the INF Treaty as well, including by noting in this summer's Brussels Summit Declaration that the Treaty "has been crucial to Euro-Atlantic security" and that the Alliance remains "fully committed to the preservation of this landmark arms control treaty."

Additionally, NATO maintains "full compliance with the Treaty is essential," and that the United States is in compliance with its obligations under the INF Treaty. NATO notes in this Declaration "in the absence of any credible answer from Russia on this new missile, the most plausible assessment would be that Russia is in violation of the Treaty," and urges greater transparency by Russia in addressing U.S. concerns.

Question. Is it still the U.S. Government's assessment that Iran has complied with its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as is stated in the 2017 State Department Annual Compliance Report, submitted to Congress in April 2018?

Answer. As reported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran continues to implement its commitments under the JCPOA. As President Trump has made clear, however, we view the JCPOA as a flawed deal. Following U.S. withdrawal from the arrangement on May 8, we are therefore seeking to impose maximum pressure on Iran to bring it back to the negotiating table in order to conclude a comprehensive agreement that resolves, not just the nuclear proliferation threats left unaddressed by the JCPOA but indeed the totality of Iran's malign conduct.

RESPONSES OF HON. ANDREA L. THOMPSON TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

STRATEGIC STABILITY TALKS

The United States and Russia held a first round of strategic stability talks last September in Helsinki. The specific agenda was not disclosed. A second round of talks was slated to take place on March 7–8 in Vienna, but Russia announced that it would not participate in the talks, citing the U.S. cancellation of bilateral consultations on cybersecurity that had been scheduled to take place in late February in Geneva.

A follow-up meeting on Helsinki between National Security Adviser John Bolton and his Russian counterpart, Nikolai Patrushev, in Geneva on August 23 had been expected to lead to an agreement to resume bilateral strategic stability talks, but no announcement occurred.

Question. Why has the administration been unable to schedule the resumption of strategic stability talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. What is the administration's plan for restarting strategic stability talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. What does the administration consider to be the benefits of strategic stability talks?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. What are the administration's goals for future strategic stability talks with Russia?

Answer. At their meeting in Helsinki earlier this year, President Trump and President Putin directed their respective national security advisors to continue discussions on issues relevant to easing tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore cooperation in areas of mutual interest. As Ambassador Bolton stated after meeting his Russian counterpart, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, in August, the two sides discussed a number of issues, including some related to strategic stability. This was just one example of the various fora where the United States and Russia discuss matters relating to strategic stability. We will continue these discussions as appropriate in the interest of U.S. national security.

Question. If New START is not extended, do you acknowledge that modernization plans risk losing the support of many in Congress?

Answer. The Administration is reviewing whether it will extend New START beyond 2021. Regardless of the outcome of this review, fully funding the modernization of our nuclear forces is essential to ensuring that the U.S. deterrent remains credible. Congress must continue its bipartisan support for modernizing U.S. nuclear forces to ensure that the United States can continue to meet its deterrence and assurance objectives. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated there is no higher priority for national defense. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act states that the United States must "afford the highest priority to the modernization of the nuclear triad, dual-capable aircraft, and related command and control elements."

Additionally, the Administration has continued to support arms control and disarmament efforts that enhance U.S. national security and the security of our allies and partners. We continue efforts to minimize the number of nuclear weapons states, deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; strictly control weapons-usable material, related technology, and expertise; and seek arms control agreements that enhance security, are verifiable and enforceable. Specifically, the Administration has supported the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, completed the reductions of strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty, and has continued full implementation of New START.

Question. Has the Department considered this potential outcome in its review of the New START treaty?

Answer. Any decision regarding whether to support extending the New START Treaty will include an analysis of ongoing U.S. modernization efforts and a projection of U.S. deterrence requirements over the period of a potential extension. It is critical that we maintain the ability to meet our deterrence and assurance requirements. As affirmed by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, constraining potential adversaries' arsenals through arms control agreements remains a tool to help achieve this goal.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR MARCO RUBIO

COMPLIANCE ISSUES WITH INF TREATY AND NEW START TREATY

In a March speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled details of new weapons supposedly under development that he described nearly a dozen times as "strategic" in the Kremlin's English translation. These new kinds of strategic nuclear arms include hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles and nuclear-powered ballistic missiles, and a nuclear torpedoes shot from drone submarines. I appreciated hearing your view that some, if not all, of these new kinds of Russian strategic nuclear arms, which are said by Putin to be under development, could fall under the New START Treaty's limits on strategic weapons.

Question. For the written record, I wanted to confirm whether or not the United States has ever asked the Russians to notify these new kinds of strategic nuclear arms, or ever otherwise discussed or raised these systems with Russian officials, in the context of the under the U.S.-Russian bilateral consultative commission (BCC) or via any other channel?

Answer. The United States began raising questions related to these new Russian systems earlier this year prior to and during the most recent session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC).

Question. As you acknowledged in your testimony, Russia is violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty). Rather than own-up to its non-compliance and resolve these issues in good faith, however, the Kremlin has repeatedly tried to change the narrative by accusing the U.S. government of violating the INF Treaty. What allegations are the Russians making about U.S. violations of the INF Treaty? Is there any truth to these allegations?

