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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND THE REGION

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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF PAKISTAN AND THE REGION

Tuesday, May 17, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Webb, Coons, Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, DeMint, Isakson, and Lee.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order.

Thank you very much for coming this morning.

Today, is the fourth of a series of hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. And having just returned from the region, I will simply convey that at every stop and in every conversation I had, everybody had a sense of how critical this moment is for our strategies in the region, and in Afghanistan and in Pakistan.

Some people have reached a level of impatience about where we are and where we're going. But it's clear to me that we need to be very careful and thoughtful, so that we get the policy right, and we do not lose the progress that has been made. It is also clear that we face a very real, complicated struggle of long duration between these countries.

But we do have a vital national security interest in that region. And with close to 100,000 of our own troops, and 1,000 civilians who are sacrificing in many different ways, every day, to help build a better future and protect American interests, we owe it to them to develop a roadmap that allows us to responsibly transition to Afghan control and to advance regional stability.

Members on both sides of the aisle have appropriately been asking tough questions and examining every assumption that guides our strategy in the region. And I want to thank my colleagues for their thoughtful analysis and deliberation, which is a service to the American people. And I believe this committee can provide a continuing service to the American people as we put the facts out on the table, listen to experts like General Jones and others who come before us, and devise a strategy that does justice to the quality of the sacrifice and contribution of the folks who are over there 24/7/365. Some of them are on third or fourth tours, and occasionally even on a fifth tour in terms of Iraq and Afghanistan combined.

We're very fortunate to have General Jones here with us today to help us think about this. I think he is one of America's most distinguished, experienced, and capable public servants. I'm very pleased to call him a friend, and I'm glad he was able to come up here today to share his wisdom and insights with us.

Before we hear from General Jones, let me provide a short summary of what I perceived in the last few days, particularly, of the results of my conversations in Pakistan.

In Afghanistan, I visited Khost, which is RC East, right on the border of Pakistan, and a hot spot in terms of Haqqani Network activities coming out of the sanctuaries. And I spoke with our intelligence community personnel and others there about the impact of those sanctuaries and their analysis of the war.

I then flew north to Mazar-e-Sharif, where the unfortunate incident of the Blue Mosque and the U.N. took place not so long ago, in order to understand how the groups in the North—mostly Tajik in that place, but also Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Uzaras, and others view the prospects of reconciliation.

And in Kabul, in addition to meetings with our Embassy officials and with the U.N., I met with the Afghan Cabinet ministers, provincial governors, civil society leaders, and with President Karzai, and discussed the upcoming transition and the steps that we all need to take to ensure success.

And, finally, I had the distinct pleasure and honor of meeting with our men and women in uniform, including 500 National Guard troops from Massachusetts who are serving at Camp Phoenix, just on the outskirts of Kabul.

Let me share this thought with my colleagues—I know all of us feel this every time we go over there, but I just cannot help but be impressed by the quality of these special young men and women who are serving in the Armed Forces of the United States. They're smart, they're disciplined, they're remarkably committed, they know their jobs, they're away from their families, they're enduring hardships, they take life and death risks on a daily basis, and for that, none of us can really say thank you enough.

My discussions with them actually helped drive home a critical point. Whether I was speaking to somebody who wore a star on their uniform or a chevron on their sleeve, whether it was General Petraeus, or the young woman that I had a great pleasure of promoting to Staff Sergeant, every person that I spoke with across Afghanistan understood that there is no purely military solution; they all get it.

So, this is an important moment. And I believe that Osama bin Laden's death has opened up an opportunity. Certainly, I learned in Afghanistan that for Afghans, our accomplishment in achieving that raid has given them a renewed sense of political space and opportunity—and of confidence about the American commitment.

Afghans do not want the Taliban to return, overwhelmingly. But many have concerns about what reconciliation means, in terms of their interests. Above all, they don't want their struggles and sacrifices over the last 10 years to be in vain.

There are many courageous Afghans, and I had the privilege of meeting some of them, like Nadar Nadari, or Governor Serabi from Bamiyan, who are daily struggling to bring about a better future

for their country through peaceful means. And we need to empower those voices so they can lead their country in the right direction.

After discussions with President Karzai and with General Petraeus, I am optimistic that we can find a way forward that significantly changes the American footprint and secures our interests. And on Saturday night, I sat with President Karzai and listened to him talk about the necessity of bringing all of the parties to the negotiating table.

He understands that time and American patience are running out, but he's also confident that there's a way forward that meets everybody's needs. He also realizes that Afghanistan is going to suffer an enormous economic shock when international forces leave and that we have to work together on a plan that is financially and militarily sustainable to Afghans and Americans, alike.

Finally, let me just say that as much as bin Laden's death opened a door in Afghanistan, it has also complicated our relationship across the border in Pakistan. While the Pakistani leadership and people initially reacted by praising our actions in Abbottabad, the subsequent discourse in Pakistan, unfortunately, became quite sharp and quite critical because of the issue of sovereignty and the questions surrounding the raid itself. Relations between us, as everybody knows, quickly took a dive, jeopardizing both of our countries' national interests.

I arrived there Sunday night, began the process to see if we could find a way to rebuild the relationship. During my trip to Islamabad, I met with President Zadari, Prime Minister Gilani twice, General Kayani twice, General Pasha, and members of the Cabinet. And I emphasized in clear and absolute terms to them the serious questions that Members of Congress, and the American people, are asking with respect to Pakistan and its role in fighting violent extremism.

I underscored the importance of seizing this moment to firmly reject an anti-American narrative that exploits our differences instead of finding common ground in advancing mutual goals. I also listened, carefully, to the frustration that many in Pakistan are feeling about how we have been doing business together, about how the raid was conducted and perceived in terms of their politics and their ability to manage in Pakistan.

After many hours of talks, we agreed that it was imperative to move forward jointly and to take specific steps to strengthen the relationship.

I also emphasized that every step of the way, this relationship will not be measured by words, or by communiques after meetings like the ones that I engaged in. It will only be measured by actions. And that should begin today with the return of our helicopter tail to American forces, and in the days ahead with very clear, defined measures of cooperation which will be further defined by high-level meetings by administration officials, commencing tomorrow or the next day, and then—depending on the outcome of those discussions, hopefully—a subsequent visit by Secretary Clinton.

I'm not at liberty to describe the things that we will do in specific terms—but I'm encouraged by them. And I think there is great ability, here, to actually shift the dynamics of the relationships between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistan and the United States,

and between all three and India, and ultimately change the longer term strategic interests of the region. But that will depend on quiet and effective diplomacy over the course of these next weeks.

The final thing I want to say is, we do have to remember that Pakistan has sacrificed enormously in the fight against violent extremism; over 35,000 of its citizens have died as a result of extremist violent acts committed by the insurgency in their country. Over 5,000 of their soldiers have died in the Western regions of the country fighting the insurgents. The Pakistanis don't have a lot of money. In fact, call them broke. During difficult economic times, they rely on assistance to wage this fight with us against extremism. Their leaders understand that this moment is an important one where they need to take decisive action as part of a regional solution in order to promote peace in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I am hopeful that the joint statement that we reached yesterday that addressed counterterrorism operations and pursues a political solution in Afghanistan will help provide a roadmap that helps to get us there.

General Jones, we look forward to your testimony, again. Thanks for being here with us.

Senator Lugar.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Your own modesty would preclude your mentioning, but I will, your arrival on the ground at about 6:30 this morning after this remarkable trip, and your report of the findings is already important to us. But beyond that, we're just delighted that you are here, safely, for our hearing this morning.

I join you in welcoming Gen. Jim Jones. And I just take a point of personal privilege to point out, in younger years, General Jones was Major Jones, and I was in my first term in the Senate and we were wandering through France and Italy, among other places learning much about the world.

Later on, I was asked by the State Department and the President of Algeria to undertake a mission to facilitate the freeing of over 400 Moroccan prisoners. As it turned out, the President of Algeria decided he really didn't want to go, and I latched onto Gen. Jim Jones, who was willing to go, and in fact provided three aircraft that hauled the Moroccans, some of whom had been held for decades, out of Polisario camps in Algeria to homecoming group across the border in Morocco.

So, I thank you for participating with me in those endeavors, General Jones, but even more for your remarkable service both in the military and in the White House. It's great to have you here this morning.

Our recent hearings have underscored the importance of Pakistan to numerous United States national security goals. Pakistan is one of the largest Muslim countries in the world, with a sizeable nuclear arsenal.

It is in a permanent state of hostility toward India, with which the United States has close relations. It is expanding ties with

China, and it borders Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism with nuclear ambitions. Although the United States signed its first mutual defense agreement with Pakistan in 1954, we have had great difficulty during the ensuing decades in forming a consistent partnership.

