

1 **PART 1—IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED**
2 **DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE**
3 **UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN**

4 **SEC. 5502. MODERNIZING TAIWAN’S SECURITY CAPABILI-**
5 **TIES TO DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFEAT**
6 **AGGRESSION BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
7 **CHINA.**

8 (a) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES**
9 **DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
10 gressional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
12 Senate;

13 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
14 Senate;

15 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
16 Senate;

17 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
18 House of Representatives;

19 (5) the Committee on Armed Services of the
20 House of Representatives; and

21 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
22 House of Representatives.

23 (b) **TAIWAN SECURITY PROGRAMS.**—The Secretary
24 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense,
25 shall use the authorities under this section to strengthen
26 the United States-Taiwan defense relationship, and to

1 support the acceleration of the modernization of Taiwan's
2 defense capabilities, consistent with the Taiwan Relations
3 Act (Public Law 96–8).

4 (c) PURPOSE.—In addition to the purposes otherwise
5 authorized for Foreign Military Financing programs
6 under the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et
7 seq.), a purpose of the Foreign Military Financing Pro-
8 gram should be to provide assistance, including equip-
9 ment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and
10 defensive military capabilities of Taiwan—

11 (1) to accelerate the modernization of capabili-
12 ties that will enable Taiwan to delay, degrade, and
13 deny attempts by People's Liberation Army forces—

14 (A) to conduct coercive or grey zone activi-
15 ties;

16 (B) to blockade Taiwan; or

17 (C) to secure a lodgment on any islands
18 administered by Taiwan and expand or other-
19 wise use such lodgment to seize control of a
20 population center or other key territory in Tai-
21 wan; and

22 (2) to prevent the People's Republic of China
23 from decapitating, seizing control of, or otherwise
24 neutralizing or rendering ineffective Taiwan's civil-
25 ian and defense leadership.

1 (d) REGIONAL CONTINGENCY STOCKPILE.—Of the
2 amounts authorized to be appropriated pursuant to sub-
3 section (h), not more than \$100,000,000 may be used dur-
4 ing each of the fiscal years 2023 through 2032 to main-
5 tain a stockpile (if established pursuant to section
6 5503(b)), in accordance with section 514 of the Foreign
7 Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h).

8 (e) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—

9 (1) ANNUAL SPENDING PLAN.—Not later than
10 March 1, 2023, and annually thereafter, the Sec-
11 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
12 Defense, shall submit a plan to the appropriate con-
13 gressional committees describing how amounts au-
14 thorized to be appropriated pursuant to subsection
15 (h), if made available, would be used to achieve the
16 purpose described in subsection (c).

17 (2) CERTIFICATION.—

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to
19 be appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to
20 subsection (h) are authorized to be made avail-
21 able after the Secretary of State, in coordina-
22 tion with the Secretary of Defense, certifies not
23 less than annually to the appropriate commit-
24 tees of Congress that Taiwan has increased its
25 defense spending relative to Taiwan's defense

1 spending in its prior fiscal year, which includes
2 support for an asymmetric strategy, excepting
3 accounts in Taiwan's defense budget related to
4 personnel expenditures, (other than military
5 training and education and any funding related
6 to the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency).

7 (B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of State may
8 waive the certification requirement under sub-
9 paragraph (A) if the Secretary, in consultation
10 with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the
11 appropriate congressional committees that for
12 any given year—

13 (i) Taiwan is unable to increase its
14 defense spending relative to its defense
15 spending in its prior fiscal year due to se-
16 vere hardship; and

17 (ii) making available the amounts au-
18 thorized under subparagraph (A) is in the
19 national interests of the United States.

20 (3) REMAINING FUNDS.—Amounts authorized
21 to be appropriated for a fiscal year pursuant to sub-
22 section (h) that are not obligated and expended dur-
23 ing such fiscal year shall be added to the amount
24 that may be used for Foreign Military Financing to
25 Taiwan in the subsequent fiscal year.

1 (f) ANNUAL REPORT ON ADVANCING THE DEFENSE
2 OF TAIWAN.—

3 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Concurrently with the
4 first certification required under subsection (e)(2),
5 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
6 shall jointly submit a report to the appropriate con-
7 gressional committees that describes steps taken to
8 enhance the United States-Taiwan defense relation-
9 ship and Taiwan’s modernization of its defense ca-
10 pabilities.

11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report
12 required under paragraph (1) shall include—

13 (A) an assessment of the commitment of
14 Taiwan to implement a military strategy that
15 will deter and, if necessary, defeat military ag-
16 gression by the People’s Republic of China, in-
17 cluding the steps that Taiwan has taken and
18 the steps that Taiwan has not taken towards
19 such implementation;

20 (B) an assessment of the efforts of Taiwan
21 to acquire and employ within its forces counter-
22 intervention capabilities, including—

23 (i) long-range precision fires;

24 (ii) integrated air and missile defense
25 systems;

- 1 (iii) anti-ship cruise missiles;
- 2 (iv) land-attack cruise missiles;
- 3 (v) coastal defense;
- 4 (vi) anti-armor;
- 5 (vii) undersea warfare, including
- 6 manned and unmanned systems;
- 7 (viii) survivable swarming maritime
- 8 assets;
- 9 (ix) manned and unmanned aerial sys-
- 10 tems;
- 11 (x) mining and countermining capa-
- 12 bilities;
- 13 (xi) intelligence, surveillance, and re-
- 14 connaissance capabilities;
- 15 (xii) command and control systems;
- 16 (xiii) defensive cybersecurity capabili-
- 17 ties; and
- 18 (xiv) any other defense capabilities
- 19 that the United States determines, includ-
- 20 ing jointly with Taiwan, are crucial to the
- 21 defense of Taiwan, consistent with the
- 22 joint consultative mechanism with Taiwan
- 23 created pursuant to section 5506;
- 24 (C) an evaluation of the balance between
- 25 conventional and counter intervention capabili-

1 ties in the defense force of Taiwan as of the
2 date on which the report is submitted;

3 (D) an assessment of steps taken by Tai-
4 wan to enhance the overall readiness of its de-
5 fense forces, including—

6 (i) the extent to which Taiwan is re-
7 quiring and providing regular and relevant
8 training to such forces;

9 (ii) the extent to which such training
10 is realistic to the security environment that
11 Taiwan faces; and

12 (iii) the sufficiency of the financial
13 and budgetary resources Taiwan is putting
14 toward readiness of such forces;

15 (E) an assessment of steps taken by Tai-
16 wan to ensure that the Taiwan's reserve forces
17 and All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency can
18 recruit, train, equip, and mobilize its forces;

19 (F) an evaluation of—

20 (i) the severity of manpower shortages
21 in the military of Taiwan, including in the
22 reserve forces;

23 (ii) the impact of such shortages in
24 the event of a conflict scenario; and

1 (iii) the efforts made by Taiwan to
2 address such shortages;

3 (G) an assessment of the efforts made by
4 Taiwan to boost its civilian defenses, including
5 any informational campaigns to raise awareness
6 among the population of Taiwan of the risks
7 Taiwan faces;

8 (H) an assessment of the efforts made by
9 Taiwan to secure its critical infrastructure, in-
10 cluding in transportation, telecommunications
11 networks, satellite communications, and energy;

12 (I) an assessment of the efforts made by
13 Taiwan to enhance its cybersecurity, including
14 the security and survivability of official civilian
15 and military networks;

16 (J) an assessment of the efforts made by
17 Taiwan to improve the image and prestige of its
18 defense forces among the population of Taiwan;

19 (K) an assessment of any significant gaps
20 in any of the matters described in subpara-
21 graphs (A) through (J) with respect to which
22 the United States assesses that additional ac-
23 tion is needed;

24 (L) a description of cooperative efforts be-
25 tween the United States and Taiwan on the

1 matters described in subparagraphs (A)
2 through (K); and

3 (M) a description of any challenge in Tai-
4 wan to—

5 (i) implement the matters described in
6 subparagraphs (A) through (J); or

7 (ii) United States support or engage-
8 ment with regard to such matters.

9 (3) SUBSEQUENT REPORTS.—Concurrently with
10 subsequent certifications required under subsection
11 (e)(2), the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
12 Defense shall jointly submit updates to the initial re-
13 port required under paragraph (1) that provides a
14 description of changes and developments that oc-
15 curred in the prior year.

16 (4) FORM.—The reports required under para-
17 graphs (1) and (3) shall be submitted in an unclassi-
18 fied form, but may contain a classified annex.

19 (5) SHARING OF SUMMARY.—The Secretary of
20 State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly
21 share any unclassified portions of the reports, pursu-
22 ant to paragraph (4), with Taiwan, as appropriate.

23 (g) FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING LOAN AND LOAN
24 GUARANTEE AUTHORITY.—

25 (1) DIRECT LOANS.—

1 (A) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding sec-
2 tion 23(e)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
3 (22 U.S.C. 2763), during fiscal years 2023
4 through 2027, the Secretary of State is author-
5 ized to make direct loans available for Taiwan
6 pursuant to section 23 of such Act.

7 (B) MAXIMUM OBLIGATIONS.—Gross obli-
8 gations for the principal amounts of loans au-
9 thorized under subparagraph (A) may not ex-
10 ceed \$2,000,000,000.

11 (C) SOURCE OF FUNDS.—

12 (i) DEFINED TERM.—In this subpara-
13 graph, the term “cost”—

14 (I) has the meaning given such
15 term in section 502(5) of the Congres-
16 sional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C.
17 661a(5));

18 (II) shall include the cost of
19 modifying a loan authorized under
20 subparagraph (A); and

21 (III) may include the costs of
22 selling, reducing, or cancelling any
23 amounts owed to the United States or
24 to any agency of the United States.

1 (ii) IN GENERAL.—Amounts author-
2 ized to be appropriated pursuant to sub-
3 section (g) may be made available to pay
4 for the cost of loans authorized under sub-
5 paragraph (A).

6 (D) FEES AUTHORIZED.—

7 (i) IN GENERAL.—The Government of
8 the United States may charge processing
9 and origination fees for a loan made pur-
10 suant to subparagraph (A), not to exceed
11 the cost to the Government of making such
12 loan, which shall be collected from bor-
13 rowers through a financing account (as de-
14 fined in section 502(7) of the Congres-
15 sional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C.
16 661a(7)).

17 (ii) LIMITATION ON FEE PAYMENTS.—
18 Amounts made available under any appro-
19 priations Act for any fiscal year may not
20 be used to pay any fees associated with a
21 loan authorized under subparagraph (A).

22 (E) REPAYMENT.—Loans made pursuant
23 to subparagraph (A) shall be repaid not later
24 than 12 years after the loan is received by the

1 borrower, including a grace period of not more
2 than 1 year on repayment of principal.

3 (F) INTEREST.—

4 (i) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding
5 section 23(c)(1) of the Arms Export Con-
6 trol Act (22 U.S.C. 2763(c)(1)), interest
7 for loans made pursuant to subparagraph
8 (A) may be charged at a rate determined
9 by the Secretary of State, except that such
10 rate may not be less than the prevailing in-
11 terest rate on marketable Treasury securi-
12 ties of similar maturity.

13 (ii) TREATMENT OF LOAN AMOUNTS
14 USED TO PAY INTEREST.—Amounts made
15 available under this paragraph for interest
16 costs shall not be considered assistance for
17 the purposes of any statutory limitation on
18 assistance to a country.

19 (2) LOAN GUARANTEES.—

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to
21 be appropriated pursuant to subsection (g) may
22 be made available for the costs of loan guaran-
23 tees for Taiwan under section 24 of the Arms
24 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2764) for Tai-
25 wan to subsidize gross obligations for the prin-

1 ciproal amount of commercial loans and total loan
2 principal, any part of which may be guaranteed,
3 not to exceed \$2,000,000,000.

4 (B) MAXIMUM AMOUNTS.—A loan guar-
5 antee authorized under subparagraph (A)—

6 (i) may not guarantee a loan that ex-
7 ceeds \$2,000,000,000; and

8 (ii) may not exceed 80 percent of the
9 loan principal with respect to any single
10 borrower.

11 (C) SUBORDINATION.—Any loan guaran-
12 teed pursuant to subparagraph (A) may not be
13 subordinated to—

14 (i) another debt contracted by the
15 borrower; or

16 (ii) any other claims against the bor-
17 rower in the case of default.

18 (D) REPAYMENT.—Repayment in United
19 States dollars of any loan guaranteed under
20 this paragraph shall be required not later than
21 12 years after the loan agreement is signed.

22 (E) FEES.—Notwithstanding section 24 of
23 the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2764),
24 the Government of the United States may
25 charge processing and origination fees for a

1 loan guarantee authorized under subparagraph
2 (A), not to exceed the cost to the Government
3 of such loan guarantee, which shall be collected
4 from borrowers, or from third parties on behalf
5 of such borrowers, through a financing account
6 (as defined in section 502(7) of the Congres-
7 sional Budget Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 661a(7)).

