

AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY?

HEARING

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

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FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

	Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R. Jr., U.S. Senator From Delaware	1
Boucher, Hon. Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC	5
Prepared statement	7
Dobbins, Hon. James, Director, International Security & Defense Policy Cen- ter, Rand Corporation, Arlington, VA	48
Prepared statement	50
Feingold, Russell D., U.S. Senator From Wisconsin, prepared statement	38
Jones, Gen James L. Jr., USMC (Ret.), Former Commander, European Com- mand and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mclean, VA	43
Prepared statement	46
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana	3

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator From Connecticut, prepared state- ment	66
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AFGHANISTAN: TIME FOR A NEW STRATEGY?

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:23 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel, Corker, Sununu, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

The Chairperson is never supposed to admit this, but I was—I called this for 9:15. They usually start at 9:30. And I'm sitting in my office at 9:15, and my chief of staff says, "What are you doing here?" [Laughter.]

I apologize, Mr. Secretary, getting you here at 9:15, and then starting 5 minutes late. And the train was actually on time, Mr. Chairman. I was actually here. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being here.

Today, we face an issue "at the very heart of our war on terror, the deteriorating—my characterization—deteriorating security situation and conditions in Afghanistan. If the current trend continues, we may soon find that our hard-won successes on the battlefield have melted away."

The last part of that statement—and I'll repeat it again—that "at the very heart of our war on terror, the deteriorating security conditions in Afghanistan—if current trends continue, we may soon find that our hard-won successes on the battlefield has melted away." I didn't write those words in preparation for this morning's hearings. I spoke them nearly 5 years ago on the floor of the U.S. Senate when two of my colleagues here, if I'm not mistaken—I don't want to get them in trouble—we all joined together to put more money and more troops and more effort into Afghanistan.

I'm not bringing up old quotes to say "I told you so," because there's a lot of things I've said that turned out not to be correct, but to make a simple point. The situation in Afghanistan is not—is not an unforeseen circumstance. Plenty of military and civilian officials have been predicting exactly this outcome for years.

So, what's the state of play? Osama bin Laden remains at large, right across the border, in Pakistan, in all probability. There are reports that he has reconstituted his terrorist training camps, in

Pakistan. Given the chance to kill him in Tora Bora, the administration instead pulled most of our special forces out, our CIA teams, and our Predators, and sent them to Iraq. The Taliban is back, keeping much of Afghanistan ungovernable. Suicide bombings, IEDs, and other techniques imported from Iraq made their way, last year, into Afghanistan. I remember, a year ago, we were saying, "Well, at least this isn't occurring in Afghanistan." I think everyone on this panel said, "Oh, it's coming. If it's in Iraq, it's coming." And this has been—the last year has been the bloodiest since the ouster of the Taliban.

The Government in Pakistan turns a blind eye to the Taliban cross-border attacks, and to the high command based in Quetta. Just last year, the government signed a "separate peace" with pro-Taliban militants in Waziristan. That is—by "the government," I mean not our Government.

Afghanistan reconstruction is stuck in first gear. President Bush promised a Marshall Plan, but he's delivered less development aid in the past 5 years than we spent in the war in Iraq in the last 3 weeks. Total amount of aid spent in Afghanistan in the last 5 years is less than we've spent in Iraq in the last 3 weeks.

Last year, Afghanistan produced 92 percent of the world's opium. The proceeds prop up the Taliban, warlords, and corrupt officials. There's no serious counternarcotics program. If the administration pursues a poorly conceived aerial poppy eradication plan, the results could be even worse. We have a lot of experience in this, in Latin American.

Don't get me wrong, we've accomplished some great things. Because of our efforts, millions of Afghanistan children are in school today. We've built roads and clinics. We got American troops in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, showing that the U.S. military can be a wonderful friend as well as a fearsome enemy.

President Bush, last month, made two encouraging statements. First, he announced the deployment of additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. This is obviously very important, because our NATO commanders desperately need not only several thousand battle-ready troops, but the helicopters, transport aircraft, and other military hardware that go with them. Second, the President pledged \$11.8 billion in new funding over the next 2 years. If these figures represent new funding, in addition to current budget numbers—and I'm not sure of that—and if we focus on projects which bring real improvement to the lives of ordinary Afghans, this may be a start of a more successful strategy. I certainly hope so. Because, in Afghanistan, success is still possible. Or, put another way, failure is not thinkable. The question is, How can we turn things around?

Very briefly, in my view we need to do three things. First, establish security. We should be surging—if we surge American forces anywhere, it should be in Afghanistan, not Iraq. NATO troops are necessary, but not sufficient. We also need to train the Afghan police and army, which means, for starters, paying them decent salaries. I remember when I was in Afghanistan right after the Taliban fell, and I was—spent a lot of time with Karzai over a 5-day period, as he was just literally moving into an office. And I remember the

discussion then about pay for police officers, pay for civilian personnel.

Second, we have to get moving on reconstruction. We need more funds, and we need to use them better. The Afghans are patient, but they're not seeing reconstruction worthy of a superpower. As General Eikenberry said, "Where the road ends, the Taliban begins."

Third, do counternarcotics right. We should target a—multi-million-dollar drug kingpins, not the dollar-a-day opium farmers. Someday, aerial eradication may have its place, but not until we've got an alternative for the livelihoods for the people who we—who we're eradicating the poppy, and a judicial system capable of taking down the drug barons. Until then, we should focus on the top of the food chain, not at the bottom. And, unfortunately, as years as chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I have an awful lot of experience watching us go through this same—how can I say it?—reverse—this same infatuation with thinking that, if we just eradicate, for the compasias down in Latin America, somehow this is all going to go away. You've got to do it at the top.

We have three witnesses today who can explain these issues in detail—with authority, with expertise. The first is Richard Boucher, the Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia. We all know and respect him, and he's a straight shooter. We're happy he's here.

The two—and then we have to exceptional witnesses, General James Jones, recently retired from the U.S. Marine Corps, who—I probably caused him to retire, because I think he's the single most qualified person in the U.S. military—was the commander—and I've said that before he retired; I hope I didn't hurt you, General—who was the Commander of NATO until earlier this year. He supervised the Alliance expansion to include responsibility for all of Afghanistan.

And then, Ambassador James Dobbins, currently at the RAND Corporation. He has served as Special Envoy for Afghanistan. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, he served as liaison to the Afghan forces fighting alongside our troops, bringing down the Taliban. An extremely talented man.

Gentlemen, welcome, and I will now, before we turn to our first witness, turn it over to my colleague Senator Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join your welcome of Secretary Boucher and General Jones and Jim Dobbins, who have been very good friends of this committee for many years. And I appreciate the extraordinary expertise that our witnesses bring to our deliberations on Afghanistan.

Almost 6 months ago, the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on Afghanistan that featured General Jones. At that time, we observed the Taliban insurgents were challenging NATO forces in greater numbers, showing dissent among Afghans, cooperating with the narcotics trade, and complicating security efforts in ways that inhibit the rule of law and reconstruction.

Many analysts believe that fighting in Afghanistan soon will intensify as the Taliban attempt a spring offensive to demonstrate their strength. Although the Taliban do not possess the capability to defeat NATO and the coalition and Afghan forces arrayed against them on the battlefield, the insecurity the Afghan people feel because of the Taliban attacks has caused some to lose confidence in their government. Others are leaning more heavily on tribal leaders and warlords who offer security. This undercuts the authority of the Afghan Government, increases the risk of civil conflict between tribal factions.

The United States and our alliance partners must be prepared to respond to any increase in insurgent violence. There should no doubt that Afghanistan is a crucial test for NATO. The September 11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan; al-Qaeda still operates there. And the fate of the country remains both strategic and symbolic.

As in Iraq, the success of our strategy depends not just on battlefield victories, but also depends on providing the populace with reasons to support the central government and coalition forces. Battlefield successes will not bring security if economic dislocation and political resentment within Afghanistan provide the Taliban with a steady supply of recruits to replace their losses.

We need to underscore that the United States, NATO, and the international community are committed to stability and to reconstruction in Afghanistan. We must focus efforts now on economic development that makes a difference in the lives of Afghans and gives young people more employment options.

We have established an infrastructure to support development in Afghanistan, including Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But if this infrastructure lacks resources to make discernible progress on electricity, water, healthcare, agriculture, and other measures, it will be irrelevant to the security situation.

It isn't clear what portion of Taliban insurgents are true believers and what portion are so-called "day fighters"—local mercenaries who are being paid to fight by the Taliban, often with funds generated from the narcotics trade, but, to the extent that alternatives to a mercenary livelihood can be expanded, the Taliban will find it more difficult to regenerate their ranks.

President Bush has made a significant request, as the chairman mentioned, for new funds for Afghanistan in the 2007 supplemental, including \$2 billion for economic reconstruction. It's vital that this funding be used to maximum effect, and that our allies, similarly, meet their commitments.

The Afghanistan Compact adopted by the international community last year called for a significant increase in reconstruction and development efforts. Likewise, when NATO assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, it called for a renewed emphasis on reconstruction and development. Our partners in NATO and beyond must support these calls with an increase in resources.

I thank the chairman for holding this hearing. I would mention, as a point of personal privilege, that the chairman and Senator Hagel, the three of us, visited with President Karzai in 2003, when we were at the conference on the Dead Sea in Jordan, before we

visited Iraq, and saw his plans then, and were impressed with his economic ministers and the things that they wanted to do. And we still have confidence in them. And it's significant that three of us are here this morning to hear you and our distinguished witnesses, and to try again.

I thank the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary welcome. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Hagel, Senator Nelson, it's a pleasure to be here today.

I have a longer statement that I'd like to have entered into the record, and then I'll—

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, your whole statement will be placed in the record.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, sir.

Senator, I'm going to sketch out, briefly, if I can, somewhat of a different picture than the one that you—than you opened up with, but—

The CHAIRMAN. I expected you might.

Mr. BOUCHER. I want to say, from the start, I think you've got all the right pieces, all the right factors are there. If the situation—if the current trends continued last year's trends, we would be in a horrible situation. But I really do think that we have set it up—we're in better position this year. We have—I'll explain—we have more resources, more capability, and we're looking for additional resources.

The areas that you outlined—security, reconstruction, narcotics—I would add governance—extending the Government of Afghanistan, extending good government in Afghanistan. Those four things, as you noted, need to be done more—more generally throughout the country, and better—in better coordination. And that's the program that we've laid out for this year.

This year, we recognize, we have to step up efforts and carry out a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy to make the country safe for all, especially for the people of Afghanistan.

In the 5 years since Bonn, we have made impressive progress—kids in school, thousands of kilometers of roads, extending government—institutions of government—but we recognize we have many challenges still to overcome. We have to check the Taliban insurgency, ensure that the population sees the benefits of good government, and do a better job of getting the message out in Afghanistan and abroad.

The administration has requested an additional \$11.8 billion in assistance for the remainder of 2007 and for fiscal year 2008 in Afghanistan. This is a significant increase in resources compared to previous years. The funding request reflects a strategy of extending government and the benefits of government to people throughout the country, especially in the south and east. It'll go into training and equipping police and military, constructing district roads, in-

creasing electricity generation and distribution, extending government, training government employees, providing services to citizens, fighting narcotics, and bringing about rural development.

We're all increasingly alarmed by the rapid growth of opium poppy cultivation in the country. Poppy production in Afghanistan fuels corruption and finances criminal and insurgent groups.

Less than 2 years ago, we launched a multifaceted campaign that we're intensifying this year. With the support of Afghan authorities, we've created and expanded a strategy of public information, rural development, law enforcement, interdiction, and eradication.

Last year, we saw six poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan. We have an opportunity this year to double the number of poppy-free provinces to 12, maybe 14, perhaps more.

Once again, this year we anticipate intensified attempts by the Taliban to disrupt government authority and sway the population in their favor. They failed, last year, to take and hold cities, towns, and territory. This year, they're more likely to—they are likely to turn increasingly to suicide bombings, assassination, and intimidation tactics, often targeting innocent civilians.

The United States, the Government of Afghanistan, and our allies are approaching the expected spring violence with some confidence. NATO, United States, and Afghan forces are more capable this year, better positioned, and poised to follow up effectively after military operations. We are succeeding in extending the writ of government to more districts, reporting more Afghan police, Afghan soldiers on the ground, more military, more NATO, more capable district officials, more reconstruction, more roads, more effective Afghan government than ever before in Afghanistan.

As you noted, Pakistan continues to be a key partner, and, I would say, a vital partner, in the fight against Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is clear to us that the Taliban are under pressure from all sides, including from Pakistan. Recently, Pakistan has launched attacks on training facilities and armed infiltrators, and has arrested Taliban leadership figures, including, as you see in press reports, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, a former Taliban Minister of Defense.

Pakistani leaders are committed to combating extremism and continuing to move the country toward a moderate course. Pakistan's success is absolutely key to the success of U.S. strategic goals in the region. We have supported Pakistani authorities, and will continue to support them.

At the NATO Summit in Riga, in November, as well as the Foreign and Defense Ministerials in January and February, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press our allies to fill the force shortfalls for the NATO requirements. And, since last fall, allies have pledged approximately 7,000 new troops to the mission; 3,200 of those are American, but the majority are contributions from other allies. While some caveats restricting operations remain a concern, allies have also expressed a willingness to come to each other's aid, should the need arise. We're also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly \$1.3 billion over the last 6 months in new multiyear assistance.

We and our allies recognize that success in Afghanistan can be achieved, and must be achieved. The people of Afghanistan badly want our assistance, and understand all too well the consequences of failure.

At the Department of State, we appreciate the committee members' interest and support, and particularly the kind of travel that you've made there in the past. Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear and discuss these issues with you today, and I look forward to responding to any questions you and the members may have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boucher follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD A. BOUCHER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address you and the committee today regarding progress in carrying out U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.

I would like to share a few thoughts with you to help frame our discussion today. The United States, joined by many international partners, toppled the Taliban government after 9/11 because of its tolerance of al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. After years of destruction brought about by war, we committed ourselves to rebuilding Afghanistan as a democratic nation to ensure that it would never again serve as a platform for international terrorism. That job is not finished. Indeed, we face a turning point. In the Afghanistan Compact, adopted by the Afghan Government and its international partners last January in London, we made the necessary political and economic commitments, but the security challenge has since increased. This year we must step up our efforts and carry out a comprehensive security, political, and economic strategy to make Afghanistan safe ground for us all, and especially for the people of that long-suffering country.

In the 5 years since Afghanistan's major factions gathered in Bonn to map out a way forward from three decades of war and violence, Afghanistan has made impressive progress. During this period, the United States has provided over \$14.2 billion dollars in security and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan. The political, economic, and reconstruction milestones Afghanistan has achieved are extraordinary. It has a new Constitution, Presidential and National Assembly elections have been held, and the current Parliament is over 20 percent women. About 4.7 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran have returned. Afghanistan's leaders have adopted sound economic policies, and annual GDP growth has averaged nearly 14 percent since 2002. Over 5 million boys and girls have returned to school, hundreds of schools and health clinics have been built or rehabilitated, and thousands of kilometers of roads have been constructed. Multidonor power sector projects are underway to build or upgrade Afghanistan's electricity generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure so that Afghans themselves can begin to rebuild their struggling economy.

We are far from having overcome every challenge. We must check the Taliban insurgency and continue to assist the Government of Afghanistan in extending its authority into ungoverned spaces. We must ensure that the population sees the practical benefits of good government and do a better job of getting the message out within Afghanistan and abroad. We have the strategic opportunity to help build a moderate, Muslim society that can support democratic development throughout the region. The transformation of Afghanistan from an essentially ungoverned territory into a land bridge linking South and Central Asia will bring unimagined opportunities to the people of the region and contribute to reducing tensions and internal political strife in neighboring countries.

The integrated strategy we are pursuing meshes security, governance, and reconstruction. We have made excellent progress on roadbuilding and intend to continue that as well as extend the availability of electricity. We are supporting honest and competent governors, as well as the training and equipping of new police and military forces. We are rebuilding the rural infrastructure, enabling agriculture production to take place in vast areas of the country until recently out of bounds because of lack of irrigation or the presence of land mines. And we are intensifying our efforts to end opium-poppay growing.

REINSTRUCTION

The administration has recently requested an additional \$11.8 billion in assistance for the remainder of 2007 and for fiscal year 2008 for Afghanistan, a significant increase in resources for Afghanistan compared to prior years. Accelerating reconstruction efforts is a critical component of our strategy to stabilize the country against the Taliban and other insurgents. The funding request reflects a strategy of extending government and the benefits of government to people throughout the country, especially in the south and east. Specifically, this funding, if approved, will go into training and equipping the police and the military; constructing a district road system, principally in the volatile south and east; increasing the reliability of, and capacity for, electricity generation throughout the country; extending government through the south and east by building government facilities, training government employees, and providing services to citizens; and fighting narcotics and increasing rural development. There is both an Afghan and international consensus on this approach. We will continue to work with our partners not only within Afghanistan but also in foreign capitals to ensure that this effort is strengthened, broadened, and coordinated.

U.S. assistance programs have already achieved measurable results and brought widespread improvements to the lives of average Afghans. Construction is complete on over 5,825 km of highways and provincial roads throughout the country, which has considerably reduced travel times and thus transport costs. The impact is lower prices for consumers. The value of legitimate agriculture production has increased some \$1.75 billion between 2002 and 2006. This increase has largely gone to farmers. In 2006, the government brought in \$440 million in total domestic revenue, largely through improved customs collection. This funding has helped to pay the salaries of newly hired teachers and health workers. A new currency has been established and remains stable; further, the United States helped establish a central bank that now holds more than \$2.5 billion in reserves. A direct result of these macroeconomic measures is stability associated with a remarkably low 3.4 percent inflation rate over the last year, and the trend is further downward. In the social sector, according to the Ministry of Public Health, 82 percent of people today have access to basic health services, up from just 9 percent in early 2002. According to Ministry of Education data, 5.8 million students, one-third of them girls, are enrolled in school, versus 900,000 under the Taliban.

We have helped the Government of Afghanistan establish new procedures during the past year to promote the effectiveness of assistance delivery. The Government of Afghanistan has developed a common vision, the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS), to ensure that all donors, nongovernmental organizations, NATO/ISAF, and the government itself are coordinating and measuring the impacts of their development programs. The ANDS structure is overseen by, and receives policy guidance from, the Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board (JCMB), cochaired by the Government of Afghanistan and the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative to Afghanistan, and comprised of members of the Afghan Cabinet, Ambassadors of the leading donor nations, and the ISAF Commander. I attended the last JCMB meeting in Berlin at the end of January, and I believe that this mechanism ensures effective coordination in the form of policy formation, prioritization of efforts, and implementation and performance measurement.

To help ensure the effective administration of the additional assistance resources, USAID's FY 2007 supplemental request contains funding necessary for the assignment of 10 additional personnel, ranging from procurement officials to roads engineers, to oversee field work.

If Afghanistan is to succeed, it is crucial that its people see that they are served fairly and effectively by their democratic government that respects human rights as it carries out policies in the interests of all Afghans. The international community is working to strengthen Afghanistan's institutions of governance through capacity-building and support for civil service reform, the Parliament, Governors, civil society, and provincial bodies, including the elected councils. The international community is helping to equip and strengthen government at the district level so that there is a capable government presence at the subnational level throughout the country. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are proving effective in supporting local-level Afghan Government officials and tribal elders in areas recently cleared of insurgents as well as in more stable parts of the country. In addition, these civilian/military teams are implementing projects such as roads, wells, and clinics that demonstrate the visible advantages and benefits of supporting the central government.

Through these activities we are helping to improve local governance and robbing the insurgency of a prime recruiting tool. Provincial Reconstruction Teams staffed by several NATO Allies and partners are proving effective in serving as a "trans-

mission belt” for policy and services linking provincial capitals with Kabul, helping Afghans get services from their own government even as the Afghan capacity to deliver those services is enhanced.

COUNTERNARCOTICS

The Afghan Government and the international community are increasingly alarmed about the rapid growth of opium-poppy cultivation in the country. Afghanistan’s poppy production fuels corruption, narcotics addiction, and is a prime source of financing for criminal and insurgent groups. In order to survive and prosper, Afghanistan—as other states before it have—must rid itself of the opium poppy. President Karzai and his top leaders recognize this.

However, just as the insurgency cannot be defeated by force of arms alone, the scourge of narcotics cannot be defeated purely by eradication. The message that poppy cultivation is immoral, illegal, and un-Islamic must be reinforced. Small farmers must be provided with other means to feed and clothe their families—access to alternative crops and other means of livelihood, to roads that will allow them to move their crops to market, to advice concerning markets for their new crops and to legitimate sources of credit so they can operate free of Taliban protection rackets and intimidation. In fact, they need to rebuild a rural economy that can render the poppy unnecessary in Afghan life. However, as in every country dealing with criminal activity, eradication and law enforcement must be credible in order to make the risks of growing poppy unacceptable; compared with the benefits of licit alternatives.