One of the main problems in dealing with Pakistan is that its government is not a monolith, but rather a collection of different power centers that interact in complex ways. There is the elected civilian government, which over the years has not always been strong or stable; the uniformed military, which has seized power at various junctures; the intelligence service, which appears to have its own independence within the military; and, we are told, a shadowy group of former intelligence agents that can act on its own.

These different actors alternately compete and cooperate with one another, and their influence periodically waxes and wanes. Equally vexing, each of the players can support U.S. policies one moment, but obstruct them the next.

Add to this mix volatile public elements that can be whipped into an anti-American fervor, and you have a partner who can seem, as some have said, to be both firefighter and arsonist, simultaneously.

Although Pakistan has cooperated with the United States in many significant ways, including the fight against terrorism, Americans are increasingly exasperated by the difficulties of the relationship. In light of the raid to eliminate Osama bin Laden, who was hiding out for years in Pakistan near Islamabad and military facilities, many critics have accused Pakistan of duplicity, of playing a double game. The event has created, or perhaps exposed, what Pakistan's Prime Minister has called "a trust deficit." It is incumbent going forward that the Obama administration and Pakistan's leaders, both civilian and military, take steps to close this deficit.

That means first, adhering to the agreements and conditions of the various assistance programs that form the most tangible part of the relationship. Pakistanis must recognize that the United States does not give out blank checks.

The Kerry-Lugar-Berman Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, for instance, passed in 2009, set up a 5-year program of civilian assistance to put our ties with the Pakistani people on a long-term basis. Yet, only a small portion of the available funds have been allocated, namely $179 million, in part because Pakistan has failed to propose many programs that conform to the bill's criteria.

Similarly, our substantial military aid comes with a requirement that the President certify that Pakistan is making significant efforts toward combating terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates. After the raid against bin Laden, it is an open question whether the President could make that determination. Going forward, Pakistan must do much more than it has to root out terrorists in Pakistan. This includes the Haqqani network in Northwest Pakistan, which launches attacks against Americans in Afghanistan, and the Taliban, which can find refuge virtually unmolested in those parts of Pakistan along Afghanistan's southern border. The Obama administration should make clear to Pakistan's military that going after some terrorists while coddling others will not be tolerated.

It should also communicate that the Pakistani military's deliberate fomenting of anti-American demonstrations to oppose United States initiatives and Pakistan's own civilian leadership is not acceptable.

The revelation of bin Laden's whereabouts in Pakistan was a setback to United States-Pakistani ties. But this event could lay the foundation for a more genuine alliance if it forces both sides to confront honestly the contradictions that have plagued the relationship for so many years. An independent, credible investigation into who in Pakistan helped support bin Laden would be a good place to start.

I look forward to hearing General Jones' views on how we can strengthen this vital partnership, and I look forward to our discussion.

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. I appreciate it very much.

General Jones, as you know, we'll put your full testimony in the record as if you've read it in full. If you want to summarize, we look forward very much to engaging with you. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC (RET.), FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, MCLEAN, VA

General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Chairman Lugar, members of the committee. It's a special privilege to be able to be here this morning to talk about a very important country and a very important region for the United States and our allies.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity, it's something that I've been able to work on for several years, going back to 2003–04 when I became the NATO commander in Europe, as we discussed ways in which NATO would move into Afghanistan. And what I'd like to do is, very quickly, just sum up essentially some of the highlights of how we got to where we are and some of the milestones that we covered along the way.

As you know, in 2003, NATO made the initial determination that we'd be interested in participating in Afghanistan. That became a reality in 2004. We had a little bit of a bifurcated mission in the sense that NATO was expanding to the north in Afghanistan, and then to the west, and then to the south over a 2- to 3-year period, and then the United States was running its own separate operation, the United States, under the Central Command, primarily to the east and to the southeast in the country.

In 2004, when NATO arrived in Afghanistan, there was already an important organization called the Tripartite Commission, which consisted of regular meetings between Afghan military leadership, Pakistani leadership and United States leadership. The NATO did not have a role or a mission with regard to Pakistan, so it was not included in that group.

In 2006, when NATO completed its counterclockwise involvement in Afghanistan in the south, in particular, the United States and NATO missions were combined, and it resulted in a much more cohesive effort, and that structure has been in place now ever since.

There are other important things; 2006 was, I think, a very, very key year for a couple of reasons. One is that it was the year, I

think, in which Pakistan underwent some major earthquakes earlier in the year, and NATO responded by providing a great deal of humanitarian relief very quickly, along with the United States.

But what really transpired in 2006 was that Pakistan authorities made a decision with the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas in exchange for the tribes patrolling the borders, that the Army would not do that; would not come into the tribal areas. Those of us who studied the situation were a little bit incredulous that this was going to work. And events proved that—and I think even the Pakistani military and I know even General Kayani himself, recognized that this was a big mistake because it not only cemented the existence of the safe havens, but it also allowed for just a dramatic increase in the flow of insurgents to and from Afghanistan from the relatively safe havens in Pakistan. And as anyone knows who has ever been involved in trying to win a war against an insurgency, if insurgents have a safe haven, that makes it very difficult. It just complicates things immeasurably.

So, this 2006 decision, really, was a turning point in terms of the number of fighters that were able to infiltrate into Afghanistan, and it resulted, obviously, in our 2009 decisions to augment our own forces in order to turn around a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan had developed its own problems internally. The insurgency that was turning against Pakistan in the Swat Valley, in the South Waziristan posed a great threat to the stability of the Government, and the Army moved against their insurgents, the insurgents in the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan in ways that were very encouraging. And they did a very good job.

As a result of Prime Minister Singh's willingness to reduce tensions along the Indo-Pak border by pulling back some of the Indian forces, that allowed the military authorities in Pakistan to transfer a significant amount of troops from their border with India to the pressing situation along near their capitol. And as I said, the operations in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan were significant, and effective. I personally visited the Swat Valley and was able to talk to the military leaders and the civilian leaders. And while they have the ability to clear and hold a certain significant chunk of that territory, they lack in the capacity to be able to transfer to local authorities in such a way that the local authorities can keep the peace in the areas that the Army has cleared. So, it's a very manpower-intensive operation. The Pakistani Army has always been beset by mobility problems, lack of helicopters and the like, but really what is really lacking is the ability to transfer and move their troops out of the areas and have confidence that the local police and the local military would be strong enough to maintain stability in those regions.

In 2009 when the President assumed the Presidency and turned his attention to the region, we opted to consider more of a strategic approach, take a more strategic approach. Instead of dealing with the three countries, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan separately, it became clear that increasingly we couldn't talk about Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan, and vice versa, simply because of the border and the safe havens.

We adopted—and I thought did a pretty good job in consulting—with both the civilian and military leadership in all three countries, to include India. We put together the elements of a long-term strategic partnership plan with all three countries. We emphasized in this partnership that there would be three main pillars to it; a security pillar, an economic pillar, and a governance and rule of law pillar, particularly for Pakistan and Afghanistan. In each case, when we put this offer on the table, it emphasized the long-term nature of the relationship, the fact that we believe that the region was strategically very important, not only to us, but to peace and stability in the world, and we developed a specific set of criteria that in order to make this plan work, that they also would have to be able to meet and to show progress in arriving at those long-term goals.

For Pakistan it was, from our viewpoint, it was a fairly straightforward request of renouncing terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, and to be able to show a willingness to move in due time, and within means and capabilities—against other safe havens and terrorist networks in their country.

We spent a lot of time trying to help the Indian-Pakistani relationship following the attack in Mumbai, obviously very concerned that another attack might happen, and if such an attack took place, particularly on Indian soil, it would be very difficult to control the reaction of India. And so the propensity for violence along the border was always something we tried to mediate between both India and Pakistan, and I think with some modest success. As I said, Pakistan was reasonably comfortable with moving some of their troops off of the border to go to their west coast.

Other gestures by India that were most helpful, in addition to the Prime Minister's decision to defuse a little bit of the tension on the border, was India's donation of $25 million to help the victims of the terrible flood, which is a $10 billion catastrophe, involving 7 million displaced people at a time when their economy really could not stand such additional pressure.

In 2010, multiple efforts to build trust between the United States and Pakistan—both public and private trips to and from the area—to build and develop the trust and confidence that's required, long-term strategic plan still being developed and on the table, we did receive some assistance from the Pakistanis in terms of intelligence exchanged that led to captures of some leaders of al-Qaeda. We had a pretty impressive run of success in terms of being able to kill or capture a significant portion of al-Qaeda leadership resulting, of course, in the most recent one involving Osama bin Laden.

