

Iran Nuclear Compliance Act of 2013 (INCA): Key Provisions

Why Congress Should Act

- The interim deal reached in Geneva with Iran weakens the leverage necessary for a strong final deal, legitimizes Iran's enrichment activities, and provides Iran more time to further develop its nuclear weapons program.
- Congress must now reject any guarantee of enrichment, while ensuring the interim deal is strictly enforced and does not become the *de facto* final deal.
- Because the interim agreement provides Iran relief from current sanctions, not new sanctions, any Iran legislation must include provisions that restrict further sanctions relief and set the basic conditions for an appropriate final deal.

Enforcing International Agreements with Iran

- INCA would enforce the interim (or final) agreement by requiring the president to reinstate all sanctions relief within 15 days of receiving credible and accurate information that Iran is not fully complying with the agreement.
 - INCA would also require a snapback of all sanctions relief if Iran does not comply with all appropriate IAEA inspection requests.
- This snapback would apply to all relief provided by the president to Iran—whether provided prior to or after INCA—and whether provided by waiver, suspension, or any other type of sanctions reduction.
- INCA aims to protect existing sanctions and is compatible with bipartisan efforts to impose additional sanctions.

Preventing the Interim Agreement from Becoming the Final Agreement

- INCA prevents the interim agreement from becoming a virtual final deal by requiring a full snapback of all sanctions relief after eight months in the absence of an appropriate final deal.
 - INCA provides the president 60 days to negotiate an interim deal and a further 180 days—as he has requested—to make an appropriate final deal.
 - Upon expiration of that 240 day period—in the absence of an appropriate final deal—all sanctions relief provided to Iran must be immediately and fully reinstated.

Setting Basic Conditions for a Final Deal

- Given the P5+1 achieved only limited concessions from Iran in the interim agreement, INCA sets the following minimum conditions for any final agreement:
 - full suspension of all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities;
 - full suspension of all heavy-water (plutonium-related) activities;
 - a cessation of all construction of uranium enrichment and heavy-water facilities;
 - full compliance with the IAEA's monitoring and inspection activities;
 - full access to certain military nuclear-related facilities;
 - full suspension of ballistic missile and nuclear delivery activities;
 - a full accounting of all nuclear weaponization activities; and
 - full suspension of all nuclear weaponization activities.
- These conditions—all but two of which are required by six U.N. Security Council resolutions—are necessary minimum requirements for any final agreement.
- INCA therefore establishes a basic starting point for a comprehensive and durable arrangement that fully and verifiably terminates Iran's nuclear weapons program.