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on
New START Treaty Implementation

Before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, and members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about implementation of the New START Treaty, the nuclear deterrent, and the future of our nuclear security enterprise.

Before I begin, I want to thank the Chair and Ranking Member for their continued bipartisan leadership on nuclear security issues in the U.S. Congress. In particular, I would like to recognize Ranking Member Lugar for his distinguished career as a champion for nuclear nonproliferation policy.

Senator Lugar, your leadership on treaty negotiations and verification, thoughtful and measured diplomacy, and efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are unique in both the United State Senate and American history. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has led to some of the most significant security measures implemented since the end of the Cold War, and has had a very real impact on preventing terrorism. Your leadership on these issues over the years will be sorely missed by everyone working to make the world safer for our children and grandchildren. I will personally miss working with you, and I sincerely hope that your voice remains a major part of future policy discussions.

Working with our colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense, the NNSA played an essential role throughout New START Treaty negotiations, and continues to contribute very directly to successful implementation of the Treaty.

NNSA experts led negotiations on behalf of the US Government for the notifications regime under New START, which since entry-into-force of the Treaty has resulted in the exchange of over 2,400 notifications on strategic forces matters between the United States and Russian Federation. Our experts also led negotiations for the exchange of telemetric information, and since entry-into-force have worked to ensure the successful commencement of this exchange. This included leading negotiations within the Treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to complete the first two BCC Agreements, which provided the necessary treaty-based framework to allow the exchange of telemetric information to begin. As a result, in April of this year the United States and Russia exchanged the first set of telemetric information on missile flight tests since expiration of the original START Treaty in 2009. NNSA also led the negotiations for the Treaty's definitions, which are relied upon for the full range of Treaty implementation matters.

In addition to leading three working groups during negotiations, we contributed significantly to several of the other elements of the Treaty, including the development of the Treaty's inspection regime. With entry-into-force, we have continued to support inspection implementation matters within the United States. This has included essential work with the U.S. Interagency and sites across the nuclear security enterprise to review and assess the Russian Federation's radiation detection equipment (RDE) for use during inspections in the United States. Through Sandia National Laboratories, we are also conducting technical analyses associated with RDE measurements, and are providing other technical support on inspection matters.

Through the New START Treaty's extensive notifications, inspections, and the exchange of telemetric information, the United States and Russian Federation once again have the tools in place to ensure transparency and predictability regarding each other's strategic nuclear forces. It is this predictability that is of the greatest benefit to us. It allows us to plan future stockpile size and infrastructure requirements with significantly greater confidence.

The President's commitment to the obligations codified as part of New START is evident: NNSA, and the weapons activities account in particular, has seen consistent support since he took office in 2009. The Administration and the Congress recognized the need to sustain the nuclear weapons in the stockpile and modernize the infrastructure and capabilities of the nuclear security enterprise. This September we will mark twenty years since the end of underground

testing, and, due to the investments we have made in science-based stockpile stewardship, we know more about how our weapons age and perform than ever before. I have said this in the past and will reiterate again now: our stockpile is safe, secure, and effective.

Right now, we are extending the life of approximately 80% of our active stockpile to ensure that it remains a viable, credible deterrent for decades to come. Four weapons systems – the W76, B61, W78, and W88 – are currently beyond phase 6.1 in the life extension process. We are in production with the W76-1, we are about to transition to Development Engineering on the B61-12, and we have begun life extension Feasibility Studies on the W78 and W88.

As you are all aware, the Administration is making these investments at a time of great fiscal pressure. Between the Budget Control Act, passed by this Congress; the four life extension programs I mentioned; and our aging infrastructure, which, contrary to some opinions, has many features other than replacing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility at Los Alamos, hard choices have had to be made. We looked at our scope of work, we have strongly challenged our people to do more with less without compromising safety or quality, and we have made tough decisions focused on the future. NNSA continues to work with our partners at the Department of Defense (DoD) to balance resources and requirements, and that commitment has not waivered despite many external pressures.