8 (F) TREATMENTS OF LOAN GUARAN-
9 TEES.—Amounts made available under this
10 paragraph for the costs of loan guarantees au-
11 thorized under subparagraph (A) shall not be
12 considered assistance for the purposes of any
13 statutory limitation on assistance to a country.

14 (3) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT.—Amounts
15 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this sub-
16 section may not be expended without prior notifica-
17 tion of the appropriate committees of Congress.

18 (h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—

19 (1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—In
20 addition to amounts otherwise authorized to be ap-
21 propriated for Foreign Military Financing, there is
22 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of
23 State for Taiwan Foreign Military Finance grant as-
24 sistance up to \$2,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal
25 years 2023 through 2027.

1 (2) TRAINING AND EDUCATION.—Of the
2 amounts authorized to be appropriated under para-
3 graph (1), the Secretary of State should use not less
4 than \$2,000,000 per fiscal year for one or more
5 blanket order Foreign Military Financing training
6 programs related to the defense needs of Taiwan.

7 (3) DIRECT COMMERCIAL CONTRACTING.—The
8 Secretary of State may use amounts authorized to
9 be appropriated under paragraph (1) for the pro-
10 curement of defense articles, defense services, or de-
11 sign and construction services that are not sold by
12 the United States Government under the Arms Ex-
13 port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.).

14 (4) PROCUREMENT IN TAIWAN.—Of the
15 amounts authorized to be appropriated for Foreign
16 Military Financing and made available for Taiwan,
17 not more than 15 percent of the amount made avail-
18 able for each fiscal year may be available for the
19 procurement by Taiwan in Taiwan of defense arti-
20 cles and defense services, including research and de-
21 velopment, as agreed by the United States and Tai-
22 wan.

23 (i) SUNSET PROVISION.—Assistance may not be pro-
24 vided under this section after September 30, 2032.

1 **SEC. 5503. INCREASE IN ANNUAL REGIONAL CONTINGENCY**
2 **STOCKPILE ADDITIONS AND SUPPORT FOR**
3 **TAIWAN.**

4 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Section 514(b)(2)(A) of the For-
5 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h(b)(2)(A))
6 is amended by striking “\$200,000,000” and all that fol-
7 lows and inserting “\$500,000,000 for any of the fiscal
8 years 2023, 2024, or 2025.”.

9 (b) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—Subject to section 514 of the
10 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321h), the
11 President may establish a regional contingency stockpile
12 for Taiwan that consists of munitions and other appro-
13 priate defense articles.

14 (c) **INCLUSION OF TAIWAN AMONG OTHER ALLIES**
15 **ELIGIBLE FOR DEFENSE ARTICLES.**—Chapter 2 of part
16 II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2311
17 et seq.) is amended—

18 (1) in section 514(c)(2) (22 U.S.C.
19 2321h(c)(2)), by inserting “Taiwan,” after “Thai-
20 land,”; and

21 (2) in section 516(c)(2) (22 U.S.C.
22 2321j(c)(2)), by inserting “to Taiwan,” after “major
23 non-NATO allies on such southern and southeastern
24 flank,”.

25 (d) **ANNUAL BRIEFING.**—Not later than 1 year after
26 the date of enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter

1 for 7 years, the President shall provide a briefing to the
2 appropriate committees of Congress regarding the status
3 of a regional contingency stockpile established under sub-
4 section (b).

5 **SEC. 5504. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND**
6 **TRAINING COOPERATION WITH TAIWAN.**

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and the
8 Secretary of Defense shall establish or expand a com-
9 prehensive training program with Taiwan designed to—

10 (1) enhance interoperability and capabilities for
11 joint operations between the United States and Tai-
12 wan;

13 (2) enhance rapport and deepen partnership be-
14 tween the militaries of the United States and Tai-
15 wan, and foster understanding of the United States
16 among individuals in Taiwan;

17 (3) improve Taiwan's defense capabilities; and

18 (4) train future leaders of Taiwan, promote
19 professional military education, civilian control of
20 the military, and protection of human rights.

21 (b) ELEMENTS.—The training program required by
22 subsection (a) should prioritize relevant and realistic
23 training, including as necessary joint United States-Tai-
24 wan contingency tabletop exercises, war games, full-scale
25 military exercises, and an enduring rotational United

1 States military presence that assists Taiwan in maintain-
2 ing force readiness and utilizing United States defense ar-
3 ticles and services transferred from the United States to
4 Taiwan.

5 (c) **AUTHORIZATION OF PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN**
6 **IN THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND**
7 **TRAINING PROGRAM.**—The Secretary of State is author-
8 ized to provide training and education to relevant entities
9 in Taiwan through the International Military Education
10 and Training program authorized under chapter 5 of part
11 II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347
12 et seq).

13 **SEC. 5505. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO SUPPORT TAI-**
14 **WAN.**

15 (a) **DRAWDOWN AUTHORITY.**—Section 506(a) of the
16 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318(a)) is
17 amended by adding at the end the following paragraph:

18 “(3) In addition to amounts already specified in this
19 section, the President may direct the drawdown of defense
20 articles from the stocks of the Department of Defense, de-
21 fense services of the Department of Defense, and military
22 education and training, of an aggregate value of not to
23 exceed \$1,000,000,000 per fiscal year, to be provided to
24 Taiwan.”.

1 (b) EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.—Section 552(c) of the
2 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2348a(c)) is
3 amended by adding at the end the following: “In addition
4 to the aggregate value of \$25,000,000 authorized in para-
5 graph (2) of the preceding sentence, the President may
6 direct the drawdown of commodities and services from the
7 inventory and resources of any agency of the United
8 States Government for the purposes of providing nec-
9 essary and immediate assistance to Taiwan of a value not
10 to exceed \$25,000,000 in any fiscal year.”.

11 (c) USE OF SPECIAL DEFENSE ACQUISITION
12 FUND.—The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with
13 the Secretary of State, shall seek to utilize the Special De-
14 fense Acquisition Fund established under chapter 5 of the
15 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2795 et seq.) to ex-
16 pedite the procurement and delivery of defense articles
17 and defense services for the purpose of assisting and sup-
18 porting the armed forces of Taiwan.

19 **SEC. 5506. MULTI-YEAR PLAN TO FULFILL DEFENSIVE RE-**
20 **QUIREMENTS OF MILITARY FORCES OF TAI-**
21 **WAN.**

22 (a) MULTI-YEAR PLAN.—Not later than 180 days
23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary
24 of Defense and the Secretary of State, in consultation with
25 the Director of National Intelligence, shall engage for the

1 purposes of establishing a joint consultative mechanism
2 with appropriate officials of Taiwan to develop and imple-
3 ment a multi-year plan to provide for the acquisition of
4 appropriate defensive capabilities by Taiwan and to en-
5 gage with Taiwan in a series of combined training, exer-
6 cises, and planning activities consistent with the Taiwan
7 Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.).

8 (b) ELEMENTS.—The plan required by subsection (a)
9 shall include the following:

10 (1) An identification of the defensive military
11 capability gaps and capacity shortfalls of Taiwan
12 that are required to—

13 (A) allow Taiwan to respond effectively to
14 aggression by the People’s Liberation Army or
15 other actors from the People’s Republic of
16 China; and

17 (B) advance a strategy of denial, reduce
18 the threat of conflict, thwart an invasion, and
19 mitigate other risks to the United States and
20 Taiwan.

21 (2) An assessment of the relative priority as-
22 signed by appropriate departments and agencies of
23 Taiwan to include its military to address such capa-
24 bility gaps and capacity shortfalls.

1 (3) An explanation of the annual resources
2 committed by Taiwan to address such capability
3 gaps and capacity shortfalls.

4 (4) A description and justification of the rel-
5 ative importance of overcoming each identified capa-
6 bility gap and capacity shortfall for deterring, delay-
7 ing, or defeating military aggression by the People's
8 Republic of China;

9 (5) An assessment of—

10 (A) the capability gaps and capacity short-
11 falls that could be addressed in a sufficient and
12 timely manner by Taiwan; and

13 (B) the capability gaps and capacity short-
14 falls that are unlikely to be addressed in a suffi-
15 cient and timely manner solely by Taiwan.

16 (6) An assessment of the capability gaps and
17 capacity shortfalls described in paragraph (5)(B)
18 that could be addressed in a sufficient and timely
19 manner by—

20 (A) the Foreign Military Financing, For-
21 eign Military Sales, and Direct Commercial
22 Sales programs of the Department of State;

23 (B) Department of Defense security assist-
24 ance authorized by chapter 16 of title 10,
25 United States Code;

1 (C) Department of State training and edu-
2 cation programs authorized by chapter 5 of
3 part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
4 (22 U.S.C. 2347 et seq.);

5 (D) section 506 of the Foreign Assistance
6 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318);

7 (E) the provision of excess defense articles
8 pursuant to the requirements of the Arms Ex-
9 port Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); or

10 (F) any other authority available to the
11 Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.

12 (7) A description of United States or Taiwan
13 engagement with other countries that could assist in
14 addressing in a sufficient and timely manner the ca-
15 pability gaps and capacity shortfalls identified pur-
16 suant to paragraph (1).

17 (8) An identification of opportunities to build
18 interoperability, combined readiness, joint planning
19 capability, and shared situational awareness between
20 the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign part-
21 ners and allies, as appropriate, through combined
22 training, exercises, and planning events, including—

23 (A) table-top exercises and wargames that
24 allow operational commands to improve joint
25 and combined planning for contingencies involv-

1 ing a well-equipped adversary in a counter-
2 intervention campaign;

3 (B) joint and combined exercises that test
4 the feasibility of counter-intervention strategies,
5 develop interoperability across services, and de-
6 velop the lethality and survivability of combined
7 forces against a well-equipped adversary;

8 (C) logistics exercises that test the feasi-
9 bility of expeditionary logistics in an extended
10 campaign with a well-equipped adversary;

11 (D) service-to-service exercise programs
12 that build functional mission skills for address-
13 ing challenges posed by a well-equipped adver-
14 sary in a counter-intervention campaign; and

15 (E) any other combined training, exercises,
16 or planning with Taiwan's military forces that
17 the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State
18 consider relevant.

19 (9) An identification of options for the United
20 States to use, to the maximum extent practicable,
21 existing authorities or programs to expedite military
22 assistance to Taiwan in the event of a crisis or con-
23 flict, including—

1 (A) a list of defense articles of the United
2 States that may be transferred to Taiwan dur-
3 ing a crisis or conflict;

4 (B) a list of authorities that may be used
5 to provide expedited military assistance to Tai-
6 wan during a crisis or conflict;

7 (C) an assessment of methods that could
8 be used to deliver such assistance to Taiwan
9 during a crisis or conflict, including—

10 (i) the feasibility of employing such
11 methods in different scenarios; and

12 (ii) recommendations for improving
13 the ability of the Armed Forces to deliver
14 such assistance to Taiwan; and

15 (D) an assessment of any challenges in
16 providing such assistance to Taiwan in the
17 event of a crisis or conflict and recommenda-
18 tions for addressing such challenges.

19 (c) RECURRENCE.—The joint consultative mecha-
20 nism required in subsection (a) shall convene on a recur-
21 ring basis and not less than annually.

22 **SEC. 5507. FAST-TRACKING SALES TO TAIWAN UNDER FOR-**
23 **EIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM.**

24 (a) PRECLEARANCE OF CERTAIN FOREIGN MILITARY
25 SALES ITEMS.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after
2 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
3 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination
4 with the Secretary of Defense, and in conjunction
5 with coordinating entities such as the National Dis-
6 closure Policy Committee, the Arms Transfer and
7 Technology Release Senior Steering Group, and
8 other appropriate entities, shall compile a list of
9 available and emerging military platforms, tech-
10 nologies, and equipment that are pre-cleared and
11 prioritized for sale and release to Taiwan through
12 the Foreign Military Sales program.

13 (2) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—

14 (A) SELECTION OF ITEMS.—The list com-
15 piled pursuant to paragraph (1) shall not be
16 construed as limiting the type, timing, or quan-
17 tity of items that may be requested by, or sold
18 to, Taiwan under the Foreign Military Sales
19 program.

20 (B) NOTIFICATIONS REQUIRED.—Nothing
21 in this Act may be construed to supersede con-
22 gressional notification requirements under the
23 Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et.
24 seq.).

1 (b) PRIORITIZED PROCESSING OF FOREIGN MILI-
2 TARY SALES REQUESTS FROM TAIWAN.—

3 (1) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of State
4 and the Secretary of Defense shall prioritize and ex-
5 pedite the processing of requests from Taiwan under
6 the Foreign Military Sales program, and may not
7 delay the processing of requests for bundling pur-
8 poses.

9 (2) DURATION.—The requirement under para-
10 graph (1) shall continue until the Secretary of State
11 determines and certifies to the Committee on For-
12 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
13 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives that
14 the threat to Taiwan has significantly abated.

15 (c) INTERAGENCY POLICY.—The Secretary of State
16 and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly review and up-
17 date interagency policies and implementation guidance re-
18 lated to Foreign Military Sales requests from Taiwan, in-
19 cluding incorporating the preclearance provisions of this
20 section.