It is precisely such a multifaceted approach that we launched less than 2 years ago and that we are intensifying now. We must be patient even as we strengthen our approach for the long term. Insecurity in some provinces—notably Helmand, the largest poppy producer—prevents the program I have described to you from being fully implemented today. But we have seen encouraging results from our efforts in other provinces, some of which are poppy-free and some of which have greatly reduced cultivation, and we are persuaded that this strategy is sound. With the support of the Afghan authorities, we have expanded our strategy of public information, alternative livelihoods, law enforcement interdiction, and eradication into additional provinces. Failure to address illegal poppy cultivation and trafficking head on and in a comprehensive manner is a challenge to the Afghan Government’s control over its own territory and a victory for the insurgents.

The United Nations and our own estimates indicate that, despite the expansion of poppy-planting, our manual eradication efforts have shown good results so far this year. As of March 5, we have confirmed 6,754 hectares cleared nationwide, including 2,229 hectares in Helmand province and 4,525 hectares in the rest of the country. Eradication is proceeding ahead of last year’s pace, and all evidence points to significant reductions in planting in the north. Last year we saw six poppy-free provinces, but we have an opportunity this year to double the number of poppy-free provinces to 12 and perhaps add as many as 8 new poppy-free provinces, to total 14.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, on March 5, in its “Afghanistan Opium Winter Assessment,” points to increases in the south, but indicates that continued strong eradication efforts throughout that region—coupled with large cultivation reductions in the north—have the potential to hold net national cultivation at last year’s level. This would be a remarkable achievement, considering the obstacles presented by the security situation.

Whatever happens this year in terms of eradication and net cultivation, there is no doubt that we, the Afghans, and our international allies need to do more. In just the first 2 months of this year, the Border Police in Afghanistan’s Herat province, which shares borders with both Iran and Turkmenistan, seized more than 3,000 kilograms of narcotics and arrested 65 drug traffickers. It is good to see that law enforcement is improving its capacity to interdict at least some of the illicit production, but we know that too much escapes through other checkpoints, and narcotics proceeds undercut all of our efforts in Afghanistan. As Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Anne Patterson noted the other day, we are increasingly concerned that the Taliban reap the benefit of narcotics production and trafficking, another important reason why we must redouble our efforts to eliminate this scourge.

SECURITY

We face a ruthless and determined enemy in Afghanistan and, as snows melt, the spring fighting is starting up once again. Last summer witnessed heavy fighting in the south and east, where U.S. and NATO forces performed admirably. We expect the Taliban to challenge the Afghan Government and ISAF once again this year.

We can anticipate intensified attempts by the Taliban to disrupt government authority and sway the population to their side. Failing last year to take and hold cities, towns, and territory, this year they are likely to turn increasingly to suicide bombings, assassinations, and intimidation tactics, often targeting innocent civilians.

The United States, the Government of Afghanistan, and our allies are approaching the expected spring violence with confidence. NATO, U.S. and Afghan forces are more capable this year, better positioned, and poised to follow up quickly and effectively after military operations. We have more troops than last year, and we have an agreed, comprehensive approach. We have thoroughly reviewed our longer term strategy, a review that resulted in our request to you for additional funding. We are succeeding in extending the writ of the government to more districts. We are putting more Afghan police and Afghan soldiers on the ground, more military, more NATO, more district officials, more reconstruction, more roads, more effective Afghan Government than ever before in Afghanistan. Our aim is to ensure that following the removal of Taliban forces from an area, we move rapidly to provide services and infrastructure in collaboration with local elders to help them realize their highest priorities. This is not top-down planning from the capital, but listening and meeting the needs of the people right where they are.

Although Afghan security forces have made tremendous strides, Afghanistan is still almost totally dependent on foreign forces for security, and faces a threat from a determined enemy, well supplied from abroad, that knows how to exploit the weakness of the security forces inside the country as well as safe havens inside and outside Afghan territory. We are making progress in recruiting and training a competent and reliable Afghan National Army (ANA). We have decided to provide qualitative improvements to training and equipping of the ANA, since the threat on the battlefield is greater than in past years and the leadership exists within the ANA now so they can operate and maintain better equipment. Our review has concluded that we must now work toward increasing the size of the army, due to the changing dynamics of the security situation, though we must not compromise the quality of the ANA in our efforts to boost the quantity. We are also committed to providing combat enablers that will increase the ANA's mobility and develop their ability eventually to defend their nation independent of coalition forces.

LAW AND ORDER

While police are an important component of the Afghan National Security Forces, the police force is underdeveloped and still in transition from a system of militias loyal to local commanders and warlords, to a professionally led, ethnically balanced, national force. In Afghanistan, police play not simply the "cop on the beat" role familiar to all of us; they are also a key component to defeating the insurgency. Once military operations have rid an area of the Taliban, it is the police, trained, equipped, and loyal to the national government, who must take over and give local people the security they need to build their lives. We have a sound program in place for developing the Afghan police, and we know that the capacity of the police must be expanded, but this will take time.

Through better training and leadership, improved pay and electronic distribution of salaries, and provision of better equipment, we are working to ensure that the police are ready and motivated to do their jobs. We strongly support efforts by President Karzai and his government to rein in corruption and prosecute dishonest officials. The international community is supporting reform of the justice system, training for judges, and humane conditions for detainees and prisoners.

Police salaries are paid for through the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA). Over the last 2 years, the international community has provided \$120 million, including \$40 million from the United States. An ongoing reform of the police is gradually tripling the salaries of most patrolmen, and that increase should extend to all police officers and patrolmen within the next year. In addition to low salaries, however, there is also the problem that corrupt officials have been skimming pay before it gets to the individual patrolmen. We are working with the Ministry of Interior on a new pay distribution system that uses electronic transfers instead of cash and a police I.D. system to reduce opportunities for fraud.

PAKISTAN

Pakistan continues to be a vital partner and ally in our fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is clear that the Taliban are under pressure from all sides, including Pakistan. Recently, Pakistan has launched attacks on training facilities and armed infiltrators, and has arrested Taliban leadership figures, in particular, according to press reports, Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the former Taliban Minister

of Defense. Pakistani leaders are committed to combating extremism and continuing to move the country toward a moderate course. Pakistan is absolutely key to the success of U.S. strategic goals in the region. We have supported the Pakistani authorities and will continue to support them.

During his February visit to Islamabad, Vice President Cheney held positive and serious talks with President Musharraf about how, together, we can take strong measures to eliminate the threats from the Taliban and al-Qaeda. While we continue to encourage the Government of Pakistan to take action against violent extremists, we recognize that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed. We, therefore, strongly support President Musharraf's efforts to adopt a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism and eliminating violent extremism in the border regions, which include the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of Baluchistan. We are committed to supporting this initiative, to bring economic and social development and governance reform that will render these areas inhospitable to violent extremists.

Additionally, we are working to harness the power of markets. To ensure that people have opportunities for employment and a chance to develop sustained alternative livelihoods, President Bush announced his support for the establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan. By allowing certain goods manufactured in ROZs to enter the United States duty free as part of a comprehensive strategy of support for the Afghan private sector, this initiative can serve as a catalyst for increased trade and economic stability. The administration will be working this year with Congress, American industry, and the Afghan Government to implement this initiative and to give these people, who need jobs and hope for the future, an opportunity to join the world economy and build sustainable livelihoods.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

At the NATO summit in Riga in November, as well as Foreign and Defense ministerials in January and February, NATO allies and partners reaffirmed their commitment to the Afghanistan mission. We have continued to press allies to fill force shortfalls in ISAF, and since last fall allies have pledged approximately 7,000 new troops to the mission; 3,200 of these are American, but the majority are contributions from other allies. While some caveats restricting operations remain a concern, allies have expressed a willingness to come to each others aid, should the need arise. We are also grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly \$1.3 billion over the last 6 months in new multiyear assistance. Of course, Afghanistan deserves our full effort and we believe the international community can and should do still more.

We and our allies must recognize that success in Afghanistan is our only option. We must vanquish the voices of intolerance and extremism that turned Afghanistan into a land of lawlessness and intimidation, where Afghan citizens' rights were severely violated, and that provided a home to al-Qaeda. The people of Afghanistan badly want our assistance and understand all too well the consequences of failure; sadly, some are questioning our commitment to ultimate success. We must, together, restore their faith by continuing our work until a secure, stable, and more prosperous Afghanistan, based on the rule of law and human rights, is firmly established so that the country will never again fall prey to extremists and terrorists. The Afghan and American people are working collectively toward a future that is secure, prosperous, and free.

We, at the Department of State, appreciate the committee members' interest and support of this most important endeavor. Thank you again for this opportunity to appear before this committee. I look forward to responding to your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

We'll stick to 7-minute rounds, if that's OK, if we agree.

Let me get right to it, Do you agree that the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremists are now operating in more areas of Afghanistan than they were a year ago?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think so. I think, first of all, they have been very dominant in the south, and largely in the south. There have been—they have the capability of carrying out bombings, of sending suicide bombers to other parts of the country, and we've seen some of that, but I would say, by and large, it's the same or less, because parts of the south where they had operated pretty

freely have been taken away from them. So, like some of the areas around Kandahar, the Panjshir Valley—

The CHAIRMAN. So, you think it's actually less territory.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it's probably less. I would say, more or less, we're facing a similar situation. We'll see suicide bombers more throughout the country, though.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the size of Afghan—the Afghanistan Army? And to what extent can they operate independently?

Mr. BOUCHER. They are—I think they have about 35,000 troops now. They are operating closely with our forces, with NATO forces. I don't—I think you'd have to get a military person to describe their capabilities to operate independently, but they operate very effectively, and very effectively with us. Their problem right now is that they're pretty strung out. They've been in the fight, and fighting well, but they're constantly working.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the police?

Mr. BOUCHER. The police have lagged behind a little bit. I don't have a number right off the top of my head for the police, but I guess I'd just have to say there's more and more every day, and they're starting to get more capabilities.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of Afghanistan does the central government control, would you say?

Mr. BOUCHER. It controls the north, the east, the west, the center. It has control of all the provincial capitals, many of the district areas in the south. At the same time, control means they have effective government, they have government officials, they have police, they have military.

The CHAIRMAN. But are they government officials—

Mr. BOUCHER. That doesn't mean it stops everything that might go on there.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I'm not—I—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Understand that. Are you telling me, in the west, in Herat and other places, that Kabul is in control, or are the warlords in those areas in control?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think there is basic national authority throughout the country. And obviously in some places, local authorities have a strong role. But previously dominant warlords in some of these areas have been moved out, and there is more effective national government authority.

The CHAIRMAN. When—you know, there's a routine by which—I recall, when—over the first couple of years after the Taliban fell, I met fairly regularly, and for 6- or 8-, 10-month period, I don't—can't remember how long—but I met weekly with the then-National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice. And I remember going into her office at one point and making the comment that I thought that we were undercutting Karzai in Kabul on public-works projects, because we were going directly to the warlords and giving them the money for sewer projects, water projects, highway projects. And the comment she made at the time was, "Well, that's always been the way it is. The warlords are there. That's just reality." Has there been a change in that philosophy? Do we actually—are we actually—when—for example, we're about to, hopefully, appropriate a considerable portion of money for Afghanistan. Much of that—some

of that will go to public works projects. The PRTs will do some of it, but there will also be, I assume, direct appropriations. Need the mayor of a city somewhere in Afghanistan go through the central government to get the allocation, or does the allocation come directly from either AID or the Department of State or the United States Government? In other words, are we funneling all the aid for local projects through the national government, Karzai's government?

Mr. BOUCHER. A lot of it does go directly through—to the central government, for the central government to spend, but—particularly with the huge amounts that we're spending. A lot of it does go directly through—to the central government, for the central government to spend; but, particularly with the huge amounts that we're spending, a lot of it we spend directly, we contract directly. But we do it in conjunction with the national authorities, with the authorities.

I was up in the Panjshir Valley, a very calm area, the PRT there works with the governor, they work on the roads that he identifies, and the local authorities identified. You know, he's the one that brings a project, cuts the ribbon. It's done—PRTs act in support of the local—of the national government. They act to extend the authority and the benefits of the national government.

The CHAIRMAN. My observation—my time is almost up—my observation is that there is a direct correlation between who you have to go to, to get the money and the degree to which the person you have to go is viewed as having authority in the region. And I've been perplexed as to why—in order to try to build up the central government and Karzai's authority, why we have not increased his ability to have leverage on the political scene by allowing it to be known that that highway that's being built is not because of the local mayor—it's a little bit like today. If you go into the—into our States in highway funding, you don't have to go through the State, you can go directly to the local mayor or councilman, I promise you, the Governor's authority is going to be a whole lot less in a State. And it seems to me—that seems to me to be a missing piece. Maybe I'm—maybe I've misunderstood how you've changed allocations.

But, to be precise, if the PRT gets a request to extend a road 2 miles into a village, or to reconstruct a water project that's been damaged, or build one from the start, or dig wells for—does that come directly from the local tribal leader or warlord? And I know we don't like using that phrase anymore, but they're still warlords. Or does the—do those requests get rationalized through the allocation of resources by the central government, say, "No, no, it's better for us to put more emphasis here than there"? What—how do the PRTs interface with Karzai's ministers and Karzai's government?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. When I was in Panjshir Valley, sir, I saw this working. When people come to the PRT, a local village, and says, "We need a school, we need a clinic, a road," the PRT's answer is, you know, "Great, we'll try to help you. Talk to the governor." He's the one who's got to sort out the priorities, because everybody wants a school, everybody wants a road. He's got to decide where it's going to go. And, as the representative of Karzai, of the

national government, the Governor is the one that sorts it out and decides where these things—

The CHAIRMAN. I have 33—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Which ones to do.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Seconds. For the record, explain the relationship between the Governor and that Governor's allegiance to the central government.

Mr. BOUCHER. The Governor is an appointee of the central government, can be hired, fired, sent off. He works for Karzai. He works for the central government.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, my time is up. I have a few more questions, later, about—if they're not asked—about the pledges we've received from other countries, how they've been forthcoming, if they've been forthcoming, and the like. But I—and I—but I thank you very much. My time is now up.

I yield to my colleague.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just following up your last comment, I would mention that the Afghan Compact was signed in Afghanistan by 64 partner countries and 11 international organizations in January 2006, last year. Now, that Compact pledged \$8.5 billion in new funding over 5 years of time. You've mentioned that some of that money has been forthcoming. And it is, of course, a 5-year pledge. But probably even more significant is the new funding that is being sought in the supplemental now and new efforts by our Government.

Now, I attended a meeting that the President called, last week at the White House, that the Vice President and the Secretary of State attended with Members of Congress, and the entire agenda item was Afghanistan. The enthusiasm for doing things in Afghanistan in that meeting was a bipartisan enthusiasm. The same is exemplified here this morning. But, as I listened to the conversation, and participated in that, I wondered: Is there what would be called, in commercial life, a business plan for Afghanistan? By that, I mean, clearly, \$8.5 billion can do a lot. So could the \$2 billion in supplemental that we're about to consider. But the question is, as a percentage of what complete plan, or—taking a closer look at it, a complete country, a so-called nation-building exercise, how many roads do we need to build? How much agriculture will need to be revamped? Or how much will it need, to turn on the lights? And I really ask this not simply to be difficult and hypothetical, but I believe that the endgame really depends upon having a comprehensive idea. Now, the figure may be a very large one, as we discussed last year, sadly enough, the destruction of Lebanon during all the controversies there, billions of dollars' worth of property were lost to individuals, as well as to the state, and it was not clear how that is ever going to be recovered in any period of time, just to get back to a level playing field.

What I'm wondering is, When the \$2 billion is asked for, is this asked for on the basis of our ability to administer that kind of funding, or the Afghans or some other group could administer it? In other words, we're limited by personnel, by logistics. Give some context, if you can, as to how this spending fits into a successful state, something in which all the objectives we've been talking about today, in terms of quality of life, are likely to arise to a point

where there is confidence in that government, and stability after the money is spent over there and Afghans are on their own.

Mr. BOUCHER. Senator, I think that's a—it's a really important question, and the answer is, really, the needs are infinite. If you want to just say, What more is needed? What we've tried to do with this funding request is—in a responsible manner, but address all the critical needs, the things that really needed to be done to change the momentum, to take the government and the benefits of government to the people throughout the country, but especially in the south and east, where the Taliban influence has been strong.

You have to remember, in the fifties, sixties, and seventies, Afghanistan was one of the poorest nations in the entire—

Senator LUGAR. Yes.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. World. And then it went downhill for 25 years. As our Ambassador points out, that we talk about reconstruction—a lot of this is construction. We've built the ring road, we're now trying to build provincial roads connecting the provincial capitals, and we're trying to build the district road system. But we've—what we've identified in that supplemental request is really the road system for the south and the east. If you wanted to add the north and the west, you'd have another billion—\$2 billion—billion, billion and a half dollars. So, what we're trying to do is all the critical things now to establish government, to build district centers and government provincial justice, and things like that. And that's what we think the \$2 billion does. It—in terms of the reconstruction. The 8.5 on the military and police side tries to give Afghanistan a security force that is geared not on what we can afford or what they could pay for, in terms of salary, but, What do they need to dominate the situation, for the Afghan Government to establish security for its citizens in years to come? And that is one that's, I think, been well worked out by the military to accomplish the necessary tasks.

Senator LUGAR. Well, now, Secretary Boucher, you're correct, certainly, that the needs would be infinite. They would be, in our country, the—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Expectations we have. But I—let me refine the question by saying—What level of spending, what level of achievement is likely to bring about confidence in the government, or the thought that there has been at least some observance of material change, so that there is a desire to proceed with regular civil government. This is as opposed to saying, "Our security depends upon the Taliban," or whoever comes along, "We're really back where we were, in the pits"? In other words, there probably is some incremental threshold of resources, less than infinity, that leads to some point of confidence, or, otherwise, we just simply are attempting to do a number of good things, hopeful that people will recognize that, that their mood will be better, vis-a-vis the United States or the allies or so forth, and, therefore, ipso facto for the Karzai government. But I—I want to get some parameters of where we're headed, in a multiyear way.

Mr. BOUCHER. What we did is, we looked, over the course of last summer and fall, what works in Afghanistan. Where has various strategies worked and bringing in—you know, clearing out the

Taliban with military force, bringing in police and government, building roads, clearing out irrigation, providing electricity, providing a new economy, new economic base—has worked—has worked in the east, has worked in, even, parts of the south. So, what we said is, What do we need, to do that more generally, throughout the problem areas in the east and south, and to help the government generally extend itself? And that's how we came up with these budgets. The road systems, the government provincial centers, the other pieces, the electricity grids, north and south, that we think we need—electricity plan, take 6 percent of the population now on the grid, up to, maybe, 40 percent of the population on the grid. It's not overwhelming, but it's a critical mass, and it's critical areas. Above all, providing roads, electricity, security, gives a chance for the private sector to go. And they've had very good economic growth in Afghanistan. That's going to take them, in the long term.

We've spent \$2½ to \$3 billion a year over the last 5 years. We think this big push is needed to extend the effort more generally. But there will be a sustained level of commitment that we'll need to keep going, steady progress, I think, beyond this. Big push and steady progress, that's what will convince and sustain people for the longer term.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes, sir.

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. Your testimony and for being here. And I appreciate the attention, in your statement, to the poppy issue in the—within Afghanistan, and how we are attempting, through some of our efforts, to provide alternatives for those who make their livelihood off the poppy seed, and your statement that eradication itself will not end the problem. I hope you would comment a little bit more in specifics as to how we are coordinating our efforts to deal with the narcotic issue within Afghanistan, and the impact that is having on achieving our objectives in that region.

Mr. BOUCHER. The first element of coordination is between all the pieces of the strategy so that there is an effective public-relations campaign, there is targeted interdiction of traffickers. I think they're moving to increasingly high levels of the networks to try to take them down. Eradication is always accompanied with rural-development schemes, alternate livelihoods. And we've actually done most of the eradication in areas that have a lot of the assistance, even in the south Helmand province, where there's been the big explosion of poppy. The eradication forces are down there. They've eradicated something like 6,700 hectares of poppy so far this year; whereas, last year at this time it was down in the hundreds. So, there is much more eradication, but there's also much more road-building, irrigation systems, jobs programs, variety of things, that give people other ways of sustaining themselves. We coordinate, also, internationally, especially in Kabul, with other key countries,

like the British and other countries that are involved in the effort. And, of course, the effort is led by the Afghan Government.

