

U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA,
THE PACIFIC, AND INTERNATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

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U.S. POLICY ON TAIWAN

TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 2024

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIA, THE PACIFIC,
AND INTERNATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Chris Van Hollen presiding.

Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Cardin, Merkley, Duckworth, and Romney.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND

Senator VAN HOLLEN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy will come to order.

I would like to begin by thanking Ranking Member Romney for being a good and strong partner on the issues we take up in this subcommittee including today as we discuss the challenges and opportunities for U.S. policy on Taiwan and the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

We are grateful today to be joined by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink.

Welcome. I will give you a fuller introduction in a moment.

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink recently returned from an official visit to China with Secretary Blinken, so we do look forward to hearing any takeaways from your trip, especially as they relate to cross-strait relations.

This month marks the 45th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides a framework for the United States' unofficial relations with Taiwan. And in just a few weeks Taiwan will undergo another peaceful democratic transition with the inauguration of a new president.

So this is a timely hearing in many ways. Across the decades U.S. policy across the Taiwan Strait has been consistent, guided by the TRA, the three joint communiques and the six assurances.

We are not the party that is seeking to change the status quo in the region. Our commitment has been and remains to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo from either side by force or coercion.

The People's Republic of China, however, has been employing increasingly bellicose rhetoric and utilizing gray zone tactics that seek to undermine the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.

Just this past weekend, following Secretary Blinken's visit to China President Xi, deployed 12 fighter jets across the sensitive median line of the Taiwan Strait, which once served as an unofficial border over which neither side's military crossed, but now China's air force regularly sends aircraft over it.

And earlier this month the PRC unilaterally announced new civil aviation routes running very close to two Taiwanese controlled islands as well as to the median line.

These actions are part of an effort to pressure Taiwan to accept Beijing's claims of sovereignty, and they escalate tensions in the region. As a partner that is committed to helping Taiwan maintain its self-defense capability, the United States must work with our allies and partners in the region to sustain a credible deterrent to those malign actions that are attempting to move the needle on a daily basis.

That is why it was so important that we passed the recent national security supplemental bill with funding for Ukraine and for our Indo-Pacific partners.

As Taiwan approaches its May 20 presidential inauguration, the PRC has ratcheted up diplomatic and military pressure against Taipei, underscoring the need for increased security cooperation between the United States and our allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, and we were glad to ensure that the bill provided security assistance to Taiwan and other partners in that region.

Additionally, we know this aid is vital to supporting the Ukrainian people in their fight against Putin, which also has critical implications for defending freedom and democracy worldwide.

Our allies and our adversaries alike have been watching closely to see if the United States and our partners will keep our promises to the people of Ukraine in their hour of need, or whether we will retreat.

In particular, we know that President Xi has one eye on the war in Ukraine and the other on Taiwan. While we, of course, remain committed to helping Taiwan defend itself and protecting U.S. national security interests in the region, I am not one who believes that conflict across the Taiwan Strait is inevitable.

We do not seek confrontation with China, and we must make clear through our words and our actions that we seek to reinforce the status quo regarding Taiwan, not upset it.

I was pleased to see Secretary Austin recently connect with his PRC counterpart for the first time, and the resumption of high level military communication is a key way to avoid unintended consequences and misunderstandings.

As we work to protect the status quo and support Taiwan's ability to defend itself, I am looking forward to hearing about how we can further strengthen our commercial ties with the island, which has become an economic powerhouse in the region and a major trading partner for the United States.

I am glad that negotiations resume this week on the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade. As the United States' eighth larg-

est trading partner; it is also long past time that we enact a tax agreement with Taiwan to avoid double taxation of our businesses.

Former Senator Sasse and I introduced a measure to encourage that back in 2022, and Senator Romney and I have been doing the same. I want to acknowledge the important investments that TSMC has been making in chips manufacturing here in the United States since the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act.

I would also like to hear more about what the United States can do to build international support for Taiwan and its democracy, and how we can strengthen the coalition of countries willing to call out the PRC when they engage in aggressive behaviors across the strait, and how we can effectively respond to China's economic coercion against those countries that support Taiwan.

The strong people to people bonds between the United States and Taiwan, our shared democratic values, and our economic ties form the bedrock of our friendship and serve as the foundation for expanding U.S. engagement with Taiwan.

I look forward to hearing further from Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink on each of these matters but before I turn it over to you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, I want to turn it over to my colleague, Senator Romney, for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MITT ROMNEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH**

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and consistent with our personal relationship I agree with virtually everything you said.

I have no bones to pick in anything you described, and I am happy to see our mutual friend, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, here as well. We have had the chance to meet and speak a number of times.

Some weeks ago I asked Taiwan's representative to the United States, what was the single most important thing we could do to convince China that it would be unwise to consider a military action of invasion against Taiwan, and the representative said, it would be to provide funding support for Ukraine. And like the Chairman has indicated I am very pleased that we finally got that done.

I think it sends a signal to would be aggressors around the world of all kinds that we will stand by our commitments and that we honor and respect the rights of democratic people to retain their freedoms and their vision for their own livelihoods.

Unfortunately, we know that Xi Jinping has stated an intention to unify with Taiwan, potentially including a forceful measure, and we see a number of troubling developments that we have to take into account.

Of course, he is building out extraordinary military capabilities—naval, space, rocketry and other dimensions. He is exerting economic coercion on Taiwan, obviously, making numerous threatening over flights, extending gray zone activities, particularly thinking about some of the disinformation that was shared through TikTok during the most recent presidential elections.

I can tell you that from my reading, that has not had the impact that China may have hoped for. But clearly, Taiwan and its ability

to retain its freedom is of great interest to us and to other nations around the world.

It is our hope that Taiwan can be an aggressive competitor with China and with other nations, even with us, but not to be conquered by China. And one of the reasons that we are so anxious to help them invest in their own military might, as well as the reason we invest in our military might, is to assure that there is not temptation on the part of any nation, particularly China, to take aggressive military action against our friends in Taiwan.

Like the chairman, I am happy that we are celebrating the Taiwan Relations Act. It is not as clear cut as, perhaps, some would like, but I think it is good news that we find that this year China will—excuse me, the U.S. will surpass China as Taiwan’s top export market.

Taiwan’s collaboration with semiconductor manufacturers here in the U.S. to help build a resilient semiconductor industry here in the U.S. is also a great note and great importance to us, and I hope that the people of Taiwan recognize that we are their friends, that we are anxious for them to be able to determine their own course and to chart their lives as they wish, and that we will and always honor our friendship and our commitment to one another.

And so I look today to get a sense of what you believe, Mr. Assistant Secretary, China’s strategy is with regards to Taiwan and what ours should be, and what it is, and what things we hope to do, everything from economic strategy, military strategy, diplomatic strategy, and how things are developing on both fronts, both China’s success and our own.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will turn the microphone back to you, and we can turn to hear from the Assistant Secretary.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you. Thank you, Senator Romney.

I am now going to introduce our witness today, Assistant Secretary Krittenbrink.

Daniel Krittenbrink became Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in September 2021 and has worked to advance our nation’s strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific region.

This role is a continuation of his three decades of distinguished public service having joined the Foreign Service in 1994.

Before serving as Assistant Secretary, Mr. Krittenbrink served as the United States Ambassador to Vietnam from 2017 to 2021, and his deep background in Indo-Pacific Affairs includes time as senior director for Asian affairs at the NSC and deputy chief of mission at the United States embassy in Beijing.

He speaks both Chinese and Japanese. As a Nebraska native he earned a bachelor’s degree from the University of Nebraska Kearney and a master’s degree from the University of Virginia later on.

I want to thank him for his distinguished service to our country, both China’s success and our own. We look forward to your testimony. We respectfully ask that you try to keep your opening statement to about 5 minutes, but we are eager to hear from you and look forward to the question period.

Assistant Secretary Krittenbrink.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AF-
FAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the kind introduction.

Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you today about the Administration's commitment to the United States' long standing "One China" policy which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, or the TRA, the three joint communiques and the six assurances and which has promoted peace and prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple Administrations from both parties.

I would also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan support for the Administration's national security supplemental which both of you mentioned. Fully agree with your comments.

Passage of the supplemental will provide critical security assistance for the Indo-Pacific region including Taiwan. Today, I will deliver the below statement, which is a summarized version of my longer written testimony which has been submitted for the record.

