

AMENDMENT NO. _____ Calendar No. _____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 2d Sess.

S. 3360

To require a report on internet freedom in Iran.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Mr. RISCH (for himself, Ms. ROSEN,
and Mr. McCORMICK)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Feasibility Review of
5 Emerging Equipment for Digital Open Media Act” or the
6 “FREEDOM Act”.

7 **SEC. 2. REPORT ON INTERNET FREEDOM IN IRAN.**

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the
9 date of the enactment of the Act, the Secretary of State,
10 in consultation with the Federal Communications Com-
11 mission and the Department of the Treasury, shall pre-
12 pare and submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations

1 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
2 the House of Representatives a report that updates and
3 supplements the report required under section 5124 of the
4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025
5 (22 U.S.C. 8754a).

6 (b) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Up-
7 dates to the strategy required in section 5124 of the Na-
8 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22
9 U.S.C. 8754a), shall also include the following:

10 (1) An assessment of the feasibility of using di-
11 rect-to-cell wireless communications technologies to
12 expand internet access for the people of Iran, includ-
13 ing technical, regulatory, and security consider-
14 ations.

15 (2) An analysis of how drone-based platforms,
16 signal jamming technologies, and related counter-
17 measures could impact the feasibility, security, eco-
18 nomics, and resilience of such direct-to-cell wireless
19 communications.

20 (3) A survey of terrestrial and non-terrestrial
21 telecommunications service providers currently active
22 in Iran, including—

23 (A) whether such providers are state-
24 owned or state-controlled;

1 (B) the extent of foreign participation or
2 investment in such providers; and

3 (C) the implications of such ownership and
4 control for communications freedom and censor-
5 ship.

6 (4) Any other relevant information to assess the
7 opportunities and risks associated with terrestrial
8 and non-terrestrial communications technologies in
9 Iran.

10 (5) An analysis of the effectiveness of low-
11 Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet constellation
12 systems in providing accessible internet to Iranians
13 during the January 2026 Iranian protests, the needs
14 of Iranian civil society in being able to ensure reli-
15 able access to such systems when the Government of
16 Iran cuts access to the internet, existing capabilities
17 of LEO satellite internet constellation systems in
18 circumventing jamming, the per user cost of pro-
19 viding LEO satellite internet constellation systems,
20 and recommendations for technology improvements
21 to LEO satellite internet constellation systems to be
22 able to resist jamming technologies to ensure the
23 Iranian people's access to the global internet. This
24 analysis should also include an assessment of phys-
25 ical and digital security vulnerabilities for LEO sat-

1 elite internet users in Iran and recommendations
2 for how to mitigate those concerns. The analysis and
3 assessment shall have a classified annex.

4 (6) An assessment of the feasibility of including
5 readily available commercial “off-the-shelf” tech-
6 nologies to be eligible for the grant program outlined
7 in section 5124 of the National Defense Authoriza-
8 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a)
9 that—

10 (A) could facilitate unrestricted access to
11 the global internet in Iran;

12 (B) could be integrated into already avail-
13 able commercial technologies that civil society
14 and the people of Iran have access to;

15 (C) could reasonably shield the personal
16 data of users from the Government of Iran; and

17 (D) has some degree of resilience against
18 countermeasures that the Government of Iran
19 could employ when cutting off the global inter-
20 net.

21 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)
22 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include
23 a classified annex.