



Statement By

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Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today to share my views on the improvised explosive device (IED) challenge in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

In February 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officially established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to focus on the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan. JIEDDO's mission, as defined by DOD Directive 2000.19E, "is to focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence."¹ JIEDDO is singularly focused on the IED threat and exists to rapidly field capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of this asymmetric weapon.

IED Challenge

The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs and attacking these threat networks cannot be overstated. During the past two years in Afghanistan, IED events increased 80 percent, from 9,300 in 2009 to 16,800 in 2011. Even though IED events are down 8 percent this year, there have been nearly 14,500 IED events in 2012.

IEDs remain the leading cause of civilian, military and law enforcement casualties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. More than 60 percent of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan, both killed and wounded in action, are a result of IEDs. This year, 1,874 U.S. casualties have been caused by IEDs. It is important to note, this threat is not exclusive to Afghanistan. Pakistan has a significant and growing IED challenge that threatens its own soldiers and populace. As of November 2012, there have been more than 926 IED attacks inside Pakistan, resulting in an excess of 3,700 casualties.² Recently, on November 21 in Quetta, a Pakistani military vehicle was targeted by a vehicle-borne IED, resulting in the deaths of three Pakistani soldiers and one civilian. The deadliest attack in Pakistan in nearly five months occurred in Rawalpindi on November 22, where a person-borne IED killed 23 and wounded more than 62 people participating in a Shiite Muslim procession. The threats posed by IEDs and the threat networks

¹ *Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization*, Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.19E (14 Feb. 2006), para 4.

² Worldwide IED Database, Institute for Defense Analysis, 1 Jan. 2012 through 13 Nov 2012

are areas of joint concern for both the U.S. and Pakistan and with the improvement in bilateral relations since July, there has been increased cooperation.

Fertilizer-based explosives still remain our greatest challenge in Afghanistan. Today, more than 85 percent of IEDs employed against coalition forces are homemade explosives (HME), and of those, about 70 percent are made with ammonium nitrate derived from calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) — a common agricultural fertilizer produced in, and/or transited through, Pakistan. CAN is produced by two factories in Pakistan, with a total production capacity of 870,000 metric tons annually, but did not reach production capacity in 2011. An estimated 200 tons of CAN was used to make IEDs in Afghanistan this year. Despite a countrywide ban on the importation of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers by the Government of Afghanistan, this HME precursor continues to be the main charge in the majority of IEDs in that country.

While ammonium nitrate continues to be the most prominent main charge in HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan, the use of potassium chlorate by insurgents has increased for 12 straight months. Potassium chlorate is now the main charge in 23 percent of exploited IEDs, up from 13 percent a year ago. Insurgents perceive potassium chlorate as being a more effective explosive. Potassium chlorate, which is also banned for importation by the government of Afghanistan, is legally imported by Pakistan for legitimate use in the textile and matchstick industries. It is illegally sold to or stolen by insurgents for use as HME material.

A critical piece to any IED is the initiator, a small, sensitive primary explosive device generally used to detonate a larger, more-powerful and less-sensitive secondary explosive. One type of initiator commonly used is the blasting cap. Pakistani law requires companies who produce blasting caps to sell their products only to entities holding an explosives permit, such as construction or mining companies. Despite this fact, military forces are recovering these products on the battlefield in Afghanistan. Curbing the supply of blasting caps to insurgents in Afghanistan can help reduce the number of IED events in Afghanistan, and I believe this is an important area of future engagement with the government of Pakistan.

The continued flow of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers and other IED materials from Pakistan and smuggled into Afghanistan is a crucial area we continue to address in concert with our Pakistani partners. This is evident by the growing record seizures by coalition forces in

Afghanistan. During the past year, coalition forces have seized more than 444 tons of HME precursor materials, an increase of 16 percent since last year. This includes more than 341 tons of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizer and 37 tons of potassium chlorate. The high number of IED incidents and seizure rates highlights the continued lack of effective measures to impede the supply of IED materials into Afghanistan from Pakistan. In Afghanistan, we are playing defense.