The U.S. unofficial relationship with Taiwan, we are confident, is stronger than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the TRA in 1979 which President Biden himself voted for as a Senator, the TRA has given us the tools that we need to pursue our overall objective of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Far from being outdated or obsolete, the TRA provides an enduring framework under which we continue to adapt to face the challenges of today.

The Taiwan Relations Act is a remarkably prescient document. Nearly a half-century ago it laid down a marker that the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a matter of grave concern.

The TRA laid the foundation for the United States to provide Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability as well as to maintain our own capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.

The TRA also astutely anticipated the need to strengthen support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat that it faces. Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act the PRC threat to Taiwan has, indeed, increased and the PRC has never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan.

In response to this threat and consistent with our "One China" policy, this Administration is bolstering cross-strait deterrence using the full range of tools at our disposal.

We are grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and subsequent appropriations, which has allowed us to provide several security assistance measures to Taiwan for the first time, and which I detail further in my written testimony.

This Administration has also notified Congress of more than \$6.2 billion in foreign military sales to Taiwan including 20 sales between 2022 and 2023, the largest 2 year number of notifications for Taiwan in at least 30 years.

The defense aspect of deterrence, while crucial, is only one element of our approach. As the Taiwan Relations Act declared, peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait are not only U.S. interests, but also matters of international concern.

Therefore, we are working daily toward increasing the diplomatic costs of precipitous action against Taiwan by strengthening the international coalition of allies and partners who recognize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and who are willing to contribute to its maintenance.

We also continue to advocate for Taiwan's international space, including Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations and pushing back against China's efforts to mischaracterize the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758.

Finally, our partnership with Taiwan has grown dramatically and stands on its own, enabled by the tools and authorities provided in the Taiwan Relations Act. Taiwan is the United States' eighth largest trading partner with bilateral trade in goods totaling nearly \$128 billion in 2023, up from just \$9 billion in 1979.

In addition, through the American Institute in Taiwan, this Administration launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, the Technology Trade and Investment Collaboration Framework, and the Inaugural Science and Technology Cooperation Dialogue, among other milestones.

As another example, TSMC's historic \$65 billion investment in Arizona is the largest greenfield direct investment project in U.S. history, supported with up to \$6.6 billion in direct funding through the CHIPS Act.

In conclusion, with the Taiwan Relations Act as a foundational element of our "One China" policy, we have deepened and expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not only the threat Taiwan faces from the PRC but also the vibrant partnership between the United States and Taiwan.

We have been able to engage in extensive cooperation with Taiwan precisely because the TRA provides the authorities we need to carry out our unofficial relationship.

We have the framework we need. We do not need to change it. What we need to do is respond to the present moment using all the tools at our disposal. I hope today I have demonstrated how this Administration is doing just that in close partnership with Congress.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:]

Prepared Statement of Mr. Daniel J. Kritenbrink

Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Romney, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the Administration's continuing commitment to the United States' longstanding One China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances, and which has promoted peace and prosperity in the region for 45 years across multiple administrations from both parties.

I would also like to thank Congress for its bipartisan support for the Administration's national security supplemental, which will provide critical security assistance for the Indo-Pacific region, including Taiwan.

The United States' unofficial relationship with Taiwan is stronger than ever. With credit to Congress for passing the TRA in 1979—which President Biden himself voted for as a Senator—my aim today is to illustrate how the TRA has given us

the tools we need to pursue our overall objective of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Far from being outdated or obsolete, the TRA provides an enduring framework under which we continue to adapt to face the challenges of today.

DEFENSE AND SECURITY TIES

The TRA is a remarkably prescient document. Nearly a half century ago, it laid down a marker that the United States would “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means” as a matter of “grave concern to the United States.”

The TRA laid the foundation for the United States to continue providing Taiwan with the defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to “maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,” as well as to maintain our own capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan.

The TRA also astutely anticipated that the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) threat to Taiwan and to cross-Strait peace and stability would continue, and provided us the ability to strengthen our support for Taiwan commensurate with the threat it faces.

Indeed, in the 45 years since the passage of the TRA, the PRC threat to Taiwan has not only continued, but increased. The PRC has become the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.

The PRC has never renounced the use of force to unify with Taiwan, and has increased its campaign of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic pressure designed to isolate and intimidate Taiwan. Beijing’s increasingly provocative actions are deeply destabilizing, risk miscalculation, and threaten peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

In response to this threat, and consistent with our one China policy, this Administration is intensely focused on bolstering cross-Strait deterrence using the range of tools at our disposal. On top of the TRA, we are grateful to Congress for providing additional authorities and resources through the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act and subsequent appropriations. To date, we have:

- Directed the drawdown of defense articles and services from DoD stocks and resources for Taiwan, valued at \$345 million;
- Notified Congress of the first-ever provision of Foreign Military Financing grant assistance to Taiwan;
- Notified Congress that Taiwan is eligible for Excess Defense Articles (EDA) grant assistance in Fiscal Year (FY) 2024;
- Provided Taiwan with International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, which will unlock millions of dollars in savings for Taiwan to participate in courses across the DoD educational enterprise;
- More than doubled DoD’s Building Partner Capacity assistance for Taiwan from fiscal year 2022 to 2023.

This Administration has also notified Congress of more than \$6.2 billion in Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan, including 20 sales between 2022 and 2023, the largest number of notifications over a 2-year period in at least 30 years.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS AND TAIWAN’S INTERNATIONAL SPACE

The defense aspect of deterrence, while crucial, is only one element of our approach. As the TRA declared, “peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern.”

We are working daily toward our goal of increasing the diplomatic costs of precipitous action against Taiwan by strengthening the international coalition of allies and partners who recognize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and are willing to contribute to its maintenance.

In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan, this Administration has driven unprecedented alignment among allies and partners on cross-Strait issues, which has manifested in numerous high-level public statements—including by the G7, EU, and Indo-Pacific partners—as well as private discussions with friends across the globe.

Amid increasing PRC pressure on Taiwan’s diplomatic partners, we have concluded Memoranda of Understanding through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) under which USAID and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) are working with Taiwan’s International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF) to leverage our collective resources toward development projects

and trainings in the Pacific Islands and Western Hemisphere, where most of Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners are located.

We also continue to advocate for maintaining and increasing Taiwan's "international space," including Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations and multilateral fora such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Assembly, and at the Organization for Economic Cooperation for Development (OECD).

We are pushing back against the PRC's efforts to mischaracterize U.N. General Assembly resolution 2758, which did not constitute a U.N. institutional position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan, has no bearing on countries' sovereign decisions regarding their relationships with Taiwan, and does not preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in the U.N. system or in any other multilateral forum. Moreover, resolution 2758 did not endorse, is not equivalent to, and does not reflect a consensus for the PRC's "One China Principle," a concept that refers to the PRC's own position with respect to Taiwan and that is distinct from the U.S. one China policy.

Thanks to Congress' generosity, the United States, Taiwan, Japan, and Australia have jointly organized dozens of workshops through the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) to share Taiwan's expertise with the world on topics ranging from public health to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

ECONOMIC AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE TIES

Finally, despite the challenges we face, I want to emphasize that our partnership with Taiwan stands on its own. Enabled by the tools and authorities provided in the TRA, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has grown by leaps and bounds since 1979.

The TRA explicitly called for the preservation and promotion of "extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations" between the United States and Taiwan. In 1979, U.S.-Taiwan trade was approximately \$9 billion, not adjusted for inflation. Today, Taiwan is the United States' eighth-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade in goods totaling nearly \$128 billion in 2023.

In addition, in the last 45 years, through great effort, Taiwan has become a vibrant and flourishing democracy, a technological powerhouse, and a global force for good. It is a critical U.S. partner in semiconductors and other critical supply chains, public health, and education. As one example, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's historic \$65 billion investment in Arizona is the largest greenfield Foreign Direct Investment project in U.S. history, supported with up to \$6.6 billion in proposed direct funding through the CHIPS Act. The TSMC facilities in Arizona will create approximately 6,000 direct manufacturing jobs, and tens of thousands more in construction and indirect jobs, as well as bring the most advanced semiconductor manufacturing back to American soil.