Answer. The United States has attempted to address Russia's violations with Russian officials since 2013. Thus far, Russia has refused to engage in a substantive manner. Instead, the Russian Federation raised allegations that falsely assert that the United States is in violation of the INF Treaty, allegations that in two cases were initially raised and addressed years before the United States found Russia in violation of the INF Treaty.

Russia has accused the United States of violating the INF Treaty in three areas: using ballistic target missiles to test missile defense systems; armed, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); and Aegis Ashore missile defense system capabilities. These accusations are baseless. The United States has always been and remains in full compliance with all of its INF Treaty obligations. The United States has directly and substantively refuted these allegations on multiple occasions in meetings with Russian officials.

Question. Does the Russian government expressly acknowledge that the United States is in full compliance with New START?

Answer. No. In its response to the U.S. Arms Control Compliance Report for 2017, the Russian Federation expresses its view of on-going implementation of the New START Treaty and alleges "problems with its implementation by the American side." Russia claims that the United States achieved some of its reductions under the New START Treaty "by manipulations that are incorrect from the point of view of contractual practice." Specifically, Russia claims that the United States "incorrectly removed some items from New START accountability using conversions that Russian inspectors cannot verify."

The United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty. Russia's assertions are baseless. The United States converted and removed these items from the New START Treaty's accountability in accordance with the Treaty's provisions. The United States has exhaustively addressed Russia's concerns in the New START Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Question. Is the Russian government currently in full compliance with the INF Treaty? And with the New START Treaty?

Answer. The Russian Federation remains in violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers, or to possess or produce launchers of such a missile.

The United States assesses that the Russian Federation is in compliance with the New START Treaty.

Question. If Russia refuses to do what's required to get in full compliance with the INF Treaty, what should the United States do in terms of the future of the INF Treaty?

Answer. Although the Administration's current strategy for responding to Russia's INF Treaty violation is aimed at convincing Russia to return to compliance, the strategy also acknowledges that the United States must be prepared for the eventuality of a world without the INF Treaty should Russia cause the INF Treaty to fail.

As part of the U.S. Integrated Strategy for responding to the violation, the Department of Defense has commenced INF Treaty-compliant research and development of conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems that could be pursued if the INF Treaty limits no longer exist. Should the Russian Federation's actions result in the collapse of the INF Treaty, these efforts will prepare the United States to better defend itself and its allies.

Question. Given Russia's ongoing noncompliance with the INF Treaty, does it make sense to start negotiations for an extension or follow-on to the New START Treaty before Russia comes into full compliance with the INF Treaty?

Answer. The United States remains willing to engage in a prudent arms control agenda. We are prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return Parties to predictability and transparency, and we remain receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States and its allies and partners. The United States will continue to implement the New START Treaty fully, which complements U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy by contributing to a transparent and predictable strategic balance between the United States and Russia. We will consider next steps related to the New START Treaty at the appropriate time, taking into account Russia's compliance with its obligations under the New START Treaty and other arms control agreements.

Question. What strategy does the United States have for addressing, diplomatically and militarily, the growth of Russian tactical nuclear weapons and other nuclear weapons systems, which the Kremlin is fielding for potential use in military contingencies in Europe, but which are not covered by the New START Treaty or the INF Treaty?

Answer. Russia has expanded and is modernizing its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. DIA estimates that Russia possesses approximately two thousand non-strategic nuclear warheads. The Administration has taken note of the new strategic nuclear weapons announced by President Vladimir Putin on March 1, 2018. In addition, Russia has rejected U.S. efforts to seek negotiated reductions in tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. Russia's nuclear modernization efforts and lack of interest in further negotiated arms reductions highlight a dramatic deterioration of the strategic environment that predates this Administration. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review recommends two supplemental nuclear capabilities to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces to respond to this challenge: the low-yield ballistic missile and the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. These modest supplements to the U.S. nuclear force will enhance deterrence by denying Russia any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment could provide an advantage over the United States or its allies and partners.

Question. Was the future of the New START treaty discussed during the drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review?

Answer. The New START Treaty was discussed during the analysis and drafting of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Both the United States and Russia met the central limits of the New START Treaty by the February 5, 2018 deadline—three days after the Nuclear Posture Review was released. The Administration has made no decision regarding potential extension of the New START Treaty beyond its expiration in February 2021.

Question. Are there any ongoing discussions, or plans to hold discussions, in the interagency to determine potential impacts on nuclear modernization and whether the treaty should be extended?

Answer. Yes, the Administration has assessed and continues to assess the value, risks, and consequences to U.S. national security of either extending the New START Treaty or not extending it.

Question. If the treaty were not to be extended, would the 2018 NPR require a revision?