For example, just this week a key piece of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility opened. The Radiological Laboratory, Utility, and Office Building (RLUOB) will play a key support role implementing the United States' plutonium strategy, allowing us to maintain our world-class plutonium capabilities when we complete program operations in the aging CMR facility in approximately 2019. In addition, we will consider options for staging bulk quantities of plutonium needed for future program use in Nevada at the Device Assembly Facility; evaluate options to share material characterization workload between the PF-4 facility at LANL and Building 332 as a Hazard Category 2, Security Category 3 nuclear facility at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and accelerate plans to process, package, and ship excess special nuclear material in PF-4 for disposition. We also identified an important synergy with our plutonium disposition mission in South Carolina and can support both feedstock production for the MOX fuel fabrication plant and sustain plutonium expertise for defense purposes by utilizing the PF-4 facility at Los Alamos. These actions allow NNSA to continue

current plutonium operations for the national security enterprise while we work to define a longer-term strategy that aligns capabilities and future stockpile needs.

Our next major investment in the future of our enterprise and the nuclear deterrent is the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The nation does not have any options for maintaining highly enriched uranium processing capabilities in existing facilities. When looking at consequences and likelihood of infrastructure failures across the nuclear security enterprise, our greatest risk is the potential failure of Building 9212 at Y-12, originally built in 1952, which would directly impact our ability to modernize the stockpile. We must replace the required UPF capability if we are going to maintain our deterrent and fuel our Navy's submarines and aircraft carriers. UPF will allow us to move uranium capabilities out of the decaying building 9212 and to consolidate and modernize all other highly enriched uranium processing capabilities that are in Buildings 9215, 9998, and 9204-2E to provide safer and more efficient operations. We have also broken ground on a new High Explosive Pressing Facility at Pantex to ensure continuity of capability for planned Life Extension Program workload.

The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) has been an integral part of this process. It would be irresponsible to make such forward-looking decisions without first talking to our partners in the DoD. As part of that process, the NWC approved a number of critical schedule adjustments in March that include the W76, B61, W78, W88, and the CMRR and UPF.

Beyond that, NNSA and the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) team have an interagency group doing further analysis on balancing the resources and requirements for the nuclear security enterprise. The NNSA CAPE effort will inform the President's Budget Request for FY 2014, which is currently being formulated.

Our coordination with DoD via the NWC is significant and detailed. We're demonstrating infrastructure responsiveness by increasing neutron generator production for the W78 when needed to meet changing stockpile requirements. We're continuing to sustain and improve the stockpile by replacing gas transfer systems to improve component lifetime and weapon performance margin. And we're working with the Department of the Air Force on an Analysis of Alternatives for the future of nuclear-capable air delivered cruise missiles. Our decisions are

not made in a vacuum, and any impact that NNSA's priorities may have on the stockpile are fully informed by our working relationship with the NWC.

Looking ahead, consistent with the President's nuclear security agenda, the results of the Nuclear Posture Review, and instructions from the Senate to pursue negotiations for non-strategic nuclear weapons, NNSA stands ready to support future negotiations and is developing and assessing capabilities to enable potential future monitoring and verification initiatives. We need to do our homework now to prepare for the future in a responsible manner, so that the United States can achieve its arms control and nonproliferation objectives while continuing to ensure the safety and security of our nuclear weapons stockpile and the facilities across the Nuclear Security Enterprise.

Toward this end, NNSA's FY13 request includes funding to research, develop, test and assess advanced monitoring and verification capabilities, including collaborative initiatives with foreign partners. These include advanced radiation detection techniques to confirm the presence of nuclear weapons while protecting sensitive information, chain of custody capabilities to monitor and track weapons and key components, and capabilities to confirm nuclear weapons dismantlement and disposition. This is important work and we must continue developing and assessing these capabilities today.

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I thank all of you, particularly Ranking Member Lugar, for your work keeping the American people safe, and I look forward to any questions you may have.