In recognition of the significance of our economic and people-to-people relationship with Taiwan, we have expanded our engagements on these topics in a manner consistent with our one China policy and the Taiwan Relations Act. Under the auspices of AIT, this Administration:

- Launched the U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade in 2022;
- Initiated the Department of Commerce-led Technology, Trade, and Investment Collaboration in December 2021;
- Institutionalized the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue to discuss cooperation in areas such as supply chains, energy security, and responding to economic coercion;
- Helped Taiwan embark on a collaboration with NASA through the ASIA-AQ regional air quality monitoring project;
- Solidified partnerships between the U.S. DFC, USAID, and Taiwan's ICDF to assist Taiwan's international development assistance strategies;
- Commemorated the 30th anniversary of the relationship between the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Taiwan's Ministry of Environment (formerly the Taiwan EPA) in 2023;
- Convened the inaugural Science and Technology Cooperation Dialogue in 2023;
- Welcomed over 150 Taiwan delegates to participate in the U.S. hosting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in 2023; and
- Facilitated a record number of American students studying Mandarin in Taiwan through Department of State language exchange programs and the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative.

CONCLUSION

With the TRA as a foundational element of our one China policy, we have deepened and expanded our ties with Taiwan over decades to reflect not only the threat Taiwan faces from the PRC, but the vibrant and dynamic partnership between the United States and Taiwan.

We have been able to engage in multiple initiatives and extensive cooperation with Taiwan because the TRA provides the authorities to carry out our unofficial relationship.

We have the framework we need. We do not need to change it. What we need is to respond to the present moment, using all the tools at our disposal. I hope today I have demonstrated how this Administration is doing just that, in close partnership with Congress.

Looking ahead, the dynamism that has defined our unofficial relationship with Taiwan—even as our foundational policy has not changed—will continue. The TRA endures as a critical element of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which not only benefits the United States, but is also in the global interest.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Assistant Secretary.

Let me start off with a question about your recent trip to China, where you and Secretary Blinken had meetings with President Xi and others.

Are there any key takeaways from your meetings in China specifically with respect to the status of Taiwan?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.

I will say at the outset that I was honored to accompany Secretary Blinken to Beijing and Shanghai for an important series of meetings with China's leaders including President Xi Jinping, Director, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, the Minister of Public Security and also the Shanghai party secretary.

As the Secretary laid out in Beijing his primary agenda was to follow up from the summit meeting between President Biden and President Xi in Woodside, California, both in terms of pursuing some of the cooperative areas that we agreed to work on, particularly fentanyl, ensuring that our mil-mil channels stay open, launching a dialogue on AI and promoting our people to people ties, and I think that on fentanyl the Secretary's message was we are grateful for the significant cooperation that has taken place thus far, but we need even more.

Second, I think it is fair to say, perhaps, even more importantly the Secretary focused on the many areas of difference between the United States and China. Certainly, the issue across the strait was a key feature of his discussions.

The Secretary made clear our "One China" policy has not changed. Our fundamental national interest is in preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

We oppose unilateral efforts by either side to undermine that status quo, and neither China nor anyone else should take advantage of this period in the run up to the May 20 inauguration to take steps that would undermine that peace and stability.

The Secretary was also very candid about our concerns for China's support in reconstituting the Russian defense industrial base, that candid exchange on the South China Sea as well, and also the Secretary was quite clear about our concerns about the distortionary impacts of the Chinese mercantilistic economic model and our concerns about what those unfair trade practices may mean for the U.S. economy.

They also had an exchange on some other foreign policy issues. But squarely on the cross-strait situation, the Secretary was quite candid, as I said, about our interests and our commitment to meeting our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act, particularly to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. You in your opening statement mentioned it, both Senator Romney and I mentioned it, but that fundamental architecture from 45 years ago, the Taiwan Relations Act.

As you know, there has been a lot of debate around the country and certainly in Congress, both the House and the Senate, about whether or not that remains the right framework for approaching our policies with respect to China and Taiwan.

There are some who have said that it is time to move to greater strategic clarity and to be very precise about the circumstances under which the United States may itself act to defend Taiwan. Others have pointed out the risks in that.

Any change there? In your testimony you said that this has not only stood the test of time, but you believe that this architecture remained sound.

Could you expand on that and maybe respond a little to those who have recommended that we change course?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I fully agree. We have the framework that we need. We think that the TRA and the other elements of our "One China" policy have given us the tools that we need.

That framework has stood the test of time. For the last 45 years we have preserved peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We believe that changing that framework, changing the TRA or the core elements of the U.S. "One China" policy would be unwise, and rather than contributing to stability we believe would undermine it.

I think it is important that the United States and our allies and partners continue to be the parties that stand for the status quo, that stand for the responsible maintenance of the status quo, and that stand against coercion and upending that framework.

I will also say as a practical matter, Mr. Chairman, on a daily basis we think it is much more productive to focus on concrete, tangible means to build Taiwan's deterrent capability, to focus on tangibly expanding the number of countries who recognize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and are willing to contribute to its maintenance.

That is the kind of work that we think is most important. We think it would be, again, unwise to change the framework that we have which, again, in our view has stood the test of time.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you.

Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Assistant Secretary, it is, I think, apparent to everyone that China goes to great lengths to try and convince other countries to sever diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Why, in your view, do they do that? What is the intent? What is the purpose? What objective are they trying to reach?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, very candidly speaking, I think their objective is to try to pressure and coerce and intimidate and isolate Taiwan, and I think they believe that by picking off, so to speak, Taiwan's diplomatic allies, they can further those objectives.

In response to that, we do a number of things. We do support Taiwan and its relationship with its remaining diplomatic partners, and we can talk a bit more about that if you like.

But we also think it is just as important to assist Taiwan in having productive relationships with its unofficial partners including the United States.

Senator ROMNEY. There have been a number of countries over the years that have severed relations with Taiwan, some in the Pacific, in Latin America as well.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Senator ROMNEY. Are there any that have gone the other way? Meaning nations that did not have relations with Taiwan but have now established those relationships.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I do not have those names at my fingertips, but I know some of the countries including in the Pacific have flip flopped over the years, and it is one of the things, Mr. Ranking Member, that we try to caution countries.

Try to caution them about getting caught up in this larger game, so to speak. We have also cautioned countries that many times the promises that the PRC makes when it is trying to convince a country to flip, many times China does not carry out those promises.

And we also try to highlight Taiwan is a very capable and valuable partner for countries to have.

Senator ROMNEY. My assessment is that there have been nations that have severed relations with Taiwan but have not gone the other way. It would seem that they are succeeding in that effort, and we are probably not being quite as effective. Am I wrong in that assessment?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, I think it is a fact, Mr. Ranking Member, that over time the number of Taiwan's formal diplomatic partners has decreased. That is a fact.

But one thing that we have underscored to our Taiwan partners as well, as important as those diplomatic relations are—I will just reiterate the point I made a moment ago—many of Taiwan's unofficial partners including the United States are at least as important as those former diplomatic—those formal diplomatic allies, and I have been gratified that even just over the last 3 years we have seen a pretty significant increase in the number of countries who are willing to stand up and say that they recognize peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait is a matter of international concern.

It is fundamentally important that they too oppose unilateral changes to change the status quo and that they too are increasing their interactions with Taiwan, which we fully support.

Senator ROMNEY. I would anticipate that if we were to look at what China's strategy is with regards to Taiwan, that one small element would be trying to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.

This is not a major, perhaps, thrust of their strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan but part of it, and the fact that they have been successful in doing that, gives me some concern that we do not have a strat-

egy as effective as theirs in moving things in the other direction and having more nations establish relations with Taiwan, and insisting on them being involved in international bodies and so forth so as to increase the ties that the Taiwan would enjoy globally, and also make it more likely that were China to be tempted to carry out some kind of military effort that they would recognize that a number of nations that would find that offensive and would be likely to respond in an aggressive way—not necessarily militarily but economically or diplomatically.

So I would think it would be an important part of our nation's strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan. Can you give me a sense what are the key parameters, do you believe, of what China is doing to try and pull Taiwan into its orbit, or ultimately, as Xi Jinping has indicated to actually create a single nation with Taiwan as part of the PRC?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I do think that the diplomatic piece is just one element of that strategy.

I think I would tend to agree with you, it is not the most important part, but it is an element, and in response to that, as I mentioned, we tried to be active in messaging countries and warning and cautioning them about what they may be getting themselves into, but also in a more proactive and affirmative way.

We partner with Taiwan and other countries around the world to see that Taiwan's remaining diplomatic partners receive tangible benefits for that partnership and understand its value.

In terms of the broader Chinese strategy, again, I will reiterate what I said at the top. I think that—I mean, China's stated objective is to unify with Taiwan. President Xi Jinping has stated that the so called great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is incomplete without reunifying the so called motherland.

