

AMENDMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_ Calendar No. \_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 1st Sess.**

**S. 1731**

To require the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to develop a strategy in response to the global basing intentions of the People’s Republic of China.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. COONS

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-  
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLES.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Combating PRC Over-  
5 seas and Unlawful Networked Threats through Enhanced  
6 Resilience Act of 2025” or the “COUNTER Act of 2025”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 According to multiple sources, including the 2024 an-  
9 nual report to Congress, titled “Military and Security De-  
10 velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China” and  
11 known informally as the “China Military Power Report”—

1           (1) the PRC is seeking to expand its overseas  
2 logistics and basing infrastructure to allow the PLA  
3 to project and sustain military power at greater dis-  
4 tances;

5           (2) a global PLA logistics network could give  
6 the PRC increased capabilities to surveil or disrupt  
7 United States military operations;

8           (3) in August 2017, the PRC officially opened  
9 the first overseas PLA military base near the com-  
10 mercial port of Doraleh in Djibouti;

11           (4) in April 2025, officials from the PRC and  
12 Cambodia officially inaugurated the China-Cambodia  
13 Ream Naval Base Joint Support and Training Cen-  
14 ter and celebrated the expansion of port facilities at  
15 Ream Naval Base, some of which appear to have  
16 been reserved for the use of PRC ships that have  
17 been continuously stationed at Ream Naval Base  
18 since December 2023; and

19           (5) in addition to the base in Djibouti and the  
20 PRC's access to the port at the Ream Naval Base  
21 in Cambodia, the PRC is likely pursuing access to  
22 additional military facilities to support naval, air,  
23 and ground forces projection in many countries.

1 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

2 While the executive branch has undertaken case-by-  
3 case efforts to forestall the establishment of new PRC  
4 bases in several countries, it is the sense of Congress that  
5 future efforts to counter the PRC's global basing inten-  
6 tions must—

7 (1) proceed with the urgency required to ad-  
8 dress the strategic implications of the PRC's actions;

9 (2) reflect sufficient interagency coordination  
10 with respect to a problem that necessitates a whole-  
11 of-government approach;

12 (3) ensure that the United States Government  
13 maintains a proactive posture rather than a reactive  
14 posture in order to maximize strategic decision  
15 space;

16 (4) identify a comprehensive menu of actions  
17 that would be influential in shaping a partner's deci-  
18 sion making regarding giving the PRC military ac-  
19 cess to its sovereign territory;

20 (5) appropriately prioritize the subject of the  
21 PRC's global basing intentions within the context of  
22 the overall United States strategic competition with  
23 the PRC;

24 (6) factor in the potential contributions of key  
25 allies and partners to help respond to the PRC's  
26 pursuit of global basing, many of which—

1 (A) have historic ties and influence in  
2 many of the geographic areas the PRC is tar-  
3 geting for potential future bases; and

4 (B) rely on the same basic intelligence pic-  
5 ture to form our baseline understanding of the  
6 PRC's global intentions;

7 (7) establish and ensure sufficient resourcing  
8 for enduring organizational structures to effectively  
9 address the issue of PRC global basing intentions;  
10 and

11 (8) ensure that future force posture, freedom of  
12 movement, and other interests of the United States  
13 and our allies are not jeopardized by the continued  
14 expansion of PRC bases.

15 **SEC. 4. DEFINITIONS.**

16 In this Act:

17 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-  
18 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-  
19 mittees” means—

20 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
21 the Senate;

22 (B) the Committee on Armed Services of  
23 the Senate;

24 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of  
25 the Senate;

1 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of  
2 the Senate;

3 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
4 the House of Representatives;

5 (F) the Committee on Armed Services of  
6 the House of Representatives;

7 (G) the Permanent Select Committee on  
8 Intelligence of the House of Representatives;  
9 and

10 (H) the Committee on Appropriations of  
11 the House of Representatives.

12 (2) PLA.—The term “PLA” means the Peo-  
13 ple’s Liberation Army of the PRC.

14 (3) PRC.—The term “PRC” means the Peo-  
15 ple’s Republic of China.

16 (4) PRC GLOBAL BASING.—The term “PRC  
17 global basing” means the establishment of physical  
18 locations outside the geographic boundaries of the  
19 PRC where the PRC maintains some element of the  
20 People’s Liberation Army, PRC intelligence or secu-  
21 rity forces, or infrastructure designed to support the  
22 presence of PRC military, intelligence, or security  
23 forces, for the purposes of potential power projec-  
24 tion.

1 **SEC. 5. ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH'S C-PRC**  
2 **GLOBAL BASING STRATEGY.**

3 (a) ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 days after the  
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National  
5 Intelligence shall submit an intelligence assessment, in  
6 classified form, if needed, to the appropriate congressional  
7 committees. The assessment shall analyze the risk posed  
8 by PRC global basing to the United States or to any  
9 United States allies with respect to their ability to project  
10 power, maintain freedom of movement, and protect other  
11 interests as a function of the PRC's current or potential  
12 locations identified pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

13 (b) STRATEGY.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days  
15 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec-  
16 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of  
17 Defense and other appropriate senior Federal offi-  
18 cials, shall submit a strategy to the appropriate con-  
19 gressional committees that contains the information  
20 described in paragraph (2).

21 (2) CONTENTS.—The strategy required under  
22 paragraph (1) shall—

23 (A) identify not fewer than 5 locations that  
24 pose the greatest potential risks, as identified in  
25 the assessment required under subsection (a),  
26 where the PRC maintains a physical presence,

1 or is suspected to be seeking a physical pres-  
2 ence, which could ultimately transition into a  
3 PRC global base;

4 (B) include a comprehensive listing of ex-  
5 ecutive branch entities currently involved in ad-  
6 dressing aspects of PRC global basing, includ-  
7 ing any resource or personnel constraints lim-  
8 iting the ability to effectively address the issue  
9 of PRC global basing intentions;

10 (C) describe in detail all executive branch  
11 efforts—

12 (i) to mitigate the impacts of the loca-  
13 tions referred to in subparagraph (A); or

14 (ii) to prevent the PRC from estab-  
15 lishing new global bases; and

16 (D) for each of the locations referred to in  
17 subparagraph (A), identify the actions by the  
18 United States or its allies that would be most  
19 effective to enable the respective foreign govern-  
20 ments to terminate plans for hosting a PRC  
21 base.

22 (c) TASK FORCE.—Not later than 90 days after sub-  
23 mitting the strategy described in subsection (b), the Sec-  
24 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of De-

1 fense and other appropriate senior Federal officials, shall  
2 establish an interagency task force—

3 (1) to implement the strategy described in sec-  
4 tion (b) to counter the PRC's efforts at the locations  
5 of chief concern; and

6 (2) to identify mitigation measures that would  
7 prevent the PRC from establishing new bases in lo-  
8 cations beyond the locations of chief concern identi-  
9 fied pursuant to subsection (b)(2)(A).

10 (d) QUADRENNIAL REVIEWS AND REPORTS.—Not  
11 later than 4 years after the submission of the strategy re-  
12 quired under subsection (b), and not less frequently than  
13 once every 4 years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in  
14 coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director  
15 of National Intelligence, and other appropriate senior Fed-  
16 eral officials, shall—

17 (1) conduct a review of the Executive Branch's  
18 strategy and overall approach in response to the  
19 PRC global basing intentions; and

20 (2) submit the results of such review, including  
21 the information described in subsection (b)(2), to the  
22 appropriate congressional committees.