Answer. Regardless of a decision whether or not to extend the New START Treaty, the guidance laid out in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would not require a revision. The NPR clearly states that the United States is prepared to consider arms control opportunities that return parties to compliance, predictability, and transparency, and the United States is receptive to future arms control negotiations if conditions permit and the potential outcome improves the security of the United States, its allies, and partners. This guidance will be used to guide the Administration's decision whether to extend the New START Treaty, and will continue to be implemented after any decision is made in order to continue to advance the security of the United States, and its allies and partners.

CTBT

Some experts have suggested that the Russians, and perhaps also the Chinese, have conducted low-yield events, skirting the definition of a test in the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Question. Has Russia or China ever conducted any nuclear weapons-related events or testing that circumvents the spirit or the letter of the CTBT?

Answer. Classified response.

Question. Does the United States view Russia's or China's nuclear weapons-related events or testing activities as violating either the spirit or the letter of the CTBT?

Answer. Classified response.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

OPEN SKIES TREATY

From September 2–10, 2018, experts from the United States and 22 other States Parties met in Russia for the Certification of Russia's Tu-214 Open Skies aircraft and its associated sensor. This was the same sensor the United States previously determined in 2016 met the treaty requirements. At the meeting, all other treaty parties approved the sensor except the United States, which declined to do so. The United States then apparently back tracked on its decision and certified the Russian aircraft.

Question. Did the United States consult our allies before the September meeting about our decision not to certify the plane at that time?

Answer. All States participating in the certification event were given limited advance notice that the Senior Representative of the United States was not authorized to sign the Certification Report; that the United States would issue an Open Skies Format 35 message within 14 days, as required by the Treaty; and that this action did not preclude the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft and sensor following further consultations in Washington.

Question. How did the State Department specifically come to the decision not to certify the plane? And why did it reverse this decision?

Answer. On September 10, 2018, the United States did not sign the certification report due to ongoing discussions in Washington. The United States announced its intent to certify the aircraft and sensor on September 18, 2018, and signed the certification report on September 24, 2018. I would respectfully refer you to the Department of State for further questions regarding their internal discussions.

Question. What legal and technical issues were identified for not certifying the plane?

Answer. On September 10, 2018, the United States did not sign the certification report due to ongoing discussions in Washington. Those discussions concluded and on September 18, 2018, the United States informed all States Parties via formal Treaty mechanisms that it would sign the certification report for Russia's aircraft and sensor. The United States signed the report on September 24, 2018.

Question. Is the United States seeking to use certification decisions as a political tool to put pressure on Russia for its Open Skies violations? Would the United States be in violation of our legal obligation under the Open Skies treaty if we held up certification of aircraft and associated sensors without a technical justification for our decision?

Answer. Open Skies Treaty certifications follow a technical process intended to ensure, through extensive and intrusive inspections, that the aircraft and sensor combination being presented for certification meet the relevant requirements of the Treaty. The United States has not linked its position on such certifications to the resolution of Russia's violations of the Treaty.

Question. Has the United States assessed which of the systems President Putin unveiled in March 2018 would be constrained by New START? Has the United States assessed whether the new Russian systems unveiled in March 2018 will be deployed during the lifetime of New START? Has the United States assessed when Russia's newly unveiled systems are likely to be fielded and deployed by the Russian military? Please include a classified answer to this set of questions if necessary.

Answer. The United States has reviewed the systems President Putin unveiled in March 2018. The Defense Intelligence Agency conducted a highly classified assessment and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is prepared to brief the findings and implications.

Question. As part of our pressure campaign to push the Russian Federation back into compliance, has the United States called upon Russia to halt production of the 9M729? Has the United States asked Russia to provide an exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review its technical characteristics and determine whether it can fly more than 500km, which would violate the treaty? Has the Russian government put forward any proposals to address the United States concerns about the 9M729? Has the United States scheduled another meeting of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) or a bilateral meeting with Russia to discuss a diplomatic solution to Russia's INF violation?

Answer. Russia has violated core tenets of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess and produce launchers of such missiles. Russia knows what it must do to return to compliance, but Russia has not substantively addressed U.S. concerns in any way. We conducted three bilateral experts meetings and two SVC meetings. No further meetings are currently scheduled.

Question. Has the United States asked Russia to provide an exhibition of the 9M729 so U.S. experts can review its technical characteristics and determine whether it would fly more than 500km, which would violate the treaty?

Answer. Russia has violated core tenets of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not to possess, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess and produce launchers of such missiles. Russia knows what it must do to return to compliance, but Russia has not substantively addressed U.S. concerns in any way. We conducted three bilateral experts meetings and two SVC meetings. No further meetings are currently scheduled.

Question. The United States and Russia held a first round of strategic stability talks last September in Helsinki. These talks in the past have been critical for reducing the risk of nuclear conflict. Does the administration support a resumption of strategic stability talks? Has Russia indicated whether they support resumption of the talks? In future strategic stability talks will the United States raise hypersonic delivery systems and cyberattacks as potential dangers to strategic stability?

Answer. No further strategic stability talks are currently scheduled, although the United States is not opposed to further discussions. Without speculating on the agenda, hypersonic weapons and cyberattacks are among the issues that could be discussed, were talks to resume.