So that statement is out there, and also——

Senator ROMNEY. That is the objective.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. That is their objective.

Senator ROMNEY. And one small element of the strategy, as we have indicated, is diplomatic isolation.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Right.

Senator ROMNEY. But what are the other dimensions do you think of that key strategy?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I think it is clear that they are building other means to try to coerce and intimidate Taiwan including their military capabilities, the exercise of those capabilities, their attempts to, as the chairman pointed out, to undermine long standing norms like the center line.

And I think if they were successful they would like to—through disinformation and these other intimidation tactics and gray zone tactics, they would like to discourage the people of Taiwan into somehow thinking that unification is inevitable.

I think that is as candid as I can be about how we see their strategy. Our strategy, as I have tried to lay out, is on the opposite side of that. We stand for peace, stability——

Senator ROMNEY. I will come back for that. My time is up so I will come back to that——

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Senator ROMNEY [continuing]. And I want to just elaborate more on theirs and then come back to ours.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, and that is a good segue to my question relating to some of these gray zone tactics. Because as you stated in your testimony and just repeated now, part of China's stated strategy is to, as they describe it, reunify with Taiwan including by force, not—certainly not ruling out force.

And a lot of time and effort has been spent trying to envision what would happen if there was an invasion of Taiwan by China, and people have tried to game that out.

But what we are seeing right now is something different. We are seeing these sort of gray zone tactics, and so my question to you, Mr. Assistant Secretary, is how should we think about our toolkit for responding to gray zone tactics?

We have seen the use of aircraft, drones, and balloons invading Taiwanese airspace. We have seen naval incursions into Taiwanese waters. We have seen cyber attacks on civilian infrastructures. You know there are some Taiwanese islands that are very close to the mainland PRC.

How should we think about the potential salami tactics—gray zone tactics, and what is our toolkit for responding to those in a way that sends the right message, but also being wary of escalation?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Look, I fully agree with your description of the challenge and the description the ranking member has provided as well. So in response to that, our focus is trying to build and increase in every way Taiwan's deterrent capability and Taiwan's resilience.

Part of that is meeting our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense. That is \$6.2 billion in arms sales notified by this Administration and many other tools that we have been given by Congress from PDA and Excess Defense Articles and the like.

So part of that is the security side. Related to that is some of the work that we are doing with friends in Taiwan to help the Taiwan administration in promoting defense reform, and building out an asymmetric resilient defense capability that we think provides greater deterrence.

Another line of effort is related to our diplomatic work, as I have talked about. We have talked about building out Taiwan's international space or an international coalition of partners that support Taiwan and support peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, support Taiwan's meaningful participation in international organizations.

Part of it is building Taiwan's economic resilience. Again, Taiwan is our eighth largest trading partner, more than \$120 billion in annual trade.

Our friends from USTR are in Taipei right now working on the next advancement of the 21st Century Trade Initiative. That is part of it as well.

Part of it is working with officials in charge of cybersecurity in Taiwan, assisting Taiwan in building their whole of society resilience.

So we see this as a multifaceted effort, but everything is motivated by, again, a desire to build Taiwan's deterrent capability and their resilience, all in support of maintaining the status quo and deterring China from being tempted to take precipitous action against Taiwan.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that.

We spoke a little bit about diplomatic efforts with other countries. I just want to focus on the neighborhood where both sort of China and Taiwan reside.

We recently had the Japanese Prime Minister Kishida here in the United States for a state visit—addressed a joint session of Congress—and I know that we have been working closely with Japan and other partners with respect to efforts to deter China's aggression in the area including with respect to Taiwan.

Can you talk a little bit about the Biden administration's efforts to create sort of a common purpose both with respect to Japan, with respect to South Korea and the Philippines and other countries where we are working to try to achieve that goal of deterrence?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

The way I would describe our efforts is, first, fundamentally it is working with a range of partners around the world to, first, explain and hopefully increase understanding of the importance of Taiwan and the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

There are many elements to that, but some of the most fundamental and obvious, in my mind, include the fact that 50 percent of the world's global container traffic goes through the Taiwan Strait. Ninety percent of the world's high end chips are produced in Taiwan.

It is very clear that if there were a crisis, let alone a conflict, in the Taiwan Strait, this would have devastating impacts, I think, globally including for the global economy.

Then once countries recognize that reality and understand the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, we then try to work with partners to determine ways in which they can help contribute to the maintenance of that peace and stability, and I think that is the most important work that we can do.

I have been gratified to see, for example, the increasingly large number of countries that have in joint statements with us spoken out in support of the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

I believe there were more than 20 countries that spoke out after the Taiwan presidential election to congratulate Taiwan and the Taiwan people.

So I think you see a pretty significant increase in the number of countries who recognize the importance of this issue.

The other point that I would make, Mr. Chairman, that I think is really important, this is another reason why I think it is vitally important that the United States continue to be the party working toward the status quo, maintaining the status quo, not being the

party that is somehow changing our approach or our framework or our actions.

Because I think when partners view this situation, they understand the importance of Taiwan and peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and when they understand that we stand for status quo and peace and stability, not for coercion and intimidation, I think it increases partners' willingness and comfort to stand up with us to advance those efforts.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I agree. That is an important point.

Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We were speaking about some of the tactics or tools that China uses in their strategy vis-à-vis Taiwan, and I would have thought that their relationship with major powers in their region would be high on their priority list, that they would want to see a weakening relationship, for instance, between the United States and places like South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Philippines.

But it has been the opposite. They have done a number of things which have weakened, from my perspective, their ties with those nations. We have seen one of the great accomplishments diplomatically as seeing Japan and South Korea be able to come together in some important respects.

Why have they failed so badly in terms of—I mean, add India to that list. That is not quite the same neighborhood but the next door.

Just one after the other they seem to have done pretty well with some of the islands in the Pacific, and perhaps in Latin America, but they seem to have gone backward with some of the major powers that are in their neighborhood.

I am sure part of that is our good work but part has to be some of the stumbles on their part. Have I mischaracterized that, and why do you believe that might be?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. No, Mr. Ranking Member, I think you have characterized it quite accurately. Maybe I will leave to other observers to explain exactly why this has happened. But I guess I would make a couple of points.

We are incredibly proud of our approach to the broader Indo-Pacific region. I would argue that our relationship with friends, partners, and allies across the region are stronger than they have ever been before, and also increasingly we have been able to network those relationships into what we call a latticework of overlapping relationships.

It is the bilateral partnerships. It is the trilateral work with Tokyo and Seoul, with Tokyo and Manila, with Canberra. It is the Quad. It is AUKUS. It is other partnerships.

And what we find, Mr. Ranking Member, I mean, the Chinese would complain that somehow this is a containment strategy. It absolutely is not.

What we find is we are promoting our affirmative agenda, the things that we stand for—peace and stability, international law, the fact that all countries large and small ought to follow and play by the same rules. Large countries should not bully the weak.

And what we find is that is a vision that is very popular in the region. Countries around the region, they do not like to be intimidated. They do not like to be bullied. They do not like to be coerced.

And I hope that that makes clear, perhaps, why China has not succeeded in certain areas and where we believe we have, and furthermore, I would say, Mr. Ranking Member, we always talk about the three pillars of our China strategy—invest, align, compete.

I would argue probably the align piece with allies and partners is probably the most important and the most effective.

Senator ROMNEY. I, for one, was surprised to see their treatment of Australia, for instance, and wondered how that could possibly be in their interest to offend a nation in their region as they did, obviously, a nation with which we have a close relationship.

But a number of actions they have taken, including the way they have treated the people in Hong Kong have, obviously, had an impact in their neighborhood.

One dimension of their strategy has to be economic with regards to Taiwan. What are they doing on the economic front, and is it alarming Taiwan? Are they building closer relations with Taiwan, particularly in the area of semiconductors or others?

Are there—I mean, they have made a massive investment. We are talking about right now our CHIPS Act and what we are finally doing, but China has been—basically has had a CHIPS Act in place for almost a decade spending over \$50 billion to establish a competitive semiconductor capacity which has not yet yielded the result they had looked for.

What is China doing on the economic front to try and either grow ties with Taiwan or to isolate it economically?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, more broadly, Mr. Ranking Member, I agree that they have stated explicitly through made in China strategies and other documents that they would like to dominate the key sectors, especially the high tech sectors of the 21st century economy. So I think that is their broader goal.