Senator CARDIN. Are you receiving the cooperation that you need in order to deal with this issue? And let me just add to that. What other areas do we need to be concerned about in regards to the narcotics issues, as far as getting greater cooperation in order to achieve our objectives?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, first of all, I'd keep your eye on international cooperation—How do other countries step up to the plate and work? Second of all, I think what we think is a very important issue this year is taking down the trafficking networks and some of the big traffickers. And we've worked to try to make sure that the Afghan capability and the international capability are matched up there very closely.

Senator CARDIN. Are there particular countries that we should be concerned?

Mr. BOUCHER. You know, I think how we work—we work very, very closely with the British on this issue, because they have been the lead nation. We're also working very closely with the European Union, generally, as they come up with a new plan to expand police training and to put more of their police trainers in, at the same time as we have vastly expanded what we're doing with police training. So, I think it's primarily the Europeans, and, of course, the Afghan Government, how they go after their own—you know, how they go after corrupt officials who might be involved in the drug trade is very important. We've very much supported that, and pressed them to do that, for example.

Senator CARDIN. I would hope that you would keep us—this committee informed as to other countries that we might have to put more interest on this issue, that may not be doing everything that we need them to be doing, or might, in fact, be hurting our efforts to deal with the trafficking of narcotics out of Afghanistan, so that, in our contact with these other countries, we underscore the importance of this particular issue.

I want to get to troop levels for one moment. If you could just share with us as to how you see troop levels over the next 12 months, 24 months, in Afghanistan—of United States troops, international troops that there—what can we expect in regards to the near future?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I think, first, it's important to remember that, since NATO started to deploy, about 2 years ago, we have not cut U.S. troops; in fact, we added to U.S. troops. So, what you have is NATO expanding into areas where United States forces might have been thin, or Afghan forces might have been thin before. So, now there are many more troops in the country than there had been before. There are many more troops in the Afghan Army than they had been before. We have just added 3,200 troops. Other allies have announced increases—the British, the Australians, a few others. And we have really, I think, seen a lot of people step up to the plates, many of those who were already in the south. What we need to do is push to fill out the NATO requirements. There are still parts of the NATO requirements that are not full—troop levels, helicopters, a few other areas like that, that are critical to full

achievement of NATO's goals, and we continue to press countries on that.

And, second, we need to make sure there's the flexibility to use the forces in—wherever they're needed, whenever they're needed. And, you know, countries in the north and the center have important missions up there, but they also—you know, if they're needed in the south, we want 'em to be able to go there. And so, the flexibility with which countries allow their forces to be used is very—

Senator CARDIN. Do you expect that there will be a need for additional United States troops in Afghanistan over the next 12 months?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, you know, we've identified the need, and we've identified the ways to fill out these additional 3,200. As far as what I've heard from the generals, that's pretty much what's needed. And the important thing about them is, they're capable, they're flexible, they're mobile. And so, they're able to go and take the fight to the enemy, wherever it's needed.

Senator CARDIN. So, I take it the answer is, you don't anticipate—

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't foresee other requests, but I—that's—again, that's a military question, and I—

Senator CARDIN. Right, and—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Those guys—

Senator CARDIN [continuing]. The NATO commitment—how short is the NATO commitment? How much—how many more are needed to be deployed?

Mr. BOUCHER. I'd have to check. We're at about 85 percent of the need, so it's several thousand short—several thousand troops short. But the requirements have just been revised, a new set of requirements coming out to NATO countries, and I don't know exact—the accounting on that.

Senator CARDIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Mr Chairman, thank you.

Secretary Boucher, welcome. Pursue, if you will, with me for a couple of minutes, the line of questioning that the Senator from Maryland was taking you along, on NATO commitments—not just troop, but dollars. You have noted in your testimony, “We are grateful that non-U.S. donors have pledged nearly \$1.3 billion over the last 6 months.” Senator Lugar asked about this, as well, as did the chairman. And you also note in your testimony that, while some caveats restricting operations remain a concern—among the NATO nations, I assume is what you mean by that—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Would you enlighten this committee on what those caveats are? General Jones noted, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee last week, that there are some conflicts, contradictions, cracks in the NATO commitment—not all countries, but a number—to their willingness to contribute to our efforts in Afghanistan. And one of the specific things General Jones noted was that the Italian-led judicial reform efforts are, in his words, “on life support.” His testimony before the Armed

Services Committee was not quite as rosy as yours. And if you could combine these pieces, and give us what you can about—starting with caveats that NATO nations have, and how that affects the pledges in troops, where we are with those pledges. And you mentioned the \$1.3 billion over the last 6 months in new multiyear assistance. How much of that has come in? Where do we stand with the overall 5-year commitment?

Thank you.

Mr. BOUCHER. On the overall 5-year commitment, the pledges from London, our view is that most of that has been spent pretty well, that people are actually carrying out their commitments. Some of it's, you know, 2 years down a 5-year stream. But they, indeed—most of the countries that we've monitored have come through pretty well, and those who don't, we go tap them on the shoulder, remind them, and give them very specific suggestions. The Afghan Government came to a meeting in Berlin not long ago with a list of very specific suggestions about who can do what. So, we're trying to make sure the money is spent effectively. But, by and large, I'd say the pledges are being committed, spent, and made effective. And that's—

Senator HAGEL. Does that mean that they've actually produced the money?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah, they've produced the money and turned—

Senator HAGEL. So, you think they're on track—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And turned it into projects.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. With the commitments they've made.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. Most—

Senator HAGEL. You don't see any of the—any difficulty with those commitments—

Mr. BOUCHER. No major difficulties. The European Union—it's a major donor—spends it very well. The Indian Government's a major donor, they spend it well. And so, we've—and we do work with governments to make sure they not only pledge the money, but put it—put up the money and spend it.

On caveats, it's—by and large, what you hear is from countries who say, "Well, we got authority from Parliament to go on a humanitarian mission to Afghanistan. We don't have authority to put our troops into active combat." And we're saying, "This is an alliance. Everybody needs to, you know, participate in whatever needs to be done." And because, you know, we had a Taliban resurgence, we have a mission to accomplish as an alliance. And we've seen a few of those caveats get lifted. We've seen contributions by countries that don't have caveats, some of these new troop contributions. So, I'd say the situation's a little better now. The French have dropped their caveats and said that they are ready to use their forces around the country whenever they're needed—they used the phrase "in extremis"—to come to the assistance of other forces. We'll have to see, as circumstances and fighting develop, how often they, in fact, do that. But I was in Paris last week, and they told me the same thing again, with the—and said they were ready to act on it. So—

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you a question on—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Specifically on this? Of the roughly 30 NATO countries, how many would you put in the “caveat” column, one caveat or another? You’ve just noted one—

Mr. BOUCHER. I—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Example.

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d like to do it, sort of, carefully and figure it out. I’d—probably about a dozen.

Senator HAGEL. That have concerns, as you noted—

Mr. BOUCHER. Some restrictions—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Caveats—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. On how they would—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Restrictions as—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Use their forces.

Senator HAGEL. So, a dozen of the NATO countries.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL. The rest are—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Well within the—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. General comprehensive commitment—

Mr. BOUCHER. That’s right. And these—they all have important jobs to do. I mean, Germans up in the north, in Badakhshan province, you know, fighting poppies, supporting government. I mean, they’re all doing good work and important jobs. We shouldn’t denigrate the commitment.

Senator HAGEL. So, would your analysis—

Mr. BOUCHER. We want—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Be that—

Mr. BOUCHER. We want more flexibility.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Our NATO partners are cooperating as well as we would like, there are no significant difficulties with their commitments, fulfilling those commitments?

Mr. BOUCHER. I would say NATO’s doing well, and can do better.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

If I could go on to Pakistan—as you know, President Musharraf signed an agreement with the tribal leaders along the Pakistan-Afghan border, intended to contain and weaken Taliban. I’d like your assessment of that, as well as answering this question. As you know, the House of Representatives passed, as part of its 9/11 bill, the new requirement that military assistance to Pakistan be conditioned on Pakistan’s efforts against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and progress on democratic reforms. What’s the State Department’s position on that? Two questions. Thank you.

Mr. BOUCHER. On the border region, certainly asserting government authority there, getting government control there, is vital. I think the government is committed to doing that. There has been pressure on the Taliban from the government. There have been attacks on training camps and madrassas. There have been arrests of key figures. All of this, on both sides of the border, are trying to become more effective and do more in pressuring the Taliban. But there is pressure from both sides, including from the Pakistani side, and that’s an important factor as they try to figure out how they’re going to operate, this year.

In terms of conditioning our assistance to Pakistan, we've—
 Senator HAGEL. Well, let me ask—we'll come—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Back to that—is your assessment, then, on this agreement, that it's working?

Mr. BOUCHER. No.

Senator HAGEL. We're satisfied—

Mr. BOUCHER. No.

Senator HAGEL. You're saying it's not working.

Mr. BOUCHER. On the Waziristan agreement itself, it hasn't done what it was supposed to do. It was designed to be an agreement with the tribal elders, where they would basically kick out the foreign fighters, they would stop the Taliban activity, and would stop the Talibanization. They haven't done that, for a variety of reasons, whether it's inability or unwillingness, but they have not effectively controlled those areas. And so, the government, in recent months, has really moved again with them to try to establish more effective control and reassert itself again. We want them to be effective. There is more to do, and they recognize that.

Senator HAGEL. If you could answer the second question, on the State Department's—

Mr. BOUCHER. We're opposed—

Senator HAGEL [continuing]. Position—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To the provision. We think that there is already effort from the Pakistani side, and that conditioning aid, the implication is that they have to be forced into it. We think they're doing it for their own sake, as well as ours, and that we should look at them as partners.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. Continuing along the line of caveats, but really looking at our own troops there, what—is your observation that our own military troops are fully engaged in combating the Taliban? Are there caveats on what we're doing? I continue to get e-mails from parents and from—directly forwarded from troops on the ground there, on our side, that feel like they actually are held back from doing some of the things they need to do, to combat the Taliban. They're able to watch them actually gear up and set up mortars and be able to do the things they need to do, to counter our troops, and we have to wait until we're fired upon to actually do anything. Any observations in that regard?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think that's the rules of engagement. We'd have to check with the military. But my observation is that our military are out there doing the job, and that they're doing the job militarily, they're taking the fight to the enemy, they're using their intelligence and information, and following up, and going after opportunities and targets. And they're also doing the job on the civilian side. One of the things we've done best is sort of blend the military's ability to put some money into reconstruction with AID's ability to come in quickly with projects and to—and the government's ability to provide authority, so that the security, political, and economic aspects of this are very well blended, and that our different agencies cooperate in doing that. So—

Senator CORKER. No—

Mr. BOUCHER. I'm not aware of any restrictions on U.S. troops, sir, not—

Senator CORKER. As far as the reconstruction that we're doing there, we obviously—following Senator Lugar's comments—a lot of money's being spent there, and—are we using outside contractors to do a great deal of that work, or are we actually trying to use Afghans to create economic growth in that regard?

Mr. BOUCHER. We funnel as much money as we can through the Afghan Government, and have a big program to increase their capacity and ability to manage money. Then we use large contractors for some of the really big projects, the building of the road systems. Those are United States contractors, generally, but then they subcontract with Afghans. And there are programs to try to develop local business, local capabilities, so that, increasingly, the money from us and other donors can go to Afghan contractors. But we do use large contracts for some of these, you know, electricity grids, road system, kind of really big projects that need to be planned out carefully in all their pieces.

Senator CORKER. You know, as we're seeing in Iraq, obviously people being unemployed is a big part of what's creating many of the issues there. Back to the poppyseed issue, it's easy, I know, to say that we're training people to do other things. I know, in my own State of Tennessee, when the tobacco issue came up, that's sometimes easier said than done. Tell me, specifically—that's a pretty big statement, to say that these people are moving into other economic—other kinds of jobs. Tell me how we're actually doing that. It seems more difficult than just a statement.

Mr. BOUCHER. It is more difficult than just a statement, because you can't find a crop that's as valuable as poppy. You can't say, you know, "Grow pomegranates, you'll make more money," because you won't. It's more difficult. Poppy is an easy crop. You get the finance. It's easy to transport when you don't have a road. What you have to do—and we've seen this in the experience of countries like Turkey or Pakistan, that, at one time, were the major opium producers—you have to keep at it over time, you have to show government determination, you have to build a different rural economy. So, it's not: You give them a different crop. It's: You give them a road and electricity and irrigation, and they start growing fruit trees, but they also can process—you know, somebody sets up a packaging plant, and it's cold storage, so you can sell all winter long. Your brother-in-law starts driving a truck. Your sister sets up a handicraft business, because she can now market in the cities or in—somewhere nearby. And a different rural economy develops. So, you've got to do all these pieces. That's where the development strategy comes in.

A lot of the immediate projects have to do with jobs. So, we're doing, like, helping villagers build cobblestone roads, where they built it, they maintain it, and it gives them an outlet from the village to a market town or a market road. And that creates jobs, but it also opens up that new economic opportunity. Repair of irrigation ditches in irrigation systems, so that once—they get the job to do the work, but once the job is finished, they have new kinds of agriculture that they can introduce. So, a lot of it's job-oriented, but

also trying to develop that different kind of rural economy is really the long-term solution, and that's the precise goal.

Senator CORKER. What's the attitude of the Afghans toward their own military? I know that's obviously, again, in Iraq, been a huge issue. How are they perceiving their own military, from the standpoint of evenhandedness and their reliance upon them to actually create security?

Mr. BOUCHER. It's very good. The polls that I've seen, you know, support for the national government and the military, is very high. The anecdotal evidence from governors and district chiefs and tribal elders is, they want these guys there, you know, their—one of their major demands for the insecure areas is, "Assign policemen to our district. Send the military to our district." And there are many more demands than the military's capable of fulfilling right now. That's why the guys are so busy and constantly fighting. But they are wanted. I think building of the Afghan military, as a national institution, has been quite successful in Afghanistan.

Senator CORKER. OK.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Senator MENENDEZ.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, let me focus on Pakistan, because I don't think we can talk about Afghanistan without talking about Pakistan. And I think we all would like to know exactly how involved Pakistan is in either supporting the Taliban or tacitly allowing it to exist. And I think it's pretty clear that the Taliban existence in Pakistan plays a big part in helping to fuel the conflict in Afghanistan.

Pakistan is one of the world's leading recipients of United States aid and has received more than \$3.5 billion in direct United States assistance from fiscal years 2002 to 2006, including \$1½ billion in security-related aid. So, would you say to the committee that, from your perspective, Pakistan is being 100 percent cooperative in its effort to combat terrorism and to quell al-Qaeda and Taliban forces?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think Pakistan is enormously cooperative, is enormously engaged in this fight. No country has captured more al-Qaeda, or lost more men doing it, than Pakistan. They have also increased the effectiveness of their efforts in the border areas. We all have a long way to go, and there's a lot more that we—we're doing, and that they're doing that we're going to try to do with them. But I think, overall, if you look at Taliban and al-Qaeda, particularly on the al-Qaeda side, there's been an enormous effort from Pakistan, and they've lost a lot of people in that fight.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, if that's the case, I would gather from your answer that you believe they're being as supportive as they can be. Then why is it that the reports of the Vice President in a recent visit suggest that a Democratic Congress might cut off assistance if Pakistan didn't do more? Why would that statement be made, if, in fact, Pakistan is doing everything it can?

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, I don't quite want to say they're doing everything they can, because I don't think any of us are. I mean, we just came up to the Hill and asked—

Senator MENENDEZ. Or doing as much as they—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. For billions more.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Should reasonably—

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. Expect.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. They have been doing more and more, and there is more we all have to do, including Pakistan. They don't have effective control of the border areas. They have arrested some leaders. There are more to be tracked down and arrested. They have stopped some of the training camps. There are more to be tracked down and eliminated. But they're in this fight, and they're in this fight because Taliban is a threat to Pakistan, as well as to us and the neighbors. And we want to help them. We want to work with them. We want to encourage them. And that's, I think, what, really, the Vice President did. He expressed our support for their effort, our willingness to support their effort, but also our encouragement, and talked to them about how we can all be more effective.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, as I read those reports, it's a rather blunt encouragement.

Mr. BOUCHER. We're very—

Senator MENENDEZ. It seems to me that the suggestion that a Democratic Congress might cut off funds to Pakistan, which no one has suggested, is a way to move them to greater action—for example, a New York Times article published in late January reported that the Pakistani city of Quetta, along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, serves as a rear base for the Taliban and that Pakistani authorities—this is a quote from the article—“are encouraging, and perhaps sponsoring, the cross-border insurgency.” And although President Musharraf denies such claims, the article goes on to say that, “Residents of the border area, opposition figures, and Western diplomats point to specific cases of Pakistani involvement.”

So, how does that make sense? And how do we justify our support if that's the reality?

Mr. BOUCHER. Again, the Taliban do operate from Pakistan. They find sanctuary there, they find sources of supply there. A lot of their command and control is on that side of the border. They're a people that go back and forth. They're not under effective government control there, and we need to work with the Pakistanis to make it more effective.

Senator MENENDEZ. Do we believe that the Pakistani intelligence service actually continues to collaborate with the Taliban?

Mr. BOUCHER. We have seen, I think, a lot of effort from the Pakistani's intelligence service against the Taliban, but there are those reports that say that some of their members might be keeping ties with their friends.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, recently, Defense Secretary Gates met with President Musharraf, who, again, denied charges that the Taliban are staging attacks from inside Pakistan. However, a recent report says that at least 700 Taliban fighters crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan to reinforce guerrillas attacking a key dam in southern Afghanistan. And the Iraq Study Group noted that Afghanistan's borders are incredibly porous. If you don't acknowledge that, in fact, Taliban fighters are working from within

your country, going across borders, how is it that you can ever deal with it?

Mr. BOUCHER. They do acknowledge it, sir. I know that the question gets asked different ways, and people answer it in different ways. But, I mean, they just announced—or just made public the fact that they've just picked up a major Taliban leader inside Pakistan. President Musharraf has said, frankly and point blank, that these people do operate from inside Pakistan, and that he's determined to go after them.

Senator MENENDEZ. So, you're satisfied with what the Pakistanis are doing.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think we're satisfied the Pakistanis are in the fight, and we're working them—with them to become more effective, as we are working with ourselves and the Afghans to become more effective on the other side of the border.

Senator MENENDEZ. Now, do we expect simply a military solution in Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. No. No. Not on either side of the border. We're also looking at how we can support the economic development of the Pakistani side so that people are brought into the national economy and have alternate opportunities. On the Afghan side, it's a very well—I think, increasingly well-coordinated strategy of military action followed by the extension of government—and Karzai, as you know, just named a number of new officials for the south, for example, new police chiefs, district chiefs—with a smooth flow of reconstruction and development assistance. And what we've found is, where we do this well, it works, it stabilizes parts of the country. What we've come up with a request to do is so we can do it more broadly throughout the country, and continue to try to do it better.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, you know, I don't think we have a blank check here. I don't think all that much progress has been made. And I think we have real challenges. Unfortunately, we diverted our attention from finishing the job in Afghanistan, and went into Iraq. But we look forward to continuing having a dialog with you on this.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Sununu.

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Boucher, what's the point of our eradication policy?

Mr. BOUCHER. It's to destroy the poppy. It's part of a complete package.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I think that's a true statement, that eradication is destruction. But what's the point? What's the goal?

Mr. BOUCHER. It's to keep it out of the markets, keep it off the streets, and to establish that there is a significant element of risk in growing this crop, so that the farmer can't count on a sure return—

Senator SUNUNU. Well, that's a—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. So that when he plants—

Senator SUNUNU. I understand—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. He has to—

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. The message you want to——

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Decide——

Senator SUNUNU. But if the point is to keep it off the street, then that places it, effectively, on par as a U.S. domestic drug enforcement effort, because we feel very strongly about preventing drugs from coming into this country. Is that a—is that a—are you telling me that's what the objective, the thrust of eradication——

Mr. BOUCHER. That's——

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Is about?

Mr. BOUCHER. That's certainly part of the whole effort. I mean, a lot of this drugs actually flow into Russia and Europe, but we want to keep it out of——

Senator SUNUNU. Well, it——

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. The markets.

Senator SUNUNU. And so—but if we're—if that's a true statement, if you really believe that, that's the thrust. So, what we're basically doing is placing this objective, as we have to make trade-offs in the policy, against the other goals of improving security or economic issues and other areas where the eradication, as a policy, might work against our interest.