So, but I'd say 2010 was still a year of testing, of building the relationship. The Pakistani's economic woes are well-known, and they are being subjected to inflationary tendencies within their economy and really just being short of funds in order to do what needs to be done inside of the country. They still have a big, almost phobic, relationship with India, and we are working hard to overcome the mistrust that exists between both countries.

Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out, the impact of the Osama bin Laden operation is one that presents us, I think, with an opportunity to get past these feelings of mistrust, now heightened on both sides. But if we could use this as a pivot point to try to bring

about this reconciliation in terms of what's tremendously important for the security of the region, it would be worth taking, in my view, a long-term view.

The strategic consequences of a failed state in Pakistan or not being able to build the trust between both countries, and it's going to take two—it's going to take both sides to work very hard on this. And, as you pointed out correctly, I think it's going to take some actionable, demonstrative indications of goodwill, but it's so very important. If we want to be successful in Afghanistan, the roads to that success have a lot to do with Pakistan. And it's not a question of who's got the advantage, and who portends to gain the most from this relationship; we all lose if it doesn't work. And I think that, hopefully, this moment, after all is laid out and all of the facts are in, that we can, in fact, continue on the path of a strategic relationship that is so very important for the future of our operations in Afghanistan, the stability of Pakistan, and also our global effort to make sure that terrorism is defeated once and for all. I think the disappearance of Osama bin Laden was a terrific message. It shows just how far we've in terms of working with many counties around the world, sharing intelligence at a rapid pace, building trust and confidence.

We have diffused many attacks—some publicly known, some not—as a result of this cooperation. Pakistan deserves its share of the credit in helping us along with that. But the wars—the fight still goes on against terrorists. But I think we can honestly say that the world is probably a little bit safer without Osama bin Laden in terms of the 9/11-type of attacks that they used to be able to generate. Let's hope that they don't have that capacity anymore, and that we can benefit from a surge of international cooperation that has us, at least, tracking terrorist organizations wherever they appear.

I'm very honored to be here today, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, again, General thank you for being here today, and thanks for that testimony.

You've commanded troops in the field and have been a chief at the highest level of military leadership, and you have served as National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, so you've seen kind of the struggles with the field commander view, and you've struggled with the larger strategic view. And I wonder if you'd help us work through a couple of things.

First of all, you would agree, I assume, as most of the reports are stating, that the military progress on the ground in Afghanistan is, in fact, real, it's measurable, and it's had an impact on some perceptions and on security. Is that a fair statement?

General JONES. I agree with that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. And, would you agree, also, that the biggest single challenge to the security in Afghanistan is the attacks and personnel launched from the western part of Pakistan?

General JONES. I absolutely have come to the conclusion over the last several years that—as I said in my opening remarks—that trying to defeat the Taliban, or any other organization, while they have safe havens across a border is extremely difficult. It costs

more lives, more of our national treasure, and it precludes us from being as successful as we otherwise might be.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to the effort on the ground in Afghanistan, let's start with the challenge of reconciliation and finding Taliban who are real, who might be willing to negotiate. Would you share with the committee your judgment as to the greatest hurdles or impediments to our being able to start the reconciliation process, or what we might change or add to the equation, if anything, to facilitate that process?

General JONES. With regard to Pakistan?

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to anything that relates to the reconciliation/peace process so that we can take advantage of this political space that's been created because of the military success?

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, I am of the view that in all of these types of engagements in this 21st century, there are essentially three major components that have to be working simultaneously. And the first one is the security component, but as time has shown us, this is not enough. But security, obviously, has to be restored to a certain level before you can do anything else.

But very quickly, in addition to security, as people transition to a different type of government and want more transparency in their lives, a democratic system, there has to be something else. There has to be reforms to meet the people's expectations, for instance, governmental policies, rule of law, where corruption exists, it has to be attacked; you need a judicial system that's functional. And you also need an economic pillar that shows that the people, there is an alternative to the way they were living before our assistance package started.

And it's those three things, working simultaneously, in some sort of harmony, that really turns the tide. We learned that, historically. We learned that in World War II, we learned it Europe, we learned it in Japan, and wherever we've had kind of a comprehensive package that starts with the security element and then has a follow through that actually shows the people what their lives are going to look like, that's the way to defeat extremist ideologies. They'll continue to blame us, and people like us, for being the root of all evil and of all problems.

The CHAIRMAN. But isn't that really a nation-building exercise?

General JONES. Well, unfortunately you have to either go in and restore or take care of the security challenges and then very rapidly—or as rapidly as possible—transition over to a government that can take charge of it, and I think that's where we are today.

In December of last year, at the NATO summit in Lisbon, the alliance agreed on 2014, which was President Karzai's request; by then he would like to be in full control of his economy, of his government, of his military and the security mission, and I think we're moving in that direction, and we'll see the first steps taken this year. It will not just be us, it will be us and our allies who will figure out a way to reduce our forces and gradually turn it over to the Afghans. And I think that——

The CHAIRMAN. Can we achieve that without resolving the Pakistan piece? Or is the Pakistan piece essential to making it possible to get that equilibrium?

General JONES. It's my personal view, Mr. Chairman, that the degree to which Pakistan pivots and does more effective work along their border and toward the safe havens that are most concerning to us, that we have an enhanced chance of a greater degree of success by 2014 if they do that. And so the importance of Pakistan figuring out the way that they can do their share, with the assistance that they need, would be a defining moment and a turning moment, I think, in the outcome in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of Afghanistan do the Pakistanis view as being in their interest?

General JONES. It's interesting, and that's a very hard question, because there isn't just one Pakistani view. If you talk to their military you get certain answers, if you talk to their civilian leadership you get certain answers. And, unfortunately, they're concern with India has something to do with Afghanistan. If you're looking at it a little bit through their eyes, you're a little bit worried, perhaps, you have India to their east, Afghanistan to the west, and an Indian presence in Afghanistan insights their fears for the long-term future.

So, they have really been very careful to not overcommit to doing anything in Afghanistan, which is unfortunate. Because if, in fact, the Pakistanis really adopted the long-term strategic relationship that, I think, was put on the table in 2009 and reiterated in 2010, they would have a better economic future. Their people would be better off. They would get assistance, internationally, that they critically need, and you know, from our standpoint it seems illogical that they wouldn't seize on that moment. But, logic doesn't always play a dominant role in this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. No, it doesn't. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. General Jones, you just touched a moment ago on Pakistan's relationship with India. What is your judgment as to why there has not been more effort on the part of Pakistan, or India, to forge ties that would lead to peace between the two countries? Granted, it's almost a given that the Kashmir dispute is there, and therefore, groups like Lashkar-a-Taibba are tolerated by the Pakistanis because the Pakistanis perceive that they have some value with regard to pressuring India.

You also suggested that Afghanistan is a ground in which both India and Pakistan might play against each other, and therefore is not to be conceded very readily. You mentioned that, because of Pakistan's historical conflict with India, a lot of those within the Pakistani Armed Forces feel that India has to be the major influence with regard to the problems they are facing, many of their efforts and expenditures are therefore accordingly concentrated to address these issues.

But, is this an area in which the United States could play any role in terms of encouraging peace? We keep going back and forth with Israel and the Palestinians, but the conflict between India and Pakistan is clearly, as a part of what we're talking about today, at the heart of the problem.

General JONES. Senator, you've put your finger exactly on one of the things that is the most vexing of issues. We have tried to play a role, not a direct role, but an indirect role, in diffusing tensions

and carrying message back and forth, encouraging foreign ministers to meet. As I said earlier, I think Prime Minister Singh deserves a lot of credit for taking a political risk in his own country to show a more reasonable side in terms of this issue by working to diffuse tensions along the border; he showed great restraint after the Mumbai attack.

I think that this is one problem that the Pakistanis will have to think very hard about as they decide how they want to play in this regional situation that they find themselves in the center of, on both sides.

While that presents some unique challenges, it also presents some unique opportunities. It will take political courage, and military support of that political courage to recognize that there is a better way, here, with regard to India. But, so far, they have been extremely reluctant—and, in some cases, resistant—to grasping that opportunity.

As I mentioned, also, India stepped up during the floods and donated some money, $25 million. Would have done more if they had been properly thanked and there had been a reciprocal gesture of goodwill. But, these are things that India—I'm sorry, Pakistan in this very important time are going to have to come to grips with, unfortunately almost simultaneously, because they need troops on the western side of their country in order to do what we want, what we'd like them to do, and their argument would be that, "Well, most of the Indian Army is still deployed, at least in proximity of, the Indo-Pakistan border, and you know, if they withdrew some more forces, that would let them withdraw some more forces."