When it comes to Taiwan I think it has been a complex approach and somewhat of a mixed message. I think, on the one hand, the economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland actually remain quite robust.

But I think that, like many partners around the region and around the world, Taiwan has been working to diversify those economic relationships so that they are not as subject to the risk of coercion and intimidation.

But here, too, I think China has used the coercive tool as well. They took some steps in the run up to the election to curtail some of the economic and trade relationships.

There were certain instances where it seemed they were picking sectors that they hoped would have the most positive impact politically in Taiwan, from their perspective, and they have also threatened to curtail some of the previous trade agreements with Taiwan.

So I think it is a mixed picture. It is partly engagement, and it is partly threatening consequences for not doing Beijing's bidding in certain areas.

Senator ROMNEY. Thank you.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I am pleased we have been joined by the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and fellow Marylander, Senator Cardin.

The CHAIRMAN. Chairman, thank you very much for convening this hearing.

Thank you, Senator Romney, for participating in this. This is an important area, our relationship with Taiwan.

I appreciate, Mr. Secretary, your comments about the importance of the supplemental appropriation bill. I am curious as to whether you have any reaction from PRC in regards to the adoption of the supplemental as it related to America's commitment to Taiwan.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, honored to see you. Thank you for having me here today and for joining us here today.

Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that the Chinese have noticed, and they have complained. They have complained in general about our strategy and our approach to the Indo-Pacific, which they have termed a containment strategy of China, in which I hope I have stated here categorically it absolutely is not.

They have also complained about elements of the supplemental as they relate to Taiwan. We have made clear that the supplemental is—just how fundamental passage of the supplemental is, and we have made clear that it is consistent with our long standing “One China” policy and it will help us meet our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan maintain its self-defense.

And we have also made clear the reason we are doing this is we are committed to maintaining that self-defense capacity commensurate with the threat that Taiwan faces, and that threat, as we have said here today, is only increasing.

The CHAIRMAN. So I understand that you are suggesting this is not necessarily the right time for us to legislate any changes in the official relationship between Taiwan and the United States.

But I think we all agree that the PRC has misinterpreted the U.N. resolution of 1971 to make it difficult for Taiwan to participate particularly in multilateral organizations.

We have an opportunity coming up later in May—at the end of May, beginning of June, with the World Health Organization and its affiliates, and Taiwan's participation and membership is one of the agenda items.

Is the United States prepared to support Taiwan's efforts to participate in multilateral organizations that there is no logical reason why they should not be permitted? And certainly, the U.N. resolution does not speak to that.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree with everything you have said. First of all, we do believe that China is misusing UNGA Resolution 2758.

They tried to somehow say that the U.N. adopted China's so called “One China” principle, and our position is categorically 2758 did not constitute a U.N. institutional position on the ultimate political status of Taiwan, has no bearing on countries' sovereign decisions about their relationship with Taiwan, and it does not preclude Taiwan's meaningful participation in U.N. bodies.

So as you know, Mr. Chairman, our position has always been we support Taiwan's participation in international bodies where state-

hood is not a requirement. We support their meaningful participation in those entities that do require statehood.

Taiwan is a very capable health partner. They have been observers in the WHA before, and they deserve to be so again. You will see us speak out again very soon as we have consistently every year in support of Taiwan's observership at WHA.

I think last year we had 22 countries supporting us. I expect that that number will grow this year. But it is the same for their meaningful participation in ICAO and Interpol.

Again, from our perspective Taiwan is a democracy. It is a force for good. It is a capable partner that has a lot to offer the international community.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me the PRC's position is more punitive than it is even political right now as it relates to Taiwan's participation. Clearly, a health organization—Taiwan could be a major contributor, and certainly, has a lot in common with the purpose of these organizations.

Their not being full membership diminishes their ability to help the World Health Organization, help all of us, in regards to health issues because as we know pandemics know no country border.

So—

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Fully agree with you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we have a strategy for the May/June meeting?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. The strategy is, Mr. Chairman, I think you will see in coming days that we will again state categorically, publicly our support for Taiwan's meaningful participation and observership at the WHA, and we will engage diplomatically around the world to get partner support for that effort.

I also agree with your assessment that I think it is not a coincidence that essentially since the President Tsai Ing-wen's election, China has become more aggressive in opposing Taiwan's participation in the WHA and elsewhere.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator ROMNEY. I wanted to turn to the concept of deterrence. We anticipate when we think about Taiwan that one of the keys to keeping China from getting ambitious militarily is to have Taiwan able to defend itself and ourselves, potentially, in a strategic ambiguity sense to be unclear about what involvement we might have.

But I would think that China's calculation about action of a hostile nature against Taiwan would encompass not just military might but also the response diplomatically of nations around the world, but also economic impact. And I wonder if you could speak to the economic peril that would be visited upon the PRC if they were to invade Taiwan. If there were to be conflict of some kind and destruction of some kind, what the impact would be on China itself?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, we are always reluctant to engage in detail on a hypothetical scenario, but I think I could say with confidence that if China were to take precipitous action against Taiwan, obviously, that would be a deeply desta-

bilizing and unacceptable move on their part, and I think it is fair to say that I think many members of the international community, obviously, would oppose that step.

I am reluctant to go into detail about, again, what may or may not happen in such a scenario. I would say two things. One, we are doing everything possible to hold—everything possible to build our deterrent capacity in every way, and I hope that friends, not just in Beijing but elsewhere around the world, would see how the international community has stood up in the last few years against efforts to coerce other countries or to use violence to achieve their means, and obviously, we would hope that that would provide a deterrent effect.

Senator ROMNEY. I am actually thinking about some of the more direct economic impact, for instance, anticipating that China relies on Taiwan, for instance, for semiconductor needs of various kinds, particularly the high end semiconductors, and that were that would be a conflict or a cross-Taiwan Strait challenge of some kind that this could have an enormous impact on China's own economy, not to mention our own, but that the global impact of disruption in Taiwan, military disruption that China might be tempted to undertake, could have the potential of throwing China itself into major economic distress as well as ourselves and others around the world.

We are an interconnected world, like it or not, and nations are racing, in some respects, ourselves included, to try and sever the ties, particularly when it relates to strategic and national security assets.

But we are far from that condition today here in the U.S., and I presume China is as well. Is that a fair assessment, that conflict in Taiwan would have a massive economic impact on China as well as, potentially, ourselves and others in the world?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Ranking Member, I think it is absolutely spot on. No one would win from such a scenario. There would be devastating impacts on the global economy that I think would impact all of us including, as you pointed out, the PRC.

I would just underscore we do not see a conflict as being either imminent or inevitable and we are doing everything possible, using all the tools at our disposal, to contribute to maintaining that peace and stability and maintaining deterrence so that Beijing is never tempted to take precipitous action.

But I do fully agree with you, this would be a devastating event.

Senator ROMNEY. And I would just note that it is hard to be prescient on things of this nature, but I concur with you that it would not be in China's interests, and I think Xi Jinping is an intelligent person, that military action is not the right path for him to consider for a lot of reasons, but one being the economic impact this would have on his own country, on nations around the world, on China's status.

Geopolitically it would also have to consider the sanctions that might apply that—and that there are alternatives, and they are pursuing the other alternatives very aggressively.

I do not know what—and this is not the setting to talk about their military efforts for military invasion, but it does seem that they have a very comprehensive strategy with regards to Taiwan that they are pursuing and succeeding in some areas and not so

well in some other areas, but that they would have ambition to be able to achieve Xi Jinping's objective with regards to Taiwan without having to take military action.

It is our hope they are not able to do that, but like you, I do not think military action would be wise in any way, and I think Xi Jinping is smart enough to recognize that, at least at this stage.

Mr. Chairman.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Senator Duckworth.

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink. We are so glad to have you back here again.

The PRC goes around the world claiming that the United States wants to be a hegemon. They frame us as a bully when it is clear that no matter where you look that the only party interested in changing that status quo in the Taiwan Strait is the CCP.

I consistently push back against that narrative by passing legislation fully in line with our long standing policy toward Taiwan like the Taiwan Partnership Act, which requires that the National Guard—our National Guard—to explore more cooperation with counterparts in Taiwan.

In your view, are we doing enough to show the people, the policymakers, and the men and women in uniform in Taiwan of the extent of our support in the face of increasing PRC aggression?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, thank you. Nice to see you. I appreciate the question.

I do agree with you. First of all, as I noted at the outset, we have not changed our "One China" policy. We will not do so.