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think that's the case. I know I've heard a lot of people talk about this. But no country that's been a major drug producer has prospered as a healthy society, a stable government, and an economically diverse nation. We're——

Senator SUNUNU. Which——

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Trying to get Afghanistan to the point where it can develop an economy, it can develop a country, without the corrosive and corrupting influence of the drug trade.

Senator SUNUNU. That's an important point.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator SUNUNU. Now, that's an economic point. And I would tend to agree with you, that, in terms of long-term economic prosperity, we probably want to encourage other areas of economic development. But, again, as an economic proposition, those long-term—that long-term potential needs to be traded off against the short-term effects that it would have on other important objectives.

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think——

Senator SUNUNU. For example, security. And let me be more specific, because—look, if you're—a policy of eradication, first and/or only—and that is primarily what we're engaged in here. There are, of course, other economic development issues going on in the country which would take place whether we were engaged in a poppy policy of eradication or not. But that policy of eradication disenfranchises the rural population from those engaged in the policy, the Afghani Government and United States forces, coalition forces. It certainly creates a huge incentive for a much stronger relationship between that rural population and the Taliban, which runs against our security interests. And I think it makes it more difficult for, then, the Afghani Government to establish both order and a strong, ongoing relationship with the populations in those areas. And I think that we've got to recognize and be honest about that, because those are the negative consequences that have to be traded off against either the drug enforcement priority—and I—that's certainly a domestic policy and priority for the United States,

and, I'm sure, for these other countries that would be affected by the movement of the drugs—or the long-term economic concerns. But I think the short-term economic concerns are at least as important as some of the longer term ones. And obviously the—an eradication policy is not good, economically, for the farmer whose crops are being destroyed.

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, first of all, it's a distortion of the policy to call it a policy of eradication. There are multiple pieces to this—education, interdiction, law enforcement, eradication, alternate rural economy. The—when we eradicate, we provide jobs, we provide economic opportunity, we provide a different rural economy for people. What—much of what we're eradicating are large holdings, drug barons, who are growing large fields, who have become rivals, and local authorities—and fight against local authorities, and try to prevent the application of national authority. A lot of that money does flow into the Taliban, so you need to—you need to stop that connection, you need to stop that flow, because you're feeding the insurgency if you allow the drugs to prosper.

Senator SUNUNU. Don't you believe—

Mr. BOUCHER. And you need to—

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. Or do you believe that the Taliban will have access to financial resources, whether it comes through the drug trade or not?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yes.

Senator SUNUNU. What's the cost of the eradication program?

Mr. BOUCHER. We spend about \$600 million, I think, last year, on the antinarcotics program, part of which is eradication, and a big chunk of which is roads and irrigation and jobs.

Senator SUNUNU. You think \$600 million is the total cost of our antinarcotics program—United States, allies, Afghan Government?

Mr. BOUCHER. No. Because so much else of what we do—

Senator SUNUNU. What is the total?

Mr. BOUCHER. The—I don't know if I could do it, because the whole effort to establish security, extend government, and give economic opportunity is the essence of the fight against narcotics, as well as the essence of development of the country. And that's—

Senator SUNUNU. Why not simply purchase the crop at the field and destroy it?

Mr. BOUCHER. Because you get yourself into a bidding war with traffickers who have more money, frankly. The—

Senator SUNUNU. I don't know that that follows. I think someone—a farmer at the field, especially in these regions, which are certainly impoverished, in many cases, are looking for—money to feed their family. And when an offer is made to purchase a crop and destroy it, they would rather be—I think many of them would rather be working with the government and obeying the law than not. So, if there's a program to participate in a purchase, I think they would be very willing to participate, and not necessarily looking to get more money from someone who's engaged in illegal or antigovernment activity.

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, he's going to follow the laws of economics, too. If there's more demand, he's going to supply more, he's going to grow more. You're merely encouraging the production, and you're getting yourself into a bidding war, where the margin for the traf-

fickers from what they pay the farmers to what they get in the network is so big that they can just keep ratcheting up what they pay. You're just going to increase production.

Senator SUNUNU. How much do you think it would cost to purchase the entire crop?

Mr. BOUCHER. The—I'm trying to see if I have a number for the value of the crop. The legal economy has been expanding, so—\$2–3 billion, probably, based on the numbers I've got.

Senator SUNUNU. So, \$2 billion, when we're probably spending between \$1 and \$2 billion now on eradication, which, at least under the eradication policy, we've seen growth expand to record levels last year, and you provide an optimistic forecast that will hold our ground on the total acreage planted this year; whereas, at least in theory, \$2 billion—heck, in theory, \$2 billion could take all of that off the street. If the bidding war you describe ensues, then perhaps you'll only take half of it off the street, with 50 percent margin of error. But my—the obvious direction this is headed is, has anyone even worked through how such a policy might work, and whether it might work? And what is our allies' thinking on this approach?

Mr. BOUCHER. Our allies, the ones who were most involved in this, with the British and others, are as against it as we are. We've looked at this carefully. We've thought about this carefully, because people do propose it. We think it violates fundamental laws of economics, and that if you buy the crop this year, you're just going to get a bigger explosion of production next year, because everybody's going to want to grow it and sell it to you. And they'll sell it to you and everybody else they can produce for.

Senator SUNUNU. You don't—so, a target—a program that is either a—broad or targeted, you don't think you have any ability to implement such a program, you know, without having negative consequences on those parts of the country where the economy is more stable, where people have substituted crops or built the refrigeration or done all the things you talk about—

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

Senator SUNUNU [continuing]. That, suddenly, if you have a purchase program designed to target those areas where this is still a problem, everything else that you've put into place will fall apart?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think—I don't know if it'll all fall apart, but I think everybody that could produce poppy and sell it to you would start producing poppy, and you'd destroy any moral basis for saying poppy is bad.

Senator SUNUNU. And, to be clear, you're suggesting that you—that the United Kingdom, in particular, which has provided a lot of assistance in this area, the policymakers responsible for this issue haven't expressed any concern, dissent, about the current policy and program?

Mr. BOUCHER. We—there are always discussions about how to do it more effectively, but they agree with the thrust of the program, and that's to stop the production of drugs and to provide people with alternative opportunities.

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I appreciate your answers to the questions.

Mr. Chairman, you know, I just have concerns, when you look at the growth, and when you look at all of the negative consequences

of an eradication program, driving farmers toward the Taliban for financial reasons, causing friction between the government and the local population, diverting our military efforts—I think we need to, at least, take a very hard look at what we’re doing and whether it’s working, and whether it is serving our near-term security needs, because those have to be of the highest priority. The long-term economic needs are extremely important. We all want to get there. And, obviously, poppy cultivation can’t be part of the long-term economic future of Afghanistan. But I think we have to talk at least as much about the short-term security needs of Afghanistan when we have this debate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say, having spent 20 years working in this, I’m not sure your assertions, Mr. Secretary, are correct, because the market works the same way. You’re arguing there’s going to be alternative crops. You’re just—not going to just eradicate. So, the question is, Why would they go to an alternative crop if they can stay in the crop they’re in? What you’re doing is—they’re assuming you’re going to buy them by providing an alternative crop.

I would like to have a copy of whatever report you all have written and concluded what the judgment—the collective judgment of State Department is about the poppy program, so we have before the committee the actual document that sets out what the strategy is and why it’s there. Because economics works the other way. The reason why they’d likely be eradicated or not, move to another crop substitute, is because of the premise my friend from New Hampshire pointed out, that there are those who would conclude that the risk of staying in the business is too high, coupled with their—they would rather make a decent living by doing something other than growing poppy. But I’d like very much to see something in writing as to what the discussions have been and what conclusions have been reached as to why the policy you’ve decided on is the correct—why you believe it’s the correct policy.

Mr. BOUCHER. I’d be glad to get you something.

The CHAIRMAN. Good.

Mr. BOUCHER. I’m not sure I have everything off the shelf, but we’ll get you something.

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:]

We believe our overall five-pillar counternarcotics policy is sound. We are, however, developing strategic options to improve its implementation. We would be happy to share the results of our reassessment with you as soon as it has been approved by the administration and to provide a classified briefing as required.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I assume these discussions just don’t take place in the abstract. I assume there’s been actual—

Mr. BOUCHER. No, there’s—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Memorandum of understanding extended between us and the Brits and others as to how to proceed with this issue. I hope there has been, anyway. I hope it’s not just casual conversation.

Mr. BOUCHER. No; it’s constant structured discussions. I’m just not sure where we have—whether we’ve put it all down in—

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I—it would be very helpful—

Mr. BOUCHER. I'll get you—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. If you could. I—

Senator. Senator Isakson.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Following up on this discussion, which is, I think, a very important one, I think I understand the eradication program. And I think the question as to its validity needs to be deeper than the questions so far. They provide 92 percent of the world's illicit opium. Is that correct?

Mr. BOUCHER. That's right.

Senator ISAKSON. OK. That is a huge amount. Assuming we've eradicated it, and assuming we have—the Afghanis have operational control over the areas where it's grown, the question is, Can we supply them with the ability, the technology, and the potential alternative crops to replace the economic value of opium? Can we do that?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think the answer is yes. What we've seen in Afghanistan is, the regular economy has been growing a lot faster than the economy of opium production. So, opium production used to come down to about 62 percent of the value of the GDP, now it's about 35. So, over the past 5 years, as a percentage of the total economy, it's gone down. So, we have seen growth in the rest of the economy. But it's—as we've talked about before, it's not just a matter of finding another crop that somebody can grow, it's giving a different economic opportunity. It's—so that you have processing plants and cold storage and transport mechanisms and handicrafts and production and, you know, cousins who get jobs in town and send money back. You need a different rural economy. And that's been the experience in places that used to be the major producers—you know, Thailand, Pakistan, and Turkey. It takes time. It takes government determination. And it takes a different rural economy. And we're—that's what we're trying to work in tandem.

Senator ISAKSON. On that subject, we're currently in the midst of Operation Achilles. Am I correct that the—that theater of operation is the poppy-growing area?

Mr. BOUCHER. Part of it's the poppy-growing area. There's also a lot of production farther south, in Helmand, as well.

Senator ISAKSON. But it is the Taliban stronghold. And the Taliban strength, economically, is through the profits from opium trade, is that not correct?

Mr. BOUCHER. They get other sources of funding, but, yeah, they get a lot of money from the drug trade.

Senator ISAKSON. I was at the World Security Conference in Munich about a month ago, and I met with the Secretary General of NATO. We have a bit of a mystery that doesn't get written about too much there are as many foreign allied troops in Afghanistan as there are Americans. There's a total 46,000. We have 23. A number of other countries have an additional 23. And the majority of them are carrying out Operation Achilles. And there's a great deal of support from the European community. I think Germany's putting in 6 more Tornados and the support to back them up. We got Mullah Mahmud last night, trying to slip out of Afghanistan in a burqa. So, obviously, things are getting pretty uncomfortable. If that success materializes in that area of Afghanistan and Oper-

ation Achilles gets operational control under Afghan security, the key to not wasting that effort is going to be quickly following up on these alternatives so that economic diversity can grow in a relatively short period of time. Am I not correct?

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely. And we've put enormous effort into this—what we call a comprehensive approach, and we've been trying to work that through with allies and NATO countries. That's the message the Secretary of State took to her NATO meeting in January. Secretary Gates took it to the Defense Ministers. And we're working very actively with NATO countries so that assistance, Afghan Government, and reconstruction, and military security are all worked together so that they work simultaneously. Had very successful operations earlier this year around Kandahar, Operation Medusa, that did very effectively. And that's what Achilles is going to do, as well.

Senator ISAKSON. If I remember correctly, when Secretary Rice was here and we reviewed the Department's budget, there was almost as much money for Afghanistan in this area as there was Iraq. Am I remembering that correctly?

Mr. BOUCHER. I'm afraid I don't know the numbers on Iraq off the top of my head, sir.

Senator ISAKSON. Anyway, I think it demonstrated, contrary to popular belief, that we have a continuing significant commitment in Afghanistan to sustain an actually more secure democracy, get rid of the illicit trade of the opium, and also defund and demoralize the Taliban.

Mr. BOUCHER. Absolutely. And the supplemental funding request we're making is a really big push, and we hope to not only make the big push, get in there more broadly where we need to, but also sustain it over the years. It's going to have to be a long-term effort.

Senator ISAKSON. And just to confirm what you were saying in answer to the questions on eradication, when I was in Munich meeting with the security people—where Putin came and made his infamous speech, a month ago—there is unanimity on this eradication program within NATO and within the European community that it's the right approach, just as long as we're able to follow it with relative security and the alternatives to allow the economy to grow.

Mr. BOUCHER. There is unanimity on the comprehensive approach, the five-pillared approach to narcotics. And there is always debate about how much eradication, and when and where, what kind of eradication, versus, Are we bringing enough alternate-livelihood money? And we've, I think, worked that out, on an ongoing basis.

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I appreciate your and the Secretary's continuing work. Thank you.

Mr. BOUCHER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Let me go back, if I can, to this. I'm going to take another round, if I may. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that the purpose was to—of eradication—was to prevent this poppy from coming into the United States and other countries. Isn't one of the overwhelming

reasons for it to stop being able to fund the warlords and fund—where is this money going? Where is this illegal money going?

Mr. BOUCHER. The money goes into drug barons. The Taliban siphon off some of it. A little bit—a little bit of it goes to farmers. But, largely, it goes into the traffickers and trafficking networks and the—

The CHAIRMAN. And who are—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. People that they pay off.

Senator ISAKSON. Who are the traffickers?

Mr. BOUCHER. Some of them are what you might call warlords, people connected to former centers of power. Some of them, I think, are just people who—

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have them identified?

Mr. BOUCHER. We are—

The CHAIRMAN. I'm not going to ask you, publicly, who they are, but do we have—

Mr. BOUCHER. I guess I'd say—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Them identified?

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We're increasingly closing in on identifying them. Some have been picked up and arrested in Afghanistan, by the Afghans—a lot of mid-level people, a few top-level people. But I think we—our drug people tell me—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what was told—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We're getting closer and—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Is some of the—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And closer.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Better-known warlords, the people who we know—we know their names, they've been around for a considerable amount of time—are significant beneficiaries of this, that they are cooperating, making their own deals with the Taliban, they're buying off one another, that they are part of the problem that relates to the physical security of our troops and NATO troops there. I would like—again, in classified form, if need be—I would like to have the committee briefed on—not generically, specifically who—because if you need help, I can give you the names of some of them. I'm not being facetious. It bugs me that we have these generic assertions that, "Well, you know, it goes to some people and goes to drug lords." My understanding is, from both our military and intelligence people, it goes specifically to warlords we know, who have been giving Karzai a hard time, who are maintaining control of regions of the country, who have cut their deals not only with traffickers, but cut their deals with being able to fund their private armies and their militias. And so, if I'm wrong about that, I'd love to hear about it, but I'd like a—if you would arrange for a classified briefing for us on who the money's going to. It's billions of dollars.

Mr. BOUCHER. It's—

The CHAIRMAN. It's billions of dollars.

Mr. BOUCHER. It's a lot of money.

The CHAIRMAN. It far exceeds anything we're putting in. I mean, in terms of thus far, if you added it all up, as I understand it. But if I'm wrong about that, I'd like to be corrected—

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think that's—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. On it.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Quite true, because the overall Afghan economy last year was about \$9 billion, and the value of the drug trade was 35 percent. So, that put it about \$3 billion. It's a lot of money.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

Mr. BOUCHER. It's a lot of money.

The CHAIRMAN. And—

Mr. BOUCHER. Sir, the—some of the warlords have been marginalized. Many of them have accepted the new governing arrangements. I wouldn't say that all of them—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I'd like to have, with your permission—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Are involved, but we—there are people involved in the drug trade that have—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. In a classified setting, I'd like the names of the warlords, each of them—we know them—and what our estimate is of their participation. It would be really sad if we didn't know that, or have an estimate, so I hope I don't get back "that's unknowable," because it is knowable. And, if it is unknowable, then we're in real trouble. We are absolutely incompetent if that's the case. But—so, I'd very much like to have that, for the record.

Mr. BOUCHER. We know a lot about a lot of people—

The CHAIRMAN. I know, and—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. And we'll get you classified—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. We'd like to know what you know, to determine whether what you know is enough to need—that needs to be known, because we don't have a lot of—I don't have a lot of confidence, so far, in the way we've handled Afghanistan.

Let me also point out that you indicated that you think things are better, yet in 2006, 4,000 people killed. And, according to the U.S. military, Taliban attacks surged by 200 percent in December. Since September, when Musharraf signed his peace deal with the extremists, the number of attacks of cross-border have increased by 300 percent. Suicide bombings have gone from zero in 2002 to one every 3 days in 2006, with apparently—at least I don't see much relief in sight. I could be wrong about that. But let me ask you about reconstruction details, if I may.

The—according to the Congressional Research Service analysis, the funds for civilian reconstruction the President requests come to less than the amounts in some prior years. And fiscal 2005, seems to have been the high mark in past years. The administration proposal that—this 11-point-whatever it is, would provide \$1.8 billion for fiscal 2007, regular and supplemental combined. And that—and \$1.4 billion for fiscal 2008. But, by comparison, in 2005, it was \$2 billion. So, as I look at this, the reconstruction number is actually going down, not going up, from 2005. Two thousand five highwater mark, \$2 billion, yet combined 2007 and supplemental is \$1.8, and the request for 2008—I mean, excuse me—combined for 2007, regular and supplemental, is \$1.8; total for 2008 in the President's request is \$1.4. Yet, in 2005, it was \$2 billion. Is this an accurate analysis, or is the Congressional Research Service incorrect?

Mr. BOUCHER. I'd have to look at the numbers. It just sounds wrong. I mean, we spent \$14.2 over 5 years. That works out to

\$2½ billion a year. And now we're asking for \$11.8 to spend over—

The CHAIRMAN. But I'm talking about—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Two years, that's \$5 billion a year.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Reconstruction, specifically. Reconstruction money, specifically.

Mr. BOUCHER. Even on the reconstruction side, we're looking at—you know, you can take out the training of army and police, even—we're looking at \$2.2 to spend over the next 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Over the next 2 years. So, that's, you know—

Mr. BOUCHER. 2007 and 2008. So, that's—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. \$1.1 a year.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. \$1.1 billion. We've had, in—what I know is about \$1 billion a year, a little less. So, this is more.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—

Mr. BOUCHER. I'd have to look at the numbers, sir, but I think what we've tried—

The CHAIRMAN. I—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To do is, do a whole program that addresses all the needs.

The CHAIRMAN. But, again, what you—what—the impression being left here is that we have to win the hearts and minds. The way in which the Karzai government and a democratic Afghanistan, from—in Kabul, a central government, is going to be able to do that, is by changing the status of the life on the ground for people, in terms of reconstruction, not just security, but in terms of the change in their daily lives. There's discussion here among various Senators—I think the Senator from New Jersey raised it—about everything from electricity to schooling to whatever, and that's all in the reconstruction piece of the equation. Yet, as I look at the reconstruction piece, at best you're about even with what you've done in the last 5 years, which is woefully inadequate, in my view, and, at best, it's less than what it was in 2005. So, if you could give us an analysis of whether or not my assessment is incorrect—and I hope it is—I'd be delighted. OK? Because—

Mr. BOUCHER. We'll get that to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Because it makes it sound like we're really doing something different, and the truth of the matter is, I don't think we're doing something radically different, in terms of funding for reconstruction. Now, we are doing more, finally, in terms of training the police. We are doing more in terms of training of the military. And we are doing more in sending more of a physical presence, more troops. But, again, remember the premise. It was the same premise the President put forward years ago with regard to Iraq when he said he needed \$18.4 billion. The rationale for that wasn't we needed that to provide for security, it was we needed that to get the lights on, we needed that to get the sewers functioning, we needed that to get, you know, the public works, the roads, the highways, the potholes filled, et cetera. And that was the only way we were going to fundamentally alter the attitude of the people in Iraq about our not being an occupier. Well, we're saying the same thing, the same basic premise, as I understand, that we're starting off with here is that we have to deal with security, but that's not enough. We can't do this militarily, we can't do this

merely by training Afghan forces, we have to do this by changing the lives on the ground as it return—as it relates to their ability to have potable water, et cetera.

And so, if that is true, and if my analysis is correct, it looks to me like we're not doing much that we haven't done the last 5 years, which hasn't been enough.

Mr. BOUCHER. What I'd say, sir, is that the premise is that people want the whole package. People expect their government to give them safety and justice and government services, and a road and electricity and economic opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Let's assume they get safety and justice—

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, we're trying to—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. And the rest. This doesn't—

Mr. BOUCHER. Well—

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Get them any more roads. This doesn't get them any more potable water. This doesn't get them any more than they've gotten the last 5 years, which they're clearly unsatisfied with.