So, I think there's a big role for the United States to play. I think we've adopted a regional strategy that makes sense. It hasn't always yielded everything we've wanted, but you cannot deal with each country individually. It's a regional problem, and it has to have regional solutions.

And I do think that other countries could help, materially. China has a border that they should be concerned about, Russia has a border they should be concerned about, and it may be worthwhile to see if, from the standpoint of aid, financial aid to Pakistan, that there might be a possibility to obtain some of that for their own internal reconstruction.

Senator LUGAR. Well, in the same way that we've taken other diplomatic tacts in the past, this seems to me to be one that would help reset the relationship and be very, very important. We've talked about putting together Afghanistan and Pakistan in our consideration, but putting India and Pakistan foremost could be very important.

Let me just follow on by noting that you touched upon the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill at one point, and I mentioned this in my opening statement. After we began talking about this package lasting for 5 years, both the Pakistani press and the Pakistani leadership applauded this move because it represented the sort of sustained, long-term commitment that Pakistan has been seeking from us for some time.

But then, very rapidly, as soon as people began to think about who would control the funds, who would determine the projects, and what sort of auditing there could be on behalf of the American

taxpayer, this sentiment fell apart in a big way, and the Pakistani press—quite apart from the leadership—perceived all sorts of intrusions on Pakistan's sovereignty. And so, as a result, almost nothing has gotten done. However, should this situation change, the opportunity to continue providing assistance to Pakistan under Kerry-Lugar-Berman remains.

And the possibility remains for the United States that working with students, health care practitioners, those involved in upholding the rule of law, and others could offer the opportunity over a good number of years to build a more robust, sustainable friendship. As a matter of fact, we want the quality of the friendship, actually, to increase as a result of talented Americans and Pakistanis working together.

How are we going to get over the bridge with regard to that situation and actually get some shoes on the ground in terms of work with civilians, and with ordinary Pakistani citizens who might then come to have a different regard for the United States?

General JONES. Senator, from our standpoint it seems like an obviously good solution of what should be done. But when questions of sovereignty kick in and they feel like the terms are being dictated, what they're being asked to do is an affront to their national pride and so on and so forth, then you get illogical answers. And I said, logic is something here that doesn't play a big role. The analogy was between the Israelis and Palestinians, as well. You know, here's a situation where everybody knows what needs to be done; both sides actually agree that it needs to be done, but nobody will take the first step.

And I think if we can, in fact, pivot on this moment—this very important moment around Osama bin Laden and have an airing of what happened and what didn't happen and get beyond and get back to the real strategic potential, here, and get the Pakistanis to really understand what we're trying to do, which is trying to help them, perhaps working harder to understand how they view the world, as well, then I think there's a good possibility that we could do it.

But, I will freely admit that it's a very difficult point to make in a way that resonates in that very fragile country that has a fragility of leadership that is obviously so apparent.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar.

As I recognize Senator Cardin, I need to step down, briefly, to the Finance Committee; I'll be right back, but Senator Lugar will chair in my absence.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first thank you as you leave for your incredible help this weekend in your visit to Islamabad and Pakistan. We very much appreciate your leadership in trying to calm things down, so thank you.

And General Jones, thank you for your service, appreciate it very much.

After the bin Laden mission, I think all of us, our initial response in regards to Pakistan is, how could Pakistan either be so inept or so complicitous? And then we heard the response come out of Paki-

stan, which was somewhat encouraging, within the first 24 hours. But then there was an about-face in Pakistan, a very anti-American rhetoric. I think our initial concern was whether Pakistan shared our commitment to fight extremists, and that was our main concern.

So, I think we're now going through an evaluation whether Pakistan's our ally and friend, and if they are, why are they spewing so much anti-American rhetoric and causing so much concern about our working to root out extremists in Pakistan and that region?

And if they're not our ally and friend, shouldn't we be looking for alternative ways to deal with extremists in that region, and is it worth the type of political and financial investment that America is currently making in Pakistan?

So, I think that's the dilemma that many of us are facing, as to whether this truly is an ally, or not an ally. And I would appreciate your candid view, here, as to whether the United States—obviously we want to be friends with—and strategic friends with—as many countries around the world as we can be. But if it's not to be, I think we have to take a look at alternative. So, I'd appreciate your view.

General JONES. Thank you. My personal view is that we should continue our efforts to find the magic here that will cause Pakistan to pivot in what we think is a direction that's in their own self-interest, to start with, but, also in the greater context of the stability in the region, the very, very important decision that they need to make. And I don't know what the answer will be, here, in terms of the reaction, but inside of Afghanistan, I've always been puzzled at why it is that the popular opinion with regard to the United States is always at such a low ebb in not only Pakistan, but in other countries around the world given the magnitude of our efforts. So, we need to figure out how it is that we can get the leadership—both civilian and military—and the popular opinion, because what's emerging in Pakistan is a press that's extremely critical and extremely important in terms of fomenting public opinions in Pakistan.

But the strategic importance of the county that won't change; that's a given. But how we pivot from this very low point, in terms of both countries' relationships, and how we rebuild the trust and confidence, and how Pakistan kind of sees where it wants to be 10 or 15 years from now, I think, is really the question.

And most of their responses to our long-term plans have been pretty tactical responses. They're interested in what we're going to do tomorrow or the next day. A drone attack throws off the relationship if there's collateral damage. We're always living from day to day, and it's very difficult to get them engaged in, you know, what their country might look like 10 or 20 years from as a result of the actions that they take today.

But this is a pivotal moment; very strategic, very important. And I think we should do everything we can to try to, once again, persuade them to turn in the right direction.

Senator CARDIN. We spend a lot of taxpayer support in Pakistan, and I think all of us understand the strategic importance of that country. I guess my question to you is, we have the ability to either refocus that aid, or make it conditional upon certain commitments

from Pakistan. We clearly need to do something different, in the respect of winning over more popular support within Pakistan, which is an important element in our strategies.

So, do you have any advice for us, as to perhaps refocusing the aid, using it in a different way? Or, the conditionalities that are likely to be imposed on that aid, as to what we should be focusing on in order to, as you say, pivot to a better position?

General JONES. Well, I think that if we decide that we want to be helpful to the Pakistani military and if, in return for that help, the Pakistani military will commit to a more effective and longer reaching effort against the safe havens and the security of the border, then there are some things that would be interesting to look at. A critical need of the Pakistani military is mobility. It's not terribly sophisticated, but it's helicopters and transportation, rapidly and otherwise.

They need help in rebuilding their local enforcement capabilities, law enforcement capabilities. I use the example of the Swat Valley where two divisions are permanently tied down there because there's no way to transition to anything; there's just no infrastructure.

But I think we could be helpful, and other countries could be helpful in providing the necessary mobility that they need in order to go after thing that we think they should do. And I think that it would take a commitment on their part that they would be willing to do this. And that commitment has just not been made. They've opted for playing both ends against the middle, a little bit, and this is where we are.

There are other levels of assistance, basic assistance that the country needs in terms of economic packages that people have put on the table. They would be transformative in terms of the economy. They have to show, on the other hand, that they're willing to implement reforms against corruption and to show that the rule of law is really something that they're willing to live by. The occasional stories about extrajudicial killings and the like which jeopardize our relationship because of our own laws is just one example of a tortuous path that we've had to work around in order to have to keep the relationship at the current level, let alone progress to the level we would like to see it progress to.

So, it is a difficult moment, but it's a moment of opportunity if cool heads prevail. And particularly I think in Pakistan that the leadership takes a longer term vision than just what's going to happen next week or next month.

Senator CARDIN. Well, I have my doubts on some of those expectations, but thank you very much for your responses, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cardin.

Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the hearing and, General Jones, for your service. You look much more rested. I know you wake up and watch what we're doing and smile, and are able today to speak more freely.

You mentioned, to Senator Cardin's question about where the aid should go, but we didn't talk about the conditions upon which aid should flow. I think everybody looks at this as an opportunity to change that relationship just because of the embarrassment this

has created within Pakistan. And I think you said, if they're willing to help us rout out the extremists in the FATA and other areas—is that one of the conditions? What are the three conditions you would place on any future aid? I think most of us are wanting to call timeout on aid until we can ascertain what is in our best interest in what I would consider to be more of a transactional relationship. So in that transaction, what are the three things you would absolutely ensure were the case before we provided more aid to Pakistan?

General JONES. Well, I think the two main qualities that we hope to have achieved with Pakistan during the last 2 years were on the table. And the first one was that Pakistan, like other countries, should make a clear and definitive statement that as part of their national policy, they reject the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. And that shouldn't be hard to do.