1 **SEC. 5508. ARMS EXPORTS DELIVERY SOLUTIONS FOR TAI-**
2 **WAN AND UNITED STATES ALLIES IN THE**
3 **INDO-PACIFIC.**

4 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
5 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
6 tees of Congress” means—

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
8 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
10 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
11 resentatives.

12 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1,
13 2023, and annually thereafter for a period of 5 years, the
14 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of
15 Defense, shall transmit to the appropriate committees of
16 Congress a report with respect to the transfer of all de-
17 fense articles or defense services that have yet to be com-
18 pleted pursuant to the authorities provided by—

19 (1) section 3, 21, or 36 of the Arms Export
20 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2753, 2761, or 2776); or

21 (2) section 516(c)(2) of the Foreign Assistance
22 Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j(c)(2)).

23 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
24 (b) shall include the following elements:

25 (1) A list of all approved transfers of defense
26 articles and services authorized by Congress pursu-

1 ant to sections 25 and 36 of the Arms Export Con-
2 trol Act (22 U.S.C. 2765, 2776) with a total value
3 of \$25,000,000 or more, to Taiwan, Japan, South
4 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, or New
5 Zealand, that have not been fully delivered by the
6 start of the fiscal year in which the report is being
7 submitted.

8 (2) The estimated start and end dates of deliv-
9 ery for each approved and incomplete transfer listed
10 pursuant to paragraph (1), including additional de-
11 tails and dates for any transfers that involve mul-
12 tiple tranches of deliveries.

13 (3) With respect to each approved and incom-
14 plete transfer listed pursuant to paragraph (1), a de-
15 tailed description of—

16 (A) any changes in the delivery dates of
17 defense articles or services relative to the dates
18 anticipated at the time of congressional ap-
19 proval of the transfer, including specific reasons
20 for any delays related to the United States Gov-
21 ernment, defense suppliers, or a foreign part-
22 ner;

23 (B) the feasibility and advisability of pro-
24 viding the partner subject to such delayed deliv-
25 ery with an interim capability or solution, in-

1 including drawing from United States stocks, and
2 the mechanisms under consideration for doing
3 so as well as any challenges to implementing
4 such a capability or solution;

5 (C) authorities, appropriations, or waiver
6 requests that Congress could provide to improve
7 delivery timelines or authorize the provision of
8 interim capabilities or solutions identified pur-
9 suant to subparagraph (B); and

10 (D) a description of which countries are
11 ahead of Taiwan for delivery of each item listed
12 pursuant to paragraph (1).

13 (4) A description of ongoing interagency efforts
14 to support attainment of operational capability of
15 the corresponding defense articles and services once
16 delivered, including advance training with United
17 States or armed forces of partner countries on the
18 systems to be received. The description of any such
19 training shall also include an identification of the
20 training implementer.

21 (5) If a transfer listed pursuant to paragraph
22 (1) has been terminated prior to the date of the sub-
23 mission of the report for any reason—

24 (A) the case information for such transfer,
25 including the date of congressional notification,

1 delivery date of the Letter of Offer and Accept-
2 ance (LOA), final signature of the LOA, and
3 information pertaining to delays in delivering
4 LOAs for signature;

5 (B) a description of the reasons for which
6 the transfer is no longer in effect; and

7 (C) the impact this termination will have
8 on the intended end-user and the consequent
9 implications for regional security, including the
10 impact on deterrence of military action by coun-
11 tries hostile to the United States, the military
12 balance in the Taiwan Strait, and other factors.

13 (6) A separate description of the actions the
14 United States is taking to expedite and prioritize de-
15 liveries of defense articles and services to Taiwan,
16 including—

17 (A) a description of what actions the De-
18 partment of State and the Department of De-
19 fense have taken or are planning to take to
20 prioritize Taiwan's Foreign Military Sales
21 cases;

22 (B) current procedures or mechanisms for
23 determining that a Foreign Military Sales case
24 for Taiwan should be prioritized above a sale to

1 another country of the same or similar item;
2 and

3 (C) whether the United States intends to
4 divert defense articles from United States
5 stocks to provide an interim capability or solu-
6 tion with respect to any delayed deliveries to
7 Taiwan and the plan, if applicable, to replenish
8 any such diverted stocks.

9 (7) A description of other actions already un-
10 dertaken by or currently under consideration by the
11 Department of State and the Department of Defense
12 to improve delivery timelines for the transfers listed
13 pursuant to paragraph (1).

14 (d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
15 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may include
16 a classified annex.

17 **SEC. 5509. ASSESSMENT OF TAIWAN'S NEEDS FOR CIVILIAN**
18 **DEFENSE AND RESILIENCE.**

19 (a) ASSESSMENT REQUIRED.—Not later than 120
20 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary
21 of State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
22 with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a
23 written assessment, with a classified annex, of Taiwan's
24 needs in the areas of civilian defense and resilience to—

1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the
2 Committee on Armed Services, and Select Com-
3 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
5 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent
6 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
7 Representatives.

8 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The assessment
9 required under subsection (a) shall—

10 (1) analyze the potential role of Taiwan’s public
11 and civilian assets in defending against various sce-
12 narios for foreign militaries to coerce or conduct
13 military aggression against Taiwan;

14 (2) carefully analyze Taiwan’s needs for en-
15 hancing its defensive capabilities through the sup-
16 port of civilians and civilian sectors, including—

17 (A) greater utilization of Taiwan’s high
18 tech labor force;

19 (B) the creation of clear structures and lo-
20 gistics support for civilian defense role alloca-
21 tion;

22 (C) recruitment and skills training for Tai-
23 wan’s defense and civilian sectors; and

24 (D) other defense needs and considerations
25 at the provincial, city, and neighborhood levels;

1 (3) analyze Taiwan’s needs for enhancing resil-
2 iency among its people and in key economic sectors;

3 (4) identify opportunities for Taiwan to en-
4 hance communications at all levels to strengthen
5 trust and understanding between the military, other
6 government departments, civilian agencies and the
7 general public, including—

8 (A) communications infrastructure nec-
9 essary to ensure reliable communications in re-
10 sponse to a conflict or crisis; and

11 (B) a plan to effectively communicate to
12 the general public in response to a conflict or
13 crisis;

14 (5) identify the areas and means through which
15 the United States could provide training, exercises,
16 and assistance at all levels to support the needs dis-
17 covered through the assessment and fill any critical
18 gaps where capacity falls short of such needs; and

19 (6) review existing United States Government
20 and non-United States Government programmatic
21 and funding modalities that are meant to support
22 Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals in pursuing
23 professional development, educational, and cultural
24 exchanges in the United States, including—

1 (A) opportunities through Department of
2 State-supported programs, such as the Inter-
3 national Visitor Leaders Program;

4 (B) opportunities offered through non-gov-
5 ernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to
6 the extent the review can practicably make such
7 an assessment;

8 (C) a description of the frequency that ci-
9 vilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue
10 or are selected for the programs reviewed in
11 subparagraph (A);

12 (D) an analysis of any funding, policy, ad-
13 ministrative, or other barriers preventing great-
14 er participation from Taiwan's civilian defense
15 professionals in the opportunities identified in
16 subparagraph (A);

17 (E) an evaluation of the value expanding
18 the opportunities reviewed in subparagraph (A)
19 would offer for strengthening Taiwan's existing
20 civilian defense community, and for increasing
21 the perceived value of the field for young pro-
22 fessionals in Taiwan;

23 (F) an assessment of options the United
24 States Government could take individually, with
25 partners in Taiwan, or with foreign govern-

1 ments or non-governmental partners, to expand
2 the opportunities reviewed in subparagraph (A);
3 and

4 (G) a description of additional resources
5 and authorities that may be required to execute
6 the options described in subparagraph (E).

7 (c) SHARING OF REPORT.—The assessment required
8 by subsection (a) shall be shared with appropriate officials
9 of Taiwan to facilitate cooperation, as appropriate.

10 **SEC. 5510. ANNUAL REPORT ON TAIWAN DEFENSIVE MILI-**
11 **TARY CAPABILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE SUP-**
12 **PORT.**

13 Section 1248 of the National Defense Authorization
14 Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Public Law 117–81; 135 Stat.
15 1988) is amended to read as follows:

16 **“SEC. 1248. ANNUAL REPORT ON TAIWAN CAPABILITIES**
17 **AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT.**

18 “(a) IN GENERAL.—Through fiscal year 2027, the
19 Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in coordi-
20 nation with the Director of National Intelligence and the
21 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
22 shall jointly perform an annual assessment, consistent
23 with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8; 22
24 U.S.C. 3302(c)), of security matters related to Taiwan,
25 including intelligence matters, Taiwan’s defensive military

1 capabilities, and how defensive shortcomings or
2 vulnerabilities of Taiwan could be mitigated through co-
3 operation, modernization, or integration. At a minimum,
4 the assessment shall include the following:

5 “(1) An intelligence assessment regarding—

6 “(A) conventional military and nuclear
7 threats to Taiwan from the People’s Republic of
8 China, including exercises, patrols, and pres-
9 ence intended to intimidate or coerce Taiwan;
10 and

11 “(B) irregular warfare activities, including
12 influence operations, conducted by the People’s
13 Republic of China to interfere in or undermine
14 the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait.

15 “(2) The current military capabilities of Taiwan
16 and the ability of Taiwan to defend itself from exter-
17 nal conventional and irregular military threats
18 across a range of scenarios.

19 “(3) The interoperability of current and future
20 defensive capabilities of Taiwan with the military ca-
21 pabilities of the United States and its allies and
22 partners.

23 “(4) The plans, tactics, techniques, and proce-
24 dures underpinning an effective defense strategy for
25 Taiwan, including how addressing identified capa-

1 bility gaps and capacity shortfalls will improve the
2 effectiveness of such strategy.

3 “(5) A description of additional personnel, re-
4 sources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United
5 States that may be required to meet any short-
6 comings in the development of Taiwan’s military ca-
7 pabilities identified pursuant to this section.

8 “(6) With respect to materiel capabilities and
9 capacities the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of
10 State jointly assess to be most effective in deterring,
11 defeating, or delaying military aggression by the
12 People’s Republic of China, a prioritized list of capa-
13 bility gaps and capacity shortfalls of the military
14 forces of Taiwan, including—

15 “(A) an identification of—

16 “(i) any United States, Taiwan, or
17 ally or partner country defense production
18 timeline challenge related to potential ma-
19 teriel and solutions to such capability gaps;

20 “(ii) the associated investment costs
21 of enabling expanded production for items
22 currently at maximum production;

23 “(iii) the associated investment costs
24 of, or mitigation strategies for, enabling

1 export for items currently not exportable;

2 and

3 “(iv) existing stocks of such capabili-
4 ties in the United States and ally and part-
5 ner countries;

6 “(B) the feasibility and advisability of pro-
7 curing solutions to such gaps and shortfalls
8 through United States allies and partners, in-
9 cluding through co-development or co-produc-
10 tion;

11 “(C) the feasibility and advisability of as-
12 sisting Taiwan in the domestic production of so-
13 lutions to capability gaps, including through—

14 “(i) the transfer of intellectual prop-
15 erty; and

16 “(ii) co-development or co-production
17 arrangements;

18 “(D) the estimated costs, expressed in a
19 range of options, of procuring sufficient capa-
20 bilities and capacities to address such gaps and
21 shortfalls;

22 “(E) an assessment of the relative priority
23 assigned by appropriate officials of Taiwan to
24 each such gap and shortfall; and

1 “(F) a detailed explanation of the extent to
2 which Taiwan is prioritizing the development,
3 production, or fielding of solutions to such gaps
4 and shortfalls within its overall defense budget.

5 “(7) The applicability of Department of State
6 and Department of Defense authorities for improv-
7 ing the defensive military capabilities of Taiwan in
8 a manner consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.

9 “(8) A description of any security assistance
10 provided or Foreign Military Sales and Direct Com-
11 mercial Sales activity with Taiwan over the past
12 year.

13 “(9) A description of each engagement between
14 the United States and Taiwan personnel related to
15 planning over the past year.

16 “(10) With respect to each to training and ex-
17 ercises—

18 “(A) a description of each such instance
19 over the past year;

20 “(B) a description of how each such in-
21 stance—

22 “(i) sought to achieve greater inter-
23 operability, improved readiness, joint plan-
24 ning capability, and shared situational
25 awareness between the United States and

1 Taiwan, or among the United States, Tai-
2 wan, and other countries;

3 “(ii) familiarized the militaries of the
4 United States and Taiwan with each other;
5 and

6 “(iii) improved Taiwan’s defense capa-
7 bilities.

8 “(11) A description of the areas and means
9 through which the United States is assisting and
10 supporting training, exercises, and assistance to sup-
11 port Taiwan’s requirements related to civilian de-
12 fense and resilience, and how the United States is
13 seeking to assist Taiwan in addressing any critical
14 gaps where capacity falls short of meeting such re-
15 quirements, including those elements identified in
16 the assessment required by section 5502(f) of the
17 James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization
18 Act for Fiscal Year 2023.