Mr. BOUCHER. Well, it gives them more, because they've got the road that was built last year, and they're going to get the road that's built next year. I mean, it's—there is the incremental increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I think that's a—we are so far behind the curve. But we can argue about that. I'd just like an analysis.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah, we'll give you—

The CHAIRMAN. Are we, in fact, doing more on reconstruction than we've done in 2005? And, if we are, how much more? Just flat reconstruction. That's my second round.

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:]

Foreign operations assistance to Afghanistan—in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of overall U.S. Government assistance to Afghanistan—has decreased from its height in fiscal year 2005. In fiscal year 2005, foreign operations assistance accounted for about \$2.9 billion, or approximately 60% of overall U.S. assistance to Afghanistan.

In fiscal year 2007, which includes the recently passed supplemental, foreign operations assistance accounted for about \$1.8 billion, or approximately 18% of overall U.S. Government assistance to Afghanistan. The other 82% is mostly funding for the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I'll yield now. I see the Senator from Wisconsin is here. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me to make a brief opening statement, but I'd rather just ask that it be put in the record, the full statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be.

Senator FEINGOLD. And I want to thank everyone for coming here to testify before the committee today.

And I want to thank you, Senator Biden, for arranging the hearing.

The situation in Afghanistan is critical to our national security. Unfortunately, obviously, recent reports about worsening security, a resurgence of the Taliban, increased al-Qaeda operations, and increased poppy production in Afghanistan, are really painting a pretty troublesome picture.

Let me ask you some questions, though, sir. DIA director, General Maples, testified in November that al-Qaeda appears to be attempting to reinvigorate its operations in Afghanistan and that its relationship with insurgent networks is, "increasingly cooperative." That strikes me as a pretty profound failure of our policies. Do you agree?

Mr. BOUCHER. What we've seen in the past year has been a resurgence of the Taliban and a reconnection of al-Qaeda and their ability to operate. We're there, we're trying to meet them. And I think we're better set up this year to deal with than we were in previous years.

Senator FEINGOLD. What does it say about our policies, though, that have caused—

Mr. BOUCHER. It says we haven't finished the job. We threw them off for a while. We pushed them out. But they've been able to regroup and regroup and start to come back at us. They came back last year. We stopped them from achieving their goals last year. But we haven't established dominance or got them on the run yet.

Senator FEINGOLD. What conditions on the ground have permitted this to happen, to allow al-Qaeda to reinvigorate operations in Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think it was the fact that there are large parts of this country that weren't effectively governed, including parts of Pakistan that were not effectively subject to government authority.

Senator FEINGOLD. During the Karzai period, you're talking about.

Mr. BOUCHER. During the last couple of years, yeah.

Senator FEINGOLD. General Craddock was quoted, in January, saying that the war in Afghanistan is an, "economy-of-force," operation, which means fewer resources. What are the opportunity costs posed by Iraq, in terms of troops and resources in Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't think there's been, really, much of a trade-off at all. I know when the—when the surge was announced in Iraq, the first question we got from the Afghans are, you know, "Are you going to take them out of here?" And the answer is, no; we've—actually adding to Afghanistan. And so—whereas, a couple of years back, you had 20- to 25,000 total forces, maybe 30, now you've got 46,000, because the United States has, in fact, increased, even as NATO has put these major increases in.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are you saying that the Iraqi war has not taken any resources—personnel, money, intelligence, others—attention away from Afghanistan?

Mr. BOUCHER. Certainly in terms of our overall national-needs, we're putting a lot of money into both, but I'm not aware of any circumstance where we've cut back in Afghanistan to send something to Iraq.

Senator FEINGOLD. I've heard differently both in Afghanistan and through many sources here, that it—there's been some real-trade-offs that have weakened our situation in Afghanistan.

What do you think General Craddock called—why do you think he called an "economy-of-force operation"?

Mr. BOUCHER. I'm not sure when he did that. Was that recent?

Senator FEINGOLD. Relatively recent, yes.

Mr. BOUCHER. I—

Senator FEINGOLD. I believe I—I've certainly read an article about it in the last month, that—

Mr. BOUCHER. I don't, frankly, know. I'm not sure what the phrase means to military men. There is a very large efforts being made. We've just increased that effort. We've increased the forces. And we're increasing the Afghan Army's ability and capabilities. So, what I see is an ever increasing military and security capability.

Senator FEINGOLD. In November, CIA Director Hayden testified to the Armed Services Committee that, "little progress has been made in constructing an effective Afghan national police force." What new initiatives or resources will be needed to finally build up the police?

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah. The police, I'd say, have generally lagged behind the military. What we're doing now is trying to build the institutions that sustain the military, the—I'm sorry, the police, the—you know, the pay system, personnel systems, things like that, so they can become a good national institution. The rates of training have been stepped up quite a bit. Europeans are about to launch another major effort on their part to put more into police training, more mentors in the field. We've also, since last fall, started to train what are called auxiliary police, which are local people who get basic training as policemen and are put on the administrative interior payroll, so they come in the national system, but they're more effective on the spot right away than the other recruits who have to go through longer training in different systems.

Senator FEINGOLD. In a recent hearing on his nomination to be Ambassador to Afghanistan, William Wood said that he thought the recent increased efforts by the United States to react and respond effectively to changes in Afghanistan appeared to be "balanced." Do you agree with this assessment, or are there specific changes that the U.S. Government should make in order to react and respond effectively to these new conditions on the ground that we've been discussing?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think, absolutely, there is balance. There's balance in what we're doing, there's balance in what we're requesting from the Congress. The point is that security, extension of government, and economic opportunity have to go in a very tight, coordinated fashion, and that's how the entire strategy has been played out, where it's—in parts of Afghanistan where it's worked really well, we've done it in a very well-coordinated fashion. Now we want to do it more broadly, throughout the country, and try to do it better—try to do it better, including coordination with our allies, NATO, and reconstruction assistance that comes with NATO.

Senator FEINGOLD. Finally, Secretary Gates said, during a February 6, 2007, hearing that, "part of the problem with the money aspect of it"—the opium drug trafficking—"is certainly not that the farmers get it, but that it fuels the Taliban and it fuels corruption." The Department of State's Narcotics Control Strategy Report also noted that there is a direct evidence linking the insurgency in Afghanistan and narcotics. How direct is the link in the increased poppy production with the resurgence of the Taliban?

Mr. BOUCHER. It's—there's certainly a lot of money that comes out of the drug trade that ends up in the Taliban. It—a lot of it looks like it's payoffs and taxes, not Taliban actually directly growing the drugs themselves, and selling it. So, they're parasites, I'd guess I'd say, major beneficiaries of this trade, in that they pull money out of this major financial flow.

Senator FEINGOLD. Let me ask it this way. If the Taliban structure were significantly weakened, would we see a decrease in illicit opium production?

Mr. BOUCHER. Probably, because we would see more areas under government control, where the alternatives are there, where we can bring in the other economic opportunities. Effective government control and economic opportunity are—you know, we can do that in areas where the Taliban are no longer a threat.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you for your answers.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]

Thank you for coming to testify before the committee today and thank you, Senator Biden, for arranging this hearing. The situation in Afghanistan is critical to our national security. Unfortunately, recent reports about worsening security, a resurgence of the Taliban, increased al-Qaeda operations, and increased poppy production in Afghanistan paint a very troubling picture.

Furthermore, the war in Iraq continues to draw attention and resources away from the fight against terrorism in places like Afghanistan, the country from which the attacks of 9/11 were planned.

I am pleased the NATO is increasing its efforts in Afghanistan—robust military operations in Afghanistan are absolutely critical at this time. It is not our national security interest not only to support NATO forces but to deploy additional U.S. forces if they are needed to compensate for NATO's shortcomings. I have been concerned that our military commitment to Afghanistan has been insufficient and while I welcome this month's offensive, our presence there must be sustained.

Increased NATO support should not be used as an excuse to shortchange our military role or our reconstruction and counternarcotics efforts. We need to match our military and counterterrorist operations with sufficient resources to help the Afghan Government extend its reach—and legitimacy—throughout the entire country.

Afghanistan has the potential for being a flagship success in the international fight against terrorist networks; it could also easily become another unending and botched engagement in which the U.S. Government has no discernable strategy for success.

The administration needs a clear strategy in Afghanistan that links together tightly those policies and programs needed to develop a viable state—including economic, political, judicial, and security sector development—with our efforts to defeat terrorist networks in the region. Without such a strategy, we run the grave risk of leaving behind a weak government susceptible to extremism and the influence of powerful warlords, and a region vulnerable to the resurgence of terrorist networks. Unlike in Iraq, we have the capability, through a sustained, comprehensive commitment, to bring stability in Afghanistan. We can do so in a way that is sustainable, in terms of military and other resources. And the American people not only support our efforts in Afghanistan, they expect that we will direct the resources and attention needed to achieve victory.

If we take the right approach—one that encompasses a fully integrated military, diplomatic, and political strategy—we can stop Afghanistan from becoming a failed narco-state, a haven for terrorists and a direct threat to our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for being on time, Senator, I mean, in your questions.

We have—I just would point out to my friend from—I'm going to hold him to 7 minutes. Like everybody else, we went over a few. General Jones has—is our—on the next panel, and he has to leave at 11:45, so I very much want to hear what he has to say. So, Senator, if you could—and I will yield to both of you to ask your ques-

tions of General Jones first. But if we could keep this portion to 7 minutes, it would be good. OK?

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And thank you for calling this hearing.

Mr. Boucher, thank you very much for being here and for your important work that you've done over many years for this Government.

I wanted to ask you about security in Afghanistan. And I know in your statement you indicated that you felt that NATO and United States and Afghan forces were more capable and better positioned, and, thus, enter this year, and enter what could be a very difficult springtime, with more confidence. Can you elaborate on that and just give us a sense of what the indices of that are, the markers that you think make this a period where they can have that kind of confidence?

Mr. BOUCHER. I think if you look back a year ago, the numbers were smaller, the capabilities were less, the numbers of Afghan troops were less. We have now increased the size of the Afghan Army, and they're much more active in the field. NATO forces are there. U.S. forces have increased, as well, with more flexibility to operate, so there's more of a presence throughout the nation. Helmand province, last year, had a couple of hundred troops from NATO and an Afghan Army; now they've got thousands.

In addition, the Afghan Government has extended its reach. President Karzai made a number of decisions on sending out better police chiefs, district officers, into the south as—well, throughout the country, but including the south. And we've been able to do more assistance—get more assistance money down there. So, I think we're better positioned, we're more capable on all aspects, on security, governance, and economics. But, again, that the enemy has been spending the winter, you know, building bombs and designing tactics, and it's going to be nasty, and it's going to be difficult, but I think we're better able to cope.

Senator CASEY. And you may have addressed this earlier. I had some conflicts and wasn't here until later in the hearing, obviously. But it always bears repeating, in terms of an important point that we should make. With regard to our troop levels, where are we now? And do we have a level that's adequate to confront which we expect, which is a pretty strong spring offensive—at least that's the expectation—spring offensive by the Taliban and by al-Qaeda or any other organized group?

Mr. BOUCHER. We're at about 23,000 troops now. I think we'll have the additional forces, another 3,200, that will go in there. When I talked to the military last fall, and said, you know, "What do we need for the springtime?" this is what they said they needed. The decision made to assign these forces is based on the request of General Eikenberry and the commanders in the field.

We're still not at the full staffing of the NATO levels. The NATO force requirements that have recently been revived—revised. We've seen more pledges from other countries, NATO members—Australia, people like that—but there's still more that we want to see from the NATO allies, in terms of what they provide to the mission, but, also, we want to get rid of any restrictions they have on the use of their forces.

Senator CASEY. If you say there's a need there, why do you think they're not forthcoming on that? What's the holdup?

Mr. BOUCHER. Countries have other obligations. They say they don't have the forces, they think somebody else should go first, they think they're already doing enough. There are a variety of things people say, or—but I think, in the end, you know, we've seen 7,000 new troops pledged for Afghanistan since the Riga Summit last fall; 3,200 of those are Americans, but the majority is still foreign troops. So, we're getting there. We're just going to keep pushing.

Senator CASEY. And just, finally, I know we've got to wrap up, but I wanted to ask you about the growing Taliban insurgency and why do you think that is? Where do you think that emanates from, in terms of that resurgence? Are there multiple reasons, or is there a more singular reason for—

Mr. BOUCHER. There are a lot of different reasons. I think it goes back to the fundamental problem of 9/11, and that's ungoverned spaces. 9/11, we had a country that was hospitable to terrorists, that was not governed and controlled. The ungoverned spaces, parts of Afghanistan have been—had not had strong government authority, or good government authority. Parts of Pakistan, the government has not held strong sway. And it's a matter of exerting government authority, bringing these people into the nation on both sides.

Senator CASEY. And, finally—this will be the last, because I know we're out of time in a minute or so—how would you assess the relationship now between the Karzai government—in particular, President Karzai—and the Pakistani political leadership, especially the personal or one-to-one relationship between Mr. Karzai and General Musharraf?

Mr. BOUCHER. You know, the relationship is rocky. I suppose that's historically the way it's been between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But, in practical terms, we see more and more cooperation. And we've got good military cooperation, with our assistance. They've got national security meetings and foreign affairs meetings. I think they're having a joint economic committee meeting very soon. We've seen them start to work together on the refugee problems, refugee returns. We are trying to facilitate and encourage every bit of cooperation between the two of them. They need to work together on the border areas, on the border crossings, a lot of those things. And we spend a lot of effort bringing them together and say, "Hey, guys, we've got to sit down and do this together," because it's the only way any of us are going to beat the problem.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

I'm going to yield to my friend Senator Lugar. He has an additional request, or—

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to amend your original suggestion for a classified briefing on the drug problem to include this question of buy-out, as opposed to eradication. And I raise it from the standpoint, as you pointed out, Secretary Boucher, that maybe a third of the economy—some have estimated more of that—is involved in the drug situation. But it's an international problem, which you've also pointed out, with a large percentage—I think you said 90 percent or something of that sort—of the opium

in the world, coming out of this—so that there are real questions, it seems to me, given the cost of both methods, as well as the future, to consider this very carefully. And I'd just like, during this classified briefing, to have the backup reasoning that has led to the administration's views on this, so that we can, in our oversight way, have an opportunity to look at it.

Mr. BOUCHER. Certainly, sir. Frankly, let me say, if we can, I'd like to give you that in an unclassified form. We'll look at it and—

Senator LUGAR. Very well.

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. We'll give you all the information, whatever—

Senator LUGAR. Unclassified would be—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. Is the best way—

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Better still—

Mr. BOUCHER [continuing]. To get it to you.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. In one form or another.

Mr. BOUCHER. Yeah.

[The written information submitted by Mr. Boucher follows:]

The Governments of Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are all opposed to the legalization of opium in Afghanistan, as are the relevant technical agencies of the United Nations. While this idea does have surface appeal to some, legalization would be a severe mistake.

In the first place, the licit opium market is not lucrative enough to entice Afghan farmers. The price difference between licit and illicit opium is so substantial that Afghan farmers would not quit the black market. To make up for the price difference, exorbitant subsidies would have to be offered, which would prove prohibitively expensive. Moreover, the Government of Afghanistan would be obligated to purchase opium stocks, resulting in the crops' exponential expansion as more farmers would grow in order to take advantage of a guaranteed source of income. Buying up existing poppy crops at licit market rates has been tried by the British in Afghanistan and failed because it did not decrease cultivation. The Government of Afghanistan opposes buyouts because of the numerous complaints they received from legitimate farmers about the "subsidy" for law-breaking poppy farmers.

Secondly, there is no legitimate world demand for legally produced opium from Afghanistan. According to the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board, world demand for opium-based medicines is fully met. World stockpiles are also sufficient to meet any conceivable future or increased demand.

Nor would this scheme be feasible. Countries that produce licit opium have strict controls, sophisticated law enforcement, and licensing systems—and still admit to significant illegal diversion. The lack of security in Afghanistan has led to the explosion of the current illicit poppy crop, so a licit industry that relies on legal controls could not work. Without safeguards, licit and illicit opium would be indistinguishable.

Furthermore, history argues against this approach in Afghanistan. Lessons from India, Pakistan, Bolivia, and other countries show the often disastrous effects of legalizing drug production without the requisite market demand, or law enforcement and control mechanisms. Each of these countries attempted to regulate a legal trade in narcotics and, as a result, saw an increase in cultivation or significant diversion into the black market.

Legalization also is ultimately counterproductive and dangerous—it would expand and entrench the drug trade, undermining efforts to bring security and sustainable economic development. This would benefit insurgent groups such as the Taliban, who profit from the trade, as well as criminals and corrupt government officials. Afghanistan would suffer from more violence, lawlessness, and corruption as a result of legalization, not less. Expanding opium cultivation would also come at the expense of important efforts to diversify Afghanistan's economy, making the country's welfare dangerously reliant on one commodity.

Unfortunately, there are no shortcuts to fighting opium production in Afghanistan. In our full report, attached for your review, we examine the main arguments raised in favor of legalization as advocated by The Senlis Council, which has been quoted by mainstream media as an authority on this subject.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As General Jones and Ambassador Dobbins come forward, I'd like to—and I'd—oh, did you have a comment you wanted to make, closing? You're welcome—

Mr. BOUCHER. I—

The CHAIRMAN. Please. No, no, no. No, no, no. Please, I'm sorry. I didn't mean to cut you off. I thought you were anxious to leave. [Laughter.]

Mr. BOUCHER. I'm anxious to leave, sir. I thank you. And I appreciate the discussion. And I've written down a lot of things that we're going to follow up on. So, I'm sure we'll continue the conversation at some later date.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I didn't mean to cut you off, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BOUCHER. No, I'm—

The CHAIRMAN. I'm sorry.

Mr. BOUCHER. I'm happy to let the seats at the table go to others. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Well, I'd like to call General Jones and Ambassador Dobbins. And, as I do, I want to make a brief comment here before we begin this panel.

I want to thank General Jones for his 40 years of exceptional service to this Nation, and at a time when we're hearing about mindboggling failures in leadership at Walter Reed, and with our VA system, it's an honor to have one of the Nation's best warriors and leaders with us today.

But, you know, I find it mindboggling what's happening out at Walter Reed. I spent 7 months, on and off, out there as a patient. I spent almost—over—close to 2 months in the ICU unit there, and I found the care out there to be incredible, exceptional, not just for me, but for everybody that was around. So, I was stunned to learn what we did, what happened out there. And I—I'm going to speak a little more to this in a little bit, but I think the combination of contracting out, about the BRAC closing, the constant attempt to underestimate the cost of this war, has led to this deplorable condition.

And there's a number of good ideas out there, but I'm going to warn my colleagues, I'm going to be introducing legislation that will deal with the privatization of military care, as well as moving in the direction to change some other bottom-line requirements. You know, at Walter Reed, the maintenance and repairs were farmed out to a private firm under a \$120 million contract, and the contractor replaced 300 workers with 50. Now, maybe some of those 300 workers weren't needed, but I—can't tell me there's not a correlation between having 300 people dealing with these needs and 50 people dealing with the needs.

And I also am going to move to prohibit the defense—the Department of Defense from being able to mandate medical care budget cuts, and also to require that managers have contact with their patients at least once a week to improve their training, and also to make that trauma brain injuries, so-called TBI, is a presumptive condition for those coming back, seeking service, if they're in an

area where there was serious exposure, as well as they have symptoms. As many as 10 percent of those serving in those countries have brain injuries. That's 150,000 servicemembers.

We also require wounded soldiers and marines to receive new uniforms. The idea—when I found out from folks back home that one of the patients could not—had to get their own uniforms, because they came back with a tattered uniform and didn't get a new uniform, I found that just absolutely mindboggling.

There's a lot more to talk about, and I wish we had time to talk to General Jones, not about the specific condition at Walter Reed, but about, as a lifelong leader in the military, what some of the line officers think about what's going on. But that's a different subject.

And I welcome you both.

General Jones, why don't we begin with your testimony; Ambassador, then yours. And then what we'll do is move to questions. And I'd ask my two colleagues, maybe we could direct most of our questions initially to General Jones, if you have any for him, so he's able to make the—his appointment. And we thank you for being here. Thank you both. Mr. Ambassador, thank you.

**STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES L. JONES, JR., USMC (RET.),
FORMER COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, McLEAN, VA**

General JONES. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, thank you very much. Distinguished Senators, members of the committee, it's a pleasure to be back talking about an issue that I am passionate about, and that's our efforts in Afghanistan.

