

AMENDMENT NO.\_\_\_\_\_

Calendar No.\_\_\_\_\_

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

**IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 2d Sess.****S. 3360**

To require a report on internet freedom in Iran.

Referred to the Committee on \_\_\_\_\_ and  
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended  
to be proposed by Mr. RISCH (for himself, Ms. ROSEN,  
and Mr. MCCORMICK)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-  
2 lowing:**3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**4 This Act may be cited as the “Feasibility Review of  
5 Emerging Equipment for Digital Open Media Act” or the  
6 “FREEDOM Act”.**7 SEC. 2. REPORT ON INTERNET FREEDOM IN IRAN.**8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the  
9 date of the enactment of the Act, the Secretary of State,  
10 in consultation with the Federal Communications Com-  
11 mission and the Department of the Treasury, shall pre-  
12 pare and submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations

1 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of  
2 the House of Representatives a report that updates and  
3 supplements the report required under section 5124 of the  
4 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025  
5 (22 U.S.C. 8754a).

6 (b) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Up-  
7 dates to the strategy required in section 5124 of the Na-  
8 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22  
9 U.S.C. 8754a), shall also include the following:

10 (1) An assessment of the feasibility of using di-  
11 rect-to-cell wireless communications technologies to  
12 expand internet access for the people of Iran, includ-  
13 ing technical, regulatory, and security consider-  
14 ations.

15 (2) An analysis of how drone-based platforms,  
16 signal jamming technologies, and related counter-  
17 measures could impact the feasibility, security, eco-  
18 nomics, and resilience of such direct-to-cell wireless  
19 communications.

20 (3) A survey of terrestrial and non-terrestrial  
21 telecommunications service providers currently active  
22 in Iran, including—

23 (A) whether such providers are state-  
24 owned or state-controlled;

1 (B) the extent of foreign participation or  
2 investment in such providers; and

3 (C) the implications of such ownership and  
4 control for communications freedom and censor-  
5 ship.

6 (4) Any other relevant information to assess the  
7 opportunities and risks associated with terrestrial  
8 and non-terrestrial communications technologies in  
9 Iran.

(5) An analysis of the effectiveness of low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet constellation systems in providing accessible internet to Iranians during the January 2026 Iranian protests, the needs of Iranian civil society in being able to ensure reliable access to such systems when the Government of Iran cuts access to the internet, existing capabilities of LEO satellite internet constellation systems in circumventing jamming, the per user cost of providing LEO satellite internet constellation systems, and recommendations for technology improvements to LEO satellite internet constellation systems to be able to resist jamming technologies to ensure the Iranian people's access to the global internet. This analysis should also include an assessment of physical and digital security vulnerabilities for LEO sat-

1       elite internet users in Iran and recommendations  
2       for how to mitigate those concerns. The analysis and  
3       assessment shall have a classified annex.

4               (6) An assessment of the feasibility of including  
5       readily available commercial “off-the-shelf” tech-  
6       nologies to be eligible for the grant program outlined  
7       in section 5124 of the National Defense Authoriza-  
8       tion Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (22 U.S.C. 8754a)  
9       that—

10                       (A) could facilitate unrestricted access to  
11       the global internet in Iran;

12                       (B) could be integrated into already avail-  
13       able commercial technologies that civil society  
14       and the people of Iran have access to;

15                       (C) could reasonably shield the personal  
16       data of users from the Government of Iran; and

17                       (D) has some degree of resilience against  
18       countermeasures that the Government of Iran  
19       could employ when cutting off the global inter-  
20       net.

21               (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (a)  
22       shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include  
23       a classified annex.