19 “(12) An assessment of the implications of cur-
20 rent levels of pre-positioned war reserve materiel on
21 the ability of the United States to respond to a crisis
22 or conflict involving Taiwan with respect to—

23 “(A) providing military or non-military aid
24 to Taiwan; and

1 “(B) sustaining military installations and
2 other infrastructure of the United States in the
3 Indo-Pacific region.

4 “(13) An assessment of the current intelligence,
5 surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities of Tai-
6 wan, including any existing gaps in such capabilities
7 and investments in such capabilities by Taiwan since
8 the preceding report.

9 “(14) A summary of changes to pre-positioned
10 war reserve materiel of the United States in the
11 Indo-Pacific region since the preceding report.

12 “(15) Any other matters the Secretary of De-
13 fense or the Secretary of State considers appro-
14 priate.

15 “(b) PLAN.—The Secretary of Defense and the Sec-
16 retary of State shall jointly develop a plan for assisting
17 Taiwan in improving its defensive military capabilities and
18 addressing vulnerabilities identified pursuant to sub-
19 section (a) that includes—

20 “(1) recommendations, if any, for new Depart-
21 ment of State or Department of Defense authorities,
22 or modifications to existing Department of State or
23 Department of Defense authorities, necessary to im-
24 prove the defensive military capabilities of Taiwan in

1 a manner consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act
2 (Public Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.);

3 “(2) an identification of opportunities for key
4 leader and subject matter expert engagement be-
5 tween Department personnel and military and civil-
6 ian counterparts in Taiwan; and

7 “(3) an identification of challenges and oppor-
8 tunities for leveraging authorities, resources, and ca-
9 pabilities outside the Department of Defense and the
10 Department of State to improve the defensive capa-
11 bilities of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Re-
12 lations Act.

13 “(c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter
15 through fiscal year 2027, the Secretary of State and the
16 Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of
17 National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the appro-
18 priate committees of Congress—

19 “(1) a report on the results of the assessment
20 required by subsection (a);

21 “(2) the plan required by subsection (b); and

22 “(3) a report on—

23 “(A) the status of efforts to develop and
24 implement the joint multi-year plan required
25 under section 5506 of the James M. Inhofe Na-

1 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
2 Year 2023 to provide for the acquisition of ap-
3 propriate defensive military capabilities by Tai-
4 wan and to engage with Taiwan in a series of
5 combined training and planning activities con-
6 sistent with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public
7 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.); and

8 “(B) any other matters the Secretary of
9 State and the Secretary of Defense consider
10 necessary.

11 “(d) FORM.—The reports required by subsection (c)
12 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
13 a classified annex.

14 “(e) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
15 FINED.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘appro-
16 priate committees of Congress’ means—

17 “(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the
18 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select
19 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and

20 “(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the
21 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent
22 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
23 Representatives.”.

24 **SEC. 5511. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

25 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

1 (1) Advancing peace and stability in the Indo-
2 Pacific has been a central element of United States
3 foreign policy toward the region.

4 (2) The Government of the People's Republic of
5 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai
6 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-
7 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-
8 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to
9 erode United States policy and create a fait accompli
10 on questions surrounding Taiwan's future.

11 (3) To secure United States interests and pre-
12 serve the ability of the people of Taiwan to deter-
13 mine their own future, it is necessary to reinforce
14 Taiwan's diplomatic, economic, and territorial space.

15 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
16 United States to—

17 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta-
18 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se-
19 curity, and economic interests of the United States,
20 and are matters of international concern; and

21 (2) work with allies and partners to promote
22 peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter
23 military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that
24 would undermine regional stability.

1 **SEC. 5512. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN DEFENSE RE-**
2 **LATIONS.**

3 It is the sense of Congress that—

4 (1) the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–
5 8; 22 U.S.C. et seq.) and the Six Assurances pro-
6 vided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982
7 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan rela-
8 tions;

9 (2) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act,
10 the United States decision to establish diplomatic re-
11 lations with the People’s Republic of China rests
12 upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will
13 be determined by peaceful means, and that any ef-
14 fort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than
15 peaceful means, including boycotts and embargoes,
16 is of grave concern to the United States;

17 (3) the increasingly coercive and aggressive be-
18 havior of the People’s Republic of China toward Tai-
19 wan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful
20 resolution of the future of Taiwan;

21 (4) as set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act,
22 the capacity to resist any resort to force or other
23 forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security,
24 or the social or economic system, of the people on
25 Taiwan should be maintained;

1 (5) the United States should continue to sup-
2 port the development of capable, ready, and modern
3 defense forces necessary for Taiwan to maintain suf-
4 ficient defensive capabilities, including by—

5 (A) supporting acquisition by Taiwan of
6 defense articles and services through foreign
7 military sales, direct commercial sales, and in-
8 dustrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capa-
9 bilities that support an asymmetric strategy;

10 (B) ensuring timely review of and response
11 to requests of Taiwan for defense articles and
12 services;

13 (C) conducting practical training and mili-
14 tary exercises with Taiwan that enable Taiwan
15 to maintain sufficient defensive capabilities, as
16 described in the Taiwan Relations Act;

17 (D) exchanges between defense officials
18 and officers of the United States and Taiwan at
19 the strategic, policy, and functional levels, con-
20 sistent with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law
21 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), especially for the pur-
22 poses of—

23 (i) enhancing cooperation on defense
24 planning;

1 (ii) improving the interoperability of
2 the military forces of the United States
3 and Taiwan; and

4 (iii) improving the reserve force of
5 Taiwan;

6 (E) cooperating with Taiwan to improve its
7 ability to employ military capabilities in asym-
8 metric ways, as described in the Taiwan Rela-
9 tions Act; and

10 (F) expanding cooperation in humanitarian
11 assistance and disaster relief; and

12 (6) the United States should increase its sup-
13 port to a free and open society in the face of aggres-
14 sive efforts by the Government of the People's Re-
15 public of China to curtail or influence the free exer-
16 cise of rights and democratic franchise.

17 **PART 2—COUNTERING PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF**
18 **CHINA'S COERCION AND INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS**

19 **SEC. 5513. STRATEGY TO RESPOND TO INFLUENCE AND IN-**
20 **FORMATION OPERATIONS TARGETING TAI-**
21 **WAN.**

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
23 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter
24 for the following 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordi-

1 nation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall de-
2 velop and implement a strategy to respond to—

3 (1) covert, coercive, and corrupting activities
4 carried out to advance the Chinese Communist Par-
5 ty’s “United Front” work related to Taiwan, includ-
6 ing activities directed, coordinated, or otherwise sup-
7 ported by the United Front Work Department or its
8 subordinate or affiliated entities; and

9 (2) information and disinformation campaigns,
10 cyber attacks, and nontraditional propaganda meas-
11 ures supported by the Government of the People’s
12 Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
13 Party that are directed toward persons or entities in
14 Taiwan.

15 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-
16 section (a) shall include descriptions of—

17 (1) the proposed response to propaganda and
18 disinformation campaigns by the People’s Republic
19 of China and cyber-intrusions targeting Taiwan, in-
20 cluding—

21 (A) assistance in building the capacity of
22 Taiwan’s public and private-sector entities to
23 document and expose propaganda and
24 disinformation supported by the Government of

1 the People's Republic of China, the Chinese
2 Communist Party, or affiliated entities;

3 (B) assistance to enhance Taiwan's ability
4 to develop a holistic strategy to respond to
5 sharp power operations, including election inter-
6 ference; and

7 (C) media training for Taiwan officials and
8 other Taiwan entities targeted by
9 disinformation campaigns;

10 (2) the proposed response to political influence
11 operations that includes an assessment of the extent
12 of influence exerted by the Government of the Peo-
13 ple's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist
14 Party in Taiwan on local political parties, financial
15 institutions, media organizations, and other entities;

16 (3) support for exchanges and other technical
17 assistance to strengthen the Taiwan legal system's
18 ability to respond to sharp power operations; and

19 (4) programs carried out by the Global Engage-
20 ment Center to expose misinformation and
21 disinformation in the Chinese Communist Party's
22 propaganda.

1 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF TASK FORCE.—Not later
2 than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
3 the President shall establish an interagency task force to
4 be known as the “Countering Economic Coercion Task
5 Force” (referred to in this section as the “Task Force”).

6 (c) DUTIES.—

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall—

8 (A) oversee the development and imple-
9 mentation of an integrated United States Gov-
10 ernment strategy to respond to People’s Repub-
11 lic of China (PRC) coercive economic practices,
12 which shall include—

13 (i) systematically monitoring and eval-
14 uating—

15 (I) the costs of such practices on
16 United States businesses and overall
17 United States economic performance;

18 (II) instances in which such prac-
19 tices taken against a non-PRC entity
20 has benefitted other parties; and

21 (III) the impacts such practices
22 have had on United States national
23 interests; and

24 (ii) facilitating coordination among
25 Federal departments and agencies when

1 responding to such practices as well as
2 proactively deterring such economic coer-
3 cion, including by clarifying the roles for
4 Federal departments and agencies identi-
5 fied in subsection (d) in implementing the
6 strategy; and

7 (iii) forming policy recommendations
8 for the implementation of relevant United
9 States authorities to respond to instances
10 of PRC coercive economic practices;

11 (B) consult with United States allies and
12 partners on the feasibility and desirability of
13 collectively identifying, assessing, and respond-
14 ing to PRC coercive economic practices, as well
15 as actions that could be taken to expand coordi-
16 nation with the goal of ensuring a consistent,
17 coherent, and collective response to such prac-
18 tices and establishing long-term deterrence of
19 such practices;

20 (C) effectively engage the United States
21 private sector, particularly sectors, groups, or
22 other entities that are susceptible to such PRC
23 coercive economic practices, on concerns related
24 to such practices; and

1 (D) develop and implement a process for
2 regularly sharing relevant information, includ-
3 ing classified information to the extent appro-
4 priate and practicable, on such PRC coercive
5 economic practices with United States allies,
6 partners, and the private sector.

7 (2) CONSULTATION.—In carrying out its duties
8 under this subsection, the Task Force should regu-
9 larly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-
10 priate, with the following:

11 (A) Relevant stakeholders in the private
12 sector.

13 (B) Federal departments and agencies that
14 are not represented on the Task Force.

15 (C) United States allies and partners.

16 (d) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall—

17 (1) appoint the chair of the Task Force from
18 among the staff of the National Security Council;

19 (2) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force
20 from among the staff of the National Economic
21 Council; and

22 (3) determine the Federal departments and
23 agencies that will serve on the task force, and direct
24 the head of those agencies to appoint personnel at

1 the level of Assistant Secretary or above to partici-
2 pate in the Task Force.

3 (e) REPORTS.—

4 (1) INITIAL REPORT.—Not later than 1 year
5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Task
6 Force shall submit to Congress a report that in-
7 cludes the following elements:

8 (A) A comprehensive review of the array of
9 economic tools the Government of the People's
10 Republic of China (PRC) employs or could em-
11 ploy in the future to coerce other governments
12 and non-PRC companies (including United
13 States companies) including the Government of
14 the PRC's continued efforts to codify informal
15 practices into its domestic law.

16 (B) The strategy required by subsection
17 (e)(1)(A).

18 (C) An interagency definition of PRC coer-
19 sive economic practices that captures both—

20 (i) the use of informal or extralegal
21 PRC coercive economic practices; and

22 (ii) the inappropriate use of economic
23 tools, including those authorized under the
24 laws and regulations of the PRC.

1 (D) A comprehensive review of the array of
2 tools the United States Government employs or
3 could employ to respond to economic coercion
4 against the government, companies, and other
5 entities of the United States or its allies and
6 partners.

7 (E) A list of unilateral or multilateral—

8 (i) preemptive practices to defend or
9 deter against PRC coercive economic prac-
10 tices; and

11 (ii) actions taken in response to the
12 Government of the PRC's general use of
13 coercive economic practices, including the
14 imposition of costs on the PRC.

15 (F) An assessment of United States allies
16 and partners key vulnerabilities to PRC coer-
17 sive economic practices.

18 (G) A description of gaps in existing re-
19 sources or capabilities for United States Gov-
20 ernment departments and agencies to respond
21 effectively to PRC coercive economic practices
22 directed at United States entities and assist
23 United States allies and partners in their re-
24 sponses to PRC coercive economic practices.

1 (H) An analysis of the circumstances
2 under which the PRC employs different types of
3 economic coercion and against what kinds of
4 targets.

5 (I) An assessment of United States and
6 international rules and norms as well as any
7 treaty obligations the PRC has stretched, cir-
8 cumvented, or broken through its economically
9 coercive practices and the United States re-
10 sponse in each instance.

11 (2) INTERIM REPORTS.—

12 (A) FIRST INTERIM REPORT.—Not later
13 than 1 year after the date on which the report
14 required by paragraph (1) is submitted to Con-
15 gress, the Task Force shall submit to Congress
16 a report that includes the following elements:

17 (i) Updates to information required by
18 subparagraphs (A) through (G) of para-
19 graph (1).

20 (ii) A description of activities con-
21 ducted by the Task Force to implement
22 the strategy required by subsection
23 (c)(1)(A).