The second piece, though, is a little bit more difficult, and that is that they should commit to making sure that in order to live up to that first statement, that they're willing to do those things that are required in their own country to ensure that terrorist organizations are gradually attrited and rooted out. And unless and until they commit to doing those things, it's going to be difficult, I think, to get our taxpayers to understand the logic of continuing to support a country that doesn't seem to be able to get its act together on those particular, very logical points.

Senator CORKER. And you being one of those taxpayers, would you agree that that ought to be the type of thing we should get out of Pakistan as a condition of any future aid?

General JONES. I think it's fair, that given what enormous potential of the benefits that could accrue to Pakistan and the people, and the country—not just from us, but other—the international community as well, that that is their best—that's the best road to the future.

Senator CORKER. And what's the best way to make that happen, where we have tangible evidence that they are going to begin, in a more expeditious manner, to actually rout out those terrorists' organizations that aren't focused on Pakistan, but are focused on India and Afghanistan?

General JONES. As I said, it's going to take a major, I think, internal reevaluation of how they've conducted business to get to that point where they can, in fact——

Senator CORKER. But you would want to have that understanding before you saw any more aid flow to Pakistan? I want to make sure I understand what you're saying.

General JONES. I think that Pakistan has to—should really consider, to make a proactive statement as an intent of their national policy and start demonstrating their willingness to actually live up to that policy. And as a consequence of that, then, I think, that the kind of assistance that they need to get to where they can possibly go, would then flow that way. To me, it's no more complicated than that, although they will make it very complicated.

Senator CORKER. I think it's pretty impactful that a former national security advisor would make such a statement.

Let me ask another question. We had witnesses in a couple weeks ago who mentioned—first of all, I've been here 4 years, and

about every 6 months, our reason for being in Afghanistan changes. You know, it just sort of keeps evolving to sort of suit the times, if you will.

The late Mr. Holbrook, when he was in last, stated that the reason we're there is because of our strategic relationship with Pakistan, we didn't want to destabilize Pakistan. We had witnesses in a couple weeks ago that believed that, really, Pakistan does not want a stable Afghanistan, they really want a degraded Afghanistan that doesn't have the ability, on their rear side of India, to really cause much trouble. I wonder if you had any thoughts you might share in that regard.

General JONES. I think that Pakistan has pursued a policy that has been, for several years, very difficult to understand from our viewpoint. The failure to move against terrorist organizations, to effectively patrol the border—even though they have rendered some assistance, and we have to recognize that—is something that strikes as being illogical. From their viewpoint, as I said, with their concerns with their neighbor to their east, in India, seeing the presence of India in Afghanistan, contributes to a philosophy of encirclement which they're uncomfortable with.

But, I think we're at the point where in this relationship we have to have a very serious meeting of the minds to say, "okay, how are we going to proceed from this point on?" Because we can't continue the way it is right now. And I think the successful raid on Osama bin Laden can either be pivoted to be kind of a positive in future, if we pivot the right way, or it can be a negative. And that's really what this is all about right now.

I'm hopeful that at long last, cooler heads will prevail and logic will come into the equation, and our colleagues in Pakistan will see the future with a little bit more of a strategic vision than what they've been showing. They certainly understand the stakes and they certainly understand that the adverse potential of any kind of future attack from Pakistani soil, in India, in the United States, or elsewhere, will dramatically change the outlook for the future of Pakistan. And they have to understand that that's a very, very serious risky business that they're playing, by not making that declaration and by not showing the watching world that they're willing to move against these terrorist organizations.

Senator CORKER. May I ask one more question?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Senator CORKER. You know, as I listen, we talk about the strategic relationship, we look at Afghanistan, and we look at sort of the bipolar or just nonrational activity that takes place in Pakistan. It's hard for me ascertain exactly what our strategic relationship is. I mean, this is a country we don't want to have in extremist hands because of the nuclear weapons that they have, but other than that, it's hard for me to understand specifically today, in today's terms, what our real strategic relationship is.

And I'd love for you to maybe talk with us—I know that I'm using up other people's time, I know Senator Kerry is tired from a long trip and I won't prolong this, but I sure would like to have a conversation with you about exactly what that strategic relationship is. Because at present, it seems to me that we have a country that acts in rogue ways from time to time and we give them aid

as a result, but as far as those things that are most pressing to us today, strategically, they're not much of a partner.

General JONES. I'd be happy to do that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. If I can just say before I recognize Senator Webb, I would like to arrange a classified discussion at some point in time in the near term. But, suffice it to say that I think your question's obviously a legitimate one. And it was at the center of the discussions that we had. And I will tell you, everything was on the table and was discussed with as much precision and depth as I've ever experienced it.

And, they did agree with respect to some very specific efforts, which I don't want to go into now, but it's important for every Senator to know about these efforts. The executive branch will discuss the efforts with specificity in the next few days, and they will be the subject of Secretary Clinton's next visit to Pakistan.

So we're really honing in, I think, in a way that committee members and Senators want us to. But I found a distinct understanding among the Pakistanis of the importance of moving forward in a positive way. There will be some responsibility for us to do certain things, too, to help empower that, and I think we all have to be recognizing it's not going to be a one-way street.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome back.

General Jones, I monitored the opening statements and the first questions from my office. I won't belabor my appreciation for how well and how long you served our country. It's been a great pleasure to have served and worked with you for many years, and your advice and counsel is very valuable to us.

If we're looking at the strategic implications of Pakistan in the region, quite frankly, I don't see how we can discuss the reality of this issue without addressing China's influence. Not only in Pakistan, but it's national interest in this entire region. We can't examine clearly what our options are, and I don't think we can examine what the region is going to potentially look like, without talking about China.

We all know, those of us who have worked in these areas for a long time, of Pakistan's long-term relationship with China and the reasons behind it—it's inception with the situation with India and the shared concern about India many, many years ago. There are people, smart people, who would assert that China actually enabled Pakistan to become a nuclear power.

Just as I was walking in here, BBC issued a news break indicating that the Pakistani Prime Minister just landed in China and hailed China as Pakistan's "best friend."

Looking at this from a strategic perspective, from an American strategic perspective, one of the concerns that I've had about Chinese foreign policy for many years, is that we really need China to become more overt in helping us solve problems around the world, whether it's Iran or Burma or North Korea and certainly here. They are going to be a big beneficiary of any stability that we bring about in the region. They're going to be a commercial beneficiary and also will benefit in terms of regional stability.

So, the real question is, how do we get China to be more involved in the solution of these kinds of problems rather than simply taking advantage of things one by one as they go wrong?

General JONES. Senator, that's a great observation and mirrors exactly with my philosophy about where the world is going in the 21st century.

We, hopefully are emerging from, once and for all, from the bipolar world of the 20th century, and we recognize the multipolarity of the world and with the rise of other economic powers in the world like India and China, Brazil, the European Union as a whole, and perhaps others, Russia. It seems to me that there is a strong case to be made that for us to make the world a better and a safer place and to solve problems like we have in Pakistan and Afghanistan, whose borders are contiguous to China's and Russia's as well, they do have an interest in making sure that this region is as stable as possible, as we begin to transition our posture in Afghanistan, in particular.

And I think that it's well worth the effort, as bilateral relations with China continue to hopefully improve, the relations with Russia have improved dramatically, that the application of a solution set that includes not just security and troops on the ground, but also the economic pillar and assistance in developing the instruments of governance and rule of law in these countries so that they can move into the 21st century themselves. There are all kinds of other ways to help, with energy solutions and the like.

This is, I think, the pattern for the 21st century, and if we are not able to create an environment where a country like China and Brazil and India understand that with this great economic power that they're about to have or already have in some cases, there comes some great responsibilities in terms of making the world a better place, and that we don't have to do it alone, is very worthwhile.

Senator WEBB. I would agree. I've had, as you know, many concerns about Chinese expansionist activities, particularly the South China Sea area sovereignty issues. I actually held hearings on those issues in the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. But perhaps this is a situation where we could test the goodwill of a growing China in terms of using its influence to help Pakistan direct its energies in a more positive way.

General JONES. Well, if any part of Pakistan thinking is that better relations with China make India mad, and that's therefore a good thing to do, then that's flawed thinking, I think. And we need to try to ensure that we can make sure that the relations don't get worse as a result of this kind of trip and this kind of rhetoric.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Webb. I think that's an important point. And actually, the Prime Minister was headed off to China, and we had a discussion about it. China figures very significantly into some of their strategic thinking.

Senator Corker has left, but I would just say to Senator Corker, aid alone is not the only ballgame here, and we need to be very cognizant of that. While it's an important part of it, they have strategic interests. And we're going to have to work those strategic in-

terests with respect to India and Afghanistan even as we deal with aid.

Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you very much.

General, in order to follow up on this conversation we're having right now about China, can you give us some indication of what China's expenditures in Pakistan—how they compare to ours, the aid, both the civilian and the military? Can you give us some kind of an idea of comparability of the two countries?

General JONES. I don't have that figure, Senator, but I'll do my best to try to find out. I'm not sure that we know that.

Senator RISCH. Do you have a general sense of that?

General JONES. I mean, our aid package totals about $4 billion——

Senator RISCH. Right.

General JONES [continuing]. Give or take, but I don't know what China's report is.

Senator RISCH. Do you know for a fact whether they are or are not doing an aid package like we are?

General JONES. I think there is some aid, but I don't think that it's, at least as of yet, is, you know, there's a real competition between us on this. And I don't think it rises to our totals.

Senator RISCH. Well, thank you much, and I—Senator Kerry just mentioned that it's not all about aid, and I agree with him on that. I have a real difficulty in explaining to people back home in Idaho what we're doing spending billions of dollars in Pakistan, particularly on civilian matters, when they don't like us. I mean, every poll you see that comes out of there, they don't like us.

And here they had this terrible tragedy with the floods. We went in, we were the first ones there, we sent the military in, we saved people's lives, we helped them. Then after the fact, we went in and spent hundreds of millions of dollars rebuilding the bridges that were washed out.

Idahoans asked, "Why are we spending our kids' and our grandkids' money to do this in a country that really doesn't like us?" And no matter what we do, we don't seem to move the needle at all as far as them liking us. And, where we're borrowing 40 cents out of every dollar that we spend, it is a hard sell to the American people, that we should borrow 40 cents, a lot of it from China, and spend it in Pakistan. And then have the head of Pakistan go to China, and then as Senator Webb said, stand up and say, "You're our best friend." It just doesn't make sense.

And, I agree with—I'll be interested to hear what Senator Kerry has to say about these items that are nonaid items, because frankly I'm getting tired of it, and I think Americans are getting tired of it, as far as shoveling money in there, to people who just flat don't like us.

General JONES. Senator, this is that moment where there's a lot of emotion on both sides and it is hard to explain. And that's why I think that what happens in the next few weeks, in terms of this relationship, is going to be extremely strategic in terms of consequences.

But I really think more of the onus is on Pakistan and if they decide to take what we think is the logical path and the right path

for their, not only their future in their bilateral issues with us, but just how they present themselves to the world. I mean, is it going to be a state where they tolerate the existence of terrorist organizations on their soil as an instrument of their foreign policy? And if they reject that, and categorically say so, and then show that they are actually doing some things to correct that image, then I think the goodwill of perhaps the international community and our goodwill might be a little bit easier to explain to your constituency in Idaho.

But, there has to be a change in behavior, here. We cannot—we probably can't continue the way we are right now.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Risch.

So, the one thing I'd say to you, Senator, is that right now we have about 100,000 reasons for worrying about our relationship with Pakistan: our young men and women in uniform in Afghanistan. So it's complicated. I can't wait until we have a classified session. I think it would be important for us to have this conversation.

Senator Coons.

Senator COONS. Thank you, Chairman Kerry, and thank you for your hard work and your leadership on this issue, and for convening this hearing today.

I agree with what you've already spoken to eloquently, General, that this is a critical moment in our relationship with Pakistan. Like several of the other Senators who have spoken, I'm hearing from my constituents at home, real frustration, real concerns.

Based on my own observations from a trip to Islamabad in February with Senator Corker, it's clear the United States and Pakistan share a common enemy, that they have suffered significantly from extremism within Pakistan, that just this past Friday, more than 80 Frontier Corps were killed and another 100 people injured on the other hand.

Like many Americans, I'm deeply disturbed by what seems to be a state that plays a double game, that accepts significant multibillion dollar aid from us, combats groups that target its own domestic concerns, but then clearly hedges against the U.S. mission in Afghanistan, is an uneven partner at best. And one of my favorite metaphors from our trip was the suggestion that they are both a fireman and arsonist in this regional ongoing conflagration.

I want to start by thanking you for your service and your advice and counsel today has been very helpful.

How can the civilian government of Pakistan be a true partner to America with a Parliament that just passed a resolution condemning the bin Laden raid and threatening to take action against the United States if drone strikes continue, including cutting off supply routes to Afghanistan? You said success in Afghanistan runs through the roads of Pakistan, and I think you mean that quite literally, tactically.

General JONES. Well, it is difficult to explain. The passions and the rhetoric that gets fired up in Pakistan are directed at us, very specifically. We do have a strong dependence on our supply routes coming through Pakistan. They've been reduced somewhat, but it's about 50 percent of our logistics go through Pakistan.

We just have to get beyond this point. We have to—and I think, as I said, Pakistan has to kind of declare itself a little bit more forcefully now as to where are you, where are you on this. And, let's not play both ends against the middle. We have a common enemy. You have a future. You have needs that the international community, led by the United States, could help satisfy. There is a brighter way, and there is a better way to conduct your foreign policy.

And—but we can't make you—we can't make you do it. If you're not going to do it then declare it, and we'll have to reconsider what our strategy is. And I'm quite sure that my colleagues, former colleagues at the National Security Council are working very hard on this right now, hopeful, hopeful that we can find the common ground to go forward in a much more transactional way, but in a much more clear-cut way toward our common goals.

But, I don't think we're there yet. Senator Kerry knows probably more than anybody else right now as a result of his trip, as to what that potential is. But I'm quite sure that in his way and in other ways we're delivering that message that says we can't go on like this.

Senator COONS. You referenced——

General JONES. No question that the Afghan struggle has been more difficult and longer and more costly in terms of the lives of our men and women in uniform and the depletion of our own national treasure to support that effort because of the fact that these safe havens and generally the Pakistani policy with regard to terror has been so ill-defined and imprecise.

Senator COONS. I agree with you that the declarations you suggest, that could possibly be conditions for continuing with our strategic relationship would make good sense to me.

General JONES. Declarations and evidence, I think, of will.

Senator COONS. Two things, if I might. What do you think are the prospects that we might actually get concrete material on the ground assistance from the Pakistani military in taking actions in the FATA or North Waziristan in particular? And what could we be urging the Chinese to do, excuse me, the Indians to do to deal with, as you referenced, the near-phobic obsession with India? My impression was that the Indian presence in Afghanistan is very modest. I also heard loud and clear a previous panel that testified that Pakistanis are dead set against our succeeding in setting up a large and stable Afghan national military and police force.

Our path forward toward 2014, strategic path forward, currently relies on standing up and sustaining a significant Afghan national force, which if the Pakistanis are bent on preventing, they can significantly interfere with our capabilities to succeed that.

So, back to your point on some level, the road to success in Afghanistan runs right through Pakistan. And at a moment when my own constituents are enraged of the idea of a continued sustained relationship, I have to remind them, as Nick Kristoff commented this week in the New York Times, sort of reciting something Holbrook apparently scribbled down, that it—in the long-term, a stable Pakistan is more critical to the region and to the United States interests, like it or not, than a stable Afghanistan. What could we do with India?

General JONES. I agree with you that the Indian presence in Afghanistan is modest, but from the way I've come to understand Pakistan's view with regard to India, one Indian would be too much in Afghanistan. So, there's no way to satisfy that except to continue to be a good interlocutor between India and Pakistan. As I said, I think India has done quite a bit to relieve the fear that there might be an Indian attack. I think Prime Minister Singh has been visionary and taken, as I said, political risk in India to do this.

We've had some benefits in the sense that Pakistan has been able to take some of its forces off the Indian border and bring it over to the west. But, I think that if the Pakistanis can seize this moment and we can pivot in a new direction with more clarity, more precision, and more accountability, then something good might come of this.

But, it's going to be difficult because they have not shown, despite many entreaties, both public and private, many trips that many of you have made to Pakistan, trips that I made on behalf of the President to deliver both public and private messages to try to get beyond this current imprecise relationship that oftentimes works against our own best interests. We just simply are at that moment where it's so important that we find a path, and I hope that we can.

Senator COONS. Thank you for your lifetime of service to our country.

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

Senator COONS. And for your counsel today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks, Senator Coons.

Senator Rubio.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General, good morning. Thank you for your service as well.

I just wanted your observation on someone that I consider to be semi-well informed or well informed—I guess Thursday of last week, kind of shared with me and said that part of our frustration is how we view our relationship with Pakistan. We view it in terms of an alliance, a traditional alliance between two willing partners working toward the same goal. He encouraged me, and I'm not sure that I've adopted this yet, but he encouraged me to view it differently. He encouraged me to view it almost as a contractual relationship, where basically we put forth a set of aid packages things toward Pakistan, and in return they allow us to get some bad guys and not others, and allow us the opportunity to transit into the country to supply our troops, et cetera. He encouraged me to view it more as a transactional thing than as a traditional alliance in the diplomatic sense. What is your impression on that view of the relationship?