Industry

In 2011, I engaged the producers of CAN in Pakistan to request their commitment in countering the illicit use of fertilizer as an explosive through the implementation of a dye program and instituting effective control and tracking measures. Additionally, I also engaged the International Fertilizer Association and the global fertilizer community to urge their commitment in developing a whole-of-industry approach to: implement a universal dye program; explore non-detonable substitutes for ammonium nitrate; institute effective industry-wide standards, regulations and safeguards regarding the production and distribution of nitrogen-based fertilizer; and produce a global education and awareness campaign.

Professional fertilizer associations are receptive and actively addressing these issues. The International Fertilizer Association has engaged its global membership with the establishment of a new product security task force to create momentum within the industry on the important issue of fertilizer misuse. Efforts continue to establish effective and adequate measures to secure CAN. The producers of CAN in Pakistan made minor packaging and marketing changes, but has yet to establish an effective tracking process to monitor and account for the distribution of the product. To date, measures taken by industry or government have minimal impact on the HME flow into Afghanistan.

Government of Pakistan

During the past few years, our cooperation on the IED challenge with Pakistan has had mixed results. While much work remains, Pakistani authorities now acknowledge their slow start in the counter-IED fight and have realized IEDs are not just a threat to ISAF but to Pakistan as well. The government of Pakistan has taken some actions to address IED threat, mostly focused on Pakistan's domestic challenge, thus having limited effect on the number of IED events in

Afghanistan or on the flow of HME precursor materials smuggled across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. However, dialogue between the United States and the government of Pakistan on IED-related issues has been improving, as evident by recent engagements such as the Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Working Group in October 2012 and the Defense Consultative Group meeting in December 2012. It is essential we continue to increase cooperation to address the illicit use and trafficking of HME and dual-use materials and the threat networks trafficking and employing IEDs on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

In June 2011, the government of Pakistan adopted a national counter-IED strategy to prevent the smuggling of CAN and other precursors out of the country; build Pakistan's counter-IED capacity through equipping and training; launch a vigorous counter-IED public awareness campaign; and modify and strengthen existing legislative framework on terrorism and explosives. This is a very positive step. The implementation plan, developed by Pakistan's Directorate General for Civil Defense, has designated the Pakistani Army the lead for counter-IED efforts. While these steps sound substantial, Pakistan has not resourced this strategy to the level we see as necessary.

Effective and enforceable regulations and border controls are necessary and essential to mitigating this shared threat and these measures can be effective. This has proven effective in other countries that have recently implemented regulations on ammonium nitrate and are seeing results. We recognize and appreciate the actions of the government of Pakistan to ban the exportation of products such as CAN; however, the porous borders, lack of enforcement in border regions and the high economic incentive to smuggle HME precursors will continue to render these efforts ineffective. The improved border coordination enabled by the tripartite border control standard operating procedure agreement, signed by the U.S., Pakistan and Afghanistan in November, and the ongoing discussion on the development of a comprehensive border security strategy are steps in the right direction.

The government of Pakistan recently approved the Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2012, amending the 1997 Anti-terrorism Act. This new legislation strengthens the provisions of the 1997 act by covering all aspects of financing terrorism including provisions on freezing, seizing and forfeiture of assets and properties of those involved in financing terrorism. This is a very

positive step and an area of critical importance. I would like to commend the government of Pakistan for taking action against several individuals involved in IED facilitation networks and urge their commitment to take action against others. Now, in accordance with this law, the government of Pakistan should take action to fully enforce United National Security Council sanctions against designated personnel.

Countering the IED threat and the networks operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border requires a strong partnership between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S. government needs to provide the government of Pakistan with actionable information on targets of mutual interest, and in turn, the government of Pakistan must act on the information.

To be a partner in the fight against IEDs and threat networks, the government of Pakistan must continue to expand cooperation with international partners to detain these individuals and share the critical intelligence needed to address these threat networks who endanger both their country and NATO forces and civilians in Afghanistan. We stand ready to partner with Pakistan to tackle this mutual threat.