24 (iii) An assessment of the implemen-
25 tation and effectiveness of the strategy,

1 lessons learned from the past year and
2 planned changes to the strategy.

3 (B) SECOND INTERIM REPORT.—Not later
4 than 1 year after the date on which the report
5 required by subparagraph (A) is submitted to
6 Congress, the Task Force shall submit to the
7 appropriate congressional committees a report
8 that includes an update to the elements re-
9 quired under the report required by subpara-
10 graph (A).

11 (3) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than 30 days
12 after the date on which the report required by para-
13 graph (2)(B) is submitted to Congress, the Task
14 Force shall submit to Congress a final report that
15 includes the following elements:

16 (A) An analysis of PRC coercive economic
17 practices and the cost of such coercive practices
18 to United States businesses.

19 (B) A description of areas of possible vul-
20 nerability for United States businesses and
21 businesses of United States partners and allies.

22 (C) Recommendations on how to continue
23 the effort to counter PRC coercive economic
24 practices, including through further coordina-
25 tion with United States allies and partners.

1 (D) Illustrative examples.

2 (4) FORM.—The reports required by this sub-
3 section shall be submitted in classified form, but
4 may include an unclassified summary.

5 (f) SUNSET.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Task Force shall termi-
7 nate at the end of the 60-day period beginning on
8 the date on which the final report required by sub-
9 section (e)(3) is submitted to Congress.

10 (2) ADDITIONAL ACTIONS.—The Task force
11 may use the 60-day period referred to in paragraph
12 (1) for the purposes of concluding its activities, in-
13 cluding providing testimony to Congress concerning
14 the final report required by subsection (e)(3).

15 (g) ASSISTANCE FOR COUNTRIES AND ENTITIES
16 TARGETED BY THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR
17 ECONOMIC COERCION.—The Secretary of State, the Ad-
18 ministrator of the United States Agency for International
19 Development, the United States International Develop-
20 ment Finance Corporation, the Secretary of Commerce,
21 and the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide appro-
22 priate assistance to countries and entities that are subject
23 to coercive economic practices by the People’s Republic of
24 China.

1 **SEC. 5515. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION**
2 **GROUP.**

3 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

4 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
5 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
6 mittees” means—

7 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations,
8 the Committee on Appropriations, and the Se-
9 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate;
10 and

11 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the
12 Committee on Appropriations, and the Perma-
13 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
14 House of Representatives.

15 (2) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term
16 “qualified research entity” means an entity that—

17 (A) is a nonpartisan research organization
18 or a Federally funded research and development
19 center;

20 (B) has appropriate expertise and analyt-
21 ical capability to write the report required
22 under subsection (c); and

23 (C) is free from any financial, commercial,
24 or other entanglements, which could undermine
25 the independence of such report or create a

1 conflict of interest or the appearance of a con-
2 flict of interest, with—

3 (i) the Government of the People’s
4 Republic of China;

5 (ii) the Chinese Communist Party;

6 (iii) any company incorporated in the
7 People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary
8 of such company; or

9 (iv) any company or entity incor-
10 porated outside of the People’s Republic of
11 China that is believed to have a substantial
12 financial or commercial interest in the Peo-
13 ple’s Republic of China.

14 (3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
15 “United States person” means—

16 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
17 fully admitted for permanent residence to the
18 United States; or

19 (B) an entity organized under the laws of
20 the United States or any jurisdiction within the
21 United States, including a foreign branch of
22 such an entity.

23 (b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION
24 GROUP.—

1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish
2 an interagency task force, which shall be known as
3 the “China Censorship Monitor and Action Group”
4 (referred to in this subsection as the “Task Force”).

5 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The President shall take
6 the following actions with respect to the membership
7 of, and participation in, the Task Force:

8 (A) Appoint the chair of the Task Force
9 from among the staff of the National Security
10 Council.

11 (B) Appoint the vice chair of the Task
12 Force from among the staff of the National
13 Economic Council.

14 (C) Determine the Federal departments
15 and agencies that will serve on the Task Force,
16 and direct the head of those agencies to appoint
17 personnel at the level of Assistant Secretary or
18 above to participate in the Task Force.

19 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Task Force
20 shall—

21 (A) oversee the development and execution
22 of an integrated Federal Government strategy
23 to monitor and address the impacts of efforts
24 directed, or directly supported, by the Govern-
25 ment of the People’s Republic of China to cen-

1 sor or intimidate, in the United States or in
2 any of its possessions or territories, any United
3 States person, including United States compa-
4 nies that conduct business in the People's Re-
5 public of China, which are exercising their right
6 to freedom of speech; and

7 (B) submit the strategy developed pursu-
8 ant to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate
9 congressional committees not later than 120
10 days after the date of the enactment of this
11 Act.

12 (4) MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet
13 not less frequently than twice per year.

14 (5) CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should
15 regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appro-
16 priate, with—

17 (A) Federal agencies that are not rep-
18 resented on the Task Force;

19 (B) independent agencies of the United
20 States Government that are not represented on
21 the Task Force;

22 (C) relevant stakeholders in the private
23 sector and the media; and

24 (D) relevant stakeholders among United
25 States allies and partners facing similar chal-

1 lenges related to censorship or intimidation by
2 the Government of the People’s Republic of
3 China.

4 (6) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.—

5 (A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force
6 shall submit an annual report to the appro-
7 priate congressional committees that describes,
8 with respect to the reporting period—

9 (i) the strategic objectives and policies
10 pursued by the Task Force to address the
11 challenges of censorship and intimidation
12 of United States persons while in the
13 United States or any of its possessions or
14 territories, which is directed or directly
15 supported by the Government of the Peo-
16 ple’s Republic of China;

17 (ii) the activities conducted by the
18 Task Force in support of the strategic ob-
19 jectives and policies referred to in clause
20 (i); and

21 (iii) the results of the activities re-
22 ferred to in clause (ii) and the impact of
23 such activities on the national interests of
24 the United States.

1 (B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report sub-
2 mitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be
3 unclassified, but may include a classified annex.

4 (C) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not
5 later than 90 days after the date of the enact-
6 ment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
7 Task Force shall provide briefings to the appro-
8 priate congressional committees regarding the
9 activities of the Task Force to execute the
10 strategy developed pursuant to paragraph
11 (3)(A).

12 (c) REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF
13 UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
14 PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—

15 (1) REPORT.—

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
18 Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter
19 into an agreement with a qualified research en-
20 tity that is independent of the Department of
21 State to write a report on censorship and in-
22 timidation in the United States and its posses-
23 sions and territories of United States persons,
24 including United States companies that conduct
25 business in the People's Republic of China,

1 which is directed or directly supported by the
2 Government of the People's Republic of China.

3 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The re-
4 port required under subparagraph (A) shall—

5 (i) assess major trends, patterns, and
6 methods of the Government of the People's
7 Republic of China's efforts to direct or di-
8 rectly support censorship and intimidation
9 of United States persons, including United
10 States companies that conduct business in
11 the People's Republic of China, which are
12 exercising their right to freedom of speech;

13 (ii) assess, including through the use
14 of illustrative examples, as appropriate, the
15 impact on and consequences for United
16 States persons, including United States
17 companies that conduct business in the
18 People's Republic of China, that criticize—

19 (I) the Chinese Communist
20 Party;

21 (II) the Government of the Peo-
22 ple's Republic of China;

23 (III) the authoritarian model of
24 government of the People's Republic
25 of China; or

1 (IV) a particular policy advanced
2 by the Chinese Communist Party or
3 the Government of the People's Re-
4 public of China;

5 (iii) identify the implications for the
6 United States of the matters described in
7 clauses (i) and (ii);

8 (iv) assess the methods and evaluate
9 the efficacy of the efforts by the Govern-
10 ment of the People's Republic of China to
11 limit freedom of expression in the private
12 sector, including media, social media, film,
13 education, travel, financial services, sports
14 and entertainment, technology, tele-
15 communication, and internet infrastructure
16 interests;

17 (v) include policy recommendations
18 for the United States Government, includ-
19 ing recommendations regarding collabora-
20 tion with United States allies and partners,
21 to address censorship and intimidation by
22 the Government of the People's Republic of
23 China; and

24 (vi) include policy recommendations
25 for United States persons, including

1 United States companies that conduct
2 business in China, to address censorship
3 and intimidation by the Government of the
4 People's Republic of China.

5 (C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES
6 ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent prac-
7 ticable, the report required under subparagraph
8 (A) should identify implications and policy rec-
9 ommendations that are relevant to United
10 States allies and partners facing censorship and
11 intimidation directed or directly supported by
12 the Government of the People's Republic of
13 China.

14 (2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year
16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
17 Secretary of State shall submit the report writ-
18 ten by the qualified research entity selected
19 pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appro-
20 priate congressional committees.

21 (B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to
22 in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to
23 the public online through relevant United
24 States Government websites.

1 (d) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the
2 date that is 5 years after the date of enactment of this
3 Act.

4 **PART 3—INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN**
5 **INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

6 **SEC. 5516. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and
9 Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina
10 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and
11 Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-
12 wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

13 (2) Taiwan was invited to participate in the
14 World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making
15 body of the World Health Organization (WHO), as
16 an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since
17 the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in-
18 creasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the
19 WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA
20 in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

21 (3) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-
22 portedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000
23 passengers in 2018, and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan
24 International Airport, the eleventh busiest airport in
25 the world. Taiwan has been excluded from partici-

1 pating at the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
2 tion (ICAO) since 2013.

3 (4) United Nations (UN) General Assembly
4 Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of rep-
5 resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United
6 Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep-
7 resent the people of Taiwan.

8 **SEC. 5517. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**
9 **PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**
10 **COMMUNITY.**

11 It is the sense of Congress that—

12 (1) Taiwan is an important contributor to the
13 global community, as a model for democracy, and by
14 providing expertise in global health, international
15 aviation security, emerging technology development,
16 and high environmental standards;

17 (2) multiple United States Government admin-
18 istrations of both political parties have taken impor-
19 tant steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful partici-
20 pation in international organizations;

21 (3) existing efforts to enhance United States
22 cooperation with Taiwan to provide global public
23 goods, including through development assistance, hu-
24 manitarian assistance, and disaster relief, in tri-

1 lateral and multilateral fora are laudable and should
2 continue;

3 (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy,
4 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's
5 meaningful participation in the international com-
6 munity; and

7 (5) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with
8 other parts of the global community could be further
9 enhanced through a systematic approach, along with
10 greater attention from Congress and the American
11 public to such efforts.

12 **SEC. 5518. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**
13 **PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-**
14 **ZATIONS.**

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
17 in consultation with other Federal departments and agen-
18 cies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate con-
19 gressional committees a strategy—

20 (1) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-
21 tion in a prioritized set of international organiza-
22 tions (IOs); and

23 (2) that responds to growing pressure from the
24 PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial ac-

1 tors, and civil society organizations to comply with
2 its “One-China Principle”, with respect to Taiwan.

3 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re-
4 quired under subsection (a) should include the following
5 elements:

6 (1) An assessment of the methods the PRC
7 uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its “One-
8 China Principle.” The methods should include those
9 employed against governments, IOs, and civil society
10 organizations. The assessment should also include
11 pressure on commercial actors, to the extent it is rel-
12 evant in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful partici-
13 pation in IOs.

14 (2) An assessment of the policies of foreign gov-
15 ernments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to identify
16 likeminded allies and partners who might become
17 public or private partners in the strategy.

18 (3) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as prac-
19 ticable, to identify IOs that best lend themselves to
20 advancing Taiwan’s participation.

21 (4) A plan to expand economic, security, and
22 diplomatic engagement with nations that have de-
23 monstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded re-
24 lations with Taiwan, in accordance with United
25 States interests.

1 (5) A survey of IOs that have allowed Taiwan's
2 meaningful participation, including an assessment of
3 whether any erosion in Taiwan's engagement has oc-
4 curred within those organizations and how Taiwan's
5 participation has positively strengthened the capacity
6 and activity of these organizations, thereby providing
7 positive models for Taiwan's inclusion in other simi-
8 lar forums.

9 (6) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which the
10 United States Government will prioritize for using
11 its voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan's
12 meaningful participation over the three-year period
13 following the date of enactment of this Act. The list
14 should be derived from the IOs identified in para-
15 graph (3).

16 (7) A description of the diplomatic strategies
17 and the coalitions the United States Government
18 plans to develop to implement paragraph (6).

19 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in
20 subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an
21 unclassified summary.

22 (d) SUPPORT FOR MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION.—
23 The Permanent Representative of the United States to the
24 United Nations and other relevant United States officials

1 shall actively support Taiwan's meaningful participation
2 in all appropriate international organizations.