I appear before you this morning in my capacity as a retired Marine four star, as of 1 February, and a former NATO Commander. My expertise, to the extent that I have any on this subject, has to do with my experiences more in NATO than as a U.S. commander. But I have been privileged to be involved with Afghanistan since NATO first started talking about it, in 2003, and was privileged to lead the formulation of NATO's plan, which has now been fully implemented and has resulted, in the fall of last year, of NATO moving into all five sectors of Afghanistan. As we divided them, the capital, the north, the west, the south, and then the east in a counterclockwise gradual expansion which reached its fruition and full completion last fall.

One of the reasons that violence has gone up in Afghanistan, in my opinion, is that prior to NATO's full expansion, particularly to the southern region, there was virtually no presence in that region. When we were there, it was largely American coalition troops who were there for specific finite reasons; very kinetic, very short-term combat operations. And, as such, reconstruction and stability had not arrived to that southern part of the country, which is enormous, and it was, in fact, a safe haven for the disparate groups which perpetrate violence in Afghanistan, including the tribes, including the remnants of the warlords, including the Taliban, including the narcotraffickers and the like.

With the arrival of NATO troops in the southern region in the summer of last year, in Operation Medusa, which was a—I think, a very defining moment, which answered the question, once and for

all, whether NATO would fight in Afghanistan. We did, in fact, make a very positive statement which—and the opposition, suffered a tactical defeat of significant proportions. And I think that's why you see some of the numbers going up, because we just didn't have any reporting before.

Having said that, I remain convinced that my previous testimony before this committee last year remains essentially valid, that the possibility of success in Afghanistan is still at our fingertips. But I would like to succinctly wrap up and make four or five points as to what I think needs to be done, what I would recommend needs to be done, and done a little bit better, in order to make sure that Afghanistan turns into the right direction.

The first thing that I would mention, Mr. Chairman, is that we have over 60 countries that are involved, in some way, manner, shape, or form, in Afghanistan. Thirty-seven countries are troop contributing nations, including 26 countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. So, there's a huge amount of international effort going on in Afghanistan.

We know what the good things are. We know we've had tremendous national elections in 2004. We know that Afghanistan is generally stable in the north and west. We know that the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams are the promise of the future for the people of Afghanistan and they're doing wonderful things. We know that the Afghan National Army represents a success story, as far as it's come, but we know that the army is not big enough, it needs to get bigger, and it needs to expand. Under the United States tutelage, the emergence of the Afghan National Army as an army that is representative of the people, and embraced by the people, and is doing good things, is to be celebrated.

We know that Japan has led the demobilization, reintegration, and disarmament pillar of reconstruction, in quite a satisfactory way. We know that schools and roads and healthcare is more available to Afghans. We know that there's a tripartite council where NATO, Afghan authorities, Pakistani authorities meet, military forces meet, and military leaders meet on a regular basis. We know that President Karzai has formed a Policy Action Group, which helps to prioritize the reconstruction effort.

Having said that, there are three or four things that I would suggest that are, as I've said before, on life support and need immediate attention by the international community. And may I say, Mr. Chairman, that one of the things I'm proudest of to be associated with is that this is an international problem. This isn't only the problem of the United States. When NATO moved into Afghanistan and took responsibility for stability and security, that is a very powerful statement by the international community. And so, the optimum word here is "we," not "we, the United States." We, the family of nations, have all the legitimacy, international legitimacy, that's required to do this mission, five separate United Nations Security Council resolutions, and the authority to justify what it is we do.

So, what are these few things that are absolutely at the core? In my view, and it's been well articulated this morning, but narcotics is the Achilles heel of Afghanistan. It affects every aspect of that

society. It fuels crime, it fuels corruption, and it's the economic engine for fueling the violence in Afghanistan.

In my testimony, Mr. Chairman, I will not link violence in Afghanistan only to the Taliban. And I think one of the things that we have to be careful of is that we don't make the Taliban any taller than the Taliban is. The Taliban is a regional problem. It's not a national problem.

But the failure of the international community to coalesce around the U.K. led campaign against narcotics is a matter of record. In my 3 years of regular visits to Afghanistan, I've seen very little progress; as a matter of fact, I've seen much more backsliding than anything else.

To develop a cohesive campaign plan that is internationally supported by not just the United Kingdom, which is, I think, the problem. The United Kingdom raised its hand and said, "We will lead this effort." What has happened is that nations have defaulted to the United Kingdom and suggested that they have to solve the whole thing. That's not the intent of the G-8 agreements.

So, narcotics, to me, is the No. 1 problem.

No. 2, and a problem that has to be tackled at the same time, is judicial reform. This is an Italian-led commitment under the G-8 agreements. And it is also on life support. The average prosecutor in Afghanistan makes \$65 a month. The average interpreter for the United Nations makes about \$750 a month. There are a thousand prosecutors in Afghanistan, and the court system is not up to the task of prosecuting people, trying them, and then putting them away. Instead, what we see is a little bit of a revolving door. To be sure, there has been some progress made, but the really big fish, Mr. Chairman, as you've pointed out, are still out there and are still operating.

So, I think if I were able to do anything, I would focus on narcotics, I would focus on judicial reform. And the third pillar I would focus on, which is a German-led pillar, is the adequacy of police forces. Trained, sufficient quantity, sufficient quality throughout the region so that if we do incentivize the farmers not to grow poppies, for example, there isn't a roving band of narcotraffickers that slits their throat at night for not doing that, or kidnaps their children, or makes them feel unsafe.

So, those three pillars of the Accords need urgent attention if we're, in fact, going to deliver on the promise of Afghanistan.

The good news, Mr. Chairman, is that all these things are there—60 countries on the ground, the United Nations is there, there is a U.N. high representative, who is the representative of the Secretary General. But what is lacking is, in my view, in Afghanistan, is that central authoritative figure that can, in fact, focus the international relief effort in a way that tackles the three or four things that absolutely have to be done. We, if you look back at Bosnia, remember Lord "Paddy" Ashdown, who was such a figure. When Paddy Ashdown spoke, the Bosnians, the Serbs, and the Croats listened. There is no Paddy Ashdown, that I've seen, at work in Kabul in Afghanistan. And I think that either a person or a group of people, whatever the solution is, that can bring discipline to the effort that we're bringing to Afghanistan, is necessary.

And, finally, to pick up on Senator Casey's comments with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan, that that relationship between those two heads of state absolutely has to be brought into a more coherence, so that Pakistan understands that what goes on in Afghanistan is vitally important to their own national interest, as well, because if we're not successful in Afghanistan, I personally believe that that problem will continue to grow, and that it will be a problem for Afghanistan in the future. So, the logic of these two countries working together to solve a common problem, to me, is incapable.

I left my job in NATO in December 2006, and the last real big meeting I had was with a senior military official from Pakistan. I showed him graphic evidence of what was happening across the border. And I listened to them respectfully about what they said their goals were. I believe them, that they mean to do what they say they're going to do, but at the rate that it was going when I left, it was clear that the problem wasn't going in the right direction.

I think we'll know a lot more this spring about whether the Pakistani Government, on its side of the border, was able to do something. But I think this is one of the four or five things that have to be done.

Mr. Chairman, I've summarized as quickly as I can, but I thank you very much for having me, and I apologize for not being able to stay as long as you might like today. And I'd be happy to be come back any other time you'd like.

[The prepared statement of General Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE, MCLEAN, VA

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, and members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to testify, and for having this hearing. It is a great privilege to be before the committee today—6 months since last testifying as SACEUR, and just over a month since my retirement from the U.S. Marine Corps. Congress remains focused on NATO's ambitious undertaking in Afghanistan. This interest and the continued support of the United States for this mission are absolutely essential to its success.

Today I will offer the committee some insights into both the ISAF mission, and the importance of sustaining NATO as it continues to perform valiantly in the execution of its mission, so vital to the future of Afghanistan. Since we last met, we have witnessed successes in the International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) mission to establish security and stability. What remains unchanged is that ISAF is still NATO's most important and challenging mission.

NATO's "out of area" operations are now at greater distances and more ambitious than ever before. There are over 50,000 soldiers deployed under NATO Command today on three different continents performing a wide variety of missions—from Baltic air policing to a 15,000-man unit keeping a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. The NATO Response Force is arguably its most transformational operational capability, providing strategic Reserve Forces and operational Reserve Forces on standby. This brings me full circle to ISAF in Afghanistan.

There are currently over 34,000 forces in ISAF—with 15,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines from the United States under its command. The Alliance now has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan and works alongside an additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). The 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) under ISAF are the leading edge of NATO's efforts for security and reconstruction, supported by military forces capable of providing necessary security and stability. ISAF's assumption of the entire security and stability mission in Afghanistan is testament to its growing capacity to engage in defense against common security challenges, including terrorism.

What makes these reconstruction teams so effective is that they're empowered. PRT commanders, usually at the rank of lieutenant colonel, have the independent authority and funding to bring about immediate effects in the region by building a bridge, opening a school, digging a well, turning on electricity, paving a road, and giving a sense of comfort and reassurance in the hinterlands where the government will some day be able to get out there and replace the PRTs. As SACEUR I witnessed what PRTs can do and I continue to believe that one PRT of up to 100 people are worth a battalion of 5,000 troops. Proactive engagement is always cheaper than reactive engagement. I would have rather had 100 people dedicated to a certain thing every single day for 365 days, than 10,000 troops for 60 days.

While SACEUR, I observed NATO's civilian leadership spend a considerable amount of time working to sustain a unity of purpose for the men and women of the Alliance, along with 17 other troop contributing nations. This is a tough job, but essential to sustaining the role of NATO in Afghanistan, and in other areas of operation. The military forces deployed under NATO are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO's collective resolve to project security in unstable regions and to deter, disrupt, and defend against terrorism. ISAF continues to be a model of teamwork—a cooperation of comrades in arms working together to solve very difficult problems. I am confident that it will continue that way. In the months since the full transfer of authority to NATO last fall, opposing militant forces have tried to test NATO to see if we have the will and the capability to stand and fight. Operation MEDUSA not only defeated the insurgents near Kandahar, but helped establish the conditions for reconstruction and development activities that are moving the province forward.

While ISAF is focused on establishing security and stability throughout the country, the international community's efforts in Afghanistan are based on five main pillars: Training the Afghan Army, training the police forces, disarmament of illegally armed groups, judicial reform, and counternarcotics. While SACEUR, I shared with many of you my belief that the ultimate success in Afghanistan depends not simply on military victories—it depends on the efforts of the international community and the Karzai government. They need to ensure military efforts are immediately followed up with the needed reconstruction and development activities in the short run, and success in the pillars of reform in the long run. Development and reconstruction activities will help meet expectations of the Afghan people who have demonstrated in two national elections, one for President, and one for Parliament, that they overwhelmingly understand this effort. Progress in education, agriculture, economic development, public services and health has to go hand in hand with providing a stable and secure environment. The Afghan authorities and ISAF are now focusing on the key tasks of ensuring that reconstruction and development can take place in accordance with the priorities identified by the local authorities themselves.

The Afghan national army is about 30,000 strong and plays a pivotal role in the security of Afghanistan. The U.S. commitment to train an army of approximately 70,000 soldiers continues. NATO nations have been fielding NATO operational, mentor, and liaison teams. Currently, NATO has 15 such teams offered by troop contributing nations, with 7 of them completely fielded and 17 more remaining to be fielded. The more rapidly NATO can build a capable and sufficiently robust Afghan national army, the faster it will establish conditions for success.

When I last testified in September, it was my judgment that much more needed to be done to train the police force, as well as provide adequate numbers, equipment, training, and pay, coupled with the need to fight against corruption. ISAF's contribution to the Afghan national police training remains within means and capabilities.

Judicial reform is not a NATO task in Afghanistan, but it is so important to everything that's going on there. Judicial reform remains one of the key areas where a progress must be made, as the courts and prosecutorial capabilities of the state remain distrusted, overly corrupt, and resource starved. A major problem with judicial reform is the low pay of prosecutors, which makes them susceptible to corruption. I remember a meeting last year with the attorney general of Afghanistan, who told me that prosecutors' average pay was \$65 a month. By comparison, an interpreter working for the United Nations makes 500 Euros a month. A top Afghan judge earns less than \$100 a month—less than the cost to rent an apartment in Kabul; less than what the Taliban pay locals to support their military operations. This situation cannot be allowed to stand.

Finally, the problem that continues to worry me the most is narcotics. Afghanistan does not need to be a narco-state, but it is unfortunately well on its way. The parts of Afghanistan which are currently producing the largest poppy crops are not those that are traditionally known for the growth of such product. The need to find the right means to ensure that farmers can economically grow and sell legal

produce, in addition to developing an overarching and understandable way ahead in the overall fight against narcotics, is vital. Ninety percent of Afghan narcotics are sold in the European markets. The money returns to Afghanistan and fuels the IEDs and terrorism that kills and wounds our soldiers.

There remains a need for closer cooperation and coordination between NATO and the Government of Afghanistan, as well as those nations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, involved in security sector reform. President Karzai has recognized this and has sought to create a policy action group to make decisions and coordinate across the spectrum of reform. This body is Afghan-led and chaired by the President. The policy action group is designed to reach down to the provincial district and community level in order to provide integrated programs that implement policy and serve the interests of the Afghan people. I believe that this policy action group has a good chance of succeeding and will contribute to the enhanced cohesion and coordination that thus far has been absent in the delivery of international relief.

The evidence is clear—over the past 5 years there has been solid progress throughout Afghanistan. However, the efforts of the international community and those of NATO need to be increased in order to consolidate and expand the gains made there to ensure long-term success. NATO's leadership role, and that of the United States, remains as important as ever. With the continued support of the United States and of this Congress, I believe NATO will ultimately succeed in solidifying the conditions necessary for sustained peace and prosperity for the people of Afghanistan.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks and I'd be happy to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We'll take you up on that, General. We'll still try to get some questions in.

Jim, the floor is yours. And thank you for being here, man.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY & DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee. I'll try to summarize quickly so we can get to some questions for General Jones.

I think that one can pin responsibility for the current difficulties in Afghanistan on two sources. They are, sort of, sins of omission and sins of commission. The sins of omission were essentially our failure, back in 2002 and 2003, to move quickly when we had a benign environment, with the Taliban on the run and an al-Qaeda largely dispersed, to provide security and begin the process of reconstruction. The amounts of money that are now being spent and being requested for Afghanistan, for economic assistance, are 20 times more than the amounts that I had in early 2002 to begin that process—20 times more on an annual basis. And the number of troops we have there now is four times more—more than four times more than we had for that first year.

This is—I've overseen post-conflict reconstruction in five societies, and I've studied them, going back to 1960—this is the only time on record in which we spent more money and had more troops 5 years after we started than we did the first year or two. And I think this is indicative of this early failure to seize the golden hour when we could have done so much more.

But if that's the sins of omission, I think the sins of commission largely lie, not in Afghanistan or in Washington, but in Pakistan. This is not an insurgency led by a discontented population in Afghanistan, with an abusive or an ineffective government. It's true that the population in the affected areas don't have a lot of reasons to take risks for their government, or place much confidence in

their government. But the real source of this conflict lies in Pakistan. The insurgency is organized in Pakistan, it's led in Pakistan, it's recruited in Pakistan, it's trained in Pakistan, it's funded from Pakistan, and it operates into Afghanistan.

And I think that the question, of course, comes as to what to do about that. How can we grapple with that phenomenon?

I don't think that punitive actions with respect to Pakistan are likely to be productive. We tried that through the 1990s. We made them international pariahs, and everything just got worse. They proliferated, they sold nuclear secrets to other countries, and they supported terrorist movements. So, I think that we need a positive agenda with respect to Pakistan.

I'm not sure that requiring the administration to certify that Pakistan is fully cooperating as a condition for United States assistance is particularly productive. Frankly and candidly, it simply requires the administration to come up here and lie to you, and you to accept those lies, because neither you nor they are actually going to move toward punitive steps toward Pakistan.

And what we need, in fact, is a more candid discussion of what's going on in Pakistan. We need to raise the international visibility of what's going on in Pakistan. And we're not going to be able to do that if it gets linked with punitive steps which everybody is—recognizes are likely to be counterproductive.

So, I hope—I mean, I think that we need—we need United States officials to say in public what they've—what they're—freely say in private about what—the links between elements of the Pakistani Government and Taliban activities, the levels of Taliban activities in the country, and the incentives that Pakistan has, to be not fully cooperative. And I'd be glad to go into some of that in response to questions.

As I said, I don't think we should be looking at punitive things. I've—in my written testimony, I've suggested four things that we should do with respect to Pakistan. One is to promote settlement of the Kashmir issue. The second is to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border. There's no sense—there's not much to be gained from winning the hearts and minds of all the Pashtuns in Afghanistan if we haven't done the same with the Pashtuns in Pakistan. There are more Pashtuns in Pakistan than there are in Afghanistan, a lot more. And unless their aspirations and their grievances are addressed, we're going to have a permanent problem.

Third, I think we need to encourage the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to establish an agreed border regime. Afghanistan doesn't recognize that border. It's insisting that Pakistan assert better control over a border that it refuses to recognize.

And, finally, I think we need to encourage Pakistan to move toward—back toward civilian rule. Now, that's not a particularly punitive list of things to do. Indeed, most of them are things that the Pakistani Government would like us to do.

Finally, just a word on the drug problem, which has been much discussed this morning. I think that U.S. officials, and, indeed, Members of Congress, are faced with, sort of, two conflicting imperatives here. One is the Hippocratic imperative to “Do no harm,” and the other is the political imperative to “Don't just stand there,

do something.” And as we know, the latter of those imperatives tends to be the operative one, in many cases.

The administration’s five-pillar plan, which includes eradication, interdiction, alternative development, judicial reform, and public information, does strike me as a bureaucratic response to the imperative of just—“Don’t just stand there, do something,” rather than a well-thought-out articulated strategy which emphasizes some things and doesn’t emphasize—and doesn’t emphasize others.

I think that drug strategy needs to be put in the context of a broader national strategy, the objective of which is to build support for the Afghan Government and allow it to assume greater control over much of the country.

It is true that probably the insurgency gains a certain amount of revenue from drug production, but the fact is that most of the drugs are being produced and trafficked in areas of the country that the government controls, not the Taliban; and, therefore, people in the government are getting, by far, the largest rakeoff from the drug production, not the Taliban. This suggests to me a strategy that would give principal emphasis to interdiction and judicial reform, rather than the other elements.

Now, finally, as regards a public information campaign, this is going to be a lot more effective if it comes from the Afghan clergy than if it comes from a government known to be riddled with drug corruption or a bunch of foreigners whose motives are suspect. The problem, of course, in Afghanistan is that, in Afghanistan, as in many other countries, including most of our democratic West European countries, the clergy depends on public revenue for support.

Every village in Afghanistan has a school and a mosque. They don’t have any government officials at all. There are no government officials, not even police, at the village level. But they all do have a mosque. Unfortunately, supporting the Afghan clergy is an area that no Western donor has been prepared to take up. And I do believe that we need to find ways of allowing the Afghan Government to better fund this aspect of its responsibilities, because I think this is one of the most important sources of potential support for that government in that country

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Dobbins follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES DOBBINS, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION, ARLINGTON, VA

The resurgence of civil war in Afghanistan can be attributed to two fundamental causes. One is the failure of the United States, the Karzai administration, and the rest of the international community to take advantage of the lull following the collapse of the Taliban regime in late 2001 to strengthen the new Afghan Government. The second cause is the fragmentation of the international coalition that the United States put together to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has experienced civil war since the late 1970s. Unlike the recent or current conflicts in Yugoslavia and Iraq, which arose principally from hostilities among their constituent nationalities, Afghanistan’s war has largely been the product of external interventions. In the 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States used Afghanistan as a battleground in their global competition. In the 1990s, Pakistan, India, Russia, and Iran supported competing Afghan factions in order to protect and extend their influences in the region. Relations among Afghanistan’s various ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities became much more difficult, but these tensions were primarily the result of civil war rather than the cause.

Many Americans believe that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration formed a multinational coalition that drove the Taliban from power. It

would be more accurate, however, to say that the United States joined Russia, India, Iran, and the Northern Alliance in an existing coalition that had been fighting the Taliban for half a decade. With the addition of American airpower and the removal of Pakistani support for their opponent, the coalition prevailed. As a result, Northern Alliance troops, which had been equipped, trained, and financed by Russia, India, and Iran, occupied most of the country.

If credit for America's military victory in Afghanistan needs to be shared with this unlikely coalition, so must credit for America's diplomatic achievement in rapidly installing a broadly based successor regime.

