THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN
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Tactics v. Strategy

It is fitting that this Committee—the Foreign Relations Committee—is holding this hearing. As I reflect on my own role and the role of many who tried just as hard to keep us safe after 9/11, we got many of the tactics right but the strategy wrong. We have yet to develop a narrative, a positive-sum roadmap for where we are going and why others will benefit by joining with us.

Retired General Stanley McChrystal—former head of Special Operations Command and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—recently nailed it. In an interview in *Foreign Affairs* on Iraq and Afghanistan, he first asked "Where is the enemy?" As the engagement evolved, he asked "Who is the enemy?" Then, "What is the enemy trying to do?" Finally, he realized the question we most needed to answer was: "Why is he the enemy?"

This realization is bone-chilling. Many senior policymakers know we cannot kill our way to victory—because kinetics alone are more likely to inflame than persuade. But what is the US doing to persuade? Are we coordinated in our actions? Are we delivering the same message?

Our tactics have an impact—and playing whack-a-mole will not win the argument with the kid in rural Syria or Yemen deciding whether or not to strap on a suicide vest.

Evolution of the Threat

How has the threat evolved over time? We all know that what once was a highly centralized structure—core al Qaeda leadership—has been decimated. But, rather than disappear, it has morphed into a decentralized horizontal organization—composed mainly of so-called "affiliates."

Our adversaries—many of them young, digital natives—have spent the past few years—while the US focused on eliminating core leadership—building up their propaganda elements and their recruiting shop. Smaller-scale, easier to accomplish attacks are now the name of the game—in an effort to cause as much chaos as possible.

Inspire magazine is back online and as savvy as ever. Extremist digital natives have created a "Muslim Mali" computer game that simulates aerial combat against French fighter jets, and is designed to inspire fellow extremists to take up arms against the French. Once a user clicks "play," an Arabic message appears with the words, "Muslim Brother, go ahead and repel the French invasion against Muslim Mali."

These digital natives can sit in their homes or computer cafes anywhere in the world. What really keeps me up at night? That this generation will turn to cyber attacks—even small ones, because the information is sitting right at their fingertips. Let me be clear: the US is <u>not</u> just

facing Chinese hackers seeking ballistic missile blueprints or Russian hackers trying to steal credit card numbers. We also face non-state actors who have drunk the al Qaeda Kool-Aid.

The Next Ten Years

Despite astonishing adaptation since 9/11—including a massive reform of the Intelligence Community, in which I played a fairly big role—Uncle Sam is <u>still</u> built for yesterday's threats.

So, what do we do?

Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation says: "The trick… is to apprehend or otherwise deal with [the] residual threat without creating a chain of events that renews motivations for participation and support."

Here are my recommendations:

1. *Stop piecemeal counterterrorism policy & implementation*

   - Stop stovepiped, one-off CT efforts and create a whole of Government strategy. Excuses about bureaucratic inertia and the number of people involved should not stop us from doing what is necessary. This includes our cyber defenses.

   - Give the Department of State's CT Bureau more support to do its job. The Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Countering Violent Extremism grants, and coordinating efforts through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications are all important but just not enough. A more robust CT Bureau could help us better find gaps in our non-kinetic efforts and fill them.

2. *Smarter investments*

   - Carefully analyze the foreign aid budgets and find ways to plus up funds to the countries that need it most—and resist funding for the flavor-of-the-month countries. Foreign aid is in many cases the only leverage we have—and should have serious strings attached. This will also be a very difficult task—and requires a clear, reasoned message to the American people about why such targeted investments are necessary for the US. Secretary of State John Kerry has urged similar efforts as has a senior Republican Senator.

3. *Live our values*

   - Our actions really do speak louder than words. It should be no wonder that the semantics America used in the past—when extra judicial kidnapping became 'rendition,' torture became 'enhanced interrogation,' and assassination became 'targeted killing'—only fueled the terror propaganda machine. We have a perception problem.

- We must apply a matrix of our interests and our values, and test against it our future engagements. Then we stand a better chance at defeating the negative narrative being created about us. That means paying more than lip service to privacy protections, and considering legal protections, especially regarding "Big Data." Trying more terror suspects in US federal courts—like Sulaiman Abu Ghaith—is also the right move.

- We need a public conversation about tactics and strategy, and Congress should legislate clear limits. Self-policing by the Executive Branch was wrong in the Bush 43 Administration, and is wrong now. I have recently suggested that FISA could be adapted to cover drones and offensive cyber.

4. *Reduce overclassification of intelligence*

- Far too much information is classified. Instead of safeguarding our secrets, we are actually preventing ourselves from seeing the bigger threat picture. If we can't see all the "dots" of intelligence, how could we hope to get ahead of future threats?

5. *Drain the swamp*

- As Wilson Center Scholar Aaron David Miller suggests, we will reduce the pool of potential terrorists by encouraging reform efforts by authoritarian governments. Secretary Kerry's efforts to persuade the Egyptians to move forward with reforms are an example of what we need more of.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I urge this Committee to play a major role in developing this overdue strategy. After all, it is foreign relationships—not more foreign enemies—that we need.