3 **SEC. 5519. MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION OF TAIWAN IN**
4 **THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGA-**
5 **NIZATION.**

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
7 gress that—

8 (1) the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
9 tion (ICAO) should allow Taiwan to meaningfully
10 participate in the organization, including in ICAO
11 triennial assembly sessions, conferences, technical
12 working groups, meetings, activities, and mecha-
13 nisms;

14 (2) Taiwan is a global leader and hub for inter-
15 national aviation, with a range of expertise, informa-
16 tion, and resources and the fifth busiest airport in
17 Asia (Taoyuan International Airport), and its mean-
18 ingful participation in ICAO would significantly en-
19 hance the ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and
20 security of global aviation; and

21 (3) coercion by the Chinese Communist Party
22 and the People's Republic of China has ensured the
23 systematic exclusion of Taiwan from meaningful par-
24 ticipation in ICAO, significantly undermining the

1 ability of ICAO to ensure the safety and security of
2 global aviation.

3 (b) PLAN FOR TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPA-
4 TION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZA-
5 TION.—The Secretary of State, in coordination with the
6 Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of Transpor-
7 tation, is authorized—

8 (1) to initiate a United States plan to secure
9 Taiwan's meaningful participation in ICAO, includ-
10 ing in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, con-
11 ferences, technical working groups, meetings, activi-
12 ties, and mechanisms; and

13 (2) to instruct the United States representative
14 to the ICAO to—

15 (A) use the voice and vote of the United
16 States to ensure Taiwan's meaningful participa-
17 tion in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial as-
18 sembly sessions, conferences, technical working
19 groups, meetings, activities, and mechanisms;
20 and

21 (B) seek to secure a vote at the next ICAO
22 triennial assembly session on the question of
23 Taiwan's participation in that session.

24 (c) REPORT CONCERNING TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL
25 PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

1 ORGANIZATION.—Not later than 90 days after the date
2 of the enactment of this Act, and not later than April 1
3 of each year thereafter for the following 6 years, the Sec-
4 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Com-
5 merce, shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
6 tions and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
7 Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on For-
8 eign Affairs, the Committee on Transportation and Infra-
9 structure, and the Committee on Energy and Commerce
10 of the House of Representatives an unclassified report
11 that—

12 (1) describes the United States plan to ensure
13 Taiwan’s meaningful participation in ICAO, includ-
14 ing in ICAO triennial assembly sessions, con-
15 ferences, technical working groups, meetings, activi-
16 ties, and mechanisms;

17 (2) includes an account of the efforts made by
18 the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Com-
19 merce to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation
20 in ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly ses-
21 sions, conferences, technical working groups, meet-
22 ings, activities, and mechanisms; and

23 (3) identifies the steps the Secretary of State
24 and the Secretary of Commerce will take in the next
25 year to ensure Taiwan’s meaningful participation in

1 ICAO, including in ICAO triennial assembly ses-
2 sions, conferences, technical working groups, meet-
3 ings, activities, and mechanisms.

4 **PART 4—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS**

5 **SEC. 5520. REPORT ON TAIWAN TRAVEL ACT.**

6 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE-
7 FINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate commit-
8 tees of Congress” means—

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
10 Senate;

11 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
12 Senate;

13 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
14 Senate;

15 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
16 House of Representatives;

17 (5) the Committee on Armed Services of the
18 House of Representatives; and

19 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the
20 House of Representatives.

21 (b) LIST OF HIGH-LEVEL VISITS.—Not later than
22 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
23 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in
24 accordance with the Taiwan Travel Act (Public Law 115–

1 135), shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con-
2 gress—

3 (1) a list of high-level officials from the United
4 States Government who have traveled to Taiwan on
5 or after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan
6 Travel Act; and

7 (2) a list of high-level officials of Taiwan who
8 have entered the United States on or after such date
9 of enactment.

10 (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
12 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
13 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall
14 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a
15 report on the implementation of the Taiwan Travel
16 Act (Public Law 115–135; 132 Stat. 341), including
17 a discussion of its positive effects on United States
18 interests in the region.

19 (2) FORM.—The report required under para-
20 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form,
21 but may include a classified annex.

1 **SEC. 5521. AMENDMENTS TO THE TAIWAN ALLIES INTER-**
2 **NATIONAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT**
3 **INITIATIVE (TAIPEI) ACT OF 2019.**

4 The Taiwan Allies International Protection and En-
5 hancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law
6 116–135) is amended—

7 (1) in section 2(5), by striking “and Kiribati”
8 and inserting “Kiribati, and Nicaragua,”;

9 (2) in section 4—

10 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
11 by striking “should be” and inserting “is”;

12 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking “and” at
13 the end;

14 (C) in paragraph (3), by striking the pe-
15 riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and

16 (D) by adding at the end the following:

17 “(4) to support Taiwan’s diplomatic relations
18 with governments and countries”; and

19 (3) in section 5—

20 (A) in subsection (a)—

21 (i) in paragraph (2), by striking
22 “and” at the end;

23 (ii) in paragraph (3), by striking the
24 period at the end and inserting “; and”;

25 and

1 (iii) by adding at the end the fol-
2 lowing:

3 “(4) identify why governments and countries
4 have altered their diplomatic status vis-a-vis Taiwan
5 and make recommendations to mitigate further dete-
6 rioration in Taiwan’s diplomatic relations with gov-
7 ernments and countries.”;

8 (B) in subsection (b), by striking “1 year
9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and
10 annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary
11 of State shall report” and inserting “90 days
12 after the date of the enactment of the Taiwan
13 Enhanced Resilience Act, and annually there-
14 after for the following 7 years, the Secretary of
15 State shall submit an unclassified report, with
16 a classified annex,”;

17 (C) by redesignating subsection (e) as sub-
18 section (d); and

19 (D) by inserting after subsection (b) the
20 following:

21 “(c) BRIEFINGS.—Not later than 90 days after the
22 date of the enactment of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience
23 Act, and annually thereafter for the following 7 years, the
24 Secretary of State shall provide briefings to the appro-
25 priate congressional committees on the steps taken in ac-

1 cordance with section (a). The briefings required under
2 this subsection shall take place in an unclassified setting,
3 but may be accompanied by an additional classified brief-
4 ing.”.

5 **SEC. 5522. REPORT ON ROLE OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF**
6 **CHINA’S NUCLEAR THREAT IN ESCALATION**
7 **DYNAMICS.**

8 (a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
9 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
10 gressional committees” means—

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
12 Senate;

13 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
14 Senate;

15 (3) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
16 Senate;

17 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
18 House of Representatives;

19 (5) the Committee on Armed Services of the
20 House of Representatives; and

21 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
22 ligence of the House of Representatives.

23 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
25 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Di-

1 rector of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appro-
2 priate congressional committees a report assessing the role
3 of the increasing nuclear threat of the People’s Republic
4 of China in escalation dynamics with respect to Taiwan.

5 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
6 shall be submitted in classified form, but may include an
7 unclassified summary.

8 **SEC. 5523. REPORT ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA’S**
9 **WAR AGAINST UKRAINE ON THE OBJECTIVES**
10 **OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA WITH**
11 **RESPECT TO TAIWAN.**

12 (a) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES
13 DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate con-
14 gressional committees” means—

15 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
16 Senate;

17 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the
18 Senate;

19 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the
20 Senate;

21 (4) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
22 Senate;

23 (5) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
24 Urban Affairs of the Senate;

1 (6) the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
2 Transportation of the Senate;

3 (7) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
4 House of Representatives;

5 (8) the Committee on Armed Services of the
6 House of Representatives;

7 (9) the Committee on Appropriations of the
8 House of Representatives;

9 (10) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel-
10 ligence of the House of Representatives;

11 (11) the Committee on Financial Services of
12 the House of Representatives; and

13 (12) the Committee on Energy and Commerce
14 of the House of Representatives.

15 (b) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the
16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
17 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Di-
18 rector of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to
19 the appropriate congressional committees that analyzes
20 the impact of Russia’s war against Ukraine on the PRC’s
21 diplomatic, military, economic, and propaganda objectives
22 with respect to Taiwan.

23 (c) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection
24 (b) shall describe—

1 (1) adaptations or known changes to PRC
2 strategies and military doctrine that the United
3 States assesses are a direct result of the Russian in-
4 vasion of Ukraine or that the United States assesses
5 represent lessons learned by the People's Republic of
6 China in light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in-
7 cluding changes—

8 (A) to PRC behavior in international fo-
9 rums;

10 (B) within the People's Liberation Army,
11 with respect to the size of forces, the makeup
12 of leadership, weapons procurement, equipment
13 upkeep, the doctrine on the use of specific
14 weapons, such as weapons banned under the
15 international law of armed conflict, efforts to
16 move weapons supply chains onto mainland
17 PRC, or any other changes in its military strat-
18 egy with respect to Taiwan;

19 (C) in economic planning, such as sanc-
20 tions evasion, efforts to minimize exposure to
21 sanctions, or moves in support of the protection
22 of currency or other strategic reserves;

23 (D) to propaganda, disinformation, and
24 other information operations originating in the
25 PRC; and

1 (E) to the PRC's strategy for the use of
2 force against Taiwan, including any information
3 on preferred scenarios or operations to secure
4 its objectives in Taiwan, adjustments based on
5 how the Russian military has performed in
6 Ukraine, and other relevant matters; and

7 (2) United States plans to adapt policies and
8 military planning in response to the changes referred
9 to in paragraph (1).

10 (d) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b)
11 shall be submitted in classified form.

12 (e) COORDINATION WITH ALLIES AND PARTNERS.—
13 The Secretary of State shall share information contained
14 in the report required by subsection (b), as appropriate,
15 with appropriate officials of allied and partners, including
16 Taiwan and other partners in Europe and in the Indo-
17 Pacific.

18 **SEC. 5524. EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-**
19 **MENT COOPERATION.**

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days following
21 the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
22 in consultation with the Administrator of the United
23 States Agency for International Development (USAID),
24 the United States International Development Finance
25 Corporation (DFC), and the heads of other relevant Fed-

1 eral departments and agencies that provide international
2 economic assistance and other support, shall submit to
3 Congress a report on cooperation with Taiwan on trilateral
4 and multilateral development initiatives through the
5 American Institute in Taiwan as appropriate.

6 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re-
7 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following ele-
8 ments:

9 (1) A comprehensive review of existing coopera-
10 tion mechanisms and initiatives among USAID,
11 DFC, other relevant Federal agencies that provide
12 international economic assistance and other support,
13 and relevant departments and agencies in Taiwan,
14 including Taiwan's International Cooperation and
15 Development Fund (ICDF).

16 (2) An assessment of how United States devel-
17 opment cooperation with relevant departments and
18 agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable coopera-
19 tion with partners of similar economic size and for-
20 eign assistance capacity to Taiwan.

21 (3) An analysis of the opportunities and chal-
22 lenges the cooperation reviewed in paragraph (1) has
23 offered to date. The analysis shall include—

24 (A) opportunities that collaboration has of-
25 fered to expand the United States Govern-

1 ment’s ability to deliver support, assistance, and
2 other international financial products into a
3 wider range communities;

4 (B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,
5 other relevant Federal agencies that provide
6 international economic assistance and other
7 support in both Taiwan and the United States,
8 or the organizations’ implementing partners
9 have a comparative advantage in providing as-
10 sistance;

11 (C) opportunities to transition capacity
12 building events with relevant departments and
13 agencies in Taiwan, through the Global Co-
14 operation and Training Framework as well as
15 other forums, into enduring forms of develop-
16 ment cooperation.

17 (4) An assessment of any legal, policy,
18 logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to ex-
19 panding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral de-
20 velopment. The analysis shall include—

21 (A) availability of personnel at the Amer-
22 ican Institute in Taiwan responsible for coordi-
23 nating development assistance cooperation;

24 (B) volume of current cooperation initia-
25 tives and barriers to expanding them;

1 (C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers fac-
2 ing the United States or other partners to in-
3 cluding Taiwan in formal and informal multilat-
4 eral development cooperation mechanisms;

5 (D) resource or capacity barriers to ex-
6 panding cooperation facing the United States or
7 Taiwan; and

8 (E) geopolitical barriers that complicate
9 United States-Taiwan cooperation in third
10 countries.

11 (5) Recommendations to address the challenges
12 identified in paragraph (4).

13 (6) A description of any additional resources or
14 authorities that expanding cooperation might re-
15 quire.

16 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required under
17 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
18 may include a classified annex.

19 **SEC. 5525. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED**
20 **STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAI-**
21 **WAN.**

22 It is the sense of the Congress that—

23 (1) expanding United States economic relations
24 with Taiwan has benefitted the people of both the
25 United States and Taiwan, as Taiwan is now the

1 United States 10th largest goods trading partner,
2 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of
3 imports, and a key destination for United States ag-
4 ricultural exports;

5 (2) further integration would benefit both peo-
6 ples and is in the strategic and diplomatic interests
7 of the United States; and

8 (3) the United States should explore opportuni-
9 ties to expand economic agreements between Taiwan
10 and the United States, through dialogue, and by de-
11 veloping the legal templates required to support po-
12 tential future agreements.

13 **PART 5—SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDU-**
14 **CATIONAL AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH**
15 **TAIWAN**

16 **SEC. 5526. SHORT TITLE.**

17 This part may be cited as the “Taiwan Fellowship
18 Act”.

19 **SEC. 5527. FINDINGS.**

20 Congress makes the following findings:

21 (1) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–
22 8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United States
23 policy “to preserve and promote extensive, close, and
24 friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations be-
25 tween the people of the United States and the people

1 on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China main-
2 land and all other peoples of the Western Pacific
3 area”.