General JONES. Well, I think that's fair. If you were to have, I think, a discussion with the Pakistani military, they would pivot into the direction of saying, "Look, you say we're strategically important, and this is the key to kind of the region and what you want to do in Afghanistan. But in terms of the quantity of military aid that we've received, helicopters and," the instruments that they feel that they're in short supply of, that we haven't done much.

And, so they take the numbers that we think are relatively significant, roughly a $4 billion package, and they say, "Now for a strategic relationship, it's worth a lot more than that, and we need that kind of help. We cannot fight the insurgents if we don't have the mobility to transport our troops and to move our troops around rapidly, and we don't have it."

You know, we provided them with MI–28 helicopters, you know, double digits, I think it was 28 or so, 30, but that's about it. And from their standpoint, given some of our support packages that we give to other countries around the world, they don't think that that measures up to a strategic, you know, the strategic imperative that we attach to the relationship.

So, you know, there may be a way to get through that, but it's a stumbling point. They obviously chafe at being held to certain conditions for our financial aid, and they wrap themselves in the cloak of sovereignty. Those are things that we're just going to have to work through, but it's too important, I think, to not give it a real good shot.

Senator RUBIO. So, in your perception of it, in your well-informed perception of it, there's some credibility to the idea that there's a price for each level of assistance that they give us. That, in essence, if we give them this much, they'll help us this much. If we give them a little more, they'll help us a little more, the way you would normally enter into some sort of contractual bargain with someone. I mean, I think there's some credibility to that view of it?

General JONES. There might be, but one of the problems with dealing with Pakistan is that there is a—people, the American people, correctly, want to know that that money is going to the right end. And, there are problems with making sure that it doesn't get diverted to other, you know, other means.

For example, if we give them military aid and some of that military aid shows up on the India/Pakistan border, that excites India and then we have to, you know, we have to figure out exactly how that happened because it was supposed to go to, you know, the western side of the country as opposed to the eastern side.

But, I think in the next few weeks, what happens in the next few weeks or maybe a couple months, in terms of redefining the relationship and having a clear-eyed transactional, to use your term, discussion as to what it is that we need to do to get this relationship back on track, if we can, and why it's in Pakistan's long-term benefit to do so.

Senator RUBIO. And just to be clear, I'm not suggesting that we should give them more money in exchange for more help. I'm just trying to understand the relationship a little better.

The other question that I had, because if you've noticed it's tough to explain to people some of this.

General JONES. Sure.

Senator RUBIO. If you go back home—I was with people yesterday and they want to know why we're spending so much money on a place that says these things about us and so forth. So, that's hard. And on the other hand, the pragmatic realities of what's happening on the ground—is there any—I think the answer is going to be no, because nothing is simple around here—but is there any simple way to understand why it is they help us with some things

and not help us with others? Is there any simple way to understand the decisionmaking matrix of how one day they're our best friend on some issue and the next day it's like we have to fight them as well? I mean, is there any simple way to understand that or is it as complicated as everything else I've found around here in the last 4½ months?

General JONES. The answer is no, but the answer I've heard coming from them, to that very question, which I posed several times, is that they will cite history as the example, that they're fearful of and they're fearful of, they say, they're fearful of the fact that we will once again leave and their relations with India will be whatever they are, but then they also have their Afghan border and the Taliban problem and a growing problem in their own country to have to deal with.

And so, for whatever reason, we have not made the case with them, that they believe that we are long-term strategic partners. And, in their calculus, when we advance 2014 as a date for our transition in Afghanistan, they click onto that and say, "Well, this is the day where—that's when the United States is going to leave and now we're going to have to deal with everything ourselves."

Senator RUBIO. So——

General JONES. I think it's really that simple. I mean, it's to convince them that a long-term strategic partnership means what it is, means—and it goes beyond 2014, than the country next door. But, whatever it is that we have to do to kind of get through to that, the almost psychological block, for them to accept that, is really the challenge.

Senator RUBIO. So you're saying that some of these debates that we're having, and rightfully so in this country about what our role is in Afghanistan, what our goals are, how long we're going to be there, how committed we are to achieving whatever that goal may be, that that debate, that concern about America's commitment to seeing the Afghanistan effort through to some level of completion complicates the relationship with Pakistan, according to them.

General JONES. According to them, I don't believe that they buy into the idea that—by a long-term strategic relationship, we're interested in anything beyond 2014.

Senator RUBIO. So, just to close, my last question. It is your opinion that if the United States were to somehow convince them and the world that we are fully committed to the idea of a stable Afghan Government and that we're willing to see that through, even though we recognize it should take us a significant amount of time, and unfortunately already has taken lives and American treasure, that that could potentially improve our bargaining hand with regards to the Pakistani relationship?

General JONES. Well, I think so. The problem is that we've really exhausted the vocabulary in the last 2 years to try to make that point. It doesn't mean we shouldn't keep trying, but I actually thought a couple years ago that with this level of dialogue, much more comprehensive than just, you know, beans, bullets, and bandages for the military, but a much more comprehensive and robust relationship, that they would gravitate toward that. But so far they have not done so.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Rubio.

Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, General Jones, for your service and for being here today.

I have a very deep concern that I voiced well before the bin Laden incident, in terms of what the Pakistanis know or do not know. The last time we considered coalition support funds I joined Senator Corker in seeking benchmarks along the way to make sure that we were getting responses to the significant commitments we were making to Pakistan in assistance.

In the last 5 years, the United States has dramatically increased security assistance and reimbursements to Pakistan—which is currently our third-largest aid recipient after Afghanistan and Israel—increased by 140 percent since 2007 to $2.7 billion in FY10.

Those numbers are staggering. At a time when we are contemplating cutbacks to foreign assistance programs and scrutinizing every domestic program to ensure maximum effectiveness, isn't it somewhat incongruous to be providing enormous sums to the Pakistani military unless we are certain that it's meeting its commitment to locate, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist threats inside its borders? I think the answer to that is probably yes, but then the question is, do you believe that the Pakistani military is committed—not just in word, but in deed, as well as with its intelligence entities—to cease supporting extremist and terrorist groups, and taking it to al-Qaeda and the Taliban?

General JONES. Yes, I think it—but it has shown itself to be a selective engagement. They almost waiting too long a few years ago in the Swat Valley and in South Waziristan, and if they had not interfered, or intervened the way they did, they could be having problems in Islamabad right now.

So, there's a lot of internal difficulties in that country—political and otherwise—that causes them to pick and choose their engagement, which frustrates us. I mean, it frustrates us because it exacerbates their problems with India, it exacerbates our problems with Afghanistan, and we like clarity, we like precision, and we like to know exactly where they are in relation to our common goals.

You can have a discussion with them and they'll say, "Of course we reject terrorism, we completely reject terrorism." Well, and then the next question is, "Well, what are you doing about it?" And they'll say, "We're doing the best we can within our limitations and means and capabilities. And if you would help us more with mobility and things like that for our army, we could do more."

So, I think those kinds of discussions will probably be much more pointed in the next few weeks and as we try to sort out the future path of this relationship. And I hope that we can make the case to—that our initial offers two years ago are still viable. But it's going to take a demonstration on their part that they really see things the same way we do and are willing to——

Senator MENENDEZ. Selective engagement makes me think about selective assistance. I don't buy into selective engagement because, then it's about picking and choosing as you think your interests——

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. I.e., Pakistani interests.

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator MENENDEZ. And, unless we are in it together——

General JONES. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. And in common cause together, and agree on the goals and the methods to achieve those goals, then I don't know that as a fiduciary to the U.S. taxpayer, as well as our national security interests, nearly $3 billion of assistance——

General JONES. Correct.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Can be given just on the basis of selective choices.

General JONES [continuing]. Correct. No, ——

Senator MENENDEZ. Do we not have benchmarks, General? Some way that we can ultimately get a concrete sense such as "You meet this goal, so much of the faucet opens. You meet the next goal, that's how much the faucet opens?"

It seems to me that there are tangible ways in which we ultimately——

General JONES. Unfortunately, it's not a precise science in the sense that if you give them X they will do Y. But, we know, you know, what they're doing and what they're not doing in terms of combating safe havens and moving against terrorist organizations.

We've had a very, I think, generally productive relationship at certain levels against certain organizations, and targets, but the problem has been that there are certain things that they are willing to do and certain things that they're not willing to do.