We stand for the maintenance of peace and stability and the status quo, and I think, as we have talked about here today, many of the steps that China is taking, unfortunately, are undermining that status quo, designed to intimidate and threaten and coerce Taiwan.

I am confident through the range of interactions with Taiwan counterparts that they understand the strength of our commitment to meeting our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist them in maintaining a self-defense capability that is sufficient, and also our commitment to building out our unofficial but incredibly important and robust relationship across the board in terms of the economy, people to people ties, and the like.

And certainly, we have tried to be supportive of the defense reforms, the whole of society defense initiatives that Taiwan authorities have carried out as well.

So yes, I can say with confidence that I think our unofficial partnership with Taiwan is stronger than it has ever been.

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

I understand that many people in Taiwan have heard of the Administration's push to invest in domestic semiconductor manufacturing capability here in the United States, and I am hearing that some people in Taiwan fear that enhanced U.S. capacity from this initiative will lessen the importance of Taiwan's own domestic industry.

I would like to ask you to speak to that. First, is there any way that the United States investments in our own semiconductor manufacturing somehow weakens the silicon shield for Taiwan, and

second, are we doing a good enough job of explaining to our allies and partners, especially Taiwan, that the building up of our own semiconductor manufacturing is not a zero sum equation with the silicon shield in Taiwan?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, what I would say is this. We have demonstrated for 45 years that we stand for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and we are committed to doing so, and we view that as fundamentally being in our national interest and that we will act accordingly to maintain that stability and deter the risk of precipitous PRC action.

I would argue quite vociferously that that is not going to change, and that is not going to change despite the developments that we have seen in the semiconductor industry.

I think our interests in peace and stability extend far beyond just our economic ties or the importance of the semiconductor industry.

And second, on your additional question, I am confident through our really robust engagement, not just with friends in Taiwan but with like minded partners around the world, I think they are increasingly clear about why Taiwan matters, about why peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait matters, and why it is in everyone's interest to ensure that there is no action to upset that.

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

The China challenge is enormously complicated. It requires nuance. It requires all the expertise and excellence and study, strategy, and skill that the United States can produce.

I am confident that we have more than enough resources and more than enough talent—human resource talent—to meet this challenge, and yet, the current travel warning on State.gov warns Americans to reconsider travel to the PRC, for good reason—out of concern for potential harassment, kidnapping, and worse by the authorities there.

Meanwhile, we still need Americans with experience in the region, Americans who speak fluent Mandarin and have a deep knowledge of Chinese cultures, and I believe that Taiwan is an obvious partner in achieving that.

So I want to invite you to speak to the U.S.-Taiwan Education Partnership. Is the progress we have been making there really making a difference?

Is it enough, and what more can Congress be doing to support American scholars who the secretary calls the ballast for a competitive and confrontational relationship?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, Senator, a couple of comments. We certainly are strongly supportive of building our people to people ties across the region, and certainly, with the people of Taiwan.

I think you have seen a pretty dramatic increase including through the support of the Senate for Taiwan's contribution to training Americans in Mandarin, and we would like to see that continue. I think it is vitally important.

We have supported the expansion of that training, and we hope it continues, and again, we welcome your support and leadership on those issues.

And maybe to add one more comment to your previous question as well. We definitely do not see our support for building our own

capacity, investing in our own capacities here domestically, as being a zero sum game.

I think you look at our economic integration with Taiwan. You look at TSMC's \$65 billion investment in Arizona as well. I think more than ever we are integrated and partnering.

So I do not see that as a zero sum game. But we talked a little bit earlier about trying to build Taiwan's resilience in every way, and I think building our people to people ties is a key part of that. It is a two way street.

We benefit, for example, from the language training that many friends of Taiwan have offered, and many Americans have studied in Taiwan, but I would like to think that many Taiwan friends have benefited from those interactions as well, including through study here in the United States.

Senator DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.

Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink, I do not know if this came up—I assume it did—during your recent visit with Secretary Blinken to China. But obviously, we have expressed concerns about China supporting Vladimir Putin and Russia in their war against Ukraine.

We have been quite clear that we would strongly oppose any direct military support, and we have indicated that that would draw a response, including economic sanctions.

There are some of us who believe that in order to make that deterrent more real we should be working with our allies in advance to spell out more clearly what those consequences would be.

We are focused on Taiwan now, and I agree with you and all your statements you made about the Taiwan Relations Act being the architecture regarding security and our approach to Taiwan.

But you do see a lot of these gray zone activities. So my question to you is this, and I do not have an answer in my own mind on this. But there has been some thoughtful discussion about whether or not we, the United States, should spell out in advance what the economic consequences to China would be about certain actions against Taiwan.

Obviously, if there were an all out military action, I agree with Senator Romney, the economic consequences would be terrible for all.

But is it worth trying to spell out in advance the United States with some of our key economic partners, both the EU, Japan, South Korea, what would trigger economic sanctions with respect to China's conduct vis-à-vis Taiwan as a deterrent?

In other words, a clear framework that has certainty and teeth on the economic side. I am not talking about the military side. On the economic side.

Is that something worth exploring, and if not why not?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a very thoughtful, very important question.

Look, I would state what is probably the clear point that even in the Taiwan Relations Act from the very beginning it points out that the United States would view any attempt to change the sta-

tus quo by other than peaceful means as something that is of grave concern to the United States.

And so I am confident both through that clear statement in the Taiwan Relations Act and our clearly indicating that to our PRC counterparts in all of our interactions that they know fundamental our interests are here, and they have to know that there would be consequences.

I think I would say we are normally reluctant to indicate in advance—particularly for a scenario that is not upon us but that is still hypothetical, we are normally reluctant to engage into specific communications or signaling about what we may or may not do and is in all of these matters of such great consequence we would not want to constrict the President's decision space.

I think I would just say I am completely confident that China knows the depth of our concern and our fundamental national interests at stake in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

I do not think there is any ambiguity on that point.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. For those of us who have sort of worked to try to create the kind of economic structure that I referred to we have encountered the same sort of questions and concerns.

But it is, I think, a topic of continuing conversation.

On the economic coercion piece, and Senator Romney raised this earlier, it is important to have a strategy that goes beyond words. I was pleased to see the G-7 statement—I think it was last year—about the joint declaration against trade related economic coercion and nonmarket policies and practices.

I know the EU has also adopted a law where if a member of the EU, like Lithuania, was to be threatened again by China's economic coercion, that they would have a mechanism in place. That is for the EU.

So my question is, how can we develop an architecture to make that more real? In other words, a lot of these countries, and we talked about Australia. New Zealand has been pressured, Lithuania.

I was in South Korea years ago when they were deploying the THAAD defense system, and China took a lot of measures to make it—to create pain on South Korea's economy.

A lot of these countries, understandably, they are in the region. They have very strong economic ties with China. We have strong economic ties with China.

How do you create a mechanism that says to China, if you engage in economic coercion against one of these partners, we are really going to be there to help address whatever hit their economy takes.

That does require planning and a clear mechanism where we will all come to the assistance of a country that is picked on by China.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree. My colleague, Jose Fernandez, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs at State, he and his team have really been in the lead for us at the State Department in developing our counter economic coercion toolkit, and I think forced by the examples as the ranking member of Australia, Lithuania, and others.

I think we have worked—we worked under duress and a great speed in an urgent situation to come up with various tools, and since learning the lesson of that experience, we have both expanded our toolkit that allows us together with other partners and other international institutions to respond to these incidences of economic coercion, again, in collaboration with other like minded parties.

We have also, I think, increased our capacity to analyze our own vulnerabilities and partners' vulnerabilities to such coercion, and I think we have found through such engagements we can assist partners to assess their own vulnerabilities and then take steps to address those vulnerabilities, and we have also through development of this toolkit, I think, developed some measures we can deploy on short notice.

I think it is absolutely important, and I think it is important to deterrence as well.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Very good.

Senator Merk—Senator Romney.

Senator ROMNEY. We are often confused.

[Laughter.]

Senator ROMNEY. I appreciate the fact that you have given me a heads up on this already today privately that we are going to make progress on the demonstration of the U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China, and again, its intent is to not confront but to help China be dissuaded from a dangerous course and instead be a competitor on the global stage, not an enemy.

But as you know the former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and myself developed legislation, had it passed, that calls upon the State Department to provide to Congress an outline of our China strategy, and some of that would be for Congress as a whole and the public. Some would probably be classified. You have indicated we are about to get that. Is that right?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, Senator. I was informed that, again, consistent with Section 6511 of the fiscal year 2022 NDAA the administration has made available for in camera review the Administration's China strategy.