4 (2) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance Ini-
5 tiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the
6 United States has grown its strategic partnership
7 with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 23,000,000 peo-
8 ple.

9 (3) The creation of a United States fellowship
10 program with Taiwan would support—

11 (A) a key priority of expanding people-to-
12 people exchanges, which was outlined in Presi-
13 dent Donald J. Trump’s 2017 National Secu-
14 rity Strategy;

15 (B) President Joseph R. Biden’s commit-
16 ment to Taiwan, “a leading democracy and a
17 critical economic and security partner”, as ex-
18 pressed in his March 2021 Interim National Se-
19 curity Strategic Guidance; and

20 (C) April 2021 guidance from the Depart-
21 ment of State based on a review required under
22 the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020 (subtitle B
23 of title III of division FF of Public Law 116–
24 260) to “encourage U.S. government engage-

1 ment with Taiwan that reflects our deepening
2 unofficial relationship”.

3 **SEC. 5528. PURPOSES.**

4 The purposes of this part are—

5 (1) to further strengthen the United States-Tai-
6 wan strategic partnership and broaden under-
7 standing of the Indo-Pacific region by temporarily
8 assigning officials of any agencies of the United
9 States Government to Taiwan for intensive study in
10 Mandarin and placement as Fellows in a Taiwanese
11 civic institution;

12 (2) to provide for eligible United States per-
13 sonnel—

14 (A) to learn or strengthen Mandarin Chi-
15 nese language skills; and

16 (B) to expand their understanding of the
17 political economy of Taiwan and the Indo-Pa-
18 cific region; and

19 (3) to better position the United States to ad-
20 vance its economic, security, and human rights in-
21 terests and values in the Indo-Pacific region.

22 **SEC. 5529. DEFINITIONS.**

23 In this part:

24 (1) **AGENCY HEAD.**—The term “agency head”
25 means, in the case of the executive branch of United

1 States Government or a legislative branch agency
2 described in paragraph (2), the head of the respec-
3 tive agency.

4 (2) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
5 MENT.—The term “agency of the United States
6 Government” includes the Government Account-
7 ability Office, the Congressional Budget Office, and
8 the Congressional Research Service of the legislative
9 branch, as well as any agency of the executive
10 branch.

11 (3) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON-
12 GRESS.—The term “appropriate committees of Con-
13 gress” means—

14 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
15 the Senate;

16 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of
17 the Senate;

18 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
19 the House of Representatives; and

20 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of
21 the House of Representatives.

22 (4) DETAILEE.—The term “detailee” means—

23 (A) an employee of an agency of the
24 United States Government on loan to the Amer-
25 ican Institute in Taiwan, without a change of

1 position from the agency at which the employee
2 is employed; and

3 (B) a legislative branch employee from the
4 Government Accountability Office, Congres-
5 sional Budget Office, or the Congressional Re-
6 search Service.

7 (5) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term “im-
8 plementing partner” means any United States orga-
9 nization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
10 nal Revenue Code of 1986 that—

11 (A) performs logistical, administrative, and
12 other functions, as determined by the Depart-
13 ment of State and the American Institute of
14 Taiwan in support of the Taiwan Fellowship
15 Program; and

16 (B) enters into a cooperative agreement
17 with the American Institute in Taiwan to ad-
18 minister the Taiwan Fellowship Program.

19 (6) PROGRAM.—The term “Program” means
20 the Taiwan Fellowship Program established pursu-
21 ant to section 5530.

22 **SEC. 5530. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.**

23 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall
24 establish the Taiwan Fellowship Program (referred to in
25 this section as the “Program”) to provide a fellowship op-

1 opportunity in Taiwan of up to 2 years for eligible United
2 States citizens. The Department of State, in consultation
3 with the American Institute in Taiwan and the imple-
4 menting partner, may modify the name of the Program.

5 (b) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.—

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The American Institute in
7 Taiwan should use amounts appropriated pursuant
8 to section 5533(a) to enter into an annual or multi-
9 year cooperative agreement with an appropriate im-
10 plementing partner.

11 (2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department of State
12 or the American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation
13 with, as appropriate, the implementing partner,
14 should award to eligible United States citizens, sub-
15 ject to available funding—

16 (A) approximately 5 fellowships during the
17 first 2 years of the Program; and

18 (B) approximately 10 fellowships during
19 each of the remaining years of the Program.

20 (c) AMERICAN INSTITUTION IN TAIWAN AGREEMENT;
21 IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days after
22 the date of the enactment of this Act, the American Insti-
23 tute in Taiwan, in consultation with the Department of
24 State, should—

1 (1) begin negotiations with the Taipei Economic
2 and Cultural Representative Office, or with another
3 appropriate entity, for the purpose of entering into
4 an agreement to facilitate the placement of fellows
5 in an agency of Taiwan; and

6 (2) begin the process of selecting an imple-
7 menting partner, which—

8 (A) shall agree to meet all of the legal re-
9 quirements required to operate in Taiwan; and

10 (B) shall be composed of staff who dem-
11 onstrate significant experience managing ex-
12 change programs in the Indo-Pacific region.

13 (d) CURRICULUM.—

14 (1) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year of each
15 fellowship under this section, each fellow should
16 study—

17 (A) the Mandarin Chinese language;

18 (B) the people, history, and political cli-
19 mate on Taiwan; and

20 (C) the issues affecting the relationship be-
21 tween the United States and the Indo-Pacific
22 region.

23 (2) SECOND YEAR.—During the second year of
24 each fellowship under this section, each fellow, sub-
25 ject to the approval of the Department of State, the

1 American Institute in Taiwan, and the implementing
2 partner, and in accordance with the purposes of this
3 subtitle, should work in—

4 (A) a parliamentary office, ministry, or
5 other agency of Taiwan; or

6 (B) an organization outside the public sec-
7 tor in Taiwan, whose interests are associated
8 with the interests of the fellow and the agency
9 of the United States Government from which
10 the fellow is or had been employed.

11 (e) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.—

12 (1) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A United
13 States citizen is eligible for a fellowship under this
14 section if the citizen—

15 (A) is an employee of the United States
16 Government;

17 (B) has received at least one exemplary
18 performance review in his or her current United
19 States Government role within at least the last
20 three years prior to beginning the fellowship;

21 (C) has at least 2 years of experience in
22 any branch of the United States Government;

23 (D) has a demonstrated professional or
24 educational background in the relationship be-

1 tween the United States and countries in the
2 Indo-Pacific region; and

3 (E) has demonstrated his or her commit-
4 ment to further service in the United States
5 Government.

6 (2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each re-
7 cipient of a fellowship under this section shall agree,
8 as a condition of such fellowship—

9 (A) to maintain satisfactory progress in
10 language training and appropriate behavior in
11 Taiwan, consistent with United States Govern-
12 ment policy toward Taiwan, as determined by
13 the Department of State, the American Insti-
14 tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its imple-
15 menting partner;

16 (B) to refrain from engaging in any intel-
17 ligence or intelligence-related activity on behalf
18 of the United States Government; and

19 (C) to continue Federal Government em-
20 ployment for a period of not less than 4 years
21 after the conclusion of the fellowship or for not
22 less than 2 years for a fellowship that is 1 year
23 or shorter.

24 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING
25 PARTNER.—

1 (A) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The imple-
2 menting partner, with the concurrence of the
3 Department of State and the American Insti-
4 tute in Taiwan, shall—

5 (i) make efforts to recruit fellowship
6 candidates who reflect the diversity of the
7 United States;

8 (ii) select fellows for the Taiwan Fel-
9 lowship Program based solely on merit,
10 with appropriate supervision from the De-
11 partment of State and the American Insti-
12 tute in Taiwan; and

13 (iii) prioritize the selection of can-
14 didates willing to serve in a fellowship last-
15 ing 1 year or longer.

16 (B) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing part-
17 ner should provide each fellow in the first year
18 (or shorter duration, as jointly determined by
19 the Department of State and the American In-
20 stitute in Taiwan for those who are not serving
21 a 2-year fellowship) with—

22 (i) intensive Mandarin Chinese lan-
23 guage training; and

1 (ii) courses in the politics, culture,
2 and history of Taiwan, China, and the
3 broader Indo-Pacific.

4 (C) WAIVER OF FIRST-YEAR TRAINING.—
5 The Department of State, in coordination with
6 the American Institute in Taiwan and, as ap-
7 propriate, the implementing partner, may waive
8 any of the training required under paragraph
9 (2) to the extent that a fellow has Mandarin
10 language skills, knowledge of the topic de-
11 scribed in subparagraph (B)(ii), or for other re-
12 lated reasons approved by the Department of
13 State and the American Institute in Taiwan. If
14 any of the training requirements are waived for
15 a fellow serving a 2-year fellowship, the training
16 portion of his or her fellowship may be short-
17 ened to the extent appropriate.

18 (D) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple-
19 menting partner, in consultation with the De-
20 partment of State and the American Institute
21 in Taiwan, may maintain an office and at least
22 1 full-time staff member in Taiwan—

23 (i) to liaise with the American Insti-
24 tute in Taiwan and institutions of Taiwan;
25 and

1 (ii) to serve as the primary in-country
2 point of contact for the recipients of fellow-
3 ships under this part and their dependents.

4 (E) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple-
5 menting partner may perform other functions
6 in association with support of the Taiwan Fel-
7 lowship Program, including logistical and ad-
8 ministrative functions, as prescribed by the De-
9 partment of State and the American Institute
10 in Taiwan.

11 (4) NONCOMPLIANCE.—

12 (A) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails to
13 comply with the requirements under this section
14 shall reimburse the American Institute in Tai-
15 wan, or the appropriate United States Govern-
16 ment agency for—

17 (i) the Federal funds expended for the
18 fellow's participation in the fellowship, as
19 set forth in subparagraphs (B) and (C);
20 and

21 (ii) interest accrued on such funds
22 (calculated at the prevailing rate).

23 (B) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fellow
24 who violates subparagraph (A) or (B) of para-
25 graph (2) shall reimburse the American Insti-

1 tute in Taiwan, or the appropriate United
2 States Government agency, in an amount equal
3 to the sum of—

4 (i) all of the Federal funds expended
5 for the fellow's participation in the fellow-
6 ship; and

7 (ii) interest on the amount specified in
8 subparagraph (A), which shall be cal-
9 culated at the prevailing rate.

10 (C) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel-
11 low who violates subparagraph (C) of paragraph
12 (2) shall reimburse the American Institute in
13 Taiwan, or the appropriate United States Gov-
14 ernment agency, in an amount equal to the dif-
15 ference between—

16 (i) the amount specified in subpara-
17 graph (B); and

18 (ii) the product of—

19 (I) the amount the fellow re-
20 ceived in compensation during the
21 final year of the fellowship, including
22 the value of any allowances and bene-
23 fits received by the fellow; multiplied
24 by

1 (II) the percentage of the period
2 specified in paragraph (2)(C) during
3 which the fellow did not remain em-
4 ployed by the Federal Government.

5 (f) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.—Notwith-
6 standing any requirement under this section, the Sec-
7 retary of State, in consultation with the American Insti-
8 tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, the implementing
9 partner, may award fellowships that have a duration of
10 less than 2 years, and may alter the curriculum require-
11 ments under subsection (d) for such purposes.

12 (g) SUNSET.—The fellowship program under this
13 part shall terminate 7 years after the date of the enact-
14 ment of this Act.

15 **SEC. 5531. REPORTS AND AUDITS.**

16 (a) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after
17 the selection of the first class of fellows under this part,
18 and annually thereafter for 7 years, the Department of
19 State shall offer to brief the appropriate committees of
20 Congress regarding the following issues:

21 (1) An assessment of the performance of the
22 implementing partner in fulfilling the purposes of
23 this part.

24 (2) The names and sponsoring agencies of the
25 fellows selected by the implementing partner and the

1 extent to which such fellows represent the diversity
2 of the United States.

3 (3) The names of the parliamentary offices,
4 ministries, other agencies of Taiwan, and nongovern-
5 mental institutions to which each fellow was as-
6 signed during the second year of the fellowship.

7 (4) Any recommendations, as appropriate, to
8 improve the implementation of the Taiwan Fellow-
9 ship Program, including added flexibilities in the ad-
10 ministration of the program.

11 (5) An assessment of the Taiwan Fellowship
12 Program's value upon the relationship between the
13 United States and Taiwan or the United States and
14 Asian countries.

15 (b) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.—

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—The financial records of any
17 implementing partner shall be audited annually in
18 accordance with generally accepted government au-
19 diting standards by independent certified public ac-
20 countants or independent licensed public accountants
21 who are certified or licensed by a regulatory author-
22 ity of a State or another political subdivision of the
23 United States.

24 (2) LOCATION.—Each audit under paragraph
25 (1) shall be conducted at the place or places where

1 the financial records of the implementing partner
2 are normally kept.