When named as the American envoy to the Afghan opposition in October 2001, I concluded that the United States would not succeed in halting civil war in Afghanistan without the support of the governments responsible for that war in the first place. This belief stemmed from my experience a few years earlier in the Balkans, in particular from observing Richard Holbrook's success in orchestrating the Dayton negotiations that ended the civil war in Bosnia. That war had been the product of Serbian and Croatian ambitions. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman had been personally guilty of the genocide we were trying to stop. Only by engaging them, bringing them to the conference table, and making them partners in the peace process were we able, however, to persuade all the Bosnian factions to lay down their arms. I believed that a similar approach was needed to achieve a comparable result in Afghanistan.

By November we were working with the United Nations to bring all factions of the Afghan opposition together in Bonn, Germany, where we hoped they would agree upon an interim constitution and the membership of a new government. The U.N.'s initial inclination had been to sequester the Afghan representatives in order to prevent any foreign government from exerting a malign influence over their deliberations.

I made the opposite case that only by bringing states like Iran, Pakistan, India, and Russia into the process would we have some chance of reaching a consensus. I argued that Afghans would only agree if they were subjected to convergent pressures by their foreign sponsors. Incidentally, this was exactly how it worked out: Each of those governments, and particularly Russia and Iran, played positive and essential roles in forging the compromises upon which the Afghans ultimately agreed. Pakistan was also present at the Bonn Conference, but its role was uncomfortable due to the presence of its former adversaries. Nevertheless, Pakistan's acquiescence in the process and support for the result was essential for the consensus' durability.

In the aftermath of this collective achievement, the United States and the rest of the international community had a golden occasion to help Afghans build an effective government capable of providing its population with the most basic public services. Al-Qaeda was smashed, and its remaining members were forced into hiding. The Taliban was discredited in Afghanistan and dispersed in Pakistan. Neither was capable of posing an immediate threat to the new regime in Kabul.

We failed to seize that opportunity. During those early years, U.S. and international assistance was minimal. While blame for that negligence must be widely shared, the failure principally reflected the American administrations' early aversion to nation-building. Well into 2003 the administration was quite vocal in touting the merits of its "low profile, small footprint" alternative to the more robust nation-building efforts that the Clinton administration had led in Bosnia and Kosovo. Many felt that generous international assistance had made those Balkan countries dependent upon foreign funding and foreign troops, something we were going to avoid in Afghanistan and Iraq.


In pursuit of this narrow vision of nation-building, the United States initially sought to minimize the size, geographical scope, and functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Washington rejected pleas from Karzai and the United Nations to deploy international peacekeepers outside Kabul. It opposed any role for NATO in Afghanistan. It also refused to assign peacekeeping functions to American forces. Security for the Afghan population was to remain the responsibility of regional warlords until a new national army could be recruited, trained, and deployed, a process which would have taken years to complete.

Economic assistance to Afghanistan was also commensurately low. In the first year following the collapse of the Taliban, the United States committed approximately \$500 million in reconstruction aid to Afghanistan. Compare that figure to the \$18 billion in economic assistance the administration requested for Iraq, a country of comparable size, greater wealth, and less damage in 2003. For the first 2 years after the fall of the Taliban, the average Afghan received approximately \$50 per year in foreign aid. By contrast, the average Kosovar received 10 times more

than that over the same period of time and the average Bosnian received 12 times more assistance.

If there is any lesson to be drawn from the Afghan experiment with frugal nation-building, it is "low input, low output." If one applies low levels of military manpower and economic assistance to post conflict reconstruction, one can expect to see low levels of public security and economic growth.

As indicated in the chart below, drawn from a RAND study (*The U.N.'s Role in Nation Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, RAND, 2005), Afghanistan has received the least amount of resources out of any major American-led, nation-building operation over the last 60 years.



Experience has shown that in major combat, it is possible to substitute firepower and technology for manpower, enabling smaller, more agile forces to rapidly prevail over much larger, less advanced adversaries. Experience has also shown, however, that in stabilization and reconstruction operations, there is no substitute for manpower, money, and time. By 2004, the administration began to recognize these realities and to adjust its aid and military manning levels accordingly: U.S. assistance and troop levels climbed steeply, NATO was invited to take over the ISAF mission, and international peacekeepers were finally dispatched to the provinces.

Two vital years had been lost, however—years during which little progress had been made in extending effective governance to the countryside. As a result, by the time the threat of civil war reemerged, the population in the affected areas had been given little incentive to risk their lives for a government that could neither protect them nor advance their material well-being.

This history explains why antiregime insurgents have found local populations receptive to their efforts to overturn the Karzai regime and expel the international presence, but it does not explain why this threat has reemerged. The current insurgency in Afghanistan does not arise from deep-seated opposition among large elements of the Afghan population toward their government. Instead, this insurgency has been raised by residents of Pakistan, some of whom are refugees from Afghanistan, others of whom are native Pakistanis.

For the tens of millions of Pashtun tribesmen on both sides of the current border, this distinction is of little importance. This is a Pashtun insurgency. I don't mean to suggest that all Pashtuns are insurgents, simply that all insurgents are Pashtuns. The insurgency is organized, funded, trained and directed from Pakistan, where most Pashtuns live, and where most Pashtuns have always lived. Pashtuns generally do not recognize the current border between the two countries as legiti-

mate. They believe themselves to represent a majority of the Afghan population, and therefore, they claim a predominant role in its government.

The degree of official Pakistani complicity in this insurgency is a matter of some controversy. In private, knowledgeable United States, NATO, Afghan, and United Nations officials are nearly unanimous in asserting that the Pakistani intelligence service continues to collaborate with the Taliban and other insurgent groups operating out of its border regions against Afghanistan. For its part, the Pakistani Government, at the highest levels, denies any official sanction for these activities, suggesting that, at most, these reports reflect the activity of former members of its intelligence service acting independently and against government policy.

The U.S. administration has complained loudly about Iranian support for sectarian violence in Iraq. At this point, lacking access to the intelligence data, it is difficult to fully assess the degree of official Iranian support for civil war in Iraq, or official Pakistani support for civil war in Afghanistan. What seems indisputably clear, however, is that Pakistani citizens, residents, money, and territory are playing a much greater role in the Afghan civil war than are Iranian citizens, residents, money, or territory in the Iraqi civil war.

The RAND Corporation has conducted several studies on nation-building and counterinsurgency drawing on dozens of American and non-American case studies over the past century. One conclusion reached, highlights the near impossibility of putting together broken societies without the support of neighboring states, and of suppressing well-established insurgencies that enjoy external support and neighboring sanctuary. The validity of this lesson is evident today both in Iraq and Afghanistan.

It is clear that Pakistan has both geopolitical and domestic political incentives for destabilizing its neighbor. Geopolitically, Pakistan fears an independent Afghan state aligned with India. Domestically, Pakistani elites would prefer to see Pashtun ambitions externalized, in the pursuit of power in Afghanistan, rather than turned inward, in the pursuit of greater autonomy, or even independence for Pashtunistan. Even if these incentives do not lead Pakistani officials to foment civil war in Afghanistan, they may diminish their commitment to helping suppress it. The United States and the rest of the international community need to offset these incentives to destabilize Afghanistan with a greater array of incentives and disincentives designed to lead Pakistan to assert control over its own territory and population and prevent either from being used against their neighbor.

Often one hears that the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 diverted American manpower and money for Afghanistan. This may be true. But a more serious charge is that the war in Iraq has diverted American attention from the real central front in this war, which is neither in Iraq or Afghanistan, but in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda, after all, is headquartered in Pakistan. The Taliban is operating out of Pakistan, as are several other insurgent and terrorist groups seeking to expel international forces from Afghanistan. It was Pakistan that assisted the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Potential terrorists in Western societies still travel to Pakistan for inspiration, guidance, support, and direction.

Yet if Pakistan is the central front in the war on terror, it is not one susceptible to a military response. We are not going to bomb Islamabad or invade Waziristan. An increase in U.S. military manpower and money for Afghanistan may be needed to contain the renewed insurgency and prevent the Karzai government from being overthrown. But the U.S. and NATO troops are likely to be required indefinitely as long as the Taliban and the other insurgent groups are able to recruit, train, raise funds, and organize their operations in Pakistan.

Afghanistan has never been a self-sufficient state, and it probably never will be. It is simply too poor to be able to provide security and effective governance to its large and dispersed population. So unless the Pakistani Government can be persuaded to abandon its relationship with extremist elements within its society, halt its support for terrorism, provide its youth an educational alternative to fundamentalist madrasas, extend effective governance into its border provinces, and curtail their use by insurgent movements, the United States and its allies are going to be forced to patrol Afghanistan's Southeast Frontier indefinitely, just as Great Britain was compelled to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign along the other side of that same frontier throughout the 19th century.

As I have noted, Pakistan is not a problem susceptible to a military solution. Therefore, other sources of influence will need to be used. First the United States should intensify quiet efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir, that dispute being the root cause of radicalization in Pakistani society and policy. Second, we need to address the economic and social needs of the Pashtun populations on both sides of the border, not just in Afghanistan. There is only limited benefit in winning the hearts and minds of Pashtun resident

in Afghanistan, if the larger number of Pashtuns living in Pakistan remain hostile and ungoverned. Third, we need to encourage both the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to establish an agreed border regime and legitimize the current frontier. And finally, the United States should encourage Pakistan to move back toward civilian rule via free elections. Fundamentalist parties have never fared well in such elections in Pakistan, and are unlikely to do so in the future. It seems ironic that the United States has pushed for democratization in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, all places where the result was likely to intensify sectarian conflict, but has largely failed to do so in Pakistan, where the opposite result is more likely.

American efforts alone, no matter how intense and skillful, will not be sufficient to achieve any of these objectives. Washington, therefore, needs to raise the profile of the Pakistan problem internationally, in order to secure a much wider array of pressures upon and of assistance to Pakistan in undertaking these transformations.

At present NATO is manning the Afghan frontier, but doing nothing to address the threat emerging from its other side. This is akin to NATO's guarding the Fulda Gap throughout the cold war, but have no discussions about how to deal with the Soviet Union. In fact, consultations on the Soviet Union occupied 90 percent of every NATO ministerial and summit for 40 years. Its time consultations on Pakistan occupied in a similarly central place in the transatlantic dialog.

The recent announcement that the administration intends to increase its troop and financial commitment to Afghanistan should be welcomed. These steps come 5 years late, but perhaps not too late. The Afghan people desperately want peace, and they continue to hope that their freely elected government, the United States, and NATO can bring it to them. We continue to be welcome in Afghanistan in a way we are not in Iraq. But public support for Karzai, his government, and our presence is diminishing. It is to be hoped that these additional commitments can reverse, or at least slow this negative trend. The more American money and manpower is committed to Afghanistan, however, the more important it becomes to address the principal source of the ongoing civil war, which remains, as it has for most of the past 20 years, largely external, and in present circumstances, largely in Pakistan.

The continuing growth of opium production and drug trafficking in Afghanistan represents a particularly frustrating challenge. U.S. officials are beset by two conflicting imperatives. One is the Hippocratic requirement to "do no harm," i.e., don't do anything that actually makes the situation worse. The second is the political requirement, familiar to Members of Congress as it is to administration officials, to "don't just stand there, do something!" Unfortunately, the latter is usually the more compelling imperative.

The administrations "five pillar" plan, for dealing with the issue, encompassing interdiction, eradication, alternative livelihood development, judicial reform, and public information, looks at first glance to be more a bureaucratic response to pressures, including congressional pressures, to be seen doing something rather than a carefully thought through strategy. Certainly these efforts seem to have been entirely ineffective in reducing drug production, while they have, reportedly, antagonized significant elements of the population to no good purpose.

I would suggest the need to put counternarcotics firmly within a broader strategy designed to defeat the insurgency and strengthen the Afghan Government's support within the population. That strategy needs to be based upon a careful examination of both the economics and politics of the drug trade. The most important measures of success should not be increased seizures, or reduced poppy production, neither of which is likely to have any measurable impact upon drug consumption in Western Europe, where most of this product goes. Rather, the objectives should be to reduce the flow of drug money into the hands of corrupt government officials and insurgent groups. Of the two, incidentally, it seems almost certain that much more of this money is going to corrupt officials than insurgents, since the former control much more of the territory and transit routes involved.

This suggests to me a strategy that would give principal emphasis to interdiction and judicial reform, while eschewing eradication and promoting alternate development only once genuinely viable alternatives can be offered.

As to a public information campaign, this will be more credibly conducted by local religious leaders than by a government known to be riddled with drug corruption or foreigners whose motives are suspect. In Afghanistan, the clergy is, in principal, publicly funded, as is the case in many of our most democratic West European allies. Unfortunately, this is one area of Afghan Government activity that international donors have been least inclined to fund. Finding ways to allow the Afghan Government to better fund not just the village schools but the village mosques, could well be one of the most effective things we could do to delegitimize drug production, and increase public support for the current regime.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We have only about 13 minutes left, and what I'm going to suggest, since General Jones has to leave in 13 minutes, and we're going to get a chance to speak to the Ambassador, is, each Senator get one question, and one question alone, and limited to no speech, just a straightforward question. Otherwise, I'll take my 7 minutes and no one will get any chance to ask anything. OK? So, let's do that.

And I'll begin by asking you, General Jones—no mention has been—no—the phrase “al-Qaeda” has not been raised by any witness thus far. How big a problem is it? And, if you had the authority from the Pakistani Government, could NATO forces go in and do damage in the western province, to al-Qaeda?

General JONES. Senator, the reason that al-Qaeda, in my view, doesn't get mentioned too much is that the al-Qaeda portion of the problem is still, in my view, very much manageable. What is come back to the fore is the Taliban. In fact, on the Pakistani side of the border, they have been fairly direct at their efforts against the al-Qaeda. It's the Taliban that we're asking them to do the same to. So, on both sides of the border, the al-Qaeda has a tough time. It's not the same with regard to the Taliban.

With regard to NATO and the western provinces of Pakistan, NATO's mandate would have to be adjusted to have NATO to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Assume it did. My question is, Does the capacity exist, if it was adjusted?

General JONES. I think some of the countries in NATO certainly have the capacity, but it would be, with the United States, it would be they could do—they could do some thing. If you had the agreements and if you solved the problem with caveats and all of—

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General JONES [continuing]. That. But the ability, the capability is there in NATO.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman—General Jones, yesterday I heard a discussion with Lord Robertson about his experiences in Bosnia. He made the comment, with regard to Afghanistan, that there is not a contact group in Afghanistan. You were, sort of, onto that general idea, mentioning Paddy Ashdown, a high commissioner of some central control. Is the contact group idea a good one, or are there so many nations that the idea, at least that was useful in Bosnia, would not work in Afghanistan?

General JONES. I think it could work, Senator. I think that despite some of the many good things that are being done, what is lacking is the ability to focus the energies and the resources in certain areas, where we know you have to do something. And so, anything that would be—any group that—or person that could be created to—with the authority to bring about that kind of emphasis, I think, is what's needed.

The current structure of the U.N. high representative and the overlapping amalgamation of organizations like the European Union, NATO, the United Nations, and disparate groups of NGOs, having this loose relationship is not bringing about the focused ef-

fort that I think needs to be done in certain key areas. I don't want to overstate this, because they're doing a lot of good, but the four or five things that I mentioned, I think, are really critical to tackle.

Senator LUGAR. So, in addition to money, we really need reorganization—

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. And focus—

General JONES. Exactly.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Somebody in charge.

General JONES. And, to the extent that it's good news is—the potential is there. I mean, it's on the ground. It's a question of shaping it in a way where the international community agrees that, "Look, we have to get after this narcotics thing, because it's going to eat Afghanistan from the inside out if we don't." I think that's clear.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Obama.

Senator OBAMA. General, the—thanks for the very useful testimony. I want to focus on where both you ended up and Ambassador Dobbins, as well, and that's on the issue of Pakistan. Given your history there, your relationship with both the Pakistani military on the ground, as well as their government, can you give me a sense of what their strategic objectives are and what we can do to encourage them to be more aggressive or more cooperative in the efforts? I tend to agree with the Ambassador's point, that if we pretend that we're going to do things here that we're not going to do, that's not particularly effective, that sanctions may not be particularly effective. On the other hand, we need to encourage a different approach on their part. Any thoughts on that?

General JONES. Well, I think we have to find a way to scratch the itches on both sides of the border in a way that makes sense. Our NATO involvement with Pakistan is an emerging one. It didn't take place until NATO took over the east, as well, and the United States and coalition forces came under the NATO mandate. And so, our military-to-military discussions with them are on the ascendancy. The relationship is evolving. But clearly there's a lot at stake, and clearly the Secretary General of NATO understands that if, in fact, we cannot find the right ways to bring about the resolutions to the problem that we see on the border, that—and if Pakistan is judged not to be doing enough—then the full weight—political weight of the 26-nation alliance, plus all the countries that are in Afghanistan, is going—will be felt; and they should be felt, because this is something that critically has to be tackled.

The Ambassador is much more of an expert on the Pakistani side of the border than I am, because of my recency, in terms of coming to that problem. But I must say that, in my meetings, all the right words were spoken by the Pakistani military. And so, you know, being from Missouri, literally, I think it's fair to say that, by springtime, we will have a sense of whether, over the winter, we've seen a change or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker.

Senator CORKER. I'll pass for the time allotted and wait to ask the Ambassador.

The CHAIRMAN. That's very kind.

Senator CORKER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Yes; thank you both for your testimony and your presence here.

General, just one quick question. You've expressed the view that a lot of people have, I guess, not just in the context of Afghanistan, but in other places in the world, that any kind of military effort is only part of the solution, and that reconstruction and development activities have to move forward.

Where do you think we are on that score, in terms of—if you view that as a recommendation that you would make, to accelerate or to ensure that we have both reconstruction and development activities at a level they should be—how do you assess that today, in light of the President's budget or in light of this administration's policies on both reconstruction and development?

General JONES. Senator, I think the way I would answer that question is to say that we do have the weight and commitment of over 60 countries—about 60 countries, in Afghanistan, which is impressive. So, there is a lot of money being spent. My observation is that what I would think would be a good thing to do is to have more focus on how it's being spent, and to make sure that we tackle the three or four things that really have to be done in order to turn that country around. And those were the pillars that I was talking about in my introduction.

So, it's a little bit like the question of, Do you have enough troops? My view in Afghanistan is that the commanders have asked for a little bit more, but it's not astronomical. But it's what you do with those troops that's important. And if you have enough money, then it's what you do with the money that's important. And some of that money is not being spent in the right directions, and it needs to be focused. And that's my message.

Senator CASEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General Jones, good to see you again.

General JONES. Senator.

Senator WEBB. I'd like to ask you a question that actually is a little bit of a follow-on from the Armed Services Committee hearing the other day. I had to leave before I was able to ask it to you there. But it dovetails in with what you're saying here.

I am wondering about your judgment with respect to this recent increase in insurgent activity or military activity on the other side. Are we actually—or to what extent are we able to measure how much of that renewed activity is a result of the squeezing of the drug lords, the—this attempt to reduce opium growing, and the resistance from that, as opposed to politically?

General JONES. Senator, I think the resurgence in activity, or the heightened activity, has more to do with the fact that NATO expansion in the south took place in the fall of last year. Prior to that expansion taking place, which was about 9,000 NATO troops from about a half a dozen countries, there was no reconstruction in the south, there was no permanent presence of large-scale troops to bring about security and stability. The south was largely a safe haven for not only the drug cartels, but the Taliban, the disparate groups, the rampant corruption and crime, no governance, and not

much to show in the way of reconstruction. With the arrival of those 8- or 9,000 troops, in Operation Medusa, that was the test by the opposition to see if NATO was going to fight. They learned a lesson and they suffered a military defeat of some significance.

But since we're now in—we have now disturbed the hornet's nest. The resultant increases are largely due to the fact that we weren't there before. So, you have more data.

But I think the NATO forces have acquitted themselves well. I will be interested to see, for all this talk about the spring offensive, exactly what happens there. We've always had something, but we'll just have to wait and see how it materializes.

But I do think that we're close with regard to the troop numbers. I think if we work on convincing our allies to eliminate some of the operationally restrictive caveats that are on their forces, that's a force multiplier in itself. The penalty for not reducing caveats on troops that are committed is that you need more troops. You need more uncaveated troops. And there are some real moral issues there, in my view, whether—you know, how right is it for troops to be caveated that they can't go to the aid of allies, and yet, a nation that is attacked expects everybody else to come to their aid? And this is something the alliance is going to grapple with. But the quicker they get through that, like, as they did in Kosovo, where there were virtually no caveats—in 2003 we had so many caveats, we couldn't even move platoon from point A to point B. And now we have no caveats. And I hope that that will happen in Afghanistan, because the commanders will then really have the operational flexibility needed to do their job.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator WEBB. Appreciate you being here.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have you at a quarter of. I'm going to ask you a parting question. You told me, when I spoke with you early on, a year and a half ago, maybe longer, that you were having trouble, when it became a NATO command, getting—you requested a squadron of 18 attack helicopters, three C-130s, and how difficult it was to—at the outset, to get that. Now, the President's committed additional combat brigade in the effort of Afghanistan. Does that include the necessary wherewithal, in terms of—do you know? Does that include helicopters, C-130 planes, logistics? Is that—

General JONES. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Part of the package?