Question. The Missile Defense Review mandated by Congress was originally scheduled for release alongside the Nuclear Posture Review in February. However, Congress has still not received a copy of this report. When will the Administration publish its Missile Defense Review?

Answer. The Secretary assigns a high priority to the Missile Defense Review (MDR) and has directed the Department to proceed with the Review's completion and release. The report is in the final stages of completion, and the MDR will be released in the near future. The MDR is an important strategic document and should be released to the Congress and the public. Thank you for support of our missile defense programs and the warfighters who operate them.

Question. What has delayed the process?

Answer. The Department's efforts to prepare the MDR have been very thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. The Department has also carefully taken into account recent missile threat and technological developments.

Question. Do you agree there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and defensive strategic arms?

Answer. Both strategic offensive arms and defensive capabilities, properly configured, sized, and postured, can promote stability by enhancing deterrence of both conventional and nuclear war.

Question. Have U.S. strategic missile defense deployments influenced the size, capabilities, and posture of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces since the United States withdrew from the ABM treaty? Please include a classified answer to this set of questions if necessary.

Answer. There can be a number of national and strategic goals and objectives that influence the size, capabilities, and posture of Russian and Chinese nuclear forces as well as their missile defenses. The composition of strategic capabilities is likely

based on a combination of these goals and objectives, rather than on a single one. For example, Russian leaders decided that building a missile defense system to protect Russian territory is in its strategic interests. They deploy defenses against both long-range and shorter-range ballistic missiles. In addition, history has shown that Russia engaged in its most substantial buildup of strategic nuclear weapons after the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. That said, we have been clear about the role and purpose of our missile defense policy. U.S. homeland missile defenses are focused on staying ahead of rogue state ICBM threats. These defenses are not capable of negating Russian and Chinese strategic forces, which greatly exceed in number and capability our homeland missile defenses. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to deter a potential Russian or Chinese nuclear attack.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

NEW START TREATY

In comments just a few weeks ago, National Security Advisor Bolton said the Trump administration is “very, very early in the process of considering” what it wants to do about the New START Treaty.

Question. Is this the first time since the Trump administration came into office in January 2017 that the Defense Department is reviewing its position with regard to the New START Treaty? If so, why is the Trump administration just starting its review now? If not, why is the Trump administration re-reviewing its position with regard to New START?

Answer. The Administration began reviewing the status of all arms control treaties and agreements in January 2017, including the New START Treaty. The Administration initially focused on assessing Russia’s current compliance with the New START Treaty, assessing Russian progress toward achieving its reductions by the February 2018 deadline, and Russia’s compliance with other treaties and agreements. Now that we assess that Russia achieved its reductions by the February 2018 deadline, the Administration is focused on monitoring Russia’s on-going implementation of the New START Treaty and other treaties.

Question. What specifically is being reviewed at the Defense Department in the “process” to which Ambassador Bolton referred? What is the timeline for completion of this review?

Answer. The Department of Defense is focused on assessing Russia’s implementation of the New START Treaty and Russia’s modernization of its strategic forces. For example, several of the new strategic systems announced by Russian President Putin in his speech on March 1, 2018, meet the criteria for what the Department of Defense believes the New START Treaty calls “new kinds of strategic offensive arms.”

Question. The Defense Department often emphasizes how important “stability” and “predictability” are for national security. Is the same not also true for policy? Does the military use information gained from New START data exchanges and inspections to inform our own force posture decisions? If so, please explain how.

Answer. The military uses a variety of information regarding Russian nuclear forces, including New START Treaty data, to inform our own force posture decisions. The verification procedures in New START provide insights into Russian behavior that inform U.S. nuclear force posture decisions. Because the security environment remains dynamic, U.S. policy must be adaptable to changing circumstances; policies that are not aligned with strategic realities do not protect our national security.

Question. If New START isn’t extended, what specific adjustments will the Defense Department have to consider making to U.S. force posture vis-a-vis Russia? How specifically would America’s nuclear forces have to be adjusted?

Answer. Recommendations regarding adjustments to the U.S. force posture, if any are needed, would be made based on an assessment of how changes to the Russian Federation’s force posture affects our ability to fulfill the roles nuclear weapons play in our national security strategy. Without knowing what changes the Russians might make in the absence of New START, it is not possible to say what adjustments would be required.

Question. If New START expires, is there anything to stop the Russians from moving rapidly to expand their strategic forces? Is the U.S. military comfortable

with no limits on Russia's strategic nuclear forces? Really want to have to go nuclear weapon for nuclear weapon with Russia?

Answer. The United States is not interested in matching Russian nuclear forces weapon for weapon. However, regardless of the future of the New START Treaty, the United States will do what is necessary to maintain a credible and effective nuclear deterrent.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) AGREEMENT

Last December the Trump administration announced "new diplomatic, military, and economic measures intended to induce" Russia "to return to compliance" with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and "to deny it any military advantage should it persist in its violation." This included beginning research on "concepts and options for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems."

Question. What is the status of these efforts and how much has DoD spent on them to date?