My understanding is we are in touch with your team to arrange an opportunity for you to review the strategy at your convenience. We are grateful for your leadership and support on this issue, and I think as an entire whole of government we look forward to continuing to partner with you on our strategy vis-à-vis the PRC which is—

Senator ROMNEY. I would note that the law that was passed called for this to be presented to Congress, some in public, and then some classified, as opposed to just an in camera review. So I would expect that the State Department would follow the law as opposed to a different course.

Separately, it is the impression of a number of people—and I do not know whether it is accurate or not, but I would be interested in your sense—that if you go around Africa, everywhere you turn there is China. If you go around Latin America, there is China.

If you go even in the Caribbean, there is China, that they are everywhere. Part of that is Belt and Road. Part of it has been to

secure the raw materials for the economy of the future, and they seem to have done that as we have been asleep at the switch.

Is that a fair assessment that they really are in prominent positions? And I know it is through loans, and we take great pride in saying some people are unhappy that there are loans, but nonetheless, China has—I mean, when you get a loan from the bank you, nonetheless, have a relationship with the banker. When they are getting a loan from China, they have relationship with China.

Have they made inroads in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, and are we woefully behind in those areas?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Well, the first part of your statement, does China have a global presence in many of these regions, absolutely, especially economically.

Are we woefully behind? No, I would absolutely say we are not. I would say, Mr. Ranking Member, again, our approach, whether it is in the Indo-Pacific or Africa or Latin America or elsewhere, we are focused first and foremost on what we stand for, our affirmative strategy in each of these regions.

We always tell our partners we are not asking them to choose between the United States and China, and partners tell us they do not want to choose.

But what they do want is they want to make sure they can make their own decisions free from coercion, they can protect their sovereignty, they can have the final say over matters that are important to their security and prosperity, and that is what we stand for.

So I remain confident in our standing in these regions and what we offer. We do have to offer something, and partners around the world oftentimes say that that is what they most look for from the United States and from others, is an offer.

But again, our fundamental focus is on what we stand for. Now, there are instances, as we have talked about here today, Mr. Ranking Member, where there are some downsides to interaction with the PRC in many cases, and we try to be clear with countries to be careful to ensure that they are not making themselves vulnerable to coercion.

We also try to make sure that partners understand what they are getting into regarding a project—what is the long term potential implication for countries' sovereignty of engaging in one of these projects, especially if it involves a huge debt burden?

What are the labor or the environmental or other implications of some of these projects? That is what we try to stand for, and then we try to stand for what we and our partners offer.

So I am confident in that. But does China have a presence in many regions around the world? Absolutely.

Senator ROMNEY. I would say based on my own limited travels but also in sounding the opinion of diplomats here and others, that China has established a much stronger presence in those nations than they had just a few years ago, and in many cases eclipsing our own.

I would note that we spent billions of dollars, if you will, helping people with charitable endeavors, development opportunities, showing them what we stand for.

China tends to do what is in their self-interest and establishing mines and rail lines and ports that will strengthen their economy, strengthen their position on the global stage.

I think we need to go from just doing things that are humanitarian and showing what we stand for to instead doing things that are actually in our best interest and promote our national security and the strength of our own economy, and that we are pretending like we are in a world where we do not have a competitor, and we do.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will turn back to you, sir.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Ranking Member, could I make just one comment on that?

I mean, I am most familiar with the East Asia Pacific region, obviously, for which my team and I are responsible. But I would say with the support and leadership of Congress, we have been given the tools, I think, to compete in the ways that you are talking about and certainly in Asia partners say all the time, we do not want to choose—we have also got—we have important trading relationships with China like most of us do.

But every country in the region that I talk to says they do not want to be pushed around. They do not want to be coerced. They want to have options. They want to have balance in their approach, and I think our being able to make an offer, hopefully, a better offer to partners is really the key.

And I think especially in the economic side and the infrastructure side, that is where I think the Development Finance Corporation, the tools, the authorities, the finances that Congress has provided have been really transformational, increased support for economic assistance programs across the region in addition to all the other tools that we bring on the security front—the people to people front, health, development, and the like.

But I do agree with you. I certainly feel like in the Indo-Pacific we have been quite successful. I think partners have noticed.

Senator ROMNEY. And I am thinking about the Development Finance Corp, and I know it is designed to deal with the development needs of poor countries and other countries that have humanitarian crises and so forth.

But I would note China invests in things that are going to help China down the road. They try and do good in many respects, but more importantly they are trying to do what is in China's interest and would suggest that we do the same with the DFC.

Thank you.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Senator Merkley.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Assistant Secretary. Pleased to have you here, and Senator Rubio and I have conspired together on a number of pieces of legislation related to Taiwan to increase our connections to Taiwan and try to create a path for Taiwan to be able to participate in more international organizations.

But the question I wanted to start with is over the issue of transnational repression. We have seen China be much more active internationally in terms of how they try to silence dissidents who are abroad—the diaspora who are abroad, not just Chinese citizens,

but also other critics of China, and of course, they would view folks from Taiwan and Hong Kong to be citizens.

And so can you give us a sense of how much of these repressive tactics, things like going up to a person who has been protesting China's policy in one area, and say, we know who you are, and we know your family back in China, or things of that nature. Different strategies of essentially pressure or blackmail, threatening family members who are back in China.

How much of that occurs against Taiwanese citizens who are in the U.S., and how much occurs for Taiwanese in Taiwan?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Senator, it is nice to see you again. Thank you for your important question.

I would say first on the issue of transnational repression writ large, we are deeply concerned by the various actions that we have seen China carry out around the world and even on the ground here in the United States. I think you saw last year there were instances where we discovered that China was operating these so called overseas police stations, these supposedly informal bodies that clearly had official direction, and as you have seen we have taken aggressive law enforcement action against those entities, and you have seen over the last several years taken aggressive law enforcement action, including the arrest and imprisonment of certain Chinese nationals who were here carrying out such activities.

I am less clear, candidly speaking, whether residents of Taiwan or Taiwan friends resident in the United States have been subjected to such intimidation or whether we have seen such activities in Taiwan.

I am not as familiar. What has been most concerning to us, I think, inside Taiwan has been the use of misinformation and disinformation to influence the domestic media market and debate within Taiwan.

But I am happy to take that back and ask that further. I am not as familiar, given the cases that I have worked on. But I will take that back.

But certainly, China has a strategy to intimidate and coerce Taiwan writ large.

Senator MERKLEY. I know of some incidents that occurred in which they harassed and pressured folks in Taiwan—Taiwanese in Taiwan who were outspoken over Hong Kong democracy, and I imagine that is just the tip of the iceberg. But I would be interested in what else we know.

Is there any sort of dialogue between U.S. and the Taiwanese government in regard to how to try to counter either that form of TNR—transnational repression—or economic retaliation?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Certainly, we have a robust set of dialogues with Taiwan counterparts on a range of issues. On the economic side we have the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, again, led by the economic bureau in the State Department that is focused primarily on economic resilience, resilient supply chains, countering economic coercion.

I would say, perhaps, the closest thing that I am aware of and involved in, I was recently involved in the fourth high level dialogue and promoting people to people and educational ties between the United States and Taiwan and we devoted a significant amount

of time for how you counter disinformation and misinformation, and I thought that was quite valuable. But again, on the issue of transnational repression, less clear, but I am happy to take that back.

Senator MERKLEY. I will close with this question, which is a few of us have been very involved in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, sir.

Senator MERKLEY. And there has been a fairly robust response with the United States intercepting shipments and saying, sorry, these do not qualify; these cannot come here. We are hoping for more cooperation from Europe and Canada and Mexico in that regard.

But I have wondered whether we are seeing companies in China where it is very hard for them to certify in any method that has integrity whether or not Uyghur forced labor is involved. We are seeing some of those companies move their operations to Taiwan.

We know that many companies are looking at other locations—Vietnam and so forth. Are we seeing a significant amount of flow of factories from China to Taiwan?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Factories from China to Taiwan that are still engaged in forced labor or—

Senator MERKLEY. No.

Mr. KRITENBRINK [continuing]. Or they are because of our Forced Labor Protection Act?

Senator MERKLEY. No. Actually—saying because the challenge is that there is no—the surveys that are done to certify that you have no forced labor, the problem is the people who answer the surveys are oppressed.

