

AMENDMENT NO._____

Calendar No._____

Purpose: In the nature of a substitute.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES—119th Cong., 2d Sess.**S. 2222**

To enhance the security, resilience, and protection of critical undersea infrastructure vital to Taiwan's national security, economic stability, and defense, particularly in countering gray zone tactics employed by the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.

Referred to the Committee on _____ and
ordered to be printed

Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE intended
to be proposed by Ms. ROSEN (for herself and Mr. CURTIS)

Viz:

1 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the fol-
2 lowing:

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Critical Undersea In-
5 frastructure Resilience Initiative Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The Government of the People's Republic of
9 China (PRC) has increasingly used gray zone tactics
10 to undermine the security of Taiwan and change the

1 status quo in the Taiwan Strait, including suspected
2 sabotage of undersea cables in and around Taiwan,
3 such as the incidents involving the severing of cables
4 around the Matsu Islands of Taiwan and other key
5 regions in 2023 and 2025.

6 (2) Undersea cables and other critical undersea
7 infrastructure are a primary vulnerability for Tai-
8 wan that could be targeted by the PRC to cripple
9 the communication capabilities of Taiwan in the
10 event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and of
11 broader hybrid warfare tactics. Disruption of critical
12 undersea infrastructure would significantly impact
13 the ability of Taiwan to communicate both domesti-
14 cally and internationally, leading to a breakdown in
15 military, economic, and social functions.

16 (3) The vulnerability of Taiwan to attacks on
17 critical undersea infrastructure has been com-
18 pounded by an increasing number of foreign vessels
19 suspected of involvement in sabotage, including
20 PRC-linked vessels, which pose direct threats to Tai-
21 wan's critical infrastructure.

22 (4) The ability of the PRC to disrupt or dam-
23 age critical undersea infrastructure is a critical ele-
24 ment of its strategy aimed at disrupting Taiwan's
25 military and civil communications and isolating Tai-

1 wan in the event of a blockade, quarantine, or other
2 attempt to force unification with the PRC.

3 (5) Recent activities by foreign adversaries, par-
4 ticularly the PRC, have increased the risk of sabo-
5 tage and disruption to critical undersea infrastruc-
6 ture serving Taiwan and other nations, including—

7 (A) in February 2023, two vessels reg-
8 istered to the PRC severed two undersea cables
9 that effectively cut internet access to the
10 13,000 residents of Taiwan’s Matsu Islands,
11 who had to rely on microwave radio trans-
12 missions to provide limited internet access for
13 50 days until a cable ship was able to complete
14 repairs;

15 (B) in January 2025, Taiwan’s Chunghwa
16 Telecom reported damage to an undersea cable
17 north of Taipei and identified a “suspicious ves-
18 sel” registered as the Shunxin-39 and the Xin
19 Shun-39, which had traveled in a criss-cross
20 pattern while dragging its anchor near where
21 the cable was damaged;

22 (C) in January 2025, a Mongolia-flagged
23 vessel named the Baoshun was driven away by
24 Taiwan’s coast guard after suspicious move-
25 ments off the coast of New Taipei; and

(D) in February 2025, Taiwan's coast guard detained the Togo-flagged Hong Tai 58 near Taiwan's Penghu Islands after an under-sea cable in the area was severed, with the captain later admitting to dropping the ship's anchor in the area and that he "might have broken the cable".

17 (7) The sabotage of critical undersea infrastruc-
18 ture constitutes gray zone tactics designed to desta-
19 bilize and undermine international security while
20 falling short of direct military confrontation.

21 (8) Several regional mechanisms have been es-
22 tablished to bolster the security of undersea cables,
23 including the Nordic Warden initiative for maritime
24 domain awareness and the Quad Partnership for
25 Cable Connectivity and Resilience, aimed at enhanc-

1 ing the security and resilience of undersea cables in
2 the Indo-Pacific.

3 (9) Taiwan is the world's 21st largest economy
4 by purchasing power parity and deeply integrated in
5 the global information and communications tech-
6 nology supply chain. Any restrictions to its internet
7 connectivity or energy security would have a direct
8 impact on the world's economy.

9 (10) To counter the threats described in this
10 section and safeguard the resilience of Taiwan, it is
11 imperative for the United States and its allies to
12 take decisive action to bolster Taiwan's defenses for
13 critical undersea infrastructure and foster inter-
14 national cooperation to protect those critical assets.

15 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

16 In this section:

17 (1) CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE.—
18 The term “critical undersea infrastructure”
19 means—

20 (A) subsea energy infrastructure, including
21 a subsea cable, pipeline, or other equipment in-
22 stalled on, beneath, or within the seabed, to
23 transmit electricity (including via subsea elec-
24 tricity cables, subsea electricity transformers, or
25 equipment related to the support of offshore en-

5 (B) subsea telecommunications infrastruc-
6 ture, including subsea fiber-optic cables and re-
7 lated equipment installed on, beneath, or within
8 the seabed, and used to transmit communica-
9 tions, data, voice, video, or other electronic sig-
10 nals, as well as associated landing stations and
11 facilities.