Pakistan Military

Last year, the government of Pakistan committed to a military-to-military cooperation framework regarding the IED issue. This is an area where we must move beyond talking about cooperation to developing a comprehensive cooperation framework and take action to address this shared problem.

The DOD, through the Office of Defense Representative–Pakistan, the United Kingdom and Pakistan have partnered to train and equip Pakistan’s law enforcement and security forces in counter-IED and attack-the-network tactics and techniques to build Pakistan’s capacity to find, disrupt and exploit IEDs, components and threat networks through advanced search, IED disruption and explosive scene investigation. The international community has provided specialized equipment and training in all of these areas. We can and must work together to dissect the IED supply chain to go after the nefarious actors and threat networks operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This is the decisive course of action and a critical area for cooperation between the United States, Pakistan and international community.

U.S. Government Efforts

JIEDDO and DOD respond to the IED problem from the military perspective, but we have increasingly recognized the requirement for interagency cooperation and cooperation with foreign governments is as essential in addressing this complex issue.

Today, JIEDDO is working with an expanded community of action that did not exist previously to put pressure on these IED networks. We have established an interagency forum, co-chaired by JIEDDO, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, consisting of U.S. intelligence and interagency partners, federal law enforcement, key allies (United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) and our commanders in Afghanistan to achieve a more effective effort to disrupt threat networks employing IEDs against U.S. and coalition forces.

We recognize no single government department or international partner has the ability to fully limit access to IED precursors, so we are integrating our efforts to go after the threat networks distributing these materials. Our U.S. government partners bring expertise in defeating and prosecuting criminal networks; applying financial pressures by going after the assets of IED network members, financiers and distributors; enacting export controls and treaty compliance efforts that lead to the interdiction of IED components; advancing counter-IED objectives through public diplomacy and regulatory changes; advising on legitimate agricultural requirements; and coordinating and executing national counter-IED policy efforts outside of declared combat zones through the interagency Joint Program Office for Countering IEDs. This is by no means a comprehensive list of the actions our interagency partners are applying to the counter-IED fight, but it should give an idea of the collaboration occurring on all levels.

For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 152 persons to the Entity List because of IED-related matters. This designation stops U.S. companies from trading with these entities — companies, organizations, persons — who violated U.S. export laws. The U.S. Department of Treasury has imposed economic sanctions on 51 Afghanistan-Pakistan-based terrorist and their supporters since October 2010, two specifically for IED-related matters. One of Treasury's designees, Taliban financier Haji Mohammed Qasim, was arrested by Afghan and coalition security forces in Logar province on November 30, 2012. As of December 2012, the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security Investigations' Global Shield Program, operating under the auspice of the World Custom's Organization, has produced 42 enforcement actions and 49 seizures totaling 140.67 metric tons of explosive precursor chemicals. Through coordinated efforts and strong partnership across the U.S. government and with our international partners, the counter-IED community is going after these nefarious actors and effectively countering the networks that use IEDs. Maintaining this momentum against an adaptive threat requires the continued focus of the intelligence community to build a common intelligence picture. The increasingly interlinked challenges we face demands integrated and synchronized efforts. We cannot go back to a stove-piped approach to address present day threats.

Closing

The challenge of interdicting this HME threat is considerable and must be addressed using a comprehensive approach, applying a range of assets in close partnership with our allies and other countries in the region to include Pakistan. This is a common threat and an area where the United States and Pakistan can continue to grow our cooperation.

Just as the IED supply chain is not limited by national borders, the counter-IED response cannot be limited to the interdiction of HME precursor materials in Afghanistan. Success against the supply of HME precursor materials is essential to reduce the effect of IEDs on our forces, as well as on government personnel and civilians in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While the U.S. government is unified and is taking action, we cannot solve this HME challenge without our regional partners like Pakistan — government, military and industry alike.

Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee, again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your questions.