3 (3) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The imple-
4 menting partner shall make available to the account-
5 ants conducting an audit under paragraph (1)—

6 (A) all books, financial records, files, other
7 papers, things, and property belonging to, or in
8 use by, the implementing partner that are nec-
9 essary to facilitate the audit; and

10 (B) full facilities for verifying transactions
11 with the balances or securities held by deposi-
12 tories, fiscal agents, and custodians.

13 (4) REPORT.—

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 270
15 days after the end of each fiscal year, the im-
16 plementing partner shall provide a report of the
17 audit conducted for such fiscal year under para-
18 graph (1) to the Department of State and the
19 American Institute in Taiwan.

20 (B) CONTENTS.—Each audit report
21 shall—

22 (i) set forth the scope of the audit;

23 (ii) include such statements, along
24 with the auditor's opinion of those state-
25 ments, as may be necessary to present fair-

1 ly the implementing partner's assets and
2 liabilities, surplus or deficit, with reason-
3 able detail;

4 (iii) include a statement of the imple-
5 menting partner's income and expenses
6 during the year; and

7 (iv) include a schedule of—

8 (I) all contracts and cooperative
9 agreements requiring payments great-
10 er than \$5,000; and

11 (II) any payments of compensa-
12 tion, salaries, or fees at a rate greater
13 than \$5,000 per year.

14 (C) COPIES.—Each audit report shall be
15 produced in sufficient copies for distribution to
16 the public.

17 **SEC. 5532. TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERN-**
18 **MENT SERVICE.**

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—

20 (1) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the approval
21 of the Secretary of State, an agency head may de-
22 tail, for a period of not more than 2 years, an em-
23 ployee of the agency of the United States Govern-
24 ment who has been awarded a fellowship under this
25 part, to the American Institute in Taiwan for the

1 purpose of assignment to Taiwan or an organization
2 described in section 5530(d)(2)(B).

3 (2) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall enter
4 into a written agreement with the Federal Govern-
5 ment before receiving a fellowship, in which the fel-
6 low shall agree—

7 (A) to continue in the service of the spon-
8 soring agency at the end of fellowship for a pe-
9 riod of at least 4 years (or at least 2 years if
10 the fellowship duration is 1 year or shorter) un-
11 less the detailee is involuntarily separated from
12 the service of such agency; and

13 (B) to pay to the American Institute in
14 Taiwan, or the United States Government agen-
15 cy, as appropriate, any additional expenses in-
16 curred by the Federal Government in connec-
17 tion with the fellowship if the detailee volun-
18 tarily separates from service with the spon-
19 soring agency before the end of the period for
20 which the detailee has agreed to continue in the
21 service of such agency.

22 (3) EXCEPTION.—The payment agreed to under
23 paragraph (2)(B) may not be required from a
24 detailee who leaves the service of the sponsoring
25 agency to enter into the service of another agency of

1 the United States Government unless the head of
2 the sponsoring agency notifies the detailee before the
3 effective date of entry into the service of the other
4 agency that payment will be required under this sub-
5 section.

6 (b) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.—A
7 detailee—

8 (1) is deemed, for the purpose of preserving al-
9 lowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other ben-
10 efits, to be an employee of the sponsoring agency;

11 (2) is entitled to pay, allowances, and benefits
12 from funds available to such agency, which is
13 deemed to comply with section 5536 of title 5,
14 United States Code; and

15 (3) may be assigned to a position with an entity
16 described in section 5530(d)(2)(A) if acceptance of
17 such position does not involve—

18 (A) the taking of an oath of allegiance to
19 another government; or

20 (B) the acceptance of compensation or
21 other benefits from any foreign government by
22 such detailee.

23 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING AGENCY.—

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Federal agency from
25 which a detailee is detailed should provide the fellow

1 allowances and benefits that are consistent with De-
2 partment of State Standardized Regulations or other
3 applicable rules and regulations, including—

4 (A) a living quarters allowance to cover the
5 cost of housing in Taiwan;

6 (B) a cost of living allowance to cover any
7 possible higher costs of living in Taiwan;

8 (C) a temporary quarters subsistence al-
9 lowance for up to 7 days if the fellow is unable
10 to find housing immediately upon arriving in
11 Taiwan;

12 (D) an education allowance to assist par-
13 ents in providing the fellow's minor children
14 with educational services ordinarily provided
15 without charge by public schools in the United
16 States;

17 (E) moving expenses to transport personal
18 belongings of the fellow and his or her family
19 in their move to Taiwan, which is comparable
20 to the allowance given for American Institute in
21 Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; and

22 (F) an economy-class airline ticket to and
23 from Taiwan for each fellow and the fellow's
24 immediate family.

1 (2) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The Amer-
2 ican Institute in Taiwan and its implementing part-
3 ner, with the approval of the Department of State,
4 may modify the benefits set forth in paragraph (1)
5 if such modification is warranted by fiscal cir-
6 cumstances.

7 (d) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The American Insti-
8 tute in Taiwan, the implementing partner, and Taiwan or
9 non-public sector entities in Taiwan at which a fellow is
10 detailed during the second year of the fellowship may not
11 be held responsible for the pay, allowances, or any other
12 benefit normally provided to the detailee.

13 (e) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be detailed
14 under subsection (a)(1) without reimbursement to the
15 United States by the American Institute in Taiwan.

16 (f) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.—Detailees may be
17 paid by the American Institute in Taiwan for the allow-
18 ances and benefits listed in subsection (e).

19 **SEC. 5533. FUNDING.**

20 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There
21 are authorized to be appropriated to the American Insti-
22 tute in Taiwan—

23 (1) for fiscal year 2023, \$2,900,000, of which—

24 (A) \$500,000 should be used to launch the
25 Taiwan Fellowship Program through a competi-

1 tive cooperative agreement with an appropriate
2 implementing partner;

3 (B) \$2,300,000 should be used to fund a
4 cooperative agreement with an appropriate im-
5 plementing partner; and

6 (C) \$100,000 should be used for manage-
7 ment expenses of the American Institute in Tai-
8 wan related to the management of the Taiwan
9 Fellowship Program; and

10 (2) for fiscal year 2024, and each succeeding
11 fiscal year, \$2,400,000, of which—

12 (A) \$2,300,000 should be used for a coop-
13 erative agreement to the appropriate imple-
14 menting partner; and

15 (B) \$100,000 should be used for manage-
16 ment expenses of the American Institute in Tai-
17 wan related to the management of the Taiwan
18 Fellowship Program.

19 (b) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing partner
20 selected to implement the Taiwan Fellowship Program
21 may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of serv-
22 ices or property in carrying out such program, subject to
23 the review and approval of the American Institute in Tai-
24 wan.

1 **SEC. 5534. STUDY AND REPORT.**

2 Not later than 1 year prior to the sunset of the fel-
3 lowship program under section 5530(g), the Comptroller
4 General of the United States shall conduct a study and
5 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen-
6 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House
7 a report that includes—

8 (1) an analysis of the United States Govern-
9 ment participants in this program, including the
10 number of applicants and the number of fellowships
11 undertaken, the place of employment, and an assess-
12 ment of the costs and benefits for participants and
13 for the United States Government of such fellow-
14 ships;

15 (2) an analysis of the financial impact of the
16 fellowship on United States Government offices
17 which have provided fellows to participate in the pro-
18 gram; and

19 (3) recommendations, if any, on how to improve
20 the fellowship program.

21 **SEC. 5535. SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL**
22 **AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.**

23 (a) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES-TAI-
24 WAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The Sec-
25 retary of State should consider establishing an inde-
26 pendent nonprofit entity that—

1 (1) is dedicated to deepening ties between the
2 future leaders of Taiwan and the future leaders of
3 the United States; and

4 (2) works with State and local school districts
5 and educational institutions to send high school and
6 university students to Taiwan to study the Chinese
7 language, culture, history, politics, and other rel-
8 evant subjects.

9 (b) PARTNER.—State and local school districts and
10 educational institutions, including public universities, are
11 encouraged to partner with the Taipei Economic and Cul-
12 tural Representative Office in the United States to estab-
13 lish programs to promote more educational and cultural
14 exchanges.

15 **PART 6—UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PUBLIC**

16 **HEALTH PROTECTION**

17 **SEC. 5536. SHORT TITLE.**

18 This part may be cited as “United States-Taiwan
19 Public Health Protection Act”.

20 **SEC. 5537. DEFINITIONS.**

21 In this part:

22 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
23 TEES.—For the purposes of this part, the term “ap-
24 propriate congressional committees” means—

1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of
2 the Senate;

3 (B) the Committee on Health, Education,
4 Labor, and Pensions of the Senate;

5 (C) the Committee on Appropriations of
6 the Senate;

7 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
8 the House of Representatives;

9 (E) the Committee on Energy and Com-
10 merce of the House of Representatives; and

11 (F) the Committee on Appropriations of
12 the House of Representatives.

13 (2) CENTER.—The term “Center” means the
14 Infectious Disease Monitoring Center described in
15 section 5538(a)(2).

16 **SEC. 5538. STUDY ON AN INFECTIOUS DISEASE MONI-**
17 **TORING CENTER.**

18 (a) STUDY.—Not later than one year after the date
19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and
20 the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in consulta-
21 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal departments
22 and agencies, shall submit to appropriate congressional
23 committees a study that includes the following:

24 (1) A description of ongoing cooperation be-
25 tween the United States Government and Taiwan re-

1 lated to public health, including public health activi-
2 ties supported by the United States in Taiwan.

3 (2) A description how the United States and
4 Taiwan can promote further cooperation and expand
5 public health activities, including the feasibility and
6 utility of establishing an Infectious Disease Moni-
7 toring Center within the American Institute of Tai-
8 wan in Taipei, Taiwan to—

9 (A) regularly monitor, analyze, and dis-
10 seminate open-source material from countries in
11 the region, including viral strains, bacterial
12 subtypes, and other pathogens;

13 (B) engage in people-to-people contacts
14 with medical specialists and public health offi-
15 cials in the region;

16 (C) provide expertise and information on
17 infectious diseases to the United States Govern-
18 ment and Taiwanese officials; and

19 (D) carry out other appropriate activities,
20 as determined by the Director of the Center.

21 (b) ELEMENTS.—The study required by subsection
22 (a) shall include—

23 (1) a plan on how such a Center would be es-
24 tablished and operationalized, including—

1 (A) the personnel, material, and funding
2 requirements necessary to establish and operate
3 the Center; and

4 (B) the proposed structure and composi-
5 tion of Center personnel, which may include—

6 (i) infectious disease experts from the
7 Department of Health and Human Serv-
8 ices, who are recommended to serve as
9 detailees to the Center; and

10 (ii) additional qualified persons to
11 serve as detailees to or employees of the
12 Center, including—

13 (I) from any other relevant Fed-
14 eral department or agencies, to in-
15 clude the Department of State and
16 the United States Agency for Inter-
17 national Development;

18 (II) qualified foreign service na-
19 tionals or locally engaged staff who
20 are considered citizens of Taiwan; and

21 (III) employees of the Taiwan
22 Centers for Disease Control;

23 (2) an evaluation, based on the factors in para-
24 graph (1), of whether to establish the Center; and

1 (3) a description of any consultations or agree-
2 ments between the American Institute in Taiwan
3 and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa-
4 tive Office in the United States regarding the estab-
5 lishment and operation of the Center, including—

6 (A) the role that employees of the Taiwan
7 Centers for Disease Control would play in sup-
8 porting or coordinating with the Center; and

9 (B) whether any employees of the Taiwan
10 Centers for Disease Control would be detailed
11 to, or co-located with, the Center.

12 (c) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State and the
13 Secretary of Health and Human Services shall consult
14 with the appropriate congressional committees before full
15 completion of the study.

16 **PART 7—RULES OF CONSTRUCTION**

17 **SEC. 5539. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.**

18 Nothing in this subtitle may be construed—

19 (1) to restore diplomatic relations with the Re-
20 public of China; or

21 (2) to alter the United States Government's po-
22 sition with respect to the international status of the
23 Republic of China.

1 **SEC. 5540. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION REGARDING THE USE**
2 **OF MILITARY FORCE.**

3 Nothing in this title may be construed as authorizing
4 the use of military force or the introduction of United
5 States forces into hostilities.

6 **Subtitle B—United States-Ecuador**
7 **Partnership Act of 2022**

8 **SEC. 5541. SHORT TITLE.**

9 This subtitle may be cited as the “United States-Ec-
10 uador Partnership Act of 2022”.

11 **SEC. 5542. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

12 It is the sense of Congress that—

13 (1) the United States should take additional
14 steps to strengthen its bilateral partnership with Ec-
15 uador, including by providing for robust trade and
16 investment, increasing law enforcement cooperation,
17 renewing the activities of the United States Agency
18 for International Development in Ecuador, and sup-
19 porting Ecuador’s response to and recovery from the
20 COVID–19 pandemic, as necessary and appropriate;
21 and

22 (2) strengthening the United States-Ecuador
23 partnership presents an opportunity to advance core
24 United States national security interests and work
25 with other democratic partners to maintain a pros-
26 perous, politically stable, and democratic Western