18 SEC. 4. TAIWAN CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE 19 RESILIENCE INITIATIVE.

20 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 360 days after
21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of
22 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the
23 Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the
24 Coast Guard, and such other heads of agencies as the Sec-
25 retary of State considers relevant, shall establish an initia-

1 tive to be known as the “Taiwan Critical Undersea Infra-
2 structure Initiative” (in this section referred to as the
3 “Initiative”).

4 (b) PRIORITY.—The Initiative shall prioritize the pro-
5 tection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure
6 near Taiwan, with a focus on countering threats from the
7 PRC.

8 (c) KEY FOCUS AREAS.—

9 (1) ADVANCED MONITORING AND DETECTION
10 CAPABILITIES.—In carrying out the Initiative, the
11 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Sec-
12 retary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of
13 Defense, shall develop and deploy advanced critical
14 undersea infrastructure monitoring systems capable
15 of detecting disruptions or potential sabotage in
16 real-time, including by informing Taiwan, as appro-
17 priate, of early warnings about risks to Taiwan’s
18 critical undersea infrastructure from global intel-
19 ligence networks.

20 (2) RAPID RESPONSE PROTOCOLS.—

21 (A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-
22 tiative, the Secretary of State shall—
23 (i) in cooperation with regional part-
24 ners, establish rapid response protocols for

9 (B) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA-
10 TIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated
11 \$20,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2027
12 through 2032 to carry out subparagraph (A).

13 (3) ENHANCING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARE-
14 NESS.—In carrying out the Initiative—

15 (A) the Secretary of the Navy and the
16 Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collabora-
17 tion with the Coast Guard of Taiwan and re-
18 gional partners, shall enhance maritime domain
19 awareness around Taiwan, focusing on the abil-
20 ity to detect and interdict suspicious vessels or
21 activities near critical undersea infrastructure;
22 and

23 (B) the Commandant of the Coast Guard
24 shall assist in joint patrols and surveillance,
25 particularly in the Taiwan Strait and sur-

1 rounding maritime zones, to monitor potential
2 threats and prevent sabotage.

3 (4) INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PRO-
4 TECTION.—

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—In carrying out the Ini-
6 tiative, the Secretary of State shall seek to es-
7 tablish cooperative frameworks with regional
8 and global partners to protect undersea cable
9 networks near Taiwan.

10 (B) ELEMENTS.—The frameworks estab-
11 lished under subparagraph (A) shall provide for
12 participation by the United States in joint
13 drills, intelligence-sharing platforms, and col-
14 laborative surveillance operations to enhance
15 collective security against sabotage.

16 (5) TAIWAN-SPECIFIC CABLE HARDENING.—In
17 carrying out the Initiative, the Secretary of State
18 shall encourage and support the hardening of critical
19 undersea infrastructure near Taiwan, including rein-
20 forcing cables, improving burial depths, and using
21 more resilient materials to reduce vulnerability to
22 natural disasters and sabotage.

23 **SEC. 5. COUNTERING PRC GRAY ZONE TACTICS.**

24 (a) WORKING WITH PARTNERS TO COUNTER PRC
25 SABOTAGE.—The President shall work with like-minded

1 international partners to implement strategies that di-
2 rectly counter the Government of the PRC's critical under-
3 sea infrastructure sabotage activities as part of its gray
4 zone warfare, including by increasing diplomatic pressure
5 on the PRC to adhere to international norms regarding
6 the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

7 (b) RAISING AWARENESS.—The President shall work
8 with like-minded international partners to raise global
9 awareness of the risks posed by the PRC's sabotage of
10 critical undersea infrastructure, including through public
11 diplomacy efforts, information sharing, and participation
12 in international forums that address gray zone tactics and
13 the protection of critical undersea infrastructure.

14 **SEC. 6. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO**
15 **CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE SAB-**
16 **OTAGE.**

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President, in coordination
18 with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the
19 Treasury, shall impose the sanctions described in sub-
20 section (c) with respect to any foreign person that the
21 President determines, on or after the date of the enact-
22 ment of this Act, is responsible for acts of sabotage, or
23 facilitates acts of sabotage, against undersea infrastruc-
24 ture critical to the security of Taiwan or other United
25 States allies or partners, including—

3 (A) commits acts of sabotage; or

4 (B) conducts preparatory surveillance,
5 logistical support, security, or other services
6 that facilitate or enable an act of sabotage; and

7 (2) any foreign person that knowingly—

10 (B) provides underwriting services or in-
11 surance or reinsurance necessary for such a
12 vessel or entity;

13 (C) facilitates deceptive or structured
14 transactions to support such a vessel or entity;

15 (D) provides port or logistics services or
16 facilities for technology upgrades or installation
17 of equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of,
18 such a vessel for the purpose of evading sanc-
19 tions;

20 (E) provides documentation, registration,
21 or flagging services for such a vessel for the
22 purpose of evading sanctions; or

23 (F) serves as a captain, principal officer,
24 or senior leader of such a vessel or entity.