And so we just had a hearing today in the Congressional Executive Commission on China about how difficult, near impossible it is, to operate in Uyghur territory and get any sort of honest clarification, reliable clarification, whether forced labor is involved.

So it is almost a given that if you are going to counter forced labor, you have to move out of Uyghur controlled territories but then also—

Mr. KRITENBRINK. I see.

Senator MERKLEY [continuing]. Teams of Uyghur workers are also brought to other locations in China. It is one of the factors that U.S. companies have been looking at as they are starting to see the risks of operating in China in addition to other risks such as, for example, the theft of intellectual property and partnerships that are turned into a way to steal control of a company.

That is encouraging companies to move operations elsewhere, and I am wondering to what degree those operations are being moved to Taiwan.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. A couple of comments, Senator.

We have certainly seen movement and shifts in supply chains out of China around the region. Certainly, when I was in Vietnam, you saw that phenomenon really accelerate, I think in which many countries and many companies as well were looking to diversify their supply chains for, I think, pretty clear reasons.

Again, less clear how much of that has happened from China to Taiwan. I am happy to take that back. I would also say, though,

on the issues related to the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang or the issues of forced labor in Xinjiang and other Uyghur areas in China, certainly, something we focus on very intently.

We have worked to hold accountable Chinese officials involved in such acts. We have taken action against a total of 80 Chinese individuals and entities.

We have certainly worked with Commerce and Customs and others on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act as well. So it is a deeply disturbing phenomena, and we take it very seriously.

But I will have to take back, Senator, and come back to you on how that might relate to the relocation of companies to Taiwan.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Thank you.

Senator MERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Well, thank you, Senator Merkley, and thank you and Senator Rubio for your work on the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and for raising it here today.

So, Mr. Secretary, I just have a couple questions in closing. Senator Cardin raised the issue of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758, which they used to claim—establishes the PRC's "One China" principle as a matter of international law. You responded to that.

Senator Romney and I have introduced legislation. It is the bill S. 2995 entitled the Taiwan International Solidarity Act, which would essentially make clear the U.S. position on this.

I do not know if you and the Administration have had a chance to review it. But if you have I would be interested in your support. If you have not, we would ask you to take a look at it.

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Mr. Chairman, I have not taken a look at it. I will be honored to do so. Tried to be very clear here that we are deeply concerned about China's misuse of 2758 on a regular basis.

We think it is in our national interest to clarify that for friends around the world.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. And the legislation is, essentially, a statement along those lines but I appreciate your taking a look at it.

The other effort I mentioned in my opening remarks that we have been working on on Capitol Hill is a tax agreement to prevent double taxation between U.S. businesses and businesses in Taiwan as part of strengthening our commercial relationships.

Is the Administration in support of that effort?

Mr. KRITENBRINK. Yes, we are. We think that the double taxation that both American and Taiwan companies have come under, we think hinders our natural and very important trading relationship, and we are supportive of efforts to resolve that.

Senator VAN HOLLEN. Great. I just wanted to get that on the record. I appreciate it, and let me close.

Senator Romney apologized that he had to leave a little bit earlier, but we both really thank you and your team for your service.

Thank you for your testimony here today, but really for your long service to our country and for putting your expertise and knowledge to work at this moment with respect to our relationships with countries in East Asia and the Pacific, and specifically related to today's hearing reinforcing as you have the importance of the fun-

damentals of the Taiwan Relations Act, making it clear what our position is, which is preserving the status quo—not trying to upset the status quo—but making clear we will use all the tools at our disposal to ensure that Taiwan has the ability to defend itself, and that we look forward to continuing strong relations between the people of the United States and the people in Taiwan.

So thank you, and thank your team.

I want to say that for the information of our fellow members, the record will be opened until close of business Wednesday, May 1.

This hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF MERKLEY

Question. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has an expansive idea of who belongs within its purview; the PRC considers citizens of Taiwan as its own, and may harass and threaten Taiwanese critics of Chinese policy accordingly.

Can you assess the degree to which Taiwanese citizens are subject to such acts of transnational repression by the PRC in both the United States and in Taiwan? Are there regular dialogues between the United States and Taiwan on how to counter transnational repression?

Answer. I share your deep concern regarding the PRC’s continued repressive practices, including transnational repression, through which the PRC reaches beyond its own borders to harass, intimidate, threaten, silence, and in some cases, render individuals who are critical of the PRC government. The Department’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in China describes how the PRC government and its agents are engaged in transnational repression against Uyghurs and members of the PRC’s other ethnic minority groups, religious and spiritual practitioners, dissidents, foreign journalists, and PRC students and faculty members on campuses and in academic institutions overseas. PRC activities intended to curtail the freedoms of speech and expression have been found to target people on Taiwan affiliated with groups the CCP has identified as challenging its rule.

Transnational repression is a global concern, therefore we are working closely with our partners and allies to raise awareness and share our efforts and best practices to address transnational repression. We view expanded collaboration with foreign partners, including in multilateral contexts, as an important tool for amplifying U.S. Government and partners’ individual and collective efforts to combat transnational repression. We also continue to support efforts to strengthen civil society and media literacy on Taiwan.

Question. Companies with operations in China have been moving supply chains to other countries due to the certification requirements of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA).

To what extent are supply chains relocating from China to Taiwan specifically, at least partly in response to the UFLPA?

Answer. Implementation of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA) combats the use of forced labor, particularly in the PRC, prevents the importation of goods produced through forced labor into the United States, and has resulted in companies moving their supply chains out of Xinjiang. The law’s impact on the relocation of supply chains to Taiwan is unclear. More generally, the Department of Homeland Security reports evidence of manufacturers moving supply chains out of Xinjiang and away from suppliers that cannot provide evidence of supply chain due diligence.

The United States continues to promote accountability for the PRC’s atrocities and other abuses through a whole-of-government effort and in close coordination with the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners. The Department of State encourages allies and partners to adopt policies and practices aligned with the goals of UFLPA. The Department routinely engages allies, partners, and likeminded governments on the PRC’s state-sponsored forced labor programs. The UFLPA has been successful in preventing thousands of shipments of goods made with forced labor from entering the United States. Department representatives also

regularly encourage their counterparts to enact policies banning goods made with forced labor. For example, we have engaged Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines with a focus on PRC state-sponsored forced labor programs.

RESPONSES OF MR. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MITT ROMNEY

Question. Section 6511 of the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires the president to develop a comprehensive report that details U.S. strategy to counter China (the “China Strategy”). Section 6511(a)(2) and (3) of the fiscal year 2022 NDAA requires the president to submit the China Strategy to Congress in classified form with an unclassified summary no later than 270 days after the president submits to Congress the National Security Strategy.

The National Security Strategy was submitted to Congress on October 12, 2022. The China Strategy required by Section 6511 of the fiscal year 2022 NDAA was due on July 9, 2023—nearly 10 months ago.

You indicated in your testimony before this subcommittee on April 30, 2024 that the China Strategy would be made available for an in-camera review.

Why has the administration only made the China Strategy available for in-camera review instead of following statutorily required procedure to submit the report to Congress?

Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue. Consistent with Section 6511 of the fiscal year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act, the Administration has submitted the China Strategy for review in a classified setting. It is standard practice for the executive branch to submit certain sensitive documents to Congress in this manner.

Question. When will the classified China Strategy and its unclassified summary be submitted to Congress as required by the law?

Answer. The Administration has submitted the China Strategy for review in a classified setting. The Administration publicly articulated its unclassified strategic approach to China through a speech Secretary Blinken gave in May 2022, for which we remain grateful for your support and attendance. In a speech delivered in January 2024, National Security Advisor Sullivan publicly shared how the Administration has worked to implement the strategy. In addition, the State Department, along with other Departments and Agencies, has provided classified briefings to Members of Congress and staff on the Administration’s approach to China. We will remain in close touch with Congress on implementation of the strategy and stand ready to provide a classified briefing for you based on the State Department’s Strategic Framework for the PRC that we developed to help implement the Administration’s China strategy.

Question. Is it correct that the China Strategy has been completed since at least last summer? What has been the reason for the extreme delay in submitting the China Strategy to Congress?

Answer. The Administration undertook a deliberate process to determine the most appropriate means to provide Congress with the Administration’s China strategy. The State Department, along with other Departments and Agencies, has provided classified briefings and explanations to Members of Congress and staff on the Administration’s approach to China. Consistent with past practice by the executive branch, the Administration has submitted the China Strategy for review in a classified setting.