General JONES. There was, when we talked, just before the NATO expansion into the south, and we were having a difficult time raising two or three helicopters and some—

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General JONES [continuing]. Transports and everything else. NATO did, in fact, provide a significant capability package, including the 8- or 9,000 troops that are now working in the south, and that included some mobility packages and things like that. There still remains maybe 5 percent of the overall plan that needs to be resourced, in terms of manpower and mobility, but, given where we were when you and I talked, and where we are today, we're in a much better situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Thank you very much, General. It's a quarter of. Actually, it's 14 of. We went over. So, thank you very, very much—

General JONES. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. For being here, and I hope we can call on you again.

General JONES. Anytime, sir. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. But, Mr. Ambassador, you're not free. We're going to pick your brain, if we can, for a little bit, if you don't mind. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, you talked about—and we'll go to 7 minutes—or 5 minutes—let's make it 5 minutes—sins of omission and sins of commission. And you indicated that the—there are Pakistani incentives not to cooperate. Could you tell us what you think those incentives to not cooperate are?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think there are two sets of incentives that lead Pakistan to possibly support insurgency in Afghanistan, and, at a minimum, to be tepid about their efforts to suppress it. One is the sort of geopolitical desire not to face a—adversaries on two flanks. And to the extent that they perceive that the Government in Kabul has a close relationship with New Delhi, allows New Delhi to open consulates all along the border, where, allegedly, Indian intelligence agents are stationed, and where, again, allegedly—and these are Pakistani allegations—Indian intelligence agencies are, in turn, supporting insurgency in Baluchistan, this feeds a certain sense of paranoia. And Pakistan would obviously prefer to have a government allied with it and supportive of it, as it had with the Taliban, and, in effect, to give it what it—what is called—what they call “strategic depth,” faced, as they are, with this huge adversary on their other flank.

The second is the desire to externalize Pashtun aspirations. As I said, most Pashtuns live in Pakistan. They've always lived in Pakistan. About, I think, three-fifths of the Pashtuns in the world live in Pakistan; and two-fifths, in Afghanistan. And the Pashtuns have always had aspirations for autonomy, or even independence, a Pashtunistan. And if the Pashtuns are going to run anything, Pakistan would prefer they run Afghanistan rather than try to run Pakistan, or try to carve out a autonomous area within Pakistan, or otherwise exert their influence in Pakistan. So, a simple desire to externalize these aspirations is a second—is a second motive.

And there are historic limitations on Pakistani control over the border areas, which have historically been highly autonomous and self-governing.

And this area is the least-developed area of Pakistan, which isn't highly developed, but which is certainly much more highly developed than Afghanistan. And, therefore, this is a population with substantial grievances, as well as aspirations.

The CHAIRMAN. When I met with Musharraf—I can't remember how long ago it was now—and I raised the issue, not about the failure of Islamabad to deal with the northeast province and with the Pashtun, but I did raise the possibility of the economic difficulty faced by Pashtun in that province. And I raised the issue about aid, and it was—he was talking about aid for education. And I gave him indications—figures about the cost of—because we hear about the

madrassas, and funding of the madrassas, particularly in this area and along the border, and so on, so forth. And I said I was prepared to come back to the Senate and make a major case for a significant economic aid package relating to education, and—but for elementary and secondary education. He said, “No, no, we want it at the university level. That’s where we need aid.” And I got the distinct impression that anything—now, I’m putting words in his—he did not say what I’m about to say—but I got—came away with the impression, with he and his ministers, that I—that the idea of enhancing the circumstances of the Pashtun in that area was not viewed by Islamabad as being in their interest. Now, you know, we think in terms of, you know, to use the phrase that our friend who writes for the New York Times, Mr. Friedman, uses, “If you don’t visit the bad neighborhood, it’ll visit you.” I get the impression that it’s better for to—they think it’s better that it stay bad neighborhood, for the reasons you’ve stated, rather than actually, even with our help, go in and try to improve the condition of the Pashtun in that—those provinces. What is your assessment? Am I misreading that?

Ambassador DOBBINS. No; I think you probably were reading it correctly. It has been a sensitive region for them, one that they have certain inhibitions about getting too deeply involved in, and probably have even greater inhibitions about our getting too—more deeply involved. It’s possible, however, that their views and ours have evolved a bit. I believe that the administration has requested, in the assistance package for Pakistan, money—a significant amount of money for—specifically for this region. So, I think that they recognize that the problem on the Pakistani side of the border needs to be addressed, as well.

And, as I said, I think that it’s not just a question of getting Pakistan and Afghanistan to agree on the border—that is, that the border is formally recognized—but to agree on a border regime which takes into the fact—takes into account the fact that these people have historically traveled back and forth, have family and tribal relations on both sides of the border, and promotes development in—on both sides of the border.

So, I think thinking may have evolved somewhat, and it’s possible even that the Pakistani thinking has evolved somewhat.

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of both sides of the border, one of the most interesting things I did in my stay in Pakistan is, with an American two-star, getting in an elevator—an elevator, Freudian slip—in a helicopter and fly that entire border in the winter. And you could see thousands of smuggling paths through the woods that were there. I mean, it was—I mean, literally, I guess it would be a thousand. I mean, just—and the point was made—this is 5 years ago—I mean, and the point was made that, you know, when the spring comes and the foliage is on the trees, it’s virtually impossible to deal with that. But I think General Jones is right, we’ll see what happens here.

I—my time is up—I yield to my friend from Indiana.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Dobbins, several of the ideas you have are certainly “thinking outside the box,” to use that phrase, but fascinating. For instance, the support of the Afghan clergy so that there is some

idea of local government. As you point out, in many villages or what have you, there isn't, aside from this. How can you go about supporting the clergy? Is this—are these persons all of one faith, or are there divergences there, or—just an administrative situation? How would you do that?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, most of Afghanistan is Sunni. There is a Shia minority. In the southern region we're talking about, I think it's exclusively Sunni. Some of the—some of the mosques are privately supported, others have traditionally depended on the government. The government's capacity to provide that support has largely dried up. And I think it's an area that's worth, you know, further study, and maybe asking for a plan in this regard.

Clearly, sort of direct Western assistance, non-Muslim assistance to these facilities and individuals may not be the most productive way. The most productive way is probably budget support to the Afghan Government and—with flexibility and encouragement that they use that budget support to fully fund the Religious Affairs Ministry and allow the Religious Affairs Ministry, in turn, to fulfill its obligations and responsibilities with respect to village mosques and imams.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that's a very important organizational point. In other words, once again, aid to the government—

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Karzai and what have you, but with ideas for them that they might find that possible to do.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right.

Senator LUGAR. In other words, as a part of our general doctrine or idea of local government, but, through them, as opposed to our attempting to work with local—

Ambassador DOBBINS. Oh, absolutely.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Mosques and what have you.

Now, second, you've just mentioned the problem of lack of development of this area in Pakistan which is the most in controversy today. It is difficult for the Pakistani Government to work with, historically, but productive of much of the trouble. Is there any conceivable way in which the international group, the 64 nations or what have you, could include, in addition to resurgence and reconstruction of Afghanistan, include that portion of Pakistan in question as well? In other words, to see, as you have analyzed today, the problem basically in Afghanistan is largely influenced from Pakistan, as you commenced your testimony. Now—this is a special part of Pakistan, as a matter of fact, which the Pakistani Government has difficulty with—obviously, due to questions of sovereignty—as well as the problems that you mentioned of rivalry with New Delhi, as a friendly government to Afghanistan and so forth. But I'm just, once again, thinking outside the box, our objective is Afghanistan, but, in fact, a good part of the problem is at least an area of Pakistan that includes Pashtuns in Pakistan, as well as in Afghanistan. Is there any conceivable way that we could recommend to our Government that you extend the territory?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, first of all, I do agree with General Jones that the lack of a coordinated and, sort of, hierarchical structure for deciding on—for prioritizing international assistance to Pakistan, and then overseeing its implementation, is an important

lacunae in our capabilities there. And I think something analogous to the kinds of structures we've set in up Bosnia or in Kosovo could be helpful. The situation's different, and it would have to be structured to take account of those differences. But the fact is that we have achieved pretty much unity of command on the military side by using the NATO structure, and we don't have anything comparable on the civil implementation side. And the result is a very highly unstructured and overlapping set of national donor programs. So, I do think creating a contact group type structure, and assigning an individual to represent all members of that group, and oversee the international community's activities in that regard, would be useful.

Now, whether that specific group could extend its responsibilities into Pakistan, I'm a little skeptical. I think that would probably make it more difficult for them to operate within Pakistan. I think you'd probably need a parallel effort directed to the Pakistani side of the border, but an effort that would be based in Islamabad, rather than in—rather than in Kabul.

I do think, however, that it's—that we should be trying to raise the profile of the Pakistan issue in various international forums. I mean, we're in this anomalous situation now, where NATO troops are facing an adversary that's coming across a border, and it's like, you know, we've—for 40 years, we manned the Folda Gap waiting for the Soviets to come across the border. It would be like NATO not talking about the Soviet Union for 40 years, just manning the gap, but not talking about where the threat was coming from. And so—and that's, in effect, what we're doing now. We don't—I don't sense that we've put Pakistan on the NATO agenda. I don't see any communiques that talk about Pakistan. The General has indicated we are developing a military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, and I think that's good. But I think we need to put this on the agenda, and we'll only do that if the administration is prepared to talk somewhat more candidly about the problem than they traditionally have been. I remember urging one of our senior officials to put this on the North Atlantic Council's agenda, and the answer was, "Oh, no, the information is too sensitive." Well, you know, I mean, we traded intelligence appraisals of what was going on in the Soviet Union for 40 years. And they were in a position to obliterate us. So, it's hard to believe that the information is so sensitive that it can't be shared with key allies, and that sharing it wouldn't create a greater overall sense of what the dimensions of the problem were, and, ideally, would result in larger resources and political influence flowing toward the kind of ameliorative steps that I've already suggested would be desirable.

Senator LUGAR. This is a quick followup. Isn't it possible, though, that, given the enthusiasm of the Congress, the administration, and what have you, for Afghanistan reconstruction success, that, at the same time that we're admonishing Mr. Musharraf and others to do better, we would say to him, "We would like, as a matter of fact, to extend our roadbuilding or our turning on the lights or whatever, over across the border. We'd like to help you out, because we think it's in your best interest and ours." In other words, this is a very different type of incentive—

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right.

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. Than the fact that he's simply not fulfilling whatever obligations we think he has.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Oh, I agree with that. And I—and, to be fair, I think the administration has suggested something like that in the budget to you. But that's not to say it couldn't be highlighted and expanded. But I agree with that.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for your time and your great service to the country. I'm struck by where you've been over all the years, and no easy places to deal with, hotbeds, all of them.

I've got about two or three. I want to start to pick up where I left off with an earlier witness, and, also, we've had a good discussion about it already with regard to Pakistan. I, like others on this committee, have had contact with the Pakistani Ambassador, Mr. Durrani, and he made a passionate case in my office a couple of days ago that what we're reading in the newspaper, what the administration and others have asserted with regard to the way Pakistan has or—either has done or has not done to have a more constructive impact and a positive impact on the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, that that's—that we're not getting all the information we need, and the press accounts are inaccurate, and their side of the story has to be told.

I asked him point blank to take the most critical news accounts of the way the Pakistanis have dealt with this issue, and rebut them, and give us—give me and give others the benefit of a written rebuttal on the most substantial charges.

What's your assessment of that? Just point blank, in terms of the Pakistani Government's assertion that they're getting a bad rap, so to speak, when it comes to the general battle against terrorists, but, in particular, within Afghanistan?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I believe that, as regards al-Qaeda, that's probably right. I mean, I think—I think that Pakistan has been cooperative in trying to locate, roll up, arrest al-Qaeda operatives. They see this as a threat to them, as well as to us. Musharraf, indeed, has been—suffered from an assassination attempt. So, I think, insofar as we're talking about al-Qaeda, this is true.

As regard the Taliban, it is—it was, until recently, not true, and I think it's still probably less true, although there have been some signs that they've stepped up their activities to interdict and interfere with the Taliban's activities in Pakistan. I mean, the—they've made—they, in themselves, make a distinction between foreigners, whom they're prepared to collaborate against, and people who aren't foreigners. Well, the fact is that many of the Taliban operatives are not foreigners, they're Pakistanis. Some of them are long-term Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have been there 10 or 20 years. Others have always been Pakistani. And that obviously represents a different political inhibition, when you're talking about your own citizens, rather than illegal aliens, in effect.

And I've cited the reasons why they, at a minimum, may feel—may lack adequate incentives to be more aggressive in this regard.

I think that there have been repeated assertions—and, indeed, I think, United States, NATO, Afghan, and United Nations officials

all have said informally and when they're off the record—that the Pakistani intelligence service has had a relationship with the Taliban, and has provided support and assistance to the Taliban. And I have no reason to believe that that is not the case. Now, Musharraf goes—says, “Well, maybe retired members of the”—of his intelligence service are doing that, but not active-duty ones.

On the other hand, I don't believe that the Ambassador you were talking to was necessarily lying to you or being intentionally disingenuous. Pakistan's a big, complicated country, with a complex government. And I think there are many Pakistani officials who are entirely sincere in their desire to cooperate with the United States, cooperate with the international community, move Pakistan into the mainstream of the international community, and see these extremist threats as primarily threats to their own society.

Senator CASEY. I was struck by something you had in your written testimony, I'll read from portions of it. On page 6, where—you make the assertion about Afghanistan, that it's, “simply too poor to be able to provide security and effective governance to its large and dispersed population. So, unless the Pakistani Government can be persuaded to”—and then you list things that they must do. The United—then you conclude with, “The United States and its allies are going to be forced to patrol Afghanistan's southeast frontier indefinitely.” So, obviously you're making the case, as I think everyone agrees, that Pakistan has much to do to prove itself, and to make sure that they're a constructive force in Afghanistan.

And I was also struck by the list of priorities you see with regard to Afghanistan. The first one being an age-old challenge. You say that the United States should intensify quiet efforts to encourage both India and Pakistan to resolve their differences over Kashmir. What do you think the likelihood of that, if—that's the first priority among several—what do you think the likelihood of that is in what is now 2 years left in this administration? And how do you think that's best accomplished? Is that diplomacy that's at the level of Secretary of State, or is it diplomacy that operates on several tracks? What's the best way to get there?

Ambassador DOBBINS. I think that's actually one of the more hopeful areas. I think there has been progress between the Pakistanis and the Indians. The Indians react very strongly. The Pakistanis would love to have us mediate this, but the Indians react very strongly and rebuff us in that regard. And, therefore, that's why I said that I think it has to be done quietly and informally.

And, I mean, we're building up a lot of credit with India. We're—we've intensified our relationship, we've offered them a nuclear agreement, which is a real breakthrough in our relationship, we're treating them as an emerging world power. And I think we need to, at the same time, make clear that we regard settlement of this issue as one of their responsibilities, and that we're not going to publicly try to engage ourselves in the process, but that it is an important aspect of our attitude toward them over the longer term.

So, I—and, to be fair, again, I think that this is an area where the administration has been making efforts. And I think probably American efforts going back to the efforts that Colin Powell made to avoid a nuclear confrontation between the two countries, back in 2002, have yielded some results.

Senator CASEY. I know I'm over, but I have more, but I'll wait.

The CHAIRMAN. No; go ahead. If you have a followup question, go ahead.

Senator CASEY. Let me do one more.

Something you've written about, the topic being "nation-building," and you contrast—or compare efforts undertaken by the previous administration, the Clinton administration, on what you call—I think you call, "low-profile, small-footprint approach" to nation-building. And, among other things, you talk about successful nation-building being measured by the level of effort made in terms of troops, time, and money.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Right.

Senator CASEY. What's your sense of that when it comes to—obviously, the past is prologue, and it gives us a lot of ideas on this, but in future efforts, in terms of nation-building, what do you think we must do, or what hasn't been done recently that—do you think it's those three areas, in troops and time and resources, or do you think there's something else that we haven't done?

Ambassador DOBBINS. Well, I think the way we organize ourselves to do this is important. Obviously, just throwing resources at a problem doesn't solve it. So, it's the competent employment of those resources. And—but I think we need to—I think we need to recognize that there's an important relationship between the scale of one's commitment and the scope of one's ambitions. When nation-building missions fail, they usually fail because that relationship hasn't been adequately recognized. That is, we went in with inadequate forces and very large-scale ambitions. Afghanistan should have been a mission that could have been accomplished with a relatively modest input, as compared to some other ones, because we had a very favorable international climate, we had support of all of the neighboring states, and we had support of most elements of the Afghan population, and we were able to put in place a moderate, responsible, and broadly based government very quickly. And, on that basis, we should have been able to make progress with a comparatively modest commitment. Unfortunately, we didn't go in with a comparatively modest commitment, we went in with a scandalously inadequate commitment. I mean, in the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the average Kosovar got 25 times more assistance the first couple of years than the average Afghanistan—Afghan, who'd had 20 years of civil war. And the average Kosovar got 50 times more security in the form of international troops than the average Afghan got. So, it was—Afghanistan was the least resourced of any America nation-building operation in the last 60 years during that first 2- or 3-year period.

Now, again, the administration's largely recognized that, and, beginning in 2004, began to provide much more adequate resourcing. But, again, the experience of these missions over the last 60 years suggests that beginning big and building down is a much—a wiser approach than beginning with minimal forces and then having to increase them as you're challenged.

That said, there's—one approach is to set high ambitions and then commit large-scale resources. The alternative is to commit limited resources, but also to scale back one's ambitions to what is likely to be achieved within those limited resources. And sometimes

that is a viable option. So, not every operation requires hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of billions of dollars.

We didn't go into Afghanistan saying we were going to make it a model for Central Asia, and that, once we democratized Afghanistan, we were going to change the form of government of every one of its neighbors. We went in with a more limited set of objectives, which were essentially to make sure it didn't become a launch point for global terrorism. We were, therefore, able to get bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—Russian, Iranian, Pakistani support. And, with that, we could have made more progress than we did. In Iraq, where we went in with that much, much higher set of objectives, the resource requirements would have been, and were, commensurately much higher.

Senator CASEY. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar, do you have any—

Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. Your insight is always very helpful to this committee, and to me, in particular, and I appreciate it. And this will—this is just the first of hearings we're going to have on this. We're going to follow this up through the spring, and I hope you'll be available to us.

Ambassador DOBBINS. Thank you. Always a pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We're adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on Afghanistan which remains without a doubt the principal front in the war on terror.

Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Government of Afghanistan has made considerable progress including in adopting a constitution; holding elections; and expanding women's rights and educational opportunities.

But Afghanistan continues to face grave threats that directly impact U.S. national security. These include the resurgence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, as noted last week by the Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell; weak institutions of administration; security and justice; rampant poverty and unemployment; and the booming drug trade which General Jones has called the "Achilles heel" of Afghanistan.

That al-Qaeda, in particular, is in a position to reconstitute itself in Pakistan's tribal areas shows just how misguided this administration's priorities have been in fighting this war on terror and how its policies have left our country less safe.

After 9/11, we had al-Qaeda's leadership on the run and severely limited in its ability to plan attacks. Five years later, after having diverted troops and resources to Iraq, al-Qaeda has reestablished itself; we're in for a bloody Taliban spring offensive; and Afghanistan is producing 90 percent of the world's heroin.

To combat these threats, the United States and the international community must urgently and rapidly increase political, economic, and military support to Afghanistan to ensure its long-term stability and prosperity, and to deny al-Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan.

We also need to get the Government of Pakistan to strengthen its commitment to fighting the Taliban, in particular, and establish control over its territory. The Pakistani leadership has made some tough choices and is an important ally of the United States but it needs to do more.

To convey this very message, I introduced a resolution yesterday which states that U.S. military assistance to Pakistan should be guided by progress that the Government of Pakistan makes in apprehending al-Qaeda and Taliban elements and preventing them from operating in Pakistan.

In the course of this hearing, I look forward to hearing the testimony of our distinguished witnesses regarding recent developments in Afghanistan and the details of the White House's new strategy toward Afghanistan.

The stakes in Afghanistan for our country, for the international community, and for NATO are significant. I will continue to closely monitor the situation there to ensure that we are doing everything we can to win a war that at this point is ours to lose.