But, I think some clarity in a restated kind of mission statement, if you will, or an agreement between us, as to what it is that we are talking about is probably in order and probably what the administration is working on right now to try to figure out, how do we get to that level of understanding and comprehension in the shortest time possible.

Senator MENENDEZ. Are we in a position to really press the Pakistanis in a way that would pursue our national security interests when they are our supply route into Afghanistan?

General JONES. We all have leverage points, this is certainly one. If the Pakistanis wanted to conclude that we can squeeze the United States in Afghanistan by cutting off the supply routes where 50 percent of our logistics still flow, I would argue that that would be a very short-term, maybe, feel-good tactic, but in the long term it would be to the great disadvantage of Pakistan's national security. Pakistan will benefit by having as stable a country next to them in Afghanistan as we can deliver. And it's in their interests, it seems to me, to do whatever they can between now and then, to demonstrate that they are, in fact, a capable ally and willing to do those things that they can do—understand they can't do everything—but just an incremental demonstration that they are willing to do these things that would help us immeasurably, will be very clear. And might generate more goodwill over here and in different parts of the world, and we would then be more willing to do the other things that they need in terms of turning their economy around and making better lives for the Pakistani people in the future.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Senator Menendez.

Senator Lee.

Senator LEE. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

At the outset, I'd like to say that I would appreciate the kind of briefing that Senator Kerry alluded to, I would appreciate hearing from him regarding his trip; I think it would be very helpful.

And thank you, General Jones, both for your service to this country and for your testimony here in front of this hearing.

Pakistan's influence on the fight against terrorism, its role in the region generally, its nuclear weapons capabilities, and various other factors make it an important, and a volatile, factor in U.S. national security. I've gone on record to request that the administration provide us with additional witnesses and information as we hold this series of hearings on Afghanistan and Pakistan. I realize that a few months ago, you retired as President Obama's National Security Advisor, but I appreciate your deep insights into the situation in Pakistan.

I desperately want to believe that the Pakistani Government is genuine in its desire to be an ally of the United States, but it seems that within that government, we don't know what we don't know about Pakistan's commitment to fighting terrorism and fully engaging as our ally. It seems somewhat implausible that nobody within the Pakistani Government knew anything about bin Laden's presence within its borders.

But, with all that in mind, Pakistan is certainly among the world's leading recipients in U.S. aid. Specifically, by the end of 2010, fiscal year 2010, over the last decade, it had obtained about $20.7 billion, and I want to be clear about how I calculate that number; that includes both overt assistance and military reimbursements, between 2001 and the end of fiscal year 2010.

I wanted to know, is that aid performance based in any way? Is it tied to any performance-based conditions?

General JONES. Well, the Kerry-Lugar-Berman package did have performance metrics in relation to the disbursement of moneys, as Senator Lugar alluded to earlier. So, yes, I think there are some aspects of it that are performance based.

Senator LEE. In what ways do you think Pakistan has used that aid to do things that have enhanced U.S. national security?

General JONES. Well, we've had a steady working relationship and dialogue with both the civilian and military side of their government. We have benefited from intelligence exchanges, that has enabled them to make some arrests that has enabled us to pull off some operational successes that were in our national interests.

Senator LEE. And those, I assume, are arrests and operations that would not have occurred without that aid?

General JONES. Exactly.

We have been able to form a military outpost in different parts of the border, between Afghanistan and Pakistan where high-technology surveillance and real-time intelligence can be derived with both Afghans, the Pakistanis and the United States sitting side by side. That would be another illustration of productive use of our aid.

And we have helped—we've tried to help them with some of their logistical problems in supporting the army with some mobility as-

sets that help them be able to move their troops around as they need to, but—so those kind of things I think have been positive.

Senator LEE. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. What would be the effect of temporarily withholding additional aid to Pakistan? I want to emphasize the hypothetical nature of this question; I'm not necessarily proposing this for purposes of our discussion. I'd like to know what the consequence would be. For example, could the administration put a 30- to 60-day hold on further aid to Pakistan while we sort out Pakistan's commitment to United States national security interests?

General JONES. I don't think that anything positive would come as a result of that. It may happen, I suppose, as a consequence. But I would think that before we decide what to do in the immediate future, rather than take a decision like that, that would have pretty clear consequences in terms of bilateral reaction, that it would be better to go through the process that I think we're going to go through of trying to see where this relation is and what it is that needs to be adjusted to better communicate the long-term potential that exists here, for our benefit and for the benefit of Pakistan.

So, I would counsel against what might be a tempting thing to do, but might have long-term consequences that we would then have to deal with.

Senator LEE. On a different note, Chinese investment in Pakistan has become something of a recurring theme in our discussions in this area. As you know, China is apparently planning to build two new civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan. Does this kind of investment by China in Pakistan trouble you from a national security standpoint?

General JONES. I think that the growing bilateral relationship that we have with China and other countries can be put to good use, in terms of helping countries like Pakistan and other countries, and I believe that it is a characteristic of our 21st century, that we will have to do more along those lines of working with the wealthier nations to help the developing nations transition to better economies, better governance, more adherence to rule of law and the security assistance where that's required.

So, I think that flows with the nature of our new world, so to speak, our 21st century world. And so, you know, I think that if China continues to demonstrate that it is, in fact, more with us in these types of issues, then I think that's a good thing.

Senator LEE. Thank you very much.

General JONES. Thank you.

Senator LEE. Thank you, Chair.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Well, thank you very much, Senator Lee, and General Jones.

Senator Lee, I might say to you and to others who are not here now, this is a very important conversation that we're having, and I'm going to make the transcript of this hearing available to Pakistani officials. I think they really need to understand even further—look, I just spent 2 long days going through every single one of these very same questions and laying out the realities.

It's not simple. Fifty percent of the supplies that go to our efforts in Afghanistan go through Pakistan.

General Jones with confirm with me that the most significant debilitation of al-Qaeda has occurred, really, in the past 2 years. And it has occurred because of some of the things that we've been permitted to do in the western part of Pakistan, at their sufferance, I might add, because they've taken real political hits for allowing us to do it.

That's accurate, is it not, General?

General JONES. That's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And in addition to that, the Pakistani military invaded Swat Valley, they've invaded Waziristan, they've gone out into Pajarah, they've taken 5,000 casualties. They have lost more military troops than we have, and they've killed probably 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters in that effort.

Are we getting them to do everything we've wanted? No, it's not a perfect situation, at all. And that's exactly the conversation that we engaged in. But from their point of view, they've asked for some helicopters, they've asked for some additional aid, they've asked for additional capacity, they're under very tough IMF constraints which have required them to raise prices, their politics are complicated. So, we have to look at this thing in its totality. Should we expect more? Absolutely. Is it tolerable that some of these insurgent entities are sitting there on the ground, and there isn't a full measure of effort against them? No, it's not. That's exactly the conversation that we're engaged in now.

And I expect the administration, in the next days, to be pressing the details of that, building on what we've created as an outline in the last few days, and I think we can get somewhere.

Now, the proof is in the pudding. I've made it very, very clear. This is no longer a time for joint statements issued, and everybody goes about their way followed by 4 more weeks of delay. We can't afford that. But they can't afford it, either. And I think that's the understanding everybody's arrived at.

I think the important thing here, and I think, General, you would agree with me, is to get deeply engaged in this current moment of dialogue with great precision, with great intensity, and see where we come out. And then we have to make some judgments.

But, let's say the relationship with Pakistan goes to hell in a hand basket completely, where there isn't any cooperation, we're not moving those goods, and we have to find other ways of doing things. The United States of America will protect its interests. I think you would agree, we will do what we need to do. But, would there not be greater risks of increased terror as a base in that region, and of greater volatility with respect to India, and the potential, even, of ultimately greater costs to the United States in terms of strategic interests that we then need to protect in other ways?

General JONES. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. And it would be a lot more expensive for us, wouldn't it?

General JONES. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. So, I think we have to come through this carefully. But, I'm hopeful in the next days, a lot of this can get appropriately adjudicated in the negotiating process.

Senator Lugar, do you have any more things you want to go into?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you want to do any sort of summary wrapup?

General JONES. Thank you, sir. Pleasure to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it easier to testify now that you're out in the government? Well, you didn't have to testify when you were at the NSC.

General JONES. That's true, that's true.

The CHAIRMAN. But you were liberated from that——

General JONES. That's true.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Executive privilege. Anyway.

General JONES. It's a pleasure to be here, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we're very, very happy to welcome you back. I want to thank you personally for the work that you're continuing to do and the many relationships that you have that benefit us enormously. And we're very, very grateful to you. Thank you so much.

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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