Answer. For the last year, the Department of Defense has reviewed and evaluated options for systems it could develop if it were not constrained by the INF Treaty. The effort up to now has been largely pre-decisional, staff-level analysis to evaluate and narrow the range of options for candidate systems. The Department is now prepared to begin formal research and development activities, pending appropriation of the \$48M DoD requested in Fiscal Year 2019. The Department is also working through the budget process to ensure it has the necessary funding to continue these efforts beyond Fiscal Year 2019. At present, all research and development efforts remain compliant with U.S. obligations under the INF Treaty and would only proceed to testing and production if the INF Treaty obligations no longer exist.

Question. Is the INF Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. The value of the INF Treaty, or any arms control treaty, depends on all Parties remaining in compliance. Russia's violation of the INF Treaty is a concrete threat to U.S. forces and to allies and partners in Europe and Asia. Russia's blatant violation of the Treaty has resulted in U.S. unilateral compliance, and calls into question the continued viability of the Treaty. It is Russia's actions that will ultimately determine the future of the INF Treaty.

Question. What evidence do you have to suggest that conducting research and development on a ground-launched, intermediate-range missile system will change Russia's behavior with regard to its noncompliance with the INF Treaty? If the premise of this strategy is wrong and R&D on this possible system is completed, what will the United States do next?

Answer. U.S. diplomatic efforts since 2013 have not resulted in any change to Russia's behavior with regard to its violation of the INF Treaty. Therefore, this Administration included a specific military measure commencing INF Treaty compliant research and development aimed at reminding Russia why it entered into the INF Treaty in the first place. Only Russia can answer the question of whether it will choose to alter its course as a result of this action. The United States is seeking to preserve the INF Treaty but Russia's actions will decide its fate. Either way, the United States will ensure its own national security and the security of our allies and partners.

Question. Has the Defense Department been instructed to ask European allies and partners to consider hosting a potential U.S. ground-launched, intermediate-range missile system? Have any European allies or partners volunteered to do so?

Answer. No, it remains too early to consider discussions on both matters.

OPEN SKIES TREATY

Question. On September 10, the United States refused to certify the new Russian Tu-214 aircraft for flights under the Treaty on Open Skies. Did the Defense Department provide a recommendation to the State Department and other interagency partners on whether to certify Russia's new aircraft in advance of the September 10 meeting?

Answer. The Department of Defense was involved in the interagency discussions regarding certification of Russia's new Open Skies aircraft.

Question. The State Department has represented that the United States did not certify the aircraft because U.S. experts needed more time to review additional data

before making a final decision. Was the Defense Department consulted on that decision?

Answer. I would respectfully refer you to the Department of State for any clarification of its representation.

Question. What additional data—if any—did the Defense Department review subsequent to the September 10, 2018 meeting to determine whether the United States should certify Russia's aircraft? Why wasn't this information available to the United States before the September 10 meeting?

Answer. At the conclusion of the certification event on September 10, the United States declined to consent to the certification due to ongoing discussions in Washington. On September 18, the United States informed all States Parties via formal treaty mechanisms that we would approve the certification of the Russian aircraft.

Question. Before the vote, did the United States give our European partners or allies like France or Canada or the U.K. and warning of our planned objection? If so, how far in advance?

Answer. All states participating in the certification event were given limited advance notice that the Senior Representative of the United States was not authorized to sign the Certification Report; that the United States would issue an Open Skies Format 35 message within 14 days, as required by the Treaty; and that this action did not preclude the United States from certifying the Russian aircraft following further consultations in Washington.

Question. In the Defense Department's view, is the Open Skies Treaty in the U.S. national security interest?

Answer. As Secretary Mattis stated in a letter to Senator Fischer in May 2018, it is the Department's view that it is in our best interest to remain a party to the Open Skies Treaty because it contributes to greater transparency and openness. However, Russia's actions in violation of certain provisions of the Treaty have the opposite effect and must be challenged.

Question. What is the progress on updating our own Open Skies aircraft to digital sensors? Was there anything, besides funding, that prevented the United States from moving to digital sensors faster?

Answer. The Department of Defense is working within the budget and acquisition process to update the sensors on our Open Skies aircraft. To date, the first of two aircraft has been modified with the new digital sensor. Testing is ongoing in preparation for Treaty certification of the new sensor.

2018 TRUMP ADMINISTRATION NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

The Trump administration has repeatedly asserted that Russia has adopted a policy of escalate to de-escalate—a doctrine in which they would use a nuclear weapon to end a conventional conflict they were losing.

Question. Has the Defense Department explicitly asked its counterparts in either the Russian Ministry of Defense, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Russian military about this supposed doctrine? If not, why not?

Answer. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has written about Russian military doctrine and emphasized that Russia has discussed using nuclear weapons to de-escalate a conflict. In addition, DoD officials have directly raised this doctrinal issue with Russian counterparts and expressed our concern about their doctrine and the risks it presents for miscalculation.

Question. The Trump administration is pressing forward with plans to develop the W76-2 "low-yield" nuclear warhead to be launched atop the Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Is a Trident D5 launched with a W76-2 warhead distinguishable from one with a high-yield W76 or W88 nuclear warhead? If not, does the Defense Department this poses any increased risk for miscalculation?