1 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 15 days
2 after imposing sanctions with respect to a foreign person
3 under subsection (a), the President shall submit to the ap-
4 propriate congressional committees a report that includes
5 a detailed justification for the imposition of the sanctions.

6 (c) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de-
7 scribed in this subsection are the following:

8 (1) BLOCKING OF PROPERTY.—The President
9 shall exercise all of the powers granted by the Inter-
10 national Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
11 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block
12 and prohibit all transactions in all property and in-
13 terests in property of a foreign person described in
14 subsection (a), if such property and interests in
15 property are in the United States, come within the
16 United States, or are or come within the possession
17 or control of a United States person.

18 (2) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR
19 PAROLE.—

20 (A) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.—An
21 alien described in subsection (a) shall be—
22 (i) inadmissible to the United States;
23 (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other
24 documentation to enter the United States;
25 and

1 (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted
2 or paroled into the United States or to re-
3 ceive any other benefit under the Immigra-
4 tion and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et
5 seq.).

6 (B) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

12 (ii) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A revoca-
13 tion under clause (i) shall—

14 (I) take effect immediately; and
15 (II) automatically cancel any
16 other valid visa or entry documenta-
17 tion that is in the possession of the
18 alien

19 (d) IMPLEMENTATION: PENALTIES —

10 (e) EXCEPTIONS.—

(B) to carry out or assist authorized law enforcement activity in the United States.

16 (B) GOOD DEFINED.—In this paragraph,
17 the term “good” means any article, natural or
18 manmade substance, material, supply or manu-
19 factured product, including inspection and test
20 equipment, and excluding technical data.

21 (f) NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS WAIVER.—The
22 President may waive the application of sanctions under
23 this section if, before issuing the waiver, the President
24 submits to the appropriate congressional committees—

4 (2) a report explaining the basis for the certifi-
5 cation.

6 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

12 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT-
13 TEES.—The term “appropriate congressional com-
14 mittees” means—

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
19 the Committee on Financial Services of the
20 House of Representatives

24 (4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
25 “United States person” means—

1 (A) any United States citizen or an alien
2 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to
3 the United States;

8 (C) any person in the United States

9 SEC. 7 SEMIANNUAL REPORT

10 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact-
11 ment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter through
12 2032, the President shall submit to Congress a report de-
13 tailing—

14 (1) any incidents of interference or sabotage re-
15 lated to critical undersea infrastructure near Tai-
16 wan; and

17 (2) any actions taken in response to such inci-
18 dents

19 SEC. 8. INTERAGENCY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR
20 CROSS-STRAIT CRISIS.

21 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the
22 United States to be prepared for potential crises involving
23 Taiwan, including an attempt by the People's Republic of
24 China (PRC) to change the status quo by force, through
25 comprehensive interagency contingency planning that ad-

1 dresses the catastrophic risks such crises would pose to
2 the national security of the United States.

3 (b) CROSS-STRAIT CONTINGENCY PLANNING

4 GROUP.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
7 shall establish a Cross-Strait Contingency Planning
8 Group—

9 (A) to be chaired by the National Security
10 Council; and

11 (B) consisting of senior officials from the
12 Department of State, the Department of De-
13 fense, the United States intelligence commu-
14 nity, and such other Federal agencies as may
15 be appropriate.

16 (2) FUNCTIONS.—The Cross-Strait Contingency
17 Planning Group shall—

18 (A) conduct scenario-based planning exer-
19 cises to prepare for potential crises involving
20 Taiwan, including blockade or quarantine sce-
21 narios, the seizure of an outlying island, mili-
22 tary contingencies, economic coercion, cyber at-
23 tacks, and hybrid threats;

24 (B) identify critical vulnerabilities in sup-
25 ply chains, financial systems, critical infrastruc-

5 (C) develop integrated contingency plans
6 that coordinate diplomatic, military, economic,
7 cyber, and homeland security responses across
8 the Group;

9 (D) assess the adequacy of existing au-
10 thorities, resources, and decision-making proc-
11 esses to execute such contingency plans;

12 (E) identify gaps in capabilities, authori-
13 ties, or coordination mechanisms and rec-
14 ommend solutions;

15 (F) share risk assessments with allies and
16 partners of the United States, as appropriate;
17 and

18 (G) regularly test and refine contingency
19 plans.

1 (A) a description of contingency scenarios
2 assessed and planning activities conducted by
3 the Group;

4 (B) an assessment of the preparedness of
5 the United States and allies and partners of the
6 United States to respond to a crisis involving
7 Taiwan, including identification of capability
8 gaps and resource requirements;

9 (C) recommendations for legislative action,
10 policy changes, or resource allocation to en-
11 hance such preparedness; and

12 (D) a description of exercises conducted
13 and lessons learned by the Group.