Answer. The W76-2 reduces the risk of miscalculation because it is meant to reinforce the credibility of our response. A credible response strengthens deterrence by denying potential adversaries the advantages they appear to believe they could realize from nuclear first use. It sends a signal to Russia and other potential adversaries that the United States is serious about maintaining an unambiguously strong nuclear deterrent.

The type of warhead is not distinguishable by observing a Trident D5 missile launch alone. The W76-2 is intended to provide a credible response option to a limited nuclear attack in order to strengthen deterrence of such an attack. We are confident that a nuclear-armed adversary that decides to use a nuclear weapon in a

limited way would anticipate that we would launch a response and that they would correctly calculate that the launch of a single Trident D5 missile would not be a large-scale attack.

Question. The United States already has “low-yield” nuclear weapons and delivery platforms in place to deter Russian aggression. Why are these options insufficient?

Answer. Although the United States has low-yield capable nuclear weapons, these weapons must be delivered by aircraft, which are vulnerable to formidable existing Russian air defenses. Russia may conclude that it could blunt the current U.S. low-yield response and that the United States would be self-deterred from using strategic nuclear weapons; the W76-2 low-yield warhead is intended to dispel this notion—however mistaken it might be.

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

Question. Emerging technologies—such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence—may potentially impact strategic stability. The science and technology behind these weapons is advancing rapidly, while the policy and diplomatic conversation is not. What discussions is the State Department having within the U.S. government to develop a diplomatic strategy for engaging with Russia, China, and others on how these weapons intersect with America’s national security and foreign policy?

Answer. In general, it should be noted that “emerging technologies” is an extremely broad term that covers many different technologies including artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons. However, I would defer to my State Department colleagues regarding diplomatic discussions on this topic.

Question. Have you raised the possibility of discussing these issues with Russia, China, or others? Could our strategic stability talks with Russia provide a good platform for having these discussions?

Answer. The issues of artificial intelligence and hypersonic weapons could be items for discussion with Russia or China, but I defer to the State Department regarding any plans to raise these issues in diplomatic forums.

Question. With respect to artificial intelligence, the State Department leads the U.S. participation in multilateral discussions on lethal autonomous weapon systems held under the auspices of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which includes China and Russia. Does the Defense Department view hypersonic weapons or artificial intelligence as threats to strategic stability?

Answer. Generally the Department views hypersonic weapons as posing a low risk to stability. The technical characteristics of these weapons are such that the risks of misinterpretation are low.

DoD does not view AI as an inherent threat to stability; artificial intelligence holds the promise of improved efficiency and effectiveness, to include improved compliance with the Law of War and improved humanitarian outcomes, as well as improved efficiencies in maintenance, personnel management and payroll, and other so-called “back-office” functions.

MODERNIZATION AND NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS

Question. The Administration likes to point to a broad, bipartisan consensus in support of upgrades to the U.S. nuclear infrastructure. That consensus is based on the idea that modernization would be paired with clear, committed, and continuous work on arms control and disarmament efforts. What has the Administration done over the last twenty months to support and enhance arms control and disarmament efforts?

Answer. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review notes that arms control can contribute to U.S., allied, and partner security by helping to manage strategic competition among states. The Administration has continued to support arms control and disarmament efforts that enhance U.S. national security and the security of our allies and partners. We continue efforts to establish the political and security conditions that would enable further nuclear reductions; deny terrorist organizations access to nuclear weapons and materials; strictly control weapons-usable material, related technology, and expertise; and seek arms control agreements that enhance security and are verifiable and enforceable. Specifically, the Administration has supported the goals of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and completed the reductions of strategic offensive arms under the New START Treaty. The Administration is working to convince States in violation of their arms control obligations

to return to compliance. We seek to reestablish the conditions necessary for greater trust with the Russian Federation and improved transparency with China.

Question. Since we knew that the Russians and Chinese were modernizing their forces back in 2013, what are the new specific nuclear-related events that have happened in the last five years that would justify not only maintaining our current numbers, but potentially expanding them?

Answer. Russia has repeatedly announced new programs and made specific nuclear threats directed at the United States and NATO Allies. For instance, in his March 1, 2018 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, Putin announced the creation of several new types of nuclear weapons, including: 1) a new heavy ICBM “equipped with powerful nuclear warheads, including hypersonic;” 2) an “unlimited-range nuclear-powered cruise missile;” and 3) intercontinental-range nuclear-powered unmanned underwater vehicles. Russia has also repeatedly brandished its nuclear sword in recent years against our NATO allies. During its invasion and illegal annexation of Crimea for instance, Russia raised the alert of its nuclear forces and issued veiled nuclear threats to warn against Western intervention. China has continued its practice of non-transparency and has steadily increased its reliance on nuclear weapons. In response, the United States studied these changes in the security environment and determined that the United States can address capability gaps by modernizing the nuclear enterprise and providing modest supplements to ensure that our adversaries do not miscalculate U.S. resolve. These supplemental capabilities would not expand the size of our nuclear arsenal.

MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW

Question. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act required the Missile Defense Review (MDR) to be completed by January 2018. On May 2, when the report was already four months late, you said you expected the MDR “to be out very soon.” Yet two months later on July 10 you stated “It’s coming out soon.” The Missile Defense Review is now eight months overdue—when will it be published?

Answer. The report is in the final stages of completion and will serve as the policy foundation and guide the Missile Defense Program Objective Memorandum for the Fiscal Year 2020 submission.

Question. What specifically has delayed release of the Missile Defense Review?

Answer. The Department’s efforts to prepare the MDR have been very thorough and comprehensive in order to produce a document in line with the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Nuclear Posture Review. These efforts have taken longer than planned but we expect the review to be out shortly.

Question. Will the Defense Department brief Congress in advance of the MDR’s release? Will the Defense Department brief foreign allies and partners about the MDR?

Answer. Yes, the Department will brief Congress as well as allies and partners on the MDR.

Question. Could increasing the amount of U.S. missile defense systems worldwide affect strategic stability?

Answer. Missile defense systems are not destabilizing. U.S. missile defenses have strengthened stability by diminishing the ability of countries like North Korea and Iran to coerce the U.S., its allies and partners. For example, our homeland missile defenses are oriented towards the strategic arsenals possessed by North Korea and, potentially, Iran. By undermining coercive strategies posed by these potential adversaries, missile defenses are a stabilizing factor that strengthen both deterrence and assurance. Despite claims to the contrary, U.S. missile defenses do not undermine Russia or China’s strategic nuclear deterrent.

Regional missile defenses similarly are stabilizing. These defenses cannot provide perfect protection, but can provide sufficient protection to our forces and infrastructure to strengthen conventional deterrence by undermining adversary confidence in their offensive missile capabilities.

The value of missile defenses is demonstrated, in part, by Russian and Chinese investments in missile defense systems.

Question. Is there an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms? If so, please detail what this interrelationship is.

Answer. Both strategic offensive arms and defensive capabilities, properly configured, sized and postured, can promote stability by enhancing deterrence of both conventional and nuclear war.

Question. In an article published in July 2016, you praised provisions in the fiscal year 2017 national defense authorization act calling for developing and integrating space-based missile defenses into the U.S. missile defense architecture and a policy of broadening U.S. territorial defense against more than just “limited” ballistic missile strikes. You added that these actions “would help make it clear that continued American vulnerability to Russian nuclear missiles is unacceptable.” Do you continue to believe that American vulnerability to Russian nuclear missiles is unacceptable? Will the forthcoming missile defense review reflect that view?

Answer. It is U.S. policy to defend our homeland from a potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack from regimes like North Korea and Iran. We rely on our nuclear forces to deter a strategic nuclear attack from Russia and China. However, even though our homeland missile defenses are designed to protect against regional powers, in the event of conflict, we will use our missile defense systems to the extent feasible to defend against an ICBM attack from any source. We will deploy and employ regional missile defenses to protect against any regional missile threat. This policy will be reflected in the Missile Defense Review.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

Question. One of the justifications given for the development of a low-yield submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is that the United States is “self-deterred” from responding to a limited use of Russian nuclear weapons. However, in addition to several conventional options, the United States already possess hundreds of newly life extended B-61 gravity bombs and hundreds more of low yield air launched cruise missiles (ALCM), launched as stand-off weapons to minimize risk to U.S. Air Force pilots. Given the current diverse options available to the President, is a new low-yield SLBM necessary?

Answer. The low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will be highly survivable when deployed in ballistic missile submarines at sea, while U.S. gravity bombs are more vulnerable in fixed storage and operating locations. SLBMs are highly accurate and, given their speed and trajectory, are better able to penetrate modern defenses that could challenge air-delivered weapons. The low-yield SLBM will provide an additional, assured option to bolster nuclear deterrence by ensuring adversaries do not miscalculate U.S. resolve and capabilities. The low-yield SLBM does not reduce the need for air-delivered gravity bombs and dual-capable aircraft, which can be forward deployed; contribute to allied burden sharing; provide visible assurance to both allies and partners; and serve as a tangible demonstration of U.S. extended deterrence guarantees.

Question. Given Russia would have mere minutes to react to the U.S. launch of a SLBM, what assurance do we have that Russia would not mistake a single low-yield warhead for a SLBM carrying multiple warheads with an explosive yield measuring hundreds of kilotons?

Answer. We are confident Russia could distinguish a single submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launch from a large-scale attack. Knowledge that we actually have a low-yield option should actually encourage restraint.

Question. If low-yield capable nuclear weapons have greater deterrence value, what is the possible reason for the administration to retain the B-83 megaton bomb, which is a nuclear weapon that boasts an explosive power of up to 80-times that which was used against Hiroshima in August 1945?

Answer. A low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead enhances deterrence by providing an additional, survivable response capability that an adversary must consider if contemplating a limited use scenario. The B83-1 enhances deterrence by maintaining a known capability that can effectively strike hard and deeply buried targets. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review reiterates the prior Administration’s commitment to retain the B83-1 in the stockpile until there is sufficient confidence in the B61-12 gravity bomb. Given the changed threat environment, deterrence requirements to hold a variety of protected targets at risk, and the unique capabilities of the B83-1 bomb to fulfill those requirements, the Administration decided to postpone B83-1 retirement until a suitable replacement is validated.

Question. The Department of Defense justified the need for the B-61 (12) Life-Extension Program (LEP), in part, on the basis that it would provide the United States an earth-penetrating capability to hold at risk underground targets. Is it no longer assessed that the B-61(12), which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) estimates could cost up to \$10 billion, can hold underground targets at risk?

Answer. We assess that the B-61(12) will be effective against a variety of targets, including some underground targets.

RESPONSES OF HON. DAVID J. TRACHTENBERG TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY
SENATOR CORY A. BOOKER

NEW START RENEWAL CONSIDERATIONS

During the hearing you outlined the importance of New START and its benefits to the United States. In your testimony you said, "Any decision on extending the Treaty will, and should be, based on a realistic assessment of whether the New START Treaty remains in our national security interest, *in light of overall Russian arms control behavior*".

Question. If the assessment is that the United States and Russia are both fully complying with New START, would the administration consider not extending it because of other difficulties with the Russia-U.S. relationship?

Answer. The Administration has not yet made a decision on whether or not to extend the New START Treaty. Future progress with the New START Treaty should occur in the context of actions taken by Russia with regard to all of its arms control obligations. Russia's appalling behavior of continued violations and non-compliance with other treaties and agreements remains an impediment to bilateral cooperation.

Question. What would be the consequences if there are no data exchanges, reciprocal inspections or verifiable limits on U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces, which would be the case if New START is allowed to expire with nothing to replace it?

Answer. Arms control treaties, such as the New START Treaty, can contribute to U.S. security by fostering transparency, establishing openness, and building confidence. However, these potential benefits must be weighed against Russia's overall arms control behavior, which suggests a policy of selective compliance that impedes transparency and diminishes confidence. The verification regime is important, but it is one of several factors in determining whether the New START Treaty continues to contribute to U.S. security.

Question. Recognizing that New START expires in February 2021, what is a realistic deadline for the U.S. to decide if it will seek to extend the treaty?

Answer. Deciding to extend the New START Treaty is a decision made between the Treaty's Parties and is not subject to any deadline other than the expiration of the Treaty itself in February 2021. The Administration has not yet made a decision on whether it will extend the New START Treaty.

RESOLVING THE INF TREATY DISPUTE

Because of a compliance dispute, the INF Treaty is under threat. A collapse of the INF Treaty would open the door to a U.S.-Russian arms race in intermediate-range missiles and have negative repercussions for the entire arms control agenda and pose a new threat to our NATO and European allies.

Some independent U.S. and Russian experts who are familiar with the nature of the Russian INF violation argue that Washington and Moscow should agree to reciprocal site visits by experts to examine Russia's disputed 9M729 missile and U.S. missile defense launchers in Romania and Poland. If the 9M729 missile is determined to have a range that exceeds 500 km, Russia could modify the missile to ensure it no longer violates the treaty or halt production and eliminate any such missiles in its possession. For its part, the United States could modify its missile defense launchers to clearly distinguish them from the launchers used to fire offensive missiles from U.S. warships or agree to transparency measures that give Russia confidence the launchers do not contain offensive missiles.

Question. Do you agree that in order to break the impasse, both sides need to address the concerns of the other side?

Answer. There is no equivalence between the two. The impasse is the result of the Russian Federation's continued unwillingness to address its serious breach of the INF Treaty. Russia has violated core tenets of the INF Treaty not to possess,

produce, or flight-test a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile and not to possess and produce launchers of such missiles.

Question. The United States has not violated the INF Treaty and remains in compliance with its obligations. The United States has addressed Russian allegations in a transparent and comprehensive manner during multiple engagements with the Russian Federation. Have you considered this or other reciprocal arrangements?

Answer. A site visit will not resolve Russia's violation. In order for the Russian Federation to return to compliance with its obligations, it must eliminate all 9M729 cruise missiles and associated launchers in a verifiable manner.

Question. What other approaches should we be exploring to get the Russians back into compliance?

Answer. The Administration continues to work through diplomatic channels to urge Russia to preserve the INF Treaty. We have engaged Russia bilaterally as well as in multilateral venues such as the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission.

Question. The Administration continues to apply pressure on Russia by conducting INF Treaty-compliant research and development of potential new ground-based strike capabilities. We urge Russia to begin recognizing that its violation will not make Russia more secure. When was the last time the administration met with representatives of Russia to discuss the INF issue? Who represented the United States and Russia at those talks?

Answer. The last dedicated meeting between the United States and the Russian Federation related to the INF Treaty occurred in June 2018 when technical experts of both countries met to discuss INF Treaty issues. Ambassador John Ordway and Mr. Vasiliy Boryak represented the United States and the Russian